

Abstract

Pursuing climate justice is one of the main challenges in the creation of international and domestic climate change policies. The reason for this is the subjective nature of the concept of climate justice, since what is perceived to be just by one, could be perceived to be unjust by others. By comparing the perceptions and translations of a Global North country's government, the federal government of Canada, with the translations and perceptions of Global South country's government, the government of Trinidad and Tobago, on the subject of climate justice, this thesis aims to provide the reader with a better understanding how climate justice can manifest itself in climate change policies. A discourse analysis has been conducted to uncover both national governments' climate justice perceptions and translations. During the analysis and comparison of the climate justice discourse of both national governments, the researcher discovered that not so much the perceptions of climate justice differ, but rather what perception the national governments' choose to focus on in its translations of the concept of climate justice into climate change policies. Their difference in focus can be explained by looking at the contexts in which both governments operate in and this difference in focus alludes to the notion that pursuing climate justice is a 'luxury need'.

Keywords: Climate justice, perceptions, translations, responsibility, vulnerability, abatement

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations.....	4
Chapter 1 Introduction.....	5
1.1 <i>Topic and Motivation</i>	5
1.2 <i>Objective</i>	6
1.3 <i>Research Question</i>	6
1.4 <i>Scientific Relevance</i>	6
1.5 <i>Societal Relevance</i>	7
1.6 <i>Reading Guide</i>	8
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework	9
2.1 <i>Introduction</i>	9
2.2 <i>From Environmental Concerns to Climate Concerns</i>	9
2.3 <i>Climate Change Politics</i>	10
2.3.1 <i>The Emergence of International Climate Change Discussions and Policies</i>	10
2.3.2 <i>Climate Change Policy Strategies</i>	11
2.4 <i>Climate Justice</i>	11
2.4.1 <i>Emergence of Climate Justice</i>	11
2.4.2. <i>Defining Climate Justice</i>	12
2.4.3 <i>International Attempts at Pursuing Climate Justice</i>	13
2.4.4 <i>Operationalisation of Climate Justice</i>	14
Chapter 3 Methodology	17
3.1 <i>Introduction</i>	17
3.2 <i>Research Design</i>	17
3.3 <i>Research Strategy</i>	17
3.3.1 <i>Climate Justice Discourse Analysis Approach</i>	19
3.3.3 <i>Research Validity and Reliability</i>	20
3.4 <i>Justification of the Research Frameworks</i>	21
3.4.1 <i>Selection of Cases</i>	21
3.4.2. <i>Justification of the Timeframe</i>	23
3.4.3 <i>Justification of the Selection of the Empirical Documents</i>	24
Chapter 4 The Federal Government of Canada’s approach to climate justice.....	25
4.1 <i>Introduction</i>	25
4.2 <i>Perceptions of the Responsibility Dimension</i>	25
4.2.1 <i>Translations of the Responsibility Dimension</i>	28
4.3 <i>Perceptions of the Vulnerability Dimension</i>	29
4.3.1 <i>Translation of the Vulnerability Dimension</i>	30
4.4 <i>Perceptions on the Abatement Dimension</i>	33
4.4.1 <i>Translation of the Abatement Dimension</i>	35
4.5 <i>Summary of the Federal Government of Canada’s Approach to Climate Justice</i>	36

Chapter 5 The Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s Approach to Climate Justice.....	38
5.1 <i>Introduction</i>	38
5.2 <i>Perceptions of the Responsibility Dimension</i>	38
5.2.1 Translation of the Responsibility Dimension.....	40
5.3 <i>Perceptions of the Vulnerability Dimension</i>	41
5.3.1 Translation of the Vulnerability Dimension.....	42
5.4 <i>Perceptions of the Abatement Dimension</i>	44
5.4.1 Translation of the Abatement Dimension.....	46
5.5 <i>Summary of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s Approach to Climate Justice</i>	47
Chapter 6 Conclusions.....	49
6.1 <i>Introduction</i>	49
6.2 <i>Comparing the Cases</i>	49
6.2.1 Comparison of the Countries Regarding the Climate Justice Dimension of Responsibility.....	49
6.2.2 Comparison of the Countries Regarding the Climate Justice Dimension of Vulnerability	49
6.2.3 Comparison of the Countries Regarding the Climate Justice Dimension of Abatement	50
6.3 <i>Discussion</i>	50
6.3.1 Theoretical Discussion	50
6.3.2 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research.....	52
6.4 <i>Conclusion</i>	53
References	55

List of Abbreviations

CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CCDRMF	Canada Caribbean Disaster Risk Management Fund
COP	Conference of the Parties
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GoRTT	Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
CNG	Compressed National Gas
EIT	Economy in Transition
IFC-Canada	International Finance Corporation Canada
KMS	Knowledge Management System
LCEF	Low Carbon Economy Fund
LECB	Low Emission Capacity Building
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
MVT	Motor Vehicle Tax
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
PA	Protected Area
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
TCCA	Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNCHE	United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
VAT	Value-Added Tax
VNR	Voluntary National Review
WCC	World Climate Conference

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Topic and Motivation

'Take your dough, and reforest Germany, okay? It's much more needed there than here.'

The above is a translated quotation from Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to the Brazilian media; it is directed at Angela Merkel and is a reaction to Germany's announcement that it would freeze the funding of projects aimed at protecting the Amazon Rainforest as long as Bolsonaro is president (Lopes, 2019). Since Bolsonaro became president in 2018, deforestation and related fires have significantly increased, as he puts economic growth above climate and environmental issues. His remark, however brash it may be, is an example of perceived climate injustice. *Climate injustice* refers to the fact that the effects of climate change and climate change policies are disproportionately distributed. In the case of Brazil, the climate injustice is that Germany, along with other industrialised countries, has also permitted significant deforestation to pursue economic growth. If Germany and others have taken this course of action, then why must Brazil spend millions every year trying to preserve the Amazon Rainforest and to save it from extreme weather patterns caused by climate change? And, why is the industrialised Western world appalled when Brazil chooses to deforest to achieve faster economic growth when Western nations did the same in the past?

The answers to these questions contain perceptions of what is fair when it comes to climate change and policies. In Brazil, Bolsonaro's notions of climate justice resulted in a 25% increase in deforestation in the Amazon in 2019. This is because Bolsonaro is no longer upholding the domestic Public Forest Management Law since he perceived it to be unfair that Brazil needed to invest so many resources in upholding this law. The deforestation, and especially the subsequent burning of the Amazon, have led to a distinct peak in carbon emissions, aggravating global warming. This example offers insight into how perceptions of what is just or unjust when dealing with the climate crisis can shape domestic climate and environmental policies and discussions.

Perceptions of climate injustices, such as Bolsonaro's, are just a few of the reasons why it has proven so difficult to create and implement efficient climate change policies, both internationally and domestically. To make sense of this challenge in climate change politics, the concept of climate justice has been developed (Bruno, Karliner & Brotsky, 1999; Porta & Parks, 2014). The concept is explained in more depth later in this thesis, but, in short, the pursuit of climate justice seeks to achieve a scientifically valid and socially fair response to climate change. The concept of 'fairness', however, is subjective: What is fair in the eyes of one may be unfair in the eyes of another (Standish, 2011).

The government of a developing or non-developed country in the Global South may have different beliefs about what is fair regarding climate change than the government of a developed country in the Global North, as the above example illustrates. How, then, do these divergent perspectives of justice come to fruition in climate change policies? Examining the climate policies of two completely different countries, such as Canada and Trinidad and Tobago, as this research does, could help explain why it is so difficult to create effective international and domestic climate policies. Explaining this challenge for international climate policy creation is especially relevant since the latest attempt at a unilateral climate change action plan, the Paris Agreement, does less regarding the pursuit of climate justice compared to its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, potentially prompting domestic policies to do the same.

1.2 Objective

The aim of this thesis is to examine and compare perceptions of climate justice and translations of climate justice into the national policies of Canada and Trinidad and Tobago. By comparing these two countries, the researcher hopes to identify commonalities and differences regarding perceptions and translations of climate justice between two countries in the Global North and Global South.

1.3 Research Question

To formulate a research question, one must first define the research frameworks (Van Thiel, 2015). The selected cases are Canada (Global North) and Trinidad and Tobago (Global South). Furthermore, only empirical sources from the national governments of these two countries are analysed over a time period of almost 10 years, from 2011 until 2020. Why these decisions were made is elaborated in Chapter 3. With these research frameworks in mind, the following research question has been formulated:

How is climate justice perceived by the national governments of Canada and Trinidad and Tobago and translated into their national climate change policies?

To help answer the research question, the following sub-questions have been formulated:

1. What is meant by the concept of climate justice?
2. How is climate justice perceived and translated into the national climate change policies of Canada?
3. How is climate justice perceived and translated into the national climate change policies of Trinidad and Tobago?
4. How do the perceptions and translations of climate justice of both national governments differ from and align with each other?

1.4 Scientific Relevance

Climate change policies are influenced by climate justice discourse, and vice-versa. Analysing the climate justice discourse of an actor reveals its material interests regarding climate change and related policies. Such analyses can contribute to better understandings of what certain actors prioritise and what they believe to be negligible regarding their climate change policies and other climate change efforts. Although almost all perceptions of climate justice seek to protect the poor and vulnerable and to enhance equality, for each researched actor the precise interpretation of what is regarded as climate justice is expected to be different (Scandret, 2016). Previous studies have explored closely related subjects, but no research has yet compared perceptions in the Global North and Global South regarding climate justice (Bulkely, Carmin, Castan Broto, Edwards & Fuller, 2013; Audet, 2013; Klinksy, Dowlatabadi & McDaniels; 2012), although multiple academics have acknowledged that justice dilemmas play a key role in unilateral climate change governance (Myers & Macnagten, 1998, Feindt & Oels, 2005). This thesis aims to fill that knowledge gap.

Doing so is important because, as Audet (2013) has suggested, the classic North–South duality in international climate change negotiations seems to be deteriorating. The focus of such negotiations has shifted to transitioning the world to low-carbon economic structures. The

analysis that this thesis provides could be a valuable step towards identifying whether this shift within international climate change negotiations, observed by Audet (2013), can also be found within the national policies and national contributions to unilateral climate change policies of two vastly different countries.

Moreover, several authors have highlighted that publications from and about the Global South are often overlooked by academics from the Global North (Coller, 2018). This situation might have contributed to the lack of research on this subject. By analysing a Global South country, comparing it to a Global North country, and sharing the results, this thesis, published by an academic institution in the Global North, helps to ensure that research on Global South countries is included in the broader academic domain of climate change politics and climate justice.

1.5 Societal Relevance

Climate change is affecting all life on earth and will continue to do so if the world stays on its current trajectory. In September 2019, thousands of young people worldwide marched in the streets protesting for better climate policies. The figure below entails a picture taken at one of these marches and shows young protesters holding signs with slogans such as the following: 'We have to live with your mistakes'. 'But we will die from climate change. You will die of old age'. 'Which green do you see? (referencing drawings with green trees and green dollar bills)'. 'Be part of the solution not the pollution'.



Figure 1. Australian climate marchers (Holli, 2019).

These statements, just like the quotation from Bolsonaro, provide an example of perceived climate injustice. In this example, intergenerational climate injustice is presented. *Intergenerational climate justice* is the notion that the generations that are mostly responsible for climate change are now the ones seemingly refusing to recognise its impact or to take proper action. The younger generations feel that they must deal with solving this complex problem or

feel that they will need to face the consequences alone because it may already be too late to reverse the damage.

Discontent among citizens, such as that illustrated above, is something that politicians and policymakers face on a daily basis. Since climate justice is a relatively new concept within political science, most research on it has taken place within the last decade (Audet, 2013; Bulkely et al., 2013; Klinksky, Dowlatabadi & McDaniels, 2012; Scandrett, 2016). Comparative research on the subject with examples of how the concept is framed within empirical sources, as will be done in his research, can be highly useful for policymakers around the world tasked with formulating climate change policies. Examining the climate justice discourse is especially critical considering that conflicting interpretations of justice are believed to be a considerable factor of both political deadlock and breakthroughs (Paterson 2001; Wiegandt, 2001; Roberts & Parks, 2007).

1.6 Reading Guide

In this first chapter the motivation and goals for this research have been presented and elaborated on. In chapter 2 relevant literature relating to the topic of climate justice and climate change, as well as relevant events in the history of (international) climate change politics, are discussed. Chapter 3 entails the research methodology and analytical framework. In Chapters 4 and 5 the results and analysis of the cases are presented and elaborated on. Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter and consists of the comparison of the two cases, a theoretical and methodological discussion, the conclusion, recommendations for the national governments of Canada and Trinidad and Tobago and recommendations for further research on the subject of climate justice.

Chapter 2 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction

Climate justice cannot be understood without fully grasping climate change since climate justice is a reaction to it. Therefore, this chapter first discusses the history of climate change. Then, in section 2.3, the politics and policies around climate change are elaborated on both practically and theoretically. Next, the emergence of the concept of climate justice is explained. After that, in section 2.4, the concept of climate justice is defined, with its various aspects explained and further outlined. Finally, the concept of climate justice is operationalised in paragraph 2.4.4.

2.2 From Environmental Concerns to Climate Concerns

In the 1960s, it became clear that the world was headed towards an environmental crisis. At the heart of this realisation lies the theory of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), which states that humans will deplete natural resources because they are mainly focused on their self-interest. An example is fishermen all trying to catch as many fish as they can from a river because the more fish they can sell, the more money they can make. However, after a while, the river will have no more fish, making everybody involved (both nature and humankind) worse off. The fast growth of both the population and the economy – both caused by the ever-increasing industrialisation and thus greater welfare of industrialising countries – led to skyrocketing consumption of energy and other resources. This had a negative impact on the environment to a degree that had not been seen before; smoke from factories polluted the air, industrialisation led to urbanisation and thus fewer rural areas, and the resultant higher welfare levels caused consumption to rise, which in turn caused more industrialisation (Eckersley, 2013).

During this time, environmental problems were seen as 'piggy-back products', the by-products of human consumption (Beck, 1992). The oil crisis of 1973 emphasised that natural resources are not infinite, and this increased states' recognition that environmental issues were important and best solved through international cooperation (Erçandirly, 2017). This also sparked the limits-to-growth debate. Environmental issues were no longer seen as just by-products of but as almost conditions for economic growth (Meadows et al. 1972). The question was now how to minimise these issues.

