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Towards a Grand Strategy for New Year's Eve Disturbances?

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Abstract

The traditions of *stoken* in Veen and bonfires in The Hague are both characterized by structural incidentalism. Based on existing knowledge about intervention policy, a long-term intervention model is proposed. This model consists of media interventions, societal interventions and communicative interventions. However, while the identification of effective intervention methods in these cases is a step in the right direction, the phenomenon of structural incidentalism can only be overcome when municipalities find a right balance between these methods and focus on their interconnectedness.

Keywords

Crisis; structural incidentalism; mayors; interventions; public order; New Year's Eve riots

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1. Introduction

1.1 New Year's Eve traditions and public order disturbances in The Hague and Veen

The Hague has a rich history of disturbances during New Year's Eve. The phenomenon of 'Christmas tree wars' as the first post-Second World War manifestation of New Year's Eve violence on the streets there. Groups of young men competed to gather Christmas trees for their bonfires, an activity known as *kerstbomen rausen*. Soon after, this degenerated into violent clashes with the police and/or between different groups. As the violence and vandalism culminated during the 1980s, authorities decided they had to act. In cooperation with the police and the organizers of the bonfires, agreements were made on the locations and ferocity of the fires. For example, car tires (which produce too much toxic smoke) were no longer allowed on the fires and a sand layer was placed on the road surface to limit damage. By arranging party tents and music facilities around the hotspots (mainly in notorious districts), authorities actively pursued convivial and safe celebrations. Because they actively cooperated with local community representatives, public order around these locations was mainly preserved. Against those who nonetheless behaved violently police acted strictly (NTR, 2011). This strategy proved to be effective: New Year's Eve would never be as violent in The Hague as it was in the 1980s and the number of bonfires decreased from 80 in 1991, to five in 2007 (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2019).

The latter is important, because the high number of fires caused a lack of capacity for the fire brigade and police, who were sometimes called out to clear dozens of fires at the same time (Gemeente Den Haag, 2007). While the violence decreased, New Year's Eve in The Hague is nonetheless characterized by violent disturbances. In general, authorities were still unable to maintain public order around the city. To further reduce disturbances in the 21st century, the municipality of The Hague inter alia decided to tolerate a maximum of four bonfires. As of 2012, the municipality allowed two urban bonfires (in the districts of Laakkwartier and Escamp) and two larger bonfires on the beaches of Duindorp and Scheveningen (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2019). Inhabitants of Duindorp and Scheveningen perceive the fires as a uniting element in their already strong social ties. Those residents are characterized by their independent stance and the ensuing aversion to government interventions (appendix X, 2020; appendix Buijserd, 2020). These regulated bonfires were part of the so-called holistic approach, or *Haagse Integrale Aanpak*, a set of repressive measures that are part of a zero-tolerance policy that was implemented after major disturbances during the New Year's Eve of 2007-2008 (Van Aartsen, 2016). Based on district-level risk assessments, authorities adopted different sets of measures. On the one hand, those measures are focused on the promotion of social activities, like aforementioned open festivities and bonfires. On the other hand, authorities aim for more repressive measures, like an increase in camera surveillance, illumination of unsafe public areas, accelerated judicial proceedings, physical police surveillance and special arrest teams.

In subsequent years, the beach fires grew into large-scale events, and the risks also increased. To contain those risks, the municipality decided to impose further restrictions, e.g. with regard to the height of the pyre. Such restricting arrangements were enshrined in a common-law covenant between the different parties involved (i.e. various governmental authorities and the organizers), which is a peculiar construction for an event of this scale (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2019). The events in Duindorp and Scheveningen attracted tens of thousands of visitors. In contrast to other large-scale events in The Hague, no safety requirements were imposed around the bonfires in an administrative event permit. Although the bonfire organizations of Duindorp and Scheveningen ignored the arrangements, authorities did not commit to active enforcement. As a result, dangerous situations, primarily centered around the Scheveningen bonfire, emerged for both builders and residents. Research shows for example, that there were ‘gales of cinder’ (burning pieces of wood that reached the boulevard) during the New Year’s Eve of 2017-2018 (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2019). Whilst the municipality received these risk signals, they only acted when it was too late: during the subsequent New Year’s Eve, more intense ‘gales of cinder’ caused a minor disaster in Scheveningen, with both material and physical damage, a foreseeable outcome, according to the *Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid* (2019).

Although the regulated bonfires were apparently not the ideal solution, initially the material damage and level of public violence demonstrated (slight) decrease in number and severity (Krikke, 2018). Just when they *thought* the holistic approach was beginning to bear fruit, the situation escalated in 2019-2020, when interim-mayor Remkes prohibited the bonfires and generated a wave of violence through the streets, lasting for more than a month. The Hague reported €763.882 worth of damage that year, a doubling compared to 2018-2019, when the total costs were set at €367.230 (excluding the gales of cinder damage). Remarkably, a significant part of the damage was inflicted during the December month of 2019 (thus prior to New Year’s Eve), when the Scheveningen district (and to a lesser extent also other districts) was the scene of riots (Van Bree, 2020). Note that these numbers do not even cover private costs (e.g. resulting from car fires), which greatly increases the actual damage caused. In all probability, authorities were sidetracked by previous successes of repressive measures, like zero tolerance policy, firework-free zones, neighborhood watches, increased police deployment and more repressive national policy principles towards public violence and firework trouble (Van Aartsen, 2016). However, these had nothing to do with intervention methods towards the bonfire tradition and public order disturbances related to this tradition. In any case, the mayors and authorities in The Hague somehow lost sight of the dangers related to the bonfire tradition.

An annual attention point for the municipality of The Hague, for example, was the phenomenon of car fires. Each year, random cars were torched by anonymous vandals, a form of high-impact crime as it harms victims both emotionally and financially. Thereupon, the municipality implemented a strategy ‘to put vandals in the spotlight and get them out of their anonymity’, thereby ventilating the clear objective to increase the chance of

arrest (Gemeente Den Haag, 2009). The strategy proved effective; random car fires decreased from 109 in 2007-2008 to 33 in 2019-2020 (Gemeente Den Haag, 2020). Examples like these (there are plenty more) make it likely that repressive measures and the allowance of a limited number of bonfires as a cultural-historical tradition solved the problem of New Year's Eve disturbances in general; 'potential rioters are no longer in the neighborhoods and arising threats can be nipped in the bud effectively because the central bonfires created an orderly situation, look at the diminished crime numbers', was the much-heard argument. However, the crisis of 2019-2020 demonstrated that restrictions against the bonfires are necessary and a successful long-term strategy is still lacking. The covenant between the parties involved turned out to be ineffective, both the builders and municipal authorities did not respect the agreements. As a matter of fact, the ineffectiveness of most intervention methods towards the bonfires itself led to the untenable situation authorities find themselves in today. Because the bonfire organizations could not get the required permits (subsequently leading to a cancellation of the fires), this eventually contributed to the exact situation that the municipality tried to prevent in the first place: major riots in the neighborhoods. In any case, the riots in The Hague of 2019-2020 demonstrated that there are still enormous risks of public order violations associated with traditional bonfire interventions in The Hague (at least, when authorities aim to regulate them). In that sense, all repressive measures taken so far, have had little effect and more effective policies are needed.

The Hague is not the only place with a notorious New Year's tradition. In Veen, a village in the province of Noord-Brabant that is currently part of the municipality of Altena (before 2019 Aalburg), the municipality experienced similar problems. For several decades, the municipality (in particular the village of Veen) is confronted with the phenomenon of *stoken*. On a now notorious crossroad located in the center of the village, *Het Kruis*, anonymous drivers ignite prepared demolition vehicles by driving the vehicles into a fire, thereby creating dangerous situations for themselves and bystanders. The danger was mainly caused by the volume of the fire and the 'chicken game' element: the later a driver jumps out of the vehicle (heading towards the fire), the tougher one is perceived (COT, 2005). Moreover, *stoken* often escalated into violence against aid workers (primarily the police and fire department) and the infliction of damage against both private and public property. *Stoken* has a diverse history. After the event escalated during the New Year's Eve of 1989-1990 (the fire was so large that it endangered surrounding homes and shops), the following years became more peaceful (COT, 2005). The relative peace, however, was short-lived. After things got out of hand again in 1994-1995, the mayor of Aalburg changed the local legislation (*Algemene Plaatselijke Verordening*); in Veen, car wrecks were no longer allowed to be moved or parked on the side of the road from December 31 to January 1. The legislative adjustment (which made *stoken* more difficult) and excessive police presence during the subsequent years did not please the *stokers*, as evidenced by the outbreak of targeted violence during Pentecost. While the municipal Council disagreed, the police decided to embrace a new strategy, i.e. to act with the least amount of interference possible during the next years, a period which is referred to by Adang et al. (2007) as the permissive period

(1999-2003). However, the police strategy of reluctance was fiercely criticized by local residents, who were terrified by the increasing volume of the fires and the fact that the police did not commit to active enforcement of the law. As a result, new mayor Buijserd (2003-2007) received the political mission to put an end to the highly dangerous tradition of *stoken* (COT, 2005), as the situation had the potential to get out of control. Consequently, mayor Buijserd deployed a massive police force during the New Year's Eve of 2004-2005, which, according to Adang et al. (2007), is an important reason for the relative peace in the following years, a statement which will be nuanced in this study.

In fact, *without* the same huge deployment of police forces, authorities succeeded in curbing serious incidents from 2005 to 2012. Although the situation thus improved, it must be acknowledged that another incident occurred in 2013. Police officers responding to a report of a car fire, were pelted with fireworks, bottles and rocks by a swarming crowd of youngsters. Hence, the police arrested approximately 97 people predominantly from Veen and its environs, who had fled into a bar. However, nobody gave a statement, as a result of which 94 cases were dismissed (Van den Berg, 2018). A smaller incident occurred in 2017, when two rioters were arrested after provocations against the press and police (Van den Oord, 2017). According to the new mayor, many villagers are now fed-up with the tradition of *stoken* and will revolt against possible troublemakers (Koster, 2020). This is reflected in the numbers; apart from the two recent incidents, *stoken* has become less extreme and anarchistic scenes as in 2004-2005 no longer occur. Here too, repressive measures have contributed to reduced crime rates.

Nevertheless, restrictions towards the tradition of *stoken* (which, like the bonfire tradition in The Hague, got out of hand) brought it (largely) under control for some time. While the circumstances in Veen and The Hague (Scheveningen and Duindorp) are comparable – proponents of both traditions are part of a close community with strong social ties, a strong sense of independence from authorities, aversion to outsiders and they received a lot of media attention – the mayors of Veen developed relatively effective intervention methods towards the escalated tradition. They thereby managed to, which is the ultimate goal, create a relatively safe celebration of New Year's Eve (without spending hundreds of thousands of euros on repressive measures and riot police). Obviously, aforementioned incidents in 2013 and 2017 are not part of a safe celebration, but because there are so many factors influencing public order disturbances (alcohol abuse, individual characteristics, group dynamics, fireworks etc.), expressions of collective violence can never be completely ruled out (within reasonable limits of the judicial system). Apparently, adequate interventions were used in Veen. Admittedly, *stoken* is again (to some degree) a cat-and-mouse game between youth and authorities, but the tradition has reached a level where serious incidents almost no longer occur and the majority of inhabitants can celebrate New Year's Eve in a safe manner (Buijserd, 2007), a so-called 'irrationalization' of the (negative consequences of) the tradition. In Adang et al.'s (2008, p. 83) words: "The mutual reinforcing and violent 'game' that took

place for decades in Veen, seems to have transformed into a local tradition which is still risky, but has been controlled over the past years. Simply put: it has become a lot safer and more peaceful on the streets.” At the same time, Buijserd (appendix, 2020) notes that recent incidents in 2018 and 2019 are worrying, because they show signs of decline in the control of the phenomenon. This study therefore aims to identify which of the interventions were apparently effective, providing valuable information for mayors and authorities in general.

1.2 More than a celebration

Both in Veen and The Hague, authorities are dealing with the escalation of a cultural-historical tradition, not just a celebration. In The Hague, the tradition of regulated bonfires originated from an earlier tradition that escalated during the 1980s and in Veen the tradition of *stoken* is explained as an alternative to carnival (COT, 2005; appendix Buijserd, 2020). As most Dutch mayors know by now, changing a tradition typically evokes a tremendous amount of civil resistance. Whether it concerns ‘black Pete’ or New Year’s Eve traditions, authorities will be confronted with violent protests and disturbances of public order when traditions are at stake. Conversely, mayors are, as representatives and guardians of the people, obliged to reconsider a tradition that harms a significant part of the population. Logically, this dilemma has implications for the mayoral intervention methods to be applied. The municipalities may treat New Year’s Eve (and its traditions) as a separate annual crisis situation, in which they are confronted with new incidents every year. However, the real challenge is to achieve a long-term solution to keep the traditions within reasonable boundaries and prevent public order disturbances. In other words, the fact that we are dealing with ‘more than a celebration’ requires an increase of long-term vision and a decrease of structural incidentalism, i.e. the breach of a persistent pattern of incidents and problems in New Year’s Eve safety care (Muller, 2010).

1.3 Academic and societal relevance originating from a New Year’s Eve knowledge gap

The existing body of research has previously focused on (the emergence of) disturbances of public order and cases of collective violence offences in general (e.g. Adang, 2016; Van Ham et al., 2019; Ireland et al., 2020), on which the theoretical section will elaborate. However, since 2009 (Adang et al., 2009), no writers have been able to draw comparative case study research into these specific New Year’s Eve cases, a fortiori into traditional intervention methods, an observation that was personally verified with professor Dr. Adang. While several policy reports on New Year’s Eve related public order disturbances have been published with a focus on national interventions (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2017; Van der Torre et al., 2017; Helsloot et al., 2012) these reports came no further than to conclude that regulated bonfires should be considered an effective method of dealing with disturbances (because they adopted a different research approach). Only Adang et al. (2007, 2009)

and Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid (2019) specifically addressed and elaborated on how to deal with the traditions in question. Adang et al.'s research (2007, 2009), however, had a different approach and was not aimed at the long-term solutions. The *Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid* (2019), on the other hand, provided useful advice by stating that the municipality of The Hague should separate its different roles – of facilitator, supervisor and licensing authority – as much as possible. But the municipality under the reign of former interim mayor Remkes interpreted this as ‘the municipality will only act as licensing authority and we will merely act as an inspector if the organizations succeed to obtain a permit’. This approach put the municipality in the current unwanted situation (see e.g. the interview of former mayor Remkes with Castricum, 2019). Therefore, additional research towards a long-term solution is necessary, to which this study aims to contribute. Considering the prevalence of these specific disturbances, additional research is much needed; inter alia Amsterdam, Assen, Delft, Schiedam and Vlaardingen have similar New Year’s Eve traditions to contend with, illustrating the first part of societal relevance. In fact, a total of 26 Dutch municipalities allow or facilitate such traditions around New Year’s Eve under safety conditions (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2017). Consequently, the revision of New Year’s Eve traditions is considered a hot and socially relevant topic. Yet, as the *Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid* (2017) has already indicated, some municipalities can learn a lot from each other, especially when the problems are concentrated around groups with similar characteristics, which is the case in the current study. This brings us to the second point of societal relevance; these New Year’s Eve incidents fall within Jong’s (2017) meaning making categorization of high collective (societal) impact and high responsibility of the mayor. As a consequence, both mayor Buijserd (Aalborg) and Krikke (The Hague) were exposed to heavy public criticism because of their role towards these traditions. As this research precisely examines this type of cases from a mayoral perspective – thereby considering that the mayor is by law in charge of maintaining public order and that these cases capture immense amounts of media-attention – it provides useful information for mayors that find themselves in similar crises (assist them on how to avoid resignation), an under-studied perspective in the academic field.

1.4 Research question

As demonstrated in the previous section, the mayors (and authorities) in Veen were able to diminish the negative consequences of *stoken* (for some time), whereas The Hague’s mayors (and authorities) were not fully able to do the same with the bonfire tradition. Although The Hague genuinely tried to tackle the problems, it remains an annually recurring problem for the municipality. This raises the question of why this is the case, i.e. as explanatory research. It thereby focuses on the question how the municipality should work towards more ‘normal’ New Year’s Eve celebrations. Considering that *vreugdevuren* and *stoken* are cultural-historic traditions, the previous sections suggest that it is necessary to adopt customized intervention methods aimed at long-term improvements. It seems to be too simplistic to think that individual repressive measures (like arrests

and area bans) alone will be enough. If undesirable traditions are merely reciprocated with repressive measures, practitioners will go underground on the long-term and authorities will be even worse off. Compare this with the exposure of a XTC-lab. In this case, a mayor can use repressive measures (criminal prosecution), to protect society. With traditions, however, a mayor must do more, like creating civil understanding about the fact that some people are damaged by it. This is because (a significant part of) the population will understand repressive measures against a XTC-lab, which is however not generally the case with the repression of a (New Year's Eve) tradition. This notion is in line with reasoning by Helsloot (Heerde, 2019) and Eysink Smeets (Ketelaar, 2019), who both expressed that it is better to accept (and to some extent go along with) New Year's Eve traditions than to impose a strict ban, which will only provoke counter-reactions. In sum, the previous sections have established that authorities became committed to the reduction of New Year's Eve problems after years of escalation. In The Hague, a strategy was adopted to fight *Kerstbomen rausen* and related excessive disturbances. The allowance of regulated bonfire (and other fire) traditions can be seen as an important intervention against these disturbances (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2017; Helsloot et al., 2012; Adang et al., 2007; Adang et al., 2009). However, this bonfire strategy also comes with problems and became untenable, creating similar disturbances, as a consequence of which authorities now aim to develop effective intervention methods specifically aimed at the control of this initial measure. This resembles the phenomenon of structural incidentalism, i.e. multiple incidents are caused by the same underlying (persistent) problem. So instead of this incident-by-incident approach, authorities need to look at longer-lasting interventions. To date, no research has been conducted into the identification and clustering of such long-term methods. Therefore, the research question for this thesis reads: *Can successful intervention methods be identified to enable the municipalities of The Hague and Altena to improve their long-term response to public order disturbances related to New Year's Eve traditions?*

1.5 Sub questions

The focus of this study mainly is on *the use of media* (known for shaping public perception), *communication* (rational crisis communication is considered essential according to following research) and *societal* (in anti-authoritarian and close communities, the government cannot successfully intervene without societal interventions, also stressed by following research) intervention methods. Therefore, the sub questions read:

SQ: Can we identify effective media interventions?

SQ: Can we identify effective societal interventions?

SQ: Can we identify effective crisis communication interventions?

To properly implement intervention strategies in these areas, a high level of individual mayoral commitment is required. Since such commitment strongly overlaps with crisis communication interventions, it will be covered by this research question. Individual mayoral commitment is still an element of this study, because in crises like these, resorting to *ad hominem* attacks on the mayor is common (this was the case in both Veen and The Hague), but also in other cases (e.g. Genemuiden, where mayor Plomp was individually involved in a conflict about illegal moped races) mayors become ‘the personification of the conflict’ (Jong & Johannik, 2005). In fact, Plomp’s case perfectly illustrates the importance of a good individual relationship between a mayor and his/her population during crises. Plomp was unable to establish a good relationship between him and the citizens of Genemuiden. As a consequence, informal societal leaders (local business owners and pastors) were seen as the highest authority, undermining the effectiveness of the mayor’s interventions. However, a strong individual connection between the mayor and his/her population can logically also be an effective, almost essential, intervention method. The importance of this governing role by mayors is also stressed by Adang et al. (2009) and the *Commissie Overlast Jaarwisseling* (2008), who describe the role of the mayor as a key element in addressing the problems of New Year’s Eve, i.e. effective crisis communication. After answering these questions, this thesis aims to have accumulated knowledge about the intervention methods that were used in both cases, and, more importantly, what it means for the long-term management of these traditions.

2. Methodology

2.1 Structure of Wittkopf et al.'s (2007) policy model

As media and political attention played an important role in both cases, the author searched for a comprehensive theoretical model including these elements. This is because the municipal politics and media coverage may reveal interventions not yet proposed and also provide information about the effectiveness of interventions. The choice was made to categorize that theoretical model based on the structure of the (multivariate) funnel of causality, which discusses five different categories related to policy making, i.e. external sources, societal sources, governmental sources, role sources and individuals sources (Wittkopf et al., 2007). In Wittkopf et al.'s (2007) model, each category scrutinizes a different perspective. Wittkopf et al. (2007) designed the model for use by American presidents, but as it describes the policy area's that determine individual Presidential policy decisions, it conveniently also reveals the relevant area's for analyzing the policy of political leaders on a national/local level. In turn, the theoretical section will analyze relevant crisis management research for each perspective: media interventions (instead of external), societal interventions and crisis communication (instead of role and individual sources). The main advantage of this model is that it provides an orderly categorization of environmental policy variables, thereby giving oversight to all intervention methods (it is thus not used for explanatory purposes), i.e. a heuristic model. In this study, the governmental perspective of Wittkopf et al.'s model (2007) is adapted because the governmental perspective is not an intervention method. Instead, the governmental perspective ('governmental source', as Wittkopf et al., 2007 named it) is used to find available intervention methods. Next to this – as already stated – the individual perspective is combined with crisis communication interventions.




Figure 1. Wittkopf et al.'s (2007) funnel of causality

2.2 Method for answering the research questions

In order to answer the research question and sub questions, this study uses a comparative case study design. Case study research is chosen because we are clearly dealing with complex cases, which require the researcher to get as much insight as possible (George & Bennett, 2005). To compile a structured comparison with a similar time frame, this study will compare the last four involved mayors of The Hague, i.e. Deetman, (2003-2008, although he started before 2003), Van Aartsen (2008-2017), Krikke (2017-2019) and interim mayor Remkes (2019-2020), with the last three mayors (excluding ex-interim mayor Fränzel, who had a negligible impact) of Aalburg/Altena, i.e. Buijserd (2003-2007), Naterop (2008-2018) and Lichtenberg (2019-present, who also had a relatively small impact). Although Remkes was an interim mayor, he exerted so much influence on the situation, that it would be unwise to exclude him. From these, Van Aartsen, Krikke and Remkes were the main players in The Hague and Buijserd and Naterop in Veen. Because they were in charge during the relevant moments of our time frame, they will get the most attention. To answer the research and sub questions (in accordance with the aforementioned adapted policy perspectives), we use a mixed-method design of semi-structured interviews, secondary literature, primary document research, which, especially in the Hague (Gemeente Den Haag, 2019) but to a lesser extent also in Veen (*Archiefweb Gemeente Aalburg*, 2019) is freely accessible and qualitative media content analysis. Next to newspapers, the importance of social media in contemporary media coverage must be acknowledged. The first advantage of social media analysis lies in the fact that it provides unfiltered information. In this manner, social media gives an inside (although highly

subjective) view on a situation. Through the private/closed Facebook groups *Wat is het fijn, om een Duindorper te zijn* and *Wat is het fijn om een Scheveninger te zijn*, the author gained much knowledge about the relevant theoretical mechanisms (see the following theory section). While the other sources were more loosely analyzed, qualitative content analysis of media requires a more structured and framed approach, which will be elaborated on in a following section. A total of five subject matter experts were interviewed, three on The Hague and two on Veen, which each lasted between 45 and 95 minutes. The participants were asked to share their insights on the indicators following from the theoretical model. The interviews have been summarized and listed in the appendix after approval of the respondent. The next paragraphs will further focus on the methodology that this study uses.

