



Universiteit Leiden

Problems, policies and politics:

A multiple-stream approach to the French and British intervention in Libya (2011)

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Word count: 19,078

The Hague, 7th October 2020

Abstract

This thesis focuses on the factors that led to the military intervention of France and the United Kingdom in Libya in 2011. Both actors were at the forefront of discussions regarding how the international community should answer to the threat to civilians posed by the Gaddafi regime, and remained prominently engaged throughout the process leading to the UN-mandated and NATO-led intervention. This research applies the multiple-stream framework as developed by John Kingdon (1984), to identify factors within the problem, policy and political streams defined by the theory. This allowed for several factors and actors crucial to the process to be identified, and for a comparison between the cases of France and the United Kingdom to be established. Overall, the cases share similarities and differences. The multiple-stream framework analysis offers valuable insights into the processes at different levels of analysis, although the qualitative nature of this research hinders possibilities for generalizability.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AU	African Union
BHL	Bernard-Henri Lévy
CER	Center for European Reform
CERI	Centre de Recherches Internationales (Sciences Po)
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
EU	European Union
EUISS	EU Institute for Security Studies
Fondapol	Fondation pour l'Innovation Politique
FRS	Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICC	International Criminal Court
Ifri	Institut Français des Relations Internationales
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IRSEM	Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire
MENA	Middle-East and North Africa
MSF	Multiple-stream Framework
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFSL	National Front for the Salvation of Libya
NTC	National Transitional Council
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
P3	France, UK, US within the UN
PSC	AU Peace and Security Council
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	UN Security Council
US	United States of America

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1. Introduction

In 2011, pro-democratic protests and uprisings developed in numerous North African and Middle Eastern countries. These protests – known as the Arab Spring – originated in Tunisia in December 2010. Despite general characteristics that can be applied to every state where the Arab Spring unfolded, specific national and historical contexts influenced the sequence of events during the protests, and the outcomes. Egypt’s transition from the rule of Hosni Mubarak to Mohamed Morsi was very different from Syria’s uprisings leading to a civil war still ongoing nowadays.

During the Arab Spring, protests occurred in Libya¹; what started as peaceful protests and civil unrest escalated into an insurrection, then a civil war, in less than a week. In 1996, the government killed over 1,200 prisoners of the Abu Salim prison (Tripoli); this event is commonly referred to as the Abu Salim prison massacre (Human Rights Watch, 2011a). On February 15th, 2011, Libyan authorities arrested two human rights activists, Fathi Terbil and Farag Sharany, advocating for justice and trial of the ones responsible for the Abu Salim prison massacre; on the same day, protesters gathered in Benghazi and Bediya to protest and demand their release (Human Rights Watch, 2011a). Within a day, these originally peaceful demonstrations turned into violent clashes against government forces. Over the next few days, tensions increased and so did governmental retaliation; by February 20th, the situation turned into a full-scale civil war in Libya.

In a regional context where the Arab Spring was unfolding, the situation in Libya raised deep concerns over humanitarian considerations: the course of events led the international community to believe that civilians were endangered, and that atrocities would be committed

¹ The name “Libya” is used throughout this paper to refer to Libya, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1977-2011).

by the Gaddafi regime on its opponents. This was exacerbated by the reception of reports relating house searches and arrests by Gaddafi supporters (UN News, 2011).

On March 17th, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted in favor of Resolution 1973, which imposed a no-fly zone on Libya, and authorized “all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.” The military intervention in Libya was launched on March 19th, 2011, and was terminated on October 31st, 2011. It was divided in two phases: from March 19th until March 31st, an international coalition operation was led by the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and France. It was the first phase of the military intervention, during which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was not yet responsible for the military operations. The second period is from March 31st until October 31st, during which NATO Operation Unified Protector oversaw all military activities in Libya.

France and the UK have been quite unanimously perceived as the two states that were advocating for an intervention in Libya (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014; Davidson, 2013; Gaub, 2014; Gomis, 2011; Hehir & Murray, 2013). Within the international community however, there was no consensus over whether an UN-led operation should be implemented, let alone how it should be overseen.

This thesis research considers the military intervention in Libya in 2011, and focuses on France, the UK, and their decision to intervene. Therefore, the research question that this thesis seeks to answer is: *What factors led to the French and British military intervention in Libya in 2011?*

Two different states, with each their own domestic dynamics and contexts, with the same policy outcome: what was similar and what differed between them? Through this analysis, this research aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of this specific case, Libya, and of foreign policy processes. It aims to explain the outcome – the military intervention in Libya –

with the multiple-stream framework as developed by John Kingdon, by demonstrating that the interactions between the three streams provide the main explanations for the outcome.

To do so, this thesis primarily focuses on domestic factors and actors, while still providing the reader with a detailed background and context, crucial to the understanding of the case and to the development of the main arguments. This research focuses on the factors that led up to the intervention; therefore, it will not address the entirety of the intervention, but will focus on the period from the start of the protests on February 15th, to the start of NATO's Operation Unified Protector (March 31st).

To answer the main research question, this thesis is based on the theoretical framework developed by John Kingdon, originally published in 1984 in the book *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*: the multiple-stream framework (MSF). Kingdon's theory was developed based on domestic public policies in the US; yet, this research applies the theory to foreign policy decisions of two (then) EU states. This poses questions as to how appropriate the theory is to this research, and why it was selected. Many scholars have applied, developed and stretched Kingdon's theory, and the instances and contexts in which it is used (e.g. Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Béland, 2016; Greer, 2015; Howlett et al., 2015, 2016; Zahariadis, 2007).

Kingdon's theory provides an explanation of agenda-setting and decision-making, through analyzing (a) why and how some issues are placed on the policy agenda while others are not, (b) why and how policy solutions are created and adopted, and (c) who are the actors involved in the policy processes. The main premise of this theory is that three streams are involved in agenda-setting and policy processes: the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream. The streams are separated yet interconnected. When these three streams come together, a window of opportunity opens; it draws on the streams to specify the agenda, and the policy options, or solutions, available to address the problem (Kingdon, 2014). This brief summary aims to demonstrate the versatility and adaptability of the theory to many cases, and

different types of policies. Even though it is applied to a context considerably different from the one in which it was developed, its broad characteristics and the subsequent literature developing the theory make it appropriate for this project.

The theory of the multiple-stream framework as developed by Kingdon encompasses and integrates different explanations, including the role of different actors and timing, under one theoretical framework. Therefore, it is especially adapted to the topic of this research, which aims to specify the factors that led both France and the UK to intervene in Libya.

This research is focused on the military intervention, and more specifically, the reasons behind the UK and France's involvement. There have been numerous researches done on the Libyan civil war and the international coalition intervention; some have a specific focus on the humanitarian aspect of it, and the justifications employed to intervene, such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) international commitment (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Bucher et al., 2013; Davidson, 2013; Kuperman, 2013; Lubura-Winchester & Jones, 2013; Saba & Akbarzadeh, 2017; Zambakari, 2016); others have researched the media representation of the war (Alalawi, 2015; Bucher et al., 2013); it has also been used as a case-study to theorize how power dynamics work in practice (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014).

This research contributes to the academic literature by testing an existing theory, and applying it to a case that has not been analyzed through this lens before. It aims to explain the dynamics that led to the intervention in Libya; not only does this develop the theory, but it also aims to identify, comprehensively describe and analyze policy processes, and contribute to a broader body of knowledge, not only academic, but also societal.

This research is a comparative qualitative study, and it focuses on a single case-study: the military intervention in Libya is the case, and it has a specific focus on two states that were involved, France and the UK. The method of data collection is document-based, and the method of analysis is a document analysis. The main theoretical framework used is the multiple-stream

framework as advanced by John Kingdon (2014). This research follows a deductive development of arguments and hypotheses: it draws from the theory, to test it against the data.

This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the background and timeline of events over the period this research focuses on. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of this research: it includes the academic perspectives on the Libyan intervention, a presentation of different frameworks of policy analysis and the multiple-stream framework. It also presents the theoretical expectations of this research. Chapter 4 addresses research design, including the justification of the case selection, the methodology, and the limitations of this research. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the analysis and the findings, relating them to the previously formulated theoretical expectations. The analysis itself, conducted following the basis presented in Chapter 4, can be found in the appendix. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis, followed by the bibliography and the appendix.

2. Background and Timeline

This section introduces the chronology of events in Libya. It presents a broad picture of the situation for the actors at the center of this analysis, and it includes a table that retraces the main events, as well as the publication date of the document analyzed in this thesis (Table 1). The purpose of the table is twofold: firstly, to introduce the main events in greater details, and to offer a clear overview of the chronology and most of the actors involved; secondly, to situate the documents within the timeline.

In 1951, the United Nations (UN) voted to create an independent country, and Libya was created out of three historically distinct regions: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan (Siebens & Case, 2012, p. 5). What was now Libya had been occupied by the British and the Italians, and was united under the rule of King Idris. In 1969, a military coup deposed the King, and Muammar Gaddafi became the leader of Libya for the next forty-two years (Siebens & Case, 2012, p. 5). Throughout his leadership, Libya's relations with the West were tense and ambivalent (Zoubir, 2009, p. 401). Libya's foreign policy was based on radical Arab nationalism, and the government supported revolutionary and terrorist movements and groups, which did not align with the West's positions (Zoubir, 2009, p. 401). The Lockerbie attack in 1988 and the UTA Flight 772 attack in 1989 resulted in sanctions against Libya. In 2003, the sanctions were lifted and Libya abandoned its nuclear programme, which led to the normalization of relations between Libya and the West (Zoubir, 2009, p. 407).

Before the events of 2011, the EU was an important trading partner for Libya: 70% of Libya's total trade, amounting to around 36.3 billion euros in 2010 (European Commission, 2020). Furthermore, Libya was, and still is, strategic in regulating illegal migration to European states (Zoubir, 2009, p. 408). During the civil war, the number of migrants trying to flee the

violence and reach Europe increased, posing a threat to EU border security (Davidson, 2013, p. 310; Payandeh, 2012, p. 366).

The 2011 protests in Libya occurred within a broader regional context of the Arab Spring. The demonstrations started as a protest to the arrest of Fathi Terbil and Farag Sharany (Human Rights Watch, 2011a; BBC News, 2011d). They were both part of a group which had organized public protests for two years, calling for an independent investigation into the killings of the Abu Salim massacre. Terbil was a group spokesman and lawyer who represented the relatives of more than 1,000 prisoners killed, and Sharany was a spokesman for the group (Human Rights Watch, 2011a).

The demonstrations rapidly turned into violent protests against Gaddafi and the government. On February 17th, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), a political opposition party, called for a “Day of Rage,”² during which clashes between pro- and anti-Gaddafi groups occurred, causing numerous injuries and deaths across Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2011a). Within a week, the protestors gained control of Benghazi. On February 20th, multiple cities, including Benghazi and Misrata, were under the control of rebel groups. This day is considered to mark the beginning of the civil war. On February 26th, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 1970, which imposed sanctions in Libya, demanded an immediate ceasefire, and referred the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

On February 27th, the opposition National Transitional Council (NTC) was created in Benghazi. The Council was headed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, former Minister of Justice under Gaddafi; Fathi Terbil and Mahmoud Jibril were also members from its creation. On March 5th, it declared itself the only legitimate government of Libya (Internet Archive, 2011). The first connection between the NTC and Sarkozy was established by Bernard-Henri Lévy (BHL), a

² Also referred to as “Day of Anger” (Human Rights Watch, 2011a).

French writer and philosopher (Girard, 2011). On March 4th, BHL, who was in Libya and met with Abdul Jalil in Benghazi, contacted Sarkozy, asking him if he would like to receive NTC representatives. Sarkozy agreed, and on March 10th, NTC officials were received at the Elysée. On the same day, France recognized the NTC as the sole legitimate government of Libya, becoming the first actor to do so to the surprise of many, including EU member-states (20 minutes, 2011).

On March 17th, the UNSC (then composed of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, the UK and the US) voted on and adopted Resolution 1973, with ten votes in favor, none against and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia). The Resolution demanded the “establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians.” It also authorized UN members to take “all necessary measures” to “protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack,” provided they informed the Secretary General of the measures taken (UN, 2011). The Resolution also acknowledged the efforts of the African Union (AU) to find solutions to the conflict, including the creation of the ad hoc High-Level Committee to Libya by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on March 10th.

Once Resolution 1973 was adopted, Gaddafi called for a ceasefire; however, reports indicated that his regime did not respect it (Black, 2011b). On March 19th, the international coalition operation was launched: led by France, the UK and the US, its goal was to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. The US code name for this operation was Odyssey Dawn; for the French, it was Operation Harmattan; and for the British, Ellamy. On March 31st, NATO assumed command of the coalition and of all operations in Libya, launching Operation Unified Protector and terminating the international coalition operation.

Throughout this period, two actors were at the forefront to draft a Resolution on Libya: France and the UK (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 898; Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Davidson, 2013). Many other actors were reluctant to support an intervention, such as the five who abstained on the vote of Resolution 1973, EU members including Germany and Italy, and another NATO member, Turkey. Some questions rise: what was the response of the African Union, and why was it not at the forefront of the discussion on the situation in Libya? Why, and how, did France and the UK take on this leadership role in preparing and drafting a response to the situation in Libya? How did France and the UK manage to convince the initially reluctant US to intervene? Why did reluctant UNSC, EU and NATO members eventually support the military intervention? These questions have been a focus of academic literature analyzing the intervention, and are also at the core of this research (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014; Bellamy & Williams, 2011; De Waal, 2013; Kasaija, 2013). Due to space constraints, they will not necessarily all be addressed in depth; they are however crucial to the understanding of the international scene at that time, and therefore of France's and the UK's decision to intervene.

It should be noted from the onset that both then and in retrospect, many observers have indicated inaccuracies in the reports and facts on which the intervention was justified. As it will be demonstrated throughout this thesis, the coverage and understanding of the situation in Libya, especially in the West, was characterized by a demonization of Gaddafi, as well as a fear for civilian casualties and a potential "bloodbath" (Abbas, 2011). In the West, the initial protests were portrayed as peaceful, democratic and nationwide throughout Libya – although this was the case for the first two days, they rapidly turned violent; they started in the East, and tribalism and religious extremism also played a crucial role in how they developed (Kuperman, in Hehir & Murray, 2013, p. 213). Kuperman writes:

Gaddafi's response was not to slaughter peaceful protesters or bombard civilian areas indiscriminately, as reported in the West, but rather to target rebels and violent protesters relatively narrowly, to reduce collateral harm to non-combatants. By no means does this excuse the Libyan government's response, which may have included criminal acts. But the statistics, testimony and documentary evidence indicate that the Gaddafi regime committed no bloodbaths during the war, and had no intention of doing so. When NATO intervened, it misperceived the situation, believing that government forces already had slaughtered thousands of peaceful protesters and were about to perpetrate a bloodbath in Benghazi. If Western countries had accurately perceived Libya's conflict in late February and early March 2011, NATO would have been much less likely to launch the intervention that gravely exacerbated humanitarian suffering in Libya and its neighbours. (Kuperman, in Hehir & Murray, 2013, p. 213)

Furthermore, the P3 (France, the UK and the US) were especially efficient in framing and constructing the intervention in the media, stressing the necessity and responsibility to protect civilians. Compared to the menacing speeches and allocutions of Gaddafi, e.g. on February 22nd, such an approach seemed legitimate and pragmatic (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 899; Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 847; Bucher et al., 2013). The P3 contrasted their views against others supporting an approach based on diplomacy, sanctions and negotiations, portraying it as "irresponsible," and unwilling to protect the civilians (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 909).

The AU's Constitutive Act article 4(h) provides the right to the Union to "intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity." This served as a basis for the communiqués that were published by the AU. In retrospect, it has been argued that the AU was not able to present a united front to the issue, nor did it provide the financial, military and

diplomatic resources to present a viable alternative to the French and British leadership (De Waal, 2013; Kasaija, 2013). Furthermore, the Resolution seemed to incorporate some of the AU concerns; however, AU leaders have felt wronged by the way their position was misrepresented, and how the intervention “stretched the bounds of legality” (De Waal, 2013, p. 378).

