



THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN SECURITY GOVERNANCE AND THE ECONOMY

Towards a Concept of Rentier Governmentality
in the Gulf

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' . . . freedom is nothing but the correlative development of apparatuses of security.'

Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*

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Introduction

“Europeans concerned with matters of strategy and security are usually not the same as those who write about structures affecting economic development, trade, and money, or with the prospects for particular regions or sectors” (Strange, 1982, p. 481). Although referring to Europe, this is an observation that can be made globally. The studies of security and political economy (PE) have evolved in isolation of each other. More recently, Homolar (2010, p. 411) states the following: *“The disciplinary fields of security studies and political economy too often maintain a deliberate distance from each other”*. Of course, there are a few academics that have made an effort to incorporate these two disciplines with one another. These include earlier studies by e.g. Gilpin (1975), Knorr (1957, 1975, 1977), Keohane and Nye (1977) and Baldwin (1985), and more recent works by Mastanduno (1998), Ripsman (2000), Kirshner (1998, 2007), Narizny (2007), Adamson (2016), Lobell & Ripsman (2016), Goddard & Nexon (2016), Cappella Zielinski et al. (2017), Hendrix (2017) and Henke (2019). That PE and security studies developed in isolation from another seems extraordinary, since the spheres of politics and economics operate in the same reality and often intertwine. Together and individually they form a nexus with security. In relation to this, the foundations of almost all International Relations (IR) and Political Economy theories - from mercantilism to realism and constructivism - imply a form of connection between stability, security and economy. This connection lies at the core of this thesis and will be further explored in the context of security governance through economic structures in the Gulf region, focussing on the UAE as case study.

Following political realist theory, security studies literature predominantly categorises politics as ‘high’ or ‘low’. The former includes that on which the survival of the state depends, meaning internal and external sovereignty; the latter encompasses all of the remainder concerns of a state, such as economic prosperity. This leads to the issue that power rooted in economy is not recognised. It does not correlate with the notion of mercantilists that “money is the sinews of war”, resulting from the idea of economic wellbeing linked to military power (Baldwin, 1985). The above-mentioned mercantilist notion ties into the wider resource acquisition dilemma within political economy, with important implications for a state’s security expressed in the question of organising one’s economy according the principles of economic nationalism or economic liberalism (Paret et al., 1986). Since Kant’s work *Perpetual Peace* (1983 [1793]), the idea that mutual interest in free markets guarantees peace through the creation of mutual interdependence has (almost) been taken for granted and therefore, has been adopted as an indirect security strategy. The economic liberal strategy gives room for specialisation and comparative advantage, which in theory leads to maximisation of wealth, meaning: more

resources to devote to security (Lake, 1992). However, a free market leads to the termination of uncompetitive national sectors. This makes a state dependent and unable to supply itself in case of a conflict where it is cut off: its security is in peril.¹ In contrast, the economic nationalist strategy aims at protecting all sectors and being self-reliant. Consequently, a defence apparatus exists; but a nationalist economy may also lead to economic inefficiencies, which in turn leads to decrease of wealth and thus, negatively impacting national security (Helleiner & Pickel, 2005).

The division between 'high' and 'low' politics, with security belonging to the former and the economy belonging to the latter, is hardly realistic. States are not - and cannot - be independent from either the international market or their national political economy as this distinction implies. A state's political economy is of utmost importance for its national security. Its relationship is complex, and often implicit. Within the field of Political Economy, security mostly occurs as an epiphenomenon and has not explicitly been developed. It would be more suitable to view political economy and security as two sides of the same coin.

The relationship between political economy and security is not a linear relationship. In the following sections, the dynamics between political economy and security will be further explored by examining the security issues entailed in the formation of institutional forms and power relations and vice versa. This thesis will explore the above-mentioned dynamics using the Foucauldian concepts of governmentality and biopolitics/biopower, as the reciprocal relationship between security and political economy lies at the core of these approaches.

¹ This notion is now noticeable as a result of COVID-19: global value chains have been interrupted which has led to a tendency towards economic nationalism.

Literature review

Governmentality & Biopolitics/Biopower

From the sovereign, to raison d'état and towards government rationality

Security is not just a political buzzword. As Michael Dillon states in his work *Politics of Security*: “Security [...] saturates the language of modern politics” (1996, p. 12). The core question of modern politics is *how* to provide security, not *why*. The how-question leads to a numerous answers. Early modern social contract theories were predominantly occupied by the relationship between security and politics. As Hobbes (1985 [1651], p. 192) states: “security of a man’s person is lastly the motive, and end”. In other words, the necessity of security is the reason the *Leviathan* is able to exist.

With the introduction of the concept *governmentality* at his famous series of lectures *Security, territory and population* at the Collège de France in 1977-1978, philosopher Michel Foucault breaks away from the idea of a Leviathan, an all-mighty sovereign. In brief, *governmentality* has been defined as “the conduct of conduct”. Foucault attempts to go beyond the question of *who governs and how*, and problematises the relationship between government of the state, the governing by society, and of others (Dean, 1999, p. 2). The “conduct of conduct” refers to the means of governance that steer and control the subjects of government. The discipline of governmentality is not per se a theory-based one, as Dean (1999, p. 3) asserts: “Its concerns are problem-centred and present-oriented.”

As with The Leviathan, the problematisation of security lies at the centre of defining the new power relation of governmentality. However, liberal security differs from the security Hobbes portrayed. Before we get into the relationship of security and governmentality, the concept of governmentality will first be further explored.

By rearticulating the idea of political sovereignty, Foucault challenged the idea of the existence of a sovereign. Foucault understands the state in modernity as a governmental state that governs a self-autonomous society, which encompasses the market. Prior to this final form of (neo-)liberal governmentality, Foucault articulates a process of ‘governmentalisation’ of the state. This process emerges with the state breaking from the sovereign and divine legislation by establishing *raison d'état* (reason of state): the state should be “[...] governed according to rational principles which are intrinsic to it and which cannot be derived solely from natural or

divine laws" (Foucault, 2007 [1978], p. 97). The development of governmentality centres around the notion of the government adopting a mode of rationale, the *raison d'état*, that encompasses goals, means and standards for and of governing: an essential feature of the *art of government*. One of the main purposes of *raison d'état* is to ensure a prosperous state by rational means; for example, by using trade knowledge. This leads to mercantilism being the first form of rationalisation of the exercise of power by government, according to Foucault (2007 [1978], p. 102). Mercantilists recognised the autonomy of the economy and it being a separate entity from the political sphere. However, the economy was not yet seen as a product of society with as objective to serve that same society; the mercantilist economy was there to serve the state and to ensure its wealth. Mercantilism was trapped in the logic of sovereignty/state. An important characteristic of mercantilism was, according to Foucault (2007 [1978], p. 312-315), the institution of the *police*. With this concept, Foucault refers to a broad form of public administration that was responsible for and regulated all spheres of public affairs, e.g. health, security and labour, while the state was pursuing its wealth through market and trade control.

With the breakdown of mercantilism - due to an economic and political crisis² - the art of government got the opportunity to further develop itself (Foucault, 2007 [1978], p 101). A new domain of knowledge came into power: political economy. *Raison d'état* was bound by the state's limitations. A new rationality, government rationality (*governmentality*), broke free from these state limitations. With the arrival of political economy, new form of 'scientific' knowledge emerged over which the state had no influencing power, but which did influence the state's governing. The relationship between the population and the political order is simultaneously transformed as part of the development of governmental reason, and outside the framework of *raison d'état*. Foucault articulates this transformation through the separation of subject of 'right' and of 'interest'. The population as subject of interest is predominantly identified as an economic one; and becomes the object as well as means of government (Foucault, 2007 [1978], p. 100). The object of the state becomes the preservation of economic freedom of the population. The treatment of population by state changes with the introduction of economic liberalism into governmental policies. Those policies that were under the authority of the *police* during mercantilist times, such as security, freedom, health and wellbeing, now became a political matter. Foucault articulates a new *technology of power*³ in order to conceptualise this social and political development: *biopolitics*. Foucault's notion of power and governmentality

² See Mokyr, 2009.

