# Immigration and welfare state attitudes: A comparative study

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**Abstract:** *This thesis seeks to explore the influence of the recent influx of migrants in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden on welfare state attitudes. The thesis is split into three major parts. First, an extensive review of existing welfare state and immigration literature is given. Based on this review, several hypotheses regarding the influence of the rising number of immigrants are formulated. Second, these hypotheses are tested in a regression using European Social Survey (ESS) data on attitudes towards both immigration and the welfare state. This analysis suggests that the recent rise in immigration has hardened welfare state attitudes. Additionally, this empirical analysis shows that perception and similarities between our three countries of interest make a bigger difference than welfare regimes. Third, it is argued that there may be ways around the problems of the current refugee crisis in the future. I will argue that based on the data and literature on integration in Europe, Policymakers may look to improve integration, rather than refusing refugees or driving up costs for the welfare state.*

**Table of contents**


1. **Introduction** **P. 4**

2. **Literature review** **P. 7**

   **2.1: The influence of migration on a country, causes and mitigating factors** **P. 7**

   **2.2: Welfare state attitudes and immigration** **P. 10**

   **2.3: Characteristics of countries of interest** **P. 15**

   **2.4: Welfare state regimes in countries of interest & their relevance** **P. 21**

   **2.5: Hypotheses** **P. 23**

3. **Methods** **P. 24**

   **3.1: Country selection** **P. 24**

   **3.2: Dataset selection** **P. 25**

   **3.3: Statistical methodology** **P. 25**

4. **Operationalization** **P. 27**

5. **Empirical analysis** **P. 30**

   **5.1: Interpretation regarding expectations and existing theory** **P. 30**

   **5.2: Interpretation regarding hypotheses** **P. 31**

6. **Policy implications** **P. 40**

7. **Conclusion** **P. 43**

**8. Literature** **P. 45**

**9. Appendix I: Regression results** **P. 48**

**10. Appendix II: Pooled regression results** **P. 69**

## 1: Introduction

Immigration is one of the most controversial topics in modern day political debates. Its influence on the economy as well as its socio-cultural impact is controversial among politicians, the public and academics alike. Immigration becomes an even more pressing issue in a sizable welfare state, as a large influx of foreigners may put pressure on welfare state programs and may lead to a dramatic increase in costs. This may cause people's welfare attitudes to change, as in the face 'outsiders', native populations often prefer policies that benefit themselves instead of newcomers. Native populations may even support the welfare state less altogether and demand stricter eligibility requirements on welfare.

Much contemporary academic literature has been devoted to this topic, that is, the manner in which immigration may influence welfare state attitudes. Burgoon (2014) for example, suggests that immigration may cause support for the welfare state to drop as a result of dwindling solidarity in the face of a more heterogeneous population. Furthermore, large gaps in rate of employment, welfare recipiency and socio-cultural values may also cause support for the welfare state to dwindle.

Other authors see a change in attitudes towards who should receive welfare state benefits. Mewes & Mau (2012: 120) for instance describe a type of *Welfare state Chauvinism* where people only see those who have contributed and are part of a community as deserving of welfare benefits. Similarly, Kvist (2004) describes the reaction of welfare states to Eastern enlargement in the EU and concludes that while spending does not change much, an expected influx of outsiders does tighten eligibility rules of 'outsiders'. For example, countries will make welfare more conditional; you may only be eligible to receive welfare benefits after a certain amount of time of living/working in the country.

Another relevant perspective is one that focuses on certain vulnerable groups, such as described by Gaston (2013), Walter (2010) and Staerkle (2012). People who are in a vulnerable position tend to support government intervention and redistribution more, as they are more likely to be unemployed or without a steady income. Furthermore, they may support the welfare state more in the face of increased immigration, as it causes greater uncertainty for them (this is especially true of low-skilled workers, for example in manufacturing jobs).

These studies have different conclusions regarding the exact effects of immigration on modern welfare states. The influence of immigrants on welfare state attitudes differs between countries for several reasons. Immigrants may have different perceptions of welfare systems, may prefer certain regimes or may self-select (high-skilled immigrants may prefer smaller welfare states for example). Furthermore, attitudes towards immigrants and solidarity are different across the EU; causing different reactions to large-scale immigration.

*Purpose of this thesis*

This thesis will investigate the change in the relationship between immigration and welfare state attitudes between 2008 and 2016 in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden

The central question of this thesis will be:

Which factors may explain the different associations between welfare state attitudes and immigration between 2008 and 2016 in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany?

This question has three elements to it, namely the relationship between immigration and changes in welfare state attitudes, why we may attribute recent changes in welfare state attitudes to immigration numbers, and the reasons why the suspected causality of immigration may be different in different countries. Certain factors, in particular attitudes held among a population, may mitigate or reinforce the influence of immigration on welfare attitudes. The countries that are chosen for comparison are all mature welfare states in western Europe with similar levels of economic prosperity, and with social attitudes that are quite close together (World Bank 2016; ESS 2018) . This will make it easier to isolate which factors may cause a shift in welfare state attitudes.