The P3 were aware that any intervention would need the support of regional organizations and powers. With the American history of intervention in the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) region, and the colonial past of France and the UK, the intervention could not be perceived as a neo-colonial attempt to pursue their interests in the region. Gaddafi accused Resolution 1973 of being a “flagrant act of colonization” (Black, [2011b](#)). The Arab League suspended Libya’s membership on February 21st. Lebanon being a member of the UNSC then, it acted as a linkage between, and a representative of, the Arab League and the Security Council (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 899).

On February 21st, UN Libyan Deputy Permanent Representative Ibrahim Dabbashi defected Gaddafi’s regime. Upon request from the French and British delegations, Dabbashi wrote a letter to the Council presidency asking for a Security Council meeting; he was seen as representing the voice of the Libyan people, despite people doubting his credentials, and Gaddafi wanting to send a replacement (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 899). French and British diplomats also asked Dabbashi to write to the Presidency to request an ICC referral. This counterbalanced the argument of some to wait for the opinions and decisions of regional organizations first, which ultimately led to South Africa, Russia and China to “give up” on their resisting positions (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 900).

Time pressure played an important role in advancing the agenda the French and British put forward. The timeframe of the situation shows just how fast the situation developed. It was accompanied by the French and British drafting a resolution on a no-fly zone early on, which

was included in Resolution 1973; this added a sense of urgency to decide on a course of action, and pressuring other states to action (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 901; Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 840).

Domestic context in France

To situate the context in more detail, these two sections focus on the domestic situation in France and the UK, both in regards to Libya and at the time of the civil war.

Sarkozy was elected in 2007, and his campaign has been linked to the Gaddafi regime: on March 16th, 2011, Saïf al-Islam Gaddafi accused him of having accepted Libyan funding to finance his presidential campaign, an amount of 50 million euros (Euronews, 2011). Sarkozy and the people involved denied it, and the investigation is still ongoing.

The ties between the French government, especially Sarkozy, and Gaddafi, also included the lengthy diplomatic and judicial procedure regarding the Bulgarian nurses affair, involving five nurses and a Palestinian doctor, accused of crimes committed in Libya by the Libyan government. The affair was resolved in 2007, during Sarkozy's presidency. Gaddafi was then received "en grande pompe" (with great fanfare) in Paris the same year (Le Monde, 2007). During his visit, several contracts have been concluded, including 296 million euros of "orders," and a protocol of agreement for the purchase of 14 Rafales (Veron, 2011).

The civil war in Libya was perceived as a turning point for Sarkozy. His government was accused of not having reacted quickly enough to the situation in Tunisia and Egypt (Vergnaud, 2011). On February 27th, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Michèle Alliot-Marie resigned, after a polemic surrounding her support and proximity with the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, especially as the Arab Spring unfolded in Tunisia. Alain Juppé succeeded her on the same day.

In 2011, the next presidential elections were a year away. Sarkozy ran for re-election, but Hollande was elected. It is sensible to note that popularity prior to elections is important for a candidate; therefore, the support for the government's decision to intervene can be crucial. His popularity increased around March 2011 after a period of decline, and increased again by the end of 2011 (TNS Sofres, 2011; Le Point, 2011b).

Domestic context in the UK

It was in March 2004, following a visit of Tony Blair to Tripoli, that British and Libyan relations were normalized, or at least working towards it. These renewed relations including potential future deals with the British defense industry (Oliver, 2004). The same year, Shell also signed an important deal with Libya (Oliver, 2004).

Cameron's premiership in 2010 was accompanied by a coalition government. A poll conducted in January 2011 showed that Cameron's popularity had decreased within the first year of his premiership (Business Insider, 2011).

The responses of Cameron and the British government as whole to the Arab Spring as it unfolded have been deemed inconsistent and selective (Leech & Gaskarth, 2015). Similarly to what Sarkozy and the French government were criticized for, their reaction ranged from having none, to lobbying for a military intervention in Libya at the UN (Leech & Gaskarth, 2015).

These sections aimed to briefly present some aspects of the domestic context in both cases. This will be elaborated upon throughout this paper. Below, Table 1 presents a detailed account of the main events regarding Libya.

Table 1. Chronology of the main events regarding the situation in Libya between February 15th – March 31st 2011, and publication dates of analyzed documents.

Date	Event
15 February	People in Benghazi, al-Bayda and Derna assemble on the streets to demand the release of family members of Abu Salim massacre victims; protests turn violent within a day, and Libyan security forces responded violently.
17 February	“Day of Rage” call by the NFSL; clashes between pro- and anti-Gaddafi groups, numerous injuries and deaths across Libya.
17 February	<i>“Nouvel appel à manifester en Libye” (Le Monde, 2011b) – problem.</i>
18 February	Libyan security forces withdraw from Benghazi and rally in the Katiba compound.
19 February	<i>“Luis Martinez : “Il sera difficile de contraindre le régime de Kadhafi à une retenue dans la répression”” (Tuquoi, 2011) – problem.</i>
20 February	Suicide-bomber drives into walls of the Katiba compound; soldiers retreat, Benghazi under rebel control. Multiple cities now under control of armed rebel groups, aiming to overthrow the government: civil war in Libya. US and EU issue statements condemning use of force against demonstrators.
20 February	<i>“Libya protests: reports of intense Benghazi violence” (BBC News, 2011a) – problem.</i> <i>Chatham House: “Libya Uprising: What Next for Gaddafi's Regime?” (Dalton, 2011) – policy.</i>
21 February	UN Libyan Deputy Permanent Representative Ibrahim Dabbashi defects from Gaddafi’s regime, reports government’s use of mercenaries against demonstrators.
22 February	Gaddafi’s speech on television, threatening the opposition. Arab League suspends Libya until it meets its demands to stop all violence. UNSC meeting.
22 February	<i>“Gaddafi urges violent showdown and tells Libya ‘I’ll die a martyr’” (Black, 2011a) – problem.</i> <i>“UK calls for UN action on Libya” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011) – problem.</i>
23 February	First AU meeting regarding Libya: issues statement condemning use of force against civilians.
23 February	<i>“Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur la situation politique en Libye” (Elysée, 2011) – problem.</i>
25 February	Human Rights Council passes resolution condemning human rights violations; request a commission of inquiry to investigate.

25 February	<i>“UN: Act on Rights Council’s decision on Libya” (Human Rights Watch, 2011b) – policy.</i>
26 February	UNSC unanimously passes Resolution 1970: imposes sanctions on Libya, demands immediate ceasefire, refers the case to the ICC, calls upon member-states to provide humanitarian and related assistance.
27 February	Formation of the NTC in Benghazi. NATO starts discussing possible no-fly zone. Alliot-Marie resigns; Juppé becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs.
1 March	NTC declares itself only legitimate government of Libya. UN General Assembly unanimously suspends Libya from Human Rights Council.
2 March	<i>“Shashank Joshi: This revolution is far more complex than we imagine” (Joshi, 2011) – problem.</i>
3 March	ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo states ongoing investigation of alleged crimes against humanity committed by Libya, Gaddafi and his close circle.
4 March	Lévy meets with Mustafa Abdul Jalil in Benghazi; contacts Sarkozy and sets up a meeting in Paris for a few days later.
6 March	Libyan army launches counteroffensive.
7 March	British Special Forces and MI6 operatives captured near Benghazi by rebel soldiers. Gulf Cooperation Council supports a no-fly zone. Obama declares US is discussing military options with other NATO members; Gaddafi invites EU observers to Libya to conduct own assessment of conflict.
8 March	Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) supports no-fly zone but excludes foreign military operations on the ground. Obama and Cameron state that Gaddafi has to go “as quickly as possible.” NATO deploys AWACS aircrafts to Libya.
10 March	Visit of NTC officials to Paris and meeting with Sarkozy, organized by Lévy. France recognizes the NTC as legitimate government of Libya. PSC reiterates condemnation of indiscriminate use of force by Libya, emphasizes legitimate aspirations to democracy, reform, justice, security and peace; communiqué draws a “roadmap” (paragraph 7); establishes ad hoc High-Level Committee to implement it. NATO moves ships to the Mediterranean Sea “to boost the monitoring effort.”
10 March	<i>“La reconnaissance des insurgés libyens par Paris surprend l’Union européenne” (20 Minutes, 2011) – problem.</i>
11 March	EU issues declaration: condemns use of force against civilians, explores options to protect civilians.
12 March	Arab League calls on UNSC to impose a no-fly zone.

14 March	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issues a statement they have received numerous reports of executions, rape, torture and disappearance.
15 March	Meeting in Paris, organized by Lévy, between US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and NTC official Mahmoud Jibril.
16 March	Government forces approach Benghazi; civil war seemingly close to an end. Saïf al-Islam Gaddafi accuses Sarkozy of having accepted Libyan financing for his 2007 presidential campaign.
17 March	UNSC adopts Resolution 1973: “all necessary measures” authorized, excluding on-the-ground operations; no-fly zone, strengthens sanctions.
17 March	<i>“BHL veut frapper les tanks de Khadafi” (Le Figaro, 2011a) – policy.</i>
18 March	Gaddafi calls for ceasefire as compliance with UNSC Resolution 1973; rebels reject it as government attacks continue.
18 March	<i>“La campagne libyenne de Bernard-Henri Lévy” (Girard, 2011) – problem.</i> <i>“Libye, le coup d’éclat de Sarkozy?” (Vergnaud, 2011) – politics.</i>
19 March	Paris Summit for the support of the Libyan people. International coalition operation is launched: France, the UK and the US begin the strikes.
20 March	Amr Moussa criticizes coalition because it exceeds the League’s original intent for a no-fly zone.
21 March	United Arab Emirates reverses original decision to contribute to the military operation with fighter aircrafts, instead humanitarian aid only.
21 March	<i>“Is Gaddafi himself a target?” (Tisdall, 2011) – problem.</i>
21-25 March	Various formal and informal meetings about the situation in Libya: Council members, AU.
22 March	Leaders of Russia, China and South Africa call for immediate ceasefire on all sides. Germany withdraws its participation from all NATO operations in the Mediterranean. NATO decides to enforce the UN-mandated embargo.
22 March	<i>“The full list of how MPs voted on Libya action” (BBC News, 2011c) – politics.</i> <i>“ITV News Cuts Index plus Libya Poll” (ComRes, 2011) – politics.</i>
23 March	US officials announce Operation Odyssey Dawn successfully decimated the Libyan Air Force. NATO ships begin halting the transfer of mercenaries and weapons to Libya.
23 March	<i>“Deux tiers des Français approuvent l’intervention en Libye, selon un sondage” (Le Point, 2011a) – politics.</i>

24 March	Rasmussen declares NATO allies have decided to take responsibility for enforcing the no-fly zone to fulfill their obligation under the UN mandate (1973).
24 March	<i>“BHL : Je n'ai aucune autre légitimité que celle de ma propre conscience” (Le Monde, 2011a) – policy.</i>
27 March	NATO gradually takes over the command and control of the military operations in Libya to enforce Resolution 1973: Operation Unified Protector gradually takes place and will last until 31 October 2011.
29 March	London Conference on Libya: foreign ministers and leaders from the UN, the Arab League, the OIC, the EU and NATO; creation of Libya Contact Group, also known as Friends of Libya (replaced original group in September 2011).
31 March	As of this day, Operation Unified Protector encompasses all operations in Libya; previous international coalition operation terminates.

(Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014; Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Bucher et al., 2013; Davidson, 2013; Davidson, 2017; De Waal, 2013; Girard, 2011; Kasaija, 2013; Koenig, 2011; Koenig, 2014; Lubura-Winchester & Jones, 2013; Menon, 2011; NATO, 2011a, b; NATO, 2015; Overbeck, 2014; Paoletti, 2011; Payandeh, 2011; Security Council Report, 2020; Siebens & Case, 2012).

3. Theoretical Framework

This section aims to review the existing literature relating to this thesis, and to define the theoretical framework that will be used for the analysis. Therefore, it has been divided in three sub-parts. The first section reviews the existing literature on the Libyan intervention, including different perspectives and theories. It aims to anchor this present research within the broader literature on the topic, and to define the academic gap it contributes to. The second section focuses on processes of policy-making, especially agenda-setting: it presents several methods and theories relevant to this research, and introduces the multiple-stream framework. Finally, the last section builds on the previous two, and establishes the theoretical and conceptual framework.

3.1 Academic perspectives on the 2011 Libyan intervention

The 2011 Libyan civil war and the subsequent intervention have been widely analyzed by academics and scholars. Focusing on the context in which the crisis unfolded is crucial to understanding the roots of it, and also to elaborate long-term solutions post-intervention. Although it will not be discussed in this research, it is important to mention that the intervention did not result in a change of government and leadership towards a more democratic system in Libya; the country has been in an unstable situation since 2011, with a second civil war breaking out in 2014 and ongoing to this day. Therefore, the works of authors on the roots and context of the conflict are crucial both for further academic analysis, but also to map out a detailed understanding of the conflicts. This is what the articles of Paoletti (2011) and Siebens and Case (2012) focus on, a topic that is also found in other works.

The R2P doctrine has been enunciated as a crucial aspect and justification for the intervention by the international community and the UN. Humanitarian justifications have been

analyzed by different academics, as well as implications for the future of humanitarian intervention (Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Bucher et al., 2013; Davidson, 2013; Hehir & Murray, 2013; Kuperman, 2013; Lubura-Winchester & Jones, 2013; Saba & Akbarzadeh, 2017; Zambakari, 2016).

A recurring conclusion is that the framework for the intervention was subject to multiple interpretations of what it allowed (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 847). The justifications for the intervention themselves were not considered sufficient to allow for an intervention by several states, including Germany, also an EU and NATO member (Bucher et al., 2013; Saba & Akbarzadeh, 2017). Furthermore, inaccurate reports, other motivations and disinformation have also been identified as influential in the decision to intervene (Kuperman, 2013; Lubura-Winchester & Jones, 2013).

Regime change has also been considered as a hidden motivation and objective for the intervention (Lubura-Winchester & Jones, 2013; Saba & Akbarzadeh, 2017). Certain sources have claimed the intervention was motivated by prospective economic gains, especially relating to oil, yet without much evidence to support these claims (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Bellamy and Williams write that at the time, several Council members, representatives and states noted that this justification might serve as a cover for states' hidden agendas, including regime change (2011, pp. 847-848; Davidson, 2013, p. 325). Kuperman (2013) presents a sequence of action that aligns with the objective of regime change. He argues that aiming to protect civilians through an intervention is closely linked to regime change. When justifying an intervention, intervening states tend to demonize the regime in question, which leads to disregarding later possibilities of negotiations that could include the regime or leader to retain some power, although this often turns out to be the fastest way to end violence and to protect civilians (Kuperman, 2013, p. 135). In the case of Libya, he reasoned from the events to arrive to the conclusion that regime change was indeed an objective. Starting two weeks after the beginning

of the conflict, Gaddafi expressed his willingness to negotiate a cease-fire. The NTC refused the negotiate unless Gaddafi stepped down first, a position that NATO supported; this moved the justification for the intervention from being humanitarian motivated to explicitly oriented towards regime change (Kuperman, 2013, pp. 135-136). These causal relations and hypotheses are based on facts, which seems to support the hypothesis that regime change was indeed an objective from the onset.

Interestingly, Davidson analyzes the decisions of Sarkozy and Cameron to intervene, a focus that resembles that of this research. Yet, that article and this present research diverge in the theories used. The aim of that article is theory development, and therefore advances a “novel analytical model,” named the “integrated model of intervention” (Davidson, 2013, p. 311). The model is based on factors from constructivism, defensive realism and liberalism to combine their strengths and provide a “satisfactory explanation” to the Libyan case. The model is linear, and starts with initial factors, namely an international norm, a threat to national interest, and implicated prestige (Davidson, 2013, p. 312). The final outcome is the use of force. Once the initial factors are present, the model suggests that states will be confronted with prerequisite factors that could block the movement towards force; these include the efficacy, cost, international consensus, and public or opposition support. Contributing factors emerge during the crisis, and can increase the likeliness to use force. Two decision points are part of the model; the first one, action, represents the decision to issue a statement or to plan any sort of action. The second one is the final use of force. When the factors are present and the conditions are satisfied, force will be used (Davidson, 2013, pp. 312-314).