³ Foucault's analysis of power is grounded in his concept 'technologies of power', which he introduced in his work *Discipline & Punish* (1975). In brief, this concept refers to "*technologies imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting certain undesired ones*" (Rose, 1999, p. 52).

has been critiqued for being too general, and thus, not being able to serve any normative or critical function (Fraser, 1981, 1989; Taylor, 1984). Governmentality could form an explanation for basically anything, therefore it loses its relevance. However, it can be argued that Foucault was predominantly interested in creating a *genealogy*⁴ of governmentality in light of the modern state (which will be further explained below), and thus governmentality as proposed by Foucault should not be viewed as a critical theory of an already existing concept of governmentality itself.

Towards the management of population: Biopower

Up until this section, the focus has been on Foucault's lectures *Security, Territory and Population*. Now, the main focus of attention will be Foucault's lectures *The Birth of Biopolitics* at the Collège de France in 1978-1979. Foucault has been critiqued for 'slippage' between the concepts of governmentality and biopolitics. But: "Foucault is fallible" (Dillon & Neal, 2008, p. 1). Instead of explicitly articulating what one *has* to think, Foucault rather aims at *provoking*, and thus, letting us question what we might deem as truth. The concepts of governmentality and biopolitics are indeed closely connected. Both concepts concern the construction and management of the population, and describe the coming of the bureaucratic, modern state. That is why this thesis will discuss concepts of governmentality and biopolitics as a coherent whole, and not as two distinct topics.

In order to understand the concept of biopolitics, one should understand Foucault's (1971, pp. 67-69) pursuit of a *genealogy of power relations*. Following Nietzsche's genealogical analysis, Foucault embarked on an investigation of the interrelatedness of truth, power and knowledge, taking into account: i) discontinuity of discourse; ii) specificity of facts and discourse in a certain time and space; and iii) exteriority of facts and power relations. According to Foucault, he was not in search of the mere origin of power relations. In order to pursue the genealogy of power relations, one has to question the very notion of an inherently repressive state.

Foucault (2007 [1978], p. 1) describes a development of power in which power does not solely carry a punitive function anymore, but a more productive one aimed at human life as a whole; Foucault conceptualises this form of power as *biopower*. It is during this time⁵, that the focus of the political subject shifted from the individual to the collective, creating the notion of *population*. The population has its own regularities and variables, such as life expectancy,

⁴ As understood in the framework of the Cambridge Dictionary's definition: *The study of the history of the past and present members of a family, or a particular history of this type.*

⁵ Around the beginning of the 18th century.

productivity, diseases, reproduction etc., and has now become a technology of government (Foucault, 2007 [1978], p. 99). Just as territory was the main concern of the Sovereign, the population was that of the State, as its most valuable resource. The power over life, *biopower*, consists of two dimensions: i) disciplinary power in the form of *anatomo-politics* that is aimed at the individual (to discipline), treats this individual as both means and object of power and interprets the body as a machine; ii) the organization around this 'power over life' takes its form in *biopolitics*: this power regulates a series of biological processes (like mortality, births, etc.) and is aimed at the collective. Biopolitics concerns itself with the control and maintenance of the population through new techniques such as statistics, demography and public policies, with as goal: equilibrium and stability. Countering the idea that biopolitics is just reserved for the State, Foucault (2003 [1976], p. 250) notes that both State and non-State entities can exercise biopolitics as a form of power.

Foucault (1998 [1976], p. 140) notes that in the 18th century these two poles still operate in isolation from each other. Later on, disciplinary power and biopolitics start to join powers that will "[...] go to make up the great technology of power of the nineteenth century"; in other words: biopower. The two technologies of biopolitics and discipline become reliant on one another and join together through techniques and practices. Due to this interconnectedness, it can be difficult to distinguish biopower from biopolitics. Even Foucault himself used these terms interchangeably (Mills, 2013, p. 85) and has given various paths of the conceptualisation of biopower/biopolitics in both his lectures and books. One must keep in mind however that Foucault advised his readers to freely interpret his work, and not to subject oneself to a certain rigid reading. A single clear framework cannot be derived from the works of Foucault. Foucault conceptualised biopower as a form of power over life, whose aim is to 'make life live'. Power utilized by government is not just aimed anymore at life and death of the individual: it has evolved and now concerns itself with the *betterment* of life of the population. However, this does not entail that biopolitical power has replaced disciplinary power. The concept of *biopower* includes measures and practices i) to which the population as a whole is subjected in order to secure its overall wellbeing; and ii) that aim at making individuals behave. In this thesis, the economic component of biopower will be emphasised: biopower is predominantly utilized to manage the population in order to secure profit and maximise production; thus, biopower aims at managing the population in the most efficient way possible.

Governmentality, (neo-)liberalism & security

Foucault touches upon another important topic in his *Birth of Biopolitics* lectures: neoliberal governmentality. He identifies two distinct differences between classical liberalism and

neoliberalism. Firstly, the relationship between state and economy differs. Within neoliberalism, the market is the underlying, regulative principle of the state (Foucault, 2008 [1979]). Secondly, neoliberalism connects the rationality of government to the rationality of individuals, instead of the freedom of individuals as classical liberalism would do. This means that the rationality of government is tied to the entrepreneurial and competitive characteristics of individuals (Foucault, 2008 [1979]). With the knowledge of political economy having reached this status, economic liberalism became a technology of government: the mechanism of the market and interests of the population transformed into the principles of limitation for government (Foucault, 2008 [1979], pp. 27-28).

Governmentality has been criticised for its liberal bias. This critique predominantly originates from the Marxist corner. Kerr (1999) notes that with governmentality, Foucault beheads the King, and enthrones the market. Kerr (1999, p. 197) continues to argue that with the market being the limitation of government and political economy being its rationality, the state becomes the subject of the interests of the market. In other words, governmentality is merely a rearticulating of capitalist rule. However, one can counter-argue that this critique exaggerates the relation between the market and the state that Foucault has articulated. As Milchman & Rosenberg (2002) and Jessop (2007) note, much can be learned from the discussion between the Marxist and governmental interpretation of the state. Foucault's governmentality does not imply that the liberal government is a slave to the market's interests – his claim is much more modest. The market merely serves as a limitation to government; it does not dictate the workings of government. Within liberal governmentality, one can also identify policies 'against' the market – these policies however do need to reckon with the market.

Foucault (2007 [1978]) imagines the population as a physical entity whose strength and productivity can grow if not hindered by governmental activity. This translates into the notion that the population determines the workings of the economy, and the economy forms the *rationalization of technologies of power* (Foucault, 2007 [1978]): we live in a self-regulating social society. If the previous statement were true, why would there be any need for regulation, one can ask? According to Foucault (2007 [1978], p. 32-56), the necessity for regulation stems from 'the treatment of the aleatory' (the uncertain). Just like Hobbes, Foucault problematises security. Only now, the biopoliticised problematic of security deals with the self-regulating society that revolves around "the economy of the contingent" (Foucault, 1976, p.46). The liberal government "[...] consumes freedom, which means that it must produce it" (Foucault, 2008 [1979], p. 63); and the uncertain is the principle of calculation to do so. In other words, regulation is necessary to make non-regulation possible, and vice versa. Therefore, for Foucault, biopower – make life live – and security are closely related. Intervention by what

Foucault calls *security dispositifs* – a *dispositif* refers to a structure or practice that is part of a larger dispersed network that enhances the exercise of power within and of the population⁶ - is justified because the self-regulating society is always under threat (of the uncertain). According to Foucault's lectures of *Security, Territory and Population*, this paradox is one of the key elements of governmentality. However, Foucault also identifies a flipside to the calculation of the uncertain: a *culture of dangers* arises. These dangers act as boundaries beyond which governments enjoy full authoritarian power and can act in “unjust and murderous” ways (Foucault, 2007 [1978], p. 263), if necessary.