2.3 Method of media analysis

Media data collection

‘Media framing’ examines the relationship between public policy issues in the news and how people think and talk about these issues (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). There are two ways to analyze media frames (or indicators): deductive or inductive. The inductive approach starts from an open perspective with loosely defined media frames. While this approach may detect the many indicators that can be used in the media, it is labor-intensive (and therefore mostly suitable for small samples) and difficult to replicate (decreasing the reliability). As a result, a deductive approach is preferred, which analyzes predefined indicators by content analysis methodology. To assess the use of media interventions and frames, the author will use the LexisNexis database (university version) with a time frame of 1 January 2003 until 1 January 2020, i.e. the period of interest for this study. Audience research by the municipality of Altena (appendix Van den Heuvel, 2020) shows that *AltenaNieuws* and *HetKontakt* are the most popular free local papers. Next to this, *Brabants Dagblad* (edition Waalwijk), *Algemeen Dagblad* (edition Rivierenland), *BN DeStem* (edition Oosterhout) and *Reformatorisch Dagblad* are the most popular regional newspapers. Furthermore, *De Telegraaf* (largest newspaper in the Netherlands, and having a reputation for right-wing rhetoric), *De Volkskrant* (focused on a higher-educated segment, primarily left-wing and liberal oriented) and the national edition of *Het Algemeen Dagblad* (overarching newspaper with a neutral reputation) are – judged by circulation – the most influential newspapers. Besides, combined they provide an ideologically balanced view of the situation, increasing the representativeness. As the free local newspapers are not registered in the LexisNexis database, this study – thus for pragmatic reasons – will merely code the four hottest regional and three hottest national newspapers. First, the author analyzed a large sample of articles related to *stoken* and public order disturbances around New Year’s Eve in Veen (n=100). The following search terms have been used: *stoken and burgemeester and Veen*, which presented a total of n=178 hits. So, for pragmatic reasons, the author used a sample of 100 articles from this

already narrowed-down search. The ‘and’ coding tool – which requires the words ‘Veen’ and ‘*stoken*’ and ‘*burgemeester*’ to be present in the same news article – is used to exclude unrelated articles (about other things that include the words *stoken* or Veen, (e.g. articles about wood-burning in a stove) and ensures a focus on mayoral interventions. In The Hague, *AD Haagse Courant* is the most influential local newspaper that is included in the LexisNexis database. Again, the three most influential national newspapers are also incorporated, leading to a sample of n=100 articles. The following search terms have been used: *vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen*, leading to a total of n=153 hits.

Media data analysis

The collected data will be analyzed using the method of qualitative content analysis. Accordingly, a codebook based on the methodological insights of Semetko & Valkenburg (2001) was created. To analyze the presence of relevant indicators (stemming from the following theory) in articles about *stoken* and bonfires, the author designed several binary questions (see codebook in appendix). The questions are meant to determine the presence of each indicator. A major advantage of this technique, is that the text can be coded the same if it appears in a different (implicit) form. For instance, when an inhabitant blames the mayor for riots, ‘he is responsible’ falls within the same category as ‘we can blame him for this’. After the media coverage is examined, the author will look for patterns and link back to the theory.

2.4 Limitations

Research on media and crisis communication can be criticized on the basis of subjectivity. In the end, crisis management – and crisis communication in particular – is about diverging perceptions, interests and interpretations (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). This study is primarily relying on (social) media statements and interviews (on the subject of events that happened over 15 years ago), which could potentially lead to the pass-on of bias to the results. Although it was also tried to interview municipal civil servants of The Hague, they were not allowed to cooperate to any external investigations because the situation is still too politically sensitive. Therefore, only five subject-matter experts were interviewed, meaning that it is possible that potentially useful insights might have been missed. Nevertheless, this study consciously created a pool of interview respondents that would illuminate different aspects of the cases in question. Another limitation regarding the interviews can logically be found in the fact that most interviews could not be conducted in person (because of the pandemic), increasing the chance that respondents might have given less information. In an attempt to diminish deficiencies in the internal validity, the indicators of effective interventions were based on well-established scientific insights in the field of Dutch riot management (Adang et al., 2007; Adang et al., 2008; Adang et al., 2009; Helsloot et al., 2012; Van der Torre et al., 2017). This would also diminish the risk of overlooking important frames in the media analysis (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). An evident limitation of the media analysis is that the qualitative

content analysis was only performed on 200 media articles. Due to a lack of unlimited time and words, it was not possible to analyze all media articles dealing with this topic. The author tried to diminish this deficiency by using an ideologically representative newspaper sample. In this way, subjectivity based on political motivations is likely to be reduced. Besides, a limitation might be that the articles were sometimes repetitive, which means that the same events appeared in multiple news articles. Another important attempt to increase the reliability and internal validity was made through data triangulation, i.e. mixed methods. As will be demonstrated in the analysis, results will – as far as possible – be based on multiple research methods. Triangulation also decreases the limitations created by confidential policy documents (primarily in the case of Veen), which could therefore not be used in this study. To reduce risks with reliability, the codebook of the media analysis is added to the appendix, increasing transparency. It could, however, still be possible that another researcher might get different results when performing the media analysis. Finally, it is important to emphasize that the most recent events in Veen (December 2020) are not part of this study, and the current lockdown might be a variable that underlays these recent riots.

2.5 Description of the theory and analysis sections

The following theoretical chapter will analyze relevant theoretical insights according to the structure of Wittkopf et al. (2007). It will depict the most important scientific insights on public order disturbances both on an international level (public disturbances have some international similarities after all) and in the Netherlands in particular. The identified indicators stemming from this review, will lead to the proposed long-term intervention model, on the basis of which the interviews, policy and media documents will be analyzed. The analysis will begin with an exploratory analysis of the policy documents from Veen and The Hague. This is because the municipal debates and policy documents on these crises reveal a lot of information about those possibilities (which methods were used and/or discussed in the municipal documents), which is necessary to answer the research question: what *can* a mayor (and his/her local authoritarians) according to the municipality do? After all previously considered intervention methods are identified, this study will – based on further analysis of the relevant indicators stemming from the long-term model – determine successful intervention methods; what *should* a mayor (and his/her authorities) do? This means that these interventions should be the ‘building stones’ of a long-term intervention strategy. And also, *how* should a mayor (and his/her authorities) do this? Evidently, these last two questions are essential in response to the research question.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Research on mass public order disturbances

Because prior research has established that mass public order disturbances are not irrational, unfocused or unfounded (such as Le Bon, 1895 suggested), scholars started to investigate the phenomenon from different angles. The following paragraphs depict these angles, thus showing the most important scientific debates in the field of collective violence and public order disturbances (around New Year's Eve and in general, both nationally and internationally). First, this section describes the research on individual perpetrators. (Who are the troublemakers?) Next, it continues with the societal context in which collective violence occurs. (Why and how, from a broader socio-political perspective, does collective violence occur?) This because it is impossible to develop intervention methods when the core problem remains unclear or undefined. (Against who and what exactly are interventions being developed?) Then this section describes the main governmental approaches towards public order disturbances (How should the government react?). It thereby focuses on New Year's Eve literature in specific. Lastly, this theoretical section presents the body of knowledge around the aforementioned relevant research fields of effective media interventions, societal interventions and crisis communication (including individual mayoral involvement).

The individual approach: who are they?

Reicher (2001) established that individuals involved in acts of collective violence often describe themselves as a member of a specific social category or group. As a result, their violent behavior is determined by the individuals – loosely described as leaders – belonging to that group (or social movement). While this is essentially true, it also suggests that any individual who strongly identifies himself with a specific group that is willing to use force can become violent when certain trigger events occur. As a majority of individuals tends to leave the scene or merely start to observe right before violent acts unfold, this is not typically the case (Adang, 2011). Subsequent research therefore focused on the question which factors were decisive for the actual perpetuation of violence and thus took personal characteristics into account. An example of such research is van Ham et al., (2019) who examined the relationship between the involvement in collective violence and individual characteristics of perpetrators, i.e. criminal record, personality traits and childhood experiences. Other research (e.g. Van Leiden et al., 2009) sketched an average profile of Dutch hardcore disturbers (male, 27 years old, criminal record, with an ambiguous socio-economic class), who are often responsible for the violent escalation of mass events. Moreover, they distinguished between three types of disturbers: hooligans, activists and neighborhood rioters. These types logically correspond to three riot categories: football, protests and neighborhood riots. While these are interesting notions, they show us that (typologies of) public order

disturbances are not unambiguously explained from individual characteristics (Van Leiden et al., 2009). Within the limits of context dependency, however, they offer points of departure for accurate intervention methods. Authorities should incrementally take action against hard core disturbers (*notoire ordeverstoorders*). To start with, authorities should broaden their knowledge on the behavior of the relevant group. (Which type of disturbers are we dealing with?) This will subsequently help with the identification and information gathering about them. (Who are the hard core disturbers and how can we effectively build files against them?) Lastly, the information-led approach needs to result in a personalized approach of the hardcore disturbers (for example by youth workers or the police) (Van Leiden et al., 2009). As most perpetrators are strongly related to a specific social group, research also focused on the social context of mass public order disturbances, which will be discussed in the following paragraph.

The emergence approach: how and why do riots occur?

Several studies investigated the emergence and social context of public order violations, thereby mainly looking into the aforementioned categorization of football hooliganism, protests and neighborhood riots. Some of these studies placed emphasis on interrelated crowd behavior from a group-psychology perspective. According to Stott et al. (2008), for instance, the absence of major public order violations during football matches, can be attributed to the non-paramilitary style of policing. This style of policing supports non-violent group behavior, which in turn leads to the isolation of smaller violent fractions from the main mass, whose influence then becomes insignificant. This is also underlined in other studies, where paramilitary or escalating policing is believed to fuel the outbreak of mass public order disturbances (e.g. Della Porta, 2013). Aforementioned investigation of public order disturbances in the Netherlands (van Leiden et al., 2009) illustrates that next to the categorization of football hooliganism, protests and neighborhoods, we should differentiate between mass, appointed and incidental riots. In mass riots, a significant part of the escalation can be devoted to the compelling effect within a mass. Examples are riots in Hoek van Holland (2009) and around football matches. Second, as the name suggests, appointed riots have been arranged in advance. A well-known example is the arrangement of fights between (football) hooligans at remote locations. The cause of these riots often lies in a history of rivalry or tensions. Finally, with incidental riots, a certain incident causes upheaval in a neighborhood or district, which is usually uttered at authorities (in most cases the police). A recent example are the riots that occurred in The Hague's Schilderswijk following the death of Mitch Henriquez (2015). Most of the time, underlying tensions were already present in those neighborhoods (Van Leiden et al., 2009). As mass and incidental public order disturbances may also be initiated a priori (by the hardcore of the disturbers), there may be overlap between incidental and appointed riots. In addition, note that these riots do not correspond to the aforementioned typology of disturbers. Football hooligans, e.g., are well known to be involved in all types of riots. However, authorities can draw conclusions for the intervention policy based on the typology. For example, when an incident occurs in a neighborhood with relatively large numbers of lower socio-economic groups, authorities

should focus on hard core disturbers who are (in general) from the same region and who have a history of violence or are involved in conflicts with other groups (Van Leiden et al., 2009).

Two general governmental approaches towards mass disturbances in general

In general, researchers in this field mention two ways in which authorities can take action against public order disturbers. Proponents of the first approach, which is known as the traditional approach, argue for an emphasis on repression and disciplinary measures. These researchers typically think in terms of arrests, detention programs/increased criminal penalties, a tit for tat/zero tolerance policy and surveillance. In contrast, proponents of the second approach, known as the community approach, pledge for prevention and, more importantly, cooperation with the community (Savage, 2007). According to these researches, the solution lies in combating educational disadvantages and social inequality. As most researchers (e.g. Law in his well-known ‘Scarman report’, 1981) argued for a transition from a traditional approach to a more community-based approach, the latter has become the leading strategy in the Netherlands (van der Vijver & Zoomer, 2004). One of the most quoted scientific contributions by proponents of the community approach is Waddington et al.’s (1989) flashpoint model, which holds interesting implications for the proper intervention methods. This is because the model retains the assumption that sole repressive policy will not be effective but that the solution can be found in interrelated variables of social unrest, implying that intervention policies need to be found here and that repressive individual measures are insufficient. Moreover, Waddington and King (2005) believe that riots should be understood as symbolic or social events. However, this does not mean that the community approach is undebated. Especially over the last few decades, the call for a return to repressive strategies has increased. Which type of approach is most effective, logically depends on the context of the disturbance; a broader intervention policy is always tailor-made. According to Van Der Vijver and Zoomer (2004), the governmental approach taken in the Netherlands is characterized by diversity. In some cases, like the 2007 riots in Utrecht’s district of Ondiep (Van de Klomp et al., 2011), researchers argued for a combination of repressive and community-based strategies. In other cases, like Project X, researchers (e.g. van den Brink, 2013) argued that public order disturbances must be answered by strict repressive policing. It can therefore be concluded that there is no unequivocal preference when it comes to public order management approaches on a local level.

National approach towards New Year’s Eve mass disturbances

New Year’s Eve is currently treated in The Netherlands as the annual crisis event, with broader implications than The Hague and Veen alone. It is no coincidence that the *Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid* (2017, p. 26) speaks of a “festivity with a dark side and with persistent problems” in their most recent national New Year’s Eve publication. It thereby fits in a ten-year trend of alarming reports, starting in the first decade of the 21st century. In 2007, Adang et al. first concluded in ‘*Hoezo Rustig?!*’ that New Year’s Eve disturbances in the Netherlands reached unreasonable proportions. Society came to a point where a New Year’s Eve with deaths,

injuries, millions of damages and riots was considered 'normal'. This is because New Year's Eve offers an annual opportunity structure for criminal activities and because people perceive this criminality as justified, since 'it is only once a year' (Adang et al., 2007). As a result, the call for a different approach of New Year's Eve – in which we stop to accept the fact that New Year's Eve is characterized by excessive incidents – increased. It particularly struck Adang et al. (2007) that authorities downplayed the incidents because they were used to them. Authorities should address the issues as they are and give more weight to the abnormality of certain incidents in their (media) communication strategy. The report of the *Commissie Overlast Jaarwisseling* (2008) – that endorses the view of Adang et al. (2007) and thus advocated a cultural transformation in the approach towards New Year's Eve – also fits perfectly in this trend. Next to this cultural transformation, researchers identified the national best practices, which should lead towards an effective intervention policy.

Regarding those best practices, a follow-up report of '*Hoezo Rustig?!*' (Adang et al., 2009) name the stimulation of civil participation, especially towards close communities in the 'Biblebelt' and working-class neighbourhoods. This is because it is difficult for the police to 'penetrate' in these communities. Additionally, Adang et al. (2009) identified a higher probability of apprehension, labelling New Year's Eve as a risk event and suggesting the use of a multidisciplinary approach in which multiple administrative authorities closely work together as best practices. At that time, however, Adang et al. (2009) acknowledged that there is still a long way to go and that more information is required. Helsloot et al. (2012) also came to the conclusion that more knowledge about effective interventions was needed. According to these authors, we should also primarily emphasize the role of civil society, whereby they distinguish between first and second order interventions. First order interventions are interventions within the existing system and second order interventions are interventions that change the system itself. First order interventions in the case of new year's disturbances primarily regard the regulation of the import of illegal fireworks (which type of firework causes a lot of casualties and is often used for vandalism and during public order disturbances), a stricter criminal justice system for violators, the expansion of summary justice (*snelrecht*) and camera surveillance. However, Helsloot et al. (2012) presume that these first order (primarily repressive) measures will not produce the desired results, so that authorities should not focus too much on those. Instead, Helsloot et al. (2012) conclude that much gain could still be made in the area of second order interventions, i.e. "the use of rational communication", by using communication in a way that "civilians will feel responsible for the negative consequences of the risks they are taking" (Helsloot et al., 2012, p. 60). Based on scientific knowledge about crisis communication it is therefore "necessary to investigate how this communication should be shaped in practice" (Helsloot et al., 2012, p. 61). In the latest follow-up report of '*Hoezo rustig?!*' (2007), Van der Torre et al. (2017) name a multidisciplinary approach, cooperation with the civil society, repressively restricting the aforementioned opportunity structure and ensuring enough staff deployment as the best national practices over a period of ten years (compared to the first report

that was led by Adang). Finally, all mentioned research acknowledges that New Year's problems are characterized by diversity and thus require tailor-made intervention policies on a municipal level; there is no 'one size fits all' intervention. To conclude this paragraph, we found that prominent researchers of public order disturbances around New Year's Eve argue for enhanced (media) communication strategies, civil/societal interventions, and a higher probability of arrests, thereby labelling New Year's Eve as a risk event and suggesting a multidisciplinary approach.

3.2 Adapting the funnel of causality

What are the relevant elements of the previous teachings from literature? *In sum*, specific features that should be taken into account are that most disturbers perceive themselves as members of a specific (social) group and that hardcore disturbers (differentiated into three types) are usually responsible for the escalation ('who are they?'). In addition, escalating or paramilitary policing styles have proven to catalyze disturbances. The cause of disturbances is often found in social dynamics and is dependent on the type of riot. The flashpoint model thereby assumes that the specific nature of these social dynamics determines if a flashpoint degenerates into violence (why do riots occur?). Considering the governmental approach towards public order disturbances, we can conclude that there is no unambiguously effective approach. In general terms, more scientific attention is being paid to New Year's Eve interventions in The Netherlands compared to the 20th century. For well over ten years, researchers argue for a cultural transformation towards New Year's Eve. Most problems are concentrated in the 'Biblebelt' cities and in certain urban districts, especially in The Hague. The latest overall best practices (on a national level) are cooperation with civil society, a multidisciplinary approach, increasing the chance of being caught and improving rational communication strategies. When translating the previous findings into the funnel of causality, research established that it is indeed important to look at societal and (media) communicational interventions. These theoretical notions will be included in the following long-term intervention model. However, there is a clear difference between national policy towards New Year's Eve in general and municipal policy towards New Year's Eve traditions. It is not possible to simply copy other best practices and the solution is to be found in the long-term. Therefore, the research perspectives of societal, media and crisis communication interventions will be analyzed in accordance with the structure of Wittkopf et al's model (2017).

4. Towards a long-term intervention model

4.1 External sources » media interventions

As far as the initial funnel causality framework is concerned, external sources are defined as the actions and characteristics of external actors, mostly of states (Wittkopf et al., 2017). However, as indicated, this study looks into an important long-term intervention method: the use of media. In general, people base their opinion and risk perception towards New Year's Eve (and its traditions) on media (Helsloot et al., 2012). Because certain media frames have implications for the effectiveness of policy, media coverage may assist authorities in the adoption of appropriate crisis responses (An & Gower, 2009). For instance, when media pay attention to the intervention policy of (local) governments citizens will become more aware of the risks, their behavioral boundaries and what is expected from them (Adang et al., 2007). Logically, authorities respond to this and use media to influence behavior and perceptions towards New Year's Eve, which will be analyzed in this study. They can do this either in a direct (by direct calls) or indirect (by using interest groups who express their views or for example ventilating numbers to create different frames) manner (Adang et al., 2007). An and Gower (2009) elaborated on Neuman Just and Crigler's (1992) premise of different crisis frames by examining which kind of media frames were used in the reporting of different crises and what this means for the altering of public perception (in this case: effective interventions). In the event of a preventable crisis (like ours), media usually tend to focus on responsibility (the responsibility frame); who is to blame (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; An & Gower, 2009)? This responsibility frame will typically result in a blame game, which is characterized by politicization and antipathy towards the responsible actor ('t Hart 1993; Olson 1998; Rosenthal 1998; Boin et al. 2008; Boin et al., 2010). Because of the politicization, public leaders are often portrayed as the responsible actor (Boin et al., 2010). Mayors must therefore commit themselves to prevent or diminish this situation of a blame game.

However, as this study also looks into the use of media as an intervention method, it aims to fill the knowledge gap of effective media interventions in our cases; how is media used to effectively diminish the negative consequences related to traditions? The way in which certain things are communicated is often more important than the actual content. While it is assumed that the government has the right intentions (to de-escalate and decrease disturbances), they may unconsciously contribute to escalation by using an incorrect media strategy, thus undermining the other intervention methods and thereby its own objectives. This paragraph will therefore aim to assist them in the indicators that are necessary for implementing an effective media strategy. To start with, if the government decides to commit to direct media interventions (directly addressing the media to inform, i.e. the media strategy), it should use pro-active risk communication to make people more aware of their own responsibility and what the government expects from them in a positive, de-escalating way. However, authorities should not release too many details, as Helsloot et al. (2012) have shown that this can be interpreted as an indirect suggestion that the police is invited to enforce these measures, undermining the societal share of responsibility and challenging troublemakers. So: enforce but do not share on beforehand how this will happen exactly. Further, revealing too many details will provide rioters with ideas on how to circumvent the intervention

policy. With regard to media communication, it is thereby important to note that good timing is essential. Helsloot et al. (2012) argue that the government should not immediately publicize violent incidents, arrests and damage because the government then positions itself as ‘the responsible actor’ for the problems, which is often unjustified. In this way, the government unintentionally projects the responsibility frame (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; An & Gower, 2009) on themselves, which also discredits them and therefore undermines their intervention(s). In addition, communication of too much negative incidents through media contributes to the phenomenon of a risk regulation reflex, in which (municipal) administrators feel compelled to promise certain intervention methods that cannot actually be implemented in reality. It comes as no surprise that this would have damaging consequences for the credibility of the government.

Instead, authorities must involve society and citizens must share this responsibility for the safe practice of New Year’s Eve. The government should realize this in two ways. First, in the run-up to New Year’s Eve by clearly stating that society itself is in the first place responsible for the safety of persons and property. Secondly, by publishing a general impression of the event (what went right and what went wrong?) in the direct aftermath of New Year’s Eve, instead of the factual enumeration of incidents. Authorities should only publish that actual registration of incidents after one or two months, when empirical evaluations are finished and no misleading frames can be formed. Next to this, extensive media attention has previously shown to mobilize and attract other troublemakers (Commissie Project X Haren, 2013), so a full radio silence (meaning that important governmental figures will not directly address the media) in the run-up to and direct aftermath of New Year’s Eve is also seen as an effective strategy in this regard. If it appears that media on their own create a mobilizing effect on troublemakers, the mayor can also point this out directly to the concerning media company (COT, 2005), which is called an indirect media-intervention in this study. Although this can also be very effective, a mayor must take the journalistic freedom into account and realize that an indirect media intervention can also be counterproductive as it will lead the journalist to publish even more. The last element that authorities should take into account is the fact that a media intervention can be undermined because of a discrepancy between the way involved actors perceive themselves and the way they are portrayed in the media. Research (e.g. Waddington et al., 1987; Haghebaert, 2005; Jakubowicz, 2006) has shown that media systematically depict a negative frame of marginalized groups within society, by using incorrect assumptions, factual inaccuracies or by substantially using negative stereotypes. While most statements are subjective in this regard (most of the time there are no hard facts), the damage is generally already done when people feel that authorities are creative with the facts or numbers with the sole purpose to marginalize them for political gain or to disguise their own mistakes. This resembles the creation of moral panic: an exaggerated media campaign with the purpose to implement certain policy objectives (Cohen, 2011). This kind of marginalization may happen as a consequence of direct interventions of authorities through media or by media themselves and it may lead to general distrust

or the adoption of a general hostile attitude towards media and/or authorities (it erodes their integrity), making their interventions ineffective.

To briefly recapitulate, media interventions can be effective because they influence public perception and therefore behavior. This may happen by means of direct (direct calls of authorities, most of the time the mayor) or indirect interventions (by addressing sensation-seeking and escalating media). A lot of research has been done on recurring frames within crisis management, of which the responsibility frame is most frequently used with regard to preventable crises. Hardly surprising, this frame has an impact on the effectiveness of intervention policy. Moreover, research has shown that the government should use a de-escalating and positive tone when committing to direct media interventions. Next, the right timing and content are essential elements of an effective media strategy. As an important part of this content, the government should allocate responsibility to society (in the run-up to New Year’s Eve) and think carefully about the details of their own approach to be shared with the media. Finally, authorities should carefully monitor if their media intervention is based on correct assumptions and prevent using negative stereotyping.