There are two main reasons for choosing this topic. First of all, the period between 2008 and 2016 saw a large influx of immigrants, particularly from Africa and the Middle-east, with many refugees among them. Since this phenomenon is new, there is still a lot to be investigated with regard to the influence this influx of migrants has had on European states. This thesis will not seek to fill this entire gap within the existing body of literature, but at the very least give an indication of what the influence of the new, very substantial influx of migrants has had on welfare state attitudes

Secondly, answering this question may allow for insight in the manner in which different welfare states react to immigration. While the three countries chosen are quite similar with regard to their economic prosperity, their welfare states are all different. We may look into the ways in which different types of welfare state regimes influence changing immigration attitudes and see if there is a substantial difference due to these varying regime types.

*Methods and structure*

This thesis will approach this issue in several steps.

First, an extensive literature review on the link between immigration and welfare state attitudes will be given. State-of-the-art academic papers and books will be reviewed and summarized in order to formulate hypotheses. I will try to show the diversity of perspectives on this issue, as many authors reach different conclusions on the influences of immigration on the welfare state.

Second, a quantitative analysis of the link between immigration and welfare state attitudes in the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany will be given. For this analysis, European Social Survey data will be used which includes data on both attitudes towards migration and attitudes towards the welfare state. The method used will be a (pooled) regression analysis using data from 2008 and 2016. More data is hard to come by, as very few cross-country analyses of welfare states which also incorporate attitudes towards immigration exist (Svallfors: 2012).

Third, the results from this analysis will be tested against the hypotheses that have been formulated from the literature review. These results are then put into perspective for policy implications, as there are several reasons why these results may be relevant for policymakers in the future. For example, it has been suggested that policies such as the universal basic income may significantly change attitudes towards migration, as they may cause a massive burden on the welfare state in times of mass-immigration (The Economist, 2016).

This thesis will end with several concluding remarks concerning our findings as well as some remarks for future studies. In particular, the difficulty of determining what we may conclude from our limited data and the difficulty of dealing with refugees in comparison with ‘regular’ immigrants. I will argue that not all immigrants are equal, in the sense that refugees cannot be refused on ‘simple’ economic

grounds. Dealing with the problems they bring both politically and economically, therefore requires a different approach.

## 2: Literature review

In this section, a literature review will be given of state-of-the-art works on immigration, welfare states and the connection between the two. This will be done in order to formulate expectations as well as hypotheses which we later test by means of a regression analysis. The body of work on these topics is massive and simply reviewing all of it properly would be a thesis on its own, but I will attempt to give a balanced and well-rounded review of the most prominent works.

### 2.1: Economic characteristics of immigrants

Before we can analyze the current influence of immigration on welfare attitudes, we must first determine what we expect this influence to be. This section will discuss the literature on immigrants in general, i.e. what immigrants' economic characteristics are and why and what influences these may have on the economy as well as attitudes in the host country. I will pay particular attention to the ways in which welfare recipiency may differ, as well as the influence on native job markets.

First, the most obvious factor that may contribute to a negative response to immigration is widespread racism and xenophobia. This alone is hardly a sufficient explanation however, as previous studies have found that concerns over immigration have a large economic element to them. Boeri *et al.* (2002) described a certain 'boat is full!' mentality in western Europe, which is the conviction that further immigration would cause problems domestically. This attitude is strongly determined by unemployment rate, unemployment concerns and foreign population share, but hardly determined by racism (Boeri et al 2002: 115-118).

Having determined that concerns over immigration have a large economic component to them, it is worthwhile to investigate what economic characteristics immigrants tend to have, particularly with regard to the welfare state. Non-EU migrants immigrating to the EU are mostly young and predominantly male. They are also, generally speaking, lower educated than host country populations *if* they migrate to northern and western European states. In contrast, migrants to southern Europe and the UK are usually more skilled than natives. This pattern holds even if we look at immigrants from areas of the world where education is worse, such as sub-Saharan Africa (Boeri *et al.* 2002: 74-77).

A stereotypical characterization of immigrants is their supposed dependence on welfare, particularly unemployment benefits. This stereotype is partially true, as people with an immigration background (particularly first-generation immigrants or foreign-born immigrants) tend to have a higher rate of unemployment and a higher reliance on social benefits (Boeri *et al.* 2002: 74-90). Both EU and non-EU immigrants have on average a higher rate of unemployment than natives, with the difference between non-EU immigrants and natives being the biggest. These differences are quite substantial. For example, in the Netherlands in 1999, over 90% of native Dutch participated in the labor force, whereas only 55.8% of recent non-EU migrants did (Angrist & Kugler, 2003).

