LEIDEN UNIVERSITY
- MASTER THESIS –

Is The New Media Diet a Recipe for Euroscepticism?

An empirical study of the effects of using new media on support for European integration

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Abstract

In recent years, new media has slowly become one of the primary sources of information on European integration, bringing Euroscepticism to the foreground. Research has shown that the events in the latter part of the 2010s have negatively influenced the people's perception of the European Union where links to new media were made. However, cross-sectional research on this topic during this period has not been established. This thesis tried to fill this gap with cross-sectional survey data from standard Eurobarometer 82.3 and 90.3 between 2014 and 2018. This thesis tried to find a significant correlation between different forms of media diet, a significant correlation between older age cohorts that use this new media and their levels of Euroscepticism, and on the overall maturity of this new media. It did so based on theories of interaction and reciprocation of information on media together with common theories of Euroscepticism, while building on past research done within these fields. While this thesis did find evidence to believe that new media users were significantly more Eurosceptic, it did not find a reason to believe older age cohorts were more sceptical than younger age cohorts. While on the topic of migration policy, new media might have matured, other topics showed no significant results that would signify new media having matured to the primary news medium for Eurocentric news.

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I. Introduction

Since the first cooperation between European nations in the European Coal and Steel community, people have been sceptical about European integration. While most of the Euroscepticism originated from the United Kingdom regarding the nation state, it soon spread to other European member states. Not only the nation state, but also other forms of criticism were introduced during the following decades of European integration (Morgan, 2009; Leruth, Startin & Usherwood, 2017). The most common form of Euroscepticism found today originates from the 1991 Maastricht Treaty of the European Union and the following big events of European Integration that happened after the creation of the European Union (Council of the European Communities & Commission of the European Communities, 1992; Morgan, 2009; Leruth et al., 2017). The many crises and events during the almost 30 years of its existence, such as the introduction of a single currency (Euro), a European constitution, the 2008 financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis, the Migration crisis, and the Brexit have shaped the political debate on Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018).

Many scholars have, considering the prominence of this Euroscepticism, well documented its effects over the last three decades. While earlier research primarily focussed on the fact that the scepticism, or in some academics eyes a form of cynicism, was primarily focussed on the outer political ranges (Buhr, 2012); it was also concluded by many that there are different forms of this criticism (Krouwel & Abts, 2007; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008a; 2008b; 2017; Taggart, 1998). This criticism was therefore more widespread than initially suggested, but not as extreme as theorized. Rather quickly, scholars started to notice a significant correlation between media and political opinion on the European Union (De Vreese, 2007). These findings created a theoretical foundation to explain various opinions on the European Union as well as the portrayal of these ideas from the media. When the internet as a source of political information started to create a foothold in the late 2000s and early 2010s, scholars started to explore this 'new' media form that was, in their eyes, going to influence the opinion of the people on the European Union (Azrout, Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2012; Conti & Memoli, 2016; De Vreese, 2007; Michailidou, 2015; 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014).

As a result of the popularity of 'new media' scholars started to conclude that there was a certain polarization between this new form of internet media and the traditional media such as newspapers and television news (Conti & Memoli, 2016). New media was found to

be more sceptically biased compared to other media and some went as far to deem it to be 'problematic'. They were of the opinion that as the medium was primarily used by the younger generation; it could influence and slow the success of the European Union in the future (Conti & Memoli, 2016; Weeks & Holbert, 2013). Most research surrounding the general direct relationship between new media and Eurosceptic influence stops around 2015, with many looking at more specific issues found within the European Union (Clarke, Goodwin & Whiteley, 2017; Dodds, 2016; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018). While most of these quantitative studies stopped, the events that influenced the European Union in the late 2010s started to develop and potentially changed the general ideas surrounding these new media consumers. Many papers show that social media and internet are an important factor in the Euroscepticism that follows certain events such as the European migration crisis (Meijers, 2015; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018). Therefore, it is strange that not many went back to the overall picture with the available survey data.

While academics have written about these events separately, the literature is still limited regarding the overall picture of Eurosceptic influence of new media since 2014. The ever growing adoption of internet and social media has likely induced a great increase of 'new media' use to the point that it's only new in name, rather than use. This idea gets its strength as research has shown that older generations are starting to use the internet to get (more) politically involved (Clarke et al., 2017; Dodds, 2016; Towner and Muñoz, 2016). As these new users start to use and learn about this new form of media, a lot of misconceptions and problems that new media has been known for in the past might not only spread to the young generations, but also influence these older generations (Pierri, Artoni & Ceri, 2020). This would increase the threat of false and misinformation spreading, which in turn could illegitimately damage the public opinion towards the European Union. Besides the fact that damage could be done, it's also the ease of access to the medium that is problematic. It has been shown to be easier to spread fake- and misleading news compared to traditional media because of its accessibility to not only consume, but also create content (Napoli, 2019; Pierri et al., 2020).

Thus, for academics and future literature it is important to have a precedent that is not (in most forms) outdated as they try to explain other aspects of Euroscepticism. Therefore, it would be preferable to update said assumptions about the current situation because this would decrease the chance of misconceived conclusions. The difference between a developed form of media and an underdeveloped form of media could be night and day when explaining political opinions and waves of scepticism on European integration in the following decade.

Therefore, it is of great scientific importance to have a good 'toolset' for academics in the field of new media and Euroscepticism.

Not only would an updated theory surrounding new media be interesting to future academics, but it has certain practical value for practitioners as well. Many scholars noted in the past that the influence of new media is primarily a sceptical one. While this in itself could be the result of failing European policy, it could also find its roots in false or misleading news that would effectively influence the political opinion in a negatively skewed way. Since new media is more likely to suffer this fate compared to traditional media. Therefore, it is important to know how 'mature' this form of media truly is to determine its effective reach and towards what audience it reaches. If a media is mature, it is important to find ways to educate people on this issue and start recognizing misleading news in order to overcome bigger roadblocks of European integration in the long term. This quantitative data thesis will therefore try to provide an answer to the question if new media has indeed reached new levels of maturity over the years, and to what extent its influence and adaptation has increased to significant levels of support by using cross-sectional survey data from standard Eurobarometer surveys. It will try to discern if new media not only still polarizes news, but may even be capable of creating its own media frames. It will also attempt to show that older generations that are slowly adopting new media are, because of inexperience, getting more sceptic than younger audiences as the events in the European Union the last five years would make believe, as well as trying to provide evidence that younger audiences did gain this experience. Therefore the following research question has been produced:

Research question How does the use of new media as a primary information source on European integration impact the levels of Euroscepticism in the European Union between 2014 and 2018 of different age cohorts?

The literature review will first and foremost feature an overall introduction of Euroscepticism, as a historical timeline with the gradual inclusion of media influence. In the theoretical framework the most relevant theories and the four hypotheses regarding Euroscepticism and age will be introduced. The methodology chapter shows a detailed explanation on how the variables were formed and how the results will be derived from quantitative data (based on standard Eurobarometer survey datasets). In the analysis the results and the hypotheses surrounding the influence of age, media use, and Euroscepticism are presented. Data will be procured from the year 2018 and compared to the last survey year

of 2014 used by Conti and Memoli (2016). The thesis will then conclude with conclusions and a discussion where the found results are discussed, some of the limitations are mentioned, and gaps in the current literature are identified which could be used for future research in the field of Euroscepticism and new media.

II. Literature review

Introduction on Euroscepticism

Scholars have written on the phenomenon of growing scepticism over the European ideal for the last three decades as Euroscepticism has ruled the debate on European integration. Euroscepticism, as a concept, should be seen as the hostility towards the (further) integration of member states into the European Union and the loss of nation state sovereignty to the European Union. Many eurosceptics state issues like undemocratic, unaccountable and/or plainly unnecessary as their prime reason for the distrust in integration (Morgan, 2009, p.56). It is evident that, while Euroscepticism as a concept is clear, the roots of the issue are not always the same. Euroscepticism takes on many different forms. It doesn't reside with just one political stream; it transcends them (Leruth et al., 2017). Nationalism, conservatism, extreme-left, extreme-right and populism are all terms commonly found in combination with Euroscepticism. Furthermore, most of the topics of discussion transform themselves over the years as well. Whereas the European Union further shapes itself from an ideal to a reality. Issues that were predominant in the 1980s with the proposed European Union are not the prime issues of Euroscepticism today. Therefore, Euroscepticism should be seen as a very context fluid form of opposition on European integration between time, political spheres, and topics (Morgan, 2009; Leruth et al., 2017; Vasilopoulou, 2017).

It should be noted that literature points to the fact that Euroscepticism in itself can be defined on different levels of opposition to European integration. The simplest form would be between soft and hard Euroscepticism, but this can be further differentiated on a level between critics and sceptics (Krouwel & Abts, 2007; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008a; 2008b; 2017; Taggart, 1998). Soft Euroscepticism is a form of criticism on the current forms of integration taking place in the European Union with wishes to change this. Hard Euroscepticism is more of a hard cynical line, which is the vision that the European integration is inherently bad (Taggart, 1998). Though other separations exist in the literature that go into further defining the different kinds of criticism, this thesis will reference to Taggart's (1998) distinction to illustrate the general move of sentiment.

This sentiment comes from not only personal dissatisfaction with how the European Union integration has gone, but the level of opposition is also fuelled by the media's portrayal of the integration (De Vreese, 2007; Michailidou, 2015; 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014). The media influences the people's view towards European Integration by a

large margin (De Vreese, 2007, Michailidou, 2015). That's why in this chapter we will describe the common theories, reasoning, and ideas surrounding Euroscepticism over these different fluent changes, based on political streams, events, and the media influence.

Euroscepticism

The literature on Euroscepticism starts with its inception back in the 1970s and 1980s, predominantly during the Margaret Thatcher era in the United Kingdom. The British Euroscepticism is a proto form of anti-European integration sentiments that were formed primarily out of a culture clash when it came to the national identity. Culturally, the United Kingdom felt rather foreign to mainland Europe when it came to these ideas of the nation state. The British vision of themselves was primarily a global one over that of a European one (Fontana & Parsons, 2014, p. 90). Furthermore, the British put nationalism in the form of sovereignty on a higher pedestal than supranational cooperation (Fontana & Parsons, 2014, p. 90; Wellings, 2010, p.489). These aspects essentially conflict with the European integration ideal. This proto-form of Euroscepticism was therefore primarily focussed around the sovereignty of the nation-state; a clear form of hard Euroscepticism (Dorey, 2017; Fontana & Parsons, 2014; Taggart, 1998; Wellings, 2010).

While the eventual departure of Thatcher led to a decrease in these Eurosceptic sentiments within the conservative party and to an extent the United Kingdom, the party itself still had MPs with a more lingering Eurosceptic mentality which has remained part of the conservative identity ever since (Dorey, 2017, pp.28-30; Fontana & Parsons, 2014, pp.94-96; Wellings, 2010, p.489).

During the 1970s and 1980s Euroscepticism was primarily contained within the United Kingdom. This changed in the early 1990s because of the 1992 Maastricht treaty. With this treaty the fear of losing (part) of the sovereignty of the nation state became a reality. This caused opposition to the European ideal to spread to mainland Europe as it had in the United Kingdom two decades earlier (Buhr, 2012).

On the foreground of this opposition were primarily the extreme parties on the left- as the right spectrum. While both were opposed to integration on a European scale in socioeconomic terms, they had different focal points for their opposition. The far right predominantly focussed on the migration issue and, to an extent, the economic dislocation. The far left focussed on the modernisation and globalist movements that cause economic dislocation. Their reasoning was primarily based on what they seemed to think that potential voters could be discontent with. This is where most of the Euroscepticism stayed in this

period. Primarily, this sentiment was found in populist parties focussing on the people left behind in the globalist movement (Buhr, 2012; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002).

In the early 2000s new member states from Central and Eastern Europe were introduced. Most of the literature during this time that produces knowledge on Euroscepticism primarily concludes that the more national identity is an important factor, the less supportive extremist are to intra-EU mobility. This was something seen primarily with right-wing parties (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002; Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2018, p.807).

The differentiation between the two parties was primarily technical. The real difference could be found in what they wanted from the current European integration. The right-wing parties primarily focussed on the scare of cultural heterogeneity and the loss of national sovereignty while the left-wing parties stayed with the on-going market liberalisation and the status quo of the welfare arrangement. This focus brings the assumption that left-wing parties aren't completely against European integration, as long as this doesn't affect economic factors within their country (Van Elsas, Hakhverdian & Van der Brug, 2016, p.1182). This would classify them to be more aligned to a soft form of Euroscepticism. The frustration for the left wing was primarily found about the current state of the European Union. With the right-wing the focus was on limiting the European Supranationalism overall, aligning more towards a hard form of Euroscepticism (Hooghe et al. 2002; Taggart, 1998; Van Elsas et al., 2016). A highlight of this Euroscepticism was the eventual veto on the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005 by the Netherlands and France, which they found to be 'too far' in terms of European integration at the time (De Vreese, 2007; Nicoli, 2016).