Environmental issues are not the same as climate change issues, but the difference was essential for this research to avoid confusion while analysing the cases. Hence, it is important to understand what environmental issues are before discussing climate change issues. Climate change is a consequence of the environmental issue of global warming. In the 1960s, the evidence of carbon dioxide warming the atmosphere became progressively more convincing, as did the fact that industrialisation had caused a steep increase in the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Around this time, a minority of scientists believed that there were two sides to the same coin highlighting that industrialisation also generates aerosols (air pollution in the form of smog, dust, mist, etc.), which have cooling effects on the atmosphere. In the following decades, the theory of atmospheric warming became the dominant one as the evidence became increasingly convincing. Today, there are countless scientific studies on the subject, spanning multiple disciplines.

2.3 Climate Change Politics

With the effects of climate change becoming visible in day-to-day life at an ever-accelerating pace (melting icecaps, heat records being broken year after year), climate change has become more than a scientific concept. The increasing rate of changes in the world's climate has led to the belief that a climate crisis is imminent. That belief has seeped into all aspects of modern society, both internationally and domestically, including politics. The next section contains a historical overview of international climate change policies and discussions. Thereafter, the political theories behind climate change politics and policies are introduced.

2.3.1 The Emergence of International Climate Change Discussions and Policies

Since the 1970s, there have been activist actions surrounding climate change. Examples are Earth Day and The Friends of the Earth organisation, both originating in 1970. The 1970s were also the decade when climate change shifted from being a solely scientific issue to being a political issue. This started in 1973 when the United Nations (UN) held the UN Conference on the Human Environment, where the need for international cooperation on the subject was established. Six years later, in 1979, the first World Climate Conference (WCC) identified climate change as a global political issue. The WCC took place three times after that, in 1985, 1987, and 1988. However, climate change was not regarded as a global political issue until the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere (TCCA) in 1988, where more than 300 scientists from all over the world and policymakers from almost 50 countries came together to discuss atmospheric issues, such as ozone depletion and global warming.

In 1992, at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established. It was among the first international climate change treaties. It was also one of the first international policies that included the notion of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', meaning that all states share a responsibility to address environmental and climate problems, but they do not share the same responsibility regarding environmental and climate protection. The UNFCCC divided countries into Annex 1, Annex 2, Non-Annex 1, and least developed countries. Annex 1 are the industrialized (developed) countries and economies in transition (EITs). Annex 2 is a subcategory of Annex 1 and consists of the developed countries that are obligated to help developing countries and EITs with both the financial and technological resources that they require to reduce global warming and greenhouse gas emissions. This categorization highlights the needs of vulnerable states regarding climate change. Lastly, the UNFCCC introduced the Conference of the Parties (COP), its highest decision-making body. As of today, there have been 25 COPs.

At the COP-3, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was passed. This treaty entailed the first legally binding targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Kyoto Protocol, 1997). Annex 1 countries were obligated to ensure a 5% reduction of their greenhouse gases emissions between 2008 and 2012 compared to their 1990 levels. At the COP-13 in 2007, the parties established that Annex 2 states should adopt nationally appropriate mitigation actions. In 2009, the COP-15 produced the Copenhagen Accord, which set the goal of keeping the level of global warming beneath 2° Celsius. Just recently, the Kyoto Protocol was succeeded by the Paris Agreement, adopted at the COP-21. It came into force in 2016 and addresses the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. At present, 187 nation-states have ratified the agreement.

With international goals and agreements being formed, it is up to nation-states themselves to implement policies and rules aimed at achieving these goals. In addition, nation-states have also set domestic climate goals and created their own climate change legislatures, plans, and programmes. Providing a detailed overview of all domestic climate change efforts in existence over the world would be impossible, but the domestic efforts of the cases analysed in this research, Canada and Trinidad and Tobago, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

2.3.2 Climate Change Policy Strategies

Although the TCCA officially acknowledged that climate change is a global political problem, national governments must decide whether to take action. When a national government decides to take action, it often pursues both domestic and international measures. How these responses look can vastly differ depending on the associated measures. Generally, there are two types of responses aimed at limiting the climate crisis:

1. Mitigation: Policies aimed at addressing the causes of climate change. An example of mitigation is a policy aimed at the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
2. Adaptation: Policies aimed at preparing humankind for the effects of climate change. An example is reforestation to seek to ensure the survival of ecosystems and Indigenous peoples¹.

2.4 Climate Justice

2.4.1 Emergence of Climate Justice

Just as climate problems are an extension of environmental problems, climate justice is an extension of environmental problems. The concept of environmental justice originated in the United States after multiple researchers concluded that ethnically diverse and economically less fortunate areas in that country had experienced more negative ramifications of industrialisation than the predominantly white and richer areas of the country (Bryant & Mohai, 1992; Lee, 1992; Lester, Allen & Hill, 2001; US General Accounting Office, 1983; United Church of Christ Commission, 1987).

Environmental justice can be regarded as a combination of the civil rights movement and the environmental movement (Faber & McCarthy, 2003) and has had a continuing and major influence on environmental politics, shining a light on issues such as environmental inequality, lack of recognition of environmental issues, and the destruction of (Indigenous) communities. In short, the environmental justice movement has underlined the uneven exposure of countries and regions to environmental dangers (Adamson et al., 2002; Sandler & Pezzullo, 2007).

As environmental problems snowballed into climate change problems, the civil rights movement also began to concern itself with justice questions arising from the effects of climate change and climate change policies. An example is the case of Hurricane Katrina, the devastating hurricane that hit the New Orleans area in 2005 (Howel, 2020). Before the hurricane, environmental justice organisations and efforts in the New Orleans area had focused on the toxic waste from the industries positioned in what was dubbed 'Cancer Alley', a small

¹ Throughout this thesis, when referencing Indigenous peoples in general the word people is lowercased. When referencing the Indigenous inhabitants of Canada, the word Peoples is capitalized. The explanation for this stylistic choice can be found in paragraph 6.2.2.

strip of land covering the banks of the Mississippi River from New Orleans to Baton Rouge. The, on average poor, communities living in this area had already been hit hard by the direct negative externalities of the industries neighbouring them, such as waste and air pollution. That same air pollution had warmed the atmosphere and the water in the Gulf of Mexico over the year. This warming added to the strength of Hurricane Katrina, which significantly and disproportionately harmed the communities of Cancer Alley in a new way. Even years later, the aftermath of Katrina is felt much more deeply in these communities than in the wealthier regions of the New Orleans area (Williams, 2020 & Byrnes, 2014).

2.4.2. Defining Climate Justice

As mentioned in section 1.1, climate change, as well as policies created to battle it, could have unintentional unequal and unjust effects. As long as climate change has been a political concern, discussions of justice have taken centre stage at climate negotiations. In 1999, CorpWatch first officially coined the concept of climate justice as a way of contesting the unequal effects of climate change, both socially and geographically. As more and more climate policies were created worldwide, different responses to the climate crisis underscored different notions about climate justice. Both mitigation and adaptation strategies, and their development, raise critical questions about justice. Who should pay the most when taking climate action? Who should benefit the most from climate action? When answering these questions, individuals make decisions about what is fair – or, in other words, what is just when taking climate change action.

Climate justice is what is considered to be fair in distributing responsibilities, burdens, obligations, and benefits in the context of a policy responding to a common resource problem for the current generation and future generations (Bulkely, Carmin, Edwards & Fuller, 2013). Climate justice also entails recognising and including all stakeholders in the process of climate policy creation and ensuring in these climate change policies that all have the means, conditions, and opportunities to function and develop (Shlosberg, 2009). However, as elaborated before, what is considered to be fair can vary greatly depending on whom one asks. Scandrett (2016), for example, has argued that only climate justice that is rooted within the significant interests of the vulnerable and those most negatively affected by climate change caused by the industrialised world can be considered as proper climate justice. Others have argued that it is just that the most affluent should take the lead, regardless of whether they are located in a region or country historically more or less responsible for or more or less vulnerable to climate change (Harris, 2010).

It is not a problem that there are many notions about what is just when it comes to creating climate change policies. Climate justice is a concept riddled with normative judgements, and thus trying to pursue it with climate change policies is a main challenge in the creation of such policies, seeing as climate justice is in the eye of the beholder. Because climate justice is subjective, there is no right or wrong way to interpret it. The leaders of Western European countries might not agree with Bolsonaro's domestic climate stances and policies, but he himself believes he is doing the right and fair thing for his country. These different notions of climate justice do mean that pure, objective climate justice does not exist (Feindt & Oels, 2005). However, to research climate justice discourse, one must clearly define the concept. In this research, climate justice is the perception of the researched actor of what is fair when taking climate action, both domestically and internationally (Bulkely, Carmin, Castan Broto, Edwards & Fuller, 2013; see also Scandrett, 2016; Feindt & Oels, 2005; Miller, 1995).

Theoretically, there are two prominent ways of including climate justice in policies. There is *distributive climate justice*, in which the rights and responsibilities for mitigation and adaptation are covered. Perceptions about the distribution of benefits and burdens regarding climate change and related policies fall into this category of climate justice. There is also procedural climate justice, which entails the inclusion and participation of all stakeholders in the decision-making process when creating climate policies (Bulkely et al., 2013).

2.4.3 International Attempts at Pursuing Climate Justice

Internationally, there have already been several attempts at including climate justice in policies. For example, the UNFCCC was one of the first international policies that included the notion of 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. This statement is a predecessor of climate justice. It is also the basis for the UNFCCC dividing countries into Annex 1, Annex 2, developing countries and least developed countries, highlighting the needs of vulnerable states regarding climate change (UNFCCC, 1992). Canada is categorised as both Annex 1 and Annex 2; Trinidad and Tobago is a developing country (UNFCCC, 1992).

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol stated that Annex 1 countries were obligated ensure a 5% reduction in their greenhouse gas emissions between 2008 and 2012 compared to their 1990 levels. Developing countries were excluded from this obligation unless Annex 2 countries financially supported their efforts to achieve the target (Kyoto Protocol, 1997). The idea behind the exclusion of developing countries was threefold:

1. One aim was to prevent these countries' development from stagnating. Emissions are strongly linked to industrialisation, which in turn leads to economic development.
2. Developing countries could sell their emission credits to those countries struggling to stay within their cap (the maximum amount of emissions a country can emit).
3. The final aim was to allow developing countries to obtain the technological and financial resources for low-carbon investments.

Although the categorisation is a translation of climate justice, some critics of the UNFCCC consider it unjust, believing that both developed and developing countries need to reduce their emissions or drawing attention to the Stern Review, which states that the costs of doing nothing when it comes to climate change are larger than the costs of complying with international climate policies (Stern, 2007). The Stern Review is a 700 page report from 2006, commissioned by the government of the UK, to examine the effect global warming will have on the world's economy. It is the biggest and most well-known report of its sort, and has often been cited in climate change policies and discussions (BBC News, 2006; Cairncross, 2006; European Commission, 2009;).

As mentioned earlier, the Paris Agreement has succeeded the Kyoto Protocol. It came into force in 2016 and addresses the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and adaption to climate change. In the preamble, the agreement states the following as an introduction to the treaty's articles, 'the Parties to the Agreement, (...) noting the importance for some of the concept of "climate justice", when taking action to address climate change have agreed as follows' (Paris Agreement, 2015, p.2). However, in the eyes of political scientists, the agreement represents a step backward when it comes to ensuring climate justice. This is because the Paris Agreement no longer contains a concretisation of the 'common, but differentiated responsibilities' statement (United Nations, 2015).

2.4.4 Operationalisation of Climate Justice

This section explains the operationalisation of climate justice. Generally, climate justice is regarded as having three dimensions: the responsibility dimension, the vulnerability dimension, and the abatement dimension (Sowers, 2007; Audet, 2013). How these dimensions are expressed in climate justice discourses is discussed in section 3.3.1.

2.4.4.1 The Responsibility Dimension

The responsibility dimension of climate justice can be divided into two issues related to climate change responsibility. First is intergenerational responsibility, discussed in section 1.1. Second, there is a geographical responsibility, which can be examined both globally and domestically. The poorest are generally hit hardest by climate change. Rich countries (global) and regions (domestic) that have significantly contributed to global warming due to their industrialisation and high levels of consumption are, generally, not the countries and regions dealing with increasingly extreme weather patterns such as hurricanes and tsunamis (Roberts & Parks, 2007; Shue, 2014). Examples of the latter are countries such as Chad and Bangladesh, which bear almost no responsibility for climate change but are tormented by both extreme weather patterns and resultant food shortages (Giovetti, 2019). An overview of the world's geographical climate injustice can be found in Figure 2 (Samson, Betreaux, McGill & Humphries, 2011).




Figure 2. Global emissions versus vulnerability to climate change (Samson et al., 2011).

This dimension, globally, underlines the divide of the Global North and Global South when it comes to issues concerning responsibility for climate change. The responsibility of a country in creating the climate crisis is often measured in its share of total emissions. As Agarwal and Narain have put it, 'there is one set of nations in the world which is emitting greenhouse gases well within its share (or, in other words, its permissible limits) whereas there is another set of countries which is exceeding its permissible limits by leaps and bounds' (1991, p.11). When fighting climate change internationally, the latter countries should be given fewer emission rights than the former countries (Bernauer, 2013).

Perceptions about the responsibility dimension of climate justice usually focus on who seemingly has responsibility for causing climate change and who has responsibility for taking action to mitigate and adapt to it.

2.4.4.2 The Vulnerability Dimension

The second climate change injustice is that of vulnerability. This dimension focuses less on the causes of climate change (efforts) and more on the unequally distributed consequences. Those who are hit hardest by the effects of climate change usually do not have the ability to fully recover. Even when extreme weather patterns caused or deepened by climate change hit developed parts of the world, the richer areas are usually less affected than the poor (see section 2.3.1). In addition, low-income regions need more time to recover from the impacts of climate-change-related natural disasters than do high-income regions; this is an injustice rooted in the unequal distribution of resources (Dugard, Saint Clair & Gloppen, 2013). The level of vulnerability to the effects of climate change depends on economic health and thus stems from economic inequality (Roberts & Parks, 2007).

Furthermore, multiple studies have concluded that Indigenous peoples are also disproportionately vulnerable to the effects of climate change and climate change policies. This is partly because of the reasons already explained in this section and partly because Indigenous peoples still rely more heavily on natural resources for their livelihood (Belfer et al., 2017; Huda, 2012; Brugnach et al., 2017 & Zetner et al., 2019).

