

Parliament as steppingstone?

An analysis of post-parliamentary careers

Master thesis

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Abstract

Not much is known about MP's after they leave parliament. This study analyses the development of patterns in post-parliamentary employment in The Netherlands between 1967 and 2017. With 999 MP's coded, this is the most extensive study into post-parliamentary careers up to date and a first inquiry into a development over time. The study argues – and finds – that the function of parliament is increasingly used as a steppingstone for a further career as MP's are increasingly making a move towards more attractive careers, either within or outside the political domain. Besides such dynamic changes, this study shows that MP's from traditionally stronger and governing parties have a distinctive advantage for gaining a more attractive post parliamentary career while MP's from anti-establishment parties have a distinctive disadvantage. Even when there is controlled for the background career of a MP. Finally, this study has tried to establish a link between the patterns of post-parliamentary employment and parliamentary behaviour for the first time. However, the results indicate that such a connection, if it is even present, is relatively weak.

Introduction

Individual politicians are the craftsmen which are required for democracy to work. As a result, they have been studied intensively; studies of political representation have focused on their background, ideology, and similarity to the voters (Bovens & Willie, 2014; Golder & Ferland, 2017; Lowande, Ritchie, & Lauterbach, 2019), parliamentary politics studies have focused on their behaviour and time within parliament (Martin, Saalfeld, & Strøm, 2014), while electoral studies focus on their behaviour during elections (Herron, Pekkanen, & Shugart, 2017). Nonetheless, as soon as politicians leave the political arena, our knowledge about them almost ceases to exist. Few studies have been conducted following the transition out of parliament (Donohue, 2016, p. 26), and the field of political exit remains “under-theorized, under-researched and under-appreciated” (Keane, 2011, pp. 282–283). This might be surprising considering the large numbers of anecdotal examples of post parliamentary careers. Multiple former politicians made the move towards lucrative private sector appointments, while similarly, critiques of anti-establishment parties have paid attention to the revolving door between political and high-ranking government positions.

Career choices of politicians do not only tell about their own perspective careers, but also highlight the relevance of institutions they move in or out of. Few studies have used the perspective of careers for determining the role of Parliaments (Scarrow, 1997). This study proposes to do exactly that. As the average age of Members of Parliament (MP’s) is increasingly lowering (Byrne & Theakston, 2016; Fraser & Weller, 1987; Staatscommissie Parlementair Stelsel, 2018), a new perspective of the function of MP and a new perspective of parliamentary importance emerges. On the one hand, MP’s are increasingly having a career after parliament (Baturu & Mikhaylov, 2016; Dörrenbächer, 2016; Stolz & Fischer, 2014), while simultaneously the first studies show that some MP’s successfully manage to make a move towards a more attractive career in either the private or the public sector (Claessen, Bailer, & Turner-Zwinkels, 2020; Würfel, 2018). As this is the case, the question emerges if parliament can be seen as steppingstone for a further career. As a result, this study uses the following research question: *Is parliament increasingly used as a steppingstone for an attractive post parliamentary career?*

Within this paper this question will be answered using the case of The Netherlands. The Dutch parliament would be an exemplary case for studying post parliamentary careers as it is a

parliament without any cool-off period¹ – i.e., MP's are able to take on any job right after parliament – and with a high level of professionalisation (Fish & Kroenig, 2009, p. 755).² Moreover, the Dutch parliament perfectly follows the development of a declining average age within parliament as this has decreased from almost 55 in 1963 towards an average age of almost 45 in 2013 (Staatscommissie Parlementair Stelsel, 2018). Besides such parliamentary characteristics, the Dutch party system offers a highly diverse set of parties – both in ideology as in size – while it simultaneously offers the possibility to study a system with a long tradition of coalition government. As a result of these factors, The Netherlands is an excellent case to compare mechanisms of post-parliamentary careers in continental Europe; offering a valuable contribution as most present research on post political careers is focussed on the Anglo-Saxon domain.

This study has three main contributions to the academic literature on parliamentary politics and political careers. First, it has developed a conceptual method in which the position of institutions within careers choices can be used to assess their relevance. This study successfully applies this framework and is able to show structural changes over a period of 50 years. Furthermore, this adds to the knowledge of post parliamentary careers which have not studied yet in such an extensive time period. Second, this study shows that a substantial part of MP's is able to make a move towards a more attractive career after parliament. Although the study does not find a direct connection between parliamentary behaviour and the respective attractiveness of the post parliamentary career, it still gives a new perspective on possible incentives for a MP. As re-election in many studies is assumed to be the most important driving force of an MP, the amount of MP's who leave during their tenure put those assumptions to the test and offers a new perspective which should be taken into account in the studies of parliamentary behaviour. Finally, this study extends the knowledge of party affiliation and political careers by showing – with multiple measures for attractiveness – how MP's from governing parties have a distinctive advantage and simultaneously MP's from anti-establishment parties have a distinctive disadvantage. It therefore shows that theories of cartelisation are not merely preserved for party competition but also apply to the political careers.

¹ Besides a cool-off period, the Dutch Parliament has an extensive benefits package for MP's after they leave parliament. However, the influence of such benefits on the post parliamentary careers is unclear. It could provide MP's with a solid safety net in their search for post parliamentary employment, but such benefits are not used by all MP's and even (ideologically) contested by some. This information is not available and as a consequence, the effect of such benefits cannot be further taken into account in this study.

² The score for the Dutch parliament on the Parliamentary Power Index is 0,78, which is measured on a scale from 0 to 1.

Finally, such findings do have a more fundamental impact on society. On the one hand, as parliament is used as a steppingstone for a further career, accountability issues arise. Citizens always have the opportunity to ‘throw the rascals out’, however, that opportunity loses a strong part of its value if parliaments are seen as a steppingstone for a further career. Moreover, this means that a shift within the principal-agent relationship takes place as the principal can move from the electorate towards the future employer. Moreover, this structural analysis can further the public debate has remained focussed on a few notorious examples.

Theoretical Framework

The position of parliamentarian has seen drastic changes throughout history. The very first MP’s were of good heritance, usually representing aristocratic backgrounds or the wealthier families as a result of census voting rights (Mulé, 1998, p. 50). The function of career was unpaid, part time and most importantly not a career choice (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 18). As MP you would represent your particular beliefs and interests on the side while maintaining a larger societal career. As a result, parliament was less professionalized and institutionalized (Rush, 2001). However, the 20th century positioned drastic changes in this regard. As the electoral realm opened up to the masses from the beginning of the 20th century, the function of MP increased in importance and size.