Euroscepticism: The new European challenges and the rise of (new) media influence

While the Euroscepticism of the early 2000s was primarily focussed on the early intra-EU immigration streams and welfare state, this changed starting with the financial- and later the euro debt crisis. This once again gave space for the European sceptics through different (sensationalist) news outlets (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015). These events impacted the European Union which caused a resurgence of similar opposition found in post-1992 Euroscepticism (Michailidou, 2015; 2016; Serricchio, Tsakatika & Quaglia, 2012). The focus for these parties and newspapers became the friction of integration between member states rather than specific policy issues. While the member states' distrust of each other was to be found between every member state, the most intense distrust came from the troubled member

state Greece as they took the brunt of the crisis (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015; Michailidou, 2016). Past Euroscepticism within the literature primarily focussed on more extreme parties and mainly as an undertone. Today this form of Euroscepticism has gotten more 'mainstream' (Buhr, 2012; Hooghe et al., 2002; Meijers, 2015). The Euro crisis also fuelled the media more towards a critical way of thinking about the European Union. The literature points to this in more detail when looking at the European parliamentary elections of 2009 and the euro crisis (Michalidou, 2015; 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014). While the influence of new media on Euroscepticism was still limited during this time, as it was still unclear what the direct effects were of online discussion, it was visible that in general, media positively influenced the election outcome thanks to the benefit of specific framing (Michalidou, 2015; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014).

While the Euroscepticism literature primarily started to produce knowledge on the financial crisis and the euro crisis, the Arabic spring movement and their consequent civil wars tore up North-Africa and the Middle East. The Syrian conflict being the hotspot for what was about to unfold, with an influx of refugees fleeing to the European Union. While the initial influx and brunt of the immigration was centred on Greece and Italy, it quickly became a European issue in 2014-2015 (Migration and Home Affairs EU, n.d.). Much of the literature from that time-period points to a lingering post-1992 anti-integration sentiment within a portion of the Euroscepticism that was found before the financial- and euro crisis (Serricchio et al., 2012). With the influx of migrants came a resurgence of the right-wing immigration scepticism which to an extent instigated the Euroscepticism in the Eastern European member states (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018).

During these developments, the literature started to focus on a trend that was noticed between new media usage and Euroscepticism as it started to play a bigger role in the spread of Euroscepticism. More critical ideas were being shared which increased scepticism on the European Union integration both in offline- as well as online spheres, which intensified the Euroscepticism (Conti & Memoli, 2016; Michailidou, 2015). This hard Euroscepticism transformed into the political sphere with the question of the nation state leading to some Eurosceptic victories across Europe. An example of one of these national election victories would be the Brexit vote (Clarke et al., 2017; Dodds, 2016; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018). Another trend witnessed was that more mainstream parties started to change their position on European integration as an effect of this Eurosceptic pressure (Meijers, 2015; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018).

As noted throughout the literature itself, the real implications of Euroscepticism are fluid and therefore always changing. Therefore, it might be more important to show how this opposition forms. Past literature has written on new media influence, but the big quantitative data studies on new media influence on Euroscepticism have been on data from 2014 or before (Conti & Memoli, 2016; De Vreese, 2007; Michailidou, 2015; 2016; Nicoli, 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014; Vasilopoulou, 2017). Therefore, there will be an attempt made to try and fill in this gap of knowledge. This will be done by comparing the 2014 Eurobarometer results to the results of 2014 to 2018 to see if the media influence has, as one might assume with the current trend, truly increased further Euroscepticism.

III. Theoretical framework

For the theoretical framework a few of the Euroscepticism and (new) media theories are used to introduce four hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses will look at the general correlation between new media diet and Euroscepticism. The second set of hypotheses will look at different age cohorts, their new media use, and their levels of Euroscepticism.

Euroscepticism and media influence

To build towards the first two hypotheses, it is important to look at the impact of media on the Euroscepticism of people. To understand how media influences and frames opinions, it is important to understand 'framing'. Frames are the interpretation and selection of objective news events by creating 'interactive' packages that give a meaning to these objective facts and make them an issue. These frames take place in either generic- or issue-specific frames (De Vreese, 2005; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). De Vreese (2005) builds further on this by showing that different frames can be set on different national levels for the same subjects, and that they therefore have different levels of impact. Issue-specific frames are primarily about specific events that can be framed, while generic frames primarily transcend themes and stretch over a long period of time. The importance of new media in general becomes clear from the theoretic support for effective spreading of information through social media (Ross, Fountaine & Comrie, 2014; Tajudeen, Jaafar & Sulaiman, 2016; Weeks & Holbert, 2013; Winter, Metzger & Flanagin, 2016). It is important to consider this idea of framing and Euroscepticism as media plays a role in both the national- as well as the international sphere.

Second of all, it is important to understand the flow of Euroscepticism. As was introduced in the literature review, the meaning of Euroscepticism changes as the European project and levels of integration progress (Morgan, 2009; Leruth et al., 2017). Major events and changes to the European Union therefore incite a change in the roots of this scepticism, like how Brexit and the migration crisis did (Clarke et al., 2017; Dodds, 2016; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018). It is therefore important to understand and test these levels of Euroscepticism when they change because it is expected to have differing results from the 2014 period. For the following hypotheses it is important to understand how this change develops through (new) media (Conti & Memoli, 2016; De Vreese, 2007; Michailidou, 2015; 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014).

In the case of Euroscepticism and media influence, the literature predominantly agrees with the fact that media portrayal of European integration has influence on the individual's perception of this process (Conti & Memoli, 2016; De Vreese, 2007; Michailidou, 2015; 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014). The specific perception of this message depends on what media diet an individual takes in (Avery, 2009; Conti & Memoli, 2016; De Vreese, 2007; De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). It also depends on their level of interpersonal communication and their ability to filter which media messages are valid and which are not (Azrout, et al., 2012; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1965). Despite all of these facts, the impact on important European votes could still be determined through this media influence (Azrout et al., 2012; Conti & Memoli, 2016; De Vreese, 2007; Michailidou, 2015; 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014).

While the impact of new media is a rather new phenomenon in literature, it has been linked to a significant effect on public opinion in combination with European integration. New media doesn't create their own framing, but rather polarizes them (Conti & Memoli, 2016; Michailidou, 2015). Conti & Memoli (2016) conclude in their analysis that a great portion of internet social media users (read: new media) are more sceptical of European integration. Furthermore, the use of social media by political parties and individuals has further increased in recent years, which could indicate more new media influence (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2019; Ross et al., 2014). This brings us to our first two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a When someone exclusively uses a new (online) media diet to inform themselves about European integration, he or she is more Eurosceptic than someone who exclusively informs themselves with a traditional media diet.

Hypothesis 1b When someone uses an exclusive new media diet to inform themselves about European integration in 2018 are more sceptical of the European Union in comparison to people using exclusive new media to inform themselves about European integration in 2014.

New media influence conditional on age

A second factor mentioned in the analysis of Conti & Memoli (2016) are the individuals using this social media. They are primarily described as young and highly educated. The question remains if this hasn't changed over the last couple years. Literature that produces knowledge on the older population and new media influence seems to indicate that these age cohorts are influenced frequently by new media (Clarke et al., 2017; Dodds, 2016; Towner & Muñoz, 2016). This was the case in the 2012 US elections where 'baby boomer' generation voters were significantly influenced by new media according to Towner and Muñoz (2016, pp.53-54). In the Brexit referendum vote it was also noted that there was a significant portion of the older generation that voted against Brexit on basis of fear of uncontrolled immigration and terrorism. This was fuel for the 'Leave' campaigners that took advantage of new media which was used as a common source for information in this campaign (Clarke et al., 2017; Dodds, 2016; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018). Not only that, but exploratory research has been finding more links towards misinformation from social media on European contextual matters (Pierri et al., 2020).

The importance of misinformation in media becomes clear when taking the filter theory into account. This theory suggests that people learn to filter which messages are valid and which are not (Azrout et al., 2012; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1965). Conti and Memoli's (2016) research concludes that the primary users of the internet up until that point were the younger generations who are very experienced with new media and its application. Thus, new media is still deemed to be in the early stages of adoption.

With that knowledge, the question remains whether older generations that are just starting to make use of this new media platform (since 2014) either have the same or worse ability to filter 'fake' news from 'real' news in the online media sphere in comparison to younger generations. If this is the case, it would make them more likely to be influenced by new media, and therefore they could end up more sceptical about European Integration. This seems to be backed by previous research based on quantitative data on increased internet usage (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2019). This change might therefore indicate the maturing process of new media as a media form (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1965).

The literature would thus suggest that the adoption rate of new media has spread not only among the youth and become 'mainstream', but also among the older age cohorts in the population since Conti and Memoli's (2016) research over 2011 to 2014.To determine if 'new media' has matured to a point where older cohorts are starting to use the medium the following hypotheses we construed: Hypothesis 2a will determine an intermediary maturing

stage in which younger cohorts are adept at using new media, resulting in a less sceptical younger audience. Hypothesis 2b will determine if younger cohorts have gotten less sceptical over the last four years, which would be another indicator of maturing.

Hypothesis 2a Young age cohorts that inform themselves about European integration with an exclusive new media diet are less sceptical of the European Union in comparison to older age cohorts with an exclusive new media diet that inform themselves about European integration.

Hypothesis 2b Younger age cohorts with an exclusive new media diet that inform themselves about European integration in 2018 are less sceptical of the European Union in comparison to younger age cohorts with an exclusive new media diet that inform themselves about European integration in 2014.

IV. Methodology

Most of the data is retrieved from the standard Eurobarometer 82.3 from November 2014 and the standard Eurobarometer 90.3 from November 2018. Eurobarometer has actively done research since 1973 and is seen as one of the most reputable surveys within the European Union (European Parliament, n.d.). The reason for its selection was primarily the availability of the proper quantitative data necessary for our evaluation of the hypotheses that were set in the last chapter, but also because it was previously used by Conti and Memoli (2016) for their basis. It is also, at this point of writing, the most recent dataset with these properties. As the situation around online media has evolved over the last six years, these datasets will provide a key view of the main changes in the perception of online media between the years 2014 and 2018. To achieve this, this thesis will use R-statistics. To test the hypotheses, various dependent variables will be used. From Conti and Memoli's (2016) research it became clear that the main types of Euroscepticism could be found within two elements. The first of which being European trust, and the second being European policy support. At first, trust dependent variables were chosen as models to explain Euroscepticism. To test this trust in European institutions, the following question from both Eurobarometer surveys was chosen: "Please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust these European institutions" with the topics "The European Commission" and "The European Parliament" (GESIS, 2014; 2018). The survey provided three standard answers. The respondent could choose between 'Trust', 'No Trust' or 'Don't Know' (DK). From these answers two trust based variables were used namely EC Trust and EP Trust. The reason these measures were chosen is because these are the main institutions of the European Union that are decided through political vote (indirect as well as direct). Therefore, they are best fitting for our explanatory variable media diet, which will be based on finding EU political news. Our second set of dependent variables, and coincidentally also the second element of Euroscepticism, is policy based. As policy becomes practice, it can have a great influence on what people think of the European Union. Therefore we use a variable based on cumulative index of policy proposal questions which included: "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it" with the following statements: "Single Currency Area, Migration Policy, Further Enlargement of the EU" (GESIS, 2014; 2018). From these answers three policy based variables were used, namely Policy Euro, Policy EU Migration, and Policy EU Enlargement. These policy proposals are, based on the literature review, very much the

main policies that are associated with most of the Euroscepticism found.

Based on past literature questioning the use of DK within survey data, we see that there has been a controversial divide in whether or not to add the DK variable (Durand & Lambert, 1988). Considering there were plenty of observations in the survey data, the removal of these DK answers would not diminish the results. Therefore, it was decided to not include DK responses in either the negative- or positive categories. For the control variables, the DK answers will be independently looked at whether or not to include them based on theory. This would only be done if adding DK responses can logically be put into category and if this could be supported by literature (Durand & Lambert, 1988). This decision created five binomial variables. Two models for testing 'European trust' and three models for 'European policy support'.