Davidson’s model and its subsequent application in the article provide an interesting analysis of the intervention, and considers aspects that are not crucial elements of the multiple-stream framework, such as prestige. Despite its similarity with this present research in the cases analyzed, the article offers an explanation that is centered around the government as the central

and most influential actor. Inversely, this model does not include some elements that are crucial to Kingdon's theory, such as the role of policy entrepreneurs (this will be presented in section 3.3). Although the focus is similar, the broader objectives of the papers (i.e. theory testing for this research), and the theoretical frameworks used differ.

Another aspect widely analyzed, and which is also part of this present research, is the media portrayal of the intervention. Alalawi (2015) compared the media coverage of Fox News and Al Jazeera during the Arab Spring, including Libya, while Bucher et al. (2013) focused on the divergence of foreign policy decisions and opinions between France and Germany over the military intervention in Libya. Overall, these pieces highlight the duality between the leading role of France and the UK on the one hand, and other more reluctant actors such as Germany, Russia and China on the other hand, to initiate a military intervention in Libya in 2011.

Many actors were involved in crafting an international response to the Libyan crisis; some authors have focused on a single actor, such as the UN (Payandeh, 2011) or the EU (Koenig, 2011; Koenig, 2013; Menon, 2011; Overbeck, 2014). Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) use the case of the intervention to develop an argumentation of how power works in practice through a multi-level analysis encompassing power politics at the UN, NATO and EU levels.

Most of the analyses presented so far focus on one aspect relating to the intervention, whether it be R2P, media coverage or analyzing policy in practice, with different levels of analysis. This thesis aims to cover an aspect that is yet to be discussed: the factors for two specific states which led them to promote, even advocate, for the intervention – and this, under one theoretical framework.

3.2 Frameworks of policy analysis

Policy processes are complex to observe, analyze and predict; hence the necessity to develop theories and conduct researches on that topic.

Kingdon presents public policy-making as a set of processes which entail (non-exhaustively) agenda-setting; specification of alternative choices; an authoritative choice between these alternatives; the implementation of the decision (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 2-3). This research focuses on the first three steps; the implementation is not discussed, but rather how the problem came to gain attention and be integrated to France's and the UK's agendas.

Studies of policy processes tend to differentiate between domestic – public – affairs and foreign affairs (Lentner, 2006, p. 169). Defining both is crucial to the applicability of Kingdon's model to the case at hand: his theory is based on American public policy, while this research focuses on two European states' foreign policy. The question rises as to how applicable Kingdon's framework is to this research.

First, public and foreign policy need to be defined. The starting point is that there is no consensus over a definition of foreign policy (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 2). There is an overlap between policy and foreign analysis – the line between domestic public policy and foreign is increasingly blurred, with areas of public policies having repercussions internationally, and vice-versa (e.g. environmental policies, counter-terrorism, trade agreements, etc) (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 4). For this thesis, the following definition applies to what is referred to as foreign policy: “[...] a set of actions or rules governing the actions of an independent political authority deployed in the international environment” (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 3). Lentner (2006) acknowledge that policy studies are often divided between public and foreign, but that there is much to be gained on either side by considering the research, theories and literature of the other. He also states that “[f]oreign policy analysts could beneficially employ Kingdon's [...] two main organizing ideas: participants and processes” (Lentner, 2006, p. 178). Policy processes remain similar whether the policy at hand is of the public or foreign domain; what therefore matters is to clearly establish the context analyzed, and specifying the actors involved. Kingdon's theory proves to be flexible enough to adapt to the foreign policy context. Therefore,

this research, by the theory used and its focus, contributes to bridging the distinction between public and foreign policy, demonstrating by its application that a theory based on domestic policies can be applied to foreign policy, and develop new understandings and insights of the policy processes supporting it.

One of the most prevalent theories in policy studies is that of punctuated equilibrium, first developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). Their framework addresses how issues rise and fall from governmental agendas, a focus shared with Kingdon. They identified a basis for policy processes, which is constituted of political institutions and decision-making, which itself relies on bounded rationality (True et al., in Sabatier, 2007, p. 156). They argue that policy-making in the US is defined by periods of relative stability, punctuated by periods of important policy changes (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Change is brought about when opponents manage to exploit policy venues of the US system (Sabatier, 2007, p. 9). Focusing-events also have an important impact on agendas: they can result in issues advancing on said agendas, which in turn hold potential for policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Birkland, 1998). Focusing events can also mobilize interest groups; the nature of the event in turn influences both groups and agendas (Birkland, 1998, p. 53).

Baumgartner and Jones' argument is that agenda-setting resembles the concept of punctuated equilibrium: policy evolution advances in steps (equilibrium, then change, then equilibrium), not gradually (continuously). In an addition to the second edition of the book, Kingdon presents his view that both punctuated equilibrium and gradual evolution are part of the process. The agenda changes abruptly, and agenda-setting therefore appears as a punctuated equilibrium; however, the alternatives are developed gradually, and policy proposals are ready when the window opens (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 226-227).

In *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1999), Allison and Zelikow develop three models which place an emphasis on different actors and processes.

These are the “rational actor,” the “organizational behavior” and the “governmental politics” models. The rational actor treats governments as the primary actor, but this approach fails to encompass all the facts to support its explanation (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 54). The organizational behavior model defends that governmental action depends on a unitary and rational actor; since the government encompasses more than a single individual, the governmental bureaucracy of a state is the one to provide structures and limits to the state’s actions (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 143). The governmental politics model posits that government behavior is the result of politics, understood as bargaining games (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 255). These models differ depending on the primary actor considered, and how they are defined.

These three models could provide different explanations of why France and the UK military intervened. The first model would focus on defining the states as unitary rational actors seeking to maximize their gains (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 13). The second model would posit that the states acted in a way that reflect their standard patterns of organizational behavior (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 143). The third one would consider many actors as the relevant players, contrarily to the first model, and the outcome therefore depends on how well the players position their preferences on the agenda (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 256). The issue is, these models are limited in their reach, because what one model considers and explains, the other does not necessarily include it.

Applications of Kingdon’s model are varied, and differ in the topics and subjects analyzed. They range (non-exhaustively) from a focus on US public policies (e.g. Young, Shepley & Song, 2010); to the context of EU policy-making (e.g. Ackrill & Kay, 2011); to the model’s contribution to comparative policy analysis (Béland, 2016). Howlett, McConnell & Perl (2015) refine the multiple-stream framework by adding two more streams to it, and

therefore combining policy process theory and the MSF. The MSF has been tested and applied in a wide array of cases (Zahariadis, 2007), and will now be discussed in detail.

3.3 The multiple-stream framework

The models and explanations presented in the previous sections offer different insights into understanding foreign policy processes. Yet, this research aims to consider several components of the policy process at once, including the roles of the media, of the policy-makers, of other participants involved in the policy process, of the politicians and of public opinion. Therefore, there is a need for a theory that encompasses all these aspects, and John Kingdon's offers just that.

Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies by John Kingdon was first published in 1984, and came to be one of the most referred to and debated books in public administration and policy analysis: as of September 1st, 2020, Google Scholar counted more than 24,800 citations of the book. The book aims to assess how issues come to be defined as such, and how and why they get on and off the agenda of the US government. It focuses on agenda-setting and decision-making, from "agendas" to "alternatives" – the problems that policymakers pay attention to, and potential solutions to these problems (Béland, 2016, p. 230). The analysis is based on the policy areas of healthcare, transportation, and waterway charges. The research was conducted over four years. It consisted of four waves of interviews with people close to decision-making in these milieus, adding up to 247 interviews (Kingdon, 2014, p. 4). His framework is based on the garbage can model of organizational choice developed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). The research is based on evidence collected and analyzed by Kingdon, and therefore is empirically oriented. Kingdon uses metaphors to explain and illustrate the processes of agenda-setting and decision-making. The model was originally based solely on

agenda-setting; however, the framework has been used and developed in a much broader scope (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 83).

One of the core concepts of the book is agendas. *Agenda* is defined as “the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (Kingdon, 2014, p. 3). Nonetheless, agendas are complex to define, as it is often unclear where they begin and end (Greer, 2015, p. 3). Within agendas, Kingdon makes a distinction between governmental agenda and decision agenda: the former refers to the list of subjects getting attention, and the latter, the list of subjects within the governmental agenda, pending a decision. One of the theory’s premises and innovations is that it considers agenda-setting and alternative specification as two distinct processes. As such, agendas are more of the domain of the presidents (in the case of the UK, prime ministers), and alternatives are more of the domain of the experts (Kingdon, 2014, p. 4).

Kingdon developed a framework that includes three streams, and a window of opportunity. The three streams do not necessarily occur sequentially one after the other, and are largely independent (Kingdon, 2014, p. 228; Zahariadis, 2007, p. 69); for clarity, they will be addressed in the same order throughout this paper. A stream is a “collection of variable[...] parameters which develop and change over time” (Howlett et al., 2016, p. 80). In each stream, different actors are involved.

The problem stream. Problems come to the attention of decision-makers because indicators show that a problem exists (Kingdon, 2014, p. 90). These indicators are subjective, but they are necessary to identify and assess the magnitude of a problem, and to identify potential changes and developments of said problem (Kingdon, 2014, p. 91). How do conditions come to be defined as problems? This varies, but mostly relies on comparison: with one’s values and beliefs, with the state of things in another system, with a past condition... (Zahariadis,

2007, p. 71). Problems also might need a push to get the attention of participants; this push can be provided by a focusing event, such as a crisis (Kingdon, 2014, p. 94). In the present case-study, the problem is considered to be the beginning of the violent protests in Libya; the escalation of violence, as well as the full-scale civil war that started on February 20th constitute the focusing event. It contributed to focus the attention of the international community to the problem, the ongoing crisis.

Comparisons and symbols also play an important role in reinforcing issue-visibility (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 97-98; p. 111). Pre-existing factors also exacerbates the perception of a problem: if the issue can be linked to past occurrences or pre-existing perceptions, the problem is more likely to be identified and gain attention (Kingdon, 2014, p. 197). Similarly, conditions and problem-definition participate in a problem's rise on the agenda: if a condition contradicts present values, or if its definition fits a category rather than another one, it focuses the attention and frames the narrative surrounding the problem (Kingdon, 2014, p. 198). The identification of indicators and problems helps focusing the attention, and can be used to garner official attention (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 71; Stone, 2012, p. 157).

The policy stream. This stream focuses on the discussion of policy options between experts. These experts can be officials, policy-makers, politicians, lobbyists, academics, civil servants... (Kingdon, 2014, p. 204). They create and advocate for proposals while considering the support and constraints coming from budgets, public opinion and elected officials (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 143-144). They develop policy solutions according to the situation, their interests, and the context in which they are, whether that is national, international, or political. The policy stream therefore "a short list of proposals" which are not necessarily a consensus, but rather different solutions, or alternatives (Kingdon, 2014, p. 144).

This stream is the ground for advocacy and entrepreneurship. Although they are not exclusive to this stream, the *policy entrepreneurs* constitute an important part of it. This is an

innovative notion presented by Kingdon; the identification of actors that are inherent to the policy process, and yet, who are not the typical ones identified within policy-making. Policy entrepreneurs are “advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an idea,” and are “willing to make investments of their resources in return for future policies of which they approve” (Kingdon, 2014, p. 122; p. 115). Policy entrepreneurs are willing and able to invest their own resources, whether it is time, energy, financial means, reputation or other, “to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Kingdon, 2014, p. 179). The return they get might be in the form of policies established which they support, the gratification from having participated, or personal gains; yet, some just enjoy being part of the process (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 122-124).

The entrepreneurs have distinct characteristics: they have some claim to what they push forward, whether that be expertise and knowledge (e.g. think tank researcher); a capacity to speak for others (e.g. leader of a lobby group); or a decision-making position (Kingdon, 2014, p. 180). They also must be known for their connections, especially political, or negotiating skills (Kingdon, 2014, p. 181). Finally, they are persistent (Kingdon, 2014, p. 181). These characteristics will be crucial in determining whether policy entrepreneurs were involved in the processes preceding the Libyan intervention.

The political stream. This stream is where politicians and civil servants are. It is composed of factors such as swings of national mood, public opinion, opposition position, election results, changes of administration, and interest groups campaigns (Kingdon, 2014, p. 145). This stream has three major components: swings of national mood, the balance of organized political forces, and events within the government. Perceptions of the national mood can affect governmental agendas, by either promoting or suppressing items that fit it (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 162-163). Organized political forces represent “interest group pressure, political

mobilization, and the behaviour of political elites” (Kingdon, 2014, p. 150). Events within the government include administration changes – and with it, agenda changes.

Within this stream, proposals are presented in a variety of ways: “through speeches, bill introductions, congressional hearings, leaks to the press, circulation of papers, conversations, and lunches” (Kingdon, 2014, p. 200). From these, limitations rise as to how accessible they are; some might be accessible online, such as speeches and bills, but others, such as conversations and lunches, are unlikely to be reported in a research, especially if its method does not include interviews, such as this one.

The policy window. Also called the window of opportunity, it represents the point in time in which the three streams come together: a problem is identified, solutions have been created and are available, the political environment is suitable for a policy change, and there are no major obstructions to change (Kingdon, 2014, p. 165). These windows open scarcely, and for a short amount of time (Kingdon, 2014, p. 204). When windows open, the *coupling* of the streams can occur. But how do policy windows open? The policy entrepreneurs have a crucial role in this. Kingdon states:

During the pursuit of their personal purposes, entrepreneurs perform the function for the system of coupling the previously separate streams. They hook solutions to problems, proposals to political momentum, and political events to policy problems. If a policy entrepreneur is attaching a proposal to a change in the political stream, for example, a problem is also found for which the proposal is a solution, thus linking problem, policy, and politics. Or if a solution is attached to a prominent problem, the entrepreneur also attempts to enlist political allies, again joining the three streams. Without the presence of an entrepreneur, the linking of the streams may not take place. (Kingdon, 2014, p. 182)

Policy windows therefore offer an opportunity for the streams to be coupled, and when this happens, for a policy to be implemented. Kingdon argues that the opening of a window can come from changes in the problem or the political stream (Kingdon, 2014, p. 173). The policy stream holds the policy proposals, or different alternatives; the other two streams determine when the opportunity is right for change (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 172-173).

Kingdon does not go into much more detail to specify the mechanisms as to why that is the case; the definition of each stream serves the understanding that the development of solutions needs to be coupled either to a problem, or to a political demand, to rise, be adopted and be implemented. He nonetheless adds that when studying case-studies, it is nearly always possible to identify a particular person, or a few, who played a crucial role in placing a problem on the agenda and into position during a policy window (Kingdon, 2014, p. 180).

The non-specification of causal mechanisms is one of the limitations that have been raised about the theory (e.g. Sabatier, 1999, p. 272). Other critics relate to the independence of the streams. Zahariadis argues that the independence of the streams is a theoretical and conceptual tool rather than an ever-present fact (2007). Kingdon added in 1995 that the coupling of the streams might take place outside of a policy window. Another limitation might be the use of the MSF in quantitative studies: most studies applying this framework have been qualitative case studies, and so is the present research (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 82). Yet, Travis and Zahariadis (2002) have however managed to test the MSF, and their findings were consistent with those of the MSF. Just like the original scope of the framework has subsequently been broadened, the MSF proves to be a versatile and adaptable model.

So, in the case of this research, what is the policy window? Is the policy window the intervention, or is the intervention an aftermath, or a consequence, of the policy window? The military intervention, starting with the international coalition intervention, represents the

implementation of one of the policy alternatives that was formulated. In the context of this research, the policy window is therefore the period ranging from when the events in Libya garnered international attention, until the implementation of the policy solution. The policy window is therefore from February 20th, when the US and the EU issued statements condemning Gaddafi's use of force against demonstrators, to the launch of the international coalition operation, on March 19th.

3.4 Theoretical expectations

This section presents the theoretical expectations this research addresses, which are derived from the theoretical framework. The following is expected:

- (1) The problem stream will showcase how the media portrayed the situation in Libya from its onset in both states. It is expected that they used indicators and symbols to define the problem as such. The analysis should shed a light on how it was done, and by whom.
- (2) The policy stream will highlight some of the policy alternatives that were put forward, and policy entrepreneurs will be identified in both states. It is expected that several alternatives will be identifiable, although some will remain non-accessible. It is also expected that a number of policy entrepreneurs will be identified.
- (3) The political stream will present an overall picture of the national mood, and the degree of support from the public and by the opposition in both states. It is expected that the national moods generally matched the governmental agenda, since both states went forward with the intervention.
- (4) There will be some differences between the "French streams" and the "UK streams" which can be attributed to the fact that they are two different states, with each its particular domestic context and interests.