The professionalization and further institutionalization of parliament throughout the 20th century has resulted into a situation in which it almost impossible – even undesirable – to have another professional position besides the function of MP. Following Max Weber’s (2015 [1919]) analogy, MP’s have moved from solely living “for” politics towards living “from” politics. As a result, the possibility of a full career in the political realm opened up. This has led to the creation of “career politicians” (King, 1981); MP’s are no longer coming for a limited tenure from all layers of society as politics becomes a career choice. A recent conceptualisation of career politicians argues that there are four defining features: strong commitment, narrow occupational background, narrow life experience and a strong ambition (Allen, Magni, Searing, & Warncke, 2020). As professionalisation of parliaments has been on the rise around the world, career politicians have established themselves as a strong and enduring presence across all kinds of democracies (Henn, 2018; Heuwieser, 2018).

The common denominator in these studies of career politicians is the central role the institution of parliament, and with that the function of MP, plays in goals and ambitions of

a career politician. Traditionally, acquiring the position of MP is central to the ambitions of lower ranking career politicians as it not only provides a national profile, influence and good financial compensation, it also functions as a sustainable basis to grow into the highest echelons of political careerism, the function of (prime) minister. Moreover, MP's are perceived as vulnerable as they lack the skills to pursue a career on a similar level after losing their seat (Allen et al., 2020; McAllister, 1997, p. 20; Roberts, 2019), further strengthening the importance of the function of a MP for a career politician.

This assumption that the function of MP is central for a career politician should, however, be put up to the test. Multiple studies show large movement between different political layers, both in legislature as in the executive functions (Borchert, 2011; Scarrow, 1997). More importantly, politicians do seem to possess valuable skills for other careers; politicians bring additional worth to a firm as this tends to lead to an increase in stock value (Faccio, 2006; Luechinger & Moser, 2014) and an increase in government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009; Schoenherr, 2019). Central to this additional value of former politicians are two concepts: one the one hand politicians bring in valuable relationship capital by which enables the possibility to “open up access to all area's” (Freund & Bendel, 2014). One the other hand, former politicians bring in valuable technical experience and substantive knowledge acquired during their legislative and executive duties (Salisbury, Johnson, Heinz, Laumann, & Nelson, 1989).

The narrow conception of career politicians would not suffice to explain the full picture of (political) careers. As a companion to the perspective of career politician, the perspective of ‘political careerist’ should be introduced (Mattozzi & Merlo, 2008). According to Mattozzi and Merlo, political careerist uses the political experience to move towards the private sector afterwards. However, studies on the careers of politicians after tenure show that both former ministers (Baturu & Mikhaylov, 2016; Stolz & Fischer, 2014) and MP's (Baturu & Arlow, 2018) successfully transfer to both private as public sector after they leave their tenure. Moreover, almost a third of former MP's are even able to transfer into more attractive positions in both sectors (Claessen et al., 2020; Würfel, 2018). Therefore, arguing that the position of political careerist is solely for the private sector would not suffice. More importantly, patterns are visible in which the position of MP is not the definite career goal.

Position of Parliament


These patterns signal the relative importance of the function of MP in their perspective careers. MP's tend to be an ambitious crowd and therefore, their careers say a lot about the institutions they chose to stay in or leave from. Or as proclaimed by Schlesinger (1966, p. 1): "ambition lies at the heart of politics". Schlessinger (1966) argues that politicians have particular ambitions which, together with institutional factors, shape political behaviour. This leads to a structure of static, discrete and progressive ambitions which are shaped by available patterns of opportunity and their prospective rewards. More recent theories of political careers have built from this model and argue that the career choices are built on three features: the attractiveness, availability and accessibility of a particular position (Borchert, 2011, pp. 121–123). As these functions are central to the type of institution a function is situated in, such choices provide information in the perceived importance of such an institution. For example, Scarrow (1997) argues that the position of the European Parliament (EP) is strengthening due to the flow of national MP's towards the EP and the simultaneous development of parliamentarians who remain within the EP to build a career there.

Using careers to determine the relative importance of a function and therefore the institution, parliament shows weakening signs. On the one hand, career politicians use the parliament to move into higher political positions; either in some level of the executive or on an international level. Moreover, the whole presence and emergence of political careerist, both public as private sector, show that the function of MP has become used for different purposes. This indicates that parliament would be an effective way to make such a career and more importantly, the career of MP would not be enough. Already in 1987, Weller and Fraser noted that for the case of Australia, that the perspective of being an MP shifted from a 'final career' towards a 'first career' (Fraser & Weller, 1987). As a result, the perspective and position of parliament in a career has shifted towards a position of a steppingstone. The function of MP would therefore be used in order to move towards more attractive positions as is visible within figure 1.

There are two defining reasons for this change. Following the classification of Borchert (2011), choices are made on the basis of the attractiveness, availability and accessibility of the function. In most established democracies, parties are still the institution that have control of and over the process of candidate selection (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). However, parties are not on the same level of strength as they once were. Membership of parties all across Europe has plummeted (Van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke, 2012), which has resulted in less competition for

particular positions. Moreover, the party landscape has been scattered as fragmentation has been on the rise all across developed democracies (Best, 2013). On other words, it are not a few and big parties that effective control the candidate selection process, but that the field has become increasingly diverse and open for competition. Both factors contribute to the accessibility of the function of MP. The accessibility of such a relatively high function might be much lower compared to functions in other sectors, which makes it interesting for usage as a steppingstone to a further career.

Figure 1. Parliament as a steppingstone within careers



Besides the accessibility of the function, the function of MP has become a lot less attractive. The process of *Deparliamentarization* has resulted in less power at the parliamentary level (Raunio, 2011). On the one hand, new layers of government such as the EU have placed a lot of responsibility out of the hands of MP's. This has been widely acknowledged as a development which has harmed the overall strength of the national parliaments (Andersen & Burns, 1996; O'Brennan & Raunio, 2007). Furthermore, recent institutional and technological developments have shifted the balance towards the executive and away from parliament and the legislature. Due to increasing globalization and specialization, issues and crisis have become more and more complex (Galaz, 2019). This requires an active and strong position from the executive and therefore, away from parliament. As a result, executive positions, both in public and private sector have become more attractive compared to the position of MP. This

would indicate that the position MP has not only changed as a steppingstone for political careerist, but also as a way into the executive positions – even on the lower administrative levels – for career politicians.

Hypotheses

As argued, the expectation is that the function of MP is increasingly used as a steppingstone for a further career. To study this development, this study formulates two hypotheses which look at the changes over time in post parliamentary careers – i.e. the dynamic changes within the career patterns of all MP's. However, as most studies into post parliamentary careers already portray, not everyone is able to make a successful transition into an attractive post parliamentary career (Claessen et al., 2020; Würfel, 2018). This study dives further into structural factors such as ideological background and parliamentary behaviour. These are expected to structurally impact who is able to use parliament as a steppingstone who is not. As a result, the hypotheses are split between dynamic hypotheses which formulate expectations about the changes over time and structural hypotheses which formulate expectations about who is able to use parliament as a steppingstone.