For the explanatory variable 'media influence', a categorical media diet variable was created to test the use of media forms and how they relate to Euroscepticism bias in these media. It was created by using the following question(s): "Where do you get most of your news on European political matters? Firstly? And Secondly?" (GESIS, 2014; 2018).

The levels of this variable are a 'Mixed media diet', which is a diet that includes both new media as well as old media for first and second choice; a level 'New media diet', which primarily uses new media by being its first and second choice and a level 'Traditional media diet', which primarily uses traditional media for its first and second choice.

For our second explanatory variable age was used. Age is a categorical variable divided in four different cohorts which are 15-24, 25-39, 40-55 and 55+. This variable will be used for the second set of hypotheses and will also be included in the first set of hypotheses, but will then function as a control variable. As an explanatory variable it will account for age and European integration because many in the field of European integration and scepticism think it has an influence (Clarke et al., 2017; Conti & Memoli, 2016; Dodds, 2016; Towner & Muñoz, 2016).

To be certain of robust results a great amount of independent control variables were introduced among these explanatory variables. Many variables that, based on literature, should have an influence on the Euroscepticism were included together with some more common control variables: Years of education, gender, social class, capacity of paying bills, political interest, political alignment (left to right), and economic situation were also included as control variables. By doing this a higher validity can be achieved for a more robust result.

Regarding the validity, it is important to understand the complications of these models. Because of the great amount of respondents and the non-panel survey data the overall fit of

the models leaves things to be desired. However, the residual deviance of the models has shown to decrease the null deviance significantly, indicating that the model helps with taking external effects into account. Even when these complications are considered, the models were deemed useful to indicate positive and negative trends within their results. To further get an insight into the used control variables and their structure, they will be shortly introduced and explained.

'Years of Education' is a categorical variable which is divided between five different categories which will be based on the following: 0: No fulltime Education, 1: Up to 15 years, 2: 16-19 years; 3: 20+ years; 4: Still studying. This is an important factor to Euroscepticism as the lower the education, the more sceptical people tend to be of European integration (Hakhverdian, Elsas, van der Brug & Kuhn, 2013).

'Gender' is a binominal variable where 1 is male and 2 is female and will be added as there can be an important demographic difference between male and female.

'Social class' is a categorical variable which is divided between 5 different social statuses that are self-assigned by the respondent. The higher the number, the lower the social status a respondent feels he or she is in. This might cause for some inaccuracies considering the fact that people might underestimate their own social status (mostly positively but also negatively). However, in the view of Euroscepticism it makes sense to include this variable because literature has indicated that individuals that are economically weaker and have a lower social status are most likely eurosceptical. (Buhr, 2012; Van Elsas et al., 2016, p.1182; Hooghe et al., 2002).

'Capability of paying bills' is a categorical variable based on the amount of times someone is not able to pay their bills. This will primarily be used to identify economically less fortunate people and their proposed Euroscepticism as explained during the social class variable. It should also be noted that this is a proxy variable for economic status, and might not completely portray the situation accurately, but in the author's belief, it does get close enough to reality to include it.

'Political interest' is a categorical variable that looks at the interest someone has in politics. This was primarily chosen because political interest influences the interest in a stance towards European Integration.

'Political alignment' is a nominal variable added based on a left to right scale of 10. This variable is introduced to account for extreme left and right wing parties that have always looked negatively towards European Integration in most cases (Buhr, 2012).

'Economic situation' is our last added control variable based on the Economic state of

the European Union. It is a categorical variable where DK answers were reprogrammed to be included as a neutral stance in Economics as this would seem logical in the case of economics (Durand & Lambert, 1988). It was included because of the great amount of literature based around the economic situation of the European Union and the opinion on the European Union. This literature shows that economic downturns can temporarily increase scepticism towards the European Union (Van Elsas et al., 2016; Hobolt & Wratil, 2015; Michailidou, 2016).

The analysis will feature logistic regressions as most of the dependent variables are binomial. The regressions will report the p-values with $^{*}= p<0.10$, $^{**}= p<0.05$, $^{***}= p<0.01$ and $^{****}= p<0.001$. The inclusion of $p<0.10$ is based on the precedent that Conti and Memoli (2016) set as they reported these as well. Every regression table in this thesis will feature five models with their corresponding dependent variables: EC Trust, EP Trust, Policy Euro, Policy EU Migration and Policy EU Enlargement. There will be four different regression tables. The first regression table will feature logistic regressions over the year 2018 to indicate overall scepticism differences between media diet. The second regression table will feature logistic regressions over the year 2014 with an interaction on the survey of 2018 to determine the change in scepticism. As a comparison between 2014 and 2018 is done, the reliability of the results have significantly improved. The third regression table will feature logistic regressions over the year 2018, but with an interaction on age. Finally, the fourth regression table will feature logistic regressions over the year 2014 with an interaction on both the survey of 2018 as well as age. In the chapter itself, a shortened version of the regression tables will be given, which will exclude the control variables for the sake of form. The full regression tables, including these control variables, can be found in the appendix under their corresponding table number.

V. Age, Media Diet & Euroscepticism

New media use in the European Union

To preface the in-depth analysis of media diet and behaviour, it is important to look at and study the age demographics of various measurements of internet and social media usage in the European Union. To properly conclude and contribute further on the work set out by Conti and Memoli (2016), it is important to look at descriptive statistics. To start off the analysis, descriptive statistics about the specific usage of these media in both the standard Eurobarometer 82.3 in 2014 and the Eurobarometer 90.3 in 2018 were collected. As stated earlier on, there has been a suspected increase in the amount of people using the internet and social media. Thus, the two variables 'internet media usage' and 'social media usage' over the years 2014 and 2018 will be used to compare them with the age cohorts. The first results note an overall increase for all age cohorts in both internet use as well as social media use. 'Every day to almost every day internet media use' increased with a 7.49 percentage point compared to 2014, and 'Every day to almost every day social media use' increased with 11.92 percentage point compared to 2014. The build-up also shows a big difference in adaptation rates between age cohorts. The biggest percentage point increases are primarily to be found in the older age cohorts as well. The 55+ had a 9.16 percentage point increase to 19.15% which equates to about every fifth person in this age cohort using social media daily. Whereas the age cohort 40-55 increased with a 19.91 percentage point to 50.34% which equates to about half of the age cohorts population using this medium. This would indicate that the assumption that mass adoption from all ages of social media and internet media can be seen as correct. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the results in scepticism between age groups that use new media could have significantly changed over the last four years, creating a further reason to research the set out hypotheses. The results indicate a reasonable change in internet and social media use compared to the previous results found by Conti and Memoli (2016).

Conti and Memoli (2016) predicted that new media might overtake or equal traditional media in the near future as the main medium of information. Therefore, it is important to see the validity of this claim by creating a media diet variable (a categorical variable based on different levels of media diets), as mentioned in the Data and Methods chapter. Both age and gender as well as the demographics will be looked at in order to investigate the validity of this prediction.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the frequency of internet and social media

	2014					2018				
	15-24	**25-39**	**40-55**	**55+**	**Total**	**15-24**	**25-39**	**40-55**	**55+**	**Total**
Internet Media Use										
Every day to almost every day	2310 (92.2%)	4814 (80.8%)	4506 (63.7%)	4047 (32.9%)	15677 (56.3%)	2120 (91.3%)	4701 (88.3%)	5107 (76.2%)	5401 (42.2%)	17329 (63.8%)
Two to three times a week	85 (3.4%)	531 (8.9%)	828 (11.7%)	969 (7.9%)	2413 (8.7%)	121 (5.2%)	340 (6.4%)	694 (10.3%)	1252 (9.8%)	2407 (8.9%)
About once a week	18 (0.7%)	157 (2.6%)	314 (4.4%)	405 (3.3%)	894 (3.2%)	33 (1.4%)	98 (1.8%)	218 (3.2%)	493 (3.8%)	842 (3.1%)
Two to three times a month	11 (0.4%)	63 (1.1%)	127 (1.8%)	178 (1.4%)	379 (1.4%)	11 (0.5%)	38 (0.7%)	60 (0.9%)	170 (1.3%)	279 (1.0%)
Less often	29 (1.2%)	118 (2.0%)	256 (3.6%)	437 (3.5%)	840 (3.0%)	9 (0.4%)	44 (0.8%)	121 (1.8%)	348 (2.7%)	522 (1.9%)
Never	24 (1.0%)	174 (2.9%)	732 (10.3%)	3861 (31.4%)	4791 (17.2%)	26 (1.1%)	95 (1.8%)	465 (6.9%)	4385 (34.2%)	4971 (18.3%)
No access	27 (1.1%)	99 (1.6%)	307 (4.3%)	2410 (19.6%)	2843 (10.2%)	1 (0.1%)	7 (0.1%)	40 (0.6%)	761 (5.9%)	809 (3.0%)
N Total	2504 (9.0%)	5956 (21.4%)	7070 (25.4%)	12307 (44.2%)	27837 (100.0%)	2321 (8.5%)	5323 (19.6%)	6705 (24.7%)	12810 (47.2%)	27159 (100.0%)
Social Media Use										
Every day to almost every day	1954 (78.0%)	3178 (53.5%)	2147 (30.4%)	1227 (10.0%)	8506 (30.6%)	1952 (84.1%)	3758 (70.7 %)	3370 (50.3%)	2447 (19.1%)	11527 (42.5%)
Two to three times a week	258 (10.3%)	952 (16.0%)	942 (13.3%)	631 (5.1%)	2783 (10.0%)	184 (7.9%)	677 (12.7%)	985 (14.7%)	1056 (8.3%)	2902 (10.7%)
About once a week	81 (3.2%)	379 (6.3%)	462 (6.5%)	395 (3.2%)	1317 (4.7%)	69 (3.0%)	255 (4.8%)	453 (6.8%)	577 (4.5%)	1354 (5.0%)
Two to three times a month	27 (1.0%)	147 (2.5%)	216 (3.0%)	218 (1.8%)	608 (2.2%)	21 (0.9%)	92 (1.7%)	166 (2.5%)	213 (1.7%)	492 (1.8%)
Less often	59 (2.3%)	406 (6.8%)	610 (8.6%)	600 (4.9%)	1675 (6.0%)	21 (0.9%)	155 (2.9%)	325 (4.8%)	593 (4.6%)	1094 (4.0%)
Never	96 (3.8%)	775 (13.0%)	2352 (33.3%)	6720 (54.7%)	9943 (35.8%)	73 (3.15%)	370 7.0%	1338 20.0%	7066 55.3%	8847 32.6%
No access	31 (1.2%)	108 (1.8%)	326 (4.6%)	2497 (20.3%)	2962 (10.7%)	0 (0.0%)	10 (0.2%)	58 (0.9%)	825 (6.5%)	893 (3.3%)
N Total	2506 (9.0%)	5945 (21.4%)	7055 (25.4%)	12288 (44.2%)	27794 (100.0%)	2320 (8.6%)	5317 (19.6%)	6695 (24.7%)	12777 (47.1%)	27109 (100.00%)

Note: A descriptive set of statistics based on demographics regarding the t variables 'internet media use' and 'social media use' retrieved from Eurobarometer 82 .3 and 90.3 (GESIS, 2014; 2018).

Table 2. Demographics of Media Diet

	Mixed Media Diet		New Media Diet		Traditional Media Diet		Total	
	2014	**2018**	**2014**	**2018**	**2014**	**2018**	**2014**	**2018**
Gender								
Male	3897	4170	449	636	8718	7460	15663	15074
	(24.9%)	(27.7%)	(2.9%)	(4.2%)	(55.7%)	(49.5%)	(100%)	(100%)
Female	3989	4683	393	623	9724	8091	17999	17526
	(22.2%)	(26.7%)	(2.2%)	(3.5%)	(54.0%)	(46.2%)	(100%)	(100%)
Age								
15-24	1540	1365	288	413	1129	623	3738	3208
	(41.2%)	(42.5%)	(7.7%)	(12.9%)	(30.2%)	(19.4%)	(100%)	(100%)
25-39	2957	2952	360	495	3081	2156	7791	6981
	(37.9%)	(42.3%)	(4.6%)	(7.1%)	(39.5%)	(30.9%)	(100%)	(100%)
40-54	2162	2596	147	254	4651	3647	8495	8078
	(25.4%)	(32.1%)	(1.7%)	(3.1%)	(54.7%)	(45.1%)	(100%)	(100%)
55+	1227	1940	47	97	9581	9125	13638	14333
	(9.0%)	(13.5%)	(0.3%)	(0.7%)	(70.2%)	(63.7%)	(100%)	(100%)
N Total	7886	8853	842	1259	18442	15551	33662	32600
	(23.4%)	(27.2%)	(2.5%)	(3.9%)	(54.8%)	(47.7%)	(100%)	(100%)

Note: A descriptive set of statistics based on demographics regarding the independent variable 'Media Diet' retrieved from Eurobarometer 82 .3 and 90.3 (GESIS, 2014; 2018).