The new technology of biopolitics operates under the notion of *laissez-faire* through *security dispositifs*⁷, with as prime task normalising the population to maximise its productivity. Security dispositifs deploy forces in a broader sense than solely disciplinary forces; predominantly by implementing the economic notion of *laissez-faire* within the political sphere (Foucault, 2007 [1978], pp 11-15). Foucault distinguishes ‘normation’ and ‘normalisation’: the former referring to disciplinary norms that exist prior to interventions on the population (*a priori*) and the latter referring to “an interplay between these different distributions of normality and in acting to bring the most unfavourable in line with the more favourable” (*a posteriori*) (Foucault, 2007 [1978], p. 63). Security dispositifs do not so much directly intervene, as they rather create a (optimal) framework for life. However, it is important to note that security dispositifs work in close proximity with disciplinary power: disciplinary power and security dispositifs should not be treated in isolation from each other, but rather as being in a symbiotic relationship. Security, in contrast to mere discipline, is exerted on the population as a whole through measures that regulate their behaviours, life and psychology. Thus, security dispositifs play an important role within (neo-)liberal governmentality, as they are the technical instrument that support the complex web of government power managed through institutions, procedures, calculations etc. which is aimed at the population, with political economy functioning as its rationality. Following this logic, political and economic techniques, especially containing liberal characteristics, can be regarded as modern security dispositifs. (Neo-)liberal governmentality implies that governance, including *security dispositifs*, is increasingly taking place through markets, as a result of the *laissez-faire* approach. Foucault (1998 [1976], pp. 140-141) states that “bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism” which has resulted in “the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes”.

⁶ There are multiple forms of dispositifs, e.g. disciplinary or military

⁷ It can be argued that *security dispositifs* and *biopolitics* can be used interchangeably (ig & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008).

In this thesis, three forms of security dispositifs will be discussed in the form of case studies. These are the following: i) private security, specifically: private military contractors; ii) logistics; and iii) surveillance. The choice to use the classification of security dispositif will now be further substantiated, as not everyone might agree with this classification. But, as Foucault states, we should not be a slave to a certain rigid interpretation. This thesis attempts to utilise a Foucauldian concept that very much lies on the intersection of governmentality and biopower: the security dispositif. The security dispositif is the predominant technique of governmentality. Its aim is the management of population through the creation of security, with political economy as its rationality, which supports the complex web of powers by functioning as a system of relations. Simultaneously, the security dispositif constitutes biopolitical power. Biopolitics is one of the two pillars of biopower and works in close proximity with disciplinary power. Biopower is power over life; biopolitics constitutes the part that aims at subjecting the population as a whole. It does so by regulating the population's behaviour, wellbeing, health and prosperity through mechanisms such as risk-calculation, statistics and public measures (that do not directly intervene); in contrast to disciplinary power that is aimed at the individual. This thesis employs a relatively broad interpretation of biopolitics, and thus of the security dispositif. Therefore, the following conceptualisation of the security dispositif will be adopted:

Behaviour of the population is regulated and managed by security dispositifs in order to ensure its wellbeing, with as goal the maximization of profit and productivity; it is the technique of governmentality that constitutes the system of relations that is established between various elements of all sorts of practices, mechanisms, measures etc. in order to enhance and preserve power over the population through a posteriori norm formation, and which works in close proximity with disciplinary power.

The analysis and discussion of this conceptualisation in conjunction with the case studies will illustrate how in our current day and age profit and security interests can simultaneously be secured. (Neo-)liberal governmentality and biopolitics/biopower make it possible for security governance to be managed through the workings of the economy. Both the economy and security are optimised⁸, as they are intimately interrelated: the economy allocates the means and knowledge for optimal security, the economy profits, and the biopolitical security creates the freedom for the population to grow in productivity and determine the workings of a well-functioning economy.

⁸ Here the word optimisation is deliberately chosen, in contrast to maximalisation, as certain compromises should be made between the systems of security and economy and the emphasis lies on interrelation factors.

Governmentality in the Gulf Region

The concept of (neo-)liberal governmentality had been developed by Foucault in the context of Europe and has up until now not been applied to the context of the Arab Gulf – only in the context of European intervention in the Gulf region.⁹ The Gulf states¹⁰ are predominantly identified as mercantilist states. In Foucauldian terms, this is the first step towards (neo-)liberal governmentality. As discussed previously, this would entail that the Gulf states acknowledge the autonomy of the economy, but the economy still serves the ‘sovereign’, and not the population. The Gulf is trapped in the logic of sovereignty. This corresponds with the state-centric view that is usually utilised when analysing the region. Consequentially, security in the Gulf is viewed solely as a state affair.

Let us move away from the state-centred perspective that riddles the Gulf, by attempting to apply the concept of (neo-)liberal governmentality and biopolitics/biopower to the region by using the security dispositif as an analytical framework. If the position and the sovereign power of the state in the Gulf is challenged, it gives room to pose the question of how the Gulf secures its interests. The Gulf states are not equipped with strong militaries¹¹; however, they are equipped with strong economies. The concept of the security dispositif will be utilised to analyse the UAE’s security governance through the three previously mentioned case studies: these will demonstrate how the UAE manages its security through its economy by making use of (neo-)liberal governmentality and biopolitics/biopower. This thesis is an attempt to rearticulate the concept of security within the Gulf as not just a state affair, and therefore demonstrating that not solely the mercantilist and state-centric perspective apply to the Gulf. (Neo-)liberal governmentality and biopolitics/biopower just might be more applicable to the Gulf than previously thought. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to answer the following question:

To what degree can the Emirati security governance be explained through (neo-)liberal governmentality in conjunction with biopolitics/biopower by using the security dispositif as analytical framework?

⁹ E.g. Malvmig, 2012

¹⁰ Due to its objective, this thesis refers to the states that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) when discussing “Gulf states”.

¹¹ Of course, there are discrepancies between the various states, with Saudi Arabia being the largest outlier by ranking 19th in military strength globally: 2020 Military Strength Ranking, retrieved on 27-12-2020, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.

Rentierism & Governmentality

The Gulf states are widely known as rentier states. This political-economic framework takes the theoretical form of Rentier State Theory (RST), closely related to 'resource curse' or 'paradox of plenty'. Events like the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, in light of the two oil 'boom'-periods in the mid-1970s have led to RST gaining prominence. In the West, the importance of oil grew rapidly among the public and policymakers. However, academics studying the Middle East began to witness paradoxes in the oil-based economies. Firstly, in contrast to the modernisation theory, the oil wealth did not bring about an educated middle-class demanding democracy. Secondly, the oil appeared to destabilise the oil regions instead of bringing security. These issues have led to the emergence of RST. RST is a political economy theory that attempts to explain the relationship between the state and its citizens in states where the majority of state revenue originates from external rents or payments that are unproductively earned (Schwarz, 2008). At the core of RST lies the assumption that since the state revenue originates from external income and is distributed to society, without having to impose taxation, the state does not owe democratic legitimacy to its society, or a development strategy that leads to increase of productivity. Ross (2001) therefore argues that rent sustains authoritarian rule: the "rentier effect". This notion has been challenged by some cases of Latin American states, but for the purpose of this thesis, Ross' notion will be accepted in the context of the Gulf, where it seems to remain valid.

Due to developments in the last two decades, e.g. technological advances, the free market, globalisation and social changes, the mainstream RST does not seem fully applicable to the wealthy countries of the Gulf region anymore (Grey, 2011). However, certain characteristics of the politico-economic systems of the Gulf states make it impossible to fully apply the concept of security dispositif in the context of (neo-)liberal governmentality. In their core, the Gulf states are still rentier states with authoritarian ruling classes, only now increasingly entrepreneurial and with an active economic development policy. To offer a more realistic picture of state-security interactions, an analysis must be made of the economic spheres through which Gulf states secure their interests. The state does not possess the sole authority over power; not even in the Gulf (although that is often assumed). It is crucial to study how various power manifests itself in depoliticised spheres outside of the state. That is why this thesis will attempt to work towards a concept of *rentier governmentality*. In other words, a concept which accepts certain sovereign features and 'rent' as a predominant source of revenue, but simultaneously adopts various *governmentality* characteristics such as operating through dispersed mechanisms of power.

The UAE: Politics & Security

The previous section elaborates on the economic structure of the Gulf states, including the UAE. In this section, the Gulf states' political structure will be discussed. This will be followed by the substantiation of the UAE as case study and a brief exploration of the UAE's security governance.