From a gender perspective, women are regarded as being more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than men. This is because women are often responsible for taking care of the family. Extreme weather patterns, such as drought or devastating storms, can result in food shortages, making caring for the family more difficult or even impossible. When women must spend more and more time taking care of basic household tasks, the time they have to get an education or engage in self-development shrinks or even disappears. Compared to men, women are also less represented at the highest political and economic levels all over the world than are men, making female voices less heard and meaning that women are not always able to participate in climate policy-making (CARE International, 2014).

Vulnerability to climate change can be divided into three factors: the capacity to adapt, sensitivity, and exposure (Schneider, 2007). The capacity to adapt is, in turn, a combination of a country's 'wealth, technology, education, information, skills, infrastructure, access to resources, and management capabilities' (McCarthy, Canziani, Leary, Dokken & White, 2001, p.8). Sensitivity is the level of response a country will have to a change in climate (Shah, Dulal, Johnson & Baptiste, 2013). Exposure is the amount of climate stress a country is under. These three factors have been explained with geographical examples, but they can also be applied to other actors regarded as being disproportionately vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Perceptions regarding the vulnerability dimensions reflect ideas about who is the most unfairly affected by both climate change itself and climate change governance.

2.4.4.3 The Abatement Dimension

The abatement dimension of climate justice is about striking a balance between all actors involved in a particular piece of climate change governance, whether it be international or domestic. Internationally, developed countries are often regarded as having to 'take the lead' when it comes to climate change governance. However, there are two sides to this coin.

Leaving developed countries to take the lead is believed to give developing countries a competitive advantage, as they can continue to chase economic growth with high(er) emissions. In contrast, developed countries must overcome the challenge of trying to maintain economic health while implementing climate change regulations and measures to meet climate change targets (Ravindranath & Sathaye, 2002). The most prominent example is the United States pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol based on the belief that exempting developing countries from reduction targets gives them an unfair competitive advantage (Audet, 2013).

Domestically, the abatement dimension of climate justice can also refer intergenerational abatement issues. Young people often feel that the current world leaders, both political and economic, are not doing enough to secure their livelihoods when it comes to mitigation or adaptation to the effects of climate change. Perceptions about the abatement dimension of climate justice contain ideas about what a fair balance is in distributing costs and benefits in climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Chapter 3 Methodology

3.1 Introduction

First, in section 3.2, the research design will be discussed. In the following section, section 3.3, the research strategy will be discussed and the analytic framework will be presented. After that, in section 3.4, the research frameworks, namely the selected cases, timeframe and selection of the empirical documents will be justified.

3.2 Research Design

The research question, ‘how is climate justice perceived by the national governments of Canada and Trinidad and Tobago and translated into their national climate change policies?’, implies in-depth observation of two empirical cases related to translating climate justice into policies. As explained before, climate justice is a matter of interpretation, meaning that its definition varies. Hence, this study consisted of qualitative research applying the case study method. The case study method is well suited for in-depth analyses of a small amount of cases. As Golafshani (2003, p.600) has stated, ‘Qualitative research uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings’ and in cases in which the researcher makes no attempt to shape the phenomena (Patton, 2001).

Furthermore, climate justice is a matter of interpretation. What is regarded as just or fair when it comes to climate change policies and discussions, both national and international, depends on the actor whom one analyses. By applying the case study method, one can examine the actor's interpretation in a broader socio-economic context. This approach provides a deeper understanding of actors' perceptions and translations of climate justice. By comparing the two case studies, the differences and commonalities could be mapped and explained.

3.3 Research Strategy

This study employs a discourse-analytic framework to explain how climate justice is perceived and translated into the climate policies of two very different countries. The decision to employ this approach was based on two aspects of discourse analysis.

First, discourse analysis provides the opportunity to reveal larger structures and patterns in thinking and talking about ‘big’ topics, such as climate justice. By performing a discourse analysis, one can determine how a topic is discussed and depicted (the topic's rendition), the perspective underlying that rendition, and the consequences of the rendition for social reality. Discourse analysis is a strategy for uncovering how a particular understanding of the world came to be and how that understanding can leave its mark on reality (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011; Friman & Strandberg, 2013). In this study, that reality is the climate governance of Canada and Trinidad and Tobago.

Second, in applying the discourse method, one does not need an extensive theoretical framework, apart from discourse theoretical notions of the social reality. The social reality in this research comprised perceptions of climate justice and their translation into the national climate policies of Trinidad and Tobago and Canada. The researcher thus needed to pay attention to everything potentially relevant to the object of analysis, not just preconceived points of attention.

However, before the discourse analysis itself is described, this research strategy needs to be explained. This task is not easy because there is no universally accepted, unambiguous definition of discourse within the social sciences (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002; Gee, 2005 & Pedersen, 2009) because language and its use are not considered to be objective (Joyce, 2009). This does not mean that there is no objective reality outside of language, but it does mean that humankind understands reality exclusively through language. In this thesis, the definition of discourse by Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) is used: Discourse is the way in which we speak about and understand (a part of) the world. Discourse also includes unspoken language; meaning is created by both what is said and what is left out (Richardson, 2007; Vultee, 2009). While multiple strategies for conducting a discourse analysis exist, its main goal is analysing text (written or unwritten) to uncover the underlying discourse. A discourse analysis is often not aimed at finding the solution to a problem, but at explaining how certain solutions and problems are constructed.

The language and imagery we use represent a way of categorising, structuring, and consequently giving meaning to the world. Why we choose to categorise and structure the world the way we do is regarded as both historically and culturally dependent. This implies that the world as we know it is mutable and that reality is shaped by the discourses we use to describe it (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). In other words, discourse is a process of inclusion and exclusion. The way we do this – and thus frame knowledge and issues – affects how we act. Most scholars agree that there is not just one dominant discourse related to a certain subject, but multiple discourses battling for dominance (Fairclough, 1995; Laclau & Mouffe, ; Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).

Foucault's (1969) approach to discourse analysis is the one that is applied in this thesis. He explained that discourse analysis is essentially the same as analysing an object. The object analysed can take different forms within a specific ruleset and conditions of a discourse. The nature of this object is one of (political) struggle, meaning that actors with different perspectives and backgrounds can all frame this same object in vastly different ways. To analyse the different framings, the researcher must look for 'enouncements' or 'statements' relating to it (Foucault, 1969). In this study, enouncements are expressions by an actor regarding the analysed concept, for example, an expression containing perceptions or translations of climate justice by the federal government of Canada. To find enouncements, the researcher must constantly ask if the source documents contain perceptions and/or translations of the research subject. In this study, guiding questions, based on the operationalisation of climate justice and its dimensions from section 2.3.4, were formulated to help in this regard. These guiding questions can be found in the analytic framework in section 3.3.2.

Just as there are three dimensions of climate justice, researchers generally agree on three dimensions of climate justice discourse (Audet, 2013). These three dimensions were used as guidelines to identify enouncements on climate justice within policies. In short, these dimensions of climate justice are the responsibility dimension, the vulnerability dimension and the abatement dimension and have been elaborated on and operationalised in section 2.3.4. The operationalisation of these dimensions has already shed a light on how discourse entailing them looks like and what enouncements indicate. Each dimension is expressed through its own enouncements. Enouncements on the responsibility dimension of climate justice contain perceptions and translations of whom the researched actor believes has responsibility for causing climate change, as well as who must take the responsibility for climate change action, such as adaptation and mitigation strategies. Enouncements on the vulnerability dimension contain perceptions and translations of whom the researched actor believes to be the most

unfairly affected by both climate change and climate change governance, as well as how the most vulnerable should be helped. Enouncements on the abatement dimension contain perceptions and translations of what a fair balance is in distributing the costs and benefits of climate change and of climate change governance, as well as ideas on how to compensate for perceived injustices arising from climate change effects and governance.

3.3.1 Climate Justice Discourse Analysis Approach

The three climate justice dimensions (Audet, 2013) serve as a lens through which the broader perceptions and translations of climate justice can be viewed. The three climate justice dimensions of Audet (2013) are supplemented by the research on climate justice, outlined in Chapter 2, to create a framework through which climate justice discourse can be analysed. Table 1 presents the coding of the three dimensions of climate justice, meaning that the abstract climate justice dimensions are summarised in keywords, or codes. These codes form the basis of the analytic framework, which is presented in Table 2. The operationalisation of the concept of climate justice and the three climate justice dimensions presented in 2.4.4 provides more contexts to Table 1, as the codes are taken from the reviewed literature and are the keywords that are most often used when discussing climate justice

Coding Climate justice Discourse		
Responsibility dimension (Audet, 2013; Agarwal & Narain, 1991; Bernauer, 2013)	Vulnerability dimension (Adamson, 002; Audet, 2013; Roberts & Parks, 2007)	Abatement dimension (Audet, 2013; Ravindranath & Sathaye, 2002)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Responsible/responsibility - Cause/causing - Carbon (dioxide) - Greenhouse Gas/GHG - Duty - Obligation - Emissions/emit(ter) - Polluter(s) - Global - Absolute - Share/sharing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vulnerable/vulnerability - Need - Danger - Risk - Expose/exposed - Protect/protection - Extreme weather (patterns) - Resources - Peripheral - Livelihoods - Affect/affected/affecting - Disproportionate(ly) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fair/unfair - Just/unjust - Distribution - Development/developing/ developed/develop - Decrease - Benefit(s) - Cost(s) - Share - Equity/equitable - Equal/equality/inequal/inequality - Sustainable (development) - Support/Supporting/

Table 1. Coding Climate Justice Discourse

Based on the coding of climate justice discourse presented Table 1, the guiding questions were developed. These guiding questions are the basis for the framework through which climate justice discourses of the selected cases were analysed, the analytic framework, and are presented in Table 2. When analysing the empirical sources, the researcher used the guiding questions as a reference for detecting perceptions and translations of climate justice within all source documents for both cases. Meaning that the discourse analysis was conducted by answering the guiding questions with, sometimes multiple per question, statements and quotations from the each individual analysed source documents. The reason for this being that

answering the guiding questions with information from the source documents uncovered perceptions and translations from the authors of those source documents, namely the national governments of Canada and Trinidad and Tobago.

Analytical Framework for Analysing Climate Justice Discourse		
Climate justice dimension	Definition	Guiding Questions
Responsibility dimension	This dimension of climate justice discourse focusses on enouncements on the responsibility for causing the climate crisis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Who are held responsible for causing the climate crisis? - Who are considered to be the biggest emitters/polluters? - Who are considered to have (had) the largest, domestically and internationally, share in carbon dioxide/greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions? - Who are considered to have the obligation/duty to take climate change action?
Vulnerability dimension	This dimension of climate justice discourse focusses enouncements on the ones most vulnerable to the effects of the climate crisis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Who are perceived as most vulnerable to the effects of climate change (governance)? - Who are perceived to be the most exposed to the dangers/risks/peripheral weather patterns/extreme weather patterns that climate change brings along? - Who are perceived to need the most protection against the effects of climate change?
Abatement dimension	This dimension of climate justice focusses on enouncements regarding what is perceived as fair when it comes to climate change governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What is considered to be fair/just or unfair/unjust regarding climate change (governance)? - What is regarded as an equitable distribution of costs and benefits regarding climate change (governance)? - Should everyone have an equal share when it comes to costs and benefits of climate change governance? - How are different levels of development addressed in climate change governance?

Table 2. Analytic framework for Analysing Climate Justice Discourse

3.3.3 Research Validity and Reliability

The guiding questions, as presented in Table 2, were developed to ensure rigor, meaning credibility and dependability, in this qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003; Tracy, 2010). In other words, the guiding questions were developed to ensure only the perceptions and

translations of climate justice of selected national governments were analysed, without the researcher's perceptions of climate justice interfering

Credibility in qualitative research is akin to internal validity in quantitative research and is established by studying the subject of the research individually and seeking similarities in other studies about the subject (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). Usually, this means comparing multiple cases with each other and checking with the researched actor regarding whether their portrayal by the researcher is correct. However, since similarities between two cases do not equate to external validity and since this type of check was not possible, the researcher pursued credibility via other means, namely, the codes and guiding questions in Table 1 and Table 2.

Dependability in qualitative research is akin to reliability in quantitative research. Seale (1999) and Clont (1992) have argued that dependability in qualitative research is rooted in consistency and transparency. In this research, all source documents were analysed with Table 1 and Table 2, making the process of analysis consistent for all source documents. Furthermore, in the chapters containing the case analyses, numerous quotations from the source documents support the arguments made.

Moreover, to find the scientific sources used in this thesis, the researcher used the Leiden University Library and Google Scholar. All sources that seemed suitable were checked on 'Web of Science' to assess their quality and level of reliability. If the articles proved suitable and valid according to this check, they were read thoroughly. These scientific sources were mainly used for defining and operationalising concepts, and providing context to the study.

Over 90 source documents in total were analysed. However, not all these source documents contained enouncements on climate justice discourse, and thus not all the analysed source documents were eventually used in this research.

3.4 Justification of the Research Frameworks

3.4.1 Selection of Cases

An important consideration when selecting the national governments was whether English or Dutch is the primary language in the country. This consideration led to a shortlist of 38 countries, of which only 11 were fully independent countries. Meaning that they were not part of the Commonwealth or that they were territories of the United States of America or the United Kingdom. The decision was made to not analyse the USA or the UK due to these commonwealth and territorial structures. The choice fell on the national government of Canada and the national government of Trinidad and Tobago. In the following three sections, this choice is elaborated on.

3.4.1.1 *The Federal Government of Canada*

Canada is the world's 11th largest emitter of carbon dioxide according to the most recently available data (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020). It is a Global North country and the 12th most developed country in the world (United Nations, 2019). The country has a gross domestic product (GPD) of 1.71 trillion Canadian Dollars, making it the 10th largest economy in the world. These facts, combined with the theories discussed in Chapter 2, suggest that Canada has a relatively high responsibility for the climate crisis, as well as a duty to 'take the lead' in trying

to solve it. This is expressed by the UNFCCC classifying Canada as both an Annex 1 and Annex 2 country (UNFCCC, 1992).