When looking at table 2 it becomes apparent that the popularity of traditional media has dropped with 7.1 percentage points in 2018. The new media alternatives on the other hand have increased with 1.36 percentage points and mixed with 3.73 percentage points over 2014. This would indicate that an information switch towards new media is very much underway. When looking at the ratio between traditional media users versus new media users a noticeable change in behaviour was found in the age cohort's 15 to 24 and 25 to 39. This could very well indicate this prediction of Conti and Memoli (2016) as they predicted new media to take over from traditional media as the primary information source to have come true. While the youngest cohort only had a 7.7% of its population with a new media diet in 2014, this seems to have increased to 12.9% of its population in 2018. While the oldest cohort of 55+ did double its total amount of new media users, the increase remained marginal. Their mixed media usage went up with 4.5 percentage points in four years, indicating an increase in people using new media for this purpose in the last four years. This would suggest a move towards using these new media as the hypothesis assumes. However, as only 3.86% of the population uses new media as their primary news source for EU political news, it is still a marginal group within the population that only uses this medium. Beyond that, 27.16%

had a mixed media diet in 2018. It shows that the build-up in media diet has changed over these four years towards a more mixed/new media diet. The same can be said for most of the older age cohorts, but within this section traditional media seems to be a mainstay. It is clear however that this new form of media is rapidly gaining more traction as a form of media. Enough to warrant another look at how this form of media impacts the opinions of European citizens.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables used in the models

	2014	2018
	(N=33662)	(N=32600)
EC Trust		
Mean (SD)	0.527 (0.499)	0.557 (0.497)
Median [Min, Max]	1.00 [0, 1.00]	1.00 [0, 1.00]
Missing	6643 (19.7%)	5468 (16.8%)
EP Trust		
Mean (SD)	0.543 (0.498)	0.589 (0.492)
Median [Min, Max]	1.00 [0, 1.00]	1.00 [0, 1.00]
Missing	5412 (16.1%)	4333 (13.3%)
Policy EU Enlargement		
Mean (SD)	0.527 (0.499)	0.538 (0.499)
Median [Min, Max]	1.00 [0, 1.00]	1.00 [0, 1.00]
Missing	4049 (12.0%)	6878 (21.1%)
Policy EU Migration		
Mean (SD)	0.773 (0.419)	0.701 (0.458)
Median [Min, Max]	1.00 [0, 1.00]	1.00 [0, 1.00]
Missing	8267 (24.6%)	10015 (30.7%)
Policy Euro		
Mean (SD)	0.643 (0.479)	0.668 (0.471)
Median [Min, Max]	1.00 [0, 1.00]	1.00 [0, 1.00]
Missing	2613 (7.8%)	5576 (17.1%)

Note: descriptive statistics of the dependent variables
EC Trust, EP Trust, Policy EU Large, Policy EU Migration and
Policy Euro created with help of table1 package
(GESIS, 2014; 2018; Rich, 2020).

The next part of the analysis will focus on this relationship between new media diet and European integration in both trust as well as policy form. To be able to retrieve these results five different dependent variables either based on trust or policy proposals will be used accordingly. Those variables will test the trust in the European Commission, the European Parliament and belief in the migration-, European enlargement- and euro policies of the European Union (reference the methods chapter for more details on the creation of

these variables). The median for all variables across the board is 1 for both European policy and European trust variables. However, the mean shows us that the trust in the European Union, while improved, hangs around 55.7% and 58.9% for trust in the European Commission and European Parliament respectively. All these dependent variables will feature in regression between media diet and Euroscepticism, media diet and Euroscepticism between years, media diet, Euroscepticism with an interaction with age, and media diet and Euroscepticism with interaction between age and between years. From the exploratory results made with a basic model it showed that there was a big statistical significance between new media users and Euroscepticism in the context of trust towards the European Commission and the European Parliament as well as on the policy proposals. However, this basic modelling is pretty negligible explaining very little without the necessary amount of control variables. Adding these control variables mentioned in the methods chapter showed us similar but more robust results.

The Impact of Media on the Public Opinion of the European Union

In table 4 we find five different models based on different aspects of European support (for all regression tables a shortened version is included within the analysis, for a full version reference the corresponding table in the appendix). The first two focus on showing the level of trust in the European Institutions. The latter three are looking at European policy support. Past literature primarily found results with trust related variables. These results, as visible in table 4, show that respondents that have an exclusively new media diet reacted more negatively towards trusting both the European Commission as well as the European Parliament as opposed to respondents consuming a more mixed media diet. The opposite was true regarding traditional media diets. These respondents tended to be more supportive, and they trusted the European Commission and the European Parliament more compared to the mixed media diets. The results over 2018 show a contrasted picture between the effects of different media diets when it comes to trust in European Integration.

By running a similar model for policy proposals for the latter three models (table 4) which, as described in our methods chapter, look at different policies that were indicated to be influenced by Euroscepticism. There isn't as much of a clear picture regarding Euroscepticism as the case is with trust. However, contrary to what Conti and Memoli (2016) found in their research, the results over 2018 indicate that there is a significant correlation with media diet and certain policy proposals. Respondents with primarily a new media diet seem to prefer a future European enlargement more than respondents with a mixed media diet

or a primarily traditional media diet. This result is rather unexpected. Most of the literature would suggest that a new media diet indicates some level of scepticism in comparison to other media forms, but this theory does not hold up regarding the 2018 Eurobarometer results (Avery, 2009; Azrout, et al., 2012; Conti & Memoli, 2016; De Vreese, 2007; De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; GESIS, 2018). The even more exceptional is that traditional media is in fact correlated to be more sceptical of a future enlargement of EU member states. This sounds contra dictionary to what would be assumed. Obviously there has been a great debate around the European enlargement policy, and it has also been a great victim of scepticism; however, it is unclear why this scepticism would be less supported by traditional media than by mixed media and new media. While no literature talks about this specific relationship, there could be two possible explanations for the phenomenon. Firstly, it could be an age difference. Considering the fact that younger age cohorts are still the main users of new media, it might be true that the progressive preference for adding new members to the European Union, as long as these comply with the set out requirements. This might be because younger cohorts might have no prior negative connotation with the addition of new member states, while the older cohorts might. This coincides with the newest potential members of the EU being Albania and North-Macedonia being reasonable additions to the European Union. Another possibility is that there is a significant difference in framing that, unlike most scientific research up until now, has found a positive bias towards European policy to increase its member states (Conti & Memoli, 2016; Michailidou, 2015; 2016).

Beyond this result it seems that there is also a significant correlation between the new media diet and migration policy within the EU. However, it should be noted it is a quite weak significance, only falling within the 0.1 threshold. New media diets seem to be slightly more sceptical of migration policy than mixed media diets. Policy surrounding a single currency market is not impacted by media diet. However, hypothesis 1a can be accepted on the grounds of trust and some policy fields, excluding the euro and EU enlargement policy.

The differences between the results of 2018 and those between 2011 and 2014 with Conti and Memoli (2016) could be explained with the events that followed after the data was collected. In 2014 the scale of the EU migration crisis just started to ramp up and the Brexit vote was far from a reality. These big changes could certainly have impacted these results as people started to become more politically aware of the European Union and its effect on daily life (Clarke et al., 2017; Dodds, 2016; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018). The ‘permissive consensus’, which Hobolt and Wratil (2015) described as ‘lost’ during the euro crisis, seems to have been spreading towards other policy fields and forms of trust. While policy in the

single currency department might not have changed significantly since this event took place, it is clear that the public is certainly opinionated in other policy fields and overall trust of the European Union.

Table 4. How Media Diet Influences European Trust and Policy in 2018*

	Dependent variable:				
	EC Trust	EP Trust	Policy EURO	Policy EU Large	Policy EU Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mixed Media Diet (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	-0.330**** (0.083)	-0.254*** (0.083)	0.056 (0.083)	0.332**** (0.084)	-0.177* (0.091)
Traditional Media Diet	0.122*** (0.038)	0.199**** (0.038)	0.047 (0.038)	-0.168**** (0.036)	0.035 (0.042)
Constant	-1.173**** (0.233)	-0.750*** (0.229)	-1.382**** (0.229)	-0.577** (0.253)	0.178 (0.264)
Observations	17,097	17,720	18,478	17,765	15,875
Log Likelihood	-10,595.450	-10,696.620	-11,108.450	-11,648.880	-9,066.701
Akaike Inf. Crit.	21,246.900	21,449.240	22,272.910	23,353.760	18,189.400

Note: Logistic regression models realized from Eurobarometer 90 data and created with stargazer (GESIS, 2018; Hlavac, 2018)

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<0.001

** This version does include control variables within the results, to see the full version with control variable, it is available in the appendix under Table4*

To look further into this seeming irregularity, a new five regression model was made under table 5 which looks at the results from 2014 and shows the interaction with 2018 regarding how much the opinion on the European Union has developed over those four years. A brief view of the data shows that it had indeed changed the overall sentiment to a negative trend in those four years. Three out of the five models showed a very significant link ($p<0.01$) towards Euroscepticism, and one model showed a weaker significant link ($p<0.1$) towards this same Euroscepticism. This strengthens the view that the past events had a severe impact on trust in the European Union and that these events changed results towards a more negative view of the European Union, its institutions, and its policy. Only the European Parliament was not significantly affected in comparison. While traditional media had no significant difference between mixed diets in 2014, it was significant positively impacted in

2018 compared to 2014 in some models. New media diet was significant negatively correlated in 2014, but did not change to be significantly more sceptical in comparison to results from 2018. Most of the literature points to this direction as well regarding the choice of media diet. In this case, new media is often seen as a form of negative focus on European Integration (Avery, 2009; Azrout et al., 2012; Conti & Memoli, 2016; De Vreese, 2007; De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Michalidou, 2015; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014). Looking at the media diet, it is clear that both of the focussed diet forms change the opinion significantly in comparison to a mixed media diet (table 4). The results show that both traditional as well as new media have contradictionary opinions on the European Union in 2018. As media diet is dependent on its set frames of reported events and European political news to influence their media consumers, it could indicate that both media are framing differently (Conti & Memoli, 2016; De Vreese, 2007; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Michailidou, 2015; 2016; Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014). Current scholars, however, are of the opinion that direct framing itself does not happen on this new medium, but rather that the polarizations of certain frames cause for more polarized opinions (Conti & Memoli, 2016; Michailidou, 2015). Nevertheless, results from table 5 would indicate that while new media diet did not significantly change for any of the models in comparison to 2014, the traditional media did have weak to moderately significant links with a more positive bias towards the European Union. This was mainly the case regarding both the European Commission (weak) as well as the European Parliament (moderate) and the European Migration policy (weak). Thus, the data from table 4 and table 5 would suggest that in 2018 traditional media moved further away from new media in its frame. Regarding this assumption there would be two potential explanations.

One of these explanations would be that the frame polarization, as Michailidou (2015), Conti and Memoli (2016) and other scholars already concluded in their respective research papers, had further increased and further polarized as it was finally used as an effective asset in politics (Clarke et al., 2017; Dodds, 2016; Tajudeen et al., 2016). Current literature would suggest this to be the most likely conclusion for the results found in table 4 and 5. However, another possible explanation could be that new media is now capable of not only creating a polarization of a particular frame like past scholars have suggested, but also create its own frame entirely. This theory gets its strength from other academics in the field of media. Moreover, the willingness of access to new media from people politically interested could have brought new media to the mainstream (Bennett, Flickinger & Rhine, 2000; Prior, 2007; Russo & Stattin, 2016).