The Gulf has predominantly external influences to thank for it being known as a conflict-riddled region. Many conflicts can be traced back to the colonial-inspired, or artificially crafted, state formation. The Gulf's colonial legacy has not only brought about issues regarding borders which were drawn, but through the transferal of the design of a deformed national identity construction, it has also impacted the way politics is conducted in the region. This heritage in combination with the huge natural resources that lie beneath the Gulf and persistent external interference, have created an environment where power politics prevail and given room to the establishment of monarchical, authoritarian regimes (Halliday, 1996). Capitalist networks and relations are one of the structures that these persistent external influences have exported to the Gulf region. Khalili (2017) explains this phenomenon through the construction of military and civilian communications and transportation infrastructures, and formation of a military machine in Saudi Arabia by the US Army Corps of Engineers. This construction simultaneously brought over a liberal capitalist dispositif to the rentier states. Additionally, the monarchical establishments in the Gulf countries have sought to create strong political and security dispositifs through familial, religious, tribal connections or common interests. These strongly established apparatuses are used to protect the power of the establishments, meaning that securing the rulers itself is interchangeable with securing the state (Ulrichsen, 2009). Consequentially, this leads to the question "security for whom and for which values" (David, 1997).

The UAE is selected as case study due its ranking as the most diversified economy in the GCC (Mansoor, 2020 August 30) and second in military power¹². This makes the UAE a strong case study, as its relatively diverse economy gives room for an increasing amount of out-sourcing and privatisation – although still adhering to the main principles of rentierism. The complex web of governmental relations in the Gulf is analysable in the UAE. Additionally, the UAE ranks second in military power within the GCC, after Saudi Arabia. In comparison to the rest of the GCC, its military is relatively strong; in absolute terms however, it is weak. If the findings show that the relatively strong UAE secures its interests via various means, it can be assumed that

¹² 2020 Military Strength Ranking, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>, retrieved on 27-12-2020.

the weaker Gulf states, in regard to their military power, have no other choice but to seek out other means as well in order to secure themselves. This makes the findings generalisable.

Only recently, the Emirates have come to control their own security. Up until 1971, Great Britain was the provider of security in the region for nearly two centuries (Foley, 1999). In return, Great Britain benefitted through profitable trading deals and being in charge of the sheikh's foreign relations (Hurewitz, 1972). In 1971 the sheikhs of six of the current seven emirates; these being Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain and Fujairah; agreed to form a federal union. From that moment the authority over security was 'back in their own hands' (Foley, 1999). The UAE's military, which carries the name Union Defence Force (UDF), owns state-of-the-art technology, but is relatively small. The UAE views its own military apparatus as inadequate. The issue is the following: the UAE is a special case when it comes to population. Only 11,48% of the people living on UAE territory actually hold UAE citizenship.¹³ The UAE's lower class predominantly consists of non-citizens (Cordesman, 2018). These are migrant workers that build and have built the UAE as we know it today: the skyscrapers, the roads, the luxurious establishments. Thus, most 'foot' soldiers in the UAE military are mercenaries originating predominantly from other Arab states and Pakistan (Cordesman, 2018). Overall, the UAE's military is seen as inexperienced, and in the view of the UAE's leaders this is prime issue in the context of the Arab Spring and being able to stand its ground against Iran.

¹³ Global Media Insight (2019): <https://www.globalmediainsight.com/blog/uae-population-statistics/>, retrieved on 01-12-2020.

Theoretical Framework

This chapter will explore the relationship between Foucault's concepts of governmentality and biopower, and the three forms of security that function as case studies: private security (with a focus on Private Military Corporations), logistics and surveillance. Three frameworks will now be formulated in light of the discussed literature and through which the UAE case studies will be analysed.

Private security & Governmentality: Privatization and Responsibilisation

This section will discuss private security in the context of governmentality and biopower. Two ways through which (neo-)liberal governmentality expresses itself in the field of security are privatisation and responsibilisation (Leander & Van Munster, 2007). These two technologies of power in regard to private security will be further explored.

Abrahamsen & Williams (2011) argue in their work *Security Beyond the State* that the emergence of private security forces is a part of the larger rearrangement of the relationship between the public and private sectors, including the allocation of the exercise of power. This shift can be connected to (neo-)liberal governmentality as proposed by Foucault. The idea of private security fits well within the framework of (neo-)liberal governmentality, since governmentality implies a web of decentralised practices and procedures. The state can no longer be seen as the source of all power (read: sovereign), but rather, as Foucault puts it, a mere way of governing. It does not mean that the state is losing control over its, in this case, security.

The Foucauldian approach to the matter of private security, and specifically private military contractors (PMCs), is a complex one. The debate surrounding Foucault's interpretation roughly consists of academics stating that PMCs fall under the logic of (neo-)liberal governmentality (Leander; 2005; Leander & van Munster, 2007; Lobo-Guerro, 2007; Yardimci & Alemdar, 2010) and academics that are critical regarding this notion (Smith, 2008; Powel, 2017). Foucault has not specifically touched the topic of private forces, but does state at the end of his *Security, Territory, Population* lectures that the military apparatus is one of the foundations on which governmentality is dependent. For the purposes of this thesis, the notion that PMCs do fall under the logic of (neo-)liberal governmentality will be substantiated.

PMCs tie into both privatisation and responsabilisation. First the former will be discussed, and subsequently the latter. Following Foucault's reasoning, sovereign authority is being replaced by new technologies of power. These constitute themselves in both the public and private spheres and act in alignment with one another, as a result of sharing a corresponding political rationality. In this sense, privatisation should not be seen as a decay of government, but rather in terms of a new 'distance' between political institutions and the population as subject. Besides direct privatisation, other forms of relocating practices to the market sphere exist, e.g. outsourcing, public/private partnerships and the creation of conditions for competitive success (Clarke, 2004). Secondly, responsabilisation is a means of liberal governmentality to influence the conduct of population. One can think of tools such as best practices, performance indicators and benchmarking. These tools simultaneously carry a disciplinary function, since they attempt to apply *a priori* norms the population in order to maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of productivity. Responsibilisation is an essential technology to liberal governmentality to ensure the wellbeing of the population through a decentralised government.

Following the previously described logic, one can argue that if a certain demand for security has not been met within the public sphere, the private suppliers of security will respond to such demand in order to fill the gap (Pugliese, 2005). In other words, it becomes the 'responsibility' of the private contractors to answer to this call. Consequentially, security is managed through the population, and therefore through economy. Security dispositifs in the context of (neo-)liberal governmentality imply a system of relations of science, measures, philosophy, practices, etc., that will support the power over the social body through the creation of security. In practice, this translates into the embedment of experts and expertise in state governing. Outsourcing the management of security to private security contractors, the specialists in the field, contributes to the development of such a system of relations. Additionally, (neo-)liberal governmentality favours entrepreneurial values and profit. Privatisation of security adheres to both values. In contrast to national military forces, PMC's are assumed to be more cost-effective and successful. However, Markusen (2003) argues that the contrary is true in reality. There is an issue of systematic dismissal of cases which show that privatisation in the defence sector is not per se successful. Then again, the private defence contractor's lobby is a strong one.

Circulation, Logistics & Governmentality

This section discusses the relationship between logistics, governmentality and biopolitics/biopower. Its focus will be on security through the creation of efficiency and the dependency of others on the logistical system. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of logistics as security dispositif will be substantiated.

Logistics can be conceptualised as the art and science of managing the mobility of people, objects and services with as goal the effective and efficient performance of communication, transport and the economy. It regards the techniques, planning and capabilities to operate systems, in the broad sense of the concept (Neilson, 2012). Either visible or invisible to the human eye, logistics is everywhere. Logistics steers the population by providing the conditions for both strategy and tactics. In today's globalised world, logistics have become essential to trade and production chains.

In order to formulate a Foucauldian conceptualisation of logistics, we have to take a step back and analyse the concept of *circulation*. Foucault (2007 [1978]) identifies circulation as the sphere in which biopolitics operates, and thus pursues profit. One should consider circulation in the most generic sense: all types of flows, from goods to people, information and ideas. But flows need to be regulated; there are different techniques to do so, e.g. through surveillance or logistics. These techniques are tasked with the regulation of the productive powers that flow as a result of the population. This necessity stems from the calculation of security, since the flows can produce and sustain, for example, both terrorist activities and legitimate global trade. In order to drive up profit and sustain a healthy economy, certain events, such as scarcity, have to be prevented, whilst others, such as prosperity, need to be boosted.

Specifically, the emergence of mobility logistics has strong ties to capitalism. Chain interdependencies have become increasingly longer and more extensive over the last two decades (Rammler, 2008). The locomotive is a prime example of both economic and technical progress in the early stages of industrialisation. However, the flow of the locomotive needs to be regulated. The managing of the locomotive, which has as goal reaching optimal efficiency and maximum profit, can be conceptualised as logistics.

