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Willingly working together

An analysis of drivers and principles of the willingness to cooperate in a collaborative governance structure

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1. Introduction

Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the Madrid train bombings in 2004, terrorism and implementing counterterrorism measures have been topics of debate in Western parliaments. The Netherlands is no exception in this regard. In response to the rising threat of terrorist attacks on Dutch soil, the 'National Coordinator for Counterterrorism' (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding*, NCTb) was appointed in 2004, followed by the official launch of his organization in 2005. Subsequently, the NCTb implemented the 'Alert System for Counterterrorism' (*Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding*, ATb) in the same year. This system aimed to connect public agencies with relevant actors from private sectors which are vital for the continuity of the Dutch society and other private sectors which entail attractive targets for terrorist attacks (NCTV, 2019, August 14, Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding, https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/atb). At the start of the implementation of the system, there were four sectors involved: the Port of Rotterdam, Schiphol Airport, the drinking water sector, and the railway sector. During the subsequent years, several other sectors were integrated into the system. In 2012, the NCTb was transformed into the 'National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism' (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*, NCTV). The NCTV, as the NCTb's successor, continued participating in the ATb.

The ATb intended to combine the efforts of public actors and private sectors in counterterrorism and to make them share this burden. This change of responsibilities has been defined as the responsibilization strategy. David Garland (1996, p. 452) introduced this process and explained that—as part of the responsibilization strategy—some governments are changing their role as they are not directly seeking to control crimes, but they rather seek to indirectly push societal actors to participate in the crime control process. Although Garland's focus was on the British government, the application and implications of his theory is not necessarily limited to the United Kingdom. The transformation of the British government's role raised new questions on security, as Garland (1996, p. 454) rightly stated, with the government experimenting with controlling crime from a distance. The role of private companies also changed due to the implementation of the responsibilization strategy as they became active participants in the crime control process. Moreover, this changing role of private companies had an impact on the relationship between the government and private companies, as the former actively sought partnerships with the latter in the security domain.

The core ambition of the ATb was to make agreements in the area of counterterrorism between the government and private sectors. It can therefore be seen as a prime example of the responsibilization strategy. Similar to other examples of agreements between the government and private actors, the ATb can be classified as a collaborative governance structure. Garland (1996) wrote about the actions of the government in applying the responsibilization strategy and establishing collaborative governance structures. He was the first to identify the responsibilization strategy and his focus was on crime control. After Garland's identification of the responsibilization strategy, it received more attention and more scholars studied the concept. Building on Garland's work as well as research from other scholars, this research aims to analyze counterterrorism policies, and more specifically the ATb, in the Netherlands against the background of the responsibilization strategy.

The ATb was founded after 1996, the year of Garland's publication on the responsibilization strategy. Therefore, it is relevant to research what the incentives of the government in more recent times have been with regard to collaborative governance structures in general. Furthermore, due to the rising threat of terrorism since the beginning of the century, as perceived by Western lawmakers and authorities, it is relevant to research what the incentives of the government have been with regard to collaborative governance structures focused on counterterrorism in particular. Besides, while Garland's analysis focused on the perspective of the government, the role of private companies has substantially changed due to the implementation of the responsibilization strategy as they became deeply involved in the crime control process. This perspective was not researched by Garland. On an academic level, it is therefore interesting to closely examine this perspective as well. Hence, this study also aims to analyze the perspective of private actors and to assess which drivers contribute to their willingness to cooperate in a collaborative governance structure focused on security issues. Thus, the central research question of this paper is: *How do different drivers have an impact on the willingness to cooperate of the government and private companies in participating in a collaborative governance structure?*

To answer this central research question, the ATb is used as a case study. Although partnerships between public and private actors had been in place before 1996, many more collaborative governance structures have been established since then. Hence, the ATb is certainly not the only collaborative governance structure. According to a governmental study (Traag and De Wit, 2016, p. 23), the number and the magnitude of collaborative governance structures is in fact still growing and expanding. They concluded that there is a shift of power

and control arising due to this development. The private sector is invited by the government in an attempt to reach public goals, but at the same time the private sector may also obtain control over the decision-making process. Therefore, the research question is relevant not only from an academic point of view, but also from a societal perspective as the involvement of private companies in public decision-making processes could greatly affect society.

The ATb is selected as the case study of this research, because it is an example of a long-term partnership between the government and the private sector. As explained, the ATb was implemented in the year after the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Since its implementation, more sectors have been incorporated into the ATb. In 2018, the ATb was subjected to an extensive reform, which is sometimes referred to as the 'ATb Update 2018' (NCTV, 2018) and which shall be named the 'ATb 2.0' in this paper (in accordance with the name used by some participants). While the ATb 2.0 has the same objective as the ATb's original version, the update was implemented to link the ATb with the existing crisis management structure in the Netherlands (NCTV, 2018). The renewal of the ATb would suggest that both the Dutch government and private actors still have a (strong) willingness to cooperate 14 years after the original implementation. However, this assumption cannot necessarily be accepted as the renewal could also indicate the opposite; perhaps it was merely a political gesture to the public or even a final convulsion of a dying system. In the absence of any firm conclusion, it is therefore relevant to investigate whether there still is a willingness to cooperate in the ATb, and if so, which factors played and continue to play a role in this regard.

The answers to this assessment can provide relevant insights into the willingness to cooperate of the two types of actors—i.e. those operating in the public and private spheres—with respect to one of the most important functions of any government, which is to provide security to its citizens. In addition, developing an understanding would be in line with a strong call for transparency of collaborative governance structures by Member of Parliament Chris van Dam. He specifically raised questions on the role of private security companies in response to concerns over whether the interests and rights of citizens are safeguarded by these non-governmental actors (Van Keken and Kuijpers, 2020).

This chapter stressed the importance and relevance of the research topic. Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework of this research, which entails an analysis of Garland's responsibilization strategy and an explanation of the concept of collaborative governance structures. Chapter 3 explains the case study design and the research methods of this paper. Chapter 4 discusses the ATb as a case study. This case study starts with a general overview of

the ATb as a collaborative governance structure. Following this, the ATb will be subdivided into two separate case studies: one focusing on the governmental side and the other one on the private sector. This chapter ends with a comparison of these two cases, followed by an analysis. Finally, chapter 5 presents concluding remarks.

2. Theoretical framework

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework which stands central in the research. The first section of this chapter will further explore the aforementioned responsibilization strategy and illustrate the strategy through the example of policing. A proper explanation of this strategy will help to explain this research's key concept of collaborative governance, which will subsequently be done, as the latter could not have emerged without the former. The second section will not only define collaborative governance, but also define (closely) related concepts as well as discuss the process(es) of creating a collaborative governance structure. The third section will explore and discuss the motivations of members of collaborative governance structures, which will be referred to as the 'drivers for the willingness to cooperate'. The fourth and final section will discuss the so-called 'principles of willingness to cooperate', which are directly influenced by the drivers and, in their turn, have a direct influence on the willingness to cooperate.

2.1 Responsibilization strategy and policing

Providing and safeguarding a system of law and order is one of the basic functions of a government (Hughes, 2018, p. 21). Although this task is the same for every government, its execution may differ strongly from government to government and can also be reformed over time by a government. Garland (1996) researched British crime control policies. He identified that the traditional strategy of the government—referred to as 'sovereign crime control'—was to control crime through direct control imposed by state agencies such as the police, judiciary, and social work organizations (Garland, 1996, p. 452). The government was the only actor to control crime and civilians were exclusively perceived as potential suspects of crimes. Garland (1996, p. 446) stated that since high crime rates became normalized in most western societies at a certain time, governments had to find new strategies to control these crime rates.

Since the traditional strategy of sovereign crime control was ineffective, the British government implemented new strategies to mitigate the rising crime rates. The other strategies used by the British government in crime control, which were identified by Garland, were responsibilization, defining deviance down, redefining organizational success (collectively, referred to as so-called 'adaptive strategies'), and the punitive sovereign response (referred to as a 'strategy of denial'). Garland defined the responsibilization strategy as "the central government seeking to act upon crime not in a direct fashion through state agencies (police, courts, prisons, social work, etc.) but instead by acting indirectly, seeking to activate action on

the part of non-state agencies and organizations" (1996, p. 452). Such non-state agencies and organizations may include private companies and societal institutions. The goal is that society shares the responsibility to control the crime rate, meaning it is not only up to the government. If a government implements the responsibilization strategy, it seeks to transform societal relationships. The government's message to society is that it cannot stop crime on its own and needs help from private companies, societal institutions, and ordinary citizens.

The shift from the sovereign crime control approach to the responsibilization strategy has also revealed itself in policing. Maintaining the social order and crime control is the main goal of policing, which in itself has always been considered a function exclusively allocated to the police (Wakefield, 2003, p. 3-4). In similar fashion, Button (2019, p. 10) explained that maintaining the social order is the primary function of the police. In order to fulfill these goals, different tasks can be executed. By way of example, the Dutch safety region Hollands Midden identified seven policing tasks. Five of these tasks were seen as part of the function to maintain the social order, which were: law enforcement, criminal investigations, traffic management, guarding/protection, and intervention. The other two tasks—information gathering and administrative and technical assistance—were labeled as support tasks (Veiligheidsregio Hollands Midden, n.d., p. 3).

Referring back to Garland's views, maintaining social order and crime control were thus primarily or exclusively functions for the police, a typical characteristic of the traditional strategy. Pursuant to responsibilization, a growing role of the private sector has resulted in a substantial increase of policing tasks by private companies. For example, private security services company G4S entered into an agreement with the Dutch city of Almere which not only made the company responsible for camera surveillance on industrial sites, but also obliged G4S to provide 55 'community service officers' (*buitengewoon opsporingsambtenaren*, BOAs) who would patrol the streets of Almere (Van Keken and Kuijpers, 2020). Both G4S' camera surveillance as well as the duties of its BOAs evidently overlapped with the aforementioned policing tasks, in particular law enforcement, traffic management, and information gathering.

With regard to the adoption of policing tasks by private companies, Chaiken and Chaiken (1987, p. 8-10) identified four mechanisms which can be used by the government. The first mechanism is the 'default transfer'. This means that if the police is unable to carry out a task, a private actor will take over the responsibility of the task. The second mechanism is 'accommodation and cooperation'. Chaiken and Chaiken defined it as the police informally

allowing private actors to execute policing tasks, which itself does not desire to perform. The third mechanism is legislation. Under this mechanism, the government grants private security companies a special legal status to maintain the order. Chaiken and Chaiken's fourth and final mechanism is privatization through contracts. With this mechanism, private companies receive the responsibility to carry out tasks through contracts with the government.

2.2 Collaborative governance structures

Having established the responsibilization strategy and its implementation with respect to policing tasks, it is now possible to closely examine the concept of collaborative governance structures in general. According to Zhang and Preece (2011, p. 46-47), collaborative governance structures have been studied by multiple scholars, who have essentially analyzed the concept through four theories. The first theory is game theory. This explains that interactions between actors are established because cooperation could result in mutual benefits for all parties, which cannot be achieved without such cooperation. The transaction cost theory is the second theory. The key notion from this theory is that organizations will work together from a self-interested point of view and will try to reduce their own costs to achieve their own goals. The third theory is the resource dependence theory, which entails that cross-boundary cooperation is needed to solve organizational problems, because without the resources of other stakeholders the problem cannot be solved. The fourth and final theory is the governance and network theory (Zhang and Preece, 2011, p. 47). This theory describes that the boundaries between the public, private, and social sectors are blurring, which started with the government outsourcing public functions to non-public organizations. The governance and network theory also considers collaborative governance structures as the answer to the emergence of 'wicked problems' (Zhang and Preece, 2011, p. 47). Such problems require a stakeholder to borrow expertise from other stakeholders to face them (Zhang and Preece, 2011, p. 47). Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 160-167) were the first to introduce the concept of wicked problems and identified the following ten primary characteristics:

1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem;
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule;
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad;
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem;
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a "one-shot operation"; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly;

6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan;

7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique;

8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem;

9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution;

10. The planner has no right to be wrong.

Scharmer's research further explored the issue of problems and their levels of complexity, which might provide a better understanding of the role of complexity within wicked problems and produce more workable and practical criteria which can be applied later in this research on the identified wicked problem(s). According to Scharmer (2016, p. 57-60), organizations and institutions nowadays face new levels of complexity with regard to problems. More specifically, complexity can be categorized into three types. They can be dynamic, social, and emerging. Dynamic complexity occurs in relation to a cause and effect relationships, in which there is a systematic distance or delay in space or time between these two elements (Scharmer, 2016, p. 57). Social complexity is caused by a situation where stakeholders have different interests and perspectives. Emerging complexity can be identified by three characteristics: the solution of the problem is unknown, the problem statement keeps changing, and it is unclear who the important stakeholders are. Based on this distinction, wicked problems seem to be closely related to the last type of complex problems: emerging complex problems. This research will mainly rely on the governance and network theory, and in particular the concept of wicked problems, to assess the willingness to operate within the framework of the ATb.

Before the implementation of the responsibilization strategy and the emergence of collaborative governance structures, public organizations carried out the actions of the government and private actors had only limited roles in governmental processes (Donahue and Zeckhauser, 2011, p. 8-9). Nowadays, the role of the private sector has grown in this regard (in the US, which was the focus of Donahue and Zeckhauser's research, as well as arguably a number of other countries like the Netherlands), as has the type of interactions between private and public actors, both as a consequence of the implementation of the responsibilization strategy. Private companies increasingly provide services for the public

cause (Donahue and Zeckhauser, p. 9). On a general note, the cooperation between public and private companies has been referred to as collaborative governance. To understand this form of cooperation between public and private actors, the concept of collaborative governance should be further defined.

The concept consists of two words. The definition of 'collaborative' is that two or more parties are working together. Stoker (2019, p. 19) referred to governance as "a complex set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government". Thus, private actors can be involved in the governance process. By this definition, governance virtually encompasses all initiatives which directly and indirectly involve the government.

According to Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 547), the concept of collaborative governance has become known as a concept which can be used to define the cooperation between private and public stakeholders and explain how they work together as a group. They identified six cumulative criteria which have to be met for the existence of collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash, 2007, p. 544-545). The first criterion is that the structure is initiated by the government. The next two criteria are that non-state actors are included in the structure and that these non-state actors are involved in the decision-making process. The fourth criterion is that the structure is organized to achieve a collective cause. The last two criteria are that the actors of the structure try to make their decisions by consensus and the focus of the collaboration lies in serving the public. Ansell and Gash's definition is clear, but they also recognized that the broadness of the concept's definition is something which could cause debate among scholars. Similarly, Emerson et al. used a broad definition. They defined collaborative governance as "the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished" (2012, p. 2).