Table 5. How Media Diet Influences European Trust and Policy in 2014 and comparison with 2018 through interaction.*

	Dependent variable:				
	EC Trust	EP Trust	Policy EURO	Policy EU Large	Policy EU Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mixed Media Diet (Baseline)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	-0.366**** (0.098)	-0.230** (0.095)	-0.059 (0.092)	0.160* (0.094)	-0.151 (0.119)
Traditional Media Diet	0.018 (0.038)	0.070* (0.038)	0.050 (0.037)	-0.116*** (0.036)	-0.085* (0.047)
Id2: Eurobarometer 90.3 (2018)	-0.830*** (0.318)	-0.473 (0.311)	-1.470**** (0.305)	-1.109**** (0.327)	-0.611* (0.358)
Mixed Media Diet* 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	0.035 (0.129)	-0.023 (0.126)	0.115 (0.124)	0.172 (0.126)	-0.026 (0.150)
Traditional Media Diet	0.104* (0.054)	0.129** (0.054)	-0.003 (0.053)	-0.052 (0.051)	0.120* (0.063)
Constant	-0.343 (0.217)	-0.277 (0.210)	0.088 (0.201)	0.532** (0.208)	0.790*** (0.242)
Observations	35,590	36,986	39,106	37,604	33,429
Log Likelihood	-22,095.430	-22,664.470	-23,845.140	-24,607.270	-17,929.450
Akaike Inf. Crit.	44,302.860	45,440.930	47,802.290	49,326.530	35,970.900

Note: Logistic regression models realized from Eurobarometer 82 and 90 data and created with stargazer (GESIS, 2014; 2018; Hlavac, 2018)

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<0.001

** This version does include control variables within the results, to see the full version with control variable, it is available in the appendix under Table5*

Scholars in this research field signify in their research that this move towards a common use of media and its success are dependent on its availability and how approachable the medium is (Bennett et al., 2000; Prior, 2007; Russo & Stattin, 2016). With the increased use of internet and social media (table 1), this can reasonably be accepted to be the case. Furthermore, as Tajudeen et al. (2016) conclude, organizations that used social media had greater accessibility to information than those that did not and could therefore utilize into this information faster and better. While this study focuses on the organizational side, it shows

that new media like social media is well capable of accessing important groups and can influence these groups. The ease of access for both consumers and producers to information makes new media powerful as a tool to influence political opinion in comparison to other forms of media. The more it will start to cater for older target audiences, the bigger its influence will be. Beyond this, many scholars have provided evidence in the past that this new media influence could occur (Conti & Memoli, 2016; Weeks & Holbert, 2013) and that it might have already had an influence on the Brexit vote (Clarke et al., 2017; Dodds, 2016; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018). This all could indicate that the original novelty of this new media has started to wear off as it becomes a more mainstream source of information for (European political) news, which enables it to set its own frames. As a consequence, it has become a real player in the European political opinion, or as the results would suggest, a potential real threat towards European Integration as Conti and Memoli (2016, p.93) predicted.

Thus, overall we can conclude that these results indicate that the more new media is used to inform on EU politics, the more it is able to influence the feelings of people towards a more sceptic view of the European Union regarding trust in its institutions and policy. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis for hypothesis 1a will be accepted for European trust and migration policy. However, hypothesis 1b null hypothesis will stand. Hypothesis 1b's alternative would've suggested a negative correlation between Euroscepticism and a new media diet in 2014 in comparison to 2018. While the two surveys did show a negative trend in trust and policy in the European Union, this trend was not intensified by new media over those four years. Traditional media seemed to have moved more positively towards some of the trust and policy variables, but is outside of the range of the hypotheses.

The Impact of Different Age Cohorts and Media Diet on the Public Opinion of the European Union

For the second set of hypotheses the models will be constructed towards the different age brackets within the new media users and the effect they have on Euroscepticism. Hypothesis 2a states that primarily older people that use internet as their source of EU political information are prone to become more eurosceptical than younger people. By re-doing the models but this time including four different age cohorts. With these models the differences between the scepticism of new media users and their age are measured. The measurement level in the regression is based on the younger age group (15-24). As explained in the data and methods chapter, these decisions are made because of Conti and Memoli's

(2016) conclusions which indicate that primarily younger people use the media and risk becoming more eurosceptical.

Table 6. How Media Diet Influences European Trust and Policy in 2018 with Age Interaction*

	Dependent variable:				
	EC Trust	EP Trust	Policy EURO	Policy EU Large	Policy EU Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mixed Media Diet (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	-0.382** (0.171)	-0.495*** (0.168)	-0.168 (0.167)	0.130 (0.171)	-0.635**** (0.185)
Traditional Media Diet	-0.219 (0.137)	0.011 (0.141)	-0.139 (0.137)	-0.299** (0.133)	-0.264 (0.176)
Mixed Media diet * Age cohort 15-24	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Users * 25-39	0.032 (0.215)	0.243 (0.212)	0.326 (0.211)	0.197 (0.216)	0.646*** (0.236)
Traditional Media Diet * 25-39	0.256 (0.156)	0.083 (0.160)	0.142 (0.155)	0.022 (0.151)	0.264 (0.195)
New Media Diet * 40-54	0.198 (0.241)	0.419* (0.240)	0.276 (0.241)	0.365 (0.241)	0.548** (0.261)
Traditional Media Diet * 40-54	0.456*** (0.152)	0.231 (0.156)	0.246 (0.152)	0.306** (0.147)	0.283 (0.190)
New Media Diet *55+	-0.319 (0.310)	0.207 (0.302)	0.100 (0.308)	0.220 (0.320)	0.408 (0.331)
Traditional Media Diet *55+	0.360** (0.151)	0.265* (0.155)	0.203 (0.151)	0.076 (0.146)	0.386** (0.189)
Constant	-1.067**** (0.238)	-0.668*** (0.235)	-1.298**** (0.234)	-0.506** (0.257)	0.338 0.272)
Observations	17,097	17,720	18,478	17,765	15,875
Log Likelihood	-10,588.820	-10,692.660	-11,105.780	-11,642.330	-9,060.949
Akaike Inf. Crit.	21,245.640	21,453.320	22,279.560	23,352.670	18,189.900

Note: Logistic regression models realized from Eurobarometer 90 data and created with stargazer (GESIS, 2018; Hlavac, 2018)

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<0.001

** This version does include control variables within the results, to see the full version with control variable, it is available in the appendix under Table6*

This is partially based on the fact that the usage of said medium is biased towards this Euroscepticism. While the same is true for the year 2018, the usage nominally seemed to have doubled while the total observations were less, indicating a stark increase in this new media gaining momentum for these purposes. This accounts not only for the younger age cohort, but for the older age cohorts as well.

However, the regression results displayed in table 6 show that the assumption made in the hypothesis 2a that older generations are more negatively biased does not become evident in any of the models for new media. The opposite however, was found in only one model (migration policy). While older new media users were significantly more positive than the younger audience, the other age cohorts showed similar results. With these results the only logical conclusion would be to not reject the 2a null hypothesis on new media, age and Euroscepticism. Thus, it seems that the influence of new media is mainly equal across all generations. Though, regarding the increase in use of this new media and the increased popularity, the claim that new media could influence our perception of the European Union is still a very valid concern. While Conti and Memoli (2016) primarily specified the younger age cohorts to be more problematic, it seems that the further widespread adoption could endanger the European integration faster than previously expected. The results (table 5) show similar results in that regard as scepticism had not significantly changed compared to 2014, while traditional media clearly did significantly move towards a more positive bias. This would indicate that the polarization between the media forms continues. It seems that the ability to filter out messages from their respective news sources, which comes with experience, has not really been established according to the results found on age in table 6 (Azrout et al., 2012; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1965). In hypothesis 2a it is stated that older generations, who are not yet as experienced in the use of new media, should be more sceptical. However, the results showed no sign of this being the case. However, to be able to conclude if they did become more sceptical, the year 2014 will be compared with 2018. When looking at table 7, which does compare these years, it is visible that the migration policy model also shows a positive correlation trend between the interaction with age, media diet and Euroscepticism between the years 2014 and 2018. That could indicate that across those age groups a more positive change was noted, which could explain the maturity of the medium as people start to get better at filtering media news. In general, the older people become, the more capable people will become in filtering false and misleading news (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1965).

Table 7. How Media Diet Influences European Trust and Policy in 2014 in comparison with 2018 with added Age Interaction*

	Dependent variable:				
	EC Trust	EP Trust	Policy EURO	Policy EU Large	Policy EU Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mixed Media Diet (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	-0.418** (0.185)	-0.283 (0.176)	-0.136 (0.166)	0.110 (0.178)	-0.056 (0.225)
Traditional Media Diet	-0.293** (0.115)	-0.115 (0.112)	-0.049 (0.105)	-0.367**** (0.108)	-0.297** (0.148)
Id2: Eurobarometer 90.3 (2018)	-0.843*** (0.325)	-0.465 (0.318)	-1.431**** (0.312)	-1.142**** (0.335)	-0.526 (0.370)
Mixed Media Diet * Age cohort 15-24 (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet * 25-39	-0.046 (0.239)	-0.020 (0.231)	0.209 (0.221)	-0.139 (0.230)	-0.005 (0.289)
Traditional Media Diet* 25-39	0.248* (0.134)	0.062 (0.131)	0.157 (0.124)	0.170 (0.126)	0.283* (0.169)
New Media Diet * 40-55	0.159 (0.281)	0.173 (0.273)	-0.095 (0.260)	0.073 (0.269)	-0.225 (0.342)
Traditional Media Diet* 40-55	0.403*** (0.133)	0.318** (0.130)	0.126 (0.124)	0.271** (0.125)	0.231 (0.169)
New Media Diet * 55+	0.070 (0.386)	-0.021 (0.382)	0.156 (0.379)	0.757** (0.385)	-0.813* (0.483)
Traditional Media Diet* 55+	0.400*** (0.137)	0.240* (0.135)	0.038 (0.128)	0.441**** (0.129)	0.160 (0.174)
Mixed Media Diet* 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	0.036 (0.252)	-0.211 (0.244)	-0.033 (0.235)	0.020 (0.247)	-0.579** (0.291)
Traditional Media Diet	0.074 (0.178)	0.126 (0.180)	-0.090 (0.173)	0.068 (0.172)	0.033 (0.230)
Media diet * Age cohort 15-24 * 2018 (difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet * 25-39 * 2018	0.077 (0.322)	0.263 (0.313)	0.117 (0.306)	0.336 (0.315)	0.651* (0.373)
Traditional Media Diet* 25-39 * 2018	0.008 (0.206)	0.022 (0.207)	-0.016 (0.199)	-0.147 (0.197)	-0.018 (0.259)

New Media Diet * 40-55 * 2018	0.039 (0.370)	0.245 (0.363)	0.371 (0.355)	0.292 (0.361)	0.773* (0.430)
Traditional Media Diet* 40-55 * 2018	0.053 (0.202)	-0.088 (0.203)	0.120 (0.196)	0.035 (0.193)	0.052 (0.254)
New Media Diet * 55+ * 2018	-0.389 (0.495)	0.229 (0.487)	-0.056 (0.489)	-0.537 (0.489)	1.221** (0.585)
Traditional Media Diet* 55+ * 2018	-0.040 (0.204)	0.026 (0.205)	0.164 (0.198)	-0.364* (0.195)	0.226 (0.257)
Constant	-0.225 (0.222)	-0.203 (0.222)	0.133 (0.205)	0.636*** (0.214)	0.864**** (0.251)
Observations	35,590	36,986	39,106	37,604	33,429
Log Likelihood	-22,082.840	-22,655.030	-23,840.370	-24,591.590	-17,920.400
Akaike Inf. Crit.	44,301.680	45,446.060	47,816.740	49,319.190	35,976.800

Note: Logistic regression models realized from Eurobarometer 82 and 90 data and created with stargazer (GESIS, 2014; 2018; Hlavac, 2018)

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<0.001

** This version does include control variables within the results, to see the full version with control variable, it is available in the appendix under Table 7*

If all age groups have a positive correlation it would indicate that eurosceptical news is easier to filter when it's about migration policy. It should also be noted that the age cohort 55+ was, in comparison with the younger cohorts, more sceptical in this department at the start of the migration crisis in 2014. It could be that, on the topic of migration policy, new media has matured faster in this specific issue than the other factors that were tested. This was exclusive to this model as other trust and policy indicators noted no difference between 2014 and 2018. Hypothesis 2b expected an intermediary stage in which the younger audience would be more experienced than the older audience. On the topic of migration policy the new media has matured to a stage beyond this. A move to this intermediary stage was seen in the data from 2014 where the interaction results between new media and age in 2014 showed a, albeit with a weak significance, negative correlation between 55+ age cohort new media users and Euroscepticism. Then in 2018, it showed a more positive correlation within that same interaction, indicating this trend change (see table 7). This would indicate more of a status quo expectation of a mature medium in 2018 (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1965). This would indicate a matured medium, but was exclusively found for migration policy and thus not applicable to generalize to new media as a whole.