Table 1. Indicators of effective direct media interventions

Indicator	Description
De-escalating	Give information, but aim for a positive and de-escalating tone
No details	Give information, but do not reveal details about the upcoming interventions
No responsibility frame	Avoid the responsibility frame in an early stage (in case something went wrong)
Good timing	Not right before or after New Year’s Eve and avoid factual enumeration of incidents in the direct aftermath
Involve society	Emphasize the role of society in the run-up to New Year’s Eve
No negative stereotyping	Avoid negative stereotyping of relevant groups
No premature assumptions	Avoid premature assumptions

Note: These indicators are applicable to the qualitative content analysis of media coverage and are also included in the media codebook

4.2 Societal sources » societal interventions

Societal interventions can be very effective by means of involving societal actors with good intentions and implementing restrictive measures against actors with bad intentions (Adang et al., 2007; Adang et al., 2008; Adang et al., 2009; Helsloot et al., 2012; Van der Torre et al., 2017; Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2019). Because of the (semi-)autonomous character of close communities (be it communities in the ‘Biblebelt’ or working-class neighborhoods), societal interventions have become an essential element of an overall effective intervention policy (Adang et al., 2007; Adang et al., 2009). As Reicher (2001) already established, persons involved in mass public order disturbances primarily perceive themselves as a member of a specific group. Much of their behavior thus depends on the group they are associated with; eventually every individual pursues recognition and prestige within his/her (mostly his) group. This holds the important suggestion that intervention policy coming from within this group – especially from leader figures – is the most effective. Therefore, authorities should make every effort to involve these figures, to make them feel responsible and to incite them to correct people from their own community. When a certain group is not susceptible to this approach and continues to misbehave or flout agreements/laws, repressive measures should be taken against them. In this regard, authorities should focus on increasing the chance of apprehension (getting certain troublemakers out of their anonymity) as an alternative for higher penalties (higher penalties are not very effective). Authorities need to develop their strategy towards these persons in a multidisciplinary way in accordance with Van Leiden et al.’s (2009) intervention towards hard core neighborhood rioters. This means that not only the police and municipal authorities should be involved in an integral strategy on the streets, but also the fire department, medical services, youth work and private security, (Adang et al., 2007; Adang et al., 2008; Adang et al., 2009; Helsloot et al., 2012; Van der Torre et al., 2017) creating a personalized intervention approach based on gathered information (Van Leiden et al., 2009). Another theoretical addition can be found in the fact that our cases are subject to social movement theory, which will be discussed in the next paragraph.

Considering that the discussion on bonfires in The Hague is part of a broader societal debate, i.e. the erosion of Dutch traditions, there is strong internal cohesion and because the (social-cultural) stakes are high, we also need to consult social movement theory. While the national debate at that time (around 2005) was underdeveloped, the same is essentially true for Veen; a unified group of proponents feels that a tradition has been taken away from them. According to Waddington et al. (1987) and Della Porta (2013), analyzing sociopolitical structures, relations and contexts of social movements is crucial for understanding processes of political or social violence

(read: mass public order disturbances). To do so, one must first conceptualize the object of study: social movements. Della Porta (2006) conceptualized a social movement as an informal network that is engaged in sociopolitical conflicts and shares a collective identity. In that sense, a social movement is more than just a spontaneous crowd, but less than a formal or procedural organization. Based on this definition, we can indeed conclude that both organizations (*stokers* and bonfire organizations) should be defined as social movements; while there are official spokespersons (in The Hague boards), both organizations are characterized by informal structures and relationships, are engaged in sociopolitical conflicts (on the preservation of a tradition) and have a collective identity (although some individuals hold more moderate opinions). This interpretation, i.e. that these groups are actually some kind of social movements, has implications for the suitable intervention policy. According to Della Porta (2013), this means that they are subject to internal or external competition (as a consequence of which a culture of silence and intimidation is often present or outsiders affiliated to the troublemakers will join the public order disturbances) (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Besides, they are susceptible to escalating policing or police brutality (they stand up for each other and exaggerated police violence is usually an escalating factor) (Stott et al., 2008). Finally, there is a chance that they will switch to violence when they do not feel heard or if their objectives cannot be reached because of government-imposed constructions (Edwards & Gillham, 2013) (Waddington et al., 1989).

To briefly recapitulate, effective societal interventions methods use leading figures in communities. Should this not work, then authorities need to develop a multidisciplinary repressive strategy towards the hard core troublemakers. In this regard, a higher probability of apprehending (arresting) and a multidisciplinary approach are preferred. Next to this, the fact that proponents of our traditions can be seen as some kind of social movements, authorities must consider social movement theory (internal/external competition, escalating policing and a chance that a marginalization of their ideas or objectives leads to public order disturbances).

Table 2. Indicators of effective societal interventions

Indicator	Description
Civil participation	Use societal leaders to establish interventions from society itself
Repression	Use a multidisciplinary and information-based repressive strategy towards hard core disturbers (with a higher likelihood of apprehension)
Mechanisms of social movement theory	Keep the relevant mechanisms of social movement theory (internal/external competition,

4.3 Role sources / Individual sources » Crisis communication methods

Jong (2017) and Ansell et al. (2014) state that mayoral communication, or meaning makings, plays a key part in the impact of crises. Next to this, an effective New Year's Eve intervention policy is largely dependent on a good communication approach (Helsloot et al., 2012). In fact, communication itself can be an effective intervention method in the field of (New Year's Eve) crisis management (COT, 2005). Besides, in order to prevent a politicized blame game, mayors need to take the issue of responsibility – but also accountability and causation – into account. The current case studies (The Hague and Veen) fall within the situation of high political responsibility and high collective impact, thus corresponding with Jong's (2017) defined role of a mayor as an orchestrator. The art of mayoral meaning making in such cases lies in ensuring the physical well-being of its population, minimizing the detrimental effects of the crisis at hand (Griffin-Padget & Allison, 2010; Helsloot & Groenendaal, 2012; Jong, 2017) and in presenting himself as a representative and advocate of the community (Jong, 2019). Towards a tradition, however, the mayor is confronted with a dilemma. When taking actions against the tradition with the objective to ensure the physical well-being of (a part of) his population, he automatically harms another part of its population and vice versa. In other words: how can a mayor position himself as a representative of the population when this population is not homogenous, but highly divided? Aiming to offer a solution to this dilemma in our cases is part of this study's intended scientific contribution. In similar cases of deliberate confrontation between a mayor and (a part of) society, the mayor enjoyed very little support among citizens. As a result, the mayor alienated from 'his' community and people communicated with informal leaders (Jong, 2017). This explains why mayor van Zanen of The Hague was eager to blame hooligans from outside the Schilderswijk for the recent riots ("Van Zanen: Voetbalhooligans Betrokken Bij Ongeregeldheden in Schilderswijk," 2020). By doing so, he positioned himself as a guardian of the local population against an external threat (i.e. football hooligans, who already have a bad record on public order), a desired situation in these types of crises (from a mayoral perspective). Logically, as meaning making apparently is an important intervention method, the question arises what kind of meaning making actions were performed by the involved mayors in The Hague and Veen; did they correctly assess the emotions (collective impact) and their political role (political responsibility)? Also, did they solve the puzzle that tradition related crisis communication establishes?

As the previous paragraphs suggest, the mayors personal involvement can also be seen as an important intervention method. Adang et al. (2007) note that a personal and active mayoral approach is required. The issue

of traditions is sensitive as some citizens perceived the interventions as direct assaults on their tradition. That certain measures may lead to displeasure among the groups they affect, is illustrated by the fact that mayors are confronted with threats on an almost daily basis. That the revision of a bonfire tradition may lead to personal threats of the mayor, was illustrated by mayor Bruinsma’s case, who got a Molotov cocktail thrown through his window after he tried to ban the bonfire tradition in Vlaardingen (Oosterom, 2019). Consequently, this study will in part focus on personal events (like being threatened personally). On the other side, this study will primarily concentrate on a mayor’s personal involvement with the community in a positive way, which is also an important factor in The Hague and Veen.

In a nutshell, crisis communication is an effective intervention method when a mayor correctly assesses the collective impact, political responsibility and the division among his population. Next to this, individual mayoral interventions can be effective when a mayor shows positive personal involvement, which is also possible through actions.

Table 3. Indicators of effective crisis communication

Indicator	Description
Collective impact	Take the collective and emotional impact into account and shows compassion towards citizens
Political responsibility	Take the issue of responsibility and politicized blame games into account and make sure that the communication also balances the interests of the proponents of the tradition
Personal involvement	Establish a good personal connection with the relevant citizens

4.4 Schematic representation of the intervention model

The previous paragraphs result in the following schematic representation of intervention policy towards New Year’s Eve traditional revisions:




Figure 2. The long-term traditional intervention model

5. Analysis

5.1 Intervention methods in The Hague

According to the Municipal Council in The Hague (*Dossiers/36814*), there are several mayoral intervention possibilities towards the bonfires. Besides making clear agreements or “firmly frames” – since 2014 stipulated in a covenant (Gemeente Den Haag, 2010), a mayor can (logically) commit to “strict compliance monitoring” (of the agreements), “clear and fair (media) communication” (Gemeente Den Haag, 2010) (Van Aartsen, 2013) and the “stimulation of civilian participation” (Gemeente Den Haag, 2010), especially of young people (Gemeente Den Haag, 2013). Next to this, it is possible to impose individual repressive measures based on the Dutch disturbance law and broader criminal law (Gemeente Den Haag, 2013). Note that the policy documents only relate to the bonfires themselves so they do not provide any information about the riot management after the cancellation of the bonfires in 2019. Following on, we can distinguish five overarching intervention methods in The Hague (which are allocated to the categories of figure 3):

Agreements (communicative intervention)

Before 2014, the agreements with the bonfire organizations concerned the following things: no violence or public order disturbances around the fires, the authorities (fire department, police and municipal employees) always have the final authority over the size and location of the bonfire, the building starts at the 31st of December unless specific agreements were made, the bonfires are not ignited before the turn of the year (23:59), they should not contain any highly flammable or environmentally damaging substances (like gasoline or car tires), the storage of pallets does not lead to dangerous situations or disturbances, pallets are not allowed to be stored in a neighborhood and a contact person from the organization should always be present to communicate with authorities (Gemeente Den Haag, 2011) (Gemeente Den Haag, 2012). Because these agreements were made verbally – creating a situation in which it was difficult to hold the organizations accountable – additional agreements were enshrined in a covenant. Since 2014, the parties (representatives of the bonfire organizations, public order & safety department, police and the fire department) agreed on additional restrictions to the buildup of the fire, the location, the surrounding area, pallet supply, building times, commercial distribution of food and other goods, and the monitoring of these agreements (Gemeente Den Haag, 2016a).

Strict compliance monitoring (societal intervention)

While the bonfire organizations are ultimately responsible for the safety of the builders and bystanders, the mayor should (according to the Municipal Council) strictly monitor if abovementioned agreements are kept. If not, “authorities should take reasonable measures” (Gemeente Den Haag, 2011) (Gemeente Den Haag, 2012).

All possible actions mentioned in the scenario matrix of the municipality are: “Communication with the organizations, stopping the pallet supply, confiscation of the music installation, police action, closing access roads to the beach, cancelling the ignition and removing unwanted subjects or people” (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014). Logically, the intervention should be in accordance with the situation. So, implementation of effective compliance monitoring is only possible after the mayor makes agreements with executive authorities on how to act in different situations. Moreover, camera surveillance around the locations can be used to assist them in recognizing arising incidents because they can quickly identify public order disturbances and/or violations of the agreements (Gemeente Den Haag, 2012).

Clear and fair (media) communication (media and communicative intervention)

The municipality acknowledges that communication is of significant importance. It can be effectively used to transmit intervention rules and procedures to, the (mainly) youthful hard core builders, bystanders, authorities (police, fire department and municipal employees), bonfire organizations and the broader public. The mayor communicated in several ways: information meetings where both organizations, youth, youth work, district officers, and the district council were present (Gemeente Den Haag, 2012), on the spot and via “online or printed media” (Gemeente Den Haag, 2012). Besides, the municipality actively pursued media interventions to pass on information or to influence public perception. In general, the municipality “can call on citizens of The Hague to cooperate with the police and municipality towards a safe celebration” (Gemeente Den Haag, 2012).

Stimulating civilian participation (societal intervention)

The municipality actively pursued to involve (representative) civilians. The builders have their own civil organizations, managing public order and maintaining contact with governmental authorities. In addition, the mayor has the ‘civil participation team’ at its disposal. This team of local volunteers (who have a connection with the neighborhood of the builders) can be used to de-escalate during incidents. A similar team – but in particular focused on the youths of the bonfire organizations, the biggest risk group – is the ‘outreaching youth work’.

Individual repressive measures (societal intervention)

Based on the aforementioned disturbance law, the mayor can impose house arrests, warnings, specific area bans (for example around bonfires) or other criminal law measures. So-called “hotshots”, individuals who – around the bonfires or other locations – misbehaved during previous New Year’s Eve’s personally receive a letter, in which they are warned about the consequences of disturbing behavior. These are no intervention methods particularly aimed at the bonfires, but towards New Year’s Eve in general.

5.2 Intervention methods in Veen

After a study of the municipal documents in the archive of the municipality of Aalburg (*Archiefweb Gemeente Aalburg*, 2019), it can be concluded that the mayor's 'toolkit' is as follows. First, the facilitation or preparation of *stoken* is officially prohibited by paragraph eight of the General Local By-Law. However, the municipality has indicated that it should be possible to practice the tradition, albeit in a safe manner (after pre-consultation with the municipal authorities). Further, the municipality could benefit from "the use of civil volunteers, who aim to ensure public order", or the stimulation of civil participation (Naterop, 2016). Also, by means of "municipal announcements" and other (online) media, the mayors communicated in order to influence people's perception and to appeal to common sense (Buijserd in Jong & Johannik, 2007) (Bartol, 2019). In addition to "abundant and early stage police presence", the municipality used private security services to tackle nuisance and violence in an early stage, thereby monitoring compliance of the rules and imposing repressive individual measures, which are also very helpful in the preventive approach of entrepreneurs facilitating the car wrecks (Spit & Naterop, 2014-2015).

Prohibition (societal intervention)

Eventually, the agreements in Veen are pretty clear: *stoken* in the public area is prohibited. As a consequence, the mayor could designate *Het Kruis* as a safety risk area (Naterop, 2011b), which goes together with preventive searching and a prohibition of gatherings. Also, to give police officers a further mandate to enforce the law, it could be prohibited to park or move a car on or near that cross road around New Year's Eve. However, after a while, the call for a tolerant policy also increased, provided that the situation remains safe and people clean up their own mess. This call was primarily expressed by *Aalburgse Alliantie*, a local opposition party. Moreover, it was permitted to make small open fires, in so-called *vuurkorven* and in some years the municipality even allowed a larger regulated bonfire, to provide the public with an alternative.

Compliance monitoring (societal intervention)

In Veen, much was tried to enforce the law over the years. Using the motto "the street is property of the government", the municipality tried to prevent *stoken* on the famous crossroad *Het Kruis* (Gemeente Aalburg, 2008). This was done by placing roadblocks or shipping containers and camera and drone surveillance to allow facial recognition (Naterop, 2011). At the beginning of Buijserd's term, the situation had escalated to an extent that it was necessary to invoke an emergency ordinance. Next to this, police presence was above-average during the December month. This went together with a tightened identification requirement (an enforcement option that always applies, but was used more pro-actively around this risk event) and making available a police telephone number for reporting activities related to *stoken* (Naterop, 2011c). Also, when the police could not

handle the situation, they had sufficient repressive capacity available in the form of riot police. During New Year's Eve in specific, the municipality also employed the private security 'SUS-team', specialized in the protection of public order (Spit & Naterop, 2015).

Repressive individual measures (societal intervention)

The repressive individual strategy of the municipality of Aalburg/Altena is twofold. On the one side, they focus on *stokers* (preferably the hard core instead of the followers). Towards this group, "Municipal actions are aimed at arresting suspects" (Gemeente Aalburg, 2008). The municipality actively tried to get *stokers* out of their anonymity. When arrested, suspects could be prosecuted via so-called *TOM-zittings* (*Transactie Openbaar Ministerie*). Not only the public prosecutor and the secretary of the legal prosecutor's office are present at these cases, but also the suspect, family of the suspect, the mayor and his civil servants (Gemeente Aalburg, 2008). On the other hand, the municipality focuses on a person-oriented approach towards facilitators, i.e. local business owners that provided the car wrecks and thereby form an essential link in the process. The municipality tries to identify and arrest these facilitators by house and business searches.

Clear and fair (media) communication (communicative and media intervention)

As discussed above, communication can be used to influence public perception. One of the ways the mayor can do this, was through the transmission of the annual damage numbers. In this case, it became fully transparent what the tradition of *stoken* actually costs the community (Naterop & Gemeente Aalburg, 2016). The mayors reported on *stoken* in the annual New Year's speech, where they sometimes made direct calls to the *stokers* (Naterop, 2012). Noticeable is the fact that the municipality actively focused on the reduction of media attention (Naterop & Gemeente Aalburg, 2016) (Naterop, 2012), although the municipal spokesperson concluded that "communication through media is good" (Noorloos, 2005). The minutes of the municipal debates likewise show that there has been debate about the question if authorities should clean the mess created by car wrecks and other damage related to *stoken*. Mayor Buijserd proposed that troublemakers should feel the consequences of their actions: "those who cause mayhem, will also suffer from the inconvenience caused", the troublemakers should thus pay for their mistakes (Van Keulen-Deelen, 2008). The mayor (Buijserd, 2004) also used beforehand communication with his authorities to give instructions (e.g. when riot police is used and where they will be located). Next to this, it was proposed to increase the role of the community policeman in the communication process (Noorloos, 2005). As a gentler alternative to the repressive measures, the mayor sent personal 'warning letters' to known *stokers*.

Stimulating civil participation (societal intervention)

First, the 'civil participation team' was used (Naterop & Gemeente Aalburg, 2016). In a broader sense, the municipality stated that: "Social forces should be able to improve security and reduce the annual costs." The

mayor will therefore “invest in civil participation teams, entrepreneurs, churches and other strong bilateral social forces to urge them to use their corrective capabilities.” (Naterop & Gemeente Aalburg, 2016). Besides, the municipality established a working group, particularly focusing on the adaption of the tradition. In parallel, the mayor tried to cooperate with working groups of the *stokers*. Lastly, festivities – with strict permit requirements – on *Het Kruis* were used to divert the attention and to make it more difficult for *stokers* (Naterop, 2011a). When one merges these identified interventions into the long-term intervention model, the considered interventions in our cases can be summarized and translated into the long-term intervention model as follows. In general, the interventions are quite similar, but as *stoken* is officially prohibited (and the bonfires in The Hague were tolerated), the authorities in Veen are more committing to individual repression against the practitioners of the tradition.

Table 4. Intervention toolkits in The Hague and Veen

Media interventions	<p>Influence on public perception (both Veen and The Hague)</p> <p>Communication/informing (both Veen and The Hague)</p>
Societal interventions	<p>Stimulate civil participation, especially focused on the control of public order and compliance with regulations (both Veen and The Hague)</p> <p>The use of police and other repressive means (to enforce agreements or act against troublemakers/facilitators) (primarily in Veen)</p> <p>The use of private security services (to enforce agreements or act against troublemakers) (both in Veen and The Hague)</p>
Crisis communication interventions	<p>Communication with authorities (to ensure proportionate performance of authorities) (both in Veen and The Hague)</p> <p>Communication with the practitioners of the traditions (both in Veen and the Hague)</p>

Communication with other civilians (**both in Veen and The Hague**)

Individual warnings to troublemakers (**primarily in Veen**)

Personal mayoral involvement (**both in Veen and The Hague**)

Note: Interventions based on study of the municipal documents of The Hague and Aalburg/Altena.

5.3 Results of the media analysis

Media interventions

Now that all considered intervention methods have been identified, this section will present the results of the media analysis. The twofold media-analysis will first focus on direct media interventions wherein the mayor or his/her spokesperson or another important actor directly speaking out in media or directly being quoted, and subsequently it will look at ‘regular’ interventions that came up in the 200 media articles but which were not directly vented by administrators or very influential actors. As the media analysis is two-fold, it also serves two purposes, i.e. to assess if the media interventions were (unintentionally) undermined (for the relevant indicators, see table 1) and how the identified interventions (from the toolkit) were received in the public opinion.

The content analysis of the aforementioned media samples reveals that 41 direct media interventions were performed in The Hague (from a sample of n=100) and 56 direct media interventions were performed in Veen (from a sample of n=100). In The Hague, the general thrust of Van Aartsen’s and Krikke’s direct media interventions was that the bonfires – from a safety point of view – have reached disproportionate heights. Van Aartsen thereby warned to use the riot police if the bonfire organizations would not commit to the agreements. Remke’s interventions were mainly aimed at riot control (that arose out of discontent with the cancellation of the bonfires in 2019-2020) and the moderation of expectations to fulfil the permit requirements. Deetman, on the other hand, did not provide any direct media interventions at all. What particularly stands out in the media communication of The Hague – which will be elaborated on in the discussion – is the fact that the bulk of media

articles was published after the gales of cinder crisis and during the riots, i.e. in 2019 (n=81). Media attention clearly peaked at that moment. Besides, a lot of articles that emerged during this time were focused on the responsibility frame, which was projected on the mayor (n=17). In this regard, Krikke clearly stands out, as she is projected as the scapegoat in 16 articles and Remkes only in 1.

For the situation in Veen, it was noted that most attention was centred around Buijserd's and Naterop's policy, whereby Lichtenberg, who got installed on 9 December 2019, was not mentioned at all in the sample. Naterop made the most media interventions in total (n=33), compared to 11 of Buijserd. This is not surprising, as Naterop was mayor for a longer period of time. The other direct media interventions were made by Municipal Councilmembers (n=4), a police director (n=1) and the well-known local politician Lodewijk Timmermans (n=4). The general thrust of the coverage was that Buijserd used (too strict) repressive interventions. As a consequence, Buijserd was portrayed as a scapegoat in several articles (n=6). However, Naterop was the main player in the incident of 2013, when approximately 97 youngsters were arrested. It thereby played a comparable role as the gales of cinder crisis in The Hague. Naterop also received criticism during this time, but to a lesser extent compared to Krikke in The Hague. In the following paragraphs, the findings for each separate indicator will be discussed in more detail. Subsequently, the results of the other intervention methods will be presented.

5.4 Indicators of direct media interventions

Attribution of responsibility

In total, the actors in The Hague performed 11 direct media interventions over the time period studied here, in which they did not take this indicator into account (out of a total of 41). Krikke made 4 direct media interventions in which she projected the responsibility frame in a premature stage, all four blaming the bonfire organization for the gales of cinder crisis. De Mos, a well-known politician (and Aldermen who enjoyed the popular vote at the time) in The Hague projected the responsibility frame two times in a too early stage. One time, he held mayor Krikke responsible for the gales of cinder crisis and the other time he blamed mayor Remkes for the riots that emerged after it became public knowledge that the bonfires would be cancelled in December 2019. Remarkable is the fact that multiple Municipal Councilmembers openly identified Krikke as the responsible actor for the gales of cinder crisis, even at an early stage, when the investigation of the *Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid* (2019) had not even started yet. The last neglect of this indicator was made by a police director, who blamed the municipality, and Krikke in particular, for the gales of cinder crisis in an early stage. In Veen, public leaders performed 3 media interventions in which they did not regard this indicator. Most of these (n=2) were performed by Timmermans, who openly criticized Buijserd's policy and later that of Naterop. However,

Naterop (n=1) also used the responsibility frame in a too early stage, when he expressed criticism on the societal leaders that should have de-escalated the situation.