The above two definitions differ with each other in terms of elaborateness and specificities. Yet, two common characteristics can be found in both definitions. First of all, collaborative governance cannot exist without the involvement of at least one public actor and one private actor. While multiple governmental agencies and multiple private actors may be involved, a collaborative governance structure has to include at least one of both types of actors in order to qualify as such. Secondly, the collaboration must serve a public cause. The private companies involved strive for, alongside the governmental agencies, a goal of public interest.

It is therefore necessary to draw a clear distinction between public and private stakeholders. The difference between these two types of stakeholders and their responsibilities in providing security has been subject to much debate by scholars. An example of such a distinction was given by Van Steden (2015, p. 179). He explained that public stakeholders are responsible for maintaining the public order of society, which he contrasted with the private stakeholders' responsibilities for maintaining the so-called 'business order'. Unlike the public order, the business order is more narrowly delineated. First, it is restricted in terms of sector. For instance, a railway company's responsibilities do not extend beyond any aspects outside the railway sector. Second, private stakeholders' responsibilities are in principle restricted to their premises. Hence, private stakeholders share a reasonable part of the responsibilities for maintaining order.

The concept of collaborative governance has not only been defined in various ways by different authors, there are also a number of other concepts which are either synonyms or closely related. Some of these concepts can be seen as a specific form of collaborative governance. According to Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 546), the concept 'corporatism' is often used as a synonym. They argued, however, that this concept is in fact a particular form of collaborative governance, as it emphasizes the relations and agreements between labor unions, corporations, and the state.

Another synonym used for collaborative governance is public-private partnerships (PPPs). Traag and De Wit (2016), for example, relied on the term PPPs in their study into the participation of private stakeholders in these structures, though their definition of PPPs essentially mirrors the above definitions of collaborative governance. Beisheim and Campe (2012) also used the term PPPs in their research. According to both pairs of authors, PPPs rely on the involvement of both public and private stakeholders, who collectively pursue one or more goals in the public interest. Their understandings of PPPs thus embodied definitions which are similar to the concept of collaborative governance.

Therefore, this research considered (different definitions of) PPPs as synonyms for collaborative governance. The concept of collaborative governance will be used throughout this paper, even though other authors may have used PPPs. Since the definitions of this concept largely overlap with the common characteristics of a collaborative governance structure, the exact differences between the definitions are beyond the scope of this research.

Having established the definition of collaborative governance, it is subsequently imperative to examine the process of creating a collaborative governance structure. Similar to the concept of collaborative governance, authors have approached the process of creating a collaborative governance structure in different ways. However, unlike collaborative governance, it is more difficult to establish similarities between the different approaches focused on the process of creating a collaborative governance structure as these approaches do not necessarily overlap.

For instance, Emerson et al. (2012, p. 20) asserted that a collaborative governance structure is developed within a context of a system that is derived from societal influences. A collaborative structure needs to have three components: principled engagement, shared motivation, and a capacity for joint action. Principled engagement entails the interaction of discovery, definition, deliberation, and determination. Shared motivation refers to trust, mutual understanding, internal legitimacy, and shared commitment. Capacity for joint action includes procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and resources. These components interact with each other which may result in collaborative action.

Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 547) distinguished two patterns of policymaking which could lead to collaborative governance. The first pattern is known as 'adversarialism'. This stems from stakeholders' perceptions of being in competition with each other. In other words, a stakeholder considers another stakeholder to be their opponent. This can be the starting point for collaborative governance as the aim of policymakers will be to turn these adversarial feelings into cooperation between the stakeholders through collaborative initiatives. Collaboration can be formed by stakeholders when they engage in positive-sum bargaining with each other. The second pattern is known as 'managerialism'. When this pattern is applied in the policymakers' decision-making process, public agencies will rely heavily on the opinions of experts and will consult other stakeholders, either public or private, before taking a decision. This approach qualifies as collaborative governance as soon as the stakeholders will have a direct role in the process.

The development of a collaborative governance structure is often described as a development of stages (Ansell and Gash, 2007, p. 557). Gray (1989, p. 57) identified three stages of development. The first one is the stage in which the stakeholders identify the problem, which includes finding a common definition of the problem, agreeing on a commitment to collaborate, identifying the stakeholders, establishing the legitimacy of the stakeholders, and determining the available resources. The second stage focuses on direction setting, which means to establish the ground rules, to set the agenda, to organize subgroups, to conduct joint

information searches, to explore options, and to reach an agreement and close the deal. The third and final stage entails the actual implementation of the collaborative governance structure, based on the inputs gathered during the first two steps. More specifically, this involves dealing with constituencies, building external support, structuring the collaboration, and monitoring the agreement as well as ensuring compliance with it.

In a similar manner, Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, p. 94-133) divided the development of collaborative governance into three stages: a prenegotiation phase, a negotiation phase, and an implementation phase. The prenegotiation phase is the phase which deals with getting the collaborative governance structure started, the selection of the stakeholders, establishing ground rules, and creating a collective information image. The negotiation phase includes the envisionment of solutions by each stakeholder, finding agreement on solutions, drafting an agreement, and binding the stakeholders to the agreement until the ratification, which is the last step of this phase. The third and final phase, the implementation phase, describes the transformation from the agreement to formal processes, monitoring of the implementation, and creating a platform for renegotiation.

Edelenbos (2005, p. 118) also defined the development of a collaborative governance structure as a three-stage process, though he subdivided each step into several stages. The first stage is the preparatory stage, which consists of two steps. The first step entails that the participants consult with each other through bilateral talks, followed by a second step which requires the establishment of a project group in charge of starting the preparation of the collaboration. The second stage is called the policy development stage, which starts with the problem analysis as a first step. This step is followed by the establishment of a joint problem definition. This is in contrast to Gray's development of stages as she regards the problem definition as the *first* stage of the collaborative process. A possible explanation for this difference is that Edelenbos' breakdown of stages is more elaborated than Gray's approach. The final steps of the second stage are the solution-oriented phase and the presentation of the policy proposal. The third stage is the decision-making stage, which contains the preparation of the decision-making and the actual decision-making.

According to Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 557-558), the above three models have an important characteristic in common. Instead of depicting collaborative processes as being linear in nature, they considered all three of them to be cyclical. As part of a cyclical process, the different elements of a collaborative governance structure, including its outcome, will therefore influence each other.

2.3 Identifiable drivers for the willingness to cooperate

The process of creating a collaborative governance structure says little to nothing about the actual reasons of the stakeholders involved to become participants in these structures. Therefore, this section will explore and discuss the drivers for the willingness to cooperate, which refers to the motivations of members of collaborative governance structures to participate in such structures.

Collaborative governance structures are built, to a large degree, on voluntary participation (Ansell and Gash, 2007, p. 552). In other words, stakeholders should be willing to join collaborative governance structures, without any force imposed by a government or any other external actor. The drivers contributing to the (voluntary) willingness to cooperate within the context of collaborative governance structures have been studied by multiple scholars. These studies identified some identical or broadly similar drivers contributing to the willingness to cooperate, though some drivers were merely identified by one or a few, and certainly not all, studies. Hence, it is necessary to discuss some different studies in order to determine which drivers contribute to the willingness to cooperate.

Emerson et al. (2012, p. 9-10) identified four main drivers that influence actors to work with other actors within the framework of collaborative governance: leadership, consequential incentives, interdependence, and uncertainty. Leadership, as the first main driver, entails that without a leader, a party which initiates and supports cooperation between the private and public actors, a structure of collaborative governance cannot exist. The willingness of the leader is therefore vital. Besides, a leader should also be able to provide, at least some of, the financial costs and other resources necessary to start the collaboration. Consequential incentives, the second main driver, refers to the existence of internal and/or external push factors which contribute to the willingness to cooperate. Both internal factors, such as a lack of resources, as well as external factors, such as crises and threats, could likewise 'push' an actor towards cooperation with others. The third main driver, interdependence, entails the realization of a stakeholder that it needs to collaborate with other stakeholders to fulfil a specific goal. Uncertainty, the last main driver, may be the result of the aforementioned wicked problems. Similar to Zhang and Preece's aforementioned definition, Emerson et al. considered a wicked problem one that is almost impossible to solve due to its complexity. This may cause uncertainty. In turn, this can result in collaborations between parties, because stakeholders want to share the risk caused by the wicked problem.

Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 550-553) also identified multiple drivers, or "incentives", for participation in a collaborative governance structure, but they group or subdivide some of these drivers, as opposed to merely listing them, in order to demonstrate the relationships between (sets of) drivers. They first note that some so-called "starting conditions" may encourage or discourage cooperation between public and private actors at the outset of the collaboration. These three starting conditions are possible imbalances between the resources or power of different stakeholders, the incentives that stakeholders may have to collaborate, and the past history of conflict or cooperation among stakeholders.

Power dynamics were considered important in creating the willingness to cooperate with other stakeholders in a collaborative governance structure. Timing is a decisive factor affecting the power dynamics. A stakeholder, who believes it is rising in the power hierarchy, will be less likely to join a collaborative governance structure, because the cooperation will constrict its power. Thus, like Emerson et al., Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 550-554) recognized the effect of power on the willingness to participate in a collaborative governance partnership, but Emerson et al. (2012, p. 9-10) focused specifically on the power dynamics as exercised by a leader within the collaboration.

The existence of incentives to participate is another important starting condition as it deals with the motives of stakeholders. First of all, collaborative governance structures have a voluntary nature. Moreover, stakeholders need to have the expectation that the collaborative governance structure will fulfill their interests. Finally, stakeholders might not be able to achieve these interests with alternative means. These three factors will clearly have an impact on stakeholders' incentives to participate.

The third and final starting condition is history of conflict or cooperation among stakeholders, which refers to the past interactions between the stakeholders. Collaborative governance structures are built on this history of either conflict or cooperation. However, if there is a history of conflict, Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 553-554) stated that the realization of dependency on each other should be present or actions of remediation should be taken by the stakeholders.

These conditions should not be viewed completely separately, as each of them may impact other starting conditions (for example, a troubled history with regard to collaboration between stakeholders could diminish incentives to collaborate).

In addition to these three starting conditions, Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 554-557) identified two other drivers. First, facilitative leadership, which refers to a stakeholder's dependency on other stakeholders, will be a driver for a stakeholder when it realizes it needs the participation of other stakeholders to reach its own goals. This dependency is clearly identical to Emerson et al.'s factor of interdependence. Second, the institutional design of a collaborative governance structure, which refers to the collaboration's basic protocols and ground rules, was identified as a driver affecting the willingness to participate throughout the collaborative process.

Finally, Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 557-558) mentioned the importance of communication, placing it at the heart of collaboration. While they technically did not identify it as a driver for the willingness to cooperate, they regarded it as an essential element for any collaborative governance structure, especially throughout the collaborative process. Given this significance, this research will discuss it in the context of drivers. Prime examples of meaningful communication include face-to-face dialogue between stakeholders and expressions aimed at building trust among stakeholders.

Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011, p. 35-36) identified two major drivers specifically contributing to the government's willingness to cooperate. The first driver is the government's search for better outcomes. For instance, another stakeholder than the government may be able to produce public value in a more efficient manner, this stakeholder may have a better information position or a non-governmental actor may have legitimacy advantages (because the public, for example, prefers the government to not be (directly) involved). The second driver is that collaboration with private actors can generate more resources for public goals. This goes beyond simple taxation, since private actors may voluntarily wish to contribute to collaborative governance structures which benefit both their interests as well as the public interest. Despite focusing initially exclusively on drivers of the government, Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011, p. 37) did discuss the reasons for private actors to prefer collaborative governance structures over, among other things, taxation or donations. In essence, this comes down to two main reasons. First, such structures will usually clarify the roles and obligations of all those involved, including the government's (and thus, for example, may help to avoid this party from cutting its own spending after receiving private donations). Second, such structures provide a potential opportunity to exercise (some) control over their (financial) support.

In contrast to Donahue and Zeckhauser, Traag and De Wit (2016, p. 21) only studied the drivers of private stakeholders for participating in a collaborative governance structure. Based on their literature review and interviews with fifteen representatives of various public and private stakeholders, they compiled a list of several drivers. Unlike the above authors, Traag and De Wit identified drivers which they observed have to be present for a *successful* collaboration. These drivers were: a shared ambition, a sense of urgency, the involvement of figureheads, a sense of ownership, the presence of a potential platform to advocate one's interests, attention to trust and informal encounters, celebrations of (partial) successes, a certain degree of equality and reciprocity, the existence of persistence and leadership, and stakeholders who are not active in too many collaborations at once.

Although the previous studies have identified many drivers contributing to the willingness to cooperate, there are also drivers which overlap with each other. Based on the similarities and (partial) overlaps between the drivers arising from the above literature review, this research identifies seven drivers for the willingness to cooperate: communication, power dynamics, leadership, institutional design, history of cooperation, uncertainty, and the outcome of the collaboration.

While Ansell and Gash's reference to communication was not technically a classification as a driver, this research considers communication a major driver given its importance throughout the (cyclical) collaborative process for trust-building, in particular with regard to setting and meeting expectations of the stakeholders involved. Several drivers identified by Traag and De Wit fall within the communication category, which are the presence of a potential platform to advocate one's interests, attention to trust and informal encounters, and celebrations of (partial) successes.

Power dynamics, specifically identified by Ansell and Gash, may likewise serve as an umbrella driver concept to which a number of drivers identified by other scholars can be allocated. For example, Emerson et al.'s notion of internal push factors (as one of two categories of consequential incentives) implies a certain pressure, or internal power, for an actor to participate in a collaboration. Donahue and Zeckhauser's drivers essentially come down to a dependency of a stakeholder—in their case, the government—on another stakeholder to reach a certain outcome through collaboration. This dependency can also be seen as a lack of power, and thus impact the power dynamics within a collaboration. Similarly, Emerson et al.'s driver of interdependence and Ansell and Gash's drivers of facilitative leadership and incentives that stakeholders may have to collaborate reflect a sense

of dependency. Finally, Traag and De Wit's driver requiring a certain degree of equality and reciprocity for a successful collaboration covers the participants' interpretation of the power relations between them.