However, the fact that new media is in this matured stage was not showing in the other models might also indicate that filtering for all the respondents that primarily use new media is still hard to achieve. Especially when considering the rampant amount of false and misleading news on this medium, falling back on what Pierri et al. (2020) observed in their twitter data study during the European elections. As political organizations are capable of using social media and create a direct relationship with their constituents, they could use this relationship to spread strategic news media among this group, which might not always portray an unbiased situation (Clarke et al., 2017; De Vreese, 2007; Dodds, 2016). Beyond that, people that associate themselves within this community might share information between each other that primarily confirms their belief (Towner & Muñoz, 2016; Weeks & Holbert, 2013; Winter et al., 2016). Thus, the noise of false or misleading news might cause the differences in scepticism between age cohorts in new media to be hard to distinguish outright. Thus, for hypothesis 2a the null hypothesis is not rejected because older age cohorts didn't show any significant results in table 6 that would indicate that their scepticism is significantly higher than younger cohorts. For hypothesis 2b only one model seemed to bring results, namely the policy on migration as a less sceptical stance was indeed found. However, this was true for both younger as well as older age cohorts. With that in mind, it seems that for hypothesis 2b the null hypothesis will remain standing as well. While the current results did not prove the alternative hypothesis 2b, the migration policy results indicate that a maturity beyond initially theorized could have taken place. The results from table 7 indicated that data from 2014 already showed older age cohorts to be correlated with negative opinions towards migration policy and later a positive trend was found between the results from 2014 and 2018).

VI. Conclusions and Discussion

While academics up until recently have looked at the upcoming of the internet, social media, and the new media phenomenon, many focussed on the overall effects of the medium or focussed mostly on the effects on the younger age cohort. Furthermore, a lot of the research done on the overall effects of new media has become, considering the events in the European Union and the constant change in Euroscepticism, potentially dated. This thesis tried, based on theories of interaction and reciprocation of information on media, to find a significant correlation between different forms of media diet and a significant correlation to older age cohorts that use this new media and their levels of Euroscepticism. It tried to do this with the standard Eurobarometer survey years 2014 and 2018, with a primary focus on 2018.

For hypotheses 1a and 1b, regarding if new media made people more sceptical, it was concluded that for hypothesis 1a there is indeed a significant difference in scepticism when it comes to different media consumption as there was a consistent opposite bias between traditional media users and new media users with mixed media users as a baseline when it comes to trust in European institutions and European migration policy. However, hypothesis 1a can be accepted on the grounds of trust and some policy fields, excluding the euro and EU enlargement policy. For hypothesis 1b, regarding the difference between 2014 and 2018, there was no significant correlation that would suggest a difference in Euroscepticism between new media users in 2014 and 2018. While not in the scope of this paper, it appears that traditional media users in 2018 were more positive towards European integration in comparison to 2014. While four out of the five models from table 4 indicated that new media users were more sceptical of the European policy and its institutions. For future enlargement policy, new media users were positively biased, whereas for traditional media users this was primarily a negative bias.

Many scholars agree with the source of Euroscepticism, but there is little to nothing known as to why new media might be more in favour of European integration in this aspect. A speculative explanation for this result is that a big portion of new media users belong to the younger cohorts and have no previous negative experience of the enlargement of the European Union. Therefore, these younger users might be more acceptant towards the ascension of nations to EU member states, as long as these nations adhere to the European standard. For the same reason, they might not support the current opposition found against the membership of Albania and North-Macedonia.

While this could be the case, there were no results that would indicate a significant difference in the age of new media users and their Euroscepticism. Therefore, this thesis suggests that a more plausible explanation for these results would be that political influencers that support the membership of these nations have strategically influenced the public opinion to a more positive view. This theory would be supported by Tajudeen et al. (2016) as they talk about a more direct relationship between organizations and their consumers through social media and being able to access these people faster and more efficiently. Moreover, they showed that strategically employed media could significantly influence public opinion, but that there was primarily a negative correlation (De Vreese, 2007; Clarke et al., 2017; Dodds, 2016). While four out of five models would indicate this negative opinion to exist within this medium, it could also work the other way. While it was stated that political strategic influence leads to mostly negative connotations in traditional media, new media has different properties than the media sources that went before it. Its availability and accessibility are unrivalled compared to its counterparts. With traditional media content it was just as easy to consume information, but it was harder to produce and to spread information (Napoli, 2019; Pierri et al., 2020). While new media content is easy to produce and to interact with, this comes with a double-edged sword. While political influence is thus more effective in social media, it makes it easier for strategically underlying agendas to hide under the anonymity of the internet. Either way, it is certainly necessary to conduct further research in not only the area of European enlargement policy and its support, but also in new media framing to make further conclusive statements. It would therefore be interesting for future academics to look further into this field in order to find more conclusive results as to why this specific difference in public opinion occurred, and to ascertain how new media is able to influence these outcomes, if at all.

If however, this plausible explanation of political influence is true, it could add onto the findings of this paper that suggest that new media is capable of creating its own frames. Regarding media framing, many academics in the field have concluded that new media was not capable of creating its own frames, but rather polarizes these frames (Conti & Memoli, 2016; Michailidou, 2015). Results in this thesis however indicate that the difference between new media and traditional media has significantly increased. This was primarily the case with traditional media users as they moved more towards a more positive view of European Integration. This significant move could thus be explained by new media not only being able to polarize set frames by traditional media, but also by being able to set their own frames. Another explanation for this behaviour could be a further polarization of said media frames as

a reaction from the Eurosceptic sentiment within the union.

While this thesis attempted to prove a significant correlation between Euroscepticism and age it did not find any reasonable results to believe there to be a significant correlation, therefore the null hypothesis for 2a will stand. However, it did find reason to believe that new media adaptation is increasing at a rate whereby this situation could be possible in the future. This move was not only indicated through demographic build-up, but also through the regression results as they were only able to find expected results for a mature medium surrounding migration policy. Whereas migration policy showed results in which older generations were more sceptical back in 2014, while becoming less sceptical later on. While the expected results would be an intermediary stage in which the younger audience would be more experienced than the older audience. On the topic of migration policy the new media had matured past this stage. Rather, it showed this intermediary stage in 2014, as data indicated older cohorts that use new media, albeit with a weak significance, negatively correlated to be more sceptical of European migration policy. Then in 2018, a positive correlation was found, indicating a trend change. This would indicate a mature media stage with a status quo that when younger people are less experienced and thus more sceptical (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1965). Other models indicated no significant correlation in differences between younger and older generations. It would be expected to find a more positive correlation as people tend to get more experienced in filtering news (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1965). However, what was expected in hypothesis 2b wasn't found either, with the exception of migration policy which seemed to be in a further state that expected. For that reason hypothesis 2b's null hypothesis remains standing. Thus, this would indicate that while new media might now still be relatively 'new' in a main information diet, it might not stay that way for very long when it comes to European integration. Another cause for the lack of effect of the other four variables is the fact that new media suffers from false and misleading news and certain forms of potential confirmation bias (Winter et al., 2016; Napoli, 2019; Pierri et al., 2020). This could create noise that is hard to control in the used models within this thesis. Regardless, it is clear that the general trend leans towards a primarily new media diet since 2014 (Conti & Memoli, 2016).

As new media becomes more mainstream, the use of this 'new' media, and the increasing maturity of this new media could certainly affect European integration in the future. While currently new media might be primarily more sceptical of the European Union, this can change in the future as experience in filtering false and misleading news becomes easier. The more people are used to using a certain media form, the more they grow

accustomed to dealing with its flaws (Azrout et al., 2012; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1965). As De Vreese (2007, p.280) mentions as an important nuance to his conclusion: once strategic political agendas disappear, the media can help overcome and combat these issues of Euroscepticism. Thus, there is a hope that once new media really reaches this mainstream use as a news medium, and if there is reasonable way to distinguish misleading news and avoid over politicization with hidden agendas, it could not only benefit the overall political engagement because of its accessibility, but also lead to a more supportive European population towards European Integration.

Nevertheless, with the essence of quantitative research come certain limitations as well. The author understands that results from cross-sectional survey data do not always portray the complete reality. First off all, it should be understood that while the models are constructed to try to control the environment as much as possible, there is still some uncontrollable variance that couldn't be modelled within these models. Partially because of the high amount of observations from non-panel survey data, the overall fit of the models left things to be desired. However, the residual deviance of the models has shown to decrease the null deviance significantly, indicating that the model helps with taking external effects into account. Therefore this should not be seen as too much of an issue. Some of the conclusions made in this thesis will also be based on 2018 only, and therefore might be of limited value. However, the comparison between the year 2014 and 2018 does further improve the reliability of the results. Furthermore, since this cross-sectional data is based on fixed answers, it has led to missing values that could not properly be taken into account. While the amount of observations would never drop below 15,000, which is representative for the population, it should be noted that a portion of the tested population was left out of this research because of these missing values. Again, this wasn't seen as being too problematic considering the considerable amount of observations that remained. As with every big survey, the limit of fixed answers can lead to generalizations in answers which should be taken into account when assessing the conclusions made in this thesis. However, when taking these limitations into account the results do not limit the conclusions made within this thesis.

While this thesis did only succeed in proving one of the four hypotheses, its findings were still important to the literature because it was able to confirm a correlation between a new media diet and Euroscepticism. It also was able to show an increasing trend in new media usage as the main source of information, building on the idea that new media might overtake traditional media as the main source of information. Moreover, it offered a foundation for future research regarding the maturity of new media, but it also created

opportunities for delving further into the positive effect surrounding the enlargement policy within the European Union.

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IX. Appendix

Table 4. How Media Diet Influences European Trust and Policy in 2018

	Dependent variable:				
	EC Trust	EP Trust	Policy EURO	Policy EU Large	Policy EU Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mixed Media Diet (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	-0.330****	-0.254***	0.056	0.332****	-0.177*
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.091)
Traditional Media Diet	0.122***	0.199****	0.047	-0.168****	0.035
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.042)
15-24 (Baseline)	--	--	--	--	--
25-39	0.069	-0.050	0.141*	-0.089	-0.068
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.103)
40-55	0.018	-0.074	0.261***	-0.217**	0.007
	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.104)
55+	0.008	-0.146*	0.266***	-0.503****	0.099
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.104)
No Education (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Education (up to 15 years)	0.547***	0.262	1.488****	1.167****	0.403*
	(0.208)	(0.205)	(0.208)	(0.233)	(0.239)
Mid Education (16-19 years)	0.669***	0.368*	1.443****	1.121****	0.274
	(0.204)	(0.202)	(0.204)	(0.230)	(0.235)
High Education (20+ years)	0.936****	0.666***	1.421****	1.117****	0.619***
	(0.205)	(0.203)	(0.205)	(0.231)	(0.236)
Still Studying	1.166****	0.893****	2.064****	1.543****	0.819***
	(0.227)	(0.224)	(0.226)	(0.249)	(0.262)
Neutral EU Economic situation (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Very Good EU Economic situation	0.590****	0.736****	0.548****	0.494****	0.349****
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.099)
Rather Good EU Economic situation	0.495****	0.525****	0.633****	0.225****	0.354****

	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.066)
Rather Bad EU Economic situation	-0.467****	-0.419****	0.098	-0.477****	-0.008
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.070)
Very Bad EU Economic situation	-1.416****	-1.398****	-0.631****	-1.025****	-0.730****
	(0.115)	(0.110)	(0.097)	(0.104)	(0.107)
Political Centre (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Political Very Left	0.049	0.005	-0.335****	0.180****	0.128*
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.067)
Political Left	0.208****	0.189****	-0.031	0.037	0.322****
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.051)
Political Right	0.029	0.003	-0.333****	-0.207****	-0.383****
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.048)
Political Very Right	-0.213****	-0.263****	-0.568****	0.049	-0.599****
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.067)
Men (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Women	0.139****	0.110****	-0.048	0.032	-0.066*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.037)
No Political Interest (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Political Interest	0.268****	0.259****	0.057	-0.138**	-0.019
	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.072)
Medium Political Interest	0.291****	0.295****	0.066	-0.062	0.033
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.062)
Hard Political Interest	0.448****	0.449****	0.141**	0.007	0.156**
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.071)
No Difficulties Paying Bills (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Difficulties Paying Bills Most of the time	-0.343****	-0.206****	-0.128**	0.270****	-0.020
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.072)
Difficulties Paying Bills From Time to time	-0.083**	-0.007	0.015	0.346****	-0.090**
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.044)
The Working Class of Society (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
The Lower Middle Class of Society	0.076	0.177****	0.026	-0.141***	-0.060
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.057)

The Middle Class of Society	0.310**** (0.044)	0.371**** (0.043)	0.291**** (0.043)	-0.127*** (0.042)	0.222**** (0.047)
The Upper Middle Class of Society	0.758**** (0.074)	0.830**** (0.076)	0.421**** (0.071)	-0.313**** (0.067)	0.508**** (0.082)
The High Class of Society	0.877**** (0.224)	0.700*** (0.219)	0.213 (0.199)	-0.009 (0.190)	0.282 (0.232)
Constant	-1.173**** (0.233)	-0.750*** (0.229)	-1.382**** (0.229)	-0.577** (0.253)	0.178 (0.264)
Observations	17,097	17,720	18,478	17,765	15,875
Log Likelihood	-10,595.450	-10,696.620	-11,108.450	-11,648.880	-9,066.701
Akaike Inf. Crit.	21,246.900	21,449.240	22,272.910	23,353.760	18,189.400

Note: Logistic regression models realized from Eurobarometer 90 data and created with stargazer (GESIS, 2018; Hlavac, 2018)

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<0.001

Table 5. How Media Diet Influences European Trust and Policy in 2014 and comparison with 2018 through interaction.