All countries are vulnerable to climate change, but some are more vulnerable than others. Canada, according to the 2017 Climate Change Vulnerability Index (Eckstein, Hutfils & Winges, 2017), is considered to have a relatively low vulnerability to climate change. However, there are various Indigenous Peoples in Canada. There are the First Nations, the Inuit, and the Métis. As established earlier, Indigenous people more vulnerable to climate change than others. This fact makes Canada even more relevant for the analysis of views on climate justice, especially because it is one of the most developed countries of the world. This case could provide insight into how a rich government tries to protect its most vulnerable constituents from the effects of climate change. With this context in mind, analysing Canada's (inter)national climate governance in relation to climate justice seemed interesting.

3.4.1.2 The Government of Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago is the world's 74th largest emitter of carbon dioxide, accounting for 0.1 % of the world's absolute emissions (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020). It is a Global South country and the 69th most developed country in the world (United Nations, 2019). The country has a GDP of 23.23 billion, making it the 111th biggest economy in the world. Under the UNFCCC, Trinidad and Tobago is a developing country, meaning it is categorized 'non-Annex 1' country (UNFCCC, 1992).

Trinidad and Tobago is an island in the Caribbean; predictions regarding the effects of climate change on the Caribbean region are as follows (Emanuel, 2005; Mimura et al., 2007):

- Both the dry and wet season will increase by 7% in length, on average, by 2050.
- Intense rainfall will increase by 20% by 2050.
- Sea levels will rise 40%, on average, by 2080.
- The intensity of the strongest hurricanes will increase.

Trinidad and Tobago, being a small island state, is highly vulnerable to climate change according to the 2017 Climate Change Vulnerability Index (Eckstein, Hutfils & Winges, 2017). In comparison to other small islands, Trinidad and Tobago's vulnerability to climate change is not as noticeable due to its economic status (Gorm et al., 2015). Trinidad and Tobago is one of the richest, most developed, small island developing states (SIDS), making them relatively more able to adapt to climate change effects than other SIDS. The country has a hydrocarbon economy, meaning it revolves mostly around oil and gas revenues and subsidies. The country is heavily reliant on the usage of fossil fuels, but it also suffers from the climatic consequences of these same fossil fuels. It will be interesting to see how the government of this developing country navigates climate change action, which is often aimed at reducing the usage of fossil fuels important for its economy.

3.4.1.3 Justification of the Case Selection

In Table 3 and Table 4, the information from the last two sections is displayed schematically. This approach illustrates how different the contexts of the two countries' governments are; these differences made these two governments interesting cases to compare due to the expectation that their climate justice discourses would also be different and were why these two cases were selected. They are on opposite poles in terms of all three climate change injustices. If these contrasts translate into different perceptions of what is just in climate change policies and action, different forms of climate change governance could be the result. These

differences in national climate governance could illustrate why effective international climate change policies are so hard to form, implement, and uphold: Governments of vastly different countries, such as Canada and Trinidad and Tobago, all must negotiate and work together in COP meetings on climate change.

Context of Canada	Responsibility for climate change		Vulnerability to climate change		Economic status		
	Higher	Lower	Higher	Lower	Developed	Developing	Undeveloped
	X			X	X		

Table 3. Canada’s climate change context

Context of Trinidad & Tobago	Responsibility for climate change		Vulnerability to climate change		Economic status		
	Higher	Lower	Higher	Lower	Developed	Developing	Undeveloped
		X	X			X	

Table 4. Trinidad and Tobago's climate change context

3.4.2. Justification of the Timeframe

The timeframe analysed was a 10-year period from 2011 through 2020. This period was partially chosen because it was long enough to permit a proper discourse analysis, but mainly because 2011 was an interesting year to start analysing climate justice discourses in both Canada and Trinidad and Tobago.

As mentioned before, the COP-15 was held in Copenhagen in December 2009. Although the reception of the outcome of the COP-15 was largely positive (Mason & Askins, 2013), the reception of Canada's performance at the convention was the opposite. The COP-15 came after some rocky years regarding Canada and climate change policies. In 2006, the Canadian government declared that the country would not uphold the emission cut targets set in the Kyoto Protocol, becoming the only country that ratified the agreement to do so. Afterwards, it also stated that it would not accept sanctions for breaking its international commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.

A year later, Canada prevented a Commonwealth resolution that would have supported binding climate targets for developed countries. In 2008, when Canada was still in the top 10 of the world's largest emitters, it ranked 53rd out of the 56 countries that were responsible for 90% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions on German Watch's Climate Change Performance Index. What is more, Canada completely withdrew from the Kyoto Agreement, the first international agreement that included specific climate justice mechanisms, in 2011. This event can be regarded as a low point for Canada when it comes to climate change politics and an interesting starting point for examining how it has since translated climate justice into domestic policies.

Furthermore, Trinidad and Tobago's first national climate change policy was published in 2011. Canada does have older climate policies, but to keep the research balanced, the policies selected for analysis were not passed before 2011.

3.4.3 Justification of the Selection of the Empirical Documents

In this study documents containing national climate change policies and sources in which figures from the national government speak about those policies, published within the research period by the national governments of Canada and Trinidad and Tobago, were analysed. Documents containing practical elaborations of national policies such as national plans, programmes, guidelines, and frameworks on climate change, were analysed to provide more context for the actual policies and to increase the validity of this study. In addition to national climate change policies, environmental policies were also used. However, only the parts of the policies relating to environmental issues stemming from climate change were analysed because this thesis focuses on enouncements on climate justice, not environmental justice. The documents analysed were mainly found on or through Canada's national website, www.canada.ca, and on Trinidad and Tobago's national website, www.ttconnect.gov.tt, using the Climate Policy Database website, www.climatepolicydatabase.org, as a guideline.

Chapter 4 The Federal Government of Canada's approach to climate justice

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter the government of Trinidad and Tobago's approach to climate justice will be elaborated on. This is done by discussing the perceptions and translations of the three climate justice discourses separately. The perceptions and translations of the responsibility dimension of climate justice will be discussed in section 4.2, the perceptions and translations of the vulnerability dimension of climate justice will be discussed in section 4.3 and the perceptions and translations of the climate justice dimension of abatement will be discussed in section 4.4. Suppositions made about these perceptions and translations are supported by quotations from analysed documents and the context in which the government of Trinidad and Tobago operates, as shown in paragraph 3.4.1 and Table 3. After the elaboration of the three climate justice dimensions the chapter will be concluded with a short summary of the federal government's approach to climate justice.

4.2 Perceptions of the Responsibility Dimension

Canada's share of world cumulative emissions since 1990 has been below 2%. Canada's share of total global emissions, like that of other developed countries, is expected to continue to decline in the face of the expected emissions growth from developing countries and emerging markets such as China, India, Brazil and Indonesia. (Environment Canada, 2014, p.2)

The above quotation is the only statement from the federal government of Canada containing enouncements on global responsibility found in the source documents. The lack of enouncements on global responsibility is an enouncement on global responsibility in itself, considering that developed countries have historically been regarded as the most responsible for climate change. The lack of enouncements regarding global responsibility could be because the Canadian government is trying to shift the focus away from this relative historic responsibility and that, as reflected in the statement, as a developed country, Canada's global share of global emissions is expected to further decline due to the growing share of developing countries. The use of the word 'continue' seems to suggest that Canada is already on the path to reducing its absolute greenhouse gas emissions when actually all that is said is that Canada's relative global share is becoming smaller. Some developing countries are even named, which could have been done to implicate them as countries that must take more responsibility for solving the climate crisis.

There were several statements from the federal government of Canada regarding Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13. The 17 SDGs, as established in the 2015 Agenda 2030 under the UNFCCC, all must be met to achieve sustainable development. Sustainable development itself is a term coined much earlier than 2015 and stems from the famous Brundtland Report of 1987, which the defines the term:

Sustainable development is development which meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs. (World Commission of Environment and Development, 1987, p.41)

SDG 13 reads as follows: 'Take urgent action to combat climate change and its implications' (Government of Canada, 2019). The following figure is from the 2019 document 'Towards Canada's 2030 Agenda National Strategy, Interim Document' and details what is regarded as necessary by the federal government of Canada to achieve SDG 13.




Figure 3. Canada on Sustainable Development Goal 13 (Government of Canada, 2019, p.37).

The word 'Canadians', used in Figure 3, is peculiar because it could suggest that the government believes that the citizens of Canada (and not the federal government) are responsible for taking climate action themselves. However, the federal government of Canada has created multiple frameworks to function as a backbone allowing the governments of provinces and territories, localities to take the lead, as illustrated by the following quotations:

The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change is a plan to grow our economy while reducing emissions and building resilience to adapt to a changing climate. It is a blueprint to spur innovation and create good jobs across the country. (Government of Canada, 2016b, p.3)

We (...) are working with provinces, territories, and municipalities to provide Canadians with more clean energy options. Protecting the environment is a responsibility we all share. That is why we are taking action to promote clean energy and growth in Canada. (Trudeau, 2018)

As our Prime Minister Justin Trudeau clearly stated, as leaders, we have a great responsibility toward our citizens to take ambitious action to ensure a safer, healthier, and more prosperous future for all. We can do it, and we must do it. (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2018, 01:57)

The Working Group on Carbon Pricing Mechanisms has highlighted why Canadian governments should take the lead, and the reason seems very similar to the theory of the tragedy of the commons, elaborated on in section 2.2.1.

Absent any other legal or regulatory requirements, the agent that causes negative externalities [greenhouse gas emissions] has no incentive to consider and integrate the impacts and costs it imposes on other agents in its business decisions or households' everyday life. This situation entices this agent to underestimate, or even ignore, the real costs of its actions to society, the economy and the environment. (Working group on Carbon Pricing Mechanisms, 2016, p.3)

The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change is Canada's national climate change strategy and specifies what sectors are responsible for which share of the country's total emissions. The data in this document are from 2014. In April 2020, the most recent greenhouse gas emission numbers, which are from 2018, were presented in a document called 'Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators' (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020a). Both documents state that the oil and gas sector and the transport sector are the largest emitters, together accounting for approximately 50% of the country's total emissions (Government of Canada, 2016b; Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020a). This information in itself is not an enouncements on the responsibility dimension of climate justice, but it is important to point out because one of Canada's main strategies for battling climate change, carbon pricing, is based on the 'polluter-pays' principle.

Carbon pricing policies, including their revenue recycling components, should strike a balance between applying the polluter-pays principle and avoiding a disproportionate burden on vulnerable groups (i.e., emission-intensive/trade-exposed industries, northern and remote communities, and low income households). (Working Group on Carbon Pricing Mechanisms, 2016, p.31)

It has been proven that it [carbon pricing] is a good way to prevent heavy polluters from emitting greenhouse gases that fuel climate change and threaten the entire planet. (Justin Trudeau – Prime Minister of Canada, 2016, 11:55)

The federal government of Canada has expressed that responsibility for solving the climate crisis, at least as far as Canada is concerned, lies with Canadian governments. Therefore, the provinces and territories are responsible for creating their own systems for carbon pricing, but these systems must include conditions set by the federal government. If the governments of provinces and territories fail to shoulder this responsibility, a federal carbon pricing scheme will be implemented to ensure that the carbon pricing system applies in the entirety of Canada (*Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act*, 2018).

Enouncement on the responsibility dimension of climate justice do not only cover the governments' responsibility to ensure that the 'polluter pays' thought the system of carbon pricing. The following enouncements by the federal government of Canada were also found on carbon pricing. These enouncements identified taking intergenerational responsibility regarding climate change:

Whereas Parliament recognizes that it is the responsibility of the present generation to minimize impacts of climate change on future generations. (*Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act*, 2018, p.1)

Canadians know that polluting isn't free. We are all paying the cost of storms, floods, wildfires, and extreme heat. Our government is ensuring a price across Canada on what we don't want,

pollution, so we can get what we do want – lower emissions, cleaner air, opportunities for businesses with clean solutions, and more money in the pockets of Canadians. We have a plan for a healthy environment and a stronger economy. Because, at the end of the day, it's what we owe our kids. (Trudeau, 2018)

4.2.1 Translations of the Responsibility Dimension

The federal government of Canada has multiple policies and frameworks in place to ensure that responsibility is taken when it comes to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For example, in June 2018, the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act was implemented. The act reinforces the responsibility of the governments of provinces and territories in taking concrete climate action. That responsibility has also been emphasised by Prime Minister Trudeau (Trudeau, 2016):

The government proposes that the price on carbon pollution should start at a minimum of \$10 per tonne in 2018, rising by \$10 each year to \$50 a tonne by 2022. The provinces and territories that choose cap-and-trade systems would need to decrease emissions in line with both Canada's target and the reductions expected in jurisdictions that choose a price-based system. If neither a price nor a cap-and-trade system is in place by 2018, the Government of Canada would implement a price in that jurisdiction.

The enouncements on intergenerational responsibility from the previous section also relate to the system of pricing carbon pollution. The federal government of Canada believes that through such a system, the current generation is already paying part of the costs that future generations will face due to climate change externalities. Carbon pricing also functions as an incentive to consider green alternatives. Green alternatives ensure that future generations can enjoy the same luxuries as current and past generations, as well as reduce greenhouse gas emissions and thus limit climate change.

However, the carbon pricing mechanism is just one of four strategies through which the federal government of Canada is aiming to achieve a low-carbon economy. The three other strategies are as follows:

- Complementary actions to reduce emissions across the economy;
- Adapting to climate change and creating climate change resilience; and
- Pursuing clean technology, innovation, and jobs.

The federal government is constructing these pillars by also financially supporting the governments of provinces and territories. Examples of these financial incentives can be found in the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change (Government of Canada, 2016b). The Low Carbon Economy Fund (LCEF) is part of this framework. This is a 2 billion Canadian dollar fund for investing in provincial and territorial projects aimed at mitigating climate change and thus at generating clean growth, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and helping to meet or exceed Canada's commitments under the Paris Agreement. The latest data on how this fund is allocated across the provinces and territories are from 15 June 2017 (Government of Canada, 2017a), as Figure 4 demonstrates.

Province / territory	Allocation
Alberta	\$ 148,426,000
British Columbia	\$ 162,179,000
Manitoba	\$ 66,754,000
New Brunswick	\$ 50,967,000
Newfoundland and Labrador	\$ 44,656,000
Nova Scotia	\$ 56,341,000
Northwest Territories	\$ 31,225,000
Nunavut	\$ 31,031,000
Ontario	\$ 419,970,000
Prince Edward Island	\$ 34,133,000
Quebec	\$ 261,225,000
Saskatchewan	\$ 62,050,000
Yukon	\$ 31,043,000
Total	\$1,400,000,000

Figure 4. Distribution of the Low Carbon Economy Fund (Government of Canada, 2017a).