These will be returned to in Chapter 5, to contrast them with the findings from the analysis.

4. Research Design

This research aims to answer the following research question: *What factors led to the French and British military intervention in Libya in 2011?* To do so, this research focuses on a case-study, namely the military intervention in Libya. Within this case-study, two specific actors are focused on: France and the UK. These were arbitrarily chosen because of the role they played in proposing a military intervention. They were at the forefront of discussions: the UK played a key role in drafting the UN mandates, while France was the first state to receive official delegates from the NTC, and to officially recognize the latter as the former leader of Libya (20 minutes, 2011). This thesis was designed as a case-study research, and it draws on document-based data, including both primary and secondary data. The method of analysis used is document analysis. The dependent variable in this study is the outcome variable, i.e. the military intervention. The thesis provides an in-depth description of the subject at hand, free of value judgements, and is therefore a positive research (Toshkov, 2016, p. 24).

4.1 Case selection and justification

Of the countries in which Arab Spring protests unfolded, Libya is the only one in which NATO militarily intervened (NATO, 2020). The situation escalated rapidly, with violence, abuses and risks increasing as pro- and anti-Gaddafi forces clashed. Slightly over two weeks after the first protests in Benghazi, the UNSC passed Resolution 1970, and less than a month later, Resolution 1973. International and national agendas developed rapidly, and action was pushed forward and promoted, especially by the UK and France.

The interest in this topic stems from wanting to investigate different paths of agenda-setting and policy-making. Academically, the case of Libya seems particularly suited for such a research: the outcome variable is the same, i.e. the intervention. The discussions and decisions

to intervene were overseen at a supranational level, the UN, which makes the international policy processes comparable between two states. Furthermore, France and the UK also share characteristics: in 2011, they were both EU and NATO members. Yet, their governmental systems diverge: the UK is a constitutional monarchy, France is a semi-presidential system defined by the Constitution and the Fifth Republic. Therefore, their national contexts and systems are different, and yet, in this case, share the same outcome. By using Kingdon's model, this research aims to determine which factors were influential in France and the UK; whether the two MSF models share characteristics; and what generalizations can be made from the results, including what it implies for the theory and in practice.

By determining how each stream evolved and what they consisted of, this research also provides a holistic perspective on what and who was involved in the process, from the issue(s) gaining attention, to the drafting of solutions, to application of policies. It provides a different perspective on the case of Libya, therefore contributing to the literature on this topic. It also applies the MSF, and therefore contributes to assess the applicability and accuracy of this model.

4.2 Methodology

4.2.a. Method of data collection

This research is based on primary and secondary sources, which non-exhaustively include government and official statements, press releases, newspaper articles, research institutes and think tanks reports and comments, and academic literature. No primary data was collected by the researcher in this study; instead, the thesis focuses on analyzing primary data through the method of document analysis. The only primary data collection method that could have been possible is interviews. Other types of qualitative data collections methods would not have been applicable to this research and its main research question: observation could not have been

made, as the events researched occurred over nine years ago. Focus group discussions do not suit the goal of this research, and thus are not a suitable collection method. The lack of collected primary data by the researcher constitutes a limitation to this study, and is addressed in 4.4.

The research process was organized in two parts: the first one was the research, and the second one, the selection. The first part was constituted of key-word searches on various platforms, which vary between the streams, and are addressed with the corresponding stream below. This was determined by the stream that was under study. The second part was to select the documents that were going to be analyzed and included in this research. This will be detailed stream by stream below.

Problem stream

For a topic to come on the political and governmental agenda, a problem needs to be identified, and it then needs to gain enough importance to be addressed. Indicators are necessary to identify and assess the magnitude of a problem, and to identify potential changes and developments of said problem (Kingdon, 2014, p. 91). Therefore, the indicator(s) had to be identified in the case of Libya. The timeline of event has been presented in Chapter 2; these events constitute indicators of an issue rising, and therefore gaining attention. The problem stream focuses on identifying these indicators, and create an overview of how the issue was presented in France and in the UK.

Therefore, the function of this stream is to establish the media coverage both in France and the UK, and to assess how, and to what extent, the situation in Libya was presented. The selection of the newspapers was based on the representativeness, readership, and reach of the outlets. The selected outlets were amongst the most widely read in 2011, regardless of whether a membership was necessary to access them. For France, the selected ones are Le Monde, 20 minutes and Le Figaro (Grosset, 2013). For the UK, the selected newspapers are the BBC, The

Independent and The Guardian (The Guardian, 2011a). Three different newspapers were selected for each country in order to have some variation amongst the sources, and to assess whether they portrayed the situation differently. The key-words and combinations used are: “Libya,” “Libya 2011,” “Arab Spring,” “Kadhafi” (for French newspapers), and “Gaddafi” (for English newspapers). These key words were purposely phrased broadly to allow for any article linked to these terms to appear in the search results, therefore including both articles about the developing situation in Libya and the international response, but also non-related articles. When available, further research filters were added to the searches: documents published between January 31st, 2011, and March 31st, 2011. This time-period therefore encompasses the first days of protests and the military missions being established.

In the period of data collection, and among the articles reviewed, 87 articles fitted the following criteria: date comprised within the period detailed above; article, or opinion paper; topic relating to the problem stream (e.g. updates situation in Libya; international community responses, statements, press releases...). These 87 articles were catalogued in a spreadsheet, which included the link to the article, the publication date, a main summary of the content, which country it was produced in and applied to (France or the UK), which stream it first appeared to relate to the most, and an extra section with extra information about the article. This spreadsheet is not included in this research due to formatting incompatibilities, but can be shared upon request. Once the data collection period terminated, the researcher reviewed the spreadsheet and each source individually, to decide on the most accurate, reliable and representative sources, to then narrow it down to the selection presented in this thesis.

Along with newspapers articles, one official document for each state was selected. Because the goal of analyzing the problem stream is to establish how the issue came to gain attention and eventually be included on the policy agenda, it was deemed important to include an official governmental source to illustrate how it was perceived early on. As Table 1

summarized, the two documents that were selected were published on February 23rd for France, and February 28th for the UK. These statements were published within days of one another, yet it has been argued throughout this paper that the situation evolved rapidly, and a few days can make a difference. These two statements reveal a clear position of both governments towards the situation, and were emitted by the then-leaders of France and the UK, Sarkozy and Cameron. Although they are not the first statements that have been published by the governments towards the situation in Libya, they are declarations and statements from the leaders themselves, and still occurred before Resolution 1973 was passed. It has also been argued in the previous chapter that the streams are not chronologically linear, and they do not occur one after the other. These publications reflect opinions that contributed to defining the issue, and to establish a solution to the problem. Therefore, they provide insight into the position of the two leaders within the problem stream.

Policy stream

A particularly interesting aspect of the policy stream within this research, is to consider who was involved in the policy process, and who was excluded from it. The period in which governments became aware of the situation in Libya and the intervention was relatively short, and developed rapidly. Although the UK followed a rather typical path to the intervention (including debates in the House of Commons), the process in France was quite peculiar: it involved Bernard-Henri Lévy, a French philosopher, writer, activist and film-maker. Therefore, the function of this stream is to establish who was involved in the policy process both in France and in the UK, especially focusing on identifying the main policy entrepreneurs.

The selection process for the policy stream is relatively similar to the problem stream, although there are some variations. An important part of this project was to research whether

policy entrepreneurs were involved, or rather how many, and then to identify them, based on the criteria as developed in the theoretical framework.

For the document selection, the research was twofold. Firstly, based on the articles reviewed, including those part of the problem stream research, special attention was given to the content of the articles: whether it included a quotation from someone, who wrote it, and whether it was linked or affiliated to any think tank or person. Secondly, the publications of numerous think tanks were reviewed. This search determined whether the think tanks had published anything (e.g. journal entry, comments, reports, policy briefings or recommendations...) on Libya leading up to the intervention.

The think tanks were selected on several criteria: they produced their own research; the reputation; the research topics they focus on; France-based, UK-based, or EU-based. The initial selection of the think tanks was based on the ranking provided by the 2011 Go To Think Tank Index of the University of Pennsylvania (McGann, 2011). This index recognizes some of the world's leading public policy think tanks and their contributions to governments and civil societies (McGann, 2011, p. 10). It was used to identify which think tanks fitted the areas that this research works in, and to select the most prominent think tanks in these areas. The areas are: security; international affairs; domestic policy; military. These areas are not all present on the index; therefore, it was used as a basis, and further research established which think tanks in France and the UK were active in these areas, and corresponded to the criteria listed above.

The think tanks reviewed that were either based in France or published in French are: Amnesty; Sciences Po Centre de Recherches Internationales (CERI); EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS); Fondation pour l'Innovation Politique (Fondapol); Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS); Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri); Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire (IRSEM). The ones either based in the UK or published in English are: Amnesty; Center for European Reform (CER); Chatham House; the

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR); Human Rights Watch; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Once a list of think tanks in both states was established, each was researched to evaluate whether they published something relating to Libya within the time period ranging from January 31st, 2011, to March 31st, 2011. All these think tanks catalogue their publications or other types of publications on their website. Therefore, the research constituted of reviewing any type of publication on every website within the time period. This included (non-exhaustively) reports, researches, statements, journals... The key words used for the searches are the same as for the problem stream: “Libya,” “Libya 2011,” “Arab Spring,” “Kadhafi” and “Gaddafi.” Every publication relating to the topic was catalogued, as well as the authors. Particular attention was given to any type of publication that included policy recommendations.

Contributors to the think tanks, whether they were full-time researchers or visiting fellows, were also considered outside of the think tanks publications. Some researchers wrote pieces published in the media, which this research considered and will elaborate on in the next chapter. A likely explanation relates to the pace at which the situation developed: the time period was short, and events unfolded rapidly, leaving little space for recommendations, in-depth analyses and reports to be published.

Politics stream

The function of the politics stream is to identify the domestic reactions to the policies developed as a response to the situation in Libya.

The documents selected for this stream are both newspaper articles and polls, to illustrate both opinions, and statistics of support for the policy decisions of the governments. The international coalition operation was launched on March 19th; the documents selected have been published after this date, so that their content could include and reflect the start of the

military intervention. The time period searched for was therefore from March 19th, 2011, to March 31st, 2011. The key words used are: “Libya poll 2011;” “sondage Libye 2011;” “opinion Libye 2011;” “opinion Libya 2011.”

The combination of articles and polls helps to gain understanding over who supported the intervention, how the opposition reacted, and what the public opinion was in the early days of the military intervention.

General considerations

For each stream, only a few documents have been selected. How can a few documents be representative of all the documents that exist, and of the situation? Why were they selected over others? The first thing to note is that the selected documents are most likely not representative of all the documents that exist, especially the ones that are not accessible. Selection bias is an inherent part of qualitative studies (Toshkov, 2016). What can be done to limit it is therefore to thoroughly transcribe and reference the research process to allow for validity and transparency, and to justify the selection process.

The documents were selected based on the criteria described above and based on Kingdon’s theory, and considering their content. They are representative of these criteria, and offer a basis for analysis, itself anchored in this research’s theoretical framework. When selecting the documents, special attention was given to the platform on which it was accessed, the author, its content and its presumed objectivity and reliability.

4.2.b. Method of data analysis

The method of data analysis used in this research is document analysis. This method has been defined as a “systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents,” which requires examination and interpretation of the data in order to “elicit meaning, gain understanding, and

develop empirical knowledge” (Bowen, 2009, p. 27). Documents provide data on context, background and historical insight (Bowen, 2009, p. 29).

When it came to selecting a method of analysis, document analysis was compared to content analysis. Content analysis is used by the researcher to code, quantify and analyze the data from the documents, and describe the data; causal relationships cannot be established through this analysis. The issue is that causal relationships is what this research aims to uncover. Therefore, document analysis is more adapted to this research, which requires an in-depth analysis of a few select documents.

From the literature, a list of criteria to consider when conducting a document analysis has been created, and is presented in the following table. It was created based on different academic sources, and will serve as a basis for analysis in the next chapter.

Table 2. Criteria for document analysis.

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose	(7) subject and object	(12) what information can be obtained from the document
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable)	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information	
(3) date of creation and/or publication	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what)	
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness	(10) structure, narrative	
(5) author	(11) lexical field(s), key-words	
(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience		

(Asdal, 2015; Bowen, 2009; EuroTopics, 2020; Ezzy, 2002; Thies, 2002).

4.3 Trustworthiness

This sub-chapter aims to address concerns of reliability and validity, but applied to qualitative research. Indeed, these criteria relate to quantitative studies more than they do to qualitative ones; this present project assesses criteria of trustworthiness as presented by Bryman (2012), who based them mostly on the work of Lincoln and Guba (1994). The criteria assessed are credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. These terms parallel terms that are usually applied to quantitative studies; respecting the order above, these are internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity (Bryman, 2012, p. 390).

The research process, including period of data collection and key-words used, was referenced in the previous sections. This contributes to making this research transparent, dependable and credible. If someone was to conduct the same research, focusing on the same topic and using the same search criteria, the documents this researcher would select would vary from the ones selected here. This is expected in qualitative research (Bryman, 2012, p. 392): there is always a degree of subjectivity involved. To ensure the trustworthiness of the research, every choice needs to be justified, which is what this chapter aimed to present.

The design of this research allows for selected documents to be analyzed, therefore highlighting themes and trends that can be generalized upon. It also allows for comparison between the MSF as applied to France and to the UK, therefore answering to the primary objectives of this research. This research aims to uncover causal relations and mechanisms. However, a certain degree of precaution must be included in establishing these relations. They are not directly observable, so there will always be a certain degree of uncertainty to any type of causal mechanism identification (Toshkov, 2016, p. 151). Furthermore, association is not causation; a relation that seems to be causal might just be the result of coincidental association (Toshkov, 2016, p. 151). Therefore, confirmability is an important aspect of this research: to make sure that any type of causation established between a variable and the outcome variable

is actually a causal relation, and not caused by other variables not accounted for, or even randomness (Bryman, 2012, p. 392).

4.4 Limitations

As it was previously mentioned, this research does not include any primary data collected by the researcher. It could have contributed to this project: interviews with actors involved in what is considered here one of the streams could have provided more insight into what actually happened, as well as information that is not accessible through the documents selected here. However, reaching any of the actors mentioned in this paper proved to be complex.

There are also inherent limitations to the use of documents: they are usually created for purposes other than research (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). The ones used in this research are documents that were accessible online; therefore, what could not be accessed needs to be considered, and constitutes a limitation to this study. The access to documents might be difficult, and might intentionally be made that way (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). Furthermore, some documents might have been deleted since 2011.

When it comes to government records, the classification of documents is also a limitation, considering that the events analyzed in this research occurred less than a decade ago. In the UK, classified records are usually declassified between 20 and 30 years after their publication (with some exceptions) (The National Archives, n.d.). In France, the time period for declassification either depends on the authority who classified it (to declassify it if it is no longer sensible), or it varies between 50 and 100 years (Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale, n.d.). Finally, there is not enough data to filter random variations, and the selected documents might not be representative. With qualitative studies, there is always a degree of subjectivity; this research addresses this by justifying the selection of each document based on the criteria as expressed in 4.2.

5. Analysis

This chapter provides the findings of the document analysis conducted on the basis of the information and criteria presented throughout this paper, which can itself be found in the appendix. The final section offers a wrap up to the analysis, putting the findings in perspective and linking them back to the theoretical expectations listed in Chapter 3.

5.1 The problem stream

Through February and March, the increasing global awareness of the situation in Libya, along with the increased violence, tensions and stakes, indicated to the international community that there was an issue. According to Kingdon, problems are identifiable through indicators (2014, p. 90). The indicators are subjective, and mostly rely on comparison (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 71). How was the issue portrayed in France and in the UK? What were the main similarities and differences between both states? This section aims to address these questions.