Correct timing

The content analysis revealed that the actors in The Hague ignored the correct timing in 17 cases of direct media interventions. Van Aartsen communicated his interventions right before New Year's Eve 2 times (while still negotiating with the bonfire organizations) and Aldermen De Mos and Van Asten did the same. De Mos and Van Asten right in the middle of the riots in 2019 and right after the gales of cinder incident. Remkes comes out on top here, with 12 direct media interventions during the riots. Next to this, he expressed multiple times about the feasibility of the event permits. In Veen, the number was 17. Buijserd made 5 media interventions with the wrong timing and Naterop 10. The remaining 2 were found in interventions by an important police director and Timmermans. In this respect, Naterop's media interventions right after the incident of 2013 are particularly important since Naterop lost a lot of credit among Veen's population because of his performance in the wake of this incident.

Involve society

In their media interventions, the important actors emphasized the role of society only 2 times. Remkes and De Mos both called for the Duindorpers of good will to oppose the rioters and show the positive side of Duindorp during the riots in 2019. In Veen, an appeal on society was made more often: 18 times. In 12 cases, Naterop emphasized the importance of civil society in the containment of *stoken*, or he called for societal figures to assist him to reach his policy. Buijserd did the same in 6 cases.

Escalating tone

In The Hague, an escalating tone was used 15 times. Remkes clearly tops the list in this regard: with a use of 11 communications with an escalating tone during the riots in 2019. All these media interventions were aimed at the rioters and the general thrust was that he would deal with the rioters in a hard way. Alderman Van Asten added to this tone by stating that the person who placed road spikes "is an idiot" and he "hopes that this person will be arrested" (Van Asten in AD, 2019). On the other side of the political spectrum, De Mos adopted an escalating tone by expressing understanding for the rioters (although he also condemned the use of violence). Lastly, Van Aartsen also used an ungrounded escalating tone towards the builders. In Veen, the important actors used an escalating tone 14 times. In 7 cases, it was found in Buijserd's direct interventions, who expressed his dissent about the *stokers*. Naterop made 5 direct media interventions with an escalating tone and finally Municipal Councilmember Timmermans and police director Smith each performed 1 intervention with an escalating tone.

Revealing too many details

In 3 articles, Remkes revealed too much details about his intervention policy. Logically, all three of these cases were related to the riots in 2019. For example, he stated that the police would be using camera surveillance to recognize troublemakers and that he would sign area bans to known troublemakers. In Veen, 4 cases of such cases were identified: 2 of Naterop and 2 of Buijserd. By contrast, it was noted that mayors stated that they were aware of the fact that revealing too much details is not a clever strategy.

Premature/incorrect assumptions and/or negative stereotyping

In 5 articles Remkes used premature (or maybe even incorrect) assumptions. All these cases are related to the riots in 2019. Remkes displayed his dismay about a bomb which was thrown at the police and about the arrest of a nine-year old boy who was walking around with a Molotov cocktail (which is questioned by local residents). Also in 5 cases, Remkes negatively stereotyped the Duindorpers by portraying them as irrational and lumping all Duindorpers together with the rioters. Negative stereotyping by media articles (which is thus not considered a direct media intervention in this study), on the other hand, was done in 2 articles, 1 of *De Volkskrant* and 1 of *Algemeen Dagblad*. In Veen 2 direct media interventions used premature (or maybe even incorrect) assumptions: 1 by police director Smits and 1 by Buijserd. Only one case was found of negative stereotyping by an authority, i.e. Buijserd. That is the case where he called Veen a “Sicilian mafia village” (Buijserd in *Brabants Dagblad*, 2004). In general, authorities spoke in a very positive way about the population and even about *stokers* in specific. Media used negative stereotyping in three cases: 1 for *De Volkskrant* and 2 for *AD*. It particularly struck the author that some media spoke of cars being lit on fire, while in fact it regards car wrecks that were lit. This may be unintentionally, but there is a clear difference.

Societal and crisis communication interventions in media analysis

Apart from the direct media interventions (i.e. those directly carried out by important actors), this study identified 14 societal and 10 communicative interventions in The Hague. From the 14 societal interventions, 10 were about civil participation and 4 about repressive measures. None of the articles mentioned societal interventions in the field of private security, in contrast to the municipal documents. The societal interventions were not only performed or initiated by governmental actors, but also by the bonfire organizations and by local residents. For instance, the Scheveningen bonfire organization called upon their constituency to remain calm after their bonfire was cancelled. The repressive measures were about the police approach towards the riots in 2019, which many inhabitants perceived as escalating and intimidating. From the 10 communicative interventions that were identified, 2 were between different authorities (expressing their disapproval for the fact that there was no unequivocal multidisciplinary approach between the police, municipality and the fire department), 7 were towards the practitioners of the tradition (mostly the organizations themselves) and 1 towards the broader civil population, i.e. the publication of the annual municipal costs for the bonfires. In Veen, 24 societal and 20 communicative interventions were found. From the societal interventions, 14 were

focused on civil participation. For instance, civilians organized themselves in working groups and approached *stokers*. Also, a lot of civil actions were performed that served as an alternative to *stoken*, like the organization of festivities or an alternative bonfire. In 10 cases, societal interventions in the area of repressive policy were observed. These repressive measures were diverse, ranging from camera surveillance to the placing of road blocks to barricade the crossroad (in congruence with the information that was found in the policy documents). Again, no societal interventions in the area of private security were found. Regarding the communicative interventions, it is particularly noticeable that a lot of effort was made to get in touch with the *stokers*: 15 cases. Both Buijserd and Naterop made various attempts to reach this group. Besides, the municipality of Aalburg/Altena actively pursued to influence public perception by not cleaning up the car wrecks: 5 cases.

5.5 Discussion

For the purpose of this study, this discussion aims to give insight into the three sub questions, i.e. which media, societal and communicative interventions were effective? These three issues are considered the building stones of a long-term strategy, of which the crux is that all three categories have to be used in a balanced way. Firstly, this means that relying too much on one category will lead to the persistence of structural incidentalism. Secondly, this means that the three categories are connected to each other. For instance, the adoption of a hostile tone in the media as a way of ‘influencing public perception’ (media intervention) negatively affects the societal intervention ‘stimulation of civil participation’, as it might alienate the target group from the mayor. As a consequence, the discussion in this thesis will not only pay attention to the identification of effective intervention methods but also to the relatedness between them (both in a positive and negative way). Each section will briefly describe the relatedness on an abstract level and subsequently discuss the relevant practical implications in Veen and in The Hague.

Effective media interventions

The long-term intervention model establishes that an effective media strategy is pro-active in the way that it actively informs people about governmental interventions but is also aware of any undermining indicators, de-escalating, linked to societal solutions, and, probably the most important, just. Furthermore – as stated – the toolkit of the media interventions consists of ‘influencing public perception’ and ‘communicating/informing’. In The Hague, a strong aversion to the media is noticed among the proponents of the bonfires. After the gales of cinder crisis, it even came to the point that the bonfire organizations announced that they would not talk with the media anymore (appendix X, 2020). The same is essentially true for Veen, where mayor Buijserd already in 2003 observed that many inhabitants were not pleased with the extensive attention by the media (appendix Buijserd, 2020). This is because they felt that media are intentionally demonizing them in search for sensational news. In fact, this feeling is not ungrounded, as the results of the media analysis have indeed shown that media unnecessarily projected negative stereotyping frames on the proponents of the bonfire tradition in The Hague (especially Duindorp), but also in Veen. Moreover, the practitioners of the traditions have the feeling (which is also not ungrounded) that the local government is contributing to this marginalization campaign by intentionally building a negative atmosphere around their traditions that is meant to turn the public opinion against them, eventually leading to the disappearance of their tradition. So, in order to be effective, the media campaign of a municipality must not only be focused on the altering of public perception, but also take this sentiment (among proponents) more seriously (which was done in a better way in Veen, as will be illustrated). Authorities must ask themselves what certain media framing campaigns will do to their own credibility and that of the media. When authorities fail to do so, they will increase the feeling among the proponents of a tradition that the government is only trying to take away their tradition, not having interest for their concerns and, more generally,

their way of life. As a consequence, these proponents may cling more strongly to their traditions, possibly leading to an increased lack of mutual understanding, thereby making the relationship with the government more hostile. The following two paragraphs will shortly present the reasons why the media interventions in The Hague did not prove effective and how that distorted the relationship between the bonfire proponents and authorities in a similar way as described above. Subsequently, it will discuss that – although their media interventions were not perfect – the municipality of Altena/Aalburg was more aware of this relationship.

The Hague

First, the tone of direct mayoral media interventions differed from the tone being used in communicative interventions. This was for example the case with Van Aartsen. In personal communication, Van Aartsen adopted a cooperative and even obedient approach towards the builders (appendix X, 2020), but in his general media approach, he spoke with force. However, this two-faced approach led to an unclear overall communication and may have contributed to the erosion of the mayor's credibility, as the media sample shows. To phrase the former spokesperson of the bonfire organization Scheveningen: "In our personal communication, the mayor was very relaxed. It was therefore very strange that, all of a sudden, he says that he will get the riot police from Groningen, if necessary." (Michel in Volkskrant, 2016). Moreover, this inconsistency between personal and media communication may lead to the violation of rules as it makes those rules unconvincing and increases the grey area when repressive actions are actually taken (appendix X, 2020). There was also inconsistency found between Remkes' personal and media communication, be it to a lesser extent (e.g. Remkes in Telegraaf, 2019; Duindorp Vreugdevuur, 2019). The second reason is the observation that Remkes' media interventions have clearly contributed to the negative stereotyping of proponents of the bonfire tradition, Duindorpers in specific. One of the respondents (appendix Eysink Smeets, 2020), even argued that Remkes contributed to the establishment of a moral panic with his media interventions, i.e. a disproportionate, hostile and mediatized response to a certain group of people or situation (Cohen, 2011), in our case the proponents of the bonfire tradition. Two examples clearly stand out here. Firstly, the 'bomb incident' in 2019. After the police released thermal images of a 'bomb' (all media from the sample systematically use the term 'bomb') that was thrown towards a police van, a lot of public outrage arose in The Netherlands. A probable purpose of this release – which does not receive any attention – was to depict the proponents of bonfires as irrational vandals and to provoke anxiety and aversion among the general public against this group (appendix Marnix Eysink Smeets, 2020). Remkes was the first to express his envy in one of the articles in the media sample: "the bomb is a case of attempted murder and has nothing to do with protesting" (Remkes in Telegraaf, 2019). X (appendix, 2020) confirms that the depiction of this bomb incident and Remkes' reaction to it have indeed contributed to the negative stereotyping of the proponents of the bonfire tradition and even Duindorpers in general. According to X, "Media merely provide negative publicity regarding Duindorp. The most recurring media frames applied are that Duindorpers are racist, violent and drug users, with the bomb incident as the perfect example." Another

example of this perceived marginalization campaign that is found in the sample of The Hague is the announcement by Remkes' spokesperson that a nine year old child was arrested who was "waving with a Molotov cocktail" (Remkes' spokesperson in De Volkskrant, 2019). Also in this case, the statement was queried by local residents and caused a lot of anger towards authorities (e.g. AD, 2019). Whether or not these incidents were exaggerated, the mayor and authorities used the images to substantiate their criminalization campaign and the Duindorpers were aware of this intention, which is damaging to the perceived integrity of the mayor and even authorities in general (appendix X, 2020).

The third damaging reason concerns the timing of some media interventions. For instance, by performing so many direct media interventions about the required event permits in November and December 2019, Remkes positioned himself as the responsible actor which dedicated himself to the obstruction of the event permit process (in the perception of most people, including proponents of the tradition). By doing so, he enhanced the perspective that he was the personification of the bonfire cancellation. This emerged media frame most likely undermined his intentions and the integrity and credibility of his policy, as the interview with X (appendix, 2020) revealed. The fourth cause is the fact that public leaders did not correctly monitor the emergence of responsibility frames in the media, in particular after the gales of cinder crisis. Immediately after the crisis, Krikke seized the media attention to project the responsibility frame on the bonfire organizations, who "manifestly violated the agreements laid down in the covenant" (Krikke in De Volkskrant, 2019). By doing so, she may have alienated the bonfire organizations, who perceived the situation as a shared responsibility and saw this accusation as a betrayal (appendix X, 2020). Following Krikke's start to the blame game, local politicians (e.g. Alderman De Mos) gained a high profile in the media regarding the responsibility frame and the 'finger pointing' had begun. So while Krikke's accusation was probably intended to diminish her political responsibility, it was the initial impetus of the blame game that arose after the crisis, eventually leading to her being portrayed as the scapegoat in most media coverage and her (chosen) resignation. The fifth reason is that public leaders used escalating tones and revealed too many details in their media interventions. For instance, alderman Van Asten emphasized that he "hopes that the idiot who used road spikes will be severely punished" (Van Asten in AD, 2019). While a fierce tone towards rioters may be a good intervention because it positions a public leaders as someone that is concerned about the safety of civilians, this kind communication enhanced the 'rumor mill' and thereby the escalation of public order disturbances in The Hague. In conclusion, it was found that the effectivity of media interventions in The Hague were primarily undermined because the media indicators of table 1 were not sufficiently considered by the municipality. This damaged communicative (primarily a good personal relationship between mayor Remkes and Duindorp's inhabitants) and societal (primarily the stimulation of civil participation) interventions. These previous (two) paragraphs illustrate that public leaders usually find themselves on thin ice concerning media interventions. A wrong media statement

(which is not in accordance with table 1) may promptly lead to escalation and a distortion of the balance with societal and communicative interventions.

Veen

Some media interventions of public leaders in Veen also negatively affected societal and communicative interventions (primarily because the indicators of table 1 were, although to a lesser extent, not regarded). However, there are several reasons why the media interventions in Veen were more effective than in The Hague. The main difference is that the mayors of Aalborg/Altena have shown to be more aware of the interrelatedness between the intervention categories. Moreover, the municipality of Aalborg/Altena developed an effective media strategy in which they better coped with the media aversion among the relevant parts of the population. Finally, the municipality of Aalborg/Altena has better utilized the media intervention ‘involving society’, of which the long-term intervention model has established that it is an essential element of an overall effective media intervention.

Under mayor Buijserd, media interventions were primarily linked to societal interventions, in particular ‘the stimulation of civil participation’. In Buijserd’s own words, an important objective of his media strategy was to “increase the self-correcting mechanism” (appendix Buijserd, 2020). Most people from Veen – especially entrepreneurs who are doing business in other parts of the Netherlands – are done with the negative image that Veen has incurred through the extensive media attention around New Year’s Eve. This sentiment was used to make those entrepreneurs commit themselves to the correction of troublemakers. Entrepreneurs enjoy a lot of prestige in the materialistic Veen, where hard work and economic successes are perceived as important values. (appendix Buijserd, 2020; appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). However, other groups could also be used for this purpose. Concealed behind the group of hard core *stokers*, there is a group of car traders (which also enjoy prestige in Veen) that provide the car wrecks, in this study defined as the ‘facilitators’ of *stoken*. Individual members of this group turned out to be involved in broader criminal activities, like criminal undermining and were therefore not very pleased with the extensive external attention. This is because it brought them under serious scrutiny of the media, and, probably more important, the police (appendix Buijserd, 2020). As this would increase the chance that their broader criminal activities would be revealed, it led to an interesting paradox: criminality is better corrected in a criminal environment. Besides, the long-term intervention model established that this kind of interventions, coming from societal leaders, are the most effective. However, this strategy of using media interventions to increase attention can have a downside, i.e. fuelling escalation.

Normally, the December month in the Netherlands is characterized by a decline of newsworthy content, allowing all media to focus on *stoken*, which has previously shown to fuel escalation (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). Whereas the media interventions of Buijserd and Naterop have certainly contributed to internal correction (from within society), there are some specific cases in which their media statements have contributed

to escalation or a deteriorated relationship between the mayor and his population. The first example is when Naterop expressed himself after the arrest of the 97 youngsters in 2013 and thereby unintentionally antagonized a large part of Veen, who perceived the arrests as unjust and saw Naterop's statement as a declaration of war (see e.g. Volkskrant, 2014). Secondly, Buijserd's media statement that Veen closely resembles a Sicilian mafia village also caused a lot of displeasure among the broader population, even years later (e.g. Volkskrant, 2016). Such direct media interventions were invariably answered by anonymous threats towards the mayor and an increase in disturbances. Again, this demonstrates that the mechanisms of table 1 should always be considered and that a single wrong media intervention can suddenly distort the balance with other interventions and cause escalation. For example, Buijserd's statement decreased the willingness of societal leaders to assist him (societal intervention) and his personal involvement with the population (communicative intervention), which was illustrated by the well-known local politician Cees Honcoop, who stated: "Buijserd should have never labelled Veen as a Sicilian village. When such rhetoric is used, the inhabitants will form a front, they feel threatened." (Honcoop in Brabants Dagblad, 2004).

However, Buijserd and Naterop also demonstrated to be aware of this escalating effect and requested media to be more considerate of the impact that their coverage has on the escalation of the situation. They confronted several media with their role in the whole situation and corrected them for escalating or overly sensationalist coverage (which is in sharp contrast to what happened in The Hague). With regard to the effectivity of this indirect media intervention, the author observed two contradicting signals. Buijserd himself stated that his intervention in the media was effective. Especially towards a web forum where proponents of the tradition provoked each other to participate in *stoken* and vandalism. The intervention towards this inciting web forum proved to be working, as the broadcasting company decided to let a webmaster filter the escalating coverage (appendix Buijserd, 2020). So when it is very clear that troublemakers use the media to invoke vandalism or violence, this kind of indirect media interventions can be effective. By contrast, Van Den Heuvel (appendix, 2020) stated that such indirect media intervention, which were also performed by mayor Naterop, were not effective because broadcasters perceive their journalistic freedom as an important good that they were not willing to give up because a mayor strongly requested them to do so. Hence, against conventional media coverage, the effectivity remains questionable. Therefore, the municipality recently developed a new media intervention strategy (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020), i.e. to give minimal and non-sensationalist information, which is not very useful for broadcasting companies in general (assuming they want to present newsworthy articles). The results of the media analysis substantiate this claim; although important actors in Veen directly expressed themselves more often in the media (compared to The Hague), they less frequently used an escalating or sensationalist tone and generally expressed themselves in an objective and sober way.

Even though the media sample shows that direct media interventions were not always timed correctly, Buijserd (appendix, 2020) argued that the municipality used media silence in the December month to prevent escalation or moral panic. This media silence was not only applied by the mayor himself but by the entire Municipal Council, and was therefore very effective according to Buijserd (appendix, 2020). When the risk of escalation had subsided, the municipality would use media interventions to activate the aforementioned self-correcting system. Moreover, the municipality of Aalburg/Altena became more committed to a positive approach of Veen, which should be seen as an effective intervention, according to Van Den Heuvel (appendix, 2020). Whereas the municipality would first publicize the damage numbers of a New Year's Eve to show the disproportionate damage that *stoken* causes (like Naterop did multiple times in the media sample), they recently became more reluctant to do so. The current strategy – which is part of the aforementioned positivity strategy – is to keep the distribution of damage across the separate villages of Altena's municipality confidential (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). The strength of this intervention lies in the fact that it improves the relationship between the municipality and the population, enhancing the effectivity of 'the stimulation of civil participation' (societal intervention) and communicative interventions in general. It also increases the support among the general population and isolates the violent hard core of the *stokers*. So while the use of media interventions has shown some successes, mayors need to be conscious of the fact that too much negative attention may antagonize the broader population. That the relationship between the municipality and the population of Veen has been better, when compared to The Hague, is illustrated by the fact that both Buijserd and Naterop made more attempts to involve civil society (media intervention). That this proved successful can be seen in the fact that multiple local societal leaders, *inter alia* Honcoop, volunteered to act on behalf of the mayor and make a deal with the *stokers*, who logically preferred to cooperate with people they personally knew and respect over an unelected mayor that comes from another region in the country. With regard to the responsibility frame, it was observed that the media showed characteristics of a political arena. Just like in The Hague, a party with a popular local leader (Timmermans, leader of the *Aalburgse Alliantie*) expressed a lot of criticism on the municipality's performance. Nevertheless, the main difference with the approach taken in The Hague, is that in Veen the large majority of the Council rallied behind the mayor when such criticism was expressed (or when anonymous threats were spread), which prevented the mayor from having to resign.

Effective societal interventions

The municipal documents clarified that the municipalities had the stimulation of civil participation, repressive means and private security in its societal 'toolkit'. As stated, a strong aversion towards authorities was identified, especially towards the police. There is a feeling that the police is acting in a provocative and unjust way. As a result, the target group may not be susceptible to any communicative interventions of the mayor, since they see the mayor as the head of this unjust police apparatus. In other words, not keeping this mechanism in mind, might undermine communicative interventions and thereby the long-term strategy. Another important

element that authorities need to consider is that repressive measures (part of societal interventions) have to be balanced in a right way with communicative and media interventions. For example, a well-coordinated communicative approach between different governmental actors is essential for effective repressive societal interventions. Alternatively, a good personal connection between the mayor and his population (communicative interventions) and a fair media campaign of ‘influencing public perception’ (media intervention) are essential elements for the ‘stimulation of civil participation’ (societal intervention). However, it must also be acknowledged that both in Veen and in The Hague, the authorities are dealing with a hard core of troublemakers, which are very difficult to reach. Thus, in order to be effective, authorities always need to have means of repression available (appendix Buijserd, 2020; appendix Eysink Smeets, 2020). When this is not the case, it might undermine communicative or media interventions. For instance, certain agreements (communicative intervention) can only be effective if they can be enforced with repression, if necessary. A distortion of this balance was seen before the gales of cinder crisis in The Hague, when authorities made a lot of effort in the field of communicative interventions (making agreements and discussing with the organizations) but forgot the importance of certain societal interventions (not using repression when necessary), causing the builders to break the agreements, which *inter alia* caused that crisis. The aforementioned theoretical mechanisms therefore illustrate a dilemma that the mayors in The Hague and in Veen are confronted with. On the one hand, too much repression will probably be perceived as escalating policing, which deteriorates the balance with communicative and media interventions (and thereby also with ‘the stimulation of civil participation’). While on the other hand, the failure to use repression when necessary might undermine the effectiveness of media and communicative interventions because it makes those interventions impossible to maintain.

The Hague

As stated in the first paragraph of this section, escalating policing may hinder the effectiveness of communicative interventions and ‘the stimulation of civil society’. According to Eysink Smeets (appendix, 2020) the reason for such cases of escalating policing lies in the nature of the media campaign in The Hague. If authorities are to retain the aforementioned exaggerated and moral panic media campaign, societal interventions will automatically adjust to this image, which was visible during the riots in 2019 (appendix Eysink Smeets, 2020). In the first place, this notion substantiates the claim that escalating policing was indeed present in The Hague. However, it also illustrates the relationship between the media intervention ‘influencing public perception’ and the societal intervention of repression. That there was (perceived) escalating policing in Duindorp was also reflected in the media sample, where inhabitants of Duindorp complained about escalating and intimidating policing. For instance, an inhabitant expressed herself about the incident involving a nine year old child that was arrested because it was in possession of a Molotov cocktail: “Nonsense, the police and media say that it was in the middle of the night but the boy was just walking around in the evening when he was suddenly placed against the wall and searched, media are exaggerating the situation” (inhabitant in Volkskrant,

2019). X (appendix, 2020) acknowledged this image and stated: “at the slightest signal of disturbances, the police massively mobilizes in Duindorp and normal inhabitants are confronted with brutal policing and abuse of power”. An important detail is that X (appendix, 2020) recognizes Eysink Smeets’s (appendix, 2020) notion that this escalating policing is connected to media. X (appendix, 2020) even goes further and states that politicians have also contributed to this campaign of criminalization. The police is overly present because of the bad reputation that politicians and media have given Duindorp. For instance, political group chairman Balster of The Hague’s *PvdA* (labour party) who, for no clear reason or without any substantiation, stated that “Duindorpers are bringing their kids to school while on cocaine” (Balster in Gioia, 2018). According to X (2020), the negative reputation of the police and politicians in general is partly reflected on the mayor.