Leadership, which was explicitly identified by Emerson et al., and power dynamics overlap to a great extent, as the former driver deals with the role of a single stakeholder who by nature will sometimes overpower other stakeholders. Issues of dependency could, for example, arise as the leader might supply all or the lion's share of resources for the collaboration. However, given the crucial role the leader will usually play in a collaborative governance structure, treating leadership as a separate driver in this research allows it to carefully assess it.

Institutional design, again specifically identified by Ansell and Gash, is a major driver as it provides the basic protocols and ground rules of the collaboration. According to Donahue and Zeckhauser, institutional design will help to clarify the roles and obligations of all those involved in the collaboration. In addition, Traag and De Wit noted two important preconditions for a successful collaboration which should be ingrained into the institutional design: a shared ambition and stakeholders should avoid being active in too many collaborations at once. These preconditions, especially the latter, concern the institutional relationship between the collaborative governance structure vis-à-vis other collaborations.

The past history of conflict or cooperation among stakeholders, hereafter simply referred to as the history of cooperation, was only mentioned by Ansell and Gash as a driver. This deals with past interactions between the stakeholders. These interactions can be positive or negative in nature. As such, the willingness to cooperate may be influenced positively or negatively by the history of cooperation between stakeholders as well.

Uncertainty, on the other hand, was identified as a driver by multiple scholars. In the case of Emerson et al., uncertainty was considered relevant in this respect in two ways. First, collaboration was presented as a risk-sharing strategy with respect to wicked problems. New levels of complexity—whether dynamic, social or emerging, as mentioned previously with reference to Scharmer's work—add to this uncertainty, especially as emerging complexity even causes wicked problems. Second, the uncertainty caused by certain external push factors (as the second of two categories of consequential incentives) implies a certain pressure, or external power, for an actor to participate in a collaboration. Finally, Traag and De Wit's sense of urgency felt by stakeholders sometimes covers uncertainties about short-term risks.

The outcome of the collaboration is not identified by any of the above scholars as a driver for the willingness to cooperate. However, it should be. As Traag and De Wit stated, drivers contributing to the willingness to cooperate determine whether a collaborative governance structure will be successful or not in fulfilling its goal(s). In other words, drivers have a direct impact on the outcome of the collaboration. However, the outcome of the collaboration in itself could in turn have an impact on the drivers. Coming back to the earlier discussion on the development of a collaborative governance structure, when discussing Ansell and Gash's views, the cyclical nature of the collaborative process means that the outcome itself may have an influence on the willingness to cooperate, and thus must be seen as a driver. This also means that the willingness to cooperate can differ throughout time because of earlier outcomes. Therefore, the willingness to cooperate is not a static concept, but it is sensitive to change.

2.4 Principles of the willingness to cooperate

The willingness to cooperate is not only determined by the above seven drivers, but is also influenced by three core contingencies, or basic principles: time, trust, and interdependence. In fact, Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 561-563) concluded that without these principles, a collaborative governance structure cannot function. However, in their study, they did not explicitly define these principles, nor did they explain the relationship between the identified drivers and the three principles. Interestingly, the vague descriptions of Ansell and Gash's principles of time, trust, and interdependence seem to suggest a (strong) overlap with Emerson et al.'s aforementioned components (for collaborative action) of principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action, respectively. Although this research will primarily refer to Ansell and Gash's principles, it is noteworthy that Emerson et al. (2012, p. 6) did discuss the relationship between the identified drivers and the three components, noting that the former influence the latter. Although they stated that the three components lead to certain actions, their model skipped an essential element between these two steps. Without a willingness to cooperate, actions are unlikely to take place. Hence, this research provides an additional perspective on the relationship between the identified drivers and the three principles, and argues that the drivers affect the three components/principles.

Rather than directly influencing the willingness to cooperate, drivers thus have an impact on these principles, which in turn influence the willingness to cooperate. In other words, when the drivers sufficiently affect all three principles, a collaborative governance structure can

emerge and operate. Some drivers are linked to one principle; others are linked to more than one.

Building on Ansell and Gash's and Emerson et al.'s conclusions, this research will define the three principles and explain the relationships between the seven drivers and the three principles which influence the willingness to cooperate. Ansell and Gash (2007, p. 562-563) and Emerson et al. (2012, p. 6) stated that the principles/components continuously interact with each other. This research does not reject that notion. Neither is the idea that drivers can interact with each other rejected. Yet, for the sake of clarity and feasibility, this research focuses on the relationship between drivers and principles, as opposed to the relationships within these two groups. Each principle as well as each relationship between a driver and a principle will be defined and explained, respectively.

The principle of time, which encompasses moments of (in)action by stakeholders themselves as well as their surrounding environment, is influenced by three drivers. First, power dynamics are not only impacted by the timing of stakeholders' decisions but, in turn, also affect the principle of time themselves. After all, power dynamics, such as dependencies on others, dictate (in)action of the stakeholders. Second, the history of cooperation—whether perceived as successful or not—will affect expectations for current and future collaborations. Third, the extent of uncertainty—which is mainly driven by external factors—is shaped by the environment in which a stakeholder operates. A stakeholder will usually have little to no influence on this environment. Actual actions and perceptions on the likelihood of potential actions occurring around the stakeholder, for example in the form of events, will affect the willingness to cooperate throughout time.

The principle of trust, which reflects the level of confidence which stakeholders within the collaboration have in each other, is influenced by four drivers. First, communication is a key instrument to build trust throughout the collaborative process. Second, institutional design will lead to the implementation of protocols and rules which are deemed necessary to achieve the collaboration's goals. It may also involve mechanisms of monitoring and compliance, which could foster trust among stakeholders that the protocols and rules will be implemented and followed by all to achieve the goals. Third, the history of cooperation, in the broadest sense of the word, refers to the existence or absence of any relations prior to the establishment of the collaborative governance structure. Perceptions on the successes and failures of this history will build or undermine trust between stakeholders. Fourth, the outcome of the collaboration should not be seen as merely the result of the collaboration but—because of the

process' cyclical nature—outcomes also provide input for the perceived levels of trust among the participants throughout the collaboration's continuation.

The principle of interdependence, which entails a mutual reliance of the stakeholders on each other. Again, three drivers influence this principle. First, power dynamics which could be affected by a lack of resources or any other source which leads to a lack of power are likely to make some stakeholders dependent on others to reach certain goals. Second, leadership within a collaboration could induce the dependency of some stakeholders on the leader(s), as the latter may contribute essential resources to the collaboration. At the same time, leading stakeholders may use their leverage to stay leaders and dictate their interests. Such ambitions require continued contributions from them, which displays their reliance on the non-leading stakeholders. Third, institutional design could introduce as many protocols and rules as possible, but completion of the aims of the protocols and rules will heavily rely on whether each stakeholder will actually comply. This question of compliance thus creates interdependencies between all stakeholders.

The above relationships between drivers and principles and their (eventual) influence on the willingness to cooperate can be schematically represented, as shown in Figure 1. The left column represents the drivers of the willingness to cooperate. The middle column represents the principles. The drivers have a direct influence on the principles, whereas the principles have a direct influence on the willingness to cooperate, depicted in the box in the right column.

Figure 1. Model of the indirect effect of the drivers via the principles on the willingness to cooperate.

3. Methodology

This chapter explains the methodology of the research. The first section of this chapter elaborates on the research design of this paper. As mentioned, this research will rely on a case study. Therefore, this section explains the specific case study design. The second section will adapt the earlier defined drivers and principles into variables, so that they are operationalized for a case study. The third section will discuss the case selection, further clarifying the research's focus on the ATb. The fourth section will set out the methods used to collect the input data for the analysis. The fifth section will explain the data analysis conducted with the collected data. The sixth and final section will address some important limitations of this research.

3.1 Research design

This research aims to study how drivers contribute to the willingness to cooperate of the government and private companies with regard to participating in a collaborative governance structure. The previous chapter identified seven drivers, and explained how these drivers influence three principles, which in turn influence the willingness to cooperate. Following this chapter, the research will proceed as follows. First, this research discusses the ATb, highlighting the system's most important aspects. Second, the drivers for the government's willingness to cooperate in the ATb are analyzed. Third, the drivers of private companies' willingness to cooperate in the ATb are assessed. Fourth, a comparative analysis between the drivers of both types of stakeholders will be undertaken. This will help to emphasize relevant similarities and differences in their willingness to cooperate. Overall, the research aims to explore and provide insights into the drivers of the government's and private companies' willingness to cooperate in the ATb in particular and collaborative governance structures in general.

The design of the research is a case study design. This facilitates an investigation into the drivers of relevant stakeholders in a detailed manner. Case studies can either analyze a single case or multiple cases. Both types of designs have advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of a multiple-case study is that the conclusions from the research are usually more compelling (Yin, 2018, p. 54). The advantage of a single case study, conversely, is that it can represent a critical test for a significant theory (Yin, 2018, p. 49). The design of this paper is a multiple-case study design. Although the ATb could be seen as a single case, this research classifies the ATb as a set of the multiple cases, more specifically two cases: one focused on

the government and another one focused on the private sector. Hence, these two cases are seen as different cases within the framework of a single collaborative governance structure. The main reason behind this is that the government, on the one hand, and one or more private companies, on the other hand, are two different types of stakeholders, which might have different drivers contributing to their willingness to cooperate. The multiple-case study design enables to first reach individual conclusions (per type of stakeholder) on drivers contributing to their willingness to cooperate, followed by a close examination into possible differences between both types of stakeholders in this regard.

A case study can be either holistic or embedded (Yin, 2018, p. 48). The difference between holistic and embedded is the number of units of analysis within a single case. A case with a single unit of analysis is called holistic, whereas a case with multiple units of analysis is called embedded. In both cases of this research, there are multiple units of analysis, which are the following. For the case focused on the government, the units of analysis are the NCTV, the Cabinet of the Netherlands, and the 'Dutch House of Representatives' (*Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal*). For the case focused on the private companies, the units of analysis are the railway operating company 'Dutch Railways' (*Nederlandse Spoorwegen*, NS) and railway infrastructure management organization ProRail. Therefore, the design of this research is an embedded multiple-case study design.

3.2 Variables

The previous chapter identified and described seven drivers contributing to a stakeholder's willingness to cooperate in a collaborative governance structure, which were communication, power dynamics, leadership, institutional design, history of cooperation, uncertainty, and the outcome of the collaboration. These drivers can be regarded as variables for the two case studies. Each variable can be assessed, with the aim of, ultimately, determining the willingness to cooperate of a specific stakeholder. Some variables are self-explanatory based on the corresponding drivers' definitions provided in the previous chapter, but some other drivers require an explanation so that they can be operationalized as variables. The variables which fall into the second group are: power dynamics, leadership, and institutional design. Besides this distinction, this research prefers to emphasize that four variables—i.e. communication, history of cooperation, uncertainty, and the outcome of collaboration—should be divided into objective and subjective sub-variables. Objective sub-variables refer to measurable facts (for example, the number of meetings), whereas subjective sub-variables entail perceptions on the subject-matter (for example, personal opinions on those meetings).

Power dynamics concern the relations between stakeholders, which could reflect situations of (inter)dependencies or entail positions of power held by some stakeholders. The previous chapter said little to nothing about the sources of such positions of power. According to Purdy (2012, p. 410-411), there are three sources of power, which are authority, resources, and legitimacy. Authority can give a stakeholder power because it is acknowledged by others that the stakeholder has the right to make a decision. Resource-based power results from dependencies of stakeholders on other stakeholders's resources, which could be knowledge, human or financial. Legitimacy-based power refers to an organization drawing its power from the status of the values or logic it represents. When assessing the variable of power dynamics within the ATb, this research will take into account this distinction, examining all three potential sources of power.

Leadership, which as a driver is closely related to the driver of power dynamics, concerns the possible leading role of a single stakeholder and its power relations with other stakeholders. Before being able to use it as a variable, it is essential to explain how leadership can be exercised. This will help to detect its presence or absence within a collaborative governance structure. According to Page (2010, p. 248-250), leadership can be exercised using three broad tactics. The first tactic is framing the agenda, which entails drawing the attention of others to a selected (part of a) complex situation with the goals to create awareness and to invite (joint) solutions. The second tactic is convening, which involves gathering a group of stakeholders and incentivizing them to take action. The third tactic is structuring deliberation, which is closely related to institutional design. In essence, a leader could shape deliberations from others through, for example, amending the collaboration's processes and procedures. If a stakeholder uses one or more of these three tactics, this may indicate it has a leading role within the ATb, while the lack of these tactics could indicate the opposite.

Institutional design, which provides the basic protocols and ground rules of the collaboration, affects the level of trust which stakeholders within the collaboration have in each other. The degree of institutionalization may affect the willingness to cooperate, but the actual effect of institutionalization on the willingness to cooperate will differ from stakeholder to stakeholder. In other words, a high degree of institutionalization does not necessarily lead to a strong willingness to cooperate and *vice versa*; in fact, it could lead to the opposite outcome. Whether a certain degree of institutionalization is desirable depends on the individual preferences of the stakeholders involved. Liese and Beisheim published a method to assess the degree of institutionalization of collaborative governance structure (Beisheim and Campe,

2012, p. 629-630). The degree of institutionalization is composed of three sets of elements: the obligatory status of the norms, the precision of the norms, and the monitoring and enforcement of the norms. The levels of each of these elements can either be high, medium, or low. High levels of all three elements reflects a high degree of institutionalization and *vice versa*. A collaboration with a high level of obligation has binding rules (for example, contracts), whereas one with a medium level has implemented escape clauses, and one with a low level has implemented non-binding rules only. In similar fashion, a high level of precision of norms signifies determinate rules, while a medium level indicates areas of discretion and issues of interpretation, and a collaboration with a low level has broad rules. Finally, a collaboration with a high level of monitoring and enforcement has external monitoring and centralized enforcement, one with a medium level has internal monitoring and publicity, and one with a low level has no monitoring.

As mentioned, this research will divide the variables of communication, history of cooperation, uncertainty, and the outcome of collaboration into objective and subjective sub-variables.