The first trend identified through the documents analyzed is a portrayal of Gaddafi that is rather negative, if not denunciative. This is especially done using figures of speech, including metaphors and comparisons, such as: “main de fer” (iron hand) (Le Monde, 2011b), “dictateur sanguinaire” (bloodthirsty dictator) (Girard, 2011); “every pillar of his rule is crumbling at the edges” (Joshi, 2011); “Sarkozy said last week that Gaddafi was behaving like a madman” (Tisdall, 2011). An article described the speech Gaddafi televised on February 22nd as being “angry, ranting and often incoherent” and as a “characteristically bizarre performance [that] underlined his desperation” (Black, 2011a).

Other documents remain rather neutral in the terms employed (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011; Tuquoi, 2011). Interestingly, the official statement of the UK was more paced and neutral than France’s (Elysée, 2011; Foreign & Commonwealth Office,

2011). Both statements were issued within a day, on February 22nd and 23rd; they both condemned the use of force against the population, and expressed demands either towards their own government (France) or towards the UN (UK).

Whether the use of negative language to describe Gaddafi is justified or not is not the point of this paper. Rather, it is the role of such language that is considered: his portrayal has an impact on the reader, who perceives the leader according to the lexical field being used. Language can also be perceived as a reflection of the author, the newspaper, or the domestic opinion at that time. The use of a more neutral language does not strip away the importance, scale and seriousness of the violence; however, it does not carry the same emotional impact as a negative language, and provides a more detached telling of the facts.

This draws back to what was discussed in Chapter 3.3: that comparisons and symbols reinforce the visibility of an issue (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 97-98; p. 111). The use of negative language creates distance between the subject of the document and the norms and values of a person reading the article or hearing the official statement. It therefore acts as an indicator that something is wrong, something has changed, and something needs to be done.

Framing is equally important. One of the articles mentions the Western interventions in Serbia and Iraq, and the fact that the Srebrenica massacre happened under a UN enforced no-fly zone (Joshi, 2011). This British article was published on March 2nd, a few days after NATO started discussing a possible no-fly zone (February 27th). It links the massacre to the no-fly zone, which is discussed as a policy option for Libya, and suggests that a no-fly zone might not be able to protect civilians, just like it did not before. It reflects the necessity to protect civilians, which has been made clear early on in the context of Libya, and further justifies the intervention. Similarly, a French article mentioned the actions of BHL, and linked him to the then Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović (Girard, 2011). Without even mentioning the war, the link between Libya, NATO and Bosnia is established. This was echoed at the UNSC level:

American diplomats skillfully made use of the presence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Council to cast Libya in terms of the Balkans precedent: ‘The Americans came out to say in the Council: “Do you want another Srebrenica?” ... The Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina was at the Security Council meeting with me and he said to the Council: “I know what the airstrikes can do, I was there, but eventually it did bring peace.” Everyone was silent after this statement. This was a turning point at the Council.’ (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 901)

Symbols and comparisons indicate the issue, and framing reinforces this perception, and allows for potential solutions to be developed.

In some articles, both in French and English, additional information about Gaddafi was included: how long Gaddafi had stayed in power (BBC News, 2011a; Le Monde, 2011b; Tuquoi, 2011), and his vision of democracy (Le Monde, 2011b). The duration of his regime clashes with Western concepts of democracy, in which representatives are elected and their term is finite. This is most likely considered as a norm by the readers; therefore, the time indication frames the issue, and furthers a negative perception of Gaddafi by the readers.

The second trend is in the protests are usually depicted within the context of the Arab Spring: they are linked to the protests of Tunisia and Libya, and none of the documents specify the origin of the protests (the arrest of Fathi Terbil and Farag Sharany). Contrarily to the negative and loaded language used to describe Gaddafi and the pro-Gaddafi protestors, the revolutions are described with hopeful language: “le souffle des révolutions” (the wind of revolutions) (Le Monde, 2011b); “si dans les pays voisins on peut renverser les dirigeants alors [...] il doit être possible de faire de même” (if in neighboring countries they can overthrow the leaders then it must be possible to do the same) (Tuquoi, 2011); “une Cyrénaïque libérée par

son peuple de la police du dictateur” (a Cyrenaica freed by its people from the police of the dictator) (Girard, 2011); “liberated city” (BBC News, 2011a).

The third trend relates to the motives and objectives of the intervention. Several documents discussed whether the justifications for the intervention were purely humanitarian, or if regime change was a non-stated objective. Libya is described as an “oil rich state” (BBC News, 2011a), with Gaddafi exerting a “diplomatie pétrolière redoutable” (formidable oil diplomacy) (Tuquoi, 2011), which connects economic motives with justifications for intervention, and demonstrates the presence of leverage for Gaddafi. One document includes the opinion of Mohamed Maklouf, a film-maker and opposition activist, who denounced the “‘hypocrisy’ of the West,” not caring “about the Arabs” but “about the oil” (Black, 2011a). One of the articles compiles statements by different officials and representatives – Libyan regime spokesman Ibrahim, UK defense secretary Fox, Hague, US defense secretary Gates, Pentagon spokesman Gortney, Obama, Clinton, Cameron, Sarkozy, and NTC member el-Deghali – and highlights irregularities between their answers, converging towards ambiguity regarding the objectives (Tisdall, 2011). From an academic perspective, a number of scholars have deemed that regime change was an objective, as discussed in section 3.1.

The ambiguity and disparity between the positions of different states, especially within the EU, is also present when considering the reaction to the French recognition of the NTC (20 minutes, 2011). Even more surprisingly, Juppé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, allegedly did not know about Sarkozy’s intentions to do so: “manifestement, le ministre [...] n’est au courant de rien” (apparently the minister is not aware of anything) (Girard, 2011). Contrarily to the UK, the role of an individual actor was identified as being crucial to this move by France: Bernard-Henri Lévy. This will be discussed in the next section.

Trends between the articles were established regardless of the origin of the document. This allowed for an identification of the main recurrent themes, and observe the similarities and

differences between the two. Repeatedly, the tone and language in the British documents was more paced than the French ones. The addition of information and the use of hopeful language was more prevalent in the French documents. Documents from both France and the UK question the legitimacy and motives for the intervention.

Overall, there does not seem to be a stark difference between both states. Variations could be attributed to the opinion of the authors or the political bias of the publisher. The media portrayal in both states seems to have been consistent throughout the entire period, starting early on, and relatively similar.

5.2 The policy stream

Once the problem was identified, policy alternatives were specified. However, the streams do not necessarily follow each other linearly and chronologically (Kingdon, 2014, p. 78). If we consider the alleged “undercover” objective of regime change: it is possible that Gaddafi was perceived as a problem by a given actor. One of the solutions to resolve this issue could be to remove him from power. The formulation of solutions can precede the highlighting of a certain problem: alternatives often precede agendas, and when the short period of coupling occurs, policy alternatives can already be present (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 205-206). Regime change as a policy alternative could well have been formulated before the events of 2011. In February, when the problem was identified, it therefore formed a focusing event, which gave way for policy alternatives. Substantiating intentions is a complex task; it would however potentially be possible to test this hypothesis by doing archival work for example. This aimed to demonstrate the flexibility of the MSF, and to introduce this section: the policy stream.

This stream introduces advocacy and entrepreneurship, and more specifically, the role of experts and policy entrepreneurs. To analyze the role of the experts and entrepreneurs, the focus was put on think tanks, and the identification of recurring actors, especially within

primary sources. Perhaps surprisingly, the majority of the think tanks had not published anything regarding the situation. There were a few papers reflecting the opinion of the authors; however, they were more informative on the background of the issue, and sometimes the ongoing situation, than giving advice and recommendations for a course of action or policy strategy. This does not necessarily exclude the influence of policy experts; they were influential, but through different channels, for example via experts being present in the media and contributing to the media portrayal of the situation, and therefore mainly to the problem stream.

The reviewed French think tanks did not publish any recommendation or reports prior to the intervention. Yet, a few experts have been identified, including Luis Martinez, a research director at the CERI, published a piece in *Le Monde* that was analyzed in the previous stream (Tuquoi, 2011). One of the documents used in the problem stream (Girard, 2011) also identified an actor whose presence was ambivalent in the media: Bernard-Henri Lévy.

BHL is a writer, philosopher and businessman, who also created and directed a few documentaries; he released one on Libya, *Le serment de Tobrouk* (2012), as well as a book on the same topic, *La guerre sans l'aimer* (2011). BHL is often criticized, and so was his involvement regarding Libya. He was instrumental in setting up the first meeting between Sarkozy and the NTC. However, from the analysis rise a discrepancy. He connected the NTC and Sarkozy, organized a meeting between Clinton and Jibril in Paris, and knew about Sarkozy's intention to recognize the NTC before Juppé did (Girard, 2011). Yet, he was seldom mentioned in articles that were not specifically about him or his involvement. He himself stated that his role was "simple," and consisted of bringing members of the NTC to Paris, and to welcome Mahmoud Jibril and Ali Zeidan to Paris (Le Figaro, 2011a; k).

Both before and after Resolution 1973 was adopted, BHL insisted on the urgency to act in Libya, and to target Gaddafi's heavy armament (Le Figaro, 2011a; Le Monde, 2011a). He also regularly insisted on the necessity to act, with or without a mandate, from the onset (Le

Figaro, 2011a). He used negative, poignant and evocative language, quite similarly to articles in the problem stream, and symbolically described the people of Libya as rising against the “dictateur fou” (mad dictator), fighting for “l’air de la liberté” (the wind of freedom) (Le Monde, 2011a). Without being certain, it can be expected that this language was extended into the discussions he had with policy-makers and Sarkozy (Girard, 2011; Le Figaro, 2011a; Le Monde, 2011a). This parallels a characteristic of policy entrepreneurs defined by Kingdon: that of pushing for a type of problem definition over another (Kingdon, 2014, p. 204).

Can BHL be considered a policy entrepreneur? An entrepreneur has distinct characteristics: expertise and knowledge, a capacity to speak for others, a decision-making position, negotiating skills, and persistence (Kingdon, 2014, pp. 180-181). BHL is not an expert, nor does he have a capacity to speak for others, or is in a decision-making position. His negotiating skills could be his capacity to enter in contact with NTC members in the first place, and to set up a meeting with Sarkozy. Through his actions, various interventions and his media presence, he was persistent in his communication with the NTC as well as officials, and in the overall message he presented regarding the situation. In terms of return, it seems like his gains were mostly enjoyment about being a part of the process. These characteristics are not enough to describe him as a policy entrepreneur as Kingdon defined them. However, he did play an interesting role, and had at least an important impact in facilitating the Sarkozy-NTC meeting.

For the UK, no such actor was identified. However, there was more input from policy experts, especially members of think tanks. The problem stream discussed a piece by Shashank Joshi, then-Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Two documents were selected as contributions to this stream: one published by a former Associate Fellow at Chatham House, and the other one by Human Rights Watch.

The first document, by Sir Richard Dalton, gives insights into a potential development of the situation for Gaddafi. The document provides information on the uprisings in Libya, and

what the government and Gaddafi should consider to meet the demands for change and channel dissent (Dalton, 2011). Although it presents the opinion of the author and warns of a possibility for continuation of the current status quo, the article is reserved in terms of hypothesizing on how the situation could develop.

The second article brings forward a different perspective. Published on February 25th, it contains a recommendation for the UN General Assembly, being that it should suspend Libya's membership to the Human Rights Council. This was done on March 1st. This could highlight a direct causal relation between the formulation of a policy alternative coming from experts, and the adoption of the recommendation. However, it cannot be confirmed; it may be caused by coincidental association, which cannot be excluded and therefore remains inconclusive.

What do we gain from both documents? According to Kingdon's criteria, no policy entrepreneurs were identified. It also seems like few policy alternatives were proposed by experts outside of the government.

5.3 The political stream

This stream is based on factors such as swings of national mood, opposition and domestic support (Kingdon, 2014, p. 145). Therefore, this section portrays these factors in both states.

Despite variations in opinions between EU member-states and within the international community, the opinion in France was rather positive and supportive of the French intervention. Sarkozy managed to adopt a policy radically different from how it approached the situation in Tunisia and Egypt, especially when considering the links between Alliot-Marie and Ben Ali's regime. Both the right and the left supported Sarkozy's decision, even though caution was expressed as to how it will develop (Vergnaud, 2011). In terms of public opinion, by the end of March, 66% of French people were favorable to the intervention, while 34% disapproved (Le Point, 2011a).

In the UK, during a vote of the House of Commons on March 22nd to support UN-backed action in Libya, 557 members of parliament voted in favor, while 13 voted against it (BBC News, 2011c). Furthermore, opposition leader Ed Miliband gave full support to British action, which counterbalanced the opinion of the public (BBC News, 2011b). Indeed, the public was more critical of it; a survey concerning the intervention also included questions on budget changes and cuts, which might have had an influence on the perception of the intervention as being costly (ComRes, 2011). 53% of people agreed “it would be unacceptable for British armed forces personnel to risk death or injury while trying to protect Libyan opposition forces against Gaddafi's regime,” and 43% disagreed that “it is right for the UK to take military action against Colonel Gaddafi's forces in Libya” (ComRes). The wording of the questions is not neutral; along with the other questions contained in the survey, the way it was presented might have influenced the responses.

France and the UK diverged in terms of support from the public. However, their own parties as well as the opposition largely supported action in Libya in both cases. In the case of the UK, this counterbalanced the public opinion, rendering the intervention politically viable for Cameron.

5.4 Summary

This section compares the results from the analysis with the theoretical expectations formulated in Chapter 3.

Hypothesis (1) regarded the use of indicators and symbols, how the problem was defined and by whom. The analysis of the problem stream showed that although some differences were found, especially in terms of the use of language, the media portrayal of the issue was highly similar in both cases. Indicators and symbols were identified for both, and their impact was

discussed. Most writers were reporters and journalists, with the exception of two member of think tanks.

Hypothesis (2) regarded the identification of policy alternatives and policy entrepreneurs. In France, Bernard-Henri Lévy played an important role, although he does not match the characteristics of a policy entrepreneur. One of the think tank writers in the UK provided insights into the situation, while HRW recommended an action, which was eventually implemented a few days later. The causal relation between the two cannot however be established, for lack of evidence supporting said relation. No policy alternative or entrepreneurs were identified.

These findings raise a question: how were the streams coupled if there were no policy entrepreneurs to open the window? Firstly, they may have been active in an area that was not explored in this paper. Secondly, they are crucial, but not indispensable: “without the presence of an entrepreneur, the linking of the streams may not take place” (Kingdon, 2014, p. 182). The entrepreneurs might have been located in areas this research did not address for lack of resources and accessibility, such as within the government or among policy-makers; or maybe there were none, raising questions as to what mechanisms allow windows to open.

Hypothesis (3) related to the overall national mood, with the expectation that they would match the governmental agenda since both states intervened. The analysis of France matched the expectations: both the opposition and the majority of the public in France supported the intervention. The analysis of the UK did not match the expectations: despite a majority of members of parliament voting for action, and the support of the opposition, the majority of the public disagreed with the involvement of the UK.

Hypothesis (4) related to whether there would be differences and similarities between the streams for France and the UK, which was the case.

6. Conclusion

The situation in Libya evolved rapidly, which was reflected in the international community's fast paced designing of a policy solution: an UN-mandated NATO intervention. France and the UK were at the forefront of advocacy for an intervention, and did so in many ways, ranging from France being the first actor to recognize the NTC, to both being the main actors drafting Resolution 1973.

This thesis focused on France, the UK, and their decision to intervene. It aimed to answer the following research question: *What factors led to the French and British military intervention in Libya in 2011?* To do so, it first addressed the context and background of the civil war in Libya, as well as a summary of domestic factors in France and in the UK. It then developed a theoretical framework in Chapter 3, and addressed research design in Chapter 4. The analysis of the selected documents was conducted using the method presented in Chapter 4.2, and is available in the appendix. Chapter 5 presented the results of the analysis, linking the data from the appendix to the theoretical framework established.

The findings from the analysis show a number of things. The first hypothesis was confirmed: indicators were identified, and the media portrayal of the problem in both states included the use of symbols.

The second hypothesis concerned policy alternatives and policy entrepreneurs. This hypothesis was not verified. Although a particular individual was identified, Bernard-Henri Lévy, his role and characteristics did not match the criteria advanced by Kingdon to define entrepreneurs. No such individual was identified in the case of the UK. Rather, the analysis focused on documents produced by members of think tanks, which provided opinion-based predictions and recommendations. Overall, no tangible policy alternatives or policy entrepreneurs were identified. This does not suggest that there were none; rather, future research

could focus on different areas, such as focusing on the government and policy-makers, and use different resources that were not in the scope of this research, to potentially identify alternatives and entrepreneurs.