	Dependent variable:				
	EC Trust	EP Trust	Policy EURO	Policy EU Large	Policy EU Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mixed Media Diet (Baseline)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	-0.366****	-0.230**	-0.059	0.160*	-0.151
	(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.119)
Traditional Media Diet	0.018	0.070*	0.050	-0.116***	-0.085*
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.047)
15-24 (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
25-39	0.048	-0.053	0.149*	-0.231***	-0.015
	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.102)
40-54	0.130	-0.065	0.213***	-0.424****	0.143
	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.103)
55+	0.079	-0.001	0.204***	-0.569****	0.152
	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.103)
No Education (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Education (up to 15 years)	-0.113	-0.237	0.255	0.212	0.562***
	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.179)	(0.186)	(0.210)
Mid Education (16-19 years)	0.053	-0.044	0.255	0.294	0.524**
	(0.188)	(0.183)	(0.176)	(0.183)	(0.206)
High Education (20+ years)	0.399**	0.334*	0.298*	0.361**	0.849****
	(0.189)	(0.184)	(0.177)	(0.183)	(0.207)
Still Studying	0.362*	0.322	0.374*	0.321	0.655***
	(0.208)	(0.202)	(0.194)	(0.200)	(0.233)
Neutral Economic Situation (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Very Good EU Economic situation	0.955****	1.093****	0.388****	0.794****	-0.133
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.135)
Rather Good EU Economic situation	0.685****	0.707****	0.399****	0.253****	0.188**
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.081)

Rather Bad EU Economic situation	-0.288****	-0.244****	-0.113*	-0.518****	-0.178**
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.078)
Very Bad EU Economic situation	-1.075****	-1.064****	-0.534****	-0.982****	-0.691****
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.090)
Political Centre (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Political Very Left	-0.159***	-0.080	-0.294****	0.378****	-0.049
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.065)
Political Left	0.046	0.058	-0.073*	0.157****	0.128**
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.053)
Political Right	0.273****	0.215****	-0.120***	-0.039	-0.156***
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.051)
Political Very Right	0.157***	0.083	-0.223****	0.303****	-0.288****
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.067)
Men (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Women	0.134****	0.102***	-0.099***	-0.006	-0.109***
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.038)
No Political Interest (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Political Interest	0.098	0.168***	-0.053	-0.232****	0.027
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.072)
Medium Political Interest	0.240****	0.280****	0.084	-0.191****	0.079
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.064)
Hard Political Interest	0.156**	0.208****	0.034	-0.309****	0.044
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.072)
No Difficulties Paying Bills	--	--	--	--	--
Difficulties Paying Bills Most of the time	-0.569****	-0.434****	-0.258****	0.185****	-0.177***
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.065)
Difficulties Paying Bills From Time to time	-0.331****	-0.198****	0.020	0.123****	-0.070
	0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.045)
The Working Class of Society (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
The Lower Middle Class of Society	-0.039	0.093*	0.061	-0.096**	-0.088
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.057)
The Middle Class of Society	0.234****	0.279****	0.329****	0.029	0.030
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.048)

The Upper Middle Class of Society	0.457****	0.470****	0.488****	-0.083	0.184**
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.085)
The High Class of Society	0.580***	0.450**	0.278*	0.137	-0.027
	(0.182)	(0.178)	(0.168)	(0.162)	(0.214)
Id2: Eurobarometer 90.3 (2018)	-0.830***	-0.473	-1.470****	-1.109****	-0.611*
	(0.318)	(0.311)	(0.305)	(0.327)	(0.358)
Mixed Media Diet* 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	0.035	-0.023	0.115	0.172	-0.026
	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.150)
Traditional Media Diet	0.104*	0.129**	-0.003	-0.052	0.120*
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.063)
Age cohort 15-29 * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
25-39	0.021	0.003	-0.008	0.142	-0.053
	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.145)
40-55	-0.111	-0.009	0.048	0.208*	-0.136
	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.147)
55+	-0.071	-0.144	0.061	0.066	-0.052
	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.147)
No Education * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Education (up to 15 years)	0.660**	0.500*	1.234****	0.955***	-0.158
	(0.283)	(0.277)	(0.274)	(0.298)	(0.318)
Mid Education (16-19 years)	0.617**	0.412	1.188****	0.827***	-0.250
	(0.278)	(0.272)	(0.269)	(0.294)	(0.312)
High Education (20+ years)	0.537*	0.332	1.122****	0.756**	-0.230
	(0.279)	(0.274)	(0.270)	(0.295)	(0.314)
Still Studying	0.804***	0.571*	1.690****	1.222****	0.164
	(0.308)	(0.302)	(0.298)	(0.320)	(0.350)
Neutral Economic Situation * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Very Good EU Economic situation	-0.366***	-0.357**	0.160	-0.300**	0.482***
	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.167)

Rather Good EU Economic situation	-0.189**	-0.181**	0.233***	-0.027	0.166
	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.105)
Rather Bad EU Economic situation	-0.179*	-0.174*	0.211**	0.041	0.170
	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.105)
Very Bad EU Economic situation	-0.341**	-0.334**	-0.097	-0.043	-0.038
	(0.142)	(0.136)	(0.121)	(0.129)	(0.140)
Political Centre * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Political Very Left	0.208***	0.085	-0.041	-0.198***	0.176*
	(0.140)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.093)
Political Left	0.162***	0.132**	0.042	-0.120**	0.193***
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.074)
Political Right	-0.244****	-0.213****	-0.212****	-0.168***	-0.227***
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.071)
Political Very Right	-0.370****	-0.346****	-0.345****	-0.254***	-0.312****
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.094)
Male * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Female	0.005	0.008	0.051	0.038	0.042
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.053)
No Political Interest * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Political Interest	0.170*	0.091	0.110	0.095	-0.046
	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.102)
Medium Political Interest	0.051	0.016	-0.018	0.128*	-0.047
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.089)
Hard Political Interest	0.291***	0.241***	0.107	0.315****	0.113
	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.102)
No Difficulties Paying Bills * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Difficulties Paying Bills Most of the time	0.226***	0.229***	0.129*	0.085	0.157
	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.097)
Difficulties Paying Bills From Time to time	0.248****	0.191****	-0.005	0.223****	-0.020
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.063)

The Working Class of Society * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
The Lower Middle Class of Society	0.115 (0.072)	0.084 (0.071)	-0.035 (0.069)	-0.045 (0.069)	0.027 (0.081)
The Middle Class of Society	0.076 (0.060)	0.092 (0.059)	-0.037 (0.058)	-0.156*** (0.057)	0.192*** (0.068)
The Upper Middle Class of Society	0.301*** (0.102)	0.360**** (0.102)	-0.067 (0.098)	-0.230** (0.093)	0.324*** (0.118)
The High Class of Society	0.297 (0.289)	0.250 (0.283)	-0.065 (0.260)	-0.146 (0.250)	0.310 (0.316)
Constant	-0.343 (0.217)	-0.277 (0.210)	0.088 (0.201)	0.532** (0.208)	0.790*** (0.242)
Observations	35,590	36,986	39,106	37,604	33,429
Log Likelihood	-22,095.430	-22,664.470	-23,845.140	-24,607.270	-17,929.450
Akaike Inf. Crit.	44,302.860	45,440.930	47,802.290	49,326.530	35,970.900

Note: Logistic regression models realized from Eurobarometer 83 and 90 data and created with stargazer GESIS, 2014; 2018; Hlavac, 2018)

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<0.001

Table 6. How Media Diet Influences European Trust and Policy in 2018 with Age Interaction

	Dependent variable:				
	EC Trust	EP Trust	Policy EURO	Policy EU Large	Policy EU Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mixed Media Diet (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	-0.382**	-0.495***	-0.168	0.130	-0.635****
	(0.171)	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.171)	(0.185)
Traditional Media Diet	-0.219	0.011	-0.139	-0.299**	-0.264
	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.133)	(0.176)
15-24 (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
25-39	-0.011	-0.100	0.062	-0.112	-0.235*
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.129)
40-54	-0.166	-0.194*	0.139	-0.388****	-0.151
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.131)
55+	-0.118	-0.296***	0.167	-0.526****	-0.132
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.134)
No Education (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Education (up to 15 years)	0.544***	0.258	1.485****	1.162****	0.396*
	(0.208)	(0.205)	(0.208)	(0.233)	(0.239)
Mid Education (16-19 years)	0.668***	0.367*	1.440****	1.114****	0.273
	(0.205)	(0.202)	(0.204)	(0.230)	(0.235)
High Education (20+ years)	0.936****	0.665***	1.418****	1.110****	0.616***
	(0.206)	(0.203)	(0.205)	(0.231)	(0.236)
Still Studying	1.150****	0.894****	2.061****	1.538****	0.826***
	(0.227)	(0.225)	(0.227)	(0.249)	(0.262)
Neutral Economic Situation (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Very Good EU Economic situation	0.596****	0.743****	0.551****	0.492****	0.354****
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.099)
Rather Good EU Economic situation	0.497****	0.527****	0.632****	0.223****	0.355****
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.066)

Rather Bad EU Economic situation	-0.465**** (0.070)	-0.416**** (0.068)	0.099 (0.063)	-0.479**** (0.066)	-0.007 (0.070)
Very Bad EU Economic situation	-1.415**** (0.115)	-1.399**** (0.110)	-0.631**** (0.097)	-1.029**** (0.104)	-0.731**** (0.107)
Political Centre (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Political Very Left	0.049 (0.057)	0.006 (0.057)	-0.335**** (0.055)	0.179*** (0.055)	0.128* (0.067)
Political Left	0.205**** (0.045)	0.188**** (0.045)	-0.031 (0.045)	0.037 (0.042)	0.322**** (0.051)
Political Right	0.028 (0.046)	0.003 (0.046)	-0.332**** (0.045)	-0.208**** (0.043)	-0.381**** (0.048)
Political Very Right	-0.214**** (0.061)	-0.263**** (0.061)	-0.568**** (0.059)	0.049 (0.059)	-0.598**** (0.067)
Men (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Female	0.142**** (0.033)	0.111*** (0.033)	-0.047 (0.033)	0.033 (0.032)	-0.067* (0.037)
No Political Interest (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Political Interest	0.269**** (0.069)	0.261**** (0.067)	0.058 (0.066)	-0.137** (0.065)	-0.018 (0.072)
Medium Political Interest	0.295**** (0.059)	0.298**** (0.058)	0.068 (0.056)	-0.059 (0.056)	0.033 (0.062)
Hard Political Interest	0.451**** (0.065)	0.452**** (0.065)	0.142** (0.063)	0.008 (0.062)	0.156** (0.072)
No Difficulties Paying Bills (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Difficulties Paying Bills Most of the time	-0.337**** (0.063)	-0.202*** (0.062)	-0.126** (0.061)	0.272**** (0.061)	-0.017 (0.072)
Difficulties Paying Bills From Time to time	-0.081** (0.039)	-0.005 (0.039)	0.017 (0.039)	0.348**** (0.037)	-0.086** (0.044)
The Working Class of Society (Baseline, 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
The Lower Middle Class of Society	0.080 (0.053)	0.180**** (0.052)	0.028 (0.051)	-0.140*** (0.051)	-0.057 (0.057)
The Middle Class of Society	0.314****	0.375****	0.295****	-0.125***	0.227****