Objective communication refers to all the communication between the stakeholders in the collaborative governance structure, which encompasses both formal and informal forms of communication. Examples of formal forms of communication are meetings or agreements between members, whereas informal contact between members could include coffee catch-ups. Such objective communication can easily be measured as it will consist of the number of contacts for the official meetings and an estimation of the informal contacts. Subjective communication refers to the perceptions of the stakeholders on the communication. Such perceptions can be measured in terms, ranging from 'good' to 'bad'. A large amount of objective communication between stakeholders does not necessarily have to result in a positive opinion on the communication. It is possible that there is almost no contact between stakeholders, but that they are still satisfied with this.

Similarly, distinctions between objective and subjective sub-variables for the history of cooperation, uncertainty, and the outcome of collaboration can be made. The objective history of cooperation refers to all the interactions between the stakeholders prior to the establishment of the collaborative governance structure. Indicators for the existence of objective history of cooperation could include agreements or contacts between stakeholders from the past. The subjective history of cooperation refers to the perceptions of the stakeholders on this history.

Like communication, the subjective history of cooperation can be measured in terms, ranging from 'good' to 'bad'.

Moreover, uncertainty may take many different forms and shapes. It can arise from both long-term as well as short-term risks. Furthermore, increasingly complex problems have not just added to uncertainty but have also been relied on as a justification for collaboration between stakeholders. Above all, it is not only objective risk assessment which determines a stakeholder's willingness to cooperate in addressing a certain risk, but it is also the stakeholder's subjective perception of that risk which will influence its willingness to cooperate.

Finally, the objective outcome of the collaboration refers to whether the goals of the collaborative governance structure are met (in essence, a question of effectiveness), whereas the subjective outcome of the collaboration refers to the perceptions of the stakeholders on this outcome. This could entail measuring the opinion of the stakeholders on the outcome, including whether they think it was a success, and if the outcome contributed to their willingness to cooperate.

3.3 Case selection

The case of the ATb is at the center of this research. Two common characteristics for all collaborative governance structures were presented in the previous chapter. The first characteristic requires stakeholders from both the public and the private sectors. The second characteristic is that the purpose of the collaboration is to serve a public goal. Hence, the ATb is evidently a collaborative governance structure. First, it is composed of governmental and private actors. Second, it provides a public service as the aim is to prevent terrorist attacks and to coordinate an adequate response if they do happen.

Since collaborative governance structures embody the cooperation between the public and private stakeholders, Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011, p. 22) have argued that research on this topic can take at least two perspectives. It can take the perspective of the government and it can take the perspective of a private company. This research analyses both perspectives, especially since one of the research's objectives is to reveal any differences and similarities between the two types of stakeholders in their willingness to cooperate. As it would be infeasible to assess all stakeholders involved in the ATb, this research focuses on one public stakeholder and two private stakeholders.

The public stakeholder is the NCTV, the agency which is primarily responsible for the continuation of the ATb. Before 2012, the NCTb was responsible for this, but this organization was reorganized (and renamed) to the NCTV. It was not always clear in sources whether certain remarks concerned (the time periods of) the NCTb or, its predecessor, the NCTV. Therefore, this research usually refers to the agency as the NCTV throughout this paper. This is also in line with governmental protocol (Staatscourant, 2012, 21754). However, wherever it was clear that the source explicitly referred to the NCTb, the agency is called the NCTb.

The private stakeholders, both active in the railway sector, are the NS and ProRail. There are three main reasons for selecting these stakeholders. First, preliminary research revealed their potentially active and long-standing involvement with the ATb. They were allocated responsible roles within the ATb, having contacts with many parties involved in the ATb. They have also been part of the ATb from the start, since the railway sector was one of the four founding sectors. Second, the 2004 Madrid train bombings were one of reasons to initiate the ATb. Since these bombings happened in four trains, the railway sector has been aware of the risk of a terrorist attack happening in trains and train stations. Third, the railway sector has been selected because the stakeholders from this sector wanted to cooperate with this research. Officials of these companies were willing to provide insights into their willingness to cooperate in the ATb.

3.4 Data collection

Yin (2018, p. 113) recognized six sources of data collection, which are documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, and physical artifacts. Each of these sources has its strengths and weaknesses. This research uses three sources for data collection: documentation, archival records, and interviews. The other three sources cannot be used in the case studies, because of the secretive nature of the ATb. For example, direct observations can involve meetings or other fieldwork experiences, but since the meetings of the ATb discuss confidential information, information obtained from these experiences cannot be used in the research. On similar grounds, participant observation, which would require to adopt the role of a member of the ATb, is not possible. Finally, physical artifacts are not possible because preliminary research did not indicate the existence of physical artifacts related to the ATb.

The first source of this research is documentation. Yin (2018, p. 113-114) identified a variety of information which could fall under this category. Examples are emails, agendas, news

articles, and formal studies and evaluations. Among other kinds of documentation, this research uses an evaluation on the earlier years of the NCTb by Bekke and De Vries (2007), which also covers the founding of the ATb as one of the first acts of the NCTb. Besides this evaluation, this research uses other evaluative reports on the Dutch counterterrorism strategy as a source, such as the report of Noordegraaf et al. (2016). Finally, Dutch newspaper articles were used, especially during the preliminary research stage to obtain relevant background information.

The second source of this research is archival records, particularly those of the Dutch House of Representatives. The government and Members of Parliament have discussed the ATb in the House of Representatives in the past. The records of these debates are available in the dossiers 29754 and 27925 of the archives of the Dutch Parliament. Dossier 29754 concentrates on terrorism in general, whereas dossier 27925 focuses on international terrorism. The records of the dossiers also discuss the introduction of the ATb, including the perspectives of the government and the Members of the Dutch House of Representatives.

The third and final source of this research was interviews of officials of the government and private companies. Yin (2018, p. 118) mentioned that this type of source is one of the most important types in a case study research. For this research, interviews were conducted with stakeholders' officials, which can all be regarded as experts in their field. The interviews were held in Dutch, the native language of all interviewees and the interviewer. The format of an interview can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. According to Moyser and Wagstaffe (1987, p. 18), the first two formats are mostly used in elite interviews. Semi-structured interviews were conducted, as this format is appropriate for interviews with experts like the stakeholders' officials. Most importantly, it allows some flexibility to adapt the line of questioning after gaining new perspectives through the answers of the experts.

For this research, three interviews were conducted, with two experts from the private sector and one expert from the government. At the time of the interviews, both experts from the private sector worked in the railway sector: Peter Schenk (2020, interview) was interviewed in his capacity as an official of NS and Paul van de Werken (2020, interview) was interviewed in his capacity as an official from ProRail. The expert from the government which was interviewed was Gert de Vries (2020, interview). He served as program director of the ATb from 2007 until 2012 at the NCTV.

One of the interviews—the one with Van de Werken—was conducted remotely, because of logistical difficulties. The interviewer perceived the risk of being contaminated with COVID-19 as too high. According to Shuy (2002, p. 540-544), there are multiple differences between in-person interviewing and remote interviews, which translate into certain (dis)advantages. The most considerable advantage of in-person interviews is that the interviewee gives more accurate responses because of the contextual naturalness. This may result in greater effectiveness with complex issues and more thoughtful responses. Advantages of remote interviewing, conversely, include that the interviewee is less likely to be influenced by the interviewer and that it may lead to faster results. Above all, this type of interviewing guarantees a safe environment for the interviewer and the interviewee. Although in-person interviews for all experts could have been preferred, their safety is a decisive factor. Therefore, the question was raised to the interviewees whether they were comfortable to do an in-person interview, and if not, the alternative was a remote interview. The software program, which was used for the remote interview, was MS Teams. This program allows both video and audio connections. Thus, although remote interviews generally have a slightly different setting than in-person interviews, it was possible to see and hear each other throughout the remote interview and imitate some of the dynamics of an in-person interview.

All interviews were recorded. Transcripts of the interviews have been included as appendices to this paper. The two in-person interviews were recorded with a phone's sound recording app and the remote interview was recorded with the recording function of MS Teams. Unfortunately, a technical error with the recording of the remote interview occurred, which produced a corrupted, non-playable audio file. The (brief) transcript of this interview was therefore based on hand-written notes which were made throughout the interview and is not a complete reflection of the answers given by the interviewee.

3.5 Data analysis

Yin (2018, p. 168-174) identified four general strategies to analyze data in a case study design. These strategies are relying on theoretical propositions, working your data from the 'ground up', developing a case description, and examining plausible rival explanations. The first strategy, relying on theoretical propositions, takes the theory as the starting point. In essence, this theory entails assessing the collected data within the designed theoretical framework. The second strategy is the opposite of the first. Working your data from the 'ground up' is an inductive strategy that takes the data as a starting point, and requires researchers to scrutinize their data and look for patterns. The third strategy, developing a case

description, is a combination of the two other strategies. In the absence of clearly defined research questions, propositions, and concepts surfacing from the study, a combination of theory and data can be used to shape any of these. The fourth and final strategy, examining plausible rival explanations, can be used in parallel to the other three strategies. The use of the other strategies may give rise to theoretical propositions and frameworks as well as alternative explanations, which can be used to define and test rival explanations. This research uses the first strategy, as the theoretical framework described in chapter 2 forms the basis of analysis of the case studies. Moreover, the research assesses the collected data within the theoretical framework.

The collected data of a research can be analyzed by applying multiple analytic techniques, as described by Yin (2018, p. 175-199). He identified five techniques for analyzing a case study: pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models, and cross-case synthesis. Pattern matching is comparing two patterns with each to look for differences between them. The technique can be used to find the 'how' or the 'why' of a case study. Explanation building is an advanced variation of pattern matching. By applying explanation building, the goal is to analyze a case by creating an explanation about it. An analysis of time-series can either be simple or complex. Simple time-series analysis involves the tracking of one variable over time, while complex time-series analysis involves the tracking of a set of multiple variables over time which are relevant to the case study. Logic models are used by case study evaluations and studies on theories of change. This technique can be used to analyze a complex chain of occurrences over a period of time. Logic models can be applied in case studies at any of three levels: the individual level, the organizational level, and the program level. Cross-case synthesis can be used in a set of multiple case studies. As a technique, it entails that the different cases are compared with each other.

The analysis strategy of this research relies on three analytic techniques, which are explanation building, logic models, and cross-case synthesis. These analytic techniques are jointly used throughout the case studies. Explanation building is especially used to analyze potential explanations for shifts in the willingness to cooperate over time. Logic models are used with respect to two levels: at the organizational level and at the program level. At the former level, the members of the ATb are analyzed. At the latter level, the ATb itself is analyzed. The cross-case synthesis technique is used to analyze the differences between the government's case and the private sector's case.

3.6 Limitations of the research

Before turning to the case studies, four important limitations of the research are acknowledged.

The first limitation is that only data from public sources can be used for verification purposes. Accordingly, classified sources cannot be used which could contain relevant information and any information received from the conducted interviews can only be verified by using public sources. Bekke and De Vries (2007), who conducted research into the first years of the NCTb and the implementation of the ATb, also had these problems. Nevertheless, they were still able to conduct viable research and reach relevant conclusions. Since this research is conducted under similar conditions, reliance on public sources and conducted interviews is a surmountable limitation.

The second limitation is that the research relies on conducted interviews with officials from the government and private companies. While the data collected from these interviews could provide insights into the two cases, the events of both cases started almost 20 years ago. The memories of these officials can be affected by events that have occurred ever since. Another risk with interviews is that the interviewees might have political agendas or give socially desirable answers. Such biases are difficult to avoid, but can be mitigated to some extent by comparing the answers of the interviews with each other.

The third limitation is that only a specific type of private stakeholders is researched. This type is referred to as a sector coordinator, which will be defined and explained extensively in the next chapter. By nature, such stakeholders will generally have a more active role than other (private) stakeholders. The willingness to cooperate of such other stakeholders within the ATb will fall outside the scope of this research. Excluding such stakeholders from the stakeholders was done because of reasons of feasibility.

The fourth and final limitation is that the research focuses only on the railway sector. Hence, other sectors involved in the ATb are not within the scope of the research. Again, feasibility reasons justified excluding more sectors from the research. As explained, with respect to the case selection, the railway sector is a relevant sector in relation to the Dutch counterterrorism strategy in general and the ATb in particular. It therefore serves a good starting point for research on the willingness to cooperate in the ATb.

4. Case study

This chapter sets out the case study, followed by an analysis of the two cases within the theoretical framework as designed by the second chapter. The first section of this chapter will present the ATb, and will contextualize it within the Dutch government's counterterrorism and security strategies at large. The second section will analyze the government's willingness to cooperate, using the earlier defined variables of the theoretical framework. The third section will analyze the willingness to cooperate of the selected private companies from the railway sector (i.e. NS and ProRail). The fourth and final section will compare and contrast the findings regarding the government's and the private companies' willingness to cooperate with each other and analyze the major findings of the case studies.

4.1 Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding

The foundation of the ATb fits within the international context of the 'post-9/11 era'. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States, terrorism became a hot topic around the world, including the Netherlands. In the immediate wake of the attacks, cooperation between countries and international organizations was sought to find the right response to terrorism (Van der Velden, 2001). Rosemont (2014, p. 148) explained that scholars wrote extensively on the topic of the involvement of private actors in counterterrorism policy making in the UK ever since. The interest in counterterrorism was not limited to the academic community. The Dutch government implemented a plan of action on counterterrorism. The aim was to improve the coordination between the different security and intelligence organizations involved in counterterrorism (Bekke and De Vries, 2007, p. 6). The call for more coordination between the organizations was strengthened after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch politician, in 2002. During the investigation of his murder, it became clear that every organization had a little piece of information (De Vries, 2020, interview). Gert de Vries stated that if the intelligence had not been as fragmented as it was, the pieces could have been put together and there would have been a chance that the murder was prevented. The 9/11 attacks and the assassination of Fortuyn urged the Dutch government to implement measures in order to prevent terrorist attacks on Dutch soil and in the event, that if an attack did happen, organize the correct response to mitigate its effects.

Additional pressure on the government to implement a new counterterrorism strategy was imposed by the Dutch House of Representatives after the Madrid train bombings in 2004. With the attacks of 9/11, Islamic terrorism reached the Western world. The realization that

with the bombings in Madrid Islamic terrorism had arrived in Europe put extra pressure on authorities to formulate effective approaches with preventive and reactive measures (Bekke and De Vries, 2007, p. 7). The government reacted on these two developments (i.e. the rise of Islamic terrorism and the call for closer coordination between the security and intelligence organizations) by introducing multiple instruments and an organization to implement the measures: the NCTb.