Although Foucault does not specifically conceptualise logistics, an attempt can be made to derive an understanding from his works. Foucault emphasises the liberal ontology of circulation in *Security, Territory, Population* (1978) and articulates in *Society Must Be Defended* that power "functions only when it is part of a chain" and is "exercised through networks" (2003

[1976], p. 29). Inspired by Foucault's work, Julian Reid (2006) has formulated the concept of *logistical life* in order to further build on and investigate the Foucauldian approach to strategy and tactics. Logistical life is an attempt by Reid (2006, p. 20) to conceptualise the following:

[...] life lived under the duress of the command to be efficient, to communicate one's purposes transparently in relation to others, to be positioned where one is required, to use time economically, to be able to move when and where one is told to, and to be able to extol these capacities as the values for which one would willingly, if called upon, kill and die for (Reid, 2006, p. 20).

Due to Foucault's views on circulation, security, and especially governance that operates in networks and through biopolitical power, and Reid's conceptualisation of logistical life, logistics can be viewed as a *means* of technology of power. In other words, logistics is utilised as technique by biopolitics in order to produce the desired effects, this being the security to sustain an optimal economy, and thus, it can be considered a security dispositif. It is important to note that the conceptualisation of logistical life, which is based on Foucault's work, seems to take the individual as point of analysis; however, the use of logistics can also be read in a broader context. Power aims at sustaining an optimal economy by mitigating security threats, and as both Foucault and Reid state: power is exercised through networks. Power which has political economy as its rationality does indeed target the population, but that does not imply that the population always is the direct target of security dispositifs. The population can also be the indirect target of practices that ensure its wellbeing, as security threats can originate from outside of the population. Security dispositifs can also target threats abroad. Logistics can thus function as power tool in an international context by subjecting other states in the sense of *logistical life* as articulated by Reid. This creates efficiency, but simultaneously a system through which those participating are dependent on those in control of the system.

Surveillance: Biopower through the Security Dispositif

In the third framework, the relationship between surveillance and governmentality will be discussed. Within the context of governmentality, this section focuses on biopower deployed through surveillance, which is conceptualised as security dispositif. It will also explore how the systematic monitoring of the population is the result of government having to deal with risks in society.

Foucault's (2007 [1978], p. 46) notion that security is not limited to territory, but concerns space, and is therefore an ever evolving and widening concept, is still very relevant today. Currently we are witnessing the inclusion of an increasing number of objects of security, such as data and body parts. This development is a result of the new forms, and mutations, of dangers, as well as the growth of and changes in knowledge and technology.

Surveillance can be considered, in terms of governmentality, a security dispositif: a mechanism to exercise power within and over the social body. This security dispositif, in its broad sense, deploys biopower, encompassing discipline as well as biopolitics. Surveillance can be biopolitical as it efficiently regulates and manages the population as a whole, e.g. by monitoring its wellbeing and health. Surveillance is simultaneously disciplinary, as it is aimed at making the individual behave and implementing the self-policing of the human body. One is more aware of one's actions when being watched. As the prime goal of government is to create freedom of the economic sphere, biopower calls for information of the population in terms of behaviour and possible future behaviour. This has led to systems of knowledge aimed at monitoring the population for possible dangers in order to ensure the wellbeing and health of that same population, and to punish individuals that endanger this wellbeing.

Foucault (2007 [1978], pp. 32-56) identifies uncertainty (the *aleatory*) as one of the natural affairs that government needs to deal with and regulate. This is the product of the unexpected character of the event and its interconnectedness with various factors, such as existing measures already in place that should normally prevent probable events within the same category. In the current day and age, such factors are technological, environmental, economic and scientific, and any change in these factors could lead to a need to adapt biopolitical management of the population (Ceyhan, 2012). The security dispositifs are, amongst other things, tasked with the forecasting of any possible change in these mentioned factors. It can then be argued that monitoring technologies in order to identify these changes before they occur are justified, as they benefit the population.

Foucault (2007 [1978], p. 11) articulates that uncertainty should be treated through statistics and forecasting that rely on the probability of possible events through, amongst other methods, comparison and the calculation of costs in regard to a whole range of dimensions, including race, biology, etc. Here Foucault introduces the problem of dealing with *probability and risk* by suggesting that such a large variety of domains are interlinked and influence the population's behaviour. Following Foucault's argumentation of biopower, surveillance as security technology can be considered a security dispositif, which deploys the power of calculation of probability in order to normalise the population and to ensure that they act as agents within the economic sphere.

For contemporary surveillance and risk management, the method through which the uncertain is translated into risk is most crucial. After 9/11, a global surge in surveillance and accompanying technologies can be identified in order to manage possible future dangers. Lyon (2003) argues that over the past two decades an increasing amount of people, groups and populations as a whole are labelled 'suspicious' in order to justify the use of the equally increasing secretive and invasive surveillance technologies. Following this logic, the population is rather treated as a statistical parameter, than a political subject (Deflem, 1997). The system has to be fed with a large amount of data in order to work the most accurately; enough behaviour and movements need to be tracked, the outliers as well as those that can be labelled 'normal'. The aim of contemporary surveillance systems is to recognise both criminal acts and future risks through the identification of relationships by using predictive analysis on behavioural patterns; this is what Norris et al. (1998) call *algorithmic surveillance*. This form of surveillance is usually silent and hidden; it is different than the kind of surveillance Foucault touches upon in his work, being the panoptic surveillance form based on the prison model articulated by Jeremy Bentham. However, the use of such sophisticated surveillance systems which are based on the behavioural features of the population corresponds with the Foucauldian notion that the population becomes the object as well as means of biopower.

Case studies

In the following chapters, three forms of security governance in the UAE will be analysed and discussed as security dispositifs in the context of governmentality and biopolitics/biopower.

These are the following:

1. **Private Security:** Blackwater/Reflex Responses in the UAE
2. **Logistics:** Dubai Port World & the UAE
3. **Surveillance:** ToTok in the UAE

The following format will be used throughout the next three sections. First, the case will be introduced, and the necessary background information will be provided. Secondly, an analysis of the case will follow, using the fitting frameworks introduced in the chapter 'Theoretical Framework', and the necessary information from the literature review. These analyses show the various economic means through which the Emirates secure their interests within the framework of (neo-)liberal governmentality and biopolitics/biopower. Lastly, each section will end in a conclusion where a linkage will be made with the to-be-formed concept of rentier governmentality.

Private Security: Blackwater/Reflex Responses & the UAE

First, an introduction will be given of the deal between the PMC Blackwater/Reflex Responses and the UAE. This will be followed with an analysis which has as point of focus the two technologies of power, privatisation and responsabilisation. The analysis will showcase how the UAE secures military power through governmental structures, and thus through their economic power. The conclusion will include factors discussed in the literature review and make a start towards a concept of rentier governmentality.

Blackwater/Reflex Responses & the UAE: Buying Security

In 2011 *The New York Times* (Mazzetti & Hager, 2011 May 14) published an article which stated that Erik Prince, founder and former head of PMC company Blackwater, had secretly struck a deal of \$529 million with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, to form an 800-member battalion of foreign troops for the UAE, under the name of Reflex Responses (R2). According to reports used by The Times, the aim of this battalion was protection from internal uprisings and protection of oil pipelines against terrorist attacks. The former referred to the possible situations in which the Emirates would be faced with social protests in the context of the 2011 Arab Spring and unrest from the large community of migrant workers living and working in its territory. Additionally, it should serve as protection against Iran, the UAE's regional foe, if necessary.

The U.S. is one of the largest beneficiaries of the UAE's wish to increase its military apparatus. The UAE's quest to purchase high-tech weapons made them the second largest purchaser of U.S. arms in the years 2007-2010 (Saudi Arabia being the largest), with the UAE spending \$10,4 billion through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program (Katzman, 2011). For Prince, the founder of Blackwater¹⁴, who left the company in 2009, the contract with the Emirates was a new opportunity. Prince's vision was the establishment of a 'for hire' army that could be deployed to crisis zones. He furthermore proposed to the C.I.A. to use Blackwater in special operations (Mazzetti & Hager, 2011 May 14). Both wishes have not become reality. Although Prince is not explicitly named in the contract and accompanying documents, former employees, commenting anonymously in The Times story, state that Prince was the one to negotiate the deal and viewed the contract with the UAE as a new opportunity for himself in the security sector. The company's documents describe the following as possible tasks for the troops: "[...] intelligence gathering, urban combat, the securing of nuclear and radioactive

¹⁴ Which has first changed its name to Xe Services and later to ACADEMI.

materials, humanitarian missions and special operations to destroy enemy personnel and equipment” (Mazzetti & Hager, 2011 May 14).