Dynamic hypotheses

The process of accessibility and attractiveness has resulted into the process of parliament as a steppingstone in which the parliament was used to move towards a more attractive position. As a result, similarly to the processes of weakening of parties and *deparliamentarization*, patterns should emerge in which parliament is used as a steppingstone for a further career. Therefore, over time, more MP's should transition towards a more attractive position after parliament.

Hypothesis 1: MP's are increasingly leaving parliament with more attractive post parliamentary careers

MP's would move if the criteria of attractiveness, accessibility and availability apply. As parliament would be a steppingstone, they would leave their tenure even after they have won their seat. In multiple studies the matter and moment of leaving parliament matters a lot in taking on attractive positions, both in the private sector and the public sector (Baturu & Arlow,

2018; Claessen et al., 2020; Würfel, 2018). The studies show that leaving with a ‘win’ compared to leaving with a ‘loss’ results into a higher chance of leaving for a more attractive position. This would make sense as leaving with a win means that someone only leaves when the conditions apply. As parliament is increasingly a steppingstone instead of a final career, this would increasingly apply.

Hypothesis 2: MP’s are increasingly leaving parliament with a ‘win’ for a more attractive post parliamentary career

Structural Hypotheses

Political parties are the vehicles of political organisation in present day representative democracy. However, large differences occur in organisation, ideology and *modus operandi*. As a consequence, these differences have a distinctive impact on a MP and their perspective career choices and possibilities. Some parties might be better suited in making moves towards attractive post-parliamentary careers. Either because of extensive networks due to their historical background or because of their ideological stance.

Differences between parties and their post parliamentary career are present because of the different opportunity structures parties provide for their MP’s. For example, parties might have ideological connections with particular like-minded sectors and as a result of these connections trade into attractive post parliamentary employment. In a survey study of the House of Commons, Theakston, Gouge and Honeyman (2007) find that conservative MP’s are three times more likely than labour MP’s to get a post parliamentary career through their personal contacts and network. Moreover, due to their business-friendly ideological position, economically right-wing parties are more likely to make an move towards the private sector (Baturu & Arlow, 2018, pp. 395–396). Research into the appointment of board members of public enterprises does seem to suggest that a similar mechanism is at play for the public sector and the more left leaning parties (Quaresima, Fiorillo, & Santolini, 2019). However, in a study into who transfers into the most attractive offices, this correlation does not seem to hold for Germany (Würfel, 2018, p. 307).

Nonetheless, some parties are indeed better at providing the network that is necessary for an attractive post parliamentary career. Traditionally, the Netherlands has known three main governing parties, each representing one of the three main party families. All three are known to have extensive connections to the executive and administrative networks in The Netherlands.

Moreover, due to their strong history of wielding executive power, they provide MP's with a strong increase in relational capital, one of the defining features of a MP's worth for post parliamentary employment. Therefore, these traditional governing parties do not only have a historically grown opportunity structure for their MP's, but also increase their respective value in relational capital.

Hypothesis 3: MP's from traditional government parties are more likely to have an attractive post parliamentary career

The connections between parties and post parliamentary careers are not only positive connections. Theories of political cartelization argue that competition between the traditional parties has disappeared, leaving political competition from anti-establishment parties as only remaining competition (Katz & Mair, 1995). Moreover, a new distinction has emerged which has split the parties between 'responsible' and 'responsive' parties (Mair, 2009). Following this distinction, political parties would close their ranks against the anti-establishment parties. As a result, positive connections between certain sectors and political parties, which are established by the same parties which these anti-establishment parties are revolting against, will impact the future careers of MP's from these parties negatively.

Hypothesis 4: MP's from anti-establishment parties are less likely to have an attractive post-parliamentary career than MP's from different parties

Most studies of post parliamentary careers have focused on the hierarchical positions within parliament. Executive roles – even within parliament – have proven to be a strong predictor for gaining attractive post-parliamentary positions (Claessen et al., 2020; Würfel, 2018). However, little is known if there is a connection between parliamentary behaviour and the post-parliamentary career. If parliament is seen as a steppingstone for a further career, this would likely impact the behaviour within parliament. In fact, research on the last term of retiring MP's does portray a link between behaviour in parliament and the perceived ambitions for the next parliamentary term (Willumsen & Goetz, 2017; Zupan, 1990). In the perspective of career politicians, reelection has been a driving force in explaining certain parliamentary behaviour. As the perspective of parliament as a steppingstone might shift the incentives from re-election towards post parliamentary employment, this could impact the behaviour within parliament.

Re-election has shown to be a powerful force for MP's to pay attention and put resources into questions of the constituency and other electoral activities (Fujimura, 2012; Louwse & Otjes, 2016; Mickler, 2018). As a result, the actual work, somewhat closed off from the public eye, will be of less importance to MP's with that drivers. However, MP's who are wanting to make a further career step by their work within parliament are therefore more likely to be highly active on the substantive part of the work. First, this work could be much closer affiliated to future employment, both in the public as the private sector. Therefore, future employers are more likely to contract him or her if there is substantial evidence of such activity. Second, MP's who do more substantive work are more likely to get an attractive position as this shows that they are able to work hard under substantive pressure. However, it would remain difficult to substantiate such particular parliamentary behaviour from more general ambition with whatever purpose in mind. Nonetheless, showing that such patterns would exist between parliamentary behaviour and the post parliamentary career would be an important first step.

Hypothesis 5: MP's who are more active in the official output of parliamentary work are more likely to have an attractive post parliamentary career

Relationship capital is a vital skill a MP could gain during his or her parliamentary tenure. As is shown in the research on movement to the lobby sector, firms appreciate good and diverse relational capital (Jordi, Draca, & Fons-rosen, 2016). However, it is not only the private sector that could benefit from a good and diverse background of relationship capital. As a result, acquiring such capital during the parliamentary tenure would lead to a higher chance of an attractive career after parliament.

Hypothesis 6: MP's who acquire good and diverse relational capital are more likely to have an attractive post parliamentary career.

Research design

This study test changes in post parliamentary careers and more specifically, the attractiveness of post parliamentary careers. The literature distinguishes two types of career attractiveness: subjective and objective attractiveness (Heslin, 2005). While subjective attractiveness refers to personal satisfaction, the objective attractiveness is built on both salary as on occupational

status. As this study looks at structural developments within career attractiveness, only the objective attractiveness is taken into account. However, to improve the robustness of the results, two different measures as dependent variable are used: first, the measure of *top functions* which is built on occupational status, level of responsibility and capabilities required, and second the measure of salary.