The third hypothesis was partially confirmed: the national moods in France matched the government agenda, but not in the UK. However, the opposition did support the intervention, which avoided a political disaster for Cameron, and justified the intervention.

The fourth hypothesis anticipated differences between the cases of France and the UK, which was confirmed.

The findings present some limitations. First of all, they do not account for individual and personal motivations for the intervention. These are already complex to substantiate with data, and the data selected for this research did not give such insights. Secondly, any causal relation uncovered is relatively weak, mostly because of the format of the research: qualitative, and based on a document analysis conducted on a small-n number of documents. This is amplified by the nature of the multiple-stream framework: causal mechanisms are under-specified and are a limitation of the theory itself (Sabatier, 1999, p. 272). Thirdly, the generalizability of the findings is not guaranteed. The trends identified for the problem stream could be used as a basis for future research, but generalized to other cases. This is not necessarily a shortcoming; such limitations are expected within qualitative research, and such findings do contribute to theory-testing, which was also a goal of this research.

The research question is therefore partially answered. Domestic, policy-related and political factors played a role. The convergence of the three streams into a policy window and an opportunity for coupling enabled the implementation of the intervention. Within each stream, certain of the factors and actors expected from the theoretical framework were identified, while others were not.

Further research might identify policy entrepreneurs, or it might not; this topic could be expanded using different methodology and data. It could also be developed by using the same topic and theory, but by focusing on different states; it would be interesting to compare the findings. Another possible take on the topic might be to look more closely into the governmental apparatus, and compare the results in terms of institutional processes, and how the streams relate to them.

Overall, this research contributes to the literature by developing and testing the multiple-stream framework in relation to a new case. It also provides a perspective on the Libyan intervention that had not been addressed before: that of considering factors in France and the UK through the interaction of problems, policies and politics.

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Appendix

Document analysis

Problem stream

France

- a. “Nouvel appel à manifester en Libye,” Le Monde, February 17th (Le Monde, 2011b)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance Discusses: - Libya in 2011 - International community’s response to use of force - A report of casualties	(7) subject and object - Gaddafi regime and the civilians - International community and Gaddafi regime	(12) what information can be obtained from the document - Some facts - Context and ongoing events in Libya: cities, events, reasons, pro- and anti-Gaddafi protests
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Newspaper article - Includes a picture: unrelated caption, pro-Gaddafi protester next to a picture of Gaddafi - Le Monde: non-partisan (sometimes considered center-left)	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Situates the protests within national context: mentions that protests started to “imitate the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt” (inaccurate) - Leaves out statements by Gaddafi regime about the protests; includes remarks on democracy by Gaddafi	- Reports response from “international community”: Amnesty International, Washington, London, the EU - Seems to cite reliable sources, but does not name them except for Quryna: “selon d’autres sites de l’opposition” (according to other websites of the opposition) - Titles of paragraphs carrying underlying meanings, especially because the layout of the article highlights them (bold, capitals, bigger font): “main de fer” (iron hand); “un anniversaire à haut risque” (an anniversary of high risk)
(3) date February 17 th , 2011	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Some inaccurate facts (reasons for protests) - Leaves out statements by Gaddafi regime - Emphasis on loaded language (see 11)	
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Published in Le Monde, one of the biggest French newspapers, with Agence France-Presse	(10) structure, narrative - Short article (8 paragraphs) - Starts with protests “called on” by protesters opposing Gaddafi’s regime; reaction from international community to “Day of Rage” call;	

<p>(AFP) and Reuters (although their input is not specified)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relies on external sources: Quryna, Ministry of the Interior - Author not identified 	<p>mentions history of fifth anniversary of killing of protesters in Benghazi (Italian Consulate); concludes with statement on democracy by Gaddafi but does not specify when it was stated, might be taken out of context for purpose of article, might be recent and related</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Includes a picture of protesters visibly pro-Gaddafi, wearing green scarves (color of the flag of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), carrying posters of Gaddafi, with a man holding a red flower 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Last paragraph seemingly unrelated to rest of the article; desire to point out Gaddafi's vision of democracy and of the Libyan system; to what end? Suppositions: to portray Gaddafi as a non-democratic leader, having been in power for a "record" time; to anchor Gaddafi's leadership and the protests within the context of the Arab Spring uprisings against authoritarian leaders.
<p>(5) author</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not disclosed 	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words</p> <p>"communauté internationale"</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Seems to be to inform readers - Sway opinion? 	<p>(international community)</p> <p>"force" x2</p> <p>"tuées", "tué" (killed) x3</p> <p>"opposants" (opponents)</p> <p>"régime" (regime) x4</p> <p>"espoir" (hope)</p> <p>"militants"</p> <p>"mort" (death)</p> <p>"affrontements" (confrontations)</p> <p>"contestation"</p> <p>"partisan" x2</p> <p>"main de fer" (iron hand)</p> <p>"affronté" (confronted)</p> <p>"émeutes" (riot)</p> <p>"record"</p> <p>"souffle des révolutions" (wind of revolutions)</p> <p>"se plaignent" (complain [about])</p> <p>"chômage" (unemployment)</p> <p>"inégalités" (inequalities)</p>	

	<p>“manqué de libertés” (lack of freedoms)</p> <p>“scénario à la tunisienne ou à l'égyptienne” (scenario similar to the Tunisian or Egyptian ones)</p> <p>“le pouvoir” (power)</p> <p>“puiser dans la manne énergétique” (to draw from the energy resources; but “manne” has a religious/Biblical/Hebrew connotation, similar to “godsend”)</p> <p>“pour satisfaire d'éventuelles revendications sociales” (to satisfy eventual social demands)</p> <p>“manifestations favorables à [...] Kadhafi” (manifestations favorable to Gaddafi)</p> <p>“attaquaient” (attacked)</p> <p>“comités populaires” (people’s committee)</p>	
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- b. “Luis Martinez : "Il sera difficile de contraindre le régime de Kadhafi à une retenue dans la répression",” Le Monde, February 19th (Tuquoi, 2011)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
<p>(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opinion paper about Gaddafi - Interviewee is a research director at the CERI 	<p>(7) subject and object</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impact of the events in Tunisia and Egypt on the situation in Libya - Gaddafi, his regime, the people of Libya 	<p>(12) what information can be obtained from the document</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Point of view and opinion from a policy expert - Certain information about Libya - Telling of the situation sounding like the people, as a whole,
<p>(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Newspaper article 	<p>(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Situates the conflict in Libya within its historical and regional contexts 	

<p>- Le Monde: non-partisan (sometimes considered center-left)</p>	<p>- Mentions similarities and differences between Libya, and Egypt and Tunisia - Mentions reality of the situation in Libya: different tribes, different groups part of the insurrection but distinct in their background and goals: islamists, human right defenders, the young</p>	<p>does not want Gaddafi as their leader anymore - Opinion that Gaddafi will not hold back on violence and repression, no matter what; accuracy, impact? - Opinion on role of oil wealth, and power of deterrence for external powers to “mingle” and be excluded from markets</p>
<p>(3) date of creation and/or publication - February 19th, 2011</p>	<p>(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Questions not always worded with neutral language - In answers, no omission of the facts, no emphasis; own opinion</p>	
<p>(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Published in Le Monde - Interviewee seems to have credentials to talk about the topic considering his position within CERI - Author identified: journalist at Le Monde - Chosen title is a quote translating to “it will be difficult to force Gaddafi’s regime to hold back on repression” - Opinion paper, therefore opinion</p>	<p>(10) structure, narrative - First question: impact of events in Tunisia and Egypt on Libya - Second: do you really think that the power of Gaddafi is threatened? - Third: what the protestors demand: only democratization, or more? - Fourth: link of the “current troubles” with tribalism - Fifth: division Tripoli / Benghazi - Sixth: how can the international community weigh in</p>	
<p>(5) author - Luis Martinez being interviewed, Jean-Pierre Tuquoi interviewing</p>	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words “difficile de contraindre le régime [...] à une retenue</p>	

<p>- Luis Martinez: research director at CERI (Sciences Po) since 2005</p> <p>- Jean-Pierre Tuquoi: journalist</p>	<p>dans la répression” (difficult to force the regime to hold back on repression)</p> <p>“révolution de masse” (revolution of the mass)</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience</p> <p>- Get the opinion of a policy expert; but how were the questions framed and answered?</p>	<p>“si dans les pays voisins on peut renverser les dirigeants alors [...] il doit être possible de faire de même” (if in neighboring countries they can overthrow the leaders then it must be possible to do the same)</p> <p>“le pouvoir de Kadhafi est menacé depuis [...] il y a près de quarante ans” (the power of Gaddafi has been threatened for close to forty years)</p> <p>Wealth of the regime, oil-based</p> <p>“moins autoritaire, moins dictatorial” (less authoritarian, less dictatorial)</p> <p>“les jeunes qui [...] sentent peser sur eux le mépris du régime” (the young who feel weighing on them the disdain of the regime)</p> <p>Tribalism</p> <p>“diplomatie pétrolière redoutable” (powerful / greatly dangerous oil diplomacy)</p>	

- c. “La reconnaissance des insurgés libyens par Paris surprend l'Union européenne,” 20 Minutes, March 10th (20 minutes, 2011)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose - Describes EU reaction to French recognition of NTC	(7) subject and object - NTC - Paris / France / Sarkozy - EU member-states, politicians and diplomats	(12) what information can be obtained from the document - Because of number of quotes, perspectives on some European and international reactions; but who is missing? - Information - One-sided decision from France; irrational decision? Justified? Not elaborated upon, only the reaction of surprise
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Newspaper article - 20 minutes: non-partisan	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Provides point of view of: European diplomat in Brussels, a source in Paris, Ali Essaoui (NTC), Paris, European Parliament, NTC, Berlin, Berlusconi, spokesperson of Ashton	
(3) date of creation and/or publication March 10 th , 2011	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - No mention of BHL - No mention of a number of EU states, including Britain	
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Published by 20 minutes, copyrights go to AFP - Facts seem to be accurate - Quotes a number of politicians and diplomats - Ends with “a[n anonymous] European diplomat [...] has not excluded that, eventually, the states of the EU follow on Paris’ steps”; reliability?	(10) structure, narrative - Presents reaction (see 8) - Alternates between facts and quotes	
(5) author - Not disclosed	(11) lexical field(s), key-words	

<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Seems to be to inform readers - Sway opinion? 	<p>“a provoqué la stupeur” (provoked the astonishment)</p> <p>France’s partners, including European, stupefied at recognition decision</p> <p>Potential proposal of Sarkozy for targeted aerial attacks</p> <p>“soutien du Parlement européen” (support of European Parliament)</p> <p>Libyan opposition saluting the French decision</p> <p>Berlin “sceptique” (skeptical)</p> <p>Lack of significance in terms of international law to recognize the opposition</p> <p>Separation between France’s decision and Italian: “la position d’un seul gouvernement” (the position of only one government)</p>	
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- d. “La campagne libyenne de Bernard-Henri Lévy,” Le Figaro, March 18th (Girard, 2011)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
<p>(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Talks about Bernard-Henri Lévy and the role he played in linking NTC officials to Sarkozy - Background on BHL 	<p>(7) subject and object</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BHL and his impact on international responses and diplomacy towards Libya - Sarkozy - Abdel Jalil, Juppé 	<p>(12) what information can be obtained from the document</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Was the meeting an initiative of BHL? - Sounds like BHL did everything and that Sarkozy followed through, without own agenda
<p>(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Newspaper article - Includes a picture of BHL in what seems to be Paris - Le Figaro: right bias / conservative 	<p>(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Focus on BHL - Seems accurate, includes background - Own opinion, not neutral 	<p>- Author clearly not supporting BHL as an individual, nor the role he played in linking NTC to Sarkozy; was</p>

<p>(3) date of creation and/or publication March 18th, 2011</p>	<p>(9) omissions and emphases (who, what)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Critical language - No mention of UK - Last paragraph mentions Resolution, sound as if Sarkozy is the one who made the adoption of the Resolution possible 	<p>BHL's role over-emphasized here?</p>
<p>(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Published in Le Figaro - Author is a journalist, seems to have credentials - Transcribes opinion of author, critical of BHL - Critical language - Facts seem accurate 	<p>(10) structure, narrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - starts with background on BHL, 18 years ago, and how he brought the then Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, to Mitterrand at the Elysée - Gaddafi's visit in 2007, without stating 2007 but "il n'y a pas si longtemps" (not so long ago) - BHL in Egypt end of February - Upon reception of news of Libyan insurrection, while still in Egypt, BHL goes back to Paris, then Libya four days after - March 4th: BHL meets Mustafa Abdul Jalil in Benghazi - BHL sets up meeting between Sarkozy and Abdul Jalil - March 10th: meeting between Sarkozy, his advisors and NTC envoys - Juppé, upon arrival in Brussels, does not know about announcement - March 15th: Meeting Clinton and Jibril - Resolution adopted 	
<p>(5) author</p>		

<p>- Renaud Girard: journalist and reporter for Le Figaro, geopolitician</p>	<p>(11) lexical field(s), keywords “BHL est un artisan important du virage diplomatique international [...] vis-à-vis de la Libye” (BHL is an important artisan of the diplomatic turn regarding Libya) “notre dandy national” (our national dandy) “dictateur sanguinaire” (bloodthirsty dictator) “jouissait du privilège” (benefitted from the privilege) “sanglante répression par les forces de Kadhafi” (bloody repression by Gaddafi’s forces) “se rue” (hurries) “vers une Cyrénaïque libérée par son peuple de la police du dictateur” (towards a Cyrenaica freed by its people from the police of the dictator) “accompagné de son fidèle Gilles Herzog” (accompanied by his loyal Gilles Herzog) “au sein du grand cirque médiatique qui couvre l’insurrection des tribus de l’est de la Libye” (at the heart of the mediatic circus covering the insurrection of the tribes of the East of Libya) “Accepterais-tu de recevoir les Massoud libyens?” (would you accept to welcome the Libyan Massoud?) (in reference to Ahmad Shah Massoud)</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience - Shed a critical light on BHL’s involvement in France’s response to Libya and its important repercussions on / for France and the West - Give opinion on how France’s position developed, BHL’s input and other actors’ reactions (i.e. US, Brussels)</p>		

	<p>“du statut de reporter de guerre amateur à celui d’acteur majeur de la diplomatie mondiale” (from the status of amateur reporter to that of major actor of world diplomacy)</p> <p>“QG improvisé” (improvised headquarters)</p> <p>“baratiner” (~ to smooth talk)</p> <p>Promise of BHL to do “whatever he can to bring them to the Elysée”; Sarkozy “accepts right away”</p> <p>Meeting March 10th</p> <p>Alain Juppé unaware: “manifestement, le ministre [...] n’est au courant de rien” (apparently the minister is not aware of anything)</p> <p>“Sarkozy-BHL duo”</p> <p>Meeting Jibril-Clinton: Washington “does not want a military intervention”</p> <p>BHL “puts pressure on Sarkozy” by picturing imagery of a French flag stained with the blood of slaughtered Libyans</p>	
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- e. Official document: declaration of Nicolas Sarkozy on the political situation in Libya, February 23rd (Elysée, 2011)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
<p>(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Declaration of Sarkozy on the political situation in Libya - Less than 10 days after the start of protests 	<p>(7) subject and object</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sarkozy, France - Situation in Libya 	<p>(12) what information can be obtained from the document</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Position of France / French people

<p>(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transcript of a presidential declaration 	<p>(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not a lot of actual facts, broad terms (e.g. “violences,” “répression brutale et sanglante,” brutal and bloody repression), but also nature of document 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Underlining that it has already condemned actions - Vocabulary used to describe situation, and what reactions it gives to listeners / readers
<p>(3) date of creation and/or publication</p> <p>February 23rd, 2011</p>	<p>(9) omissions and emphases (who, what)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does not exemplify what is being denounced; again, format of document 	
<p>(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Source is reliable - Presents position of Sarkozy / government at that time - What has been left out? 	<p>(10) structure, narrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Starts with violence against Libyan population - States who has rejected actions so far: UNSC, UN Secretary General, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (“Conference” in text), and the “quasi-totalité” (almost the entirety) of world states - Denounces “massive human rights violations” - Demands: to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU 	
<p>(5) author</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unknown; pronounced by Sarkozy - Published by French government 	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words</p> <p>“répression brutale et sanglante” (brutal and bloody repression)</p> <p>“contre la population civile libyenne” (against the Libyan civilians)</p> <p>“horreur et compassion” (horror and compassion)</p> <p>“indigne” (unworthy, shameful)</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Express position of France - To condemn the actions of the government on the population in Libya 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To call for measures: by the French government, by the EU - Possibly to be seen as attentive to the situation 	<p>“rejet de ces actions inacceptables” (rejection of these unacceptable actions)</p> <p>“à nouveau” (again)</p> <p>“violations massives des droits de l’Homme” (massive violations of human rights)</p> <p>Proposals for action by French Ministry of Foreign Affairs</p>	
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United Kingdom

- f. “Libya protests: reports of intense Benghazi violence,” BBC, February 20th (BBC News, 2011a)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
<p>(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reports of events in Benghazi and Libya 	<p>(7) subject and object</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Benghazi, Libya - Violence - Libyan troops, Gaddafi 	<p>(12) what information can be obtained from the document</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Casualties, victims, violence; weapons, mercenaries
<p>(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Newspaper article - BBC News: non-partisan (accused of political bias) 	<p>(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reasons for start of protests not mentioned - Reports of violence seem reliable and based on reports and reliable sources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reports and sources difficult to verify: so what is accurate? Who says it?
<p>(3) date of creation and/or publication</p> <p>February 20th, 2011</p>	<p>(9) omissions and emphases (who, what)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emphasis on victims (aim of article according to title) - Voluntary omission of reactions of the international community, or deemed irrelevant to article? 	