Another example of how the federal government supports provinces and territories in adapting to climate change is the 42.5 million Canadian dollar financial support it is providing to integrate climate resilience into residential, institutional, commercial, and industrial buildings (McKenna & Monsef, 2019).

4.3 Perceptions of the Vulnerability Dimension

The analysis revealed few enouncements containing the Canadian federal government's perceptions of the vulnerability dimension of climate justice. The related enouncements are mostly from the domestic discursive arena and focus on the disproportionate vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples living in Canada. The few examples of enouncements found in the international discursive arena are listed below:

Communities around the world, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable, are experiencing the destabilizing effects of climate change in dramatic and costly ways. (Global Affairs Canada, 2017, p.43)

The humanitarian case is clear. We know that it will be the world's poorest citizens who will be hardest hit by climate change – displaced by rising sea levels, left hungry by failed crops, more vulnerable to disease. (CBC News, 00:33)

The language in these quotations is clear. The use of the word 'particularly' suggests that the federal government of Canada realises that the effects of climate justice are disproportionately divided, a sentiment that is literally expressed in the second quotation. When talking about the 'most vulnerable', the federal government of Canada often means the poorest and developing communities and countries, examples of which can be found in section 4.2.1. However, the federal government also acknowledges gender inequality when it comes to the effects of climate change, as Marie-Claude Bibeau, Minister of International Development and La Francophonie, has clarified: 'women and girls (...) are often the most vulnerable to poverty, violence and climate change' (Global Affairs Canada, 2017, iii). Additionally, the country's Voluntary National Review under the UNFCCC states, 'Around the world, women with less access to resources and greater responsibility for family and community welfare are disproportionately feeling the effects of climate change' (Global Affairs Canada, 2018, p.100).

While the above quotations focus on the poor and gender inequality, the enouncements on vulnerability in the domestic discourse arena heavily emphasise the vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples:

Geographic location, socio-economic challenges, and for Indigenous Peoples, the reliance on wild food sources, often converge with climate change to put pressure on these communities. (Government of Canada, 2016b, p.1)

Indigenous Peoples and northern communities are particularly vulnerable and disproportionately affected. (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2016, p.2)

Indigenous Peoples are among the most vulnerable to climate change due to their remote locations and reliance on wild foods. (Government of Canada, 2016c, p.33)

Again, the word 'particularly' is used to illustrate that Indigenous Peoples' vulnerability to climate change is regarded as higher than that of other Canadian citizens by the federal government. The word 'disproportionately' establishes that the federal government believes this higher level of vulnerability to be unjust. The federal government has had a tumultuous history with the Indigenous Peoples in the country. In the late 18th century, the federal government implemented several policies and strategies to force their assimilation. Missionary work aimed at converting Indigenous Peoples to Christianity began even earlier, in the 17th century. Reconciliation measures started in the late 20th century. Since then, discriminatory treaties have been amended and pledges have been made to do more to renew the relationship between the federal government and Indigenous Peoples. Taking their disproportionate climate change vulnerability into account when creating climate change policies is part of this effort.

From an international perspective, the federal government of Canada's focus with regard to climate justice differs from its domestic focus. Domestically, the government perceives Indigenous and rural communities to be the most vulnerable. Internationally, the federal government of Canada perceives the poorest and women to be the most vulnerable groups. Examining the context in which the federal government of Canada operates might help to explain this change of focus. The country's current poverty rate is 8.7%, and was lower than the average poverty rate worldwide for the duration of the research timespan (Statistics Canada, 2020). On gender equality, the federal government has made the following statement: 'Canada has been a global champion of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, and the BCFP [Blended Climate Finance Program] seeks to promote gender-responsive climate action' (International Finance Corporation Canada & Government of Canada, 2020). Therefore, the government's position is seemingly that the gender gap and income inequality gap in Canada are both relatively less pressing issues than the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous citizens. It has adopted this position because Indigenous Peoples generally depend more on natural resources for their livelihoods than other citizens of Canada. Thus, domestically, the disproportionate climate change vulnerability of the poor and women seems to be less of an issue for the federal government of Canada than the disproportionate climate change vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples.

4.3.1 Translation of the Vulnerability Dimension

Although this research did not find many enouncements on climate change vulnerability beyond that of Indigenous Peoples living in Canada, the federal government of Canada has put significant effort into helping those whom it considers to be the most vulnerable to climate change. These efforts have been both domestic and international. As an example, the federal

government has promised to allocate 2.65 billion Canadian dollars to help underdeveloped countries with climate change efforts. This sum is being distributed within multiple frameworks, funds, and programmes, such as the 300 million Canadian dollar pledge to the Green Climate Fund to help developing countries adapt to climate change (Government of Canada, 2020). Moreover, 250 million Canadian dollars have been contributed to the International Finance Corporation (IFC)-Canada Blended Climate Finance Program. The IFC is a member of the World Bank Group. It is the largest global development institution focused on the private sector in developing countries. The IFC's aim is to advance economic development and improve the lives of people by encouraging the growth of the private sector in developing countries. In the Blended Climate Finance Program, the IFC and the Canadian federal government work together. The programme is, first, designed to protect private investors from the risks of projects aimed at establishing resilient infrastructure, climate-friendly agriculture, and renewable energy. Second, it is designed 'to promote gender-responsive climate action' (International Finance Corporation Canada & Government of Canada, 2019, p.3). Another channel through which the federal government of Canada, more specifically Global Affairs Canada, has tried to help vulnerable countries is the Canada Caribbean Disaster Risk Management Fund (CCDRMF). The CCDRMF finances projects in the Caribbean aimed at community-driven action to enhance climate change resilience and adaptation. The CCDRMF is noteworthy in this research context because it has financed two programmes in Trinidad and Tobago. The financed programmes are outlined in Table 5 and are illustrative of the types of projects that Caribbean countries could submit grant proposals for. Even though there were almost no enouncements found explicitly stating that the federal government of Canada perceives underdeveloped countries to be disproportionately vulnerable to the effects of climate change, this can be concluded by the Canadian federal governments' many efforts to support these countries with adaption and mitigation strategies.

Projects in Trinidad and Tobago funded by CCDRMF					
Project	Organization	Objectives	Project Time Period	Government of Canada's Contribution	Total Project Costs
Project C.A.R.E. Community Awareness through Responsible Preparedness and Empowerment	Habitat for Humanity Trinidad and Tobago	To reduce Disaster Risk and meet the needs of the Cumana community for safe, hurricane resilient homes.	2012 – 2013	\$69,974.52	\$108,212.52
Sale Shelter through Landslide Mitigation: A Community-Based Solution	Habitat for Humanity Trinidad and Tobago	To reduce the devastating effects of landslides on livelihoods, homes, and household safety in the low-income, landslide prone community of Moriah.	2016 – 2017	\$85,222.00	\$186,903.00

Table 5. Projects in Trinidad and Tobago funded by the Canada Caribbean Disaster Risk Management Fund (CCDRMF, 2017, p.3).

The second function of the IFC-Canada's Blended Climate Finance Program ('to promote gender-responsive climate action') indicates that the federal government of Canada also recognises that women are among those most vulnerable to climate change. Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy aims to address the following:

Women and girls are particularly at risk when it comes to these threats [threats caused by climate change]. The scarcity of resources in the wake of these challenges – in particular, the lack of clean drinking water – coupled with a gender-based imbalance in household responsibilities, means that climate change has a disproportionate impact on women and girls at the household level. (Global Affairs Canada, 2017, p.43)

The intent of this policy is to guide developing and non-developed countries towards gender equality. To do so, the policy stipulates conditions and guidelines for including gender equality in climate change policies to which countries must adhere to be eligible for financial support from the federal government of Canada and its complimentary institutions. Those conditions and guidelines can be found in Figure 5 (Global Affairs Canada, 2017, p.45). That the federal government of Canada has created such a policy in the first place illustrates that it regards gender equality to be of great importance. The inclusion of a whole chapter on environmental and climate action in the policy indicates that the same can be concluded about gender-based climate justice. The federal government of Canada seems to realise that gender equality is not yet high on the agenda for most undeveloped and developing countries and feels that it has a responsibility to address the issue and to help limit the disproportionate vulnerability of women to climate change. The IFC-Canada has mentioned that 'Canada has been a global champion of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, and the BCFP seeks to promote gender-responsive climate action' (International Finance Corporation Canada & Government of Canada, 2020, p.3). Canada's Feminist International Assistance program is a translation of this.

RECOGNIZING THAT WOMEN AND GIRLS ARE UNIQUELY AFFECTED BY THE DAMAGING EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, CANADA WILL...	
<p>...support women's leadership and decision making in climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, resilience-building and sustainable natural resource management. To achieve this, Canada will require that</p>	<p>women participate actively in the design and implementation of any climate adaptation or mitigation initiatives that are funded wholly or in part by the Government of Canada.</p>
<p>...ensure that the government's climate-related planning, policy-making and financing acknowledge the particular challenges faced by women and girls. This lens will be applied to all climate</p>	<p>change mitigation and adaption initiatives, including those developed through partnerships with local governments, civil society, the private sector and financial institutions.</p>
<p>...support employment and business opportunities for women in the renewable energy sector. In many developing countries, energy is the primary responsibility of women and girls, especially in rural areas. Canada will support greater use of renewable energy, create opportunities for women within</p>	<p>that sector, and help ensure that climate financing is equally accessible to woman-led initiatives and enterprises. This will be accomplished through programming that gives woman entrepreneurs greater access to information on and services related to renewable energy opportunities.</p>

Figure 5. Ensuring gender equality when taking climate action (Global Affairs Canada, 2017).

Lastly, this section considers how the federal government's focus on the vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples to the effects of climate change has been translated into federal climate efforts. The general consensus is that 'strengthening the collaboration between our governments and Indigenous Peoples on mitigation and adaptation actions, based on recognition of rights, respect, cooperation, and partnership', as well as 'recognizing the importance of Traditional Knowledge in regard to understanding climate impacts and adaptation measures', is important in Canada's climate change efforts such as policies (Government of Canada, 2016b, p.3). As Justin Trudeau expressed at the COP-21,

Our government is making climate change a top priority, and our actions will be based on five principles. (...) we will work with (...) Indigenous leaders who are taking a leadership role on climate change. Indigenous Peoples have known for thousands of years how to care for our planet. The rest of us have a lot to learn. And no time to waste. (Justin Trudeau, 2015, 00:00)

Examples of how the federal government of Canada will be or already is making an effort to abide by this promise are the following:

- Its continuing support to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations, 2007). As Jonathan Wilkinson stated at the COP-24 (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2019, p.30), 'Indigenous communities are the first to feel the impacts of climate change. Canada strongly supports respect for human rights of Indigenous Peoples'.
- Its pledge of 129.5 million Canadian dollars to, among other things, increase climate resilience in Indigenous communities and to develop a science base to inform decision-making and protect the health and wellbeing of all Canadians.
- Its pledge of 195 million Canadian dollars to, among other communities, Indigenous Peoples to adjust to carbon pollution pricing.

The main strategy of the federal government to reduce the disproportionate climate change vulnerabilities of, and thus ensure climate justice for, rural and Indigenous communities is supporting them financially regarding climate change adaptation and mitigation.

4.4 Perceptions on the Abatement Dimension

When it comes to the climate justice dimension of abatement, the federal government of Canada has had a striking history. As mentioned before, the then-federal government withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol under the UNFCCC in 2011 (Kyoto Protocol, 1997). Peter Kent, the former Minister of Environment and Climate Change and the one who officially announced Canada's withdrawal from the treaty at the COP-17, has made contradictory statements when explaining the withdrawal. First, he claimed that the treaty simply does not and will not achieve what it was created to achieve:

This government, unlike the one that signed on to Kyoto, has a plan to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, and we are making good progress. We are working to address climate change in a way that is fair, effective and comprehensive, and allows us to continue to create jobs and growth in Canada. (Kent, 2012)

Not only the related enouncements, but also the whole withdrawal shed light on the government's perception of the abatement dimension of climate justice. The use of the word 'fair' when talking about ways for the federal government to address climate change beyond the Kyoto Protocol implies that the federal government at the time did not perceive the treaty to be fair. The change of heart by the government could have been related to the fact that the federal government that signed and ratified the treaty was a different one than that which withdrew from it. A liberal government ratified the agreement in 2002, and a conservative government withdrew from it in 2011. Historically, conservative governments have been less inclined to take climate change action than liberal governments. In 2010, Japan and Russia announced that they would not accept new commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, but Canada was the only country to repudiate the treaty.

The reason the federal government of Canada perceived the treaty as unfair is twofold. First, Kent has argued that because the two largest emitters at the time, the United States and China, were not covered by the Kyoto Protocol, the treaty would not successfully achieve its aim. The emissions of the United States and China accounted for 41% of absolute global emissions, and China's emissions increased by over 200% from 1990 to 2009 (The Economist, 2011). John Dillon, Canadian Council of Chief Executives at the time of withdrawal, further argued that because numerous countries were not on track to meet their greenhouse gas emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol, the treaty would not be effective. Second, Canada was among those countries not on track to meet its targets and thus had to pay 14 billion dollars to enter the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

The federal government was not willing to stay, presumably because it did not consider these costs for climate change action fair, especially when the largest emitters were not covered by the protocol. This line of thinking is summarised by Kent's statement officially announcing Canada's withdrawal at the COP-17:

It is clear that Kyoto is not the path forward for a global solution to climate change. If anything, it's an impediment. (TheAlyonaShow, 00:31)

The word 'impediment' suggests that the federal government of Canada perceived the Kyoto Protocol as a burden. Regardless of the exact reason for withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, by doing so, the federal government of Canada officially renounced its global responsibilities within the UNFCCC for the remainder of the time that the protocol was still in place.

However, that period now belongs to the past. Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, the federal government of Canada has set the ambitious target of reducing the country's greenhouse gas emissions by 30%. It has also promised to uphold the commitments that come with the country's Annex 2 categorisation. Trudeau's speech at the COP-21 before signing the Paris Agreement echoed this promise:

At the same time, Canada's ambition cannot end with making it through a challenging situation at home. We have a role to play in supporting developing countries as well. They shouldn't be punished for a problem they didn't create, nor should they be deprived of the opportunity for clean growth that developed nations are now pursuing. (CBC News, 2016, 03:32)

This quotation's phrasing is notable. Trudeau's statement that developing countries 'shouldn't be punished for a problem they didn't create' hits the core of international climate injustice. With this statement, Trudeau was perhaps even acknowledging that Canada, as a developed

country, is in part responsible for creating the problem, which would make it just for its federal government to help the disadvantaged to deal with the problem.