In order to test both the dynamic and the structural hypotheses on the post parliamentary careers, the analysis is twofold. First, the careers of all MP's who left parliament between 1967 and 2017 have been coded. This gives the possibility to compare the percentages of MP's who leave for an attractive career after parliament per parliamentary period. This period is selected as 50 years is a substantive period to look for real changes, while simultaneously this period overlaps with the changes that are hypothesized to be the driving forces of changes in post parliamentary employment – decline of party membership and deparliamentarization. Moreover, all MP's are coded if they have left parliament early or not. This gives the opportunity to compare the level of MP's who leave during their tenure with a 'win' over the same period of 50 years. Leaving early is selected as the best measure as this would give the most direct relationship of choosing a different career over that of MP. Moreover, due to the selection and nomination processes of the parties, a clear 'win' or 'loss' would be difficult to find compared to single member district systems.

The second method, to test for the structural factors at play in reaching an attractive post parliamentary career, is a logistic regression analysis in which all MP's who have left between 1998 and 2017 are incorporated. This has two reasons; on the one hand this period is extensive enough to look for structural factors while simultaneously reflecting a difference in leading government party with 6 different governments. And second, the data on parliamentary behaviour is increasingly difficult for periods before 1995. A good comparison would not be possible with present day MP's.

Dependent variables

The post parliamentary careers are the dependent variable, which are coded on the basis of their attractiveness. In order to gain the information, this study uses the database of biographic information of the Dutch Parliamentary Information Centre³ which contains high quality data on MP's before, during and after their tenure. The data is further collected by three sources of

³ *Parlementair Documentatie Centrum (PDC)*

internet-based information: general sources of information as personal websites, websites of companies they work for and Wikipedia, second, social media accounts LinkedIn, Twitter and Facebook of these former members of parliament, and third, a further search within (local) newspapers. On the basis of this information, the most attractive position within the first 5 years after parliament is selected and coded. Such a period after parliament is considered to still have effect for the career (Claessen et al., 2020; Würfel, 2018). Only MP's from the *Tweede Kamer* are selected as political competition is taken place in that lower chamber and therefore effectively serves as the chamber in which the decisions are made. The *Eerste Kamer* traditionally fulfils a much lesser political role and the members are part-time employed, which brings the additional problem of distinguishing post-parliamentary careers. Moreover, their members are usually selected on the basis of experience outside the political world.

As mentioned above, two different measures are used as dependent variable. Both the measure of *top functions* and the measure of *salary* are applied.⁴ Both are dichotomous variables in which 1 means that the function would be more attractive, either in salary or in the required skill and responsibilities, and 0 means it is not. The variable of skill is first based on the *International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)*, which uses only professions which are in the top category of the list. Moreover, these are further coded in 4 different categories: manual professions, middle management professions, sub-top functions and absolute top functions. This classification is an adaption of the earlier work of Berkhout (2017). Top functions would include board membership of one of the 50 biggest companies in the Netherlands, mayor of one of the four biggest cities or as Secretary General at NATO. Sub-top functions include the function of mayor, professor, partner at an (inter)national consultancy firm. Only a very small percentage of people manage to gain such a position. These 4 categories are further recoded into a dummy variable in which sub-top and top functions are considered to be attractive careers (1) and middle management and manual professions to be less attractive (0).

The second variable is based on the perceived salary of the highest function. For all public sector and political positions this information is known in the Netherlands. Moreover, based on earlier research into private sector rewards and earnings a good estimation can be made of the perceived salary. This study builds from the earlier codework of Claess et al. (2020) for the Netherlands and Germany. There are 3 categories of perceived salary, 0 which means that the perceived salary is lower than that of a MP, 1 which means the salary would be similar

⁴ The exact coding instructions can be found in the appendix of this thesis.

and 2 in which the salary is higher. This is recoded into a dummy variable in which 1 means that the position is more attractive in salary and means that it is not. Finally, both measures have been relatively similarly applied in both other studies including sufficient levels of inter-coder reliability. Therefore, such a coding method could be used conformably within this thesis which only employs the author as a coder.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics career coding for both periods

Variable	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std.dev
<i>1967-2017</i>					
Attractive Top Functions	972	0	1	0,461	0,473
Attractive salary	972	0	1	0,358	0,479
Background Top functions	999	0	1	0,173	0,378
Background salary	999	0	1	0,111	0,314
Early leaving	961	0	1	0,288	0,453
<i>1998-2017</i>					
Attractive Top Functions	514	0	1	0,491	0,493
Attractive salary	514	0	1	0,401	0,490
Background Top functions	517	0	1	0,185	0,388
Background salary	517	0	1	0,134	0,340

Independent variables

The first variable of interest would be the variable of *leaving early*. This is a dummy variable for the period of 1967-2017 in which all MP's who have left parliament during their tenure are coded as 1 and all MP's who have left at the end of their tenure are coded as 0. This in order to check for the second hypothesis of leaving with a win. However, some MP's have deceased within their tenure; those MP's are excluded from the analysis. The measure is reshaped into the percentage of total leaving MP's during that particular parliamentary period that leave early. In this way, different periods with different lengths can be compared.

The operationalisation of both party focussed hypotheses is fairly similar. For hypothesis 3, three parties meet the expectations: CDA, PvdA and VVD. These parties have traditionally been the governing parties including a large member organisation. A dummy variable is constructed in which 1 means that a MP is of one of the three parties with a good

opportunity structure and 0 means a MP is not. Similarly, Hypothesis 4 requires that MP's from anti-establishment parties are separated from the other MP's. The Populist (2020) is used as a method to classify which parties qualify as anti-establishment parties and which do not. This results in the fact that MP's from CD, LN, LPF, SP and PVV qualify as MP's from anti-establishment parties. A dummy variable is created in which 1 means that a MP is from an anti-establishment party and 0 means it is not.

The data on parliamentary behaviour of MP's is coming from the Dutch parliamentary Behaviour Dataset (Louwse, Otjes & van Vonno, 2017). This database encompasses data on all types of proposals put to a vote in parliament (bills, amendments and votes) and also has another database on the written questions to the executive. Two types of parliamentary activity are combined into one single measure of parliamentary output: the amount of sponsorships and the amount of written questions. By combining both types of activities particular instrumental preferences of a MP can be taken into account. However, time can cloud the impact of behaviour on a post parliamentary career. To establish a connect as good as possible, only the final parliamentary tenure of a MP is used. Moreover, as not all parliamentary tenures are of the same length, a yearly average parliamentary output is constructed for this final parliamentary tenure. In this way the length of the period does not play a substantive role.

Hypothesis 6 looks at the relational capital built during their tenure. Similarly, only the final parliamentary period is selected. This hypothesis is tested using two different measures: a measure for individual connections and party connections. The first measure is a scale variable of all individual MP's a MP has collaborated with as a (co-)sponsor. As working together on a sponsorship requires actual cooperation, this would lead to the creation of important relational capital. The second measure focusses on a party level. It is not only important to have a large number of MP's within your personal network, the research on the value of relational capital shows that it is also very important to have a diverse network of connections. Therefore, a scale variable is constructed in which a total number of different parties are listed with whom the MP has collaborated on a sponsorship during his/her final tenure.