<p>(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Published by the BBC - Sources vary: unnamed local witnesses, reports, other press agencies (Associated Press and Al-Jazeera, Reuters), Human Rights Watch - Does not mention cause for protests (arrests), situates events as “Libya is one of several Arab countries to have experienced pro-democracy demonstrations [...]” - How reliable are the sources? Article acknowledges twice that reports are difficult to verify 	<p>(10) structure, narrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Starts with Libyan troops opening fire on anti-government protesters - Reports violence in Benghazi, casualties - Gaddafi being “the Arab world’s longest-serving leader” - Violence and casualties on Saturday - Benghazi “liberated” 	
<p>(5) author</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not disclosed 	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words</p> <p>“machine-guns and large-calibre weapons”</p> <p>“killed” x3</p> <p>“scenes of chaos”</p> <p>“hundreds of injured protesters”</p> <p>“reports difficult to verify”</p> <p>“Arab world’s longest-serving leader”</p> <p>“oil-rich state”</p> <p>“Ben Ali,” “Mubarak”</p> <p>“42-year rule”</p> <p>“a heavy machine gun typically produced in the former USSR”</p> <p>“indiscriminately”</p> <p>“mercenaries”</p> <p>“to attack protesters”</p> <p>“like hell” (quoting a doctor)</p> <p>“liberated”</p> <p>“thousands of protesters”</p> <p>Condemnation by Hague</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inform of the situation - What impact does certain of the information have on reader? E.g. “a heavy machine gun typically produced in the former USSR” - Relay advice from British Foreign Office as to what cities to only go to for essential travel 		

- g. “Gaddafi urges violent showdown and tells Libya 'I'll die a martyr',” The Guardian, February 22nd (Black, 2011a)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose - Reports what Gaddafi said in television speech on the same day - Provides background information in situation in Libya	(7) subject and object - Gaddafi - Televised speech, supposedly of February 22 nd	(12) what information can be obtained from the document - Content of Gaddafi’s speech - International reactions - Report of violence, death squads, casualties
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Newspaper article - The Guardian: usually left bias	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Date of speech not disclosed - Accounts for content of speech, presence of mercenaries in Libya, international response and condemnation of events / actions of government in Libya - Some sources unclear - Quotes and expresses position of: Hague, Merkel, Berlusconi, Arab League, UNSC, Maklouf (film-maker and opposition activist)	- Berlusconi warm relations, London protesters: “hypocrisy”
(3) date of creation and/or publication February 22 nd , 2011	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Context and reasons for protests not disclosed; due to focus / content of article? - Reports violence, some context	
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Published in The Guardian	(10) structure, narrative - Starts with three bullet points illustrating different parts of article: “[...] Gaddafi tells loyalists to take to the	

<p>- Relays information that was in Gaddafi's speech: do not say exactly what speech / when, supposedly, speech of same day as article; language used expresses own opinion, not neutral account of speech</p> <p>- Author seems to have credentials and knowledge</p> <p>- Acknowledges difficulties to confirm reports</p>	<p>streets of Libya," "witnesses speak of mercenaries in death squads," "international condemnation of bloodshed grows"</p> <p>- Content of speech</p> <p>- Reports from Tripoli, violence in Libya</p> <p>- Condemnation and statements of several actors (states, organizations)</p>	
<p>(5) author Ian Black: former Guardian's Middle East editor, now senior visiting fellow at LSE</p>	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words "violent, final showdown to crush Libya's popular uprising"</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience</p> <p>- Inform audience of content of speech</p> <p>- Sway opinion? Critical, negative and pejorative language; author's own opinion</p>	<p>"greasy rats"</p> <p>"angry, ranting and often incoherent speech"</p> <p>"beleaguered"</p> <p>"evidence of repression and bloodshed"</p> <p>"reports of death squads"</p> <p>Gaddafi saying he will not leave Libya and will die "as a martyr"; that protesters were on "hallucinogenic drugs"; "deserved the death penalty"</p> <p>"an estimated 300 people already killed"</p> <p>"prepared to unleash more violence"</p> <p>"corpses [...], burnt-out cars and shops, and armed mercenaries who looked as if they were from other parts of Africa"</p> <p>Videos of "mobs lynching two people who were understood to be mercenaries" and "a demonstrator shot in the head"</p>	

	<p>by a sniper and of bodies torn apart”</p> <p>“Gaddafi’s death squads” (quote from Tripoli resident)</p> <p>Alleged resignation of Interior minister who joined the people</p> <p>“Gaddafi's characteristically bizarre performance underlined his desperation”</p> <p>“injured animal,” “back to the wall”</p> <p>“state TV broadcast pictures of supporters cheering and waving flags”</p> <p>Hague “scorned Gaddafi’s claim of a conspiracy of world leaders against him”</p> <p>Gaddafi said Italy and US supplied protestors with RPGs</p> <p>Berlusconi and “exceptionally warm relations with Gaddafi”</p> <p>Suspension of Libya from and by Arab League</p> <p>Western diplomats said it was “too soon” for UNSC to “discuss sanctions against Libya or the imposition of an internationally policed ‘no-fly zone’”</p> <p>Anti-government protesters in London: denounced hypocrisy of the West only caring about the oil (Mohamed Maklouf)</p>	
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- h. “Shashank Joshi: This revolution is far more complex than we imagine,” The Independent, March 2nd (Joshi, 2011)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose - Opinion paper on the Libyan revolution, from someone working at a British think tank (RUSI)	(7) subject and object - Gaddafi - Libyan revolution	(12) what information can be obtained from the document - Opinion from policy expert working at a think-tank; link with policy stream
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Newspaper article - The Independent: usually left bias	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Does not mention why protests and revolution started - No mention of NTC - Information seems accurate	- Information about situation in Libya - Did not think the resolution would go through because of veto powers; was it founded to assume so, and if yes, what happened?
(3) date of creation and/or publication March 2 nd , 2011	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Sources?	
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Published in The Independent - Author seems to have credentials to discuss topic - Opinion paper based on facts, but no sources mentioned	(10) structure, narrative - Starts with two misconceptions surrounding revolution: east-west frontline divide, and Gaddafi being besieged in Tripoli - Argues why these are misconceptions: information about Gaddafi, his loyal units, rebels, capacities - Projects that a UNSC Resolution will not be coming, because of the veto powers of Russia and China, who will execute it if a Resolution had to be voted upon - Mentions Western history of intervention in Serbia, Iraq and Srebrenica	

	<p>- Three threshold lines not to cross for Gaddafi to avoid a coalition to intervene and to “sidestep” the UN: massacre, intensification of airstrikes, or use of chemical weapons</p>	
<p>(5) author - Shashank Joshi: then Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute</p>	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words “inner sanctum” “deeply fluid revolution” “every pillar of his rule is crumbling at the edges”</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience - Inform - Analyze - Give opinion on revolution and possible future turn of events</p>	<p>“ability to direct ground forces” “most loyal units are also his best equipped and trained” “potent airpower” “delusional speech” “a leader without a grasp of reality” “not without a strategy” “countering the opposition’s attempt to project an image of momentum” “rebel groups have no viable means of pushing along the coast” “limited offensive capabilities despite their numerical superiority” “logistical challenge,” “overwhelming” “international intervention could break this impasse” Political “barriers” “Nato could obliterate Libya’s air-defence network” “far-easier task than enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq” “but Nato Secretary General and prominent Arab voices have demanded that it be</p>	

	<p>authorized by a UN[SC] [...] resolution”</p> <p>“Russia and China will be opposed to any resolution that violates the principle of non-intervention”</p> <p>“Western appetite for military operations”</p> <p>“it is also questionable whether a no-fly zone could preclude regime brutality inflicted by troops on the ground”</p> <p>“1995 massacre at Srebrenica occurred under a UN-enforced no-fly zone”</p> <p>“calibrate his violence”</p> <p>“stalemate could drag into the spring”</p>	
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i. “Is Gaddafi himself a target?” The Guardian, March 21st (Tisdall, 2011)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
<p>(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Addresses question whether Gaddafi himself is a target; regime change has been suspected to have been a non-stated objective from the onset, under the cover of R2P 	<p>(7) subject and object</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gaddafi - Regime change 	<p>(12) what information can be obtained from the document</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Libyan regime spokesman talks about “American and western claims”: what does it say about how non-British, non-French actors, perceived the role of France and UK? - Ambiguity in responses from officials regarding whether regime change is an objective
<p>(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Newspaper article - Includes a picture of a flag with Gaddafi’s image being flown - The Guardian: usually left bias 	<p>(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does not mention exactly what Resolution 1973 entails; focuses on statements from officials and politicians - Does not include statements or point of view of Arab League, African Union 	

<p>(3) date of creation and/or publication March 21st, 2011</p>	<p>(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Arab League, African Union, NATO</p>	
<p>(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Published in The Guardian - Author is a journalist who seems to have credentials to discuss the topic</p>	<p>(10) structure, narrative - Starts with stating there are suspicions that regime change is an objective - Quotes from: Fox, Hague, Gates, Gortney - Ends with quotes from Salwa el-Deghali, a member of the NTC, who stated that the goal for the attacks was regime change</p>	
<p>(5) author - Simon Tisdall: journalist, foreign affairs commentator</p>	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words “the coalition [...] seems unsure whether it wants to take him [Gaddafi] out or not” “controversy grew over whether Britain and its allies were deliberately targeting Colonel Muammar Gaddafi” “suspicions” were “heightened by a reported overnight missile attack on Gaddafi’s compound in Tripoli” “the regime [...] seized on as evidence of an assassination plot” “barbaric bombing” (Mussa Ibrahim, regime spokesman) “Liam Fox [...] increased speculation that Gaddafi was [...] a target” “at all times we are very careful to avoid that” “Fox was ambivalent”</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience - Analyze / present intervention objectives, based on statements by politicians: Fox, Hague, Gates, Gortney, Obama, Clinton, Cameron, Sarkozy, el-Deghali - In the way the article is made, to argue that regime change is an objective of the intervention: rightly so or not?</p>		

	<p>Hague “opted for obfuscation rather than a direct reply”</p> <p>“no occupation and no invasion”</p> <p>“confusion over allied intentions”</p> <p>“Sarkozy said last week that Gaddafi was behaving like a madman”</p> <p>“raised the prospect of a ‘targeted’ action against Gaddafi”</p> <p>“rebel forces in eastern Libya say the aims of the revolution and the [...] intervention are the same: regime change”</p>	
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- j. Official document: UK calls for UN action on Libya, February 22nd (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
<p>(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Declaration of William Hague - Less than 10 days after the start of protests 	<p>(7) subject and object</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hague, UK government - Libya 	<p>(12) what information can be obtained from the document</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of reports and monitors in Libya; how accurate and reliable
<p>(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transcript of an official statement 	<p>(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More of a statement on the position of UK so not a lot of factual information on the situation; nature of document 	<p>has the information received been so far?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “close cooperation”: US, yes; EU, not really, rather France (article about surprise after recognition of NTC by France); countries of the region, who? AU proposals not implemented, Arab League
<p>(3) date of creation and/or publication</p> <p>February 22nd, 2011</p>	<p>(9) omissions and emphases (who, what)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does not exemplify what is being denounced; again, format of document 	

<p>(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Source is reliable - Presents position of UK government at that time - What has been left out? 	<p>(10) structure, narrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Starts with how UK opinion: “concerned” - Meeting UNSC later on that day: what the UK will say - Expresses support for UN High Commissioner for Human Rights - UN Human Rights Council - UK will continue to be “active on every diplomatic front” 	
<p>(5) author</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unknown; pronounced by Hague - Published by UK government 	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words</p> <p>“gravely concerned”</p> <p>“a danger to the people”</p> <p>“serious implications”</p> <p>“condemn the violence”</p> <p>“respect human rights”</p> <p>“act with restraint and in accordance with international law”</p> <p>“investigation”</p> <p>“to press for access for human rights monitor”</p> <p>“trying to stop the world seeing what is happening”</p> <p>“held accountable”</p> <p>“active on every diplomatic front”</p> <p>“deepening crisis”</p> <p>“close coordination with the US, EU and countries of the region”</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Present position of UK - To express “concern[s] about the situation in Libya” - To present next actions of UK: UNSC meeting later that day, UN Human Rights Council, “active on every diplomatic front” 		

Policy stream

France

k. “BHL veut frapper les tanks de Khadafi,” March 17th, Le Figaro (Le Figaro, 2011a)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose - BHL: policy entrepreneur? - Includes quotes and his opinions	(7) subject and object - BHL - His opinions on the urgency of the situation, and what should be done	(12) what information can be obtained from the document - Article starts by reminding reader that BHL is a writer
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Newspaper article - Typo on “Kadhafi” in title itself - Le Figaro: right bias / conservative	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Neutral narration - Mostly quoting BHL so own opinion - BHL “écrivain” (writer): described also as philosopher, activist but not included here	- Insights into opinion of BHL - Questioning as to how qualified he is? What is he trying to accomplish?
(3) date of creation and/or publication March 17 th , 2011; quotes might be from the Thursday before (jeudi)	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Title “BHL veut frapper les tanks de Khadafi” (BHL wants to strike Gaddafi’s tanks): sounds humoristic, critical; interrogation over BHL’s credentials - Certain quotes are preceded by author’s summary, who draws inexact conclusions from what the quote says (e.g. acting without a mandate)	
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Published in Le Figaro, with AFP - The few facts included seem accurate - Several typos	(10) structure, narrative - BHL underlining urgency of situation - Quote of BHL: destructions of airports no longer sufficient - Quote of BHL: what type of intervention: “la France et	

	<p>l'Angleterre et un ou deux pays arabes" (France and England and one or two Arab countries)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BHL saying there might need to act without a UN mandate - Quote of BHL: consequences of a victory of Gaddafi - Jibril and Clinton meeting - Why was BHL in Libya in the first place 	
<p>(5) author - Not disclosed</p>	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words "L'écrivain Bernard-Henri Lévy" (the writer Bernard-Henri Lévy)</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience - Relay BHL's statements</p>	<p>"frappes ciblées sur les tanks" (strikes targeted on the tanks) "la France et l'Angleterre et un ou deux pays arabes" (France and England and one or two Arab countries) "il y a des situations d'urgence humanitaire où si l'on n'arrive pas à avoir de mandat il faut y aller sans mandat" (there are situations of humanitarian emergency in which if we do not manage to get a mandate we have to go without a mandate; "we" not used but closest translation) "écœuré" (sickened) "non comme émissaire de Nicolas Sarkozy" (not as an envoy of Nicolas Sarkozy)</p>	