As mentioned, to enable the interventions of ‘stimulating civil participation’ and ‘repressive interventions’, these interventions should be balanced with the right communication and media interventions. In The Hague, it is clear that the order team of the bonfire organization of Duindorp can be seen as an effective intervention. Members of this team are appointed by the board and wear recognizable clothing. As this team consists of local societal leader figures, they enjoy a lot of respect in the neighborhood, also among the group that was involved in the riots of 2019 (appendix X, 2020). The effectivity can also be deduced from the fact that the municipal documents do not reveal any public order disturbances around the Duindorp bonfire. Unfortunately, this order team is only employed around the bonfire and not to assist during other situations. Although the municipality asked for their assistance during the riots in 2019, the board does not want to act as “babysitters out of the bonfire context” (appendix X, 2020). According to X (appendix, 2020) they could have played an important role, but “they are not willing to do things for a municipality that never returns something” (appendix X, 2020). In other words, ‘the stimulation of civil participation’ (which has proven to be effective around the bonfires and could therefore also be effective in another context) of actual societal leaders, could not be used because the municipality is dealing with a reputation problem among Duindorpers that was mainly caused by the aforementioned criminalizing campaign of media and public leaders. Another example of The Hague’s municipality missing out on opportunities to implement the (usually effective) intervention stimulation of civil participation can be deduced from the observation that the majority of people spoke out against the rioters in 2019. For instance, an inhabitant who expresses himself in the group *Wat is het fijn om een Duindorper te zijn* states: “Once again we are in the national news, in a negative sense. If you are a real Duindorper you keep your neighborhood safe and protest in a right way, without terror and vandalism” (Pronk, Facebook, 2019). The message evoked 261 comments, of which almost each one agreed with this statement. Similar messages in the group of Scheveningen were responded to in the same manner (e.g. Van Rijn, Facebook, 2019). So while most people dared to express themselves against the riots (there was thus no silence culture), there were no cases found of the actual use of societal leaders (for example a civil order team) when the riots arose in The Hague.

Moreover, it was noticed that a well-coordinated communicative intervention between different governmental actors was lacking in The Hague (which is essential for an effective repressive policy). The municipal documents revealed (e.g. Gemeente Den Haag, 2011) that different authorities in The Hague did not adequately cooperate with each other and that it was sometimes unclear which authority was responsible for certain actions. This claim was also supported in the media sample: “all authorities have been busy to further limit their own responsibilities: police, fire department and the municipality” (Leers in AD, 2019). This means that a multidisciplinary approach was lacking, which clearly undermines the governmental objective to perform effective societal (repressive) interventions.

Finally, the media sample clearly shows that the municipality of The Hague indeed merely focused on media and communicative interventions before 2019. From the 14 societal interventions that were identified in total, only four amounted to repressive interventions. These four were all related to the riots in 2019 (thus after the gales of cinder crisis). As illustrated in the first paragraph of this section, not using repression when necessary might undermine communicative or media interventions. In practice, the negative consequences were shown when the authorities of The Hague made a lot of effort in the field of communicative interventions (making agreements and communicating with the organizations) but forgot the importance of certain societal interventions (they did not use any repression when necessary), causing the builders to break the agreements, which *inter alia* caused the gales of cinder crisis in 2019. After analyzing the municipal documents, it should have been clear to the municipality that repression was already needed against the builders of the Scheveningen bonfire in 2014. Compared to Duindorp, the organization of Scheveningen was chaotic (appendix X, 2020) and a large group of builders was “not under control of the bonfire board” and “not approachable by municipal employees and the police” (Gemeente Den Haag, 2014). As this eventually led to serious situations – individuals from this group have been responsible for the placing of oil barrels on the bonfires – which eventually led to the gales of cinder crisis (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2019), the municipality should not have hesitated at that time. After all, the long-term intervention model teaches that when the use of societal leaders (the bonfire board of Scheveningen) or communicative interventions (trying to approach them or make agreements with them) are not effective, it is advisable to enforce through repression.

Veen

As indicated in the first paragraph of this section, societal interventions (repression in particular) have to be balanced with communicative and media interventions. In this regard, it is foremost important to note that Buijserd inherited a totally escalated situation in 2003. At the end of the 1990s, the situation deteriorated and the occurrence of a disaster was not unthinkable. This is because former mayor Mostert (1993-2002) communicated that *stoken* was prohibited, but this could not be followed-up by actual societal interventions, since the police and other authorities clearly stated that they would not maintain Mostert’s prohibition (appendix

Buijserd, 2020). Therefore, the balance between communicative and societal interventions was distorted. If one translates this to the long-term intervention model again, repression was necessary at that time because communication and the stimulation of civil participation did not prove effective (appendix Buijserd, 2020). The relative peace of the years 2005-2009 can thus primarily be explained by a recovery of the intervention balance, not that repression in itself is to be seen as an effective intervention method.

It is important to distinguish between different ‘target groups’ in Veen. First, there are the hard core *stokers*, comprising of approximately 20 to 30 people (appendix Buijserd, 2020; appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). Among that hard core are currently not only younger people (of the new generation) but also ‘the old guard’ that practices the tradition for several decades now. Secondly, there are the aforementioned facilitators, that usually own companies and provide for the car wrecks (appendix Buijserd, 2020). The main challenge with this group is that they operate(d) in anonymity, making it – in contrast to the hard core – difficult to perform interventions against them. As this group almost never shows itself, it is really hard to catch them red-handed. Lastly, there is a large group of followers, who are mostly very youthful and predominantly come from surrounding villages. It is really hard to target these groups (especially the first two) because there is a strong silence culture in Veen. People who openly spoke out against *stoken* were physically threatened or had their property damaged (appendix Buijserd, 2020; appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). For example, an inhabitant who provided information to the police got a Molotov cocktail thrown at her house in 2013 (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). It appears to be very hard to break through this silence culture, as it is related to the autonomous and cohesive character of the village; “An inhabitant of Veen does not snitch another inhabitant of Veen” (AD, 2014), is the striking motto of the village. However, this silence culture is also partly maintained because of lacking communication between the municipality and the police (communicative intervention between authorities). When the police – responding to a call about *stoken* – arrives at the scene, they file the declaration in full police uniform so the *stokers* immediately know who reported the incident (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020) and thus who they need to target with their intimidation campaign. Improved coordination between the police and the municipality (e.g. file a report in plain clothes) would therefore be a step in the right direction (although it would not tackle the root cause of the silence culture). The next paragraph will gradually analyze the interventions that were used against each separate group, thereby focusing on the effective interventions.

First, towards the hard core and its followers, the police will aim to enforce the rules, be it that they want to prevent a game of cat and mouse between them and the *stokers*. In practice, this meant that if *stoken* is performed in a safe manner and the firefighters are not threatened, the police will not intervene because this would only escalate the situation (Gemeente Aalburg, 2008; appendix Buijserd, 2020; appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). When people from this group cross the line, the municipality has learnt that the imposition of period penalty payments is an effective strategy (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). This is because, in contrast to the

facilitators, this group is not so rich that such punishments would not hurt them. Besides, the group of followers predominantly consists of young people who like the tradition of *stoken* but do not want to suffer any severe criminal consequences. Another effective method in the direction of this group – especially towards teenagers – is the use of *TOM*-sittings, as described above. The success lies in the fact that it starts a conversation between the offender and the authorities (communicative intervention) and at the same time has a repressive element to balance the communicative intervention. Towards the facilitators, Buijserd started with an approach that was meant to increase the chance of arrest. Together with the hard core, they are the most important actors but they do not suffer the consequences, because – in contrast to the hard core – they remain on the background, so-called low-profile perpetrators. The municipality eventually (around 2005) realized that they could only get to this group by using harsh repression, as they refused to communicate with the mayor (both Buijserd and Naterop made several attempts to) and they would not listen to societal leaders (in fact they are considered as societal leaders themselves). More recently, this group is mainly targeted by unannounced house or business property searches and additional criminal investigation, because, after all, the public prosecution would consider their actions as a preparation of arson, a serious criminal offense. Actually, a lot of progress has already been made by this pre-detection strategy as the municipality discovered several car wrecks intended to be used for *stoken* and arrested several facilitators who stored and prepared these car wrecks in their business properties (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). How did the municipality distinguish the car wrecks meant for *stoken* from regular car wrecks? By an extensive communication campaign on schools, the local football club and other important organizations in Veen. This can therefore be considered as another example that communicative interventions need to be tailored to societal interventions, which was done effectively in this case. In addition, an emergency ordinance has shown to be effective, also with the note that the media and communicative interventions are adjusted to it. For example, Buijserd used communicative interventions towards the population of Veen to create understanding for this measure, accompanied by high police presence and a tightened identification requirement. When such drastic measures are taken, it is important to get the majority of the population behind the authorities, which can be done by crisis communication (mainly an important personal connection with the neighborhood) and media interventions (influencing public opinion in a just way).

The mechanism of escalating policing was also present in Veen (usually undermining the effectivity of other interventions). The most prominent case in this regard is the incident in 2013. 97 arrestants were unjustly detained and kept for days, which has made a huge impact on the community and declined the trust in the police and the mayor. In an anonymous letter addressed to Naterop, a *stoker* wrote: “We will never forget what you did on the night of 30 to 31 December. 97 innocent people have been arrested in a scandalous way. We are now determined that we will always continue to keep *stoken*.” (Omroep Brabant, 2014). Nevertheless, the author must note that – in more recent years – there are no signs of escalating policing. Quite the contrary, when

firefighters are doing their job, the police is not present at the scene but they are watching from a distance (since they know that their presence can be escalating).

However, in a broader sense, a sentiment among the inhabitants was noticed that the police never assists or protects them throughout the year. But in the December month they are in the vanguard to prevent ‘a relatively harmless tradition’. This sentiment creates a feeling of injustice. Just as with the media – which is accused of only spreading negative coverage (ignoring any positive statements) – the police has the reputation that when it is really necessary, they will not help Veen’s inhabitants. Therefore, the intervention of stimulating civil participation can only be effectively used on the long-term in Veen when the police (and municipality) enhance its reputation throughout the year by giving more attention to other problems in the village (apart from *stoken*). Of course, it is likely that the municipality already does that, but it would clearly enhance their reputation if this would be more visible to Veen’s general population. Furthermore, an example of a (partly successful) intervention in the category of ‘stimulating civil participation’, however, is the organization of a festivity as an alternative to *stoken*. The success lies in the fact that it breached the monoculture of young men on *Het Kruis* (which typically leads to an aggressive atmosphere). However, after a while, the enthusiasm for this kind of festivities eventually faded away (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). Next to the reputational issue of the police and the municipality, the silence culture remains an underlying problem. Usually, the municipality only starts with the stimulation of civil participation in November or December, when the emotions have already run high and nobody wants to help the municipality, mostly out of fear for threats or retaliation. So if the municipality really wants it to be effective, they should start much earlier with this strategy. However, when the municipality really wants to tackle the root cause of this silence culture, they need to continue (and maybe increase) their positive media and communication strategies throughout the year. This is because it would restore the trust among societal leaders and stimulate communication.

Effective crisis communication

The municipal documents showed that the municipalities considered communicative interventions towards authorities and practitioners, individual warnings of troublemakers and personal involvement. The previous paragraphs already highlighted the relationship between media, societal and communicative interventions. As stated, the mayor’s personal communication must be in congruence with media communication in order to remain credible and to decrease the grey area of repression. In both cases, it became clear that the communicative interventions of the mayors were undermined by a bad police and municipal reputation at some moment, causing proponents of the tradition to internalize and to stop communicating with the mayor. Nevertheless, mayors still need to make efforts to establish a good personal connection with the practitioners of the tradition. Furthermore, as stated, a lacking mutual communication between different governmental authorities might undermine a multidisciplinary repressive approach (societal intervention), which in turn, will

contribute to a distortion of the balance. Finally, to overcome the communication dilemma (presented in the introduction), mayors must show compassion towards the affected citizens and at the same time ensure that they do not antagonize the supporters of the traditions. So again, the magic word is ‘balance’.

The Hague

Deetman, Van Aartsen and Krikke all committed to a good personal connection with the bonfire organizations (appendix X, 2020). In fact, they did everything they could to ensure that the bonfires would go on, as they were clearly convinced of the positive effects that they have. That the mayors committed to a good personal connection is also evident from the media sample and municipal documents. For example, Van Aartsen – who knew the bonfires were getting dangerous in 2016 – invited the bonfire organizations at the city hall of The Hague. Van Aartsen thereby did not shy away from a jovial tone: “Fancy a beer?” (Van Aartsen in De Volkskrant, 2016). Furthermore, as stated in the first paragraph of this section, ‘effective communication between authorities’ is necessary to implement effective repression. In The Hague, internal effective communication was clearly lacking. This was for example visible when the bonfire organization of Duindorp continued the building process in December 2018, which was against the agreements. While Krikke herself declared that she consciously did not intervene to prevent unnecessary escalation, X (appendix, 2020) has another explanation. According to X (appendix, 2020), the mayor was not able to intervene because it was not clear who was responsible for what at the side of the authorities: “The police did not intervene because it was not clear for them what was allowed, and what not”.

With regard to the communication dilemma, the municipal communication was found to mainly be aimed at the bonfire organizations, meaning that the other inhabitants felt ignored (appendix Lautenbach, 2020). This is also substantiated by the municipal documents, which show that local residents already shared their concerns in 2014 (e.g. *Concept-Verlag van de 134ste Vergadering van de GSBO d.d. September 2014*, 2014; *Evaluatie Vreugdevuur Scheveningen*, 2015; *Vreugdevuur Scheveningen*, 2016; *Vreugdevuur*, 2017; *Omschrijving Klacht*, 2018) and no serious meaning making was performed towards this group, nor were their concerns taken seriously. Since the bonfires were beginning to take dangerous proportions in 2014, there was a clear lack of mayoral and municipal attention towards the impact that the bonfires had on the local residents. While the media sample merely reveals this with regard to Krikke (who was later portrayed as the scapegoat), the other mayors fell short in this as well. At most the local residents could count on were assurances that the municipality would include their complaint in the evaluation. So before the gales of cinder crisis happened, the balance within the communication was distorted and we could therefore conclude that Van Aartsen and Krikke did not give collective meaning to the members of their community, which later influenced the political (blame game) that Krikke was exposed to.

After the gales of cinder crisis, Krikke finally gave meaning to the community, especially the victims in Scheveningen-Dorp. However, this was not effective, as it was perceived as an act to save her political position. Eysink Smeets (appendix, 2020) even termed Krikke's meaning making as "administrative cowardice". She therefore did not manage to position herself as a representative of the population. By contrast, Remkes went too far in the other direction: he showed little compassion to the proponents of the bonfire tradition and did not anticipate on the political aftermath of the crisis. One of the (many) examples of a lacking communication approach towards the bonfire organizations under Remkes' term can be deduced from the fact that, according to the bonfire organization, "we need to learn via the media that our bonfire is cancelled" (Vreugdevuur Scheveningen, 2019). It is therefore concluded that the mayors in The Hague were not able to find a solution to the communication dilemma.

Veen

Since his appointment in 2003, Buijserd had tried multiple times to start the communication with the proponents of the tradition. For example, he sent letters and contacted leading societal figures that were maybe able to help them. There were three reasons why this attempt did not work. First, as some of the proponents (primarily the facilitators) were involved in broader criminality, they were not willing to talk or cooperate with the mayor at all, afraid that their broader criminal activities would come to light (appendix Buijserd, 2020). Secondly, there was a huge lack of trust. For example, when mayor Buijserd invited leaders of the *stokers* to communicate with him about a possible solution, Lodewijk Timmermans was directly suspicious: "Mayor (Buijserd) will hopefully not think that the *stokers* will turn themselves in by communicating with him. At least he does not have to come to me and I know for certain that a lot of people from Veen think the same way about it as I do." (Timmermans in Brabants Dagblad, 2005). Thirdly, people that potentially wanted to communicate and cooperate with Buijserd were intimidated. So, communication with key societal figures was not possible for Buijserd.

As a consequence, Buijserd thought of other ways to get into contact with the proponents. He eventually came to the conclusion that not cleaning up the burned car wrecks would help. In the first place, it would remove the mystical character that *stoken* had before he was appointed. When the municipality directly cleans up the damage of the tradition, the population of Veen will not be confronted with the consequences of the tradition, and most people would just go on with their lives like nothing happened. At the time, not cleaning up the wrecks helped Buijserd to get the conversation started. After the car wrecks were left for some time Buijserd got a phone call from a societal leader who wanted to know who was going to clean the car wreck. When Buijserd pointed to the fact that it was their tradition meaning that they should also take care of the cleaning, inhabitants organized a party cleaning all the rubble.

Under Naterop, the communication between himself and the proponents of the bonfire tradition was slightly improving, especially in the first couple of years (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). However, the 2013-incident

– and primarily the direct media intervention that he made in the aftermath – proved to be a tipping point in this relationship. Naterop expressed himself in the media about the police action, of which he stated: “As far as I can see at the moment, the police acted correctly” (Naterop in Boonstra). Timmermans defined the exact problem that Naterop faced: “How can you communicate when you do not even apologize for the wrongful imprisonment of most people” (Timmermans in Brabants Dagblad, 2014). It is therefore safe to conclude that, in contrast to The Hague, the mayors of Aalburg/Altena were not able to develop a good personal relationship with (the representatives of) *stokers*. Buijserd declared (appendix Buijserd, 2020) that this is probably due to the antagonistic atmosphere and persistent silence culture in Veen. However, one effective way to reach the broader population is the use of sponsored content on social media sorted by zip code (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). While it is highly questionable if this will have any impact on the group of *stokers*, it strengthens the position of the mayor, as he can at least demonstrate to the Council that the municipality reached a large part of the population with their communication approach.

So next to communication with the practitioners of the tradition, it is important to communicate towards other authorities, which could influence the societal interventions, as mentioned before. In Veen, a serious problem has emerged in this field. As most firefighters are volunteers from Veen or its environs themselves, they know much of the *stokers* personally and they usually make a chat with bystanders when they are extinguishing the fire from the burning car wrecks (appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020). Not surprisingly, this leads to a lot of misunderstanding amongst the police (not consisting of local volunteers), who look at this in a totally different way. If the fire department knows who the troublemakers are – which the police should thus target – why will they not give up their names? The lack of mutual communication therefore leads to a cleavage within the government, which might also undermine the effectiveness of the police’s repressive approach. When the police cannot trust the information that they get from their colleagues – who might be conspiring with the group the police is aiming to arrest – this may lead to an uncoordinated and thereby incorrect (repressive) approach. Both Buijserd (appendix, 2020) and Van Den Heuvel (appendix, 2020) acknowledge that a distortion of the mutual coordination among different authorities can be seen as the cause of the incident in 2013. Therefore, this cleavage has indeed undermined a societal intervention, which made a huge impact on the situation in Veen. In fact, it was not only the lack of coordination between the fire department and the police that lies at the root of the incident but also a lack of communication between the mayor and the police. The policemen in question were not sufficiently informed about the specific policy in Veen and they adopted a too harsh approach (appendix Buijserd, 2020; appendix Van Den Heuvel, 2020).

As the long-term intervention model suggests, it is important to analyze how the mayors operationalized their crisis communication. As stated, Buijserd’s communication mainly consisted of approaching societal leaders (like Lodewijk Timmermans) and trying to build a connection with the community, while marginalizing the

culprits. After the first year, Veen was shocked by Buijserd's hard approach (and his labelling of Veen as a Sicilian village), which did not do the relationship between him and the community any good. However, the shaming mechanism (because of the national attention, people were ashamed to commit that they were from Veen) partially solved this problem. Nevertheless, Buijserd was still threatened by the hard core of the *stokers*, who did not intend to let their tradition be contained by the government. The media sample shows that Buijserd's old-timers were burnt and that he received threats like "Buijserd is next". While these threats were meant to deter Buijserd in his intervention policy, it only strengthened his meaning making as a representative of the people, as citizens started to stand up for Buijserd and his policy, which unintentionally further marginalized the threateners. So while the dilemma was still present, the extensive threats ensured that Buijserd could count on a lot more support and was therefore better able to communicate with his community, overcoming a blame game. He was thus able to stand up for this large majority of the population, which also included proponents of the tradition. Veen remained divided about *stoken* but showed more respect towards the fact that Buijserd was only imposing the repressive measures to protect his population, even the reasonable proponents recognized this. The same actually applied to Naterop, who, from the beginning, invested a lot of effort in personal communication with the relevant people in Veen. He, too, managed to get a lot of understanding among the civilians (including proponents of the tradition) and also got support from the Municipal Council (except for *Aalburgse Alliantie* maybe). However, by not speaking out as a defender of *his* community after the 2013 incident, Naterop eroded this trust and he lost a part of his support base. From this, we can deduce that the solution to the communication dilemma in this type of crises primarily lies in the gathering of support among the population. But not just any support, but the support of reasonable political opponents, in this case the reasonable proponents of *stoken*, who comprised the largest group in the village after the opponents. Of course, the support of the majority of the Municipal Council is an essential condition for this, but also the monitoring of public sentiments is necessary. Therefore, the interventions 'communication to the proponents of the tradition' (identify the moderate proponents and focus the communication on them) and 'communication to other civilians' are important interventions to build on.

6. Conclusion

This study analyzed which interventions were effective based on the experiences with public order disturbances in Veen and The Hague. Furthermore, it considered the relatedness between the interventions in order to establish a long-term intervention model. The study adopted an approach in which it started broad (international research on public order disturbances in general) and gradually narrowed down to our specific cases (Veen and The Hague and their New Year's Eve traditions related to mass disturbances). From the broader research – both international as national – we can indeed conclude that the categorization of media, societal and communicative interventions is suitable for finding specific effective intervention methods to New Year's disturbances which are part of traditions in certain areas in The Netherlands. While the funnel of causality was used as a heuristic framework, a (adapted) long-term intervention model was subsequently suggested, incorporating scientific knowledge of the theoretical framework. To work towards a decrease in public order disturbances on New Year's Eve, it is necessary to identify effective interventions in these three categories, thus serving as building blocks for the proposed long-term intervention model. However, the mere identification of these interventions is insufficient. In order to genuinely conquer (or prevent) the phenomenon of structural incidentalism, municipalities must not only use effective methods and stop to treat the incidents separately but also look at the connection between these interventions. As experiences from both Veen and the Hague showed, a one-sided approach may either lead to direct incidents (primarily when repression is not used when this is necessary) or to the weakening of other interventions, indirectly leading to incidents. This means that municipalities which are faced with (potential) New Year's Eve disturbances must use all three categories and ensure that the balance between them does not get distorted. As mentioned, the mayors of these municipalities must realize that it usually takes very little to destabilize the situation. For instance, one case of brutal policing (part of the societal intervention) might totally disturb the relationship between the population and the municipality. The long-term intervention model looks as follows.