Private Security in the UAE: Entrenchment of (Neo-)liberal Governmentality

Responsibilisation is a key-element to (neo-)liberal governmentality. It is a necessity due to the decentralisation of a government's practices and activities. The responsibility comes to lie elsewhere: with the social agents. In the context of security governance in the UAE, responsabilisation can be identified through the framing of security issues in markets terms. This translates into a security demand which the security suppliers have a responsibility to meet. However, we must ask ourselves: where does this security demand originate from? And for what purposes? This demand of security, according to the Foucauldian approach, should stem from the population, for the population. The question of 'security for whom?' is very much applicable to this case, as only a small portion of the UAE's population carry a citizenship. In the terms described above, it could be said that that security in the UAE is equivalent to the security of its rulers, and in Foucauldian terms: the sovereign. The authoritarian characteristics of RST are very much noticeable in this situation. As stated previously, one of the possible tasks of the R2 battalion would be to handle any tumult originating from the non-citizens living in UAE territory. This poses some difficulties, since Foucault prefers to think in terms of space, not territory. So, in Foucauldian terms, does the population entail just the people that hold an official citizenship, or does the notion of population also include the non-citizens living on the territory of the state (especially if these people largely contribute to the state's economy)? If a 'strict' interpretation of Foucault is applied to the case of the population of the UAE, one should conclude that the non-citizens are not seen as part of the population, since Foucault envisions a more active and engaged citizen. Foucault believes that the individuals that make up the population shape forms of subjectivity – this goes further than a mere political membership. Of course, we cannot blame Foucault for not having considered a situation such as the UAE's, as his point of focus is Europe. If just those holding a citizenship define the UAE's population, it can be argued that the demand for security stems from the "righteous population", with as biopolitical aim the wellbeing of that population. In that case, the problematisation of the uncertain would imply the possible risk of social unrest. Through both the direct and indirect interventions of R2, freedom is created for the individuals of the population to safely participate in the economic sphere. This follows the rationality of i) political economy: the population can grow in productivity, and this benefits the economy; and of ii) biopolitics: the wellbeing of the population and their prosperity is ensured.

However, a second problem is encountered. The corporate documents of the deal between R2 and the UAE indicate that the battalion would also be deployed in order to control social

unrest originating from pro-democracy protests. The people participating in these protests could include both citizens and non-citizens. This would entail that the PMC would be used against the population, and this being the will of the sovereign. As the security dispositif follows the rationality of political economy, the analysis can unfold in two ways. Firstly, the population might believe that democracy would enhance the workings of the economy; an intervention should in this case be uncalled for. Secondly, it can be argued that these forms of social unrest demand intervention by regulating the behaviour of the population, in order to ensure that the economy stays functioning to the best of its abilities. It seems that the former refers to normalisation, and the latter to normation, normally associated with disciplinary power. Additionally, the flipside of the calculation of security can also be identified in this situation. These possible protests that should be intervened in, could be seen as the *culture of dangers*. In other words, this could be the boundary beyond which the government enjoys full authoritarian power (Foucault, 2007 [1978], p. 263).

Conclusion

The concept of (neo-)liberal governmentality seems to be applicable at first glance. Through the decentralisation of practices an ensemble of knowledge and mechanisms is created, as the UAE is not capable of forming an adequate military apparatus and the market acknowledges the responsibility to answer this call. This structure further adheres to the political rationality by (theoretically) maximising profit and productivity through the creation of the necessary security for its population and the use of market forces. But when the questions of 'whose will is being executed' and 'for what purpose' is posed, the application of the security dispositif in the context of (neo-)liberal governmentality runs into some issues. As shown above, there are several ways to interpret this question. However, it seems apparent that it is the sovereign will to secure its position by intervening in possible unrest.

A concept of rentier governmentality might offer an adequate framework to solve these issues. RST argues that due to lack of taxation, the rentier state lacks democracy. Consequentially, the role of the population as well as norm formation by the security dispositif should be approached differently in the UAE. The population should rather be seen in line with the ruling class and norm formation is predominantly *a priori* instead of *a posteriori*; both due to the authoritarian structure of the UAE. From the perspective of the government/sovereign, the use of biopower, rather than mere biopolitical power, is perceived: the population is managed and simultaneously the individual is 'trained' in order to suppress social unrest. The rationalities of the rentier state are apparent.

Furthermore, the R2 battalions were financed by the state, mainly through oil revenue. By applying an adapted view of governmentality, the use of PMCs by the UAE can be conceptualised as security dispositif: social unrest and Iran have been problematised into risk; security is created through the mobilisation of an ensemble of practices and expertise through the market; the target of the security is the population/sovereign; and it does so through normation. This ensures the population's/government's wellbeing and therefore maximises productivity. Through this mechanism, the UAE secures its interests through their economy, and thus the economy itself.

Logistics: Dubai Port World & the UAE

First, Dubai Port World (DP World) and its role in the UAE will be introduced. This will be followed with an analysis that focusses on the security created by DP World through the establishment of efficiency and the dependence of others on the logistics deployed by DP World. The analysis will showcase how the UAE secures its interests through various complex structures, and therefore through their economic power. The section will end in a conclusion and will further build on the concept of rentier governmentality.

Dubai Port World: The Security Extension of the UAE

DP World is a major logistics giant. They state the following:

Our operations include ports and terminals, but also industrial parks, logistics and economic zones, maritime services and marinas [...] we can now be an integral part of your supply chain, tailoring innovative solutions that tackle your challenges and manage your costs. We aim to be essential to building the bright future of global trade, ensuring everything we do leaves a long-lasting positive impact on economies and the world. (DP World)¹⁵

One could say with certainty that DP World adopts a politico-economic rationality.

Although registered as a private company and stating it operates independently of the UAE, most of the company's equity (80%) is owned by Dubai World, an investment company whose majority stakeholder is the ruler of Dubai and the UAE's prime minister: Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. In addition, DP World's CEO has strong ties to the ruling class of the UAE (Kocak, 2020 February 18). The historical trajectory of DP World also showcases a close relationship with the Emirates' state power. The firm's history can be traced back to the establishment of Port Rashid in 1972, Dubai. In 1979 Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum of Dubai, who had the first Port named after him, completed the construction of the large Jebel Ali Port. In 1991, these two ports were put under the authority of the new state-owned company: Dubai Ports Authority (DPA) (Advani, 2019 December 9). During these years, the Emirates' financial power began to grow as a result of their oil wealth; this led to, amongst other things, a substantial development of their infrastructure. Port Jebel Ali, especially, grew considerably and became a regional and international trade hub, and favourite of the US Navy's. In 1999, the Emirati government formed Dubai Ports International (DPI) which was

¹⁵ <https://www.dpworld.com/en/about-us/who-we-are>, retrieved on 8-11-2020.

charged with the control over the container terminals outside the UAE. In 2006, DPI and DPA merged becoming one of the biggest logistical companies in the world (Advani, 2019 December 9).

During the 2009 financial crisis Dubai was heavily impacted. They survived through a \$10 billion bailout from neighbour Emirate, Abu Dhabi, giving the latter an increasingly stronger grip on political decision-making in the country as a whole. This development had a changing impact on the dynamics within DP World as well as between the firm and the UAE (Ulrichsen, 2016). It is justified questioning the independence of DP World. DP World might be a private company, but its commercial interest certainly aligns with the Emirati foreign policy interests (International Crisis Group, 2018). DP World can be considered the 'lifeblood' of at least Dubai, and a crucial asset to the other Emirates in terms of soft power.

It is safe to say that DP World is more than just a logistics company. Besides the historic and current relationship between private and state capital, tactics deployed by DP World secure strategic (security) interests of the Emirates. This is done through port acquisition, large infrastructure projects and even DP World's role in international counterterrorism and counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf. In the next section these activities will be analysed in the light of (neo-)liberal governmentality and biopolitics/biopower.