1. “BHL : Je n'ai aucune autre légitimité que celle de ma propre conscience,” March 24th,
Le Monde (Le Monde, 2011a)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose - BHL: policy entrepreneur?	(7) subject and object - BHL - Libya	(12) what information can be obtained from the document - BHL's tendency to highly value own role in the situation
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Newspaper article: transcript of an online chat discussion on lemonade.fr, moderated by Olivier Biffaud (journalist) - Picture: portrait of BHL, captioned that it was taken at the Elysée on March 10 th - Le Monde: non-partisan (sometimes considered center-left)	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Not fact-based; BHL's own answers	- Language used - His vision of the role he played: humble but not quite - His opinion on Gaddafi - His ideas, ideals, values
(3) date of creation and/or publication March 24 th	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Questions left out and not included here?	
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Online discussion: presents opinion of BHL - Transcript published by Le Monde	(10) structure, narrative - Introductory paragraph - Questions from a user, answer from BHL: 35	
(5) author - Moderator: Olivier Biffaud - BHL - Internet users with own pseudonym	(11) lexical field(s), key-words “un million de civils menacés” (one million of threatened civilians) “bouleversé” (devastated)	
(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience	“mandat” (mandate) x6 “je vous rappelle” (I remind you)	

<p>- Not specified why the chat discussion took place: whose incentive?</p> <p>- Present the discussion</p>	<p>“je répète” (I repeat) x3</p> <p>“comme on a tardé” (because we took too long)</p> <p>“frappes ciblées contre les armements lourds de Kadhafi” (targeted strikes against the heavy armament of Gaddafi)</p> <p>“regrettable” (unfortunate / regrettable)</p> <p>“horrible” (horrible)</p> <p>“il n’y a plus d’autre solution” (there is no other solution)</p> <p>“otages” (hostage) x3</p> <p>“Kadhafi est un preneur d’otages professionnel. Il a passé sa vie à prendre des otages.” (Gaddafi is a professional hostage-taker. He spent his life taking people hostage)</p> <p>“il me semble” (it seems to me)</p> <p>“selon des informations qui me sont arrivées ce matin” (according to information that arrived to me this morning)</p> <p>“vous ne savez pas, ni moi non plus” (you do not know, and me neither)</p> <p>“n’oubliez pas” (do not forget) x2</p> <p>“attention à ne pas confondre, par paresse intellectuelle [...]” (careful not to mix up, out of intellectual idleness)</p> <p>Does not think the role “tribus” (tribes) is important x2</p> <p>“Une chose importante déjà: ce sont des musulmans laïques” (one thing important</p>	
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	<p>already: they are secular Muslims) about the NTC “dictature actuelle” (current dictatorship)</p> <p>“la démocratie parfaite n’existe pas, nous le savons bien” (perfect democracy does not exist, we know that well)</p> <p>“Je n’ai pris, évidemment, la place de personne. Et je trouve d’ailleurs qu’Alain Juppé fait, en ce moment, très bien son travail. Mon rôle, je vous le répète, a été extrêmement simple. Amener à Paris les membres du Conseil national de transition. Accueillir Mahmoud Jibril à Paris, le jour du sommet du G8, afin qu’il puisse plaider sa cause auprès de Hillary Clinton. Inviter Ali Zeidan, à Paris toujours, avant-hier, à exposer les grandes lignes de son projet de société devant des journalistes. Voilà.” (I have not taken, obviously, anyone’s place. And I incidentally think that Alain Juppé does, currently, his job very well. My role, I repeat, has been extremely simple. To bring to Paris the members of the [NTC]. To welcome Mahmoud Jibril in Paris, on the day of the G8 summit, so that he could plead his case to Hillary Clinton. To invite Ali Zeidan, still to Paris, the day before yesterday, to expose the outline of his project of</p>	
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	<p>society in front of journalists.)</p> <p>“Bosnie” (Bosnia)</p> <p>“je n’ai aucune autre légitimité que celle de ma propre conscience” (I have no other legitimacy than my own conscience)</p> <p>“fait horreur” (~ I cannot stand it)</p> <p>“aucun rôle” (no role)</p> <p>“l’idée folle” (the mad idea)</p> <p>“la Libye libre” (the free Libya / liberated Libya)</p> <p>“colonnes infernales de Kadhafi” (the infernal pillars of Gaddafi)</p> <p>“cauchemar” (nightmare)</p> <p>“dictateur fou” (mad dictator)</p> <p>Why intervene in Libya and not in Côte d’Ivoire or Yemen? “Parce que les Libyens eux-mêmes, la Ligue arabe, l’Union africaine, en ont fait la demande pressante” (Because the Libyans themselves, the Arab League, the African Union, made an urgent demand to do so)</p> <p>Can you explain the reason for the refusal of China and Russia to intervene? “Parce qu’elles ont sans doute trop peur que l’idée puisse venir, un jour, à la communauté internationale d’aller mettre son nez dans leurs propres affaires prétendument “intérieures”. Pensez au Tibet. Souvenez-vous de la Tchétchénie.” (In all likelihood because they are too afraid that the idea might</p>	
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	<p>come, one day, to the international community to go snoop in their own supposedly “interior” affairs. Think about Tibet. Remember Chechnya.)</p> <p>“son sale travail de terroriste” ([Gaddafi’s] dirty terrorist work)</p> <p>“l’air de la liberté” (the air / wind of freedom)</p>	
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- m. “Libya Uprising: What next for Gaddafi’s regime?” February 20th, Chatham House (Dalton, 2011)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
<p>(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Published by a think tank - Opinion and analysis 	<p>(7) subject and object</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gaddafi - Libya 	<p>(12) what information can be obtained from the document</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opinion from policy expert
<p>(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Expert comment” - Article originally published on Channel 4; not a Chatham House publication but written by a member of the think tank 	<p>(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does not try to guess what is going to happen: rather, presents broad possibilities, but based on own opinion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Possibilities of development of situation
<p>(3) date of creation and/or publication</p> <p>February 20th</p>	<p>(9) omissions and emphases (who, what)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mentions that there is no evidence for a link between the situation in Libya and “foreign countries” - Does not provide specific reason for protests 	

<p>(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Published by Chatham House - Acknowledges lack of source in certain areas 	<p>(10) structure, narrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Starts with Libyan leadership's instinct to "rely on force" - Nature of "challenge": "many people [...] are sick of the suppression of dissent, of the lack of reform, and of the profiteering by some" as well as "killings of protesters" - Political response from leadership: none - How they would need to go about to "stay ahead of demands for change" - Continuation of the status quo for a period might occur 	
<p>(5) author</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sir Richard Dalton: former British diplomat; former Associate Fellow at Chatham House 	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words</p> <p>"poor fuel on the flames and spread them to new areas"</p> <p>"home-grown challenge"</p> <p>"the suppression of dissent, of the lack of reform, and of the profiteering by some"</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Express opinion 	<p>"enraged at the large-scale killings of protesters"</p> <p>"minor steps"</p> <p>"as have Bahrain and Egypt"</p> <p>"include expression of opinion, constitutional change and corruption"</p> <p>"no one can forecast"</p> <p>"we don't know:</p> <p>"status quo"</p>	

- n. “UN: Act on Rights Council’s decision on Libya.” February 25th, Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, 2011b)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
<p>(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Advice to and opinion on Human Rights Council: the General Assembly should suspend Libya’s membership rights (occurred on March 1st) - Published by think tank (HRW is defined as a think tank by the Go To Think Tank Index Report (McGann, 2011, p. 56)) 	<p>(7) subject and object</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UN - Human Right’s Council decision to suspend Libya 	<p>(12) what information can be obtained from the document</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Facts - Content of resolution adopted on February 25th - Statements by Peggy Hicks, global advocacy director at HRW
<p>(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Publication on Human Rights Watch; account of event 	<p>(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Seems to be based on facts 	
<p>(3) date of creation and/or publication</p> <p>February 25th</p>	<p>(9) omissions and emphases (who, what)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Necessity for UN to act; goal of the publication 	
<p>(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Published by HRW 	<p>(10) structure, narrative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Starts with: Council’s decision should be implemented - What happened on February 25th during special session on Libya - Unanimous decision needs to be followed by action - Human Rights Council’s recommendation that UN General assembly suspends Libya’s membership 	
<p>(5) author</p> <p>Not specified; HRW</p>	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words</p>	

<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Give opinion / advice - Having opinion weighing in? - Present facts and advancements on situation in Libya 	<p>“independent international commission of inquiry”</p> <p>“serious human rights violations in Libya”</p> <p>“recent gross and systematic human rights violations committed in Libya, including indiscriminate armed attacks against civilians”</p> <p>“some of the attacks ‘may amount to crimes against humanity’”</p> <p>“should waste no time”</p>	
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Politics stream

France

- o. “Libye, le coup d’éclat de Sarkozy?” March 18th, Le Journal du Dimanche (Vergnaud, 2011)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose - Discusses the support for the intervention domestically	(7) subject and object - Sarkozy - Passing of Resolution 1973 and domestic support	(12) what information can be obtained from the document - In favor of a departure of the dictatorial power of Gaddafi: but this was not supposed to be an objective? Link with doc. i
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Newspaper article - Includes a picture: a picture of Sarkozy at the World Economic Forum, captioned “Nicolas Sarkozy a réussi un coup d’éclat en imposant son choix à l’ONU” (Nicolas Sarkozy managed a feat while imposing his choice on the UN) - Le Journal du Dimanche (JDD): right bias	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Seems to accurately represent role of US and UK - Neutral narration - Includes different points of view (France, Germany, US) but not Arab League, AU	- A summit with the EU, the AU and the Arab League will take place on Saturday in Paris with the presence of Ban Ki-moon: considering the dates, “Saturday” is March 19 th , date of the first meeting of the ad hoc committee; timing of Paris Summit perceived by AU leaders as a “snub to them) (De Waal, 2013, p. 371) - Support for Sarkozy, position of US, UK, EU, role of US and UK
(3) date of creation and/or publication March 18 th , modified in June 2017	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Centered on role of Sarkozy, but still mentions role of US, UK - No BHL (?)	
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Published in le JDD - Includes many sources, quotes	(10) structure, narrative - Starts with domestic situation in France: almost total unanimity - First to recognize opposition and being in favor of Gaddafi leaving power - Mention of Russia / Georgia, 2008	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Tournant opportuniste” (opportunistic turn) - Abroad, commentators cautious about French attitude towards Libya, including NTC recognition not well received and perceived - Role of UK and US - Still to get a united EU position - Sarkozy’s success will be judged in action 	
(5) author Vivien Vergnaud	(11) lexical field(s), key-words “unanimité [...] presque parfaite” (unanimity almost perfect)	
(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience - Discuss the success of Sarkozy and his role in the UN adopting Resolution 1973 - Discuss domestic support for Sarkozy’s policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “succès” (success) “louanges” (praise) “espoir” (hope) “leadership” “en s’exprimant la première en faveur d’un départ du pouvoir dictatorial de Kadhafi puis en reconnaissant l’opposition comme seul interlocuteur légitime” (by being the first expressing itself in favor of a departure of the dictatorial power of Gaddafi and by recognizing the opposition as sole legitimate interlocutor) “un sommet réunissant l’Union européenne, l’Union africaine et la Ligue arabe se tiendra samedi à Paris en présence de Ban Ki-moon” (a summit with the EU, the AU and the Arab League will take place on Saturday in Paris with the presence of Ban Ki-moon) 	

	<p>“forcing identique” (identical pressure / forcing) “tournant opportuniste” (opportunistic turn) “circonspects” (cautious) “mal perçue” (badly / poorly perceived) Merkel “fondamentalement sceptique” (fundamentally skeptical), Rutte “geste ‘fou’” (crazy move) “abrupt” (abrupt) “embarrass” (embarrassment) “fervent soutien” of UK (fervent support) “revirement” of Barack Obama (reversal of Barack Obama) “sans-faute diplomatique” (flawless diplomatic performance)</p>	
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- p. “Deux tiers des Français approuvent l'intervention en Libye, selon un sondage,” March 23rd, Le Point (Le Point, 2011a).

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
<p>(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose - Poll on domestic support for intervention (France)</p>	<p>(7) subject and object - Domestic support for intervention</p>	<p>(12) what information can be obtained from the document - March 23rd poll results published: 66% of French people favorable to intervention, 34% disapprove; change in percentages from beginning of month</p>
<p>(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Newspaper article - Le Point: liberal-conservative bias</p>	<p>(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Also includes polls in UK and Germany, although comparability of polls is not disclosed and questionable - Could not find original Ifop poll; not sure about methodology, date of collection, sample size etc</p>	

<p>(3) date of creation and/or publication March 23rd</p>	<p>(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Compares with poll conducted at beginning of March, but does not mention the fact that intervention was not certain then</p>	
<p>(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Presents results of poll conducted by the Institut Français d'opinion publique (Ifop)</p>	<p>(10) structure, narrative - Starts with support in France: “deux tiers” (two-thirds) 66% “favorables” (favorable) to intervention; 34% “désapprouvent” (disapprove) - Compares to previous poll at beginning of March, which had 63% against a possible intervention, 36% for and 1% without opinion; again, comparability? (method, sample etc) - UK support: 53% soldiers of her Majesty should not risk their life to help the opposition forces in Libya, 43% disapprove strikes against Gaddafi - Germany support: majority for intervention while being happy German forces not intervening;</p>	
<p>(5) author - Not disclosed</p>	<p>(11) lexical field(s), key-words N/A</p>	
<p>(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience - Survey of population about Libya - Inform of domestic support, results of poll, as well as polls in UK and Germany</p>		

United Kingdom

- q. “The full list of how MPs voted on Libya action,” March 22nd, BBC News, (BBC News, 2011c)

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose - How the MPs voted on UN-mandated action in Libya	(7) subject and object - MPs - Vote on Libya action	(12) what information can be obtained from the document - Fifteen MPs voted against
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Newspaper article - BBC News: non-partisan (accused of political bias)	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Detailed list (names, constituencies, parties)	- MPs who did not vote - 557 MPs voted in favor
(3) date of creation and/or publication March 22 nd	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Did not specify number of MPs who did not vote, but list of names	
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Published by BBC - Report of vote	(10) structure, narrative - Fifteen MPs voted against - MPs who did not vote - 557 MPs voted in favor	
(5) author - Survey: N/A; BBC News (not disclosed)	(11) lexical field(s), key-words N/A	
(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience - Inform of how MPs voted on Libya		

- r. "ITV News Cuts Index plus Libya Poll," March 22nd, Savanta:ComRes (ComRes, 2011).

Approaching the document	Content	Outcome
(1) relevance to the research problem and purpose - Presents results of Libya poll (UK)	(7) subject and object - Libya - Public opinion	(12) what information can be obtained from the document - 53% of people agree "it would be unacceptable for British armed forces personnel to risk death or injury while trying to protect Libyan opposition forces against Gaddafi's regime"
(2) type of document and extra; political bias (if applicable) - Poll	(8) comprehensiveness or selectivity of information - Poll on Libya conducted along poll on economic situation / public spending	- 35 % agree "it is right for the UK to take military action against Colonel Gaddafi's forces in Libya"; 43% disagree, 22% don't know
(3) date of creation and/or publication - Survey conducted 18 th -20 th March 2011 - Results published March 22 nd	(9) omissions and emphases (who, what) - Survey on Libya: 4 statements on page 13 (Index accessible via document)	- 49% agree "that military action in Libya is an unnecessary risk for Britain to take"; 31% disagree
(4) authenticity, credibility, reliability, accuracy, legitimacy and representativeness - Survey conducted by Savanta:ComRes	(10) structure, narrative - Results of survey asking whether the public feels the Government understand problems British families face - Libya poll results	- 52% agree that "they have a good understanding of why the UK is planning military action in Libya"
(5) author N/A	(11) lexical field(s), key-words Four statements to agree / disagree / don't know: "It is right for the UK to take military action against Colonel Gaddafi's forces in Libya" "I feel I have a good understanding of why the UK is planning military action in Libya" "Military action in Libya is an unnecessary risk for Britain to take"	- 36 % agree international action "reflects well on David Cameron's leadership"; 34% disagree, 30% don't know
(6) original purpose and intent, and target audience - Survey of population about Libya		

	<p>“The international action being taken on Libya reflects well on David Cameron’s leadership”</p>	
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