Starting with media interventions, literature established that 'informing' and 'influencing public perception' can be considered as specifically effective intervention methods, provided that they are performed in the right way. Literature also made suggestions on how these media interventions can effectively be implemented: a positive de-escalating tone, avoiding responsibility framing in an early stage, correct timing, involving society in the run-up, basing the media statements (in this study defined as direct media interventions) on correct assumptions and avoiding negative stereotyping. While the municipality might have the right intentions and while these mechanisms might seem obvious, practice has shown that it is not self-evident that these mechanisms are taken into account. Secondly, effective societal interventions are in the first place interventions coming from the own group or community. Nevertheless, broader research into cases of collective violence has shown that the group

of hard core troublemakers is usually unsusceptible to this internal correction. Therefore, this group needs to be targeted with an information-based and multidisciplinary repressive approach. Authorities need to know who the hardcore troublemakers are and – based on information – which forms of repression will be the most effective on them. In addition, it is argued that the proponents of *stoken* and bonfires can be regarded as some kind of social movements, meaning that they are also subject to the relevant social movement mechanisms. Thirdly, based on existing literature it is concluded that effective communicative interventions can only be performed when the mayor has a good relationship with the population. During crises, mayors not only have to communicate about the impact (of the crisis) or about their policy, but also balance their communication with undermining frames and the issue of political responsibility, which might result in a blame game in the wake of a crisis. Moreover, it was established that there is a high form of variation in crisis types and that the mayor should adapt its meaning making to the crisis at hand. In cases of high political responsibility and high collective impact (as was the case in The Hague and Veen), a mayor should adopt a role in which he takes the collective and emotional impact into account and shows compassion towards his citizens. On the other hand, a mayor should monitor that his meaning making balances the interests of proponents of the tradition as an outspoken statement may readily contribute to a politicized blame game.

After inquiry based on policy documents, media coverage, interviews and secondary literature, it is concluded that the media interventions in The Hague were ineffective, because the media campaign undermined the integrity and credibility of the municipality. Primarily in the run-up to New Year's Eve 2019-2020, authorities have contributed to a marginalizing media campaign of proponents of the bonfire tradition, who realized this and may have hardened in their anti-authoritarian stance. Other indicators, like a de-escalating tone, not revealing details about repressive (societal) interventions and the correct timing were also not applied. Besides, the media in the aftermath of the gales of cinder crisis has shown to be heavy politicized, with Krikke being portrayed as the scapegoat. The Hague's public leaders (including Municipal Councilmembers and Aldermen) actively contributed to the establishment of this frame, which has most likely contributed to Krikke's resignation. Finally, it is shown that The Hague missed out on opportunities to involve society in their media intervention, which was effectively applied in Veen.

In Veen, authorities also used media as an instrument to influence public perception. Whereas media-attention was limited in the run-up to New Year's Eve – as this might fuel escalation – the media was consciously approached by authorities in the aftermath to activate the feeling of shame among the moderate people in Veen. On the short-term, this strategy stimulated the self-correcting mechanism as informal societal leaders turned against the rioters. However, as the mayors of Veen also disregarded the undermining mechanisms of an effective media intervention (be it to a lesser extent than in The Hague), it remains highly questionable if this strategy has also been effective on a longer term. Both mayors have aggravated a lot of people in Veen with

some of their media performances, illustrated by the many threats that they received from anonymous *stokers*. Other examples of media interventions that at least showed some positive effects were addressing a media station on the escalating effect of their web forum, rightly timed media silences (in December) and the involvement of society. Besides, on the long-term, a positive (also point to positivity) and equivalent (to other neighborhoods or villages in the municipality) is likely to be successful. And while the mayors in Veen were also confronted with a politicized media debate, they always kept the support of the Municipal Council and the majority of Veen's population, which probably made them outlast the political aftermath. One can therefore conclude that the most promising media interventions in times of New Year disturbances consist of involving society (at the right time, so before the tensions are rising), measures to reduce the escalating effects of media (e.g. media silences) and, probably the most important, a positive and fair media approach.

Furthermore, this study has shown that the use of societal leaders has been an effective intervention in The Hague, mainly around the Duindorp bonfire. However, the marginalization campaign might have resulted in the fact that the societal leaders were not willing to help the municipality during the riots in 2019. While private security was mentioned in the policy documents, it was not possible to collect enough information to make any statements about the effectivity of that intervention. The same applies to the mechanisms of social movement theory, except for escalating policing. A strong aversion towards the police and politicians was found and this also reflects on the mayor and the municipality in general. Finally, relatively little societal interventions were performed in The Hague, and the balance between communicative interventions and repression was distorted, which probably contributed to the gales of cinder crisis. By contrast, a lot of repressive interventions were found in Veen. It was observed that the stimulation of civil participation was frustrated by the underlying silence culture in Veen. Although it seems impossible to completely eradicate this culture, mayors can appeal to the moderate (and good willing) proponents of the tradition to isolate the (usually) small group that is responsible for the culture. Towards the hard core and the followers, periodic penalty payments and *Tom-sittings* were effective, while pre-detection methods had more success towards the facilitators. The author could not gather enough information regarding the social movement mechanisms and private security, except for escalating policing. Just like in The Hague, cases of escalating policing undermined the authority of the mayor and perhaps the entire municipality. One can therefore conclude that the most promising societal interventions can be found within repression and the stimulation of civil participation (which is highly dependent on other interventions though).

In The Hague, no effective communicative interventions were found. Whereas Van Aartsen and Krikke showed too little care towards the inhabitants, Remkes showed too little compassion towards the proponents of the bonfire tradition. Besides, Krikke did not correctly assess her political responsibility and contributed to the political blame game that arose after the gales of cinder crisis. In Veen, communication towards the hard core

of the *stokers* proved ineffective. Again, the silence culture appeared to be the main reason. However, the mayors succeeded to communicate on behalf of the population, which strengthened their position towards critical politicians and enhanced the communicative interventions. To get the majority of the population behind the mayor, communication should thus also be focused on the (good willing) proponents of the tradition.

6.1 Future research

The current study has applied the long-term intervention model to local cases of disturbances of the public order. However, as it is also connected to international research, it should be relevant to test it on international cases of mass disturbance. In addition to the limitations in the methodology, it is argued here that the research was carried out individually, allowing it to be possible that the author unconsciously implemented his own bias (or that of the respondents) at some point. To decrease this bias, a recommendation for future research might be to perform (large n) quantitative survey research under inhabitants. Furthermore, it was noted in one of the interviews that there is a link between the municipal local interventions and national New Year's Eve policy, which, according to Eysink Smeets (interview, 2020) is based on an incorrect media campaign that is incongruent with reality. Future research might therefore focus on this exact national intervention and how this strategy influences the public order management of local cases of New Year's Eve disturbances.

6.2 Recommendations

Instigating from the aforementioned conclusions, this section provides several policy recommendations that may help in the implementation of an improved intervention policy. As this study emphasizes the role of the mayor, some of these recommendations will also be related to the strengthening of the mayor's position. First, the mayors should learn from Krikke's situation by involving the Municipal Council much more and in an earlier stage of the decision making process of intervention policy. This might strengthen the mayor's position when a mediatized blame game arises. Secondly, public leaders should not base their communication and media strategy too much on electoral stimuli because they often refer to the indicators of table 1 and may thus alienate the proponents of the traditions and thus disturb social participation. Third, the municipalities should start way earlier with their interventions: the most effective interventions are performed in the eleven months before December. Primarily in Veen, this would diminish the issue of a silence culture, which is primarily present in December (interview Van Den Heuvel, 2020). Fourth, to diminish the negative consequences of escalating policing, the police should focus, more on EQ (emotional intelligence) and SW (street wisdom) in their recruitment. In other words: police officers need more connection with the neighborhood they are working in, as the interviews and media have shown that the reputation of the police is low in neighborhoods like Duindorp. This is logically related to societal interventions but also to communicative (as the mayor benefits in the area of communication from an enhanced police reputation). Finally, municipalities should implement the same (science-based) approach over a longer period of time. Despite the fact that there are differences between

mayors, too large differences may lead to the distortion of the intervention balance, resulting in the persistence of structural incidentalism.

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Appendix

Codebooks of the media analysis

Codebook of direct media interventions

Indicator	Description	Questions
Escalating tone	Give information, but aim for a positive and de-escalating tone	<p>-Does a public leader express anger?</p> <p>-Does a public leader use muscular language?</p> <p>-Does a public leader call for a tougher approach when the police is already intervening?</p>
Details	Give information, but do not reveal details about the upcoming interventions	<p>-Does a public leader reveal any details about the specific means of repression?</p> <p>-Does a public leader reveal any details about specific places where certain measures will be taken?</p> <p>-Does a public leader reveal any details about the specific timing in which certain measures will be taken?</p>
Responsibility	Try to avoid the responsibility frame in an early stage (in case something went wrong)	<p>-Does a public leader directly blames another actor in a premature stage?</p> <p>-Does a public leader suggest that another actor is responsible in a premature stage?</p>
Timing	Not right before or after New Year's Eve and avoid factual enumeration of incidents in the direct aftermath	<p>-Does a public leader perform a direct media intervention in December or the first half of January?</p> <p>-Does a public leader perform a direct media intervention in the middle of mass disturbances?</p>

Involvement society	Emphasize the role of society in the run-up to New Year's Eve	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Does a public leader call for society's help in general? -Does a public leader call for the help of specific societal figures?
Negative stereotyping	Avoid negative stereotyping of relevant groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Does a public leader negatively express itself towards a societal group? -Does a public leader project a criminal frame on a specific group?
Premature assumptions	Avoid premature assumptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Does a public leader make any statements that are (later) questioned by local residents? -Does a public leader make any statements that are (later) questioned by authorities?

Codebook of indirect media interventions

Intervention	Description	Questions
<i>Societal</i>		
Stimulation of civil participation	Stimulate civil participation, especially focused on the control of public order and compliance with regulations	<p>- Does the article mention individuals who volunteer to help the government?</p> <p>-Does the article mention the emergence of civil organizations on a voluntary basis?</p>
Repression	The use of police and other repressive means (to enforce agreements or act against troublemakers/facilitators)	<p>-Does the article mention any pre-detection methods?</p> <p>-Does the article mention any use of (riot) police?</p> <p>-Does the article mention any other criminal system methods?</p>
Private security	The use of private security services (to enforce agreements or act against troublemakers)	-Does the article mention any paid civil security service?
<i>Communicative</i>		
With authorities	Communication with authorities (to ensure proportionate performance of authorities)	-Does the article mention any communication between different authorities?
With practitioners	Communication with the practitioners of the traditions	<p>-Does the article mention any informal communication between authorities and practitioners?</p> <p>-Does the article mention any formal communication between authorities and practitioners?</p> <p>-Does the article mention any written agreements between authorities and practitioners?</p>
With broader society	Communication with other civilians	<p>-Does the article mention any direct communication with other civilians?</p> <p>-Does the article mention any acts which are meant for the</p>

With troublemakers	Individual warnings to troublemakers	<p>communication with other civilians?</p> <p>-Does the article mention any direct communicative ways of warning individual troublemakers?</p> <p>-Does the article mention any warning letters or other written warnings?</p>
Mayoral involvement	Personal mayoral involvement	<p>-Does the article mention any mayoral meaning making in which the mayor takes the emotional/collective impact into account?</p> <p>-Does the article mention any mayoral meaning making in which the mayor takes the interests of the proponents of the tradition into account?</p> <p>-Does the article mention any meaning making or acts of personal involvement from the mayor?</p>

Interviews Veen

Summary interview Frans Buijserd, mayor of Wijk en Aalburg from 2003 until 2007

The origins of *stoken*

At the end of the last century, citizens of Veen used to gather around a bonfire on the crossroad *Het Kruis*. Eventually, as a way of symbolism, cars were set on fire on *Het Kruis*. The phenomenon was not handled properly and the fires became more intense after a while. There are two main reasons for the escalation back then. First, authorities contradicted each other, creating space for malevolent people. Mayor Mostert (1993-2002) communicated that *stoken* was prohibited, while other authorities (including the police) stated that they would not maintain Mostert's prohibition. Secondly, because of their self-regulatory nature, inhabitants of Veen do not let themselves to be forced into reforms of their customs. When Buijserd took office in 2003, it was clear that *stoken* was out of control and that it would go wrong if authorities would not develop intervention methods. He basically inherited a neglected problem.

Media interventions

Media attention has two components. On the one side, media attention fueled escalation because it provokes *stokers* and attracts troublemakers. In 2003, local media were extremely focused on New Year's Eve in Veen, especially *Omroep Brabant*. The attention already started in November and also contributed to the escalation. This is because *Omroep Brabant* provided incendiary and sometimes incorrect news. As a consequence, the Municipal Council agreed on a full radio silence prior to New Year's Eve. Next to this, Buijserd organized a conversation with *Omroep Brabant*, to establish that they would provide honest media coverage around *stoken*, which was not always the case. Especially on their webforum, unfiltered and escalating messages were spread. On the other side, Buijserd also noticed that all media attention was undesired for a large part of Veen's inhabitants. This is because they wanted to be left alone and the media attention brought them a negative reputation. After a while (2005), Buijserd started to use this sentiment for a media intervention campaign. He started with an interview with the *Reformatie Dagblad*, and appealed to the moral sense of the 'good part of Veen' (in this regard). After the second year of riot police presence, Veen received national media attention and Buijserd performed several interviews, inter alia to the *Telegraaf* and *NOS*. For Veen's inhabitants, this was the tipping point. Some inhabitants did not even want to admit that they were from Veen while they were doing business or on vacation in other parts of the Netherlands (Veen established the reputation of a 'riot village'). Next to this, the criminal supporters of the *stokers* (mainly car traders) did not like the media attention at all, increasing self-correction. Buijserd tried to use media in a tactful way, thereby not revealing too much details because this would give *stokers* information about their strategy and contribute to a challenging aspect in a

sense that *stokers* saw it as a challenge to circumvent the announced policy, thus creating a ‘battle’ between the government and *stokers*.

Societal interventions

There are indeed strong tendencies of self-reliance and anti-authoritarianism in Veen. If an inhabitant fits the moral standards, he or she will be well taken care of. However, there is no clear link between the *stokers* and the reformatory community, as suggested by the COT report (2005). Using or communicating with local pastors therefore makes no difference whatsoever. Instead, with regard to *stoken*, it can be valuable to distinguish between three relevant groups: the hard core (around 20 to 30 people), supporters/facilitators (bystanders but also garage owners who actively helped the *stokers*) and the wider population. While the supporters played an active role, they remained in anonymity. With regard to the wider population, the denormalization of *stoken* has been a gradual process. Besides the fact that it is a close community, there were two challenges in this process. First, there was an underlying problem in the form of a blame culture. People who disagreed were (physically) intimidated and their property damaged. For instance, anonymous vandals shot an illegal firework rocket through the window of a school principal who disagreed with *stoken*. And a critical real estate agent who was observing the ritual got a burning car wreck in his front yard the next day (interview Buijserd, 2020). This culture was also visible in the tradition of *koeiemelken*. Rich farmers had to provide their cows, allowing the poor population of Veen to milk for free. Farmers that did not participate to this tradition were imitated, threatened or even physically assaulted. Nobody dared to speak out because of the fear of repercussions from (a part of) the community. Second, for most people, *stoken* was something mystical which did not bother them much. This is because the consequences were not visible to them and on the 1st of January, everyone continued with their normal lives like nothing was wrong. Buijserd tackled this problem by deliberately abstaining from the clean-up of car wrecks and other junk related to *stoken*. While the broader population (including the province and municipal councils) were not happy with this strategy, it led to self-correction within the community. Next to this, it cleared the path for communication, which is an important element of the solution. With regard to the supporters, the main objective was to get them out of their anonymity. Those supporters are responsible for *stoken* but they do not suffer the consequences, so-called low-profile perpetrators. It was known that the supporters paid for the car wrecks and authorities suspected them of bribery. As authorities realized that they could not contain *stoken* without measures against this specific group, the police specifically started to target this group. They eventually fell into a trap because the police and the mayor used wiretapping and revealed their exact plans. As a consequence, the supporters – most of which were business owners – got severe penalties, deterring them to proceed with their activities. Among this group were also people who were engaged in more serious crime (some were later arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and tax evasion). This hindered the direct communication interventions but it created an ideal situation for media interventions.

With regard to the hard core, it was clear that communication did not work. Their actions were triggered by anonymous supporters and they were mostly stubborn youths, continually pushing the limits of the authorities. Authorities gathered information and used targeted repression against them, primarily aimed at the increasing of the chance of apprehension. Penalty decision was based on so-called *TOM-zittingen*, in which far-reaching measures were taken and the family or close environment was also involved. After authorities succeeded to get this group of their anonymity, Buijserd aimed for a policy of de-escalation. From the beginning, Buijserd closely cooperated with the police and he often went along in person. In partnership with the fire department, Buijserd decided not to extinguish fires if this was unnecessary (for safety reasons). In this manner, the police got a better impression of the situation (e.g. who were standing around the fires) and the police were fully present in Veen, making it difficult for *stokers*. Buijserd therefore declares that this close cooperation with the police and fire department helped a lot. As he noticed that the communication with *stokers* did not work in this phase, he switched to a repressive approach during New Year's Eve. While it did evoke aggression, the Municipal Council agreed on the fact that this was the only option at the moment (2003). However, with regard to the societal interventions, one thing was for certain; *stoken* is a social tradition, so the main interventions must come from society itself. Buijserd actively cooperated with the town council (a civil organization) and a group of women took the initiative to organize an alternative celebration. Mayor Naterop later ensured that the town council organized alternative festivities on *Het Kruis*. After a couple of years, Buijserd (and later Naterop) succeeded to normalize *stoken*. Occasionally, a car wreck was burned, but this was done safely and without major damages. This 'happy medium' was an ideal solution as rebellious youngsters had their way (they could 'let off steam'), while the rest of the population did not suffer the consequences. In 2013 approximately 100 people from Veen were arrested. According to Buijserd (who spoke to a district police commander), this policy of tolerance was not correctly communicated towards the police during that time. The police therefore acted unfairly strict against the youngsters. Instead, the municipal authorities should have made it clear to the police that a policy of tolerance is applied in practice and that they should not use repressive force at the slightest disturbance because this will only create new escalation.

Crisis communication interventions

Since his appointment, Buijserd has committed to communication interventions with the *stokers*. Because of anti-government sentiments, however, his attempts to get in touch with practitioners and proponents of the tradition did not work immediately. Because there were more serious criminals among the supporters, communication with this group was useless. After Buijserd's new policy in which car wrecks are no longer removed by the municipality, the communication process finally began. Important informal community leaders contacted him and the community organized a festivity where the mess was cleaned. *Stokers* thus directly affected their own community in this way. During his New Year's speech, Buijserd (and the other mayors) paid attention to the situation in Veen and mentioned what went well and what did not. An important element of this

speeches was the publication of the damage numbers, by which Buijserd hoped to increase the ‘self-cleaning capacity’ of Veen’s population. Lastly, Buijserd was personally threatened by anonymous proponents of the tradition (he received threatening letters and a burning car wreck in his front yard). Logically the intimidations complicated the personal contact and resulted in the fact that Buijserd mainly resorted to media and societal interventions. The threats were counterproductive; Veen’s inhabitants felt this went too far, undermining the sympathy towards proponents.

Interview Dewi van den Heuvel, safety consultant of the municipality of Altena

Stoken in its contemporary form

Indeed, *stoken* should be seen as a form of ‘structural incidentalism’. Over the last ten to fifteen years, *stoken* has become a lot safer and serious public order disturbances no longer occur (except for the incident in 2013). When the tradition causes damage to the property of individual community members, they solve this among themselves (victims are financially compensated and police or insurance actors are disregarded). It is thereby important to note that the intention of the *stokers* is not to cause as much damage or trouble as possible, but to practice their own tradition in a way that it releases their energy, an important note that is often misunderstood or neglected. In the past, authorities have tried to take tough actions against *stoken*, which only provoked counter-reactions, proving this approach to be counter-productive. Instead, *stoken* should be considered as a ‘symptom’ caused by an underlying ‘disease’: the marginalization of Veen (as a whole) by media and the municipality. Veen has never received much support from the government in the past, and if they *do* get attention, it is always in a negative way. If the municipality does not commit to the community of Veen, then why would they let the municipality intervene in *their* tradition? In itself, this line of reasoning is reasonable. So, while *stoken* in its contemporary form is not the biggest issue, we must stay alert as the number of car wreck fires is increasing.

The mayoral toolkit

There has been considerable intervention debate regarding *stoken*. The first possibility is communication. Mayors have tried to reach the *stokers* and to communicate with them in different ways (through leading societal figures, media, letters or direct). Secondly, there is the General Bye-Law, prohibiting the possession of facilitating goods for *stoken* (the police needs a legal base to enforce). Next to this, pre-detection is also an important intervention method (camera surveillance and even drones equipped with facial recognition). However, probably the most important pre-detection methods are the identification and prosecution of facilitators – local entrepreneurs that aid the *stokers*, and who form the vital link in the practice of the tradition – and the imposition of period penalty payments to hard core *stokers* (*dwangsommen*). Lastly, of course, the police is used to enforce the law (while, in practice, *stoken* is tolerated, as long as the dangers are contained and the fire department can freely do their job).

Media interventions

Normally, the December month leads to a clear decline in newsworthy content, allowing all media to focus on *stoken*, which is an unwanted situation, as too much media attention has shown to cause escalation. The municipality therefore uses a well-considered media strategy. First, they use social media to transmit information. However, as their own media accounts do not reach the target group (of mainly people involved with *stoken*), sponsored messages are also used, which have proven to reach a significantly larger part of Veen's population. An additional advantage of this strategy is that a mayor can always justify his/her policy towards the Municipal Council in case something goes wrong; at least they can substantiate that enough was done to communicate the interventions. In the old days (under mayor Buijserd and later under mayor Naterop), the mayor strongly requested media (Omroep Brabant, to be specific) not to publish about *stoken*, as this would only agitate the situation and set the population against the government. Since media perceive their journalistic freedom as an important good, this did not work properly. Instead, mayors should allow them to publish and even give them some straightforward information, thereby pointing out that rabble rousing (encouraging further dissent) is unwanted, and that media also share responsibility in the containment of the situation. In this way, it can only be advantageous if media would share mayoral intervention messages. Also, with regard to the publication of damage numbers, the municipality has adopted a clear strategy. Whereas the municipality would publish the damage numbers of *stoken* in Veen in specific, they now only publish the full picture i.e., the damage numbers of the entire municipality, so that they do not undesirably contribute to the marginalization of Veen as a whole.

Societal interventions

Regarding *stoken*, we can distinguish between several groups. First, the *stokers* themselves can currently be divided in hard core *stokers* and followers. The hard-core *stokers* are not only younger people, but this group also consists of the 'old guard' (that practices the tradition for several decades now). So, when looking at age, we can conclude that this is a very diverse group. The followers, in general, are younger people that also come from surrounding villages. They primarily practice the tradition before December 31st, because there will be less police present during this time. For them, *stoken* is a nice tradition, but they do not want to suffer any negative (criminal) consequences. Towards these two groups, the police will enforce the rules, be it that they want to prevent 'a game of cat and mouse' and that *stoken* in a relatively safe manner is usually tolerated (to prevent unnecessary escalation). Then there are the aforementioned facilitators, who are responsible for the arrangement of prepared demolition vehicles. With regard to the facilitators, the municipality uses an information-based (stemming from societal communication) detection strategy. This group is mainly targeted by unannounced searches (for cars designated for *stoken*) and additional criminal law, because, after all, the public prosecution would consider their actions as a preparation of arson, a serious criminal offense. Finally,

the broader population is divided about *stoken*. For some, the tradition is harmless, as long as it does not get out of hand. By contrast, several business owners, suffer the reputation costs of *stoken*, which ultimately also damages their businesses. As this is a tradition of Veen's population, the municipality acknowledges that interventions should also come from the population itself. Aforementioned business owners of the broader population are most affected by the tradition, wherefore the municipality tries to use these leading figures (they provide a lot of employment and, as leading figures, are held in high regard by Veen's population) in order to contain the tradition. This is a good strategy, but the timing leaves something to be desired. Usually, the municipality only starts with this strategy in November or December, when the emotions have already run high and nobody wants to help the municipality, mostly out of fear for threats or retaliation. A blame culture thus remains to be an underlying problem. After the incident of 2013 – which was caused because of friction within the 'governmental triangle' – an inhabitant who spoke with the police got a Molotov-cocktail thrown at her house. Such incidents leave a huge impact on Veen, which explains the reluctance to talk with the police or the municipality. The fact that policemen show up in full uniform when they are filing declarations by victims of this group, makes it even more difficult to tackle this problem. Malicious persons then immediately know who they have to target. Besides, leaving the cleaning of car wrecks to the community (it did not result in cooperation and people would eventually dump them in nature), the organization of a festivity on *Het Kruis* (after a couple of years, the enthusiasm declined and people from the reformed church are no proponents of loud music) and camera/drone surveillance (in practice, it was too difficult to recognize persons) have also proven to be ineffective methods on the long term. The same applied to the road blockades, which only challenged the *stokers* to think of more inventive and dangerous ways to practice the tradition. For instance, they used ramps to get over the blockades.