Domestically, the federal government of Canada's enouncements on abatements are quite general and do not indicate precisely what the federal government means by 'fair'. On multiple occasions, the federal government stated that climate change governance should be fair, but did not specify what it perceived as fair regarding the distribution of the costs and benefits of climate change policies. Examples include the following:

It [the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Development and Climate Change] is fair and flexible, and recognizes the unique situation of provinces and territories across the country. (Government of Canada, 2016b, p.3)

It will also be important [for the federal government of Canada] to ensure a commitment to skills and training to provide Canadian workers with a just and fair transition to opportunities in Canada's clean growth economy. (Government of Canada, 2016b p.40)

One of the few more specific enouncements on the abatement dimension of climate justice again focused on Indigenous Peoples: 'Internationally, Canada is advocating for the enhanced participation of Indigenous Peoples in multilateral climate forums, including at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change as part of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, and in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change' (Government of Canada, 2018, p.98). The emphasis on including Indigenous Peoples in governance stems from the 2015 Assembly of First Nations 36th Annual General Assembly. A speech by Trudeau during this assembly underlined the importance of including Indigenous Peoples in climate change governance: 'Which leads me to the two key themes that I would like to address today (...) the importance of fairness and equality of opportunity for Aboriginal Peoples in Canada' (Liberal Video, 2015, 03:29).

4.4.1 Translation of the Abatement Dimension

As mentioned earlier, the federal government of Canada has allocated 2.65 billion dollars to supporting developing countries as part of its commitments under the 2015 Paris Agreement. This allocation relates to the enouncement by Trudeau stating that developing countries should not be punished for the climate crisis, considering that they took little part in creating it (CBC News, 2016, 03:32). Specifically, to name a few examples of how the federal government of Canada supports developing countries with climate change adaption and mitigating, this means the following:

- An additional 250 million Canadian dollars, on top of the 300 million Canadian dollars already mentioned in section 4.2.1, have been made available to help developing countries mitigate climate change through low-carbon emission strategies.
- The Canada-IFC Renewable Energy Program for Africa is part of the IFC-Canada Climate Change Program. This means an investment of 150 million Canadian dollars.
- A contribution to and co-founding of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to reduce short-lived climate pollutants. The federal government of Canada has pledged 13 million Canadian dollars to this coalition as well as 7 million Canadian dollars to backing other initiatives that combat long-term and short-term climate pollutants.

Another way to seek to ensure just climate action internationally is by sending a diverse national delegation to the COPs under the UNFCCC. The Canadian delegations over the last

years have included the prime minister and key government officials, business and labour representatives, environmentalists, religious groups, young people from all around the country, and representatives of Indigenous Peoples. The government of Canada has thus ensured diverse representation and guaranteed that diverse voices are heard at these conventions – and thus at the international level of climate governance (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2016). Furthermore, the federal government has devoted a whole chapter within its strategy for achieving the UNFCCC’s Agenda 2030 to the importance of taking Traditional Knowledge into consideration. The aim is to ensure that the perceptions and beliefs of Indigenous Peoples are considered in discussions on topics such as climate action, equality, and justice, to name a few key concepts of the SDGs.

Domestically, the following actions have also been undertaken to reduce climate change injustice for Indigenous Peoples:

- The federal government of Canada has pledged to include the needs, wants, and Traditional Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples in its four main strategies for climate change mitigation and adaptation.
- The federal government of Canada has acknowledged that Indigenous Peoples have jurisdiction over matters involving and impacting their wellbeing, both socio-economically and culturally.

These measures are mostly aimed at achieving procedural climate justice by including Indigenous Peoples in the decision-making process and recognising their authority on matters concerning their own wellbeing when creating climate change policies. The already-discussed carbon pricing system is also seen as a strategy through which climate justice for Indigenous people is pursued as has been illustrated before in the statement by the Working Group on Carbon Pricing Emissions (Working group on Carbon Pricing Emissions, 2016, p.3)

To ensure this balance, proper greenhouse gas emission measurement and monitoring mechanisms must be in place, along with proper monitoring of the state of the environment. When both factors are closely monitored, the government can evaluate whether its climate policies are successful. Additionally, in a carbon pricing system, accurately measuring and monitoring greenhouse gas emissions ensures that the actual polluter is the one that pays. On multiple occasions, the federal government has stressed the importance of measuring and monitoring to enhance fairness regarding climate action.

4.5 Summary of the Federal Government of Canada’s Approach to Climate Justice

The federal government of Canada has recently taken quite some steps regarding the translation of their perceptions of climate justice into practice, both internationally and domestically. The responsibility for tackling climate change lies, according to the federal government, with the Canadian governments on the federal and decentralised levels.

Internationally, the federal government is most concerned with women and the less affluent, meaning underdeveloped countries, non-developed countries and impoverished groups and citizens. To help ensure climate justice for women globally, the federal government of Canada has created the Feminist International Assistance Policy. In spite of the federal government of Canada not having mentioned the country’s relatively high share in creating the global climate crisis in the analysed documents, the federal government has expressed on multiple occasions that it must support developing and non-developed countries in taking action to adapt to and mitigate climate change. This perception of climate justice has come to fruition, for example,

by pledging 2.65 billion dollars for financing climate change adaption and mitigation projects in these developing countries through multiple funds and programs. To be eligible for support from the federal government of Canada in climate change mitigation and adaption, the governments of developed and non-developed countries must meet the conditions stated in the Feminist International Assistance Policy. This way, the federal government of Canada appears to be trying to safeguard climate justice for women in those countries.

Domestically, the federal government of Canada does not focus as much on the geographical vulnerability of the country itself, but it lays heavy emphasis on the disproportionate vulnerabilities to climate change and climate change policies of Indigenous Peoples. To reduce the vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples, the federal government has pledged funding to these groups to support climate change adaption as well as measures to ensure procedural climate justice for them.

The federal government of Canada mainly employs funding as a strategy to combat climate injustices, both domestically and internationally. It has also ensured the implementation of carbon pollution nationwide to ensure that the ‘the polluter pays’ principle is being employed in Canada.

Chapter 5 The Government of Trinidad and Tobago's Approach to Climate Justice

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter the government of Trinidad and Tobago's approach to climate justice will be elaborated on. This is done by discussing the perceptions and translations of the three climate justice discourses separately. The perceptions and translations of the responsibility dimension of climate justice will be discussed in section 5.2, the perceptions and translations of the vulnerability dimension of climate justice will be discussed in section 5.3 and the perceptions and translations of the climate justice dimension of abatement will be discussed in section 5.4. Suppositions made about these perceptions and translations are supported by quotations from analysed documents and the context in which the government of Trinidad and Tobago operates, as shown in paragraph 3.4.1 and Table 4. After the elaboration of the three climate justice dimensions the chapter will be concluded with a short summary of the government's approach to climate justice.

5.2 Perceptions of the Responsibility Dimension

How the government of Trinidad and Tobago frames responsibility for causing the climate crisis seems to depend on the discursive space (global, regional, or domestic) in which the discourse of the national government of Trinidad and Tobago is analysed. Notably, the source documents frequently mentioned Trinidad and Tobago's perceived relatively low global responsibility for the climate crisis. Enouncements on this are usually framed similarly to the following quote from the 'Medium-term policy framework 2011–2014' explaining that the country must take action to mitigate climate change through lowering its emissions: 'In spite of its minuscule absolute greenhouse gas emissions, Trinidad and Tobago is committed to playing its part as a responsible member of the global community' (Ministry of Planning and the Economy, 2011, p.17).

Another example is a statement by Senator Moses, Minister of Foreign and Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, at the 2015 UN Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Moses, 2015, p.3): 'Although its contribution to the climate change challenge has been negligible, Trinidad and Tobago is committed to doing its part to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate the effects of climate change'.

These statements, using concessive conjunctions (e.g., 'although' and 'in spite of') and adjectives such as 'negligible' and 'minuscule' strategically frame Trinidad and Tobago as a country with low global responsibility for causing the climate crisis, but a high willingness to nonetheless do its part within the international framework of the UNFCCC. Such statements suggest that the country is going above and beyond to help solve a problem it did not create. The first statement was made when the Kyoto Protocol was still in place, which is interesting because under the Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto Protocol, 1997), developing countries such as Trinidad and Tobago are exempted from having to reduce their emissions. The government of Trinidad and Tobago thus seemingly rejected that exemption by stating that it did feel that the country's emissions needed to be reduced. This assumption is affirmed by statements from the government of Trinidad and Tobago asserting that it would uphold its obligation under the UNFCCC to mitigate climate change through the reduction of greenhouse

gas emissions (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011a, 2015; Doodnath, 2019). Notably, even though the government is committed to doing its part, it does believe in 'common but differentiated responsibilities for addressing environmental challenges proportional to their contribution', as expressed in its recent National Environmental Policy (Government of Trinidad, 2018, p8). What the government perceives to be fair based on its contribution to climate change is elaborated on in section 5.1.1, which presents the targets the government aims to achieve with its climate policies.

The government seems to strike a slightly different note in enouncements on responsibility found at the regional discourse level. Examples are the following quotations: 'Although the country accounts for less than 1% of absolute global greenhouse gas emissions, it is the second largest producer of carbon dioxide per capita basis in the world' (Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development, 2015, p.21) and 'Trinidad and Tobago acknowledges its relatively high GHG emissions compared to other countries of the region. Thus, there is cognisance of the need for increased efforts to reduce these emissions, consistent with the targets in SDG 13 and the Paris Agreements' (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2020, p.58). With these statements, the government appears to acknowledge that it does have a responsibility, at least regionally, to take climate action. Its perception of its global responsibility stays intact with these enouncements, but they do imply that there is more to the government upholding its obligations under the UNFCCC than just willingness to cooperate.

Domestically, the government realises that the country's industrialised hydrocarbon economy must be restructured to fight climate change. The government assigns domestic responsibility for the climate crisis to the energy generation industry and gas sectors, which are responsible for the largest share of greenhouse gas emissions. The graph in Figure 6 comes from the 'Strategy for Reduction of Carbon Emissions in Trinidad and Tobago, 2040' (Solaun et al., 2015, p.3) and illustrates the percentage of the country's GHG emissions per economic sector:




Figure 6. Distribution of greenhouse gas emissions per sector (Solaun et al., 2015, p.3).

5.2.1 Translation of the Responsibility Dimension

The following mitigation target has been set by the government of Trinidad and Tobago as a translation of its perception of climate change responsibility (Singh, 2019; Solaun et al., 2015; Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2015): Reduce overall cumulative emissions from the three main emitting sectors by 15% by 2030 from 'business as usual' to 103 mtCo2e. The estimated cost of implementation is USD \$2 billion domestic funding and is conditional on international climate financing, including through the Green Climate Fund. The 2019 Report of the CERM Project 2019 makes the additional pledge to reduce emissions from transportation: Trinidad and Tobago has also committed to unconditionally reduce its public transportation emissions by 30% or one million, seven hundred thousand tonnes (1,700,000) CO2e compared to 2013 levels by December 31, 2030. (Minister of Planning and Development, 2019, p.35)

The three main emitters referenced in the first target are the power generation sector, the industry sector, and the transport sector of the country. These sectors are the ones the government perceives to be responsible for the country's greenhouse gas emissions.

The government's strategy for climate change mitigation is based on this perception and aims to reform the country's economy in the hopes that it will no longer be dependent on its oil and gas resources by 2040. The belief is that transforming the economy will lead the country to a green economy by following the path of sustainable development based on green growth. As the government itself has stated, 'in a green economy, growth income and employment should be driven by public and private sector investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance energy efficiency and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services' (Ministry of Planning and the Economy, 2015, p.2). Sustainable development is the main strategy through which the government of Trinidad and Tobago plans on achieving climate change adaptation and mitigation. The government has put the fiscal incentives outlined in Figure 7 in place to 'diversify the economy away from its skewed dependence on non-renewable resources to alternative, renewable energy sources' (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2013, p.22):

SOLAR	WIND	ENERGY EFFICIENCY (EE)
25 % Tax Credit on Solar Water Heaters (SWH)	0% VAT on Wind Turbines	150 % Allowance for the design and installation of energy saving systems by an Energy Service Company(ESCO)
150 % Wear & Tear Allowance for SWH;SWH Plant, Machinery and Equipment, and Solar PV Systems	150 % Wear & Tear Allowance for Wind Turbines and supporting equipment	ESCO can write off value of assets in two years: - a)75 % Depreciation on plant, machinery and equipment acquisition; b) 25 % Wear& Tear Allowance in following year.
Conditional Duty Exemptions for SWH Manufacturers		
0 % VAT on SWH& Solar PV Systems		

Figure 7. Fiscal incentives for greenhouse gas emissions reductions (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2013, p.24).

The use of the word 'skewed' is interesting when describing a relatively prosperous economic structure. The sectors on which the economy is most reliant are also the most polluting. Perhaps because of the country's relatively high vulnerability to extreme weather patterns due to climate change, the government has mixed feelings about its economic structure. On the one hand, this structure has resulted in Trinidad and Tobago being one of the richest SIDS. On the other hand, it realises that this status comes at a price.

Next to the energy sector, the transport sector of Trinidad and Tobago is also perceived to be in need of transformation. It has already undergone changes aimed at making the sector more sustainable. Almost 7,000 vehicles have been converted from running on gasoline to running on compressed natural gas (CNG), which is considered greener and more efficient. The low retail price of CNG and the related price structure came into effect in 2014. Other fiscal incentives to convert gasoline vehicles into CNG vehicles are the following:

- 'MVT [Motor Vehicle Tax] and VAT [Value Added Tax] removed on imported new and used (less than 2 years old) natural gas vehicles
- Removal of duty on components for the retrofit of vehicles to use CNG
- For non-business – 25% tax credit for conversion cost up to a limit of 2,500 Trinidad and Tobago Dollars per vehicle
- For business – Capital uplift of 130% for wear and tear allowance' (Ministry of Energy and Energy Efficiency, n.d.).