	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.047)
The Upper Middle Class of Society	0.762**** (0.075)	0.833**** (0.076)	0.425**** (0.071)	-0.309**** (0.067)	0.513**** (0.082)
The High Class of Society	0.884**** (0.223)	0.704*** (0.219)	0.217 (0.199)	-0.002 (0.190)	0.288 (0.232)
Mixed Media Diet * Age cohort 15-24	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet * 25-39	0.032 (0.215)	0.243 (0.212)	0.326 (0.211)	0.197 (0.216)	0.646*** (0.236)
Traditional Media Diet * 25-39	0.256 (0.156)	0.083 (0.160)	0.142 (0.155)	0.022 (0.151)	0.264 (0.195)
New Media Diet * 40-54	0.198 (0.241)	0.419* (0.240)	0.276 (0.241)	0.365 (0.241)	0.548** (0.261)
Traditional Media Diet * 40-54	0.456*** (0.152)	0.231 (0.156)	0.246 (0.152)	0.306** (0.147)	0.283 (0.190)
New Media Diet*55+	-0.319 (0.310)	0.207 (0.302)	0.100 (0.308)	0.220 (0.320)	0.408 (0.331)
Traditional Media Diet *55+	0.360** (0.151)	0.265* (0.155)	0.203 (0.151)	0.076 (0.146)	0.386** (0.189)
Constant	-1.067**** (0.238)	-0.668*** (0.235)	-1.298**** (0.234)	-0.506** (0.257)	0.338 0.272)
Observations	17,097	17,720	18,478	17,765	15,875
Log Likelihood	-10,588.820	-10,692.660	-11,105.780	-11,642.330	-9,060.949
Akaike Inf. Crit.	21,245.640	21,453.320	22,279.560	23,352.670	18,189.900

Note: Logistic regression models realized from Eurobarometer 90 data and created with stargazer (GESIS, 2018; Hlavac, 2018)

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<0.001

Table 7. How Media Diet Influences European Trust and Policy in 2014 in comparison with 2018 with added Age Interaction

	Dependent variable:				
	EC Trust	EP Trust	Policy EURO	Policy EU Large	Policy EU Migration
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mixed Media Diet (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	-0.418**	-0.283	-0.136	0.110	-0.056
	(0.185)	(0.176)	(0.166)	(0.178)	(0.225)
Traditional Media Diet	-0.293**	-0.115	-0.049	-0.367****	-0.297**
	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.148)
15-24 (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
25-39	-0.042	-0.069	0.069	-0.288***	-0.123
	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.128)
40-54	-0.059	-0.235**	0.154	-0.544****	0.061
	(0.109)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.134)
55+	-0.123	-0.127	0.213*	-0.843****	0.129
	0.119)	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.146)
No Education (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Education (up to 15 years)	-0.116	-0.240	0.255	0.205	0.559***
	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.179)	(0.186)	(0.211)
Mid Education (16-19 years)	0.054	-0.044	0.253	0.294	0.519**
	(0.189)	(0.183)	(0.176)	(0.183)	(0.206)
High Education (20+ years)	0.403**	0.336*	0.296*	0.364**	0.845****
	(0.189)	(0.184)	(0.177)	(0.183)	(0.208)
Still Studying	0.362*	0.316	0.371*	0.315	0.632***
	(0.209)	(0.202)	(0.194)	(0.201)	(0.233)
Neutral Economic Situation (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Very Good EU Economic situation	0.955****	1.091****	0.388****	0.796****	-0.133
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.135)
Rather Good EU Economic situation	0.684****	0.706****	0.400****	0.251****	0.188**

	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.081)
Rather Bad EU Economic situation	-0.288**** (0.066)	-0.244**** (0.063)	-0.113* (0.060)	-0.519**** (0.061)	-0.178** (0.078)
Very Bad EU Economic situation	-1.077**** (0.082)	-1.066**** (0.079)	-0.535**** (0.072)	-0.982**** (0.076)	-0.692**** (0.090)
Political Centre (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Political Very Left	-0.159*** (0.053)	-0.079 (0.052)	-0.296**** (0.050)	0.375**** (0.050)	-0.048 (0.065)
Political Left	0.046 (0.044)	0.058 (0.043)	-0.073* (0.042)	0.158**** (0.041)	0.128** (0.053)
Political Right	0.271**** (0.045)	0.213**** (0.044)	-0.121*** (0.043)	-0.040 (0.041)	-0.157*** (0.051)
Political Very Right	0.156*** (0.058)	0.083 (0.057)	-0.222**** (0.055)	0.302**** (0.055)	-0.287**** (0.067)
Men (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Women	0.132**** (0.032)	0.101*** (0.031)	-0.099*** (0.030)	-0.008 (0.030)	-0.109*** (0.038)
No Political Interest (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Political Interest	0.102 (0.063)	0.172*** (0.062)	-0.053 (0.058)	-0.230**** (0.058)	0.027 (0.072)
Medium Political Interest	0.242**** (0.056)	0.282**** (0.055)	0.085* (0.052)	-0.190**** (0.052)	0.079 (0.064)
Hard Political Interest	0.161** (0.063)	0.212**** (0.061)	0.034 (0.058)	-0.307**** (0.058)	0.045 (0.072)
No Difficulties Paying Bills (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
Difficulties Paying Bills Most of the time	-0.566**** (0.055)	-0.431**** (0.054)	-0.256**** (0.050)	0.185**** (0.051)	-0.173*** (0.065)
Difficulties Paying Bills From Time to time	-0.326**** (0.037)	-0.194**** (0.037)	0.020 (0.036)	0.128**** (0.035)	-0.070 (0.045)
The Working Class of Society (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
The Lower Middle Class of Society	-0.034 (0.049)	0.096** (0.048)	0.063 (0.046)	-0.093** (0.046)	-0.088 (0.057)

The Middle Class of Society	0.236****	0.281****	0.330****	0.030	0.031
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.049)
The Upper Middle Class of Society	0.460****	0.474****	0.490****	-0.081	0.187**
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.086)
The High Class of Society	0.581***	0.449**	0.279*	0.144	-0.026
	(0.182)	(0.178)	(0.168)	(0.163)	(0.214)
Id2: Eurobarometer 90.3 (2018)	-0.843***	-0.465	-1.431****	-1.142****	-0.526
	(0.325)	(0.318)	(0.312)	(0.335)	(0.370)
Mixed Media Diet * Age cohort 15-24 (Baseline, 2014)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet * 25-39	-0.046	-0.020	0.209	-0.139	-0.005
	(0.239)	(0.231)	(0.221)	(0.230)	(0.289)
Traditional Media Diet* 25-39	0.248*	0.062	0.157	0.170	0.283*
	(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.169)
New Media Diet * 40-55	0.159	0.173	-0.095	0.073	-0.225
	(0.281)	(0.273)	(0.260)	(0.269)	(0.342)
Traditional Media Diet* 40-55	0.403***	0.318**	0.126	0.271**	0.231
	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.169)
New Media Diet * 55+	0.070	-0.021	0.156	0.757**	-0.813*
	(0.386)	(0.382)	(0.379)	(0.385)	(0.483)
Traditional Media Diet* 55+	0.400***	0.240*	0.038	0.441****	0.160
	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.174)
Mixed Media Diet* 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet	0.036	-0.211	-0.033	0.020	-0.579**
	(0.252)	(0.244)	(0.235)	(0.247)	(0.291)
	(0.252)	(0.244)	(0.235)	(0.247)	(0.291)
Traditional Media Diet	0.074	0.126	-0.090	0.068	0.033
	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.173)	(0.172)	(0.230)
Age cohort 15-29 * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
25-39	0.032	-0.031	-0.007	0.176	-0.112
	(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.181)
40-55	-0.107	0.040	-0.015	0.156	-0.213
	(0.155)	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.188)

55+	0.005 (0.164)	-0.170 (0.162)	-0.046 (0.157)	0.317** (0.157)	-0.261 (0.198)
No Education * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Education (up to 15 years)	0.660** (0.283)	0.498* (0.278)	1.230**** (0.274)	0.958*** (0.298)	-0.163 (0.319)
Mid Education (16-19 years)	0.614** (0.278)	0.411 (0.272)	1.187**** (0.269)	0.820*** (0.294)	-0.246 (0.312)
High Education (20+ years)	0.533* (0.280)	0.330 (0.274)	1.121**** (0.271)	0.746** (0.295)	-0.229 (0.314)
Still Studying	0.787** (0.308)	0.578* (0.302)	1.690**** (0.298)	1.223**** (0.320)	0.194 (0.351)
Neutral Economic Situation * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Very Good EU Economic situation	-0.359*** (0.138)	-0.348** (0.139)	0.162 (0.128)	-0.303** (0.131)	0.486*** (0.167)
Rather Good EU Economic situation	-0.187** (0.095)	-0.179* (0.092)	0.232*** (0.086)	-0.028 (0.087)	0.167 (0.105)
Rather Bad EU Economic situation	-0.177* (0.096)	-0.172* (0.093)	0.211** (0.087)	0.040 (0.089)	0.171 (0.105)
Very Bad EU Economic situation	-0.338** (0.142)	-0.333** (0.136)	-0.096 (0.121)	-0.046 (0.129)	-0.039 (0.140)
Political Centre * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Political Very Left	0.207*** (0.078)	0.085 (0.077)	-0.039 (0.074)	-0.195*** (0.074)	0.176* (0.093)
Political Left	0.159** (0.063)	0.131** (0.062)	0.042 (0.062)	-0.121** (0.059)	0.194*** (0.074)
Political Right	-0.243**** (0.064)	-0.210**** (0.064)	-0.211**** (0.062)	-0.168*** (0.060)	-0.225*** (0.071)
Political Very Right	-0.371**** (0.084)	-0.345**** (0.083)	-0.346**** (0.080)	-0.253*** (0.080)	-0.311**** (0.094)
Male * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--

Female	0.009 (0.046)	0.010 (0.046)	0.052 (0.045)	0.041 (0.043)	0.042 (0.053)
No Political Interest * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Low Political Interest	0.167* (0.093)	0.090 (0.091)	0.111 (0.088)	0.092 (0.087)	-0.045 (0.102)
Medium Political Interest	0.053 (0.081)	0.017 (0.080)	-0.017 (0.076)	0.131* 0.076)	-0.047 (0.089)
Hard Political Interest	0.290*** (0.091)	0.240*** (0.089)	0.109 (0.086)	0.315**** (0.085)	0.111 (0.102)
No Difficulties Paying Bills * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
Difficulties Paying Bills Most of the time	0.229*** (0.084)	0.229*** (0.082)	0.130* (0.079)	0.087 (0.079)	0.156 (0.098)
Difficulties Paying Bills From Time to time	0.245**** (0.054)	0.189**** (0.054)	-0.003 (0.053)	0.220**** (0.052)	-0.017 (0.063)
The Working Class of Society * 2018 (Baseline, difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
The Lower Middle Class of Society	0.114 (0.072)	0.084 (0.071)	-0.034 (0.069)	-0.047 (0.069)	0.031 (0.081)
The Middle Class of Society	0.077 (0.060)	0.094 (0.059)	-0.035 (0.058)	-0.154*** (0.058)	0.196*** (0.068)
The Upper Middle Class of Society	0.302*** (0.102)	0.359**** (0.102)	-0.066 (0.098)	-0.227** (0.093)	0.326*** (0.118)
The High Class of Society	0.303 (0.288)	0.255 (0.282)	-0.063 (0.260)	-0.146 (0.250)	0.314 (0.316)
Media diet * Age cohort 15-24 (difference between 2014 & 2018)	--	--	--	--	--
New Media Diet * 25-39	0.077 (0.322)	0.263 (0.313)	0.117 (0.306)	0.336 (0.315)	0.651* (0.373)
Traditional Media Diet* 25-39	0.008 (0.206)	0.022 (0.207)	-0.016 (0.199)	-0.147 (0.197)	-0.018 (0.259)
New Media Diet * 40-55	0.039 (0.370)	0.245 (0.363)	0.371 (0.355)	0.292 (0.361)	0.773* (0.430)

Traditional Media Diet* 40-55	0.053 (0.202)	-0.088 (0.203)	0.120 (0.196)	0.035 (0.193)	0.052 (0.254)
New Media Diet * 55+	-0.389 (0.495)	0.229 (0.487)	-0.056 (0.489)	-0.537 (0.489)	1.221** (0.585)
Traditional Media Diet* 55+	-0.040 (0.204)	0.026 (0.205)	0.164 (0.198)	-0.364* (0.195)	0.226 (0.257)
Constant	-0.225 (0.222)	-0.203 (0.222)	0.133 (0.205)	0.636*** (0.214)	0.864**** (0.251)
Observations	35,590	36,986	39,106	37,604	33,429
Log Likelihood	-22,082.840	-22,655.030	-23,840.370	-24,591.590	-17,920.400
Akaike Inf. Crit.	44,301.680	45,446.060	47,816.740	49,319.190	35,976.800

Note: Logistic regression models realized from Eurobarometer 83 and 90 data and created with stargazer (GESIS, 2014; 2018; Hlavac, 2018)

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<0.001