The founding of the NCTb immediately affected the dynamics within the Dutch counterterrorism community, because a number of other agencies did not initially know what to expect from the new agency. According to Bekke and De Vries (2007, p. 45), the founding was unexpected (and unannounced) for some organizations, several other agencies felt threatened by it, and even feelings of failure were felt by some others. Despite these concerns, a significant number of officials nevertheless agreed that the founding of an agency like the NCTb was necessary. After all, there was a lack of cooperation between the governmental agencies and the impact of terrorism on national security was perceived to be too high.

The NCTb wanted to introduce a program which would enable it to work together with the private sector (De Vries, 2020, interview). This plan eventually turned into the ATb. The head of the NCTb, Tjibbe Joustra, invited the CEOs of private companies of vital sectors to discuss the program (De Vries, 2020, interview). In 2007, Minister of Justice Hirsch Ballin and Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Ter Horst announced to the House of Representatives that the ATb had been officially established and the upkeep of the system would become a regular task of the NCTb (Hirsch Ballin and Ter Horst, 2007), though four sectors were already incorporated into the ATb in 2005 as test sectors. These sectors were the Port of Rotterdam, Schiphol Airport, the drinking water sector, and the railway sector. Since the official launch of the ATb in 2007, 11 other sectors have joined the ATb. As of early 2021, these sectors were the oil, chemical, electricity, telecom, gas, nuclear, financial, city and regional transport, event, hotel, and tunnels and flood defense industries (NCTV, ATb).

The ATb was not the only measurement that the government and its agency NCTb introduced. The founding of the 'Special Interventions Service' (*Dienst Speciale Interventies*, DSI), the introduction of the program 'Dutch Threat Assessment Terrorism' (*Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland*) and the establishment of the program 'Guard and Protect System' (*Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen*) were other prominent examples in this regard. The DSI is an agency consisting of special forces serving within the police force, which can act in situations of (potentially) extreme violence. According to De Vries (2020, interview), the DSI was

formed after the government evaluated that the then existing SWAT-like teams were not ready to face such situations. The program Dutch Threat Assessment Terrorism was implemented to inform the House of Representatives and the public about the likelihood of a terrorist attack in the Netherlands. It was agreed that within the framework of this program the NCTb received information from the intelligence and security organizations in the Netherlands and analyzed that information to determine the corresponding threat level. Although the information itself was classified, the announcement of the threat level was public, as it was intended to provide input for discussions within the House of Representatives and to inform the public at large. The Guard and Protect System was implemented after the assassination of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn (Bekke en De Vries, p. 22). The main goal of the program's unit was to prevent terrorist attacks on persons, objects, and agencies (NCTV, n.d., Bewaken en beveiligen).

Originally the Minister of Justice Donner and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Remkes wanted to implement a 'National Alert System' (*Nationaal Alerteringssysteem*) (Stuiveling, 2008, p. 7). The aim of this system was to inform the governmental agencies, private sector, and the public. With the ATb and the Dutch Threat Assessment Terrorism, this goal was achieved by two separate systems. At the start of the ATb, the goal was to encourage cooperation between the government and private companies from vital sectors. Since the beginning, the NCTb and its successor NCTV (NCTV, 2018, p. 11) felt that the government and private companies had to share the responsibility in providing security in the Netherlands. Within the framework of the ATb, the government would provide risk assessments to the private companies of vital sectors. In return, private companies gave their assessments on security matters to these agencies, even though it was recognized that the governmental agencies had a better information position in many instances. Thus, the main information flow was from the government to private sectors, but a reverse information flow from private actors to the government also existed since the founding of the ATb.

From the start, the communication of the threat level was not the only function of the ATb. The members of the collaborative governance structure made agreements on cooperation strategies and tactics in crisis situations. These agreements were captured in 'connection documents' (*aansluitdocumenten*). Such documents were concluded between the NCTV and individual sectors (NCTV, 2018, p. 14). Thus, the ATb had a dual function from the start as

the first function was the exchange of information and the second function was preparing and shaping cooperation between its members in crisis situations.

In the ATb, a distinction was made between normal members and sector coordinators (NCTV, 2018, p. 6). Since the start, every sector has at least one sector coordinator, who is designated by other private companies. Sector coordinators serve as liaisons between the NCTV and the other ATb's members active in their sectors and are responsible for the provision of information from the NCTV to these members and *vice versa*. Moreover, the sector coordinator acts as the point of contact for the NCTV during preparations of any initiative implemented within the framework of the ATb. If a stakeholder is not a sector coordinator, it is considered a normal member. Both NS and ProRail serve as sector coordinators on behalf of the railway sector.

The ATb was not the only system in place to protect vital infrastructure against security threats. There were two other systems in particular: the 'National Advice Centre Vital Infrastructure' (*Nationaal Adviescentrum Vitale Infrastructuur*, NAVI) and the program 'Protection Vital Infrastructure' (*Bescherming Vitale Infrastructuur*, BVI). The NAVI advised and supported vital sectors on necessary security measures by providing information about developments, trends and changes in the *modus operandi* of criminals and terrorists (Stuiveling, 2008, p. 29). The BVI, in contrast, focused specifically on securing the continuity of vital infrastructure by advising and supporting the prevention of large-scale failures and disruptions of vital infrastructure and adequate preparation by the government and the business community for the consequences of any incidents or disruptions. The idea for the BVI started in the spring of 2001 when a motion from Dutch Member of Parliament Wijn (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2005, p. 3), which called for action from the government to protect vital infrastructure, passed. The BVI was enacted in April 2002.

Interestingly, the same ministries were not necessarily involved in all national security systems. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations was involved in the ATb and the BVI. In fact, it was the main coordinator of the latter program. The Ministry of Justice was only involved in the ATb, and hence not in the NAVI nor the BVI (Stuiveling, 2008, p. 8). In 2008, the ATb and the NAVI became intertwined with each other through the initiation of a joint project between the NAVI and the NCTb, which involved the NAVI in the formation of agreements between companies in vital sectors and local partners (Stuiveling, 2008, p. 29). The involvement of different ministries in the various programs perhaps explained the strong

similarities in scope between them, especially the ATb and the BVI. However, the practical implications of the theoretical overlap between the programs was limited (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2005, p. 5-6). While the ATb primarily aimed to introduce a means of communication between the government and the private sectors about the seriousness of security threats and provided a basis for agreements about measures to be taken, the BVI aimed to ensure continuity of (vital) private sectors.

In 2009, several years after the implementation of the above security systems, the Suyver Commission, which was set up by the House of Representatives, published its evaluative report on counterterrorism measures (Commissie Suyver, 2009). One of the Commission's main pieces of advice was to enact a national strategy on counterterrorism (Noordegraaf et al., 2016, p. 5). Three years later, the NCTb was reorganized and renamed to NCTV. While the upkeep of the ATb remained a responsibility of the organization succeeding the NCTb, there was one interesting change in responsibilities. As a result of the reorganization, the BVI became a responsibility of the NCTV. Meanwhile, and at odds with the Suyver Commission's advice, local (and not national) counterterrorism approaches had gained considerable strength (Noordegraaf et al., 2016, p. 21).

This development was a prelude to a significant reform of the ATb. In 2018, the NCTV updated the ATb to the ATb 2.0. According to the NCTV (2018, p. 5), the update entailed a change of focus. In the original ATb, the focus was primarily or exclusively on the national level. This was changed in the updated version and the focus shifted to the local level. The goal of the update was to connect the ATb to the existing crisis structure of Dutch governance. Due to the shift of focus as envisioned by the updated version of the ATb, new agreements had to be made between the NCTV and the private sectors. According to Van der Werken (2020, interview), the new connection document under the ATb 2.0 system for the railway sector has still to be agreed on. In fact, Schenk (2020, interview), working for the sector coordinator NS and in his job responsible for his employer's participation in the ATb, stated that the ATb is inactive. Over time, the frequency of the meetings between the NCTV and the sector coordinators decreased and these meetings, ultimately, ceased to exist. This was also confirmed by De Vries (2020, interview). In other words, the activities undertaken within the collaborative governance structure decreased during the past years.

4.2 Governmental drivers

This section analyzes the drivers of the NCTV's willingness to cooperate with regard to the ATb (also referred to as the 'governmental drivers'). The discussion of these drivers is heavily

influenced by the data provided by the interview with De Vries (2020, interview), the program director of the ATb from 2008 until 2012 at the NCTV. All seven drivers will be discussed individually.

4.2.1 Communication

At the start of the ATb, Tjibbe Joustra, the first coordinator of the NCTb, organized face-to-face meetings with the CEOs of several private companies. The subsequent communication of the NCTV could be, according to De Vries (2020, interview), categorized into two channels. Within the first channel, the NCTV served as an intermediary between intelligence services, on the one hand (referred to as the "input side" by De Vries), and, on the other hand, the operational services (the "output side"). In essence, the NCTV regularly held meetings with operational services, in particular the DSI, the 'Royal and Diplomatic Security Service' (*Dienst Koninklijke en Diplomatieke Beveiliging*), and several units of the 'Royal Military Police' (*Koninklijke Marechaussee*), in which relevant information from the intelligence services was shared. The meetings focused especially on threats directed at humans and related affairs, though once a month they also (very) briefly discussed private sectors at these meetings. Within the second channel, the NCTV specifically focused its communications on the private sectors. Every half a year, the NCTV organized a specific meeting with the intelligence services to discuss all private sectors. Also, every half a year, all sector coordinators of the ATb were invited to The Hague to discuss the ATb in a group meeting. Finally, the NCTV held sector-specific meetings with sector coordinators, again, every half a year. Hence, no direct communication channels between NCTV and normal members of the ATb existed. Sector coordinators were responsible for the exchange of information between the NCTV and their sectors' normal members of the ATb.

Over the years, however, the number of contact moments between the NCTV and the sector coordinators decreased (De Vries, 2020, interview). At first, the meetings were held every year, instead of every half a year. Alongside this development, the amount of exchanged information dropped. Originally, the reports with respect to threat levels consisted of about eight to nine pages. Over time, these reports turned into documents of half a page which essentially said "We have no news". However, a communication line which did continue was the existence of 'warm contacts' within the NCTV (Schenk, 2020, interview). These contacts were available to private parties to discuss all sorts of serious security concerns (even those other than terrorism).

Based on the above, it is clear that the objective communication initiated by the NCTV decreased after a while. This might have negatively impacted the NCTV's willingness to cooperate. After all, the NCTV was (very) pleased with the regularly organized meetings with the private sectors and the sector coordinators during the first years of the ATb (De Vries, 2020, interview). According to De Vries, the eventual lack of news resulted in a reduced attention for the ATb, also on the part of the government. It cannot be ruled out that the reduced flow of communication negatively impacted the NCTV's sense of urgency to cooperate. In other words, the lack of objective communication lowered the NCTV's trust in the necessity of collaboration with the other stakeholders. With regard to the subjective communication, it is unclear whether this had any impact on the NCTV as none of the interviewees touched upon this. Interestingly, while Schenk (2020, interview) was positive about NS' warm contacts within the NCTV, he perceived this communication to take place outside the framework of the ATb, especially since these forms of communication were not formalized in any way.

4.2.2 Power dynamics

Asymmetry with respect to valuable information on terrorism and related security risks entailed a strong position of the NCTV vis-à-vis the private stakeholders, as also recognized by Schenk (2020, interview). This information asymmetry naturally had a great impact on the power dynamics. After all, the NCTV held a valuable resource (i.e. information) to which the private stakeholders wished access to. Yet, a strong dependency of the NCTV on the private stakeholders likewise existed. According to De Vries (2020, interview), the NCTV proactively sought the involvement of (vital) private sectors, as without them, the ATb could not succeed in its mission.

The perceived dependency of the NCTV on (vital) private sectors can be explained. In the early 2000s, the government and the NCTV recognized that the Dutch culture was not authoritarian enough to dictate rules and measures top-down (i.e. from the government to the private companies), as had, for example, been done in France and their national counterterrorism strategy for the private sector (De Vries, 2020, interview). Conversely, the Dutch government needed the cooperation of the private sectors and their willingness to cooperate to achieve their goals. This shows that the government did not have sufficient authority as a source of power, in the meaning of Purdy's distinction (2012, p. 410-411), to implement counterterrorism measures without involving or consulting private companies. This lack of power made the NCTV dependent on the involvement of the private sectors and

willing to cooperate in the ATb to shape this cooperation and achieve its own goals. The NCTV also dedicated significant resources, such as personnel, at the outset of the ATb to strengthen the structure (De Vries, 2020, interview; Schenk, 2020, interview).

However, similar to the aforementioned development of a reduction in communication from the NCTV, the NCTV also reduced its contribution of resources over time. It replaced its entire team which was responsible for the upkeep of the ATb with only one official (De Vries, 2020, interview). A major influence on the NCTV's willingness to cooperate in the ATb was its dependency on some private stakeholders for relevant information. In order to receive that information, the NCTV organized meetings and other forms of communication and allocated resources to those contact meetings (including their preparation and follow-ups) and the communication channels. As their communication efforts produced fewer and fewer results, the NCTV appeared to become less convinced of its dependency on the private stakeholders to reach the outcome of the ATb through collaboration with the private stakeholders. As a result, the NCTV possibly withdrew the lion's share of its resources from the ATb. Accordingly, power dynamics, especially shaped by a perceived reduction in dependency on private stakeholders, resulted in the NCTV's state of inaction, which affected the principles of time and interdependence.

4.2.3 Leadership

From the beginning of the ATb, the NCTV acted as a leader, though this role declined later on. Referring to Page's aforementioned classification of tactics a member could use to establish a leading position, the NCTV demonstrated all three in the ATb. First, the NCTV framed the agenda by initiating the structure to create awareness among (vital) private sectors about terrorism-related security risks and to invite them to participate in joint solutions. Second, the NCTV convened by gathering all the relevant stakeholders and incentivizing them to take action through the provision of relevant information. Third, the NCTV structured deliberation from others, eventually leading to the reforms which resulted in the ATb 2.0.

Moreover, the NCTV's leading role within the ATb was illustrated by the consequences of its reduced contribution in resources to the collaboration. As Emerson et al. (2012, p. 9-10) noted, any collaborative governance structure requires the involvement of a party which initiates and supports the collaboration. The NCTV clearly fulfilled this role as a leader in the beginning. As it cut down its involvement, so did the activity of the ATb. There was no other stakeholder involved that decided to take over the leader's position.