Control variables

Finally, control variables are taken into the analysis. The most important variable is the background occupation. If someone entered parliament from a more attractive position, this would make him or her more likely to have an attractive career after parliament. The background of the MP is coded similarly as the attractiveness is coded of the post parliamentary

tenure. Earlier findings point to a positive effect; however, this is the first analysis in which background careers are taken into the account with such a systemic analysis. Moreover, as a results of the study by Claessen et al. (2020) point out that female MP's have a substantial lower chance of entering an attractive post parliamentary career, gender will be incorporated into the analysis. Age is also is a large determining factor in questions of retirement and future career goals, therefore, age is also incorporated as a control variable. This raises the expectation that age would have a negative effect on an attractive career. Finally, executive experience and the place in the party hierarchy play an important role and are therefore included.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics independent variables 1998-2017.

Variable	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std.dev
Governing Party	519	0	1	0,6744	0,469
Anti-establishment Party	519	0	1	0,1544	0,479
Legislative output	497	0	180,6	37,475	30,667
Individual collaboration	501	0	44	14,32	9,266
Party collaboration	501	0	10	5,73	2,260
Cabinet experience	514	0	1	0,119	0,325
Gender	514	0	1	0,359	0,480
Age	519	28	78	50,779	9,095

Results

The results are divided into two sections as this study both looks at dynamic development factors of post parliamentary careers and structural factors.

Dynamic changes over time

First, it is important to mention that the results show the fact that a substantial group of MP's is able to transfer into an attractive positions after parliament. Between 1967 and 2017 (N= 972), 35,82 percent of MP's successfully managed to get a more attractive position on the basis of salary and 46,14 percent of the MP's was able to move into the top functions. Moreover, the careers of MP's who join parliament are substantially lower (N=999); on the basis of salary

only 11,07 percent of MP's join parliament from a more attractive position, while this is 17,33 percent on the basis of top functions.⁵

The development in post parliamentary careers over time is visible in figure 2. The years visible are the starting years of the parliamentary period, so the final period is between 2012-2017. The first hypothesis expected an increase in movement towards more attractive post parliamentary careers. The data supports this hypothesis as both for salary as for occupational status; MP's are increasingly moving into more attractive positions after parliament. Following the measure of top functions, it has increased from 39 percent of MP's moving towards a more attractive positions during the 1967-1971 tenure towards 47 percent of MP's moving towards more attractive positions during the 2012-2017 tenure. Moreover, MP's who have left parliament between 2006-2017 – the final decade – have a substantial higher average of 42,12 percent on the basis of salary and 52,31 percent on the basis of top functions.


The measurement based on salary shows an even stronger increase in MP's who have a more attractive career after parliament. Compared to MP's who left during the 1967-1971 tenure, the amount of MP's who left during the 2012-2017 with a more attractive career based on salary almost doubles from 21 to 40 percent. Moreover, the percentage of MP's who transition into such an attractive career after parliament has been stably over 40 percent since 2003. On the other hand, the amount of MP's who transition into the position of MP from a more attractive background career has remained relatively stable over 50 years. This further strengthens the argument as the increase of MP's who leave for an attractive career cannot be explained by an increase of in attractive background careers

However, what explains the differences in movements of attractive careers in certain parliamentary periods per measurement? There are two periods of interest here. First the period of 1977-1981. Understanding the first requires the understanding of a specific difference within the coding of the measures. The salary of a member of the European Parliament has a similar level as that of a MP, while this is an international function with a large responsibility. This divergence means that, based on salary, the function of MEP is not more attractive than that of a MP while this is the case on the basis of top function. As the function of MEP has become a full-time independent function since 1979, this causes many MP's (8 in total) to jump towards the European level in 1979 and the first years after. This effectively

⁵ The difference in the number of cases between careers before parliament and after parliament is explained by two causes: 14 MP's died while in office or shortly after and for a total of 13 cases their post parliamentary career cannot be determined. The first type of cases are removed from the analysis, for the second type of cases only their background career is used in the analysis.

explains why, on the basis of salary, there is not an increase in percentage of MP's who transition, while this is the case on the basis of top functions.

Figure 2. Development of Dutch MPs' careers between 1967-2017




The second period of interest, the parliamentary period of 2002-2003, is a special period within Dutch parliamentary history; it entails both the spectacular emergence of the LPF by entering parliament with 26 seats, as that it shows the fast demise of the party and the losses of the 2003 election. This has caused that relatively many MP's who have left parliament during that particular period are from the LPF. Interestingly, most of these MP's did manage to get positions which earned more, while simultaneously seeing a relatively low percentage of MP's move into the top positions. At the centre of this divergence is the fact that none of those MP's managed to get a position at a high level of decision making within the public sector. As these positions are usually coded at higher levels of responsibility, this shows in the results of top functions.

Hypothesis two argued that as a result of parliament as a steppingstone, relatively more MP's would leave parliament during their tenure with a 'win'. As figure 3 shows, this hypothesis cannot be accepted. On average 28,2 percent of MP's who have left parliament between 1967 and 2017 has left during his or her tenure. Moreover, there is an increase visible

when comparing from the parliamentary period of 1967, the highest levels of early leaving were visible during the 1970s and have been fluctuating around 20-25 percent of MP's who leaving during their tenure in the last decade. However, when looking at absolute numbers, an increase is visible as much more MP's are leaving during a parliamentary period in the last decades compared to the first. Furthermore, the mechanism that was expected to generate a higher level of leaving MP's is indeed at play: of the MP's who leave early, 76,34 percent is able to transition into a top function and 62,14 percent is able to transition into a function with a higher salary. Both averages are substantially higher compared to that of all MP's.

Figure 3. Percentage of MP's who are leaving early during their tenure between 1967-2017



But what explains such spike during the 1970s? The answer is twofold: First, the already mentioned organisational developments of the European Parliament. Without MP's who leave for a seat in the EP, the percentage of MP's who would have left parliament early during the period of 1977-1981 would be 33 percent. This offers a first nuance of this graph. However, the second spike during the parliamentary period of 1972-1977 cannot be fully explained. One argument could be the fact that this is one of the longest periods within the total timespan, which would give MP's ample opportunity to make a move towards another functions. This is further confirmed by the fact that parliamentary periods with a very small timespan such as

1981-1982 or 2002-2003 also see a relatively low level of MP's who are leaving during their tenure.

Structural factors

The second element of this analysis concerns not the development of MP's who transition in a post parliamentary career, but the question who effectively makes that transfer. The results of this research into the structural determinants of post parliamentary careers are visible in table 2.⁶ In this table are four models of logistic regressions in which, both for the measurement of top function as for salary, are visible.