Crisis communication

All three mayors have tried to get in contact with the population. Whereas Buijserd adopted a more antagonistic tone (he was more focused on the prohibition), Naterop tried to use a more friendly strategy. However, he ran also into the dilemma that this tradition causes a lot of division in Veen. By speaking out for the proponents of the tradition, a mayor automatically affronts the opposition, and vice versa. There are two important points in the communication strategy. First, the communication of multiple authorities should be attuned to each other. This would prevent that different actors (e.g., the police and municipality) would contradict each other. Second, the communication must be in plain language. The target group, in general, is less educated and therefore wants their communication presented in a clear manner. This is also related to the background of the municipal spokesperson. Preferably, his/her background is similar as that of the *stokers*, so they can better understand each other. To conclude, appointing the damage numbers in New Year's Eve speeches is also an ineffective method on the long term, as this has also proven to provoke counter-reactions.

Interviews The Hague

Summary interview with Marnix Eysink Smeets, lector public order at InHolland University of Applied Science and former police officer in The Hague

The origins of the bonfire tradition

The Hague is famous for its bonfire tradition and escalation was seen as an annual phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s. The governmental response could be summarized as perseverance in repressive policy. In The Hague, the underlying problem was a monoculture of young men on the streets. In order to break the trend of annual incidents, authorities had to ensure that this monoculture was broken. Next to this, the expectation of riots should be downplayed. The major blow was made between 1985 and 1987, and the *Haagse Integrale Aanpak* builds on the policy implications of this period (a combination between repressive and preventive interventions). At a certain point, authorities started to rely too much on routine. When authorities start to work on routine, it will lead to laxity. The regulated bonfires were key in the intervention policy towards bonfire related disturbances. That the regulated bonfires on the beaches escalated can also be dedicated to routinely interventions.

Media interventions

Over the last year, authorities in The Hague are actively trying to influence public perception by antagonizing proponents of the bonfire tradition. By media interventions, they have created an atmosphere in which Duindorpers and Scheveningers (at least the proponents of the tradition) are depicted as irrational vandals. A good example of this strategy is the release of usually restricted police footage of a firework ‘bomb’ being thrown under a police van (NOS, 2019), which mayor Remkes immediately uses to state that “life-threatening” and severe measures are needed. Fed by the national police and the Dutch Attorney General, authorities have consciously created a situation of moral panic. The national police is doing everything they can to decrease the incidents during New Year’s Eve, including the distortion of facts (violence against aid workers is increasing) and marginalization of certain groups holding to their traditions. That authorities build this atmosphere around the traditions of New Year’s Eve, results in the fact that media coverage increases and public perception turns against New Year’s Eve (traditions), while this clearly contradicts the actual numbers. By doing this, authorities are losing their integrity. The general public have been presented with a distorted image of New Year’s Eve. That the bonfire of Scheveningen ended in a crisis was a favourable development for some authorities. This influencing of public perception also creates friction between the frontrunners (bonfire traditions are outdated) and laggards (the proponents of the tradition) as the increasing discrepancy will cause the laggards to resist. In conclusion, Eysink Smeets therefore prefers a practice-based approach instead of media interventions aimed at the influencing of public opinion.

Societal interventions

The best interventions against the bonfire tradition in The Hague can be found in the way of thinking and the way that authorities use their capacities. It is of utmost importance that authorities deploy people that have enough street wisdom and empathy. Eysink Smeets therefore argues for an approach that is not only based on IQ but also on EQ (emotional) and SW (street wisdom). Authorities need to be able to empathize with the *bouwers* and should be able to foresee the consequences of their own actions. If these elements are missing, authorities will again persevere in repressive measures, thereby neglecting the complex societal processes, which are the most important. If authorities retain to the aforementioned distorted image of anarchistic scenes, interventions will automatically adjust to this image (which was visible in The Hague), so this tendency is dangerous. The societal intervention policy should therefore consist of 90% prevention and 10% of pruning hard and precise repression (towards hardcore disturbers). Additional elements that are important in this respect, are the equipment and appearance of police officers. Informal leaders (from the bonfire organizations) can also be very effective in this regard. The main cause for the riots of 2019-2020 lies in the fact that mayor Krikke did not anticipate on the next New Year's Eve after the crisis with the 'gales of cinder'. She should have known that the mere use of repression would not be enough and started to think about alternatives for the fires in January of February, which she omitted to do. The effective way of thinking (which has proven to be effective in the 1980s), was absent last year and the mayor only acted from a repressive perspective.

Crisis communication

Krikke is guilty of 'executive cowardness'. She did not take her political responsibility and merely blamed others for the crisis. She thereby used the feelings and safety of the opponents of the bonfires to fuel escalation to absolve herself of responsibility. Instead, she should have communicated in a way of common responsibility. Remkes, on his side, missed out on the opportunity to accept a bonfire of maximum 10 metres, which was also an option on the negotiation table back then. Authorities have to stay in conversation with the organizers of the tradition and think along with their desires.

Summary interview board member bonfire organization Duindorp (wishes to remain anonymous)

More than a celebration

Duindorpers in general, but even more those who are involved with the bonfires, are a really close community who strongly care for each other. X, himself a professional cook, provided free meals for all participants on a voluntary basis. Next to this, local restaurants and stores provide free food and other supplies to the bonfire organizations. He describes the gathering around the bonfire as one big happy family. In order to increase the conviviality around the tradition, a lot of money (from sponsors) is being spent on activities for children and other inhabitants, e.g. bingo's, disk jockeys etc. In this way, the fires really have become a family event.

Description of the organization

Within the board of the organization (consisting of eight people), everyone has their role and tasks (some are e.g. concerned with sponsors and others with communication). Next to the board, there is a group of approximately 300 *bouwers* involved, primarily youngsters. The decision-making process is based on a democratic voting system. As stated, most of their income comes from sponsors, who get their own banners on the bonfire. The internal communication is done through WhatsApp. The organization has a group with involved people, in total consisting of approximately 200 people. Whereas the board of Duindorp runs a tight ship, Scheveningen is much less organized. As a consequence, individuals placed the barrels of oil (which was the biggest cause of the crisis). Because of the strict organization, this kind of incidents would not occur in Duindorp.

The municipal Council

In the municipal Council, Duindorpers are supported by the *PVV* and *Groep de Mos*. *Groep de Mos*, for example, is one of the large sponsors. But the other parties take part in the media's depiction of Duindorp as a racist and deprived neighbourhood. In fact, because of this depiction by authorities and media, Duindorp is already one nil down, which is seen by the way police is deployed. A good example of this negative stereotyping by the political group chairman of The Hague's *PvdA*, who stated that "parents of Duindorp pick up their children from school while on cocaine" (Gioia, 2018).

Media interventions

Media merely provide negative publicity regarding Duindorp. The most recurring frames are that Duindorpers are racist, violent and drug users. The biggest example of this framing campaign is the 'firework bomb incident', publicized by several media. While X disapproves the violence, he argues that it was unfair to state that it was a 'bomb'. The situation has been staged by thermal images. And besides, if it was really a bomb, there would have been damage on the road surface, which was not the case. To make things even worse, the mayor (in particular Remkes) has contributed to this image with his media appearances. On the other side, positive news is ignored and only ventilated by local newspapers (with a much smaller circulation). Therefore, the organization has decided to stop the communication with the media.

Societal interventions

The underlying reason why Duindorp did not commit to the covenant was the game element. Besides, Krikkes prejudice strengthened this because she did allow Scheveningen to continue the building, while Duindorp was forced to stop. These kinds of practices naturally provoke violations of the agreements, like the night that Duindorp proceeded building while this was prohibited. According to the municipality, Krikke did not intervene in this case because she did not know the exact state of the people (with regard to drug and alcohol abuse).

According to X, this was hugely exaggerated and most *bouwers*, especially the board, were in a reasonable state of mind. Next, X expressed a lot of critique towards the police, who, according to him, is provocative. At the slightest signal of public order disturbances (sometimes coming from other neighborhoods), police massively mobilizes and inhabitants are confronted with police violence and abuse of power. He also noticed that this police mobilization is disproportionally distributed. In other districts with disturbances (e.g. the Schilderswijk), the police deployment was much lower. If the same things would happen in Duindorp as in the Schilderswijk, authorities would have acted more heavily. The municipality further fails to dedicate themselves for other (more preventive) social interventions. For example, the realization of a youth centre, which has been demanded for some time now, is still lagging behind. According to X, such a youth centre could also prevent a lot of the trouble. The organization does not feel responsible for the disturbances after the cancellation of the fire. They are no ‘babysitter’ organization. They might have control over the larger group of builders, but they simply do not wish to act as neighborhood control. By contrast, around the bonfire, the organization has employed their own (civil) order team for two years now. Everyone has positive experiences with this team, consisting of leading figures from Duindorp itself. Zero incidents have occurred with this team and according to X, they work way more effective than police officers, who are provocative and escalating. The police stays at a distance and the order team controls every situation themselves.

Crisis communication

It all started with Deetman. According to X, Deetman was a proponent of the tradition because he was convinced of the positive influence that a bonfire would have (decreasing disturbances). While he did not experience their mayoralty as a board member, Van Aartsen probably followed this line of arguing. Mayor Krikke has always presented herself in a good manner, but according to X, it probably went wrong in the triangular relationship between the mayor, chief of police and the public prosecutor. Mayor Van Zanen clearly showed a lot of understanding for the organizations. After his appointment, he directly started a conversation and expressed himself in an open way; civilians must have the space to practice their traditions. By contrast, Remkes behaved in a hostile manner, without providing much understanding to the organization. Even when he did communicate with one Duindorper (there is a video of this discussion: Facebook, 2020) he positioned himself in a distant way. The inhabitant indicated that he blames Remkes on his media performance; Remkes contributed to the vilification of Duindorp. If he would have acted with pure intentions, the disturbances would be prevented. In fact, X argues that Remkes deliberately hindered the permit application process of the organizations, because he is involved in the company responsible for the company that was necessary to grant them a nitrogen permit.

Interview with Jan Lautenbach, chairman of *Stichting Wijkoverleg Scheveningen*

Introduction Scheveningen bonfire

The population of Scheveningen is divided regarding the bonfires. In the past, the bonfires were spread across the district, leading to even more damage and trouble. As a solution, the municipality organized a tolerated bonfire on a designated location. In fact, the first location was closer to the harbor (and further from the buildings), so it did not cause a lot of trouble. Suddenly, they changed this location (for vague reasons) into the current location. The municipality totally excluded the residents organization from this decision. When they found out (after contacting the municipality themselves) the new location was too close to the buildings, they immediately protested against this. Lautenbach spoke with the municipality several times, but it did not help much. Only small interventions (like placing fences), were, after several protests implemented in 2015-2016. The covenant proved completely ineffective; builders totally neglected the agreements and the new board did not feel accountable. As a result, the situation totally escalated and dangerous situations arose. The barrels with burning liquid, for example, were placed with the knowledge of the Scheveningen bonfire organization.

Media interventions

The municipality abstains from media attention, according to Lautenbach. As manager of the local newspaper, Lautenbach did not feel heard. For instance, during a press conference, he was treated unfriendly by the Scheveningen organization and he was expelled from the building under police supervision.

Societal interventions

The mayors have been very naïve in their approach, as they were surprised by the fact that the bonfire organizations did not meet the agreements. According to Lautenbach, they never intended to do this in the first place, and the mayors should have known this. To be credible, Krikke should just have prevented the ignition of the bonfires and she should not be surprised that it escalated (as she never acted). Moreover, Lautenbach does also not believe in the notion that the central bonfires prevent the emergence of riots. According to him, there has not been any turmoil at all in Scheveningen and he totally agrees with the policy of Remkes. It would therefore not make sense to allow them in the future. Lautenbach also did not hesitate to deny that the bonfires are a tradition: the central bonfires on the beaches are there since 2013-2014, so we cannot speak of a tradition. Another important reason for the escalation is the lack of cohesive policy between the police, municipality and the fire department. All these parties should have never accepted that the bonfires grew bigger and more dangerous over the years. The citizens have not been taken into account at all, if the bonfire would be located in front of the Kurhaus, it would never be allowed like this. The only law enforcement that Lautenbach was aware of, was the use of private security, which was used from 2015-2016.

Crisis communication

The district council (*Stichting Wijkoverleg Scheveningen*) was totally excluded from the communication. First, the municipality clearly falls short. They did not provide any answers about the location (why did this location

change?) and their argumentation (the old location was too close to the harbor) for their decision was vague, as the Duindorp bonfire was even closer to the harbor. This (the unsubstantiated change of the location) was the biggest mistake, according to Lautenbach. On the other side, the Scheveningen organization also ignored the district council. This lack of communication was not the fault on the district council, as Lautenbach actively contacted both the bonfire organization as the security department of the municipality (and got no response at all). Next to this, the municipality (Krikke, in particular) did also not take their political responsibility for the crisis (what they should have done). It also resented Lautenbach that Krikke first proposed to have the research carried out by the *Instituut voor Fysieke Veiligheid (IFV)*, where she was on the board herself, implying that this would never be an independent research.

Conclusion

Lautenbach has a twofold objection to the situation: the location was wrong and the enforcement and communication were lacking.

Media analysis The Hague

User Name: Steven Siccama

Date and Time: Friday 11 December 2020 21:21:00 CET

Job Number: 132029637

Documents (100)

1. [Geen vreugdevuur in duindorp dit jaar, scheveningen nog onbekend](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media-intervention Remkes: informing that bonfires will probably be cancelled

None of the direct media indicators is relevant

2. [Scheveningen wil groots festival bij vuurstapels](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Societal intervention: the Scheveningen organization themselves call for a festivity as an alternative to the bonfires

3. [Vuurstapel op smaller strand](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Krikke: communicating that the bonfires are becoming dangerous

None of the direct media indicators is relevant

-Societal intervention: Krikke uses leading figures from Scheveningen

4. [Kost vreugdevuur Krikke de kop?](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant, De Telegraaf, de Volkskrant

-No interventions, but Krikke is framed as the responsible actor for the crisis

5. [Straks weer in uw theater: Het House of Cards van Den Haag](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

-No interventions

[6. *De mannen van het vuur*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

-Direct media intervention Van Aartsen: warning for enforcement by riot police

-No right timing

-No positive and de-escalating tone

-The media article uses negative stereotyping of Duindorp

[7. *Afval ligt op straat na brandjes*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

-Direct media intervention Remkes: informing about intervention strategy

-No right timing

-No positive and de-escalating tone

-Revealing too many details of the intervention policy

[8. *Iedereen lijkt blij met 35 meter vreugdevuur*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

-Direct media intervention Van Aartsen: informing about measures and express fear about safety

None of the direct media intervention indicators is relevant

[9. 'Brand in vrede, vreugdevuur'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media-intervention Remkes: communicative (expressing dismay about firework bomb used in the riots)

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Not based on facts and negative stereotyping

[10. Vreugdevuren op losse schroeven](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Municipal Council: informing that bonfires will probably be cancelled

None of the media indicators is relevant

[11. Grote kans op kleine vuurstapels](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Remkes: informing that he will not negotiate about the height of the bonfires

-No positive and de-escalating tone

[12. JANUARI: Vreugdevuur op Scheveningen loopt uit de hand](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

[13. Puinruimen na horrornacht](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Krikke: she directly blames the bonfire organization for the crisis

-No right timing of the responsibility frame (on bonfire organization)

[14. *Het veen voelt zich niet gehoord*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention De Mos: he shows understanding for the anger of the rioters in Duindorp

-No right timing of responsibility frame (on Remkes)

-No de-escalating tone

[15. *In Scheveningen is het grote vingerwijzen begonnen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention of Council Members: blaming Krikke for the crisis

-No right timing of responsibility frame (on Krikke)

16. [Inferno lijkt product van angst en aarzelen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but clearly Krikke is framed as the scapegoat, including poor behavior in other cases

17. [Vreugdevuur in Laak gaat niet door](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Remkes: informing that the bonfires will probably be cancelled

None of the media indicators is relevant

18. [Remkes: schade verhalen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Remkes: informing about the intervention policy

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Negative stereotyping

-Direct media intervention Remkes: calling for society to stand up against the riots

-No undermining media indicators present

19. ['Bestuurlijk handjeclap bij vreugdevuur'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Krikke is framed as the scapegoat (she should have taken her responsibility)

20. [Duindorp op slot, wel iets rustiger](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type
News

Narrowed by
Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

21. [Stapels nooit meer als vanouds](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type
News

Narrowed by
Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Remkes: bonfires will probably be cancelled

None of the indicators is relevant

22. [Vreugdevuur kan Den Haag verzoenen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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Narrowed by
Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Societal intervention: using leading societal figures

According to the article, the key to a safe practice of the bonfire tradition lies in the use of leading societal figures

23. [En weer moet Den Haag zijn traditie opnieuw uitvinden](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Narrowed by
Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

-Societal intervention: using leading societal figures

- According to the article, the key to a safe practice of the bonfire tradition lies in the use of leading societal figures

[24. *Met pannetjes je dak op om het vuur te blussen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Narrowed by
Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Krikke: blaming the bonfire organization

-No right timing of the responsibility frame

[25. *'Duindorp heeft het weer gedaan'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Remkes: a nine year old was arrested on possession of a Molotov cocktail

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Based on premature assumptions

-Societal intervention: the police does preventive searches

-Social movement theory is not kept in mind: local residents speak of escalating policing

[26. *Iedereen lijkt blij met 35 meter vreugdevuur*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

[27. Onrust laait op na verbod vreugdevuur](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Alderman Van Asten: speaks out his dismay about the riots

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Direct media intervention Remkes: the bonfires will probably be cancelled

No relevant media indicators

[28. 'Zijn we helemaal besodemieterd?!](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Remkes: the police must be extremely firm with the rioters

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Direct media intervention Remkes: rioters in Duindorp are walking around with bombs

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Negative stereotyping and the questionable if this statement is based on facts

-Direct media intervention Remkes: informing about the governmental approach (area bans and prolonged prison sentences)

- No right timing
- No de-escalating tone
- Revealing too much details of the intervention strategy

[29. *Bouwers van Scheveningen manen achterban tot rust*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Societal intervention: the bonfire organization of Scheveningen calls his constituency to quit rioting

[30. *Alles is verbrand en roet- zwart in garage De Jong*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but Krikke is blamed for the crisis by inhabitants.

[31. *Bouwers zetten Facebookpagina's op zwart*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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Narrowed by

News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

[32. *Optreden? Of buigen voor de boze burger?*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but the crisis was caused by different authorities (police, fire department and municipality) shifting authorities to each other.

[33. *Knallende 'crematie' van traditie Duindorp*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Communicative intervention: Remkes discusses with an angry proponent of the bonfire organization Duindorp.

[34. *Roep om alsnog vreugdevuren*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention De Mos: he openly blames Remkes for the riots

-No right timing of responsibility frame

-No de-escalating tone

-No right timing

-Societal intervention: local residents have collectively called for rest

[*35. Meer vuurwerk op het strand, minder in stad*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Societal intervention: Van Aartsen agrees to a firework show

[*36. Het Haagse vuur is nog niet gedoofd*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Societal intervention: bonfire organization Scheveningen organized a meeting with concerned civilians

-Communicative intervention: Van Aartsen shared his concerns about the fact that the bonfires were getting larger and larger in 2016

37. [Ook vuur van Duindorp is nu nationaal erfgoed](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type**Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

38. [Burgemeester maakt harde afspraken met bewoners](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type**Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Societal intervention: Van Aartsen used social leaders to arrange safety

Communication intervention: Van Aartsen was the first to make written down agreements with the bonfire organizations

39. [Lezersbrieven](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type**Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but many citizens perceive Krikke as scapegoat

40. [Niemand wil er zijn vingers aan branden](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

No interventions, but Krikke is perceived as the scapegoat

[41. *'Nacht ervoor nog duizenden pallets erbij'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

-Direct media intervention

police: blaming the

municipality

-No right timing of responsibility

frame

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

[42. Duindorp geeft vuur op](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

[43. Streep door Schevenings vreugdevuur](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but information about internal struggle in the bonfire organization

Scheveningen

[44. Schoonmaak na vuren kostte 110.000 euro](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Communication intervention: the municipality publishes the annual costs for the bonfires

[45. 'Ik hou van een grote fik'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Krikke: she likes a big fire, but it must remain within limits

No relevant media indicators

[46. De grote vraag blijft: hoe hoog mogen de vuurstapels worden?](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Communication intervention Van Aartsen: warning the Council that the dangers with the bonfires are increasing

[47. Vuurstapels niet hoger dan 35 meter](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Communicative intervention Van Aartsen: written agreements in covenant

[48. Nieuw onderzoek naar veiligheid vreugdevuren](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Communication intervention Van Aartsen: communicating with the bonfire organizations about the possibilities

[49. Vuurstapels met de hand opgebouwd](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

[50. Druk op burgemeester is enorm](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Direct media intervention Krikke: blames the bonfire organizations for the crisis

No right timing of the responsibility frame

[51. OVV neemt vreugdevuur onder de loep, raad is blij](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Communicative intervention: Remkes uses a discouragement policy to ensure that the bonfires will be cancelled

Krikke gets a scapegoat frame

[52. Overleg over toekomst Haagse vreugdevuren weer uitgesteld](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Van Aartsen: by breaking the agreements, the builders are taking big risks

No relevant media intervention indicators

[53. *Knallende 'crematie' van traditie*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

No interventions, but Remkes is portrayed as the scapegoat

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

[54. *Duindorp gaat voor vuurstapel*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Communicative intervention: Remkes holds to the notion that event permits are needed, even if the bonfires are only 10 metres high

[55. *Branding bij de branding*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

[56. *'In buitenland is vuur wel 50 meter hoog'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Communicative intervention Van Aartsen: the bonfires have become a risk and we need to re-open the discussion with the organizations

[57. *Pauline Krikke ging bewust grens over*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Direct media intervention Council member: only Krikke is responsible for the crisis, not the Council.

-No right timing

-No right timing of responsibility frame

58. [Vergadering vreugdevuur gaat donderdag niet door](#)

Client/Matter: -None-**Search Terms:** vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type****Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but Krikke is portrayed as the scapegoat

59. [Luister naar wat er wordt gezegd in rauw Duindorp](#)

Client/Matter: -None-**Search Terms:** vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type****Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

60. [Afspraken](#)

Client/Matter: -None-**Search Terms:** vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type****Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but Krikke is portrayed as the scapegoat

61. ['Inspectie heeft gefaald'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-**Search Terms:** vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but Krikke is not the only responsible actor

62. ['Ik voel me niet meer veilig, ik wil rust'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

No interventions, but negative stereotyping of Duindorpers

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

63. [Gemeente Den Haag riep vuurregen over zichzelf af](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Societal intervention: when the builders of Duindorp did not hold to the agreements, Krikke stopped the building process of the Duindorp bonfire

[64. *Als burgemeester soms te direct, soms te aarzelend*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention: Krikke held the bonfire organization responsible for the crisis.