With the transition from the ATb to the ATb 2.0, a shift from a national structure to local structures occurred (Noordegraaf et al., 2016). This also reflected the general development involving the emergence of stronger local counterterrorism strategies in the Netherlands. As part of this development, the NCTV joined 'local triangles' (i.e. a consultative body between the mayor, the public prosecutor, and the police chief), which are the governance structures responsible for public order and security at the local level. As highlighted by Schenk (2020, interview), mayors are ultimately responsible for maintaining the public order and are therefore authorized to implement certain measures. As a result, the NCTV has had a limited, non-leading role within these local bodies.

According to De Vries (2020, interview), leadership was not a primary influencing factor on the NCTV's willingness to cooperate. He stated that the NCTV did not necessarily have to play a leading role within the ATb. For example, clustering sectors to work with each other under the leadership of a sector coordinator allowed the NCTV to limit its own involvement. The NCTV was also willing to (and actually did) facilitate initial contacts between two sectors (for example, between the railway sector coordinators NS and ProRail and the city and regional transport sector), but subsequently the agency did not (want to) play a role in cross-sectoral cooperation. Finally, the NCTV implemented ATb 2.0, even though this resulted in no leadership role for the NCTV within the local governance structures. Overall, being a leader within the ATb, driven by a recognition that without the NCTV's leadership the ATb would not be initiated, evidently drove the NCTV's willingness to cooperate prior to the start of the ATb and during the collaboration's first years. The NCTV's subsequent conviction that it was less reliant on the private stakeholders resulted in a reduction of its will to maintain a leading position during the following years.

4.2.4 Institutional design
With respect to the institutional design of the ATb, a decisive factor for the NCTV's willingness to cooperate was the absence of a formal, legally binding underlying agreement (De Vries, 2020, interview). The ATb relied on the aforementioned 'connection documents', which was a deliberate choice. Other names, such as contracts or covenants, could have had legal implications, including potential costs for the government as private companies could claim their expenses with the NCTV. Interestingly enough, the connection documents appear to have been perceived as having the same status as a legally binding agreement by the representatives of the private companies (Schenk, 2020, interview; Van de Werken, 2020,

interview). According to De Vries (2020, interview), the arrangements made within the ATb were clear.

Another relevant factor of the ATb's institutional design, which is also part of its basic protocols and ground rules, was the existence of compliance and monitoring mechanisms. The NCTV reviewed the private stakeholders through sectoral exercises. Again, interestingly enough, the representatives of the private companies did not perceive these exercises as review moments with regard to compliance and monitoring under the ATb (Schenk, 2020, interview; Van de Werken, 2020, interview). Moreover, the NCTV was careful in its selection of private sectors for the ATb. For example, the agricultural sector was interested in joining the ATb, but the NCTV rejected their application (De Vries, 2020, interview).

Overall, the original ATb's degree of institutionalization—as distinguished by Liese and Beisheim (Beisheim and Campe, 2012, p. 629-630)—was medium to high. There was a medium to high level with regard to the obligatory status of the norms, as the government perceived the ATb's arrangements as legally non-binding, but the private companies perceived them as having a similar legal status to legally binding agreements. Additionally, there was a high level with regard to the precision of the norms due to clarity of the agreements. Finally, there was a low to medium level with regard to the monitoring and enforcement of the norms, again due to a divergence between the public and private stakeholders: The NCTV used sectoral exercises in this regard, while the private companies thought there were no monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in place.

The transition from the ATb to the ATb 2.0 also entailed a major change in the ATb's institutional design. The shift to local structures seemed to have affected the NCTV's role in the ATb in a significant way. Ever since the introduction of the ATb 2.0, no new agreements between the NCTV and the railway companies were concluded, despite interest from the latter (Schenk, 2020, interview). Instead, the NCTV joined 'local triangles'. Referring to Liese and Beisheim's framework, the lack of agreements between the NCTV and private companies as well as the lack of rules and monitoring mechanisms within the framework of the ATb 2.0 indicates a total absence of institutionalization.

Initially, the specific institutional design of the ATb was tailored to the NCTV's desires, so this strongly influenced the NCTV's trust in the ATb in a positive way and reflected the felt mutual reliance between the stakeholders. The institutional design of the original ATb fulfilled the principle of trust among the NCTV (as well as other stakeholders) as the lack of

legally binding agreements to shape the collaboration reflected a high level of trust in each other. With the shift from national to local counterterrorism approaches in general and the transition of the ATb into the ATb 2.0 in particular, a number of things changed in the NCTV's trust and perceived reliance on private stakeholders. First, they refrained from entering into new agreements with private companies in the context of the ATb 2.0. This implies the absence of trust and perceived interdependence with private companies within the framework of the ATb 2.0. Second, they rather actively sought cooperation with local governance structures, though it is unclear whether these forms of collaboration have been conducted in the framework of the ATb 2.0 or in other contexts (such as the NCTV's general responsibilities with regard to security measures). The fact that the NCTV has not actively communicated to external partners or the public that these activities were conducted under ATb 2.0, as was done before under the original ATb, suggests they probably were not.

4.2.5 History of cooperation

Prior to the existence of the ATb, there was some collaboration regarding security issues between the government and private actors. De Vries (2020, interview) gave the example of a municipality working together with the hospitality industry within its (municipal) boundaries as part of a security strategy. Similarly, Schenk (2020, interview) explained that there were collaborative initiatives focused on security between local governments and the railway sector. On a national level, the railway sector also collaborated with the government in the framework of the 'Battle Plan Social Safety' (*Aanvalsplan Sociale Veiligheid*) (Schenk, 2020, interview). This program aimed to improve the social safety in public transport services through collaboration between the government and public transport companies. These actors collectively implemented measures in several security areas, which also touched upon counterterrorism. Yet, these measures were not as specifically focused on terorrism as the ones taken within the framework of the ATb. In other words, the ATb was the first national structure specifically focused on counterterrorism.

Before its introduction, there had been limited to no interactions between the stakeholders which became involved in the ATb. This was especially the case for the NCTV, as the agency was still new at the time of the ATb's launch and the establishment of the ATb was, in fact, one of its first acts. So, there were no past actions between the NCTV and the other stakeholders active within the ATb. Therefore, it appears that history of cooperation did not influence the NCTV's trust in the private stakeholders. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out

that individual officials of the NCTV did have experiences, including interactions, with other stakeholders due to possible past working experiences in the counterterrorism field.

4.2.6 Uncertainty

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the Madrid train bombings in 2004, the risk of terrorist attacks was felt across the Netherlands (De Vries, 2020, interview) and recognized within the Dutch government, as also demonstrated by the introductions of the DSI, the Dutch Threat Assessment Terrorism, the Guard and Protect System, the NAVI, and the BVI, alongside the establishment of a new agency, the NCTV. Clearly, there was a strong sense of urgency among both public and private stakeholders to address the risks related to terrorism. Already at the time around the inception of the ATb, terrorism was a wicked problem, and more specifically one of emerging complexity. This type of complexity has three characteristics: the solution to the problem is unknown; the problem statement is always changing, and the key stakeholders are unknown (Scharmer 2016, p. 57-60). All three characteristics apply to the problem of terrorism. The problem's complexity causes uncertainty, which in turn creates an unstable environment. The ATb was an effort to tackle the emerging complex problems surrounding terrorism.

Uncertainty among the NCTV with regard to the risk of terrorism was not absolute. Based on its risk analyses, the NCTV considered certain sectors more likely to be a target of a terrorist attack than others. The NCTV limited the ATb's participation scope to a number of sectors. The agricultural sector, for example, was excluded as their risk of being a target was deemed unlikely (De Vries, 2020, interview).

Eventually, the risk of another terrorist attack as perceived by, among others, the NCTV lowered (De Vries, 2020, interview). According to de Vries, this was because of the time elapsed since the last terrorist attacks (those in the beginning of the 2000s) as well as the non-occurrence of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and the neighbouring countries. This resulted in a reduced attention to counterterrorism strategies, including the ATb. In other words, there was a tendency to switch to a 'business as usual' mentality within the public governance structures responsible for counterterrorism and related security issues.

When assessing this new state of affairs against Scharmer's framework (2016, p. 57-60), some changes can be observed. The problem statement regarding terrorism was still always changing, but because the objective uncertainty about a terrorist attack had lowered (the number of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and abroad had dropped) and the NCTV's

subjective assessment likewise perceived the risk to be low(er), the problem statement lost a certain sense of urgency. The solution to the problem and the stakeholders were also still unknown, but the shift to the local level with the ATb 2.0 put forward a new approach involving many new stakeholders. In other words, the NCTV opted for a different solution with a substantial involvement of different stakeholders. All in all, this suggests that the objective and subjective assessments of uncertainty affected the NCTV's perception of its surrounding environment, which led the NCTV to take a different course of action.

4.2.7 Outcome of the collaboration

Given the circular nature of the collaborative process, the outcome of the collaboration should not be understood as a static variable but rather as a dynamic one. As explained, the outcome of the collaboration is part of a continuous cycle which essentially relates to the central question whether a collaboration is effective in reaching its intended objectives (the objective point of view) and the perceptions of stakeholders on this (the subjective point of view). From an objective perspective as well as a subjective perspective, the ATb was perceived to be successful in achieving its goals. A major way in which the participants assessed whether the ATb was successful was through sectoral exercises. Based on De Vries' insights (2020, interview), it becomes clear that these exercises shaped the NCTV's perceptions on the effectiveness of the ATb. According to him, these exercises also helped to reinforce the NCTV's trust in the collaboration as the findings of these exercises helped with reaching the goals of the ATb.

It is therefore quite intriguing that overtime these exercises stopped (De Vries, 2020, interview). It is unclear why this happened, but perhaps this was due to the reduced attention to counterterrorism strategies in the Netherlands in general (as described under the previous driver). Either way, the shift to the ATb 2.0, as initiated by the NCTV, seems plausible if the NCTV considered a local approach to be at least as effective, if not more, in reaching the set objectives. Accordingly, the NCTV then changed the course of the ATb's action with the objective to continue to achieve a positive outcome of the collaboration and to fulfill the goals of its counterterrorism strategy. Hence, it was not a negative outcome of the collaborative process within the framework of the ATb that drove a shift to the ATb 2.0, but it appears that the positive outcomes from the past as well as a desired outcome of the collaboration influenced the NCTV's trust in the reformed ATb 2.0.

4.2.8 Conclusion

Overall, the NCTV's level of action, trust, and perceived interdependence shifted strongly from a high level around the start of the ATb to a low level around the time of the ATb's transformation into the ATb 2.0. The drivers of communication, power dynamics, leadership, institutional design, and uncertainty initially all contributed to a proactive stance and solid trust, along with a recognition of reliance on other stakeholders, on the part of the NCTV to cooperate with (vital) private stakeholders in counterterrorism. Over time, all three principles lowered. Important factors in this regard were substantial reductions in communication, an arguably lowered conviction of the NCTV's dependency on other stakeholders, and the NCTV's changed perceptions on the necessary solution and stakeholders. Related to that last factor, the outcome of the collaboration was relevant. Originally, sectoral exercises served as indicators for the effectiveness of the ATb, which in turn strengthened the NCTV's trust in the ATb. But this changed as the NCTV considered other solutions necessary to safeguard the desired outcome of the collaboration. While the degree of the ATb's institutionalization was medium to high, any form of institutionalization and formalization between the NCTV and private stakeholders has been absent under ATb 2.0. Given this lack of institutionalization, it appeared the NCTV had no trust in collaborating with the original (private) stakeholders ever since the reforms. Lastly, the non-existent history of cooperation and the absence of a strong will to maintain a leadership position within the ATb seemed to have neither contributed nor declined the NCTV's trust in cooperation and perceived interdependence.

4.3 Private drivers

This section analyzes the drivers of the private stakeholders' willingness to cooperate with regard to the ATb (also referred to as the 'private drivers'). The discussion of these drivers is heavily influenced by the data provided by the interviews with Schenk (2020, interview), an official of NS, and Van de Werken (2020, interview), an official of ProRail. As with the governmental drivers, all seven drivers will be discussed individually.

4.3.1 Communication

Similar to the NCTV, the sector coordinators NS and ProRail had two communication channels at the start of the ATb. The first channel was a communication line with the NCTV and the second channel was one with the 'normal' members of the railway sector. As described before, the frequency of communication meetings with the NCTV within the framework of the ATb went down and the meetings eventually completely ceased to exist. The frequency of communication within the railway sector depended on the situation,

according to Schenk (2020, interview). When there was an imminent terrorist threat, the frequency of the communication increased and *vice versa*. The information flow from the second channel was influenced by the first channel, as information obtained from the NCTV served as input. In response to some difficulties regarding communication between the sector coordinators of the railway sector and other members of the ATb which were active in several domains of public transport (including rail transport), it was decided at some point to merge the railway sector with the city and regional transport sector (Van de Werken, 2020, interview). This allowed NS and ProRail to reach these companies more easily.

According to Van de Werken (2020, interview), the communication within the sector was good, but only after the merger of the railway sector with the city and regional transport sector. Prior to the merger, the subjective perception on communication under the second channel was thus perceived to be insufficient. Communication within the first channel, however, was both objectively and subjectively good during the first few years of the ATb. Schenk (2020, interview) recognized the information asymmetry, whereby the NCTV had useful information and shared this with private sectors, as a major advantage of the ATb. Another advantage of the first communication channel was the proliferation of a '*Schwan, kleb an* effect', as observed by De Vries (2020, interview). Some sectors, such as the railway and aviation sectors, showed greater awareness of terrorism risks and displayed more involvement in the ATb than others. As a result of the NCTV's meetings with all sector coordinators, other sectors like the events sector were alerted of these risks and were inspired to take action. Hence, the first communication channel had a positive influence on even the initially less involved private stakeholders' trust in collaboration.

As the frequency of the first communication channel went down and ultimately stopped, a number of problems for the private stakeholders arose. Firstly, along with the ATb 2.0's focus on local networks, the railway companies have had difficulties in obtaining information due to limited access granted by 'local triangles' (Schenk, 2020, interview). Secondly, there was no cross-sectoral communication since the NCTV's general meetings ended. Consequently, the '*Schwan, kleb an* effect' has not occurred ever since. Thirdly, while there has been communication between the NCTV and private stakeholders (with NS, at least) since the NCTV's reorganization, the lack of any formalized arrangements under ATb 2.0 has led to the perception within NS that this communication is taking place outside the ATb (Schenk, 2020, interview), even though the discussed topics sometimes fall within the ATb's scope.