First, the hypotheses based on party determinants are examined. Hypothesis 3, which suggested that MP's from the main governing parties are more likely to transfer into attractive careers is supported by the data. For all four models there is a strong and statistically significant ($p < 0,01$) positive result for being an MP of one of the three (CDA, PvdA, VVD) main governing parties. The effect shows that MP's from one the three main governing parties the chances increase of gaining a more attractive career compared to MP's from other parties. Interestingly, the effect is stronger for the measurement of salary (Model 4) than the effect for top functions (model 2). This could point to the fact that such MP's do not have more chance of moving into top functions but are even more likely to move into the best paying top functions. This would mean that the effect of being an MP from a governing party would also travel within the realm of top functions.

The second hypothesis – MP's of anti-establishment parties are less likely to gain a more attractive career after parliament – is also supported by the data. Both the measures of top functions and salary indicate a strong decrease in the chances of a MP in all models. Following the models including the control variables, the odds of gaining a more attractive career decrease by 1,225 (Model 2; $p < 0,01$) for top functions and by 1,208 (Model 4; $p < 0,05$) for salary. Both results are statistically significant. Interestingly, the decrease in chances is larger for top functions compared to salary. However, a cause for this fact might be the resurgence and downfall of the LPF as shown in figure 2 and discussed above.

⁶ All models meet the assumptions of a logistic regression analysis. In all models, the same two outliers were present which have been excluded to improve the model marginally.

Table 3. Logistic regression analysis of the probability of an attractive career

	Top functions		Salary	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Constant)	-2,002*** (0,435)	-0,177 (0,795)	-2,307*** (0,451)	-0,536 (0,864)
Governing party	1,059*** (0,295)	0,978** (0,326)	1,126*** (0,307)	1,127** (0,366)
Anti-establishment party	-1,391** (0,437)	-1,225** (0,438)	-1,159* (0,509)	-1,208* (0,537)
Legislative output	0,009 (0,005)	0,008 (0,005)	0,003 (0,005)	0,005 (0,006)
Individual collaboration	0,006 (0,021)	0,014 (0,023)	0,024 (0,021)	0,027 (0,023)
Party collaboration	0,135 (0,076)	0,077 (0,075)	0,109 (0,072)	0,083 (0,078)
Background career (top function/salary)		1,689*** (0,329)		1,639*** (0,350)
Cabinet position		2,674*** (0,577)		4,064*** (0,800)
Gender		-0,734** (0,227)		-0,661** (0,243)
Age		-0,034** (0,008)		-0,041** (0,014)
-2LL	600,685	516,401	588,914	460,402
Cox and Snell's R ²	0,146	0,281	0,123	0,315
Nagelkerke's R ²	0,195	0,376	0,167	0,429
N	492	485	492	485

Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets.

*** p < 0,001, ** p < 0,01, * p < 0,05

For both hypotheses on the relationship between parliamentary behaviour and post parliamentary careers the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected; therefore, these hypotheses cannot be accepted. None of the results are statistically significant at p<0,05 and the effects that are visible are small. The measure of total output shows a very small effect for top functions (model

2) and an even smaller effect for salary (model 4). The small positive effects are, in comparison with all other variables in the model, remarkably small. Running the output of sponsorships and written questions independently even results in smaller effects while simultaneously remaining not statistically significant. This might point to the fact gaining a larger network might increase your chances for an attractive post parliamentary career. Compared to factors of party and the control variables these effects remain very small and not statistically significant at a confidence interval of 95 percent.

Finally, the control variables all follow the formulated expectations. The strongest positive effect remains whether or not a MP has executive experience. This further confirms earlier findings and shows that such experience benefits a MP greatly for gaining an attractive post parliamentary career. Furthermore, as the effect is even stronger for salary (Model 4; $p < 0,001$) compared to the measure for top functions (Model 2; $p < 0,001$). This points to the fact that within the top functions they also have a higher chance of gaining the best paid top functions. Moreover, both age and gender have a negative effect an attractive career for both the measure of top functions as for the salary. This confirms the earlier findings on the role of gender. Finally, the attractiveness of the career background – measured both in top functions as in salary – shows a strong positive effect. Entering parliament with a more attractive career increases the odds of leaving parliament with a more attractive career with 1,689 (Model 2) for top functions and with 1,639 (Model 4) for salary, both statistically significant with confidence interval of 99,9 percent. As this is the first structural coding of background and post parliamentary career, this indicates that although parliament can be a steppingstone, this effect is also mediated by the career before parliament.

Discussion

This analysis has provided the first systematic analysis that covers changes in post parliamentary employment over time. It has shown that relatively more MP's have been able to successfully transfer into more attractive post parliamentary careers within the past 50 years. As this is the case it presents a novel method to study the precepted position of a political institution by looking at the career choices of politicians. By showing that there is an actual increase in such movement of MP's, the theory that parliament can be used as a steppingstone is supported by these patterns. This conceptual perspective brings to things to the literature. On the one hand it contributes to the larger literature of deparliamentarization by using career

choices and showing that MP's are more and more leaving parliament for other and more attractive careers. The place of parliament has changed in the career ladder as it is not a final career, but more a first or temporary career in order to move into new positions. All of this further strengthens the argument of the weakening strength of parliament as an institution. Second, these patterns show that the perspective of career politician is not sufficient as the steppingstone in both for career politicians and political careerist. The distinctions between both types of MP's should be studied in further detail as the mechanisms for using parliament as a steppingstone might differ.

However, hypothesis 2, which looked at MP's who are leaving early, is not supported and therefore poses questions that still need to be addressed. If parliament is increasingly a steppingstone, MP's were expected to leave parliament increasingly during their tenure. As the data did not show such an increase this offers a puzzle for the theory of parliament as a steppingstone that requires further attentions. Especially as the causal mechanism of attractiveness seems to be correct; MP's who leave parliament early are substantially more likely to have a more attractive post parliamentary career. Therefore, this does not fully contradict the notion of parliament as a steppingstone. Other factors do seem at play for leaving parliament early and as a result other measures of leaving with a 'win' should be examined over time.

Besides this argument of parliament as a steppingstone, this study shows how party affiliation affects the post parliamentary opportunities. By showing the strong positive effect from the traditional parties, this study contributes to the understanding of particular party dynamics in opportunity structure. The steppingstone function is particularly preserved for MP's from the traditional governing parties with strong ties and a strong relational network. Moreover, this study brings a new viewpoint into cartel theory (Katz & Mair, 1995; Mair 2009) as it shows that it would not merely effect party competition, but also political careers. This study finds that MP's from anti-establishment parties are less likely to have an attractive post parliamentary career. This brings an addition as this means that political parties and elites do not only close ranks against such challenger parties within the political realm of parliament, but that this would be able to move towards other levels. This also gives another argument as support for the distinction between responsible and responsive parties as MP's of anti-establishment parties are dependent of their parliamentary seat to remain at a similar level of career. This dependency gives these MP's – unlike their counterparts of other political parties – more incentives towards the electoral realm.