Dubai Port World & the UAE: Soft Power as Biopolitics through (Neo-)liberal Governmentality

The relationship between DP World and the UAE can be classified as the decentralization of practices and activities via the market. It is not exactly the same as privatization, as previously discussed in section one, since DP World states that it operates independently from UAE foreign policy. However, due to the various ways through which DP World is affiliated with the ruling class of the UAE, it can be safely argued that there are enough ties between the state and the firm to speak of outsourcing of security practices via the market.

From a (neo-)liberal governmentality perspective, the security practices deployed by DP World through the use of logistics, which are in line with the security objectives of the UAE, are twofold: they create i) efficiency and effectiveness; and ii) a logistical system of dependence. First the former point will be discussed and subsequently the latter.

First of all, efficiency contributes to security by ensuring a healthy working economy. Efficiency is predominantly created by logistics, through which costs of business operations are

minimised and desired outputs achieved. Logistical efficiency concerns itself with the most profitable way to move objects and vital information, e.g. fast delivery times, quality control and cost-saving logistical measures. Optimizing logistics delivers an increase in profit. This efficiency, in the broadest sense, leads to economic growth, and economic growth leads to security. The International Labour Organisation (2004) argues that economic security positively impacts personal wellbeing and happiness. In Foucauldian terms, measures that enhance the population's wellbeing and happiness are conceptualised as a biopolitical practices. This argumentation can be applied to the practices of DP World. The firm's main practice is logistics; since it is one of the main players in the field, it will be assumed that they do this as efficiently and effectively as possible, as this generates profit. A profitable DP World positively impacts the economic security of the UAE by increasing the UAE's economic diversification: Jebel Ali and Jafza port alone accounted for 14.9% of the Emirati non-oil GDP in 2017.¹⁶ That is why it can be argued that the creation of efficiency by DP World through logistics increases profit and productivity and thus improves the wellbeing of the UAE's population.

Secondly, the creation of a logistical system of dependence can be conceptualised as a form of soft power: the power to influence the behaviour of others in order to get the outcomes you want (Nye, 1990). Through port-politics and infrastructure projects, other states have become dependent on DP World. DP World has become necessary to continue global trade; something many states find immensely important since their wellbeing depends on it. Through DP World, and therefore through their decentralised economy, the UAE is safeguarding its security interests. The UAE mitigates outside threats and thus ensures the wellbeing and prosperity of its population by securing a healthy economic sphere. One can argue that DP World creates dependence through normalisation of global trade. However, this makes global trade the target of normalisation, not the population which is targeted through the creation of security.

The Emirates have been securing themselves a role as essential partner in supply chains and maritime trade, globally and especially regionally. Throughout 40 countries on 6 continents, DP World possess 78 marine- as well as inland terminals. The firm actively deploys port-acquisition strategies by buying rival businesses and investing in undeveloped ports in order to entrench its strategic position (Kocak, 2020 February 18). The Emirates' foreign policy ambitions to increasingly becoming a key regional actor and obtaining political power are served by DP World through both influence and power over alternative shipping routes and

¹⁶ These were the results of a study done by the Boston Consultancy Group, which were presented during a press conference at the Dubai Press Club on February 3rd 2019: <https://the-levant.com/boston-consultancy-group-highlight-positive-impact-dp-world-projects/>

the decreasing dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, a serious bottleneck in regional tensions involving Iran (Kocak, 2020 February 18). The Emirati regional (and global) position can be problematised into risk, with an emphasis on the uncertainty of Iran. DP World furthermore caters to the Emirates' foreign policy ambitions more directly. The company builds and operates dual-use facilities which are made to both accommodate Emirati naval and air forces, and foreign commercial partners to DP World (Miller & Verhoeven, 2020). Additionally, the firm has secured an important role in international counterterrorism and counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Ayden and the Horn of Africa by undertaking policing activities and organizing conferences on counter-piracy (Kocak, 2020 February 18). This ensures both supply chain security, and general security of which the UAE profits directly (by eliminating terrorists and pirates on important trade routes) as well as indirectly (by portraying a positive image to the outside world).

Conclusion

It can be concluded that DP World caters to the UAE's strategic ambitions by making it a crucial player in the field of logistics and trade, and more directly, a security officer in the region. The UAE manages its security on various levels through its economy in terms of logistics. This fits well within the framework of (neo-)liberal governmentality. The use of logistical power by the UAE through DP World can be characterised as decentralised biopolitical power deployed by a security dispositif. This power is aimed at securing supply chains through a system of relations of practices, expertise and mechanisms. It does so through the normalisation of global trade. This increasingly secures the UAE's global as well as regional role, which secures the economy of the UAE and thus the wellbeing and prosperity of the population/sovereign (biopolitical/biopower). Simultaneously, profit is secured through commercial practices and activities and emphasizes the rationality of the political economy by increasing the UAE's economic diversification.

The case of DP World and the UAE runs into the similar issues as R2 regarding the questions 'what population and whose security' when applying the concept of (neo-)liberal governmentality. Besides that, DP World fits well in the framework of a security dispositif in the context of (neo-)liberal governmentality. However, this might change in the near future. In February 2020 DP World announced that it will delist from the Nasdaq Dubai and return to full private ownership, in other words state ownership. DP World's CEO stated:

Returning to private ownership will free DP World from the demands of the public market for short term returns which are incompatible with this industry, and enable the

company to focus on implementing our mid-to-long-term strategy [...] (CNBC, 2020 February 17).

This however will be a blow for UAE markets and contradicts the Emirati efforts to diversify regarding its domestic exchanges, and (neo-)liberal governmentality. In the case that DP World delists, DP World will increasingly be connected to Emirati's oil wealth, tilting it towards rentier rationality.

Surveillance: ToTok & the UAE

First, the necessary background information will be given about ToTok and its deployment by the Emirati government. In the second sub-section, the use of ToTok as a surveillance tool by the UAE will be discussed as a form of biopower, deployed by the government/sovereign as part of a (neo-)liberal governmental structure. The biopolitical and disciplinary components will be explored and, subsequently, how this form of biopower fits within (neo-)liberal governmentality. This analysis will showcase how the Emirates govern their security via their economy. The section will end with a conclusion in light of rentier governmentality.

ToTok in the UAE: Eyes Everywhere

Mid 2019, the Emirates released a chat application called 'ToTok'. It was promoted as a safe and easy way to talk to friends and family. Of course, in a country that has restricted apps like WhatsApp, ToTok was enthusiastically received by the population. In only a couple of months the app was downloaded millions of times by people living in both the Emirates and other countries across the globe. However, ToTok was too good to be true. In December 2019, The New York Times revealed in an article that the messaging application was used as a mass surveillance tool by the Emirati government, and labelled it a 'spy tool' (Mazzetti et al., 2019 December 22). The article's sources, American officials conducting an intelligence assessment and the app's developers (who anonymously supplied information), disclosed that the Emirati government tracked all movements, conversations and other activities of those who had installed the app on their phone.

Officials mark ToTok as one of the umpteenth techniques of rich, authoritarian governments that can be regarded part of the digital arms race taking place amongst them. According to The Times, these governments use an increasing number of state-of-the-art technologies to spy on foreign rivals, criminal networks, terrorists, but also critics such as journalists or human rights lawyers; therefore, they spy on their entire population and beyond. ToTok is a "cleverly designed tool for mass surveillance" according to The Times' investigation (Mazzetti et al., 2019 December 22). Unlike WhatsApp or Signal, ToTok does not claim end-to-end encryption. Although labelled "fast and secure", it is highly unlikely that a regular user would figure out that the opposite is true. Only the sentence "we may share your personal data with group companies" can be found buried in between the small letters of the terms and conditions (Mazzetti et al., 2019 December 22).

The information collected via ToTok, which includes messages, calls and contacts, is analysed by intelligence analysts. What firm these analysts actually belong to, and their relationship with

the Emirati government is, unsurprisingly, vague. The interviews and analysis conducted by The Times lead to a firm called 'Breej Holding' being behind ToTok. However, the probability of this firm being a front company connected to the company 'DarkMatter' is quite substantial. DarkMatter is a private cybersecurity and hacking firm based in Abu-Dhabi, and the cyber intelligence extension of the Emirati government. At the time the story leaked, DarkMatter was already being investigated by the F.B.I. due to possible cybercrimes directed at foreign adversaries. Besides DarkMatter, the investigation conducted by The Times also connected ToTok to Pax AI, an Abu-Dhabi based data mining firm, and most probably linked to DarkMatter.