Despite the non-existence of any communication between NS and the NCTV within the framework of the ATb during the past years, the NS' trust in cooperation remained strongly present. NS' perception continues to be that the NCTV is "sitting on a pot of gold", which is the valuable information it holds (Schenk, 2020, interview). NS' reasons to collaborate with the NCTV, which was primarily to gain access to this information, still applied. This rationale for cooperation with the NCTV could also apply to the other private stakeholders involved in the ATb.

4.3.2 Power dynamics

Power dynamics, as described in the context of the governmental drivers, worked both ways. While the NCTV was dependent on the private stakeholders to achieve the ATb's objectives, the private stakeholders likewise felt a dependency on the NCTV. As stated explicitly by Schenk (2020, interview) and Van de Werken (2020, interview), the goals of the ATb could only be achieved through collaboration between the government and private sectors. Two sources of power, as identified by Purdy (2012, p. 410-411), stressed the private stakeholders' dependency on the NCTV, according to Schenk (2020, interview) and Van de Werken (2020, interview). First, the aforementioned NCTV's strong information position manifested itself as resource-based power. The private stakeholders' lack of certain information, which the NCTV did have, was therefore an internal push factor to collaborate. Second, there was legitimacy-based power, because without the ATb, private stakeholders did not consider the additional responsibilities assigned to them as being part of their activities (Schenk, 2020, interview).

However, Purdy's third source of power became relevant throughout the development of the ATb. Although the private companies did not have authority-based power during the preparation of the ATb, their authority grew later on. After all, the NCTV acknowledged that private stakeholders had a right to make some decisions regarding the implementation of counterterrorism strategies (Schenk, 2020, interview; Van de Werken, 2020 interview). In addition, the NCTV left certain aspects of the ATb for private stakeholders, especially the sector coordinators, to decide.

As a consequence of the ATb 2.0, private companies had to seek local collaborations, which greatly impacted the perceived power dynamics. Instead of a single line between NS and ProRail and the NCTV, the sector coordinators were now supposed to draft and enter into a multitude of agreements with governmental actors. The requirement to conclude potentially dozens of collaborations requires extensive resources from a private stakeholder (Schenk,

2020, interview). This is perceived to be problematic for a few reasons. First, there are limited resources for drafting, entering, and monitoring agreements. Second, the private stakeholders are active on a national level. Therefore, a company like NS, which had to deal with limited resources, has a stronger preference to cooperate in an agreement with some uniform standards at the national level.

4.3.3 Leadership

Due to the NCTV's leading role in the ATb, the sector coordinators were in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the NCTV. However, the sector coordinators also fulfilled a leading role within the framework of the ATb to some extent. Based on the interviews, two relationships of private stakeholders are interesting to discuss: the relationship between the sector coordinators NS and ProRail and the relationship between the sector coordinators and normal members of the ATb. Initially, ProRail was the NCTV's primary point of contact of the railway sector (Schenk, 2020, interview). Over the years, this changed due to the understanding that terrorism risks for the railway sector seemed to focus relatively more on personnel and passengers than infrastructure. Accordingly, NS became the railway sector's primary point of contact and gained a firmer leadership role within the ATb. Furthermore, NS and ProRail played a leadership role through their relationships with the normal members of the railway sector, based on Schenk's observations (2020, interview). Even when the ATb declined in activity, they continued their initiatives to design and implement counterterrorism-focused agreements for the railway sector. The NCTV only stood on the sidelines in this regard, as the sector coordinators merely notified the NCTV about these new agreements.

The reforms implemented by the ATb 2.0 had implications for the leadership positions within the collaborative structure. NS struggled with this development in two main ways. Firstly, the NCTV did not fulfill a leading role anymore in the eyes of NS (Schenk, 2020, interview). In order to get an answer to the question on who would take the initiative when, the NS hosted sessions in which it invited the major public stakeholders, such as the NCTV, the police, and the municipalities. These efforts qualify as the earlier explained leadership tactics of framing the agenda and convening. However, none of these parties was able to provide clarity on which party was in charge. Subsequently, the NS turned its attention to the local level, especially the four largest municipalities (known as the 'G4') and Schiphol Airport, and initiated discussions to reach agreements. However, these discussions lost momentum, perhaps also because of the difficulties in creating (slightly) uniform agreements as a national organization with the different local organizations.

These experiences, in which NS attempted to show leadership but with limited success, probably explain NS' preference for the NCTV as a leader (Schenk, 2020, interview). Additionally, it also offers a plausible explanation on NS' desire for an at least partially nation-wide agreement with a leadership position fulfilled by the NCTV. NS' experiences highlighted its dependence on a stakeholder with real leadership capabilities, and this probably applies to many, if not all, other private stakeholders active on a national level, to support such an agreement.

4.3.4 Institutional design

As stated in the previous section with respect to the governmental driver's institutional design, the original ATb's degree of institutionalization—as distinguished by Liese and Beisheim (Beisheim and Campe, 2012, p. 629-630)—was medium to high, with medium to high levels regarding the obligatory status of norms, high levels regarding the precision of those norms, and low to medium levels regarding the monitoring and enforcement of norms. On top of this earlier conclusion, a slight divergence among the private companies can be observed with regard to the precision of the norms. While Van de Werken (2020, interview) considered the agreements to be clear, Schenk (2020, interview) perceived these agreements to be clear for the most part, as some elements of the agreements were merely formulated as ambitions, while others were highly detailed. Another interesting observation is the divergence between the NCTV and the private companies with regard to monitoring and compliance of the agreements of the ATb. As stated, the NCTV used sectoral exercises to monitor the private sectors (De Vries, 2020, interview), while both NS and ProRail thought there were no monitoring and compliance mechanisms in place (Schenk, 2020, interview; Van de Werken, 2020, interview). NS did rely on self-monitoring to examine their compliance with the agreements of the ATb (Schenk, 2020, interview).

From the outset of the ATb, there appeared to be a strong trust in collaboration among the fourteen selected private sectors, which was also shaped by a strong sense of interdependence. According to De Vries (2020, interview), the institutional design of the ATb played an important role in this regard. Since collaboration within the framework of the ATb would be cost-neutral and the private stakeholders would get a valuable resource (i.e. information) in return, participation was perceived to be great.

The focus on local networks due to the ATb 2.0 had strong implications for the institutional design(s) of these new local collaborations. According to Schenk (2020, interview), this led to

uncertainties perceived by his organization. The ensuing fragmentation required local tailored approaches, which can be difficult to effectively design for a national organization like NS. Nevertheless, Schenk recognized that local tailored approaches can have added value. By way of example, he referred to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which started at the national level, followed by local tailor-made solutions. Schenk approved such an approach. Moreover, NS is sometimes excluded from participating in certain local bodies led by mayors, even when such exclusions contravene the NCTV's advice. These factors, as well as a reliance on other stakeholders in counterterrorism, have strengthened NS' trust in a national cooperative framework, such as the original ATb, though supplemented—where necessary— by local tailored approaches.

4.3.5 History of cooperation

Prior to the establishment of the ATb, there had been a limited form of cooperation in the area of security between the railway sector and the government, according to Van de Werken (2020, interview). The most prominent example of cooperation had been the railway police (*spoorwegpolitie*). According to him, the control room of the railway police was right next to the railway control room, and the cooperation between the two control rooms was very close. In case of incidents, the control rooms could easily find each other and work together. The railway police was established in 1978 and differed from the other police departments in a few ways (Van Steden, 2015, p. 181-182). For instance, the officers of this department were employed by NS, but the police department had more responsibilities than 'normal' private security firms. The officers received the same training and were granted the same competences as any other police officer, but unlike other officers the authority of railway police officers was limited to trains and train stations. In 1992, NS was privatized and the company was split up into a railway operating company (i.e. NS) and a railway infrastructure management organization (i.e. ProRail) (Van Steden, 2015, p. 182-183). The railway police force initially remained the responsibility of NS, but in the wake of the company's privatization discussions on whether NS should have policing responsibilities arose. These discussions ended in 2000 when the railway police officially became part of the national police force.

In addition to the railway police, the railway sector had another form of cooperation with the government, which was the aforementioned Battle Plan Social Safety (Schenk, 2020, interview). As described, the ATb was, however, the first of its kind, as it specifically focused on counterterrorism and not on other acts of crime. It was also new because the governmental

agency involved, the NCTV, had just been founded. Obviously, NS and ProRail did not have any cooperation with this new agency.

Based on the interviewees' answers, it became clear that the (lack of) history of cooperation between the railway companies and the NCTV did not play any role for NS and ProRail to join the ATb. However, the history of cooperation in the area of security with the government in general did appear to play a role for ProRail's willingness to cooperate. There had been well-regarded experiences with regard to information exchange between the control rooms in the past (Van de Werken (2020, interview). Additionally, Van de Werken felt a gap had been left by the disappearance of the railway police. By joining the ATb, ProRail hoped, and maybe even excepted, this would fill this gap, at least to some extent. Trust in the ATb also seemed to have been derived from successful initiatives involving the government from the past, such as the railway police and Battle Plan Social Safety.

4.3.6 Uncertainty

Similar to the government, the private stakeholders acknolwedged terrorism as a serious risk after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the Madrid train bombings in 2004. According to Van de Werken (2020, interview), terrorism was not ignored before these events but it was just one of many risks. In the wake of the attacks it was more clearly recognized and it received more attention from all stakeholders, including private companies. This attention had an impact on the private stakeholders' perception of the surrounding environment in several ways, including the recognition of terrorism as a emerging complex problem and the realization that solutions to this problem could only be achieved through collaboration between a group of stakeholders encompassing both public and private actors. In light of the stronger attention terrorism received as a risk, private stakeholders were therefore eager to join the ATb (Schenk, 2020, interview). In fact, some private sectors which wanted to join the ATb out of concerns arising from terrorism, such as the agricultural sector, but were barred from doing so by the NCTV (De Vries, 2020, interview). This clearly showed that the uncertainty created by the risk of terrorism, as an external push factor, drove some private sectors' willingness to cooperate in the ATb.

The private companies' subjective perceptions of uncertainty seem unchanged. According to Schenk (2020, interview), the reasons which led NS to participate in the ATb are still valid. In other words, he still recognized the risks of terrorism. Van de Werken (2020, interview) used similar wordings to express ProRail's recognition of the risks. Accordingly, it is clear that the

perceptions on the surrounding environment continue to influence the driver of uncertainty of both private stakeholders.

4.3.7 Outcome of the collaboration

The outcome of the original ATb's collaboration appeared to have fulfilled the private companies' desires (Schenk, 2020, interview). Sectoral exercises, which were used to test the outcome of the collaborative process, strengthened trust in collaboration, albeit limited to the specific sector involved in the exercise (De Vries, 2020, interview). Since any conclusions on the basis of these exercises could not be shared with other sectors, the aforementioned '*Schwan, kleb an* effect' could not take place.

Under the current ATb 2.0 framework, the same reasons for NS' collaboration at the beginning of the ATb still applied. The government continued to have a strong information position to which a company like NS wished access to (Schenk, 2020, interview). The ATb 2.0 has led to a stronger sense of self-reliance felt by NS with regard to countering terrorism, though Schenk also expressed that he considered this to be a responsibility which should be shared with the NCTV. Specifically, he stated that NCTV should provide guidance to private stakeholders as the agency was perceived to be the government-designated organization responsible for this domain. In this way, the NCTV could offer reassurance in an area filled with complex questions.

Despite the fact the original ATb has ceased to exist, no sectoral exercises are organized anymore, and the local arrangements under ATb 2.0 do not fully contribute to the private companies' interests, there is still a strong trust in collaboration within NS (Schenk, 2020, interview). Their expressed trust focused, again, on a preference for a hybrid approach to counterterrorism, which encompassed a national framework and some additional local agreements.

4.3.8 Conclusion

Overall, the private stakeholders' desired level of action, trust, and perceived interdependence still exists, though NS in particular expressed dissatisfaction with the current framework. Schenk (2020, interview) showed a strong preference for a framework which would combine the best of both worlds by mixing elements of the original ATb and the ATb 2.0. In essence, such a structure should consist of a national framework, as the original ATb, supplemented— where necessary—by local tailored approaches, as initiated under ATb 2.0. As shown above through the discussions of individual drivers, none of the drivers have decreased the private

stakeholders' principles in a counterterrorism-focused agreement. On the contrary, they maintained or strengthened the private stakeholders' drivers, which expressed a preference for a cooperation within a framework as described in brief above. With regard to communication, a dependency on the NCTV or the government at large for useful information remains. In similar fashion, the information asymmetry is recognized as a necessity for collaboration with public stakeholders to achieve the goals of counterterrorism strategies. While Schenk (2020, interview) expressed unhappiness with the lack of leadership of any public stakeholder, including the NCTV, this had no impact on the perceived reliance. Instead, it emphasized the desire to collaborate with a public stakeholder that acts as a strong leader. Similarly, the current fragmentation of collaborations and exclusion from certain local structures created problems for NS, but out of these problems grew an eagerness for at least some uniform standards at the national level which facilitate and safeguard effective collaboration. With respect to the history of cooperation, the gap left by the national police has fueled the private stakeholders' expectations and trust with the NCTV in an attempt to fill this gap. Finally, the unchanged uncertainty (with perceptions of risk remaining high) and the outcome of the collaboration have also not had any effect on the private stakeholders' perceptions of the surrounding environment and the levels in trust of cooperation, respectively.

4.4 Analysis

This section compares and contrasts the governmental drivers with the private drivers of the willingness to cooperate in the ATb, supported and supplemented by several analytical comments on the major findings of the case studies. Subsequently, some additional stand-alone analyses on the drivers and principles are provided.

Communication as a driver focused in the eyes of both public and private stakeholders on the existence of information asymmetries and the desire to gain access to useful information in the domain of security. Despite the interviewees' recognition of information asymmetries, dependencies on other parties' information was seen as a two-way street. Schenk (2020, interview) and Van de Werken (2020, interview) noted the importance for their organizations to gain access to information held by the NCTV (and other governmental agencies), while De Vries (2020, interview) highlighted the essential involvement of private stakeholders in the ATb. Both the NCTV and private stakeholders (in their roles as sector coordinators) created broadly two communication channels within the ATb.