Even with the presence of such patterns of different incentives, these incentives are not directly visible within the parliamentary behaviour of MP's. Interestingly, the total legislative output of a MP does not particularly matter for their post parliamentary career. This could point to the fact that social capital is eventually the main contributing factor for the additional value of a MP. However, hypothesis six, which tested for this relationship of relational capital cannot be accepted either. As a result, the conclusion must be that the concept of parliament as a steppingstone has not to be proven to be a driving force for parliamentary behaviour. Nonetheless, as these patterns are visible the relationship between parliamentary behaviour and career planning with parliament as a steppingstone remains open. Further research should be directed towards establishing whether such incentives are present either by looking at votes or attendance or via qualitative methods.

A larger question is if these results can be adopted towards different contexts. The argument of a fundamental shift of the position of parliament within careers can and should not be based on one sole case. The Netherlands is used as an exemplary case for continental (Western) Europe, but similar analysis across time would be needed to fully establish such a theory. Moreover, this study has used two different time frames within the analysis. It is questionable whether factors such as particular party advantages do indeed travel towards earlier periods of parliamentary history. Especially as the development of parliament as a steppingstone is a gradual one. Nonetheless, the presence of such patterns for the last two decades strongly indicates that not everyone is able to use parliament as a steppingstone today. As the steppingstone function is most present today, such findings can be described to the present functioning of parliament as steppingstone.

Finally, further research should try to establish if MP's do consciously underline the patterns that are there. Qualitative research should accompany such a large-N analysis in order to control whether the causal mechanisms theorized are also visible for individual MP's. Interviews should be held in order to establish such incentives and could further answer the questions whether such possibilities do indeed influence their parliamentary behaviour. Finally, despite coder reliability in earlier research, this study has been done by one sole coder. For further reliability of the results, similar analysis should be built around multiple coders to prevent any bias in the coding's of particular careers.

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Appendix

This appendix is a companion to the master thesis ‘*Parliament as a steppingstone?*’ written by Denny van der Vlist as part of the Political Science master program of Leiden University. The appendix consists of two different components: First, the codebook for coding top functions based on responsibility, capabilities and occupational status, and second, the codebook for coding careers on the basis of salary. Both codebooks are based on earlier work; the coding frame of Joost Berkhout (2017)⁷ is used as a foundation for the codebook on top functions, while the work by Claessen, Bailer and Turner-Zwinkels (2020)⁸ is used as the basis for coding careers by salary.

⁷ This codebook was shared by Joost Berkhout to the author.

⁸ This codebook can be found as a companion to their article at the ECPR website:

https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1475-6765.12385?casa_token=4rXDJOjDKRgAAAAA:x3-57rXxHPciQOIwI9-aIFdUD-OIsD0x2E0Tw8C9Hg-fbiMGCefatVNVJCNkBb-Jgt6Fi190NAjX27k

Coding top functions

The top functions coding manual is built from the notion that there is a small percentage of top functions which fulfil duties on a high level of responsibility, require substantive executive skills and enjoy high levels of occupational status. The coding manual is made by Joost Berkhout (2017) in cooperation with the PATHWAYS research on careers. Initially, this coding manual was solely used on all types of functions present within the biographic archive of the Dutch Parliamentary database. However, this study has applied this framework to the functions, but has connected them to individual MP's. This is done by selected the best function of the post parliamentary career five years after leaving office. This function is coded following the instructions within table A1 (public sector) and table A2 (private sector). Categories 3 and 4 of the table represent functions that are considered top functions. Moreover, retirement is coded as less attractive as the assumption is that someone would refrain from retiring with the possibility of a more attractive career.

A few things have been changed from the original coding manual:

- Some high-ranking functions within the public sector are added as sub-top functions: Ambassador, Judge, high ranking police officer and professor. All functions show a relatively similar level of public status, required capabilities and responsibility as similar functions.
- Head of a ministry (Secretary-general) is added to the top function category. This as such a position entails large responsibility and very high-level executive decision-making.
- Executive positions within 50-100 companies have been added as sub-top functions. Such positions still oversee large corporations but are a significant step down from the top 50 companies. Moreover, they function at a similar level of responsibility as other functions within this category. For example, partner at a large consultancy firm.

Table A1. Coding public sector top functions

Code	Type of function	ISCO level	Description
1	Manual functions	1,2,3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All manual labour (police officer, firefighter, etc).
2	Middle management/ white collar functions	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Non-executive civil servants (ministries, party staff, teachers, local level civil servants etc.).
3	Sub-top functions	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Electable legislative functions (Senate, European Parliament). Non-electable executive functions (all other mayor positions, aldermen in the G4, ambassador, Judge, high ranking police commissioner etc.). Semi-public executive function as board of a University, large hospital, full professor (<i>hoogleraar</i>). International functions as special advisor world bank, UN, EU etc.
4	Top functions	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Non-electable high executive functions (Mayor G4, King's commissioner, SER, DNB, SCP etc.). Head of a ministry (<i>secretaris-generaal</i>) High level international office (UNHCR chair, chair NATO, European Commissioner, board member World Bank etc.).

Table A2. Coding private sector Top functions

Code	Type of function	ISCO level	Description
1	Manual functions	1,2,3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All manual labour (farmer, factory employee etc.).
2	Middle management/ white collar functions	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> White collar work as consultants, management support etc.
3	Sub-top functions	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Executive position in a top 50-100 company (van Spaendonk, movaris, uber etc.) Large interest groups function (Branch organisations as Bouwend NL, VSNU, health insurances). Senior advisor or lobbyist at an (inter)national acclaimed firm (partner KPMG, EY, Deloitte, Hill & Knowlton etc.).
4	Top functions	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High level interest group functions (VNO-NCW, FNV, VNG, CNV). Executive position top 50 company (Shell, KPN, KLM etc.).

Coding Salary

The coding of the salary is in large part built from the coding manual constructed by Claessen et al. (2020). This codework consist of three categories in which 0 means that a function has a lower salary compared to that of a MP, 1 means that the salary is similar to that of a MP and 2 means that the salary is higher. This is recoded into a dummy in which only '2' is coded as a more attractive career. Similarly to coding top functions, the best function of the post parliamentary career within five years after leaving office is selected and coded. The coding instructions are visible in table A3 (public sector) and A4 (private sector). Salaries for the public and political sector are easily accessible via the government channels. Moreover, the estimations made for the private sector are based on the esteem of the particular company and the seniority within the company. Finally, retirement is coded as less attractive as the assumption is that retirement would not be accepted if a more attractive career would be possible.