-No right timing

-No right timing of responsibility frame

Krikke is portrayed as scapegoat: she tried to hide her mistakes by proposing the IFV (where she was a board member) to perform the investigation

[65. *'Terecht geen vergunning'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No intervention, but the article shows that 75% of the Dutch respondents agrees with Remkes' decision

[66. *Van kerstbomen rauzen tot nationaal aftelmoment*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

[67. *Duindorp staat in vuur en vlam*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Societal intervention: the police is present to do identification checks and searches

-Direct media intervention Remkes: emphasizing that the rioters are irrational and that the police even arrested a child with a Molotov Cocktail

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Negative stereotyping and questionable if this is based on correct assumptions

-Direct media intervention De Mos: call on the rioters to stop and on Duindorp civilians to correct them

No relevant media indicators present

[*68. Net langs de waarheid scheren*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Council member: directly blaming Krikke for the crisis

No right timing of responsibility frame

[69. vuur scheveningen Angst, mevrouw Krikke, is een slechte raadgever](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but Krikke is portrayed as scapegoat

[70. De waarheid, of toch niet helemaal?](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

[71. Het vreugdevuur is heilig john van Zweden](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but John van Zweden, a local person of stature backs Krikke's policy

[72. Brief van de dag Schollekoppen staan achter Remkes](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but local inhabitant backs Remkes

[73. *Den Haag houdt hart vast*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Remkes: informing about the police approach

-No right timing

-Revealing too many details

[74. *'Vanaf nu gaan we echt handhaven'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

Narrowed by

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Krikke: she takes her own political responsibility

-No relevant media indicators

[75. *Jaarwisseling zonder grote problemen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Van Aartsen: giving a general impression of New Year's Eve

No relevant media indicators present

[76. *Kiezen of delen bij vreugdevuur*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Direct media intervention Remkes: he is going to be strict in the negotiations with the bonfire organizations

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

[77. *Krikke: 'We kunnen nu door met kleinere vreugdevuren'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

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Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but Krikke is portrayed as the scapegoat

[78. *Duindorp staat in brand*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions**79. [Stel nou eens echt orde op zaken daar](#)****Client/Matter:** -None-**Search Terms:** vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type****Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-No interventions, but Remkes should act more firmly according to the article**80. [Lezersbrieven](#)****Client/Matter:** -None-**Search Terms:** vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type****Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but Krikke is portrayed as the scapegoat**81. ['De beelden waren angstaanjagend'](#)****Client/Matter:** -None-**Search Terms:** vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type****Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions**82. [Agenten willen gehoord worden](#)****Client/Matter:** -None-**Search Terms:** vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type****Narrowed by**

News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but the article states that there was no unequivocal approach from the authorities (no congruence between the police, municipality and fire department)

83. [Kritiek te over op Krikke](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Direct media intervention

Municipal Council: Krikke is portrayed as the scapegoat

-No right timing

-No right timing of the responsibility frame

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

[84. 'Terugkeer van vuren is zeker mogelijk'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Societal intervention: it is proposed that Remkes helps with fixing a permit, instead of acting as an independent actor (which was an advice of the OVV though)

[85. Stapel mag niet hoger](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Societal intervention Krikke: stopping the supply of pallets to Duindorp

[86. Hoe het vreugdevuur het Waterloo werd van Krikke](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but information about Krikke's failing policy and her previous administrative failures

[87. 'Alles draait om mensen'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Direct media intervention Council member: blaming Krikke for the crisis

[88. 'Het loopt nog eens uit de klauwen'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions.

[89. Angstig Scheveningen overleeft vonkenstorm](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Direct media intervention Krikke: states that she cannot make any statements about the future of the bonfires in this stage

No relevant indicators present

[90. Vreugdevuren zijn bijna onmogelijk geworden](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Remkes: informing that the bonfires will probably be cancelled

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

[91. 'Had nooit zo ver mogen komen' Rapport OVV is duidelijk:](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but Krikke blamed for not enforcing the agreements

[92. Brieven](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions.

[93. *Palletstapelaars willen volgend jaar weer een feestvuur*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions.

[94. *'Regeling wachtgeld zo snel mogelijk aanpassen'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but Krikke is portrayed as the scapegoat

[95. *Vreugdevuur Delft blijft uit*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but it is clear that the crisis in Scheveningen has an impact on other bonfires

[96. *Bom in Duindorp*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

-Direct media intervention Remkes: the rioters are preparing and using bombs against the police

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Negative stereotyping and questionable if based on correct assumptions

[97. *Nederlandse burgemeesters zijn het slachtoffer van de zwarte doos*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions

[98. *Gokken met Haags gemeenschapsgeld*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

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Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

No interventions, but the author blames Van Aartsen for hypocrisy because he published the costs of the municipality on bonfires

[99. *Vreugdevuren zijn in gevaar*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

Direct media intervention: Van Aartsen calls the risks associated with the bonfires unacceptable.

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

[100. Geen vuurstapel in Escamp](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: vreugdevuur and burgemeester and Duindorp or Scheveningen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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News

No interventions

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:

AD/Haagsche Courant,De Telegraaf,de Volkskrant

Media analysis Veen

User Name: Steven Siccama

Date and Time: Sunday 13 December 2020 11:13:00 CET

Job Number: 132097082

Documents (100)

[2. Lakmoesproef 'pact Veen' met oud en nieuw](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

-Communicative intervention Buijserd: the municipality does not clean up the mess and the car wrecks are left on the street

-Societal intervention (using leading figures): Kees Honcoop made a deal with the stokers

[3. Dreigbrief voor eerste burger van Veen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

-No interventions, but Naterop is being threatened personally because of his policy

[4. 'Stoken is geen traditie meer het is jennen'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Naterop: downplaying the incidents and complimenting society for its efforts

-No relevant media indicators present

Societal intervention: local residents organize a party on *Het Kruis*

Societal intervention: massive police deployment

[5. *Verdeeldheid over stoken tijdens jaarwende Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch

Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Communicative intervention Naterop: communication with proponents of stoken

[6. *Legaal auto's stoken in Veen is een optie*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Communicative intervention Naterop: Discussing the possibilities with stokers

Direct media intervention Naterop: emphasizing importance of societal involvement and communication

-No relevant media indicators

[7. *Nieuwjaarsrellen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

-Direct media intervention Naterop: solution must come from society

No relevant media indicators

Buijserd is portrayed as scapegoat (he called Veen a mafia village)

Negative stereotyping of Veen's population

[8. *Veen heeft naasten lief, alleen niet alle naasten*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

No interventions, but Buijserd is portrayed as the scapegoat

[9. *Burgemeester Veen vreesde inzet tank*](#)

-

Client/Matter: -None-**Search Terms:** stoken and burgemeester and Veen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type**

News

Narrowed byTijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf**-Societal intervention Buijserd:****considered using a tank****-Communicative intervention****Buijserd: sending a warning****letter to potential stokers**9. [Burgemeester Veen bedreigd](#)**Client/Matter:** -None-**Search Terms:** stoken and burgemeester and Veen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type****Narrowed by**

|

News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention: Naterop says that he will not be influenced by the anonymous threats

No relevant media indicators

[10. *Burgemeester:Probleem Veen niet overdrijven*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Directe media intervention Naterop: downplaying the incidents

No relevant media indicators

Direct media intervention Naterop: emphasizing that society has played a key role (in correcting troublemakers)

No relevant media indicators

Direct media intervention Naterop: informing about the police approach

-Revealing too many details

[11. *Vandaag meer duidelijkheid 'stoken' Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Societal intervention Naterop: cooperating with representatives of the stokers

[12. *Veen verdeeld over 'traditie' bij jaarwisseling*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot
jan 01, 2020; Bronnen:
Brabants

Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Buijserd: stoken has become too dangerous and the authorities will use camera surveillance

-No right timing

-Revealing too many details

Societal intervention Buijserd: the introduction of a special telephone number to report suspicious activities

Socetal intervention Buijserd: placing road blocks

Societal intervention Buijserd: organizing an alternative festivity

13. *Veen kiest voor vreugdevuur*

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Societal intervention Naterop: festivity on *Kruis* and a large bonfire in a meadow

Communicative intervention Naterop: discussing with proponents of stoken about the options

Direct media intervention Naterop: appeal to societal leaders to ensure a safe New Year's Eve

-No relevant media indicators

14. *En het bleef nog lang rustig in Veen ...slechts één auto ging in vlammen op*

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:**Content Type**

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Naterop: informing about the course of New Year's Eve (giving a general oversight)

-No relevant media indicators

The inhabitants blame the media and police for the escalation

[15. *'Stoken sloopauto's is niet de kop in te drukken'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:**Content Type**

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

-Direct media intervention Naterop: stoken has caused more damage and is unacceptable

-No right timing

Direct media intervention Naterop: calling for societal forces to stand up against stoken

No relevant media indicators

[16. *Aalburg wil snel overleg met stokers Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:**Content Type**

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Buijserd: he calls for a conversation with the hard core stokers

-No de-escalating tone

Moreover, Buijserd states that it is not true that the stokers come from other villages

[17. *Autobrand op kruising Veen tijdens speech burgemeester Naterop*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:**Content Type**

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Naterop: directly calls the stokers to conversate and come out of their anonymity

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

[18. 'Stooktraditie Veen' kost ruim 10 euro per inwoner](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Naterop: he is disappointed in the societal leaders that should have de-escalated the situation

-No right timing

-No right timing for responsibility frame

[19. Rol politiek in kwestie Veen groter](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

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News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Municipal Council: they openly declare to back Buijserd in his policy

-No relevant media indicators

[20. 'Strategie Veen niet opgeven'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Communicative intervention Buijserd: starting a conversation with the hard core stokers

[21. Reldorp Veen is terug bij af](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

-Direct media intervention Naterop: downplaying the incident of 2013

-No right timing

[22. 'Buijserd moet Veen rehabiliteren'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch

No interventions, but **Buijserd is portrayed as a scapegoat who, on purpose, discriminates Veen, giving it a bad reputation**

[23. *Burgemeester Veen vreesde inzet tank*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Communicative intervention Buijserd: sending warning letters to possible troublemakers

[24. *Vete van Veen raakt hele gemeenschap*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

Narrowed by:

Content Type

News

Narrowed by

Tijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

-Direct media intervention police director Smits: we will use harsher punishments for stokers

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-This call is not based on right assumptions

-Direct media intervention Buijserd: call for social control

No relevant indicators

[25. Geen avond over jaarwisseling Veen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

-Direct media intervention Timmermans (an important villager): critique on Naterop (he did never apologize for the incident in 2013)

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

[26. Oproep in Veen om wrakken in brand te blijven steken](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Communicative intervention Naterop: sending a warning letter to known stokers

-Many villagers criticize the intimidating approach of the police

[27. Extra alert op stokers Veen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Direct media intervention Buijserd: help us to arrest the troublemakers

No relevant indicators

[*28. In Veen willen ze het kwaad niet bij naam noemen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Direct media intervention Buijserd: emphasizing the severity of the situation

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Direct media intervention Buijserd: Veen is some kind of Sicilian mafia village where people are silenced by means of threats

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Negative stereotyping and questionable if based on facts

[29. *Brieven \(niet langer dan 200 woorden\) richten aan: Opiniereactie Brabants Dagblad Postbus 235, 5201 HB Den Bosch opiniereactie@brabantsdagblad.nl - LEZERSBRIEVEN*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventions.

[30. *Dick Honcoop kent alle vrijbuiters van Veen - Knokpartijen en feesten eeuwenlang hand in hand*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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h Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Societal intervention: organizing a party on *Het Kruis*

Direct media intervention municipal Council Member Dick Honcoop: he rallies behind

Naterops approach

No relevant media indicators

[31. *De autostokers van Veen laten zich niet lokken*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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h Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Timmermans: call to not communicate with Buijserd (undermining his policy)

-No relevant media indicators

[32. NIEUWJAARSNACHT Onderzoek naar mogelijkheid feest op hèt kruispunt - Nieuwe aanpak oud en nieuw in Veen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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h Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Communicative intervention Naterop: communicating with a working group of stokers to find a solution

[33. Zwijgen is goud in 'maffiadorp' Veen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventions, but information about the incident in 2013: the government did not handle the situation properly and they can expect heavy damage claims

[34. *ME maakt einde aan weer onrustige jaarwisseling in Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Naterop: speaking out about the incidents

-No right timing

[35. *Geen stoken en hoken bij welkomstavond in badkuip*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventions.

[36. *Werkgroep Veen moet onrust voorkomen;Van onze verslaggever*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Societal intervention Naterop: a civil working group from Veen wil work on a safe New Year's Eve

-Direct media intervention Naterop: calling out to media to think about their responsibility in the situation

No relevant media indicators

37. [Straatoorlog in Veen nadert climax 'Een Veener heeft nog nooit een Veener verraden'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Societal intervention Buijserd: street ban from 22:30 until 5:00 on New Year's Eve on Het Kruis

Direct media intervention Buijserd: tackling stoken is difficult because there is a blame culture

-No de-escalating tone

-No right timing

38. [LEZERSBRIEVEN - Brieven \(niet langer dan 200 woorden\) richten aan: Opinieredactie Brabants Dagblad Postbus 235, 5201 HB Den Bosch opinieredactie@brabantsdagblad.nl](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

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No interventions, but the communication with representatives of the stoken also leads to anger among some of the civilians

[39. Veen: prettige jaarwisseling](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Naterop: he is open to communication with the stokers

-No relevant media indicators

[40. Onrust in Gorinchem en autobranden in Veen - Mobiele Eenheid in actie tegen brandstichtende jeugd](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Naterop: it is a shame that the riot police had to be used

-No right timing

[41. Geen extra menskracht voor aanpak Veen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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sch

No interventions, but Buijserd mentions that it is not possible to expand the security apparatus (due to financial reasons)

[42. *Werkgroep tevreden over viering Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Societal intervention Naterop:
organizing a party (which did not
work though)

[43. *Veen in spanning voor oud en nieuw*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Societal intervention: Kees Honcoop makes a pact with the stokers (which did not work)

Direct media intervention Buijserd: stokers should clean up the car wrecks themselves

No relevant media indicators

[43. *Inwoners Veen over jaarwisseling : 'Schuld van de burgemeester!'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

No interventions, but Buijserd is portrayed as the scapegoat

[44. *'Escalatiespiraal in Veen doorbreken'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Communicative intervention Naterop: communicating with the stokers

[45. *Burgemeester Fons Naterop weet het: 'Veen wil dit niet'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention: Naterop states that Veen does not want these riots to happen

-No right timing

[46. *Naterop zwijgt nog over aanpak in Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Naterop: the municipality will leave the car wreck for one day but he does not reveal any further details on his approach

-No relevant media indicators

[47. *Aalburg doet niks met brief stoken*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention, Naterop states that the anonymous threats will not influence his policy

No relevant indicators

[48. 'Feest en ijsbaan in Veen kunnen brandstichting niet tegengaan'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Societal intervention: organizing an alternative festivity (which did not prove effective)

[49. Die incidenten maken Aalburg niet crimineel](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Direct media intervention Naterop: relativize the seriousness of the incidents and call on society to assist him

No relevant media indicators present

[50. 'Ik pieker er niet over, het gaat gewoon door'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Communicative intervention Buijserd: speaking with stokers (not effective because there is no room for negotiation)

[51. *Inwoners Veen geschokt na nieuwe dreigbrief; 'Verschrikkelijk dat burgemeester zo wordt bejegend'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

No interventions, but local residents speak out against the stokers and the threats against

Naterop

[52. *'Laat nou gewoon een paar wrakken uitbranden'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Communicative intervention Buijserd: speaking with important stokers (which did not work because stokers feel that they will be criminally prosecuted when they express themselves as stokers)

-Societal intervention Timmermans: just allow one or two car wrecks

[53. *'Buijserd begrijpt niet dat Veen Veen is'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-No interventions, but Buijserd is portrayed as a scapegoat

[54. *Camera's in strijd tegen uitwassen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Buijserd: informing that they will be using camera surveillance to identify stokers

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

-Revealing too much details

Communicative intervention Buijserd: sending potential troublemakers a warning letter

[56. Aalburg brandt zich steeds opnieuw aan vreugdevuur](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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sch Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

-Societal interventions: prohibition on gathering

-Naterop is not clear in his communication (stoken is sometimes permitted, sometimes tolerated or sometimes something in between)

[57. 'Dapper hoor, zo'n anonieme brief'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventions, but a party does not work

[58. *Stokers slaan alsnog bres in Veense vesting*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Societal intervention Buijserd: camera surveillance and riot police

[59. *De schroeiplekken van Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Naterop has lost a lot of confidence from society with his approach towards the riots in 2013 (by stating that the police handled correctly)

-Direct media intervention Council Member Timmermans: critique on Naterops policy of 'zero-tolerance'

-No right timing of responsibility frame

-Direct media intervention Naterop: announce media silence

No relevant media indicators

[60. *Mini-interview: Overhandiging steunbetuiging aan F. Buijserd*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

No interventions, but a statement of support towards Buijserd after he was threatened and his cars were lit

[61. *Onrust Veen verder opgestookt*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Communicative intervention Naterop: sending warning letters to potential troublemakers (of which Aalburgse Alliantie states that this is an escalating move)

-Communicative intervention Naterop: giving a New Year's 'crisis speech' (which only provoked more stoken)

-Direct media intervention SGP (the biggest party in Aalburg): they rally behind Naterop's policy

No relevant media indicators

[62. *Nieuwjaar Langstraat vrij rustig*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Naterop: he regrets the fact that stoken remains a problem but states that they will not change the approach of de-escalation

No relevant media indicators

[64. *Vuurtje in Veen laait op*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Naterop: he speaks directly to the stokers: come out of the anonymity

-No de-escalating tone

-No right timing

Direct media interventions Council member Timmermans: Naterop, please allow stoken on a regulated base (Naterop is now responsible for the trouble)

-No right timing of responsibility frame

[63. *Tips uit Veense bevolking helpen politie*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Societal interventions Buijserd: car searches, preventive searching and identification controls

[65. *Veel wild geraas bij inwoners van Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Many villagers are angry about the restraining order of Buijserd

[66. *'Ik dacht nooit, krijg allemaal de rambam'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventions.

[67. *Naterop tevreden over Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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-Direct media intervention Naterop: giving a general impression of New Year's Eve

No relevant media indicators

-Direct media intervention Naterop: no excuse for the incident in 2013

No de-escalating tone

-Direct media intervention Naterop: emphasizing the importance of society in tackling stoken

No relevant media indicators

[68. *Actie Buijserd krijgt volop steun*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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No interventions, but the threats towards Buijserd lead to a lot of support statements for Buijserd

[69. *'In Veen wonen mensen die wars zijn van regels'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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No interventions

[70. Rust lijkt terug in Veen na excuses](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Naterop: the police acted properly during the incident in 2013

-No right timing

This incident and the fact that Naterop immediately stated that the police acted right caused a lot of anger

[71. 'Actie voor Buijserd toch zinvol'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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No intervention, but concerned civilians started an initiative of support towards Buijserd

[72. 'Begrip in Veen voor maatregelen oud en nieuw'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Naterop: 96 percent of Veens civilians is against stoken, so we will eventually come to a solution

No relevant media indicators

Societal intervention Naterop: Het Kruis is a risk area with preventive searches

Communicative intervention Naterop: speaking with the football club and with important figures from Veen

[73. *'Waarom heeft zo'n knappe vent nog geen meid'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventions.

[74. *Veen weet wie de stokers zijn*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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Communicative intervention Buijserd: trying to communicate with the stokers

[75. *Fons Naterop sprak ouders aan als een echte burgervader*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventions

[76. *Stoken auto s begon eind jaren 70*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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**Direct media intervention Naterop: he says nothing about the criminal prosecution of Ab
Bouman, Council member of AA**

No relevant media indicators

[77. *In Veen worden auto's steeds eerder in brand gestoken*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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No intervention, but the article speaks of cars while it are actually wrecks (negative stereotyping)

[78. OUDEJAARSVANDALISME 'Gezellig slopen' verworpen tot dorpsterreur - Veen knalt en brandt al sinds oktober](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

No interventions, but stoken is exacerbated in the article (negative stereotyping)

[79. door Brigit Groeneveld - Brand in Veen is nog lang niet geblust - ANALYSE](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Naterop: call towards stokers to come out of their anonymity and communicate with him

No right timing

No de-escalating tone

[80. Brief Veen over oud en nieuw](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Buijserd: informing about the measures (parking prohibition and an area ban) and calling people to stay away from Veen

-No de-escalating tone

[81. *Veen oogt als een belegerde vesting*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

No interventions and the article argues for more severe measures

[82. *Feest of niet, de Veense stokers slaan weer toe*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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sch Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Societal intervention Naterop: organizing festivities (which also does not work)

[83. *Werkstraf voor geweld bij rel Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Communicative intervention Buijserd: he tries to communicate with the stokers (which did not work)

[84. *Rust lijkt terug in aangeslagen Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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-Communicative intervention Naterop: leaving the car wrecks for a couple of days

-Societal intervention Naterop: placing camera systems

[85. *'Politie heeft steeds meer mogelijkheden'*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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Direct media intervention Naterop: the police has new methods to locate stoking wrecks

-Too many details

[86. *Buijserd hoopt op initiatief uit Veen*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventions.

Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

[87. Een wapenstilstand met kerst? Niet in Veen.](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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Tijdlijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Buijserd: it is a shame that Veen uses Christmas night to provoke me, even in war zones they respect an armistice

-No de-escalating tone

Communicative intervention Buijserd: not cleaning the car wrecks

[88. 'Red traditie autobranden Veen'](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

Search Type: Terms and Connectors

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No interventions.

[89. Smeekbede om aangiftes uit Veen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Buijserd: call for society to stand up against stoken

No relevant media indicators

[90. NIEUWJAARSNACHT Verdachten geven hun visie op de rellen - Stoker mijdt oudjaar in Veen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventuions

[91. *Veense jeugd krijgt legaal vreugdevuur; Van onze verslaggever*](#)

Client/Matter: -None-**Search Terms:** stoken and burgemeester and Veen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type****Narrowed by**

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Societal intervention Naterop: an alternative bonfire

[92. Arrestanten 'Veen' nog vast](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

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Direct media intervention Naterop: he hopes the troublemakers will be severely punished

-No right timing

-No de-escalating tone

[93. Autobrand op berucht kruispunt](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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No interventions.

[94. Van Loon bedankt de bedreiger](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

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No interventions.

[95. Kritiek uit Veen roept reacties op](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Narrowed byTijdslijn: jan 01, 2003 tot jan 01, 2020; Bronnen: Brabants
Dagblad,AD/Rivierenland,BN/DeStem,Reformatorisch
Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf**No interventions, but citizens speak out their support for Buijserd**[*96. Intensief overleg oud en nieuw - Geen legaal vreugdevuur meer in Veen*](#)**Client/Matter:** -None-**Search Terms:** stoken and burgemeester and Veen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

Direct media intervention Naterop: informing about measures**-Revealing too much information**[97. Aanloop naar jaarwisseling Veen stuk rustiger dan vorig jaar](#)**Client/Matter:** -None-**Search Terms:** stoken and burgemeester and Veen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type**

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Communicative intervention Buijserd: he invited stokers for a conversation**Direct media intervention Buijserd: announcing a media silence****-No relevant indicators**[98. Geen millimeter ruimte voor stokers Veen](#)**Client/Matter:** -None-**Search Terms:** stoken and burgemeester and Veen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type**

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Societal intervention Buijserd: prohibition of gathering[99. OUDEJAAR VEEN Elf verdachten vandaag voor de rechter - Slotstuk van Veens 'feestje'](#)**Client/Matter:** -None-**Search Terms:** stoken and burgemeester and Veen**Search Type:** Terms and Connectors**Narrowed by:****Content Type**

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Dagblad,de Volkskrant,De Telegraaf

No interventions.

[100. Politie schermt met forse straffen in Veen](#)

Client/Matter: -None-

Search Terms: stoken and burgemeester and Veen

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Direct media intervention Municipal Council: we rally behind Buijserd (strengthening his position)

No relevant media indicators