These fiscal incentives are aimed at making the switch from gasoline to CNG vehicles more, economically, appealing and thus are aimed to urge companies and individual government to make that switch. The government of Trinidad and Tobago, specifically the Public Transport Corporation, has also sought to convert the national bus fleet to be powered by CNG. To that end, the Public Transport Corporation purchased 35 CNG busses from China; these busses were added to the bus fleet in 2015. These translations of perceptions of responsibility regarding climate justice fit with the transition strategy mentioned earlier, in which the focus is less on assigning blame and more on working together to achieve green growth (Audet, 2013).

5.3 Perceptions of the Vulnerability Dimension

As a small island developing state (SIDS), the country is vulnerable to temperature increases, changes in precipitation and sea level rise. Other vulnerabilities include increased flooding, increased frequency and intensity of hurricanes, hillside erosion and loss of coastal habitats. In fact, even though Trinidad and Tobago is not in the main Atlantic hurricane belt, one of the new hazard scenarios considered for the country is the increased potential to be hit by tropical storms. (Solaun et al., 2015, p.5)

This statement, or versions of it, can be found in almost all the national documents of Trinidad and Tobago regarding both climate change and environmental issues (Solaun et al., 2015; Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011a; Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2018b). The multitude of similar statements illustrates that the government of Trinidad and

Tobago is highly aware of the dangerous consequences of climate change for the country. Temperatures in Trinidad and Tobago have already risen by 1.64° Celsius between 1975 and 2015. Such statements also emphasise that Trinidad and Tobago is an SIDS. This term adds a certain weight to the government's statements about climate change, especially when used in an international climate policy context – it is globally acknowledged that SIDSs are among the most vulnerable and least globally responsible for climate change. Examples can be found in the 2014 Islands Declaration on Climate Change Policy and the 2011 National Climate Change Policy, respectively:

Concerned by our lack of capacity and the resources necessary for us to face up to climate changes, extreme phenomena, population movements and possible reconstruction of our territories. (Reunion of the Islands, 2014, p1)

Adaptation and mitigation therefore remain a priority for highly vulnerable countries such as Trinidad and Tobago. As a SIDS, Trinidad and Tobago will be severely impacted by the adverse effects of climate change. (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011b, p.10)

Most enouncements by the government found during the analysis on unjust climate vulnerability found point to the relatively high climate change vulnerability of the country itself. In comparison to the numerous enouncements on the country's vulnerability, hardly any enouncements specified whom the government perceived to be most vulnerable domestically. This lack of enouncements found suggests that, over the last 10 years, the government of Trinidad and Tobago has not been focusing on ensuring climate justice regarding the unequal effects of climate change and climate change policies within its national climate change governance framework. The few enouncements on domestic climate change vulnerability were quite superficial and broad. Nonetheless, these statements indicate that the government of Trinidad and Tobago considers the less affluent, women, and Indigenous peoples to be more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than others. Examples of enouncements regarding the climate change vulnerabilities of women, the poor, and Indigenous peoples are below:

The differential impact of climate change and natural disasters on women/girls and men/boys should be understood in risk management and mitigation activities aimed at planning, responding to and the recovery from such occurrences. (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2018a, p.58)

However, it [climate change] will be particularly harmful for the less affluent population sectors, which are the most vulnerable to its effects. (Solaun et al., 2015, p.12)

Only two enouncements on the disproportionate vulnerability of rural communities and Indigenous Peoples were found. Meaning that the government of Trinidad and Tobago does believe that Indigenous Peoples are among the groups most vulnerable among the most vulnerable, but their focus regarding climate change is elsewhere.

5.3.1 Translation of the Vulnerability Dimension

At the UN Summit for adopting Agenda 2030 during Dialogue No. 4, in which climate change was discussed, Senator Moses, Minister of Foreign and CARICOM Affairs, stated the following: 'Our stand in solidarity with the impoverished, the marginalised and the vulnerable cannot end with the adoption of a declaration and empty words and promises' (Moses, 2015, p.2). The declaration in question was Agenda 2030.

As is spelled out in the National Voluntary Review itself, 'Trinidad and Tobago's Voluntary National Review (VNR) underscores the Government's commitment to sustainable and inclusive development that leaves no one behind' (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2020, p.7). The VNRs are documents in which countries review and demonstrate how they have been trying to achieve sustainable development. This means fulfilling the 17 interconnected SDGs set by the UN as part of Agenda 2030 (UN General Assembly, 2015). Trying to achieve the 17 SDGs is the government of Trinidad and Tobago's main strategy for trying to reduce vulnerability in the country, including climate change vulnerability. In its Roadmap for SDG Implementation, crucial steps towards achieving Vision 2030 are outlined (United Nations Country Team MAPS Mission Teams, 2017, p.10). Figure 8 illustrates the challenges the government of Trinidad and Tobago must overcome to ensure better social protection and thus less vulnerability.




Figure 8. Challenges for social protection (United Nations Country Team MAPS Mission Teams, 2017, p.10).

The roadmap, however, does not contain concrete measures that the government will implement to overcome these challenges. The Vision 2030 (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2015) document is the government's own Agenda 2030, and it states that vulnerability will be addressed by completing a vulnerability assessment, which will form the foundation of more concrete policies to reduce vulnerability.

In the National Climate Change Policy of 2011, the government of Trinidad and Tobago already mentioned the need to assess climate change vulnerability, although it was only referring to a sectoral vulnerability assessment. Despite the government's heavy emphasis on sustainable development and green economy strategies, this sectoral vulnerability assessment was only completed in 2019, eight years after the need for such an assessment was expressed. The vulnerability assessment entails how and to what degree climate change will influence seven 'sectors' of Trinidad and Tobago: coastal resources, agriculture and food security, water

resources, human health, biodiversity, infrastructure and human settlements, and the financial sector. The lengthy assessment process has slowed the process of decreasing climate change vulnerability. Various climate change policy documents state the need for such an analysis to guarantee that climate change measures intended to help the most vulnerable correspond to what these people actually need.

That this vulnerability assessment took so long could be one reason that government policies have lacked concrete measures to ensure that the most vulnerable are considered and included when adapting to climate change. Another reason may be the lack of enouncements containing perceptions found within climate change policies on climate change vulnerability, combined with the limited concrete efforts to decrease climate change vulnerability, as mentioned in section 5.3. Making it seem that government of Trinidad and Tobago does not have climate justice for the disproportionately vulnerable high on its domestic climate change agenda. The vulnerability assessment has been one of the only concrete measures taken to address climate change vulnerability in Trinidad and Tobago, making the following statement by Senator Moses almost ironic: 'Our stand in solidarity with the impoverished, the marginalised and the vulnerable cannot end with the adoption of a declaration and empty words and promises' (Senator Moses, 2015, p.2). That said, the completed vulnerability assessment does contain numerous recommendations for adaptation measurements that could reduce climate change vulnerabilities.

Climate change vulnerabilities that the government has already addressed through adaptation strategies and plans are geographical vulnerabilities, such as the vulnerability of coastal zones and protected areas (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011b, 2011c). Examples of such adaption measures are the construction of dikes and the harvesting of rainwater for agricultural practices. These adaptation projects do not address the disproportionate impacts of climate change on vulnerable peoples and groups, but they do address the disproportionate global vulnerability of the country itself.

5.4 Perceptions of the Abatement Dimension

As illustrated before, the focus of the government of Trinidad and Tobago seems to be on the country's high vulnerability to climate change and its low responsibility for causing it. The government may perceive it to be the duty of developed countries, which are generally more responsible for the climate crisis, to help Trinidad and Tobago with its mitigation and adaptation strategies. The government of Trinidad and Tobago has expressed this belief on multiple occasions, claiming that Trinidad and Tobago, as an SIDS, should have access to financing and other resources through the international frameworks to which it is connected. One of the most striking related enouncements on this perception can be found in the Islands Declaration on Climate Change (Reunion of the Islands, 2014, p.3):

We ... request that islands and island states are given priority for the post-2015 international climate change agenda and that they may benefit from important efforts made by the international community to support the commitment of our territories and commitments ... we request easy access to the set of instruments and support structures, both financial and institutional, enabling the application of policies aimed at sustainable development and at improving the resilience of our territories to the effects of climate change. (Reunion of the Islands, 2014, p.3)

The word 'priority' means 'primary concern'. By issuing this statement together with other SIDSs, the government of Trinidad and Tobago seemed to be suggesting that Trinidad and Tobago, as an SIDS, should be one of the world's top concerns while combating climate change internationally. Senator Moses made a similar statement at the 2015 UN Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda:

Those of us with a greater historical responsibility must also ensure that the necessary resources are made available to support more ambitious action in developing countries. (Moses, 2015, p.2)

Another statement echoing this sentiment is found in the 'Second Communication of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago', a document submitted under the UNFCCC to update the COP on Trinidad and Tobago's greenhouse gas emissions and national programmes for mitigating and adapting to climate change. This statement is more specific and concerns the importance of preserving biodiversity, as the loss of biodiversity negatively affects sustainable development, poverty eradication, and people's livelihoods and wellbeing:

The convention is the key instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2013, p.86)

The three statements already presented in this section, although all of them have a different specific meaning, all indicate that the government of Trinidad and Tobago does agree with the UNFCCC categorisation system that classifies some countries as Annex 2. As discussed before, Annex 2 countries are developed countries that have an obligation to help non-Annex 1 countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change financially and through the distribution of other helpful resources. Both climate change policy aims are considered of equal importance by the government of Trinidad and Tobago, as stated in the government's Nationally Determined Contribution: 'the Government of Trinidad and Tobago has placed equal importance on mitigation and adaptation because it recognises the need for developing a low carbon economy to assist in the achievement of sustainable development objectives' (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2015, p.5).

As with the enouncements on vulnerability, the enouncements on abatement were quite broad and superficial. In most empirical sources analysed, enouncements on abatement were statements such as the following from the National Climate Change Policy:

This will be done through the development and delivery of strategies and actions for maximising renewable energy resources, clean energy and clean production technology as well as adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change through integration within all aspects of national development in its infrastructural, human and socio-economic systems, at an acceptable balance of costs and benefits. (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011b, p.15)

The government of Trinidad and Tobago has not specified what it believes to be an 'acceptable balance' beyond its perception that Annex 2 countries should share their resources to support non-Annex 1 countries' climate change efforts. Furthermore, the enouncements on what is fair regarding domestic climate change efforts are almost exclusively aimed at intergenerational fairness. Enouncements on this are similar to the one below:

Accordingly, the government shall develop, through a process of thorough consultation, win-win or no-regrets solutions, or 'actions worth doing anyway' which will redound to the benefit

of the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago, for current and future generations consistent with the principles of sustainable development. (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011a, p.16)

The National Gender Policy (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2018a, p.58) also contains the following enouncements on gender equality regarding climate change governance:

Ensure the equitable inclusion of men and women in efforts aimed [at] mitigating climate change.

Ensure the equitable inclusion of men and women in communities in developing strategies and mechanisms for coping with and adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change.

Both the enouncement containing the idea of intergenerational fairness and the enouncements addressing gender equality in climate change governance are broad statements. Expressions such as 'equitable inclusion', 'fair access', 'fairly allocating', and 'equitable access' are typical of the abatement dimension of climate justice discourse. However, the government has not specified what it perceives to be 'fair' and 'equitable' in this context. Nonetheless, that such a policy exists suggests that the government of Trinidad and Tobago holds gender equality in high regard.

Only two enouncement regarding Indigenous people's disproportionate climate change vulnerability were found during the analysis of the government of Trinidad and Tobago. Perhaps this is not surprising since the Indigenous population of Trinidad and Tobago has long disappeared. In spite this, due to the implications of one of the enouncements it notable to present it in this study. It comes from Trinidad and Tobago's National Forest and Protected Areas Policy:

take into account the needs of indigenous people and local communities, including subsistence resource use, where this does not adversely affect the primary objective; to contribute to local economies through tourism. (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011, p.48)

Because so few enouncements, not even in the international discursive space, were found on climate change vulnerability of Indigenous peoples, no conclusions can be drawn on how the government perceives this climate change vulnerability. The fact, however, that so little enouncement on this vulnerable group were found, combined with the enouncement from the National Forest and Protected Areas Policy stating that the economy take precedence over taking into account Indigenous people's needs, does suggest that the government of Trinidad and Tobago has not focused on pressing the importance of climate justice for Indigenous peoples over the last ten years.

5.4.1 Translation of the Abatement Dimension

The absence of concrete enouncements indicating what exactly the government of Trinidad and Tobago perceives to be 'fair' regarding gender and intergenerational climate justice made it hard to find practical examples of how the government has translated this dimension of climate justice into its climate change efforts. The case analysis revealed, however, that sustainable development is the way forward for the government of Trinidad and Tobago. Pursuing sustainable development is the government's main strategy for mitigating the disproportionate burdens of climate change effects and policies. Examples of how the

government is trying to achieve sustainable development are present in the following two statements:

The goal of the policy is the sustainable management of the forest resources of Trinidad and Tobago to provide for the social, economic, ecological, cultural and spiritual needs of present and future generations; contribute to the sustainable development of the country; enhance the quality of human life, while at the same time protecting biological diversity and ecological processes. (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011b, p.12)

PAs [protected areas] are important management tools for protecting, conserving and managing natural and built heritage, and so critical to national sustainable development. (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011c, p.1)

The protection of forests, wildlife, and other protected areas such marine areas can be seen as a means to the end of sustainable development and the costs, benefits, and responsibility 'will be shared among all stakeholders, who should have opportunities to share in managing resources and the right to participate in decision-making' (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2011b, p.14; 2011c, p.10, 2013). Another slightly more specific enunciation on abatement comes from the National Environmental Policy (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2018b, p. 8): 'The cost of preventing pollution, minimising environmental damage due to pollution, and/or compensation for damages due to pollution, shall be borne by those responsible for the pollution'. This statement articulates that the government of Trinidad and Tobago believes it to be fair that actors responsible for pollution should also be held accountable for it. Section 5.1.1 has already discussed the government's tactics to reform the country's most economically beneficial sectors, which are also responsible for the largest share of the country's emissions.