The income of a Dutch MP is 7311,56 per month, which grows with additional benefits towards 102040,30 a year. This study does not take into account any additional bonuses, such as leader of the parliamentary faction of the party or any rules concerning paying an allowance to your party. This salary has been – when corrected for inflation – relatively stable for over decades. Therefore, this can be used as a good reference point, even for comparisons over a fifty-year period.

A few things have changed compared to the original coding manual:

- The position of ambassador is added as a more attractive career. It did not mention ambassadorships at all.
- The function of full professor is added as this function gives the possibility to grow to a similar salary. It is coded as 1.
- A special distinction has been made between lawyers at small firms and lawyers at the bigger (inter)national firms. The biggest firms usually see high levels of competition and high salaries.
- The chair's of (inter)national NGO's are added as these positions have a large array of salaries. Checking the salary per NGO.

Table 3A. Coding public sector salary

Position	Code	Explanation
Mayor	0,1,2	The salary of a mayor is dependent of the number of inhabitants. Mayors of municipalities with lower than 14.000 inhabitants are coded as 0, between 14.000 and 24.000 are coded as 1 and above 24.000 inhabitants are 2. ⁹
Alderman	0,1,2	The salary of an alderman is dependent of the number of inhabitants. Aldermen in municipalities with lower than 60.000 inhabitants are coded as 0, between 60.000 and 100.000 are coded as 1, and above 100.000 inhabitants are coded as 2. ¹⁰
Provincial executive	2	The salary of a position within the provincial executive has a monthly salary of €8.515
King's commissioner	2	The salary of King's commissioner is comparable to the salary of a minister with a monthly salary of €12.000
Dijkgraaf	2	Executive position tasked with water management. Monthly salary of €8.514
Head/deputy head of a ministry	2	Salary is much higher, in most instances even higher than a minister's salary. The bar for the highest function in a ministry is €181.000 a year.
Crown members SER	2	Monthly salary is between the salary of a MP and a minister.
Council of State	2	Highest judicial position and a mayor advisor to the government. Monthly salary of €9.501.
High level international office	2	Positions as EU commissioner, Chair NATO, special advisor UN, World Bank etc., all have a substantial higher salary than that of a MP.
Minister of State	2	Important honorary position. Not direct monthly salary but has a small compensation.

⁹ These salaries are based on the official documentation of salary scales by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Kingdom Relations. The information about the number of inhabitants is coming from the *Regionaal Kerncijfers*, collected for Statline of the Dutch national Bureau of Statistics (CBS).

¹⁰ For number of inhabitants see mention above on mayors.

Ambassador	2	Basic salary is comparable to that of a MP, however, ability to grow to €9.200 a month without additional bonuses (as location bonus). ¹¹
Member of the First chamber	1	This is a part time function; however, the salary is comparable when addressing the fact that other positions can be taken on.
Member European Parliament	1	Salary of the MEP is comparable to the salary of a MP. Monthly salary around €7.000
Mid-level executive positions	1	Head of a department within a ministry, head of a part of a city. Mid-level executive civil servants have a similar salary compared to MP's
Full professor (<i>Hoogleraar</i>)	1	Salary of a full professor is comparable to the salary of a MP.
Judge/public prosecutor	1	Salary of a Judge/public prosecutor can grow to a similar level of salary.
City councillor	0	Salary is dependent of the number of inhabitants. However, it is at all times lower than the salary of a MP.
Provincial parliament	0	The salary of a provincial council/parliament is lower than that of a MP
Civil servants	0	All types of lower level civil servants working at all types of levels. (teachers, lower level academic staff, civil servants at ministries, municipalities etc.) Salaries are lower than that of MP's

¹¹ Ambassadors can retrieve a bonus for the perceived 'danger' of being stationed in a particular country. Moreover, there are also substantial bonuses in living expenses, transport and other expenses.

Table 4A. Coding private sector salary

Position	Code	Explanation
Executive position nationally/ internationally active company	2	Executive positions on boards/ supervisory boards (<i>'raad van commissarissen'</i>). Companies as ABN, Shell, Nuon etc.
Senior position within nationally/ internationally active company	2	Senior level position within large companies, still have on average a higher salary compared to MP's. Head of departments enjoy large responsibilities, examples include head of public affairs at Tata Steel Europe, head of public affairs at <i>'Rotterdams Havenbedrijf'</i> etc.
Senior position in an international consultancy firm	2	Partner, special advisor at Deloitte, EY, KPMG etc.
Executive position in national consultancy firm	2	Board member at consultancy firm. For example, Diëtz Dröge & van Loo, Twynstra Gudde, Berenschot.
Senior position in (inter)national lobby firm	2	Senior position at Hill & Knowlton, Dröge & van Drommelen etc.
Senior attorney at a (inter)national firm	2	Attorneys at such firms see large fluctuations within their salary, however, in most instances show a relatively higher salary at a competitive (inter)national firm. Examples include, Houthoff, Accenture, Baker & McKenzie.
Chair VNO-NCW, MKB- Nederland etc.	2	Head of a large employers' organisation. Salaries are higher than the salaries of MP's. Also because of the important role they play within the Dutch corporatist system. (VNO-NCW is 130 percent of a minister's salary)
Chair (inter)national NGO	2,1,0	Salaries of Large NGO's as Rode Kruis, Oxfam Novib all have high salaries for their chairs as they head large organisations with high responsibility. However, chairs of multiple (inter)national NGO's earn substantially less. Search per specific position. ¹²

¹² Differences between NGO's are visible, especially at the more Christian NGO's salary is less. For more information on the specific salaries of NGO's the following website is used which combines public information about the salaries: <https://www.goededoelennederland.nl/sector/sectoronderzoek/beloning-directeuren-goede-doelen>

Multiple executive positions within smaller firms	1	These positions generate a smaller salary, however, by stacking them the salary can reach a comparable level to that of a MP ¹³
Attorney at a small firm	1	Attorney's at a small firm still manage to gain a relatively high salary, however, in less competitive firms these salaries are on a similar level of a MP.
Chair FNV, CNV	1	Chair of the labour union has an annual salary comparable to that of a MP. It heads a large organisation, but also one which fights on behalf of the workers. As a result, a lower salary compared to the chairs of employers' organisations
Head party bureau (CDA, PvdA, VVD)	1	Salaries of the head of the party bureau with the three – traditionally – biggest parties. High level of responsibility within high member parties.
Lower consultancy functions	0	Salary is lower than that of MP, independent of the firm. Only the senior positions transition into the higher salaries.
Lower lobbying functions	0	Salary is lower than that of MP, independent of the firm. Only the senior positions transition into the higher salaries.
Non senior functions in the private sector	0	All types of lower level functions within all kinds of private firms.

¹³ This is the only instance in which functions can be combined. Normally, only the 'highest' function has been coded. However, as positions at supervisory boards of smaller firms usually entail a small amount of work per week, such functions can be combined into one full-time executive function.