The UAE's Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) briefly commented on the allegations directed at ToTok and the removal of the app from Google and Apple app stores, stating that "its laws prohibit any kind of data breach". Later, the TRA additionally made the statement that "the UAE is committed to fostering a business environment that encourages innovators and entrepreneurs to thrive across multiple sectors" as a response to the call by the population to lift the ban on free calling apps; a consequence of the debate that surged around ToTok. The app's founders brought out a statement as well, saying that they built the app with "user security and privacy as our priority".

ToTok: Biopower through the Rent-Fuelled Market

The surveillance practices deployed by ToTok classify as a political technology that aims to regulate the behaviour of the population through large-scale monitoring. This practice is biopolitical in the sense that the population as a whole is subjected to the controlling power; this can be safely assumed since it was the main application used by individuals in the UAE to communicate. Furthermore, the tool deploys statistics and complex algorithms with the offline as well as online movements of the human body as its focal points. It does so with the objective to identify or to forecast irregularities throughout the population. Besides surveillance being biopolitical because it subjects the population as a whole, it can also regulate the behaviour of the population with the intention to improve its wellbeing, or health. The government wants to ensure that its population makes the right choices, e.g. through the enforcement of anti-obesity measures. Surveillance can serve as tool to monitor the food choice of the population; well-informed public measures can be taken as a result. An attempt could be made to apply an adapted form of this logic to the case of ToTok and the UAE. The Emirati government/sovereign certainly monitors the population on the choices that it makes; not so much in regard to food choices, but rather to what extent the government is criticised and the possibility of instigation of social unrest. (Oppressive) public policies can be implemented and

upheld accordingly. This rather ties into the concept of normation, the disciplinary norm formation, than normalisation, the biopolitical form. The boundary between biopolitical and disciplinary power becomes all the vaguer in the case of ToTok. According to a 'stricter' Foucauldian approach, biopolitics and discipline merge when surveillance is used to identify and forecast irregularities with the individual as its object, in contrast to monitoring the population with as aim the formulation of public measures. However, it is more likely that ToTok predominantly uses the individual as both object and instrument for its exercise of power. The population as a whole is monitored, but ToTok's prime aim is to subject and to 'train' the individual by identifying (future) irregularities.

Although not specifically stated by the Emirati government, it can be assumed that the same motivations that were articulated in the corporate documents regarding the deployment R2 are applicable to the case of surveillance by ToTok: social unrest by pro-democracy uprisings and migrant workers, terrorist attacks and any form of Iranian hostility. The latter might play a smaller role in the case of ToTok, since Iranian officials probably would not be communicating via an Emirati communication application; the UAE deploys other sorts of cyber techniques when attacking a foreign adversary. The large scale, intrusive surveillance is most probably utilised in order to identify the risk of social unrest, including the identification of regime-critics, and possible terrorist threats. The aim of this tool is rather safeguarding the sovereign/government, than increasing the wellbeing and prosperity of the population.

Conclusion

Although the relationship of the firms behind ToTok, these being DarkMatter and Pax AI, and the Emirati government are, to say the least obscure, the deployment of the tool can be classified as decentralisation of practices through the market. The use of ToTok by the Emirati government functions within the structure of (neo-)liberal governmentality, as the surveillance tool works through a complex web of structures that maintains the exercise of power within and over the population (however, in a more authoritarian way); with political economy as its rationality since it aims at maximising the productivity of the population through halting any form of unrest. It further classifies as a security dispositif as it holds a strong biopolitical component, since it subjects the population as a whole, problematises social unrest and terrorism into risk, and deploys knowledges as statistics and risk calculation.

Even though it is possible to mould the use of ToTok into the framework of (neo-)liberal governmentality and biopower, there are some apparent issues when doing so. These issues have been discussed in previous chapters as they concern the questions of 'whose security',

norm formation and the source of payment, this being rent, for the outsourcing of practices. In this case study, the rationalities of an authoritarian rentier government are apparent. In the following, and concluding, chapter these considerations will be articulated into a concept of rentier governmentality.

Conclusion: Towards a Concept of Rentier

Governmentality

The position of the sovereign in the UAE has been successfully challenged. This thesis supplied the necessary room to explore how Emirati interests are secured through various dispersed networks. The three case studies have shown that Emirati security governance is not solely a state affair and that a rigid state-centric approach is not suitable. The Emirates safeguard their security through the workings of the economy, and the economy benefits from this security. However, the state-centric approach should not be completely disregarded. Emirati security governance can, to a certain extent, be explained through (neo-)liberal governmentality, but the rationalities of a rentier state are still apparent in their governing, as shown in the empirical chapters. These rationalities will function as components of the concept *rentier governmentality*. This concept attempts to combine various governmentality characteristics, such as operating through a dispersed web of power and the rationality of political economy, with certain rentier features, these being: i) security for the sovereign; ii) an emphasis on disciplinary power; and iii) a market financed by oil-rent.

Firstly, all cases illustrate that not per se the population's interests – and 'who make up the population' is a discussion by itself – but the sovereign/government's interests are being secured. R2 explicitly, and ToTok implicitly, were deployed in order to identify and suppress any (future) social unrest, caused by the large community of migrant workers as well as pro-democracy protesters. It would be difficult to argue that it is the population's wish to be suppressed. Via these mechanisms, the Emirati ruling class secures its position. Besides overpowering social unrest, both R2 and DP World are utilised by the UAE to secure a position as regional security officer, specifically to counter the Iran-threat, and as counterterrorism tool. This serves the sovereign/government's security interests, and simultaneously those of the population by creating a secure environment to participate as agents in the economic sphere. The latter is in line with the political economy rationality, the former with rentier rationality.

Secondly, the R2 and ToTok cases illustrate that the apparatuses rather deploy biopower than solely biopolitical power; making it necessary to adapt the conceptualisation of the security dispositif in the context of the Gulf. Power deployed by both R2 and ToTok possesses a biopolitical component to which the entire population (and beyond) is subjected, with as goal to create stability and thus, create prosperity and ensure the wellbeing of the population. However, both security dispositifs have a strong disciplinary component, as they aim at 'training' the individuals that make up the population, including the community of migrant

workers. The cornerstone of the management of the population by these dispositifs consists of making individuals behave in line with the will of the Emirati government. This is done through normalising self-policing as well as directly identifying possible (future) risks among the population. Both methods exert strong disciplinary power. That is why rather normation than normalisation is present in these cases: *a priori* norms are used as measures. In the case of DP World on the other hand, a form of normalisation within global trade can be perceived. However, power exerted by the security dispositif that directly targets the population (R2 and ToTok), creates security by subjecting the population as a whole, but with strong disciplinary elements. That is why in the context of the Gulf, the security dispositif rather makes use of biopower, than solely biopolitical power.

Lastly, security governance through ToTok and R2 both qualify as outsourcing of practices in the context of (neo-)liberal governmentality. However, these practices are most likely financed by the Emirates' oil wealth; and thus, undermine the entrepreneurial and competitive values which are central to (neo-)liberal governmentality. The mechanisms of the market and the interests of the population do not serve as principles of limitation of government/sovereign. Oil-rent, the predominant source of funding of the Emirati economy, is a strong rentier characteristic. At the moment, DP World does adhere to the principles of entrepreneurship and competitiveness as it accounts for a large part of the Emirates' non-oil wealth and plays a large role in the economic diversification of the UAE. However, this will change once DP World delists, tilting this case towards a rentier rationality as well.

Following this thesis' interpretation of the above-discussed elements of i) population; ii) disciplinary power; and iii) oil-wealth, in conjunction with (neo-)liberal governmentality, rentier governmentality is formulated as follows:

An ensemble formed by various practices, mechanisms, institutions and knowledges that preserve and advance the exercise of power over the population by the sovereign/government; the predominant technical means to do so is the security dispositif, which deploys biopower with a strong disciplinary component – it subjects the population as a whole, but with as aim to make the individuals that make up the population behave in line with the will of the sovereign/government; its principal forms of knowledge are political economy, as its objective is to increase profit, and rentierism, as the ensemble is predominantly financed by rent originating from oil-wealth.

The UAE might not have a strong military apparatus, but it is more than capable of securing its interests through the workings of its strong, oil-wealthy, economy. The security dispositifs that do so, deploy their power in the name of 'the greater good', or in the case of the UAE: in the name of 'the greater sovereign'.

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