Two more concrete examples of how the government tries to achieve sustainable development are the National System for Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and the Knowledge and Management System (KMS), for which a pilot started in 2019 (UNPD, 2019). These systems are particularly aimed at achieving 'SDG 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts' (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). The MRV was implemented to gather accurate data on greenhouse gas emissions. The KMS, which includes methodological strategies, will function as a foundation for the MRV depository. In this MRV depository the data will be collected and reviewed. In this framework of monitoring emissions to gain better insight into how to mitigate them, the government is connected to the Low Emission Capacity Building (LECB) programme of the European Commission, the governments of Germany and Australia, and the UN Development Programme. The LECB was created to help developing countries build capacity and knowledge regarding how they can seek a low-carbon path towards economic development. The MRV ultimately exists to support the National Climate Change Policy and the Carbon Reduction Strategy because accurately monitoring emissions will help the government form fairer and more effective mitigation efforts and to review the effectiveness of existing mitigation initiatives, such as the strategies mentioned in section 5.2.1.

5.5 Summary of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago's Approach to Climate Justice

The government of Trinidad and Tobago regards the country to have low global responsibility, globally, for causing the climate crisis, something that is expressed on multiple occasions. The focus of the government of Trinidad and Tobago regarding climate justice is on the country

itself. The most amount of enouncements found entailing perceptions and translations of climate justice detailed that the country should be supported in its climate change adaption and mitigation strategies.

The government of Trinidad and Tobago does recognize the disproportionate vulnerability to the effects of climate change and climate change policies of the impoverished, women and Indigenous people. There were, however, no in-depth measures or specific statements found in the analysis through in which the government really addressees the disproportionate climate change vulnerabilities of these groups within the governments national climate change policies. Notable is, that in the ten years that the country's first National Climate Change Policy has been in place, not much progress has been made by the government to actually adapt to climate change or to mitigate GHG emissions. Therefore, there were not many examples to be found of how the government of Trinidad and Tobago has translated ideas about climate justice into practice. The government of Trinidad and Tobago does perceive that it's their responsibility to take the lead in achieving sustainable development.

Pursuing sustainable development is the government of Trinidad and Tobago's main strategy for eventually also achieving climate justice.

Chapter 6 Conclusions

6.1 Introduction

In this concluding chapter the comparison of both cases, the national governments of Canada and Trinidad and Tobago, will be made, in section 6.2, by answering the guiding questions presented in the analytic framework, Table 2, from the perspectives of both analysed governments. Afterwards theoretical discussion as well as a discussion on the limitations and possible avenues for future research on the subject will be elaborated on in section 6.3. Last, the conclusion of this thesis will be presented in section 6.4.

6.2 Comparing the Cases

6.2.1 Comparison of the Countries Regarding the Climate Justice Dimension of Responsibility

Both the federal government of Canada and the government of Trinidad and Tobago perceive the responsibility for tackling climate change as belonging to governmental institutions. Furthermore, both governments believe in the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, but how they translate this principle is quite different. The Canadian federal government has put a system in place, the carbon pricing system, that is meant to ensure that the polluter actually pays, domestically. The government of Trinidad and Tobago seems to regard the polluter to be industrialized countries, this perception translates itself in the government stating on multiple occasions that support from these countries is needed for Trinidad and Tobago’s mitigation and adaption strategies. This difference also manifests itself in that hardly any enouncements on global responsibility were found within the source documents from the federal government of Canada, but related enouncements were numerous in the source documents from the government of Trinidad and Tobago.

However, for both governments, the perception of governmental responsibility extends beyond national borders, meaning that both believe that developed countries – Annex 1 countries – have the responsibility to assist developing and underdeveloped countries with adapting to and mitigating climate change. For this reason, and the categorisations of Canada as an Annex 1 country and Trinidad and Tobago as a non-Annex 1 country, both governments likely perceive the former as bearing responsibility for helping the latter to battle climate change.

6.2.2 Comparison of the Countries Regarding the Climate Justice Dimension of Vulnerability

Both governments perceive that the groups most vulnerable to the effects of climate change are women, the poor, Indigenous peoples, and rural communities. There were more diverse enouncements from the Canadian government than that of Trinidad and Tobago on the global injustices of climate change vulnerability. In terms of vulnerability, the government of Trinidad and Tobago perceives Trinidad and Tobago, as an SIDS, to be disproportionately vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change.

Although both governments have the same perceptions on which groups are the most vulnerable, their focuses differ. The federal government of Canada perceives the disproportionate vulnerability of its Indigenous inhabitants and rural communities as most important, with most of its enouncements on the vulnerability dimension of climate justice

focusing on these groups. The focus of the government of Trinidad and Tobago is on the country's own vulnerability, emphasising the disastrous consequences that climate change is expected to have for SIDSs. Most of its enouncements on climate justice focused on this issue. The government of Trinidad and Tobago had far less enouncements containing perceptions on domestic climate change vulnerabilities than did the federal government of Canada.

An interesting difference between the two governments regards their statements on Indigenous peoples. When the federal government of Canada refers to Indigenous peoples, the words are capitalised. When the government of Trinidad and Tobago does so, the words are lowercased. Further research revealed the following statement from the Canadian Department of Justice (Department of Justice Canada, 2020): 'The use of initial capital letters is not only grammatically correct but also conveys respect'. It can thus be concluded that the government of Canada holds Indigenous peoples in high regard. No similar specifications were found on why the government of Trinidad and Tobago uses lowercases when addressing Indigenous peoples, so no conclusions can be drawn from the decision can be drawn based on this stylistic decision.

6.2.3 Comparison of the Countries Regarding the Climate Justice Dimension of Abatement

Regarding the abatement dimension of climate justice, both governments seem to be in agreement, with the government of Trinidad and Tobago stating that it feels it should have access to international resources to combat climate change and the federal government of Canada providing these resources. Coincidentally, this agreement on perceived fairness has already come to fruition through the CCDMRF, which has partly funded two climate change adaptation programmes in Trinidad and Tobago. A more detailed description of this funding can be found in paragraph 4.2.1. Another example of how the federal government of Canada has helped to reduce injustice in terms of the negative externalities of climate change is its Feminist International Assistance Policy, in which it sets guidelines for countries to ensure gender equality in their climate change governance. These guidelines must be followed for non-Annex 1 countries to be eligible for support from the government of Canada.

The federal government of Canada has also honoured its commitments as an Annex-2 country under UNFCCC to support developing countries' climate actions by committing 2.65 billion Canadian dollars to projects in developing countries.

6.3 Discussion

6.3.1 Theoretical Discussion

The findings of this study echo Audet's (2013) claim that the focus of climate change negotiations has shifted from the classic North–South duality to a shared understanding that the world as a whole needs to transition to a low-carbon economy. This is because there were almost no enouncements found framing the North–South duality as an obstacle to overcome when creating unilateral climate change policies in either case. Instead, when emphasis was placed on this duality, it was more in the context of illustrating why cooperation between the Global North and the Global South is needed when combatting climate change.

Internationally, both governments seem to be in agreement about how to reduce global climate injustice. Specifically, both governments concur that developed countries should support undeveloped and developing countries in their climate change efforts. In this way, they both

agree with Harris's (2010) climate justice strategy, which states that the most affluent should take the lead.

By comparing the two countries' perceptions of climate justice and their translation into climate change policies, this study finds that the federal government of Canada is numerous steps ahead of the government of Trinidad and Tobago in bridging the domestic gap in terms of unequal climate change and climate change policy effects. Hardly any in-depth enouncements from the government of Trinidad and Tobago indicated the groups that it perceives to be most vulnerable to the unfair distribution of climate change (policy) burdens and its plans to limit this unfairness. For the federal government of Canada, numerous translations of its perceptions of climate justice were found, along with information on how it wants to pursue climate justice and measures that it has already taken. Due to the numerous climate change efforts of the federal government of Canada found addressing matters of climate justice and the very few climate change efforts by the government of Trinidad and Tobago found addressing climate justice in this analysis, the federal government of Canada seems closer to achieving climate justice as meant by Scandrett (2016) than is the government of Trinidad and Tobago.

This difference can be explained by the contexts of both countries. As has been discussed, Canada is much wealthier and much less vulnerable to the effects of climate change and climate change policies than Trinidad and Tobago. Regarding its climate change policies, the government of Trinidad and Tobago seemingly prioritises other factors than climate justice. Its focus seems to be on meeting people's physiological needs, such as food security; protecting the economy; and ensuring that the country is safe from the effects of climate change.

In comparison, it appears the federal government of Canada is far ahead in its pursuit of climate justice. It has taken steps to enhance procedural climate justice by, for example, including Indigenous Peoples in the process of climate change policy creation. It has also enhanced distributive climate justice, having provided financial aid for the vulnerable and less affluent, helping them adapt and mitigate (Bulkeley et al., 2013).

This finding is reminiscent of Maslow's (1943) famous hierarchy of needs. In this framework, human development is divided into five tiers of needs that must be fulfilled sequentially (Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg & Schaller, 2010). Broadly speaking, the government of Trinidad and Tobago is still working on fulfilling people's basic, low tier, needs when it comes to climate change policy, making it less concerned with pursuing climate justice – a self-actualising, high tier, need – even though it does have ideas about what climate justice means for the country and its citizens. The implication that pursuing climate change is a 'self-actualising need', suggest that pursuing climate justice as meant by Scandrett (2016) is a luxury need, one that is not a priority when more pressing matters are at stake.

A related finding is that the government of Trinidad and Tobago is far more concerned about the country's economy than about pursuing climate justice. The most striking example is a statement, presented in paragraph 5.2.1, from the national government that it will take the needs of Indigenous peoples and local communities into account when doing so does not negatively affect the economic gains from tourism. The implication is that for a developing Global South country, economic development is more important than pursuing climate justice domestically. The climate justice perception of Brazilian President Bolsonaro, as explained in Chapter 1, also exemplifies this view. The Brazilian government also prioritises economic growth over the protection of Indigenous peoples living in the Amazon Rainforest. The finding that perusing

climate justice appears to be a luxury regarding climate change policies has been illustrated in this thesis using the example of Indigenous peoples, but the same is true regarding gender-related and poverty-related climate justice. To validate this supposition, further and larger-scale comparative research must be conducted on perceptions of climate justice and their translations in Global North and Global South countries.

All previous climate justice research has agreed that the precise definition of climate justice can differ depending on the analysed actor (Bulkely et al., 2013; Miller, 1995; Feindt & Oels, 2005). This study does not deny that this is true, but it does add an important caveat: Both analysed governments agree on the groups that are disproportionately impacted by the unequal effects of climate change and climate change policy can be unjust. However, their focal points differ regarding how these perceptions are translated into policies. The Canadian government has focused on ensuring climate justice for Indigenous Peoples and rural communities domestically, and the government of Trinidad and Tobago's domestic focus has been on ensuring climate justice for the disproportionately vulnerable country of Trinidad and Tobago itself.

Based on these findings, the researcher offers policy recommendations:

1. The governments of developing countries should focus on pursuing procedural climate justice. This is less economically challenging than focusing on distributive climate justice, and procedural climate justice can also enhance distributive climate change decisions in terms of justice (Bulkely et al., 2013).
2. The governments of developed countries could follow the federal government of Canada's lead in creating policies such as Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy. With built-in justice conditions for undeveloped and developing countries to receive financial climate change support, such policies could enhance overall climate justice.

6.3.2 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

Since this paper has only analysed empirical sources from the national governments of Trinidad and Tobago and Canada, it only contains translations of climate justice perceptions into climate action on the national level. Since the practical implementation of the Canadian federal policies are carried out by lower levels of the government, reviewing the practical implications of climate justice perceptions and translations was difficult. Analysing documents with different governmental origins could result in a more accurate depiction of climate justice in the context of the whole governmental network in both countries. For a concept as subjective as justice, this approach could have provided more complete information on why certain climate actions were taken.

In addition, a discourse analysis always contains some level of subjectivity from the researcher, and this research is no exception. Hence, the findings on climate justice discourses are subject to the researcher's interpretation, which may have influenced the structure of the analysis and the identification of dimensions of climate justice discourses. Different choices could have led to different outcomes. For this reason, the researcher attempted to make the analysis and its presentation as transparent as possible by presenting numerous quotations from the analysed cases supporting the statements made by the researcher. It also would have been beneficial to conduct interviews with politicians or public servants from the selected countries to gain other perspectives on the collected data.

The specific reasons for choosing certain types of climate action not elaborated on in-depth in this thesis. This could mean that the researcher's interpretations of the motivations for certain climate policies or actions might differ from the actual motivations, which could have resulted in partly incorrect assumptions about how a government's perceptions of climate justice were translated into actual policies.

Lastly, since only two cases were examined, the conclusions have low external validity. This means that they cannot be generalised to other Global North and Global South countries.

Based on the limitations of this research, the researcher offers the following suggestions for further research:

1. Since a government consists of more than just the national bodies of that government, it would be worthwhile to also include local governments in similar climate justice research. This study has illustrated that national climate change policies are usually implemented at the local or regional level. This approach could help to explain why national governments chose certain climate change actions over others and would entail analysing the contexts of those policies and actions in more depth.
2. Conducting a larger-scale discourse analysis on climate justice could identify additional dimensions of climate justice. This approach could also be beneficial in creating a discourse framework for the concept of climate justice. Such a framework could be useful for delegations to COPs and for policymakers worldwide since different perceptions of climate justice could be easily detected through such a framework and therefore considered by those involved in climate change governance. Such a framework could also help policymakers to better formulate their climate justice perceptions, making them less prone to ambiguity.

6.4 Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to examine and compare perceptions of climate justice and their translations into the national policies of Canada and Trinidad and Tobago. By comparing these two countries, the researcher has found that their perceptions of climate justice are in fact quite similar. Both national governments share the belief that the less affluent, women, Indigenous peoples, and rural communities are the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and climate change policies. Another commonality found is that both governments seem to be in agreement about the climate justice implications that the UNFCCC categorization has, in which Annex 2 countries should support Non-Annex 1 countries in their climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies. Where they differ, however, is in the translation of these perceptions: The focal points of both national governments regarding climate justice are vastly different. The government of Trinidad and Tobago is focused on global climate justice for the country itself because of its climate change vulnerability as an SIDS. The federal government of Canada is more concerned with ensuring climate justice for the Indigenous inhabitants of the country.

The most important implication of the findings is that pursuing climate justice when creating climate change policies seems to be somewhat of a luxury. The governments of countries that are less developed have other priorities regarding climate change beyond climate justice, such as security and safeguarding basic needs. Whereas the governments of developed countries,

which usually already have secured these basic needs or can easily do so due to their rich resources, seem to have the luxury to be able to be concerned with matters of climate justice. Meaning that, perhaps, it is up to the governments of developed countries to take the lead in ensuring that the perceptions of climate justice of governments of developing and non-developed countries are not forsaken.

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