The significant reduction in objective communication had different implications for the NCTV and the private stakeholders, undermining the former's trust in collaboration, yet not

harming the private stakeholders' trust. Lastly, the '*Schwan, kleb an* effect' warrants attention. The new arrangements after the reforms of the ATb 2.0 do not facilitate any intersectoral exchanges. Consequently, this could cause problems as private sectors which underestimate the risk of terrorism will not be corrected through engagements with private stakeholders who are active in the domain of counterterrorism. Additionally, the lack of certain forms of objective communication, such as meetings with private sectors, might (further) negatively affect the NCTV's trust on similar grounds. As De Vries (2020, interview) stated that engagements with proactive stakeholders kept the NCTV focused.

Closely connected to communication, power dynamics also concentrated on asymmetries and dependencies between the NCTV and private stakeholders. At the outset of the ATb, both sets of stakeholders were convinced that collaboration between them was the only way to achieve the objectives of the ATb. For the NCTV, a lack of authority-based power in the sense of Purdy's concept (2012, p. 410-411) forced the agency to collaborate with private sectors. For the private stakeholders, and in this case NS, it was an internal push factor (i.e. the absence of certain information which the NCTV held) that incentivized action. This necessity remained unchanged for NS throughout the years. However, the NCTV developed over time a preference for collaborations with local partners, and appeared less convinced of its dependency on the ATb's private stakeholders.

Leadership was not a priority for any of the stakeholders involved in the ATb. Although the NCTV acted like a leader in the beginning, it reduced its leadership role during the subsequent years and basically transferred it to 'local triangles' with the advent of the ATb 2.0. Meanwhile, NS attempted to display some acts of leadership based on the realization that leadership was necessary, but these acts had limited success and NS ultimately stopped with them. The NCTV's original display of leadership within the ATb arose from a perceived sense of reliance (without the NCTV's leadership, the ATb would not be initiated; without the ATb, the NCTV's objectives would not be achieved), but the NCTV's changed role later on did seem to be affected by this reasoning at all. NS, however, became more convinced of the necessity of leadership by the NS and, as a result, maintained its conviction that the desirable structure would involve the NCTV in a leadership position.

The institutional design of the ATb affected the trust in collaboration and sense of interdependence of the NCTV and the private stakeholders in different ways. The NCTV considered it essential that no legally binding agreements were made on the basis of the ATb. The private stakeholders, on the other hand, prioritized the financial burden of the ATb,

deeming it attractive that the ATb was cost-neutral for them (and with a valuable resource in return). On the basis of the ATb 2.0, new agreements were supposed to be concluded between the NCTV and the private stakeholders, but this did not happen. The private stakeholders indicated a strong desire for such agreements, perhaps in part also because of their discontent with the current completely local arrangements in place. The ensuing situation seems to suggest that the NCTV developed a limited trust and a reduced perception of mutual reliance and the private stakeholders remained a strong sense of trust and interdependence on collaboration with the NCTV on a national level, complemented by some local agreements but only where necessary.

The history of cooperation as a driver had, again, different effects. Simply put, the history of cooperation did not play a role for the NCTV, since it was a new agency. For the private sectors, and the railway sector in particular, the ATb filled a gap, which was left after the abolishment of the railway police. Prior to this, the railway police represented a tight link between the railway's and government's security structures. The aspiration, and perhaps even the expectation, to fill the gap left by the disappearance of the railway police shaped the railway sector's interest and trust in participating in the ATb.

With regard to uncertainty, a strong divergence between the NCTV and the private stakeholders as time passed by can be observed. According to De Vries (2020, interview), the time elapsed since the major terrorist attacks in the beginning of the 2000s and the absence of new attacks led to a reduced attention to terrorism as a risk. This is contrary to Schenk's (2020, interview) and Van de Werken's (2020, interview) perceptions, as they considered these risks to be unchanged. De Vries' perception might show similarities to what is known as the 'prevention paradox', which entails that the very fact that stakeholders took measures, such as the ones taken in the framework of the ATb, actually prevented the risks from manifesting themselves. Either way, this does not eliminate the realization of all the stakeholders involved in the beginning of the ATb that cooperation was required to address the emerging complex problem of terrorism. Besides, the divergence which developed later on also highlights a possible explanation for the differences in the perceptions on the surrounding environment. Driven by these perceptions, the NCTV grew convinced that a new solution to the perceived problems and risks was necessary, while the private stakeholders' views remained constant.

Outcome, as the final driver, also requires a brief explanation as they had different impacts on both groups of stakeholders' trust levels. The NCTV wished to maintain a positive outcome of

the collaborative process and therefore supported the transition to the local levels under ATb 2.0. The private companies, in contrast, were not convinced of this transition's necessity and they do not appear to have been convinced ever since. Instead, they seem to back a return, at least in part, to the traditional ATb in order to maintain the wanted outcomes, with the maintenance of some minor changes as introduced by the ATb 2.0 only.

Based on the above discussions of the governmental and private drivers and the related principles, the following conclusions can be drawn on the NCTV's and the private stakeholders' willingness to cooperate in the ATb. At the start of the ATb, the willingness to cooperate of all stakeholders seemed high. However, this did not stay the same throughout the ATb.

With respect to the NCTV, all three principles affected the willingness to cooperate in the ATb in a negative manner. The NCTV's reduced number of actions (as explained in the context of power dynamics) and its changed perceptions on the surrounding environment (as explained in the context of uncertainty) negatively influenced the principle of time. The decreased flow of communication (and ultimately, a complete disappearance of it), the ATb 2.0's focus on local arrangements, as opposed to the national agreements with the private stakeholders (as explained in the context of institutional design), and the developed preference for a different approach to reach the same outcome undermined the NCTV's principle of trust, i.e. the confidence in collaborating with the private stakeholders in the manner it had done this under the original ATb. The NCTV's reduced perceived reliance on the private stakeholders (as explained in the contexts of power dynamics, leadership, and institutional design) negatively impacted the principle of interdependence.

With respect to the private stakeholders, the influence of the three principles on the willingness to cooperate in the ATb remained largely the same. The private stakeholders' continued reliance on the NCTV's resources (as explained in the context of power dynamics), their possible expectations derived from past interactions like the railway police (as explained in the context of the history of cooperation), and their unchanged perceptions on the surrounding environment (as explained in the context of uncertainty) kept the principle of time as highly affected as before. Past pleasant experiences regarding communicated information from the NCTV, also before the advent of the ATb (as explained in the context of the history of cooperation), as well as wishful expectations regarding this for the (near) future (as explained in the context of communication), problems with the current local structures under the ATb 2.0 (as explained in the context of institutional design), and the desire for a

return to a predominantly national framework (as explained in the context of the outcome of the collaboration) have driven the private stakeholders' principle of trust, and more specifically, their confidence in collaborating in a hybrid framework (i.e. a national framework with local elements). The private stakeholders' unchanged perceived reliance on the NCTV (as explained in the contexts of power dynamics, leadership, and institutional design) has left the principle of interdependence as strong as ever. All in all, these three principles have shaped the private stakeholders' willingness to cooperate in a national framework, such as the original ATb, though supplemented—where necessary—by local tailored approaches, as initiated under ATb 2.0.

In short, the two analyses demonstrate a divergence in the willingness to cooperate between the NCTV and the private stakeholders throughout the evolution of the ATb. At first, the willingness to cooperate was clearly present for both groups of stakeholders. As time passed by, the NCTV lost its willingness to cooperate with the private stakeholders, as its levels of trust in the collaboration as well as its perceived reliance on the stakeholders lowered and due to (in)actions by the NCTV and (perceived) actions by the surrounding environment. Meanwhile, private stakeholders kept their willingness to cooperate with the NCTV. As all drivers positively influenced the principles of time, trust, and interdependence, the private stakeholders' willingness to cooperate was reinforced, if not strengthened. Experiences with local structures within the framework of the ATb 2.0 have created a desire for a return to a national framework led by the NCTV, with opportunities for local solutions but only if necessary.

5. Conclusion

<u>5.1 Conclusion</u>

The central research question of this paper was: *How do different drivers have an impact on the willingness to cooperate of the government and private companies in participating in a collaborative governance structure?* In order to answer this question, several steps were undertaken.

First of all, the theoretical framework was set out. Discussions on the responsibilization strategy and policing contextualized the emergence and functioning of collaborative governance structures, which as a concept was subsequently further elaborated. Next, a stand-alone framework to assess the willingness to collaborate of participants in a collaborative governance structure was designed, building on insights from several authors. Specifically, so-called drivers and principles of the willingness to cooperate were determined and the relationships between drivers and principles were specified. The academic literature discussed multiple factors which drive stakeholders to participate in a collaborative governance structure. By means of a critical literature review, this paper determined seven drivers: communication, power dynamics, leadership, institutional design, the history of cooperation, uncertainty, and the outcome of the collaboration. In addition, this paper identified three principles: time, trust, and interdependence. Each driver is related to one or more principles, as shown in Figure 1.

Secondly, this paper formulated the central research question and explained the applied research methodology, including an explanation of the relevant aspects of the research design and the multiple-case study on the ATb. As explained, the roles of the NCTV and the private stakeholders within the ATb formed two separate cases. The ATb was selected as the focus of the case studies, because it was considered an appropriate and interesting example of a collaborative governance structure. Since the ATb involved actors from the public and private sectors and the purpose of the structure was to serve a public goal, it satisfied both criteria of a collaborative governance structure.

Thirdly, this paper conducted the multiple-case study on the ATb. To that end, the ATb was introduced, and the relevant aspects surrounding its establishment and developments were discussed. Subsequently, the governmental drivers and private drivers of the willingness to cooperate in the ATb were separately discussed. Three interviews with representatives of stakeholders in the ATb, i.e. the NCTV, NS, and ProRail, provided a substantial amount of

data, which was used as input for the discussions on the drivers. The discussions also addressed the effects of the drivers on the three principles. Finally, the main findings of this paper were that the willingness to cooperate of all stakeholders had been high at the beginning of the ATb and during the structure's first few years. Over time, however, a divergence between the NCTV's willingness to cooperate and the private stakeholders' willingness to cooperate appeared. Almost all drivers negatively affected the three principles underlying the NCTV's willingness to cooperate with the private stakeholders. In contrast, the private stakeholders' willingness to cooperate remained the same to a large extent. All drivers reinforced or even strengthened the three principles underlying the private stakeholders' willingness to cooperate with the NCTV. Due to the shift to the ATb 2.0, which introduced a focus on local structures, private stakeholders developed a strong desire for the previous (national) framework with the NCTV as a leader and some local tailor-made approaches whenever needed.

5.2 Discussion

The findings of this research added value to the current state of research in the domains of collaborative governance structures and counterterrorism. As explained, Garland's research on the responsibilization strategy only focused on the perspective of the government and thus ignored the increasingly important role of private companies in crime control processes. This paper closely examined both public and private perspectives in collaborative governance structures against the background of the responsibilization strategy. An important finding in this regard is that, in the case of the ATb, it became clear that without a proactive stance from a public stakeholder like the NCTV, it will be difficult for a collaborative governance structure to successfully emerge and sustain. Even when a private stakeholder, such as NS, shows a strong willingness to cooperate and is even willing to take on leadership responsibilities, it encounters all sorts of difficulties. Accordingly, a lesson for legislators and policymakers would be to critically examine the necessary roles and responsibilities of its public actors when designing collaborative governance structures.

On a more specific level, some findings of this research are especially relevant for the ATb. The ATb and the ATb 2.0 have a combined age of approximately a decade and a half. This paper provided insights into the functioning of this collaborative governance structure. So far, this research remains the first to (publicly) assess the ATb from the perspective of models on the willingness to cooperate in a collaborative governance structure. As the ATb has evolved over a considerable period of time, the findings of this research could provide input for further

improvement of the ATb. Moreover, no public sources—as far as this research was able to find—have as of yet noted the significantly reduced activity of the ATb or the current issues surrounding the local collaborative structures, as especially highlighted by Schenk (2020, interview). Given the key role of the ATb in Dutch counterterrorism strategies, this finding should perhaps invite discussions on the desirability of these developments at the political and governance levels.

Finally, the theoretical framework composed of the drivers and principles of a stakeholder's willingness to cooperate in a collaborative governance structure was specifically designed for this research. Moreover, it was applied in a multiple-case study setting. Building on work of several authors, especially Ansell and Gash (2007) and Emerson et al. (2012), the framework of this research aimed to provide a tool to provide greater insights into a stakeholder's willingness to cooperate in a collaborative governance structure. The theoretical model, as depicted in Figure 1, can be used by other researchers when conducting research into the willingness to cooperate of stakeholders in (successors to) the ATb and other collaborative governance structures.

5.3 Further research

Given the earlier discussed limitations of this research, there are several possibles for further research. First of all, the ATb itself could be the subject of more studies. This research heavily built on data obtained from interviewees working in the railway sector. Because of this, there is inherently a restriction on the ability to generalize certain statements and other explanations offered by representatives of NS and ProRail and to consider them valid for other sectors as well. Since many other sectors have also been involved in the ATb, it is relevant to assess the validity of certain conclusions for all private stakeholders involved. Furthermore, the two private stakeholders which were the focus of this research were sector coordinators within the ATb. It is also relevant to study the willingness to cooperate of normal members. Finally, further research should aim to gain a better understanding of the current dynamics within the NCTV. This research relied on data provided by a representative of the NCTV with a relatively greater involvement during the earlier phases of the NCTV's activity within the ATb.

On a more general level, stakeholders' willingness to cooperate in other collaborative governance structures is in need of further research. Due to the academic and societal relevance of the topic, which is ever-increasing because of the further implementation of the responsibilization strategy, the functioning of collaborative governance structures warrants

detailed scrutiny. More extensive research on this topic also creates additional benefits, as it allows researchers to build on each other's insights and to improve the applied theoretical frameworks, including the one constructed for this research. Such studies should certainly address an area which is currently largely overlooked by the current theoretical frameworks, which is the dynamics among drivers as well as the dynamics among principles of the willingness to cooperate. All in all, these efforts will help to find solutions that mitigate actual and potential problems and complexities pertaining to collaborative governance structures, while allowing society and all stakeholders to reap the benefits of collaboration.

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