The ways in which immigrants benefit from and evaluate the welfare state is also different from native populations. Immigrants tend to be younger and are more likely to be unemployed. This means that while they are more dependent on unemployment benefits, they are less dependent on old-age pensions (partially because countries often impose requirements on receiving old-age benefits). Furthermore, immigrants have on average more children than natives, making them more dependent on family benefits in the long run (Boeri *et al* 2002: 77-90).

Immigrants' also evaluate these benefits different then natives. Immigrants tend to be more positive about their host' countries welfare benefits, that is, they see them as effective in creating equality and alleviating poverty. This is especially true in our countries of interest, as immigrants evaluate social benefits in Nordic and Continental European countries better than other high-risk groups such as the sick or elderly. At the same time, immigrants attribute the least responsibilities to the government of any high-risk group. Their perception of what the welfare state's purpose is, is also different from natives. For instance, immigrants hold the government more responsible for elderly care than for job security (Blomberg, 2012: 65-70).

The presence of another group in the form of immigrants is not in and of itself a problem; as pointed out before, racism and xenophobia are not big determinants in people's attitudes towards immigrants. More heterogeneity does not always create a strong sense of an 'in-group' and an 'out-group'. This does happen in the case of immigration however. Immigrants tend to live together (mostly in urban areas) and while they do create a more heterogeneous population, they often do not mix with the local population all that well. The distinction between who belongs to one's own group and who does not becomes stronger in the face of immigration, as integration takes long and is often ineffective, thus making the differences between groups more apparent (Eger, 2010).

Immigrants staying within their own community brings along other issues as well. There are fears that the concentration of immigrants in certain neighborhoods and cities may weaken social cohesion and proper integration (Ireland 2004: 124). There are several reasons to believe that this is true, mostly due to lacking integration. For instance, the turnout rates in elections are lower among immigrants, particularly non-western immigrants (Ireland 2004: 84, 140). For example, in the Netherlands, only 45% of people with a non-western immigrant background voted in national elections, whereas 74% of natives participated (CBS 2012). This gap between the natives and migrants, as well as the lack of social contact due to immigrants being concentrated in urban areas, may make attitudes towards migration harsher, as this lack of contact may cause a lack of solidarity.

Another issue for immigrants in economic terms, is that they tend to work in low-skilled and low-income jobs. In particular, immigrants are overrepresented in agriculture, manual labor and industry. These sectors are at a higher risk, which is reflected in both the risk immigrants run in terms of job-security, as well as their general lower employment (Angrist & Kugler, 2003). Immigrants also benefit less from economic growth and suffer more in times of crisis; when unemployment is on the decline, natives see a bigger drop in unemployment than migrants. Similarly, if unemployment is on the rise, immigrants see a bigger rise in joblessness than natives (Boeri et al 2002: 24-26).

Immigrants do 'adjust' however; immigrants may start lower but experience faster growth in their earnings compared to natives. While this is sensitive to the type of migrant (e.g. EU/US migrants adjust faster than migrants from other regions), all groups do better over time with regard to wages and employment. This is partially due to adjustment to the local labor market and education, but also because immigrants tend to be 'downgraded'. Even when immigrants are from relatively well-off regions of the world, they tend to be underemployed at first; they more often than natives perform jobs that are below their level of education (Dustmann, Frattini & Preston, 2013). Despite this adjustment however, a substantial long-term gap between natives and immigrants remains, and even 'veteran' immigrants who have lived in their host country for years, still see lower average employment than natives (Angrist & Kugler, 2003).

A country receiving immigrants may be expected, if we follow simple, one-good, economic reasoning, to experience moderate positive influences from immigration. If a country has capital, low skilled

labor and high-skilled labor, and that capital is complementary with both types of labor, an increase in low-skilled labor will increase the income of capital. More low-skilled labor will most likely not affect high skilled labor (while more low-skilled people will move to high-skill labor, scale effects may also cause higher demand for high-skilled labor) and will cause wages of low-skilled labor to drop as there is a bigger supply of it (Borjas 2014: 69-70). In other words, while the overall economy of a country will probably benefit from migration slightly, this benefit will not be divided equally among everyone in the host country.

Studies also suggest that immigrants are likely to allocate themselves quite efficiently, that is, they are inclined to go where there is more opportunity, i.e. they improve labor market efficiency. Natives tend to see moving as more expensive, whereas immigrants usually incur a mostly fixed cost for migrating, after which their decision of where to go is nearly free (Borjas 2001). To give a simplified example, if someone were to move from Turkey to western Europe, it does not really matter cost-wise (both economic and social) if they move to the Netherlands or Germany. Therefore, they may as well choose to go for the better job opportunity, as the costs they pay are mostly fixed. For a native Dutchman to move to the other side of the Netherlands incurs massive social costs even if there are employment gains to be made. Immigrants will therefore allocate themselves more efficiently than natives.

There are several studies which deal with the actual effects of immigration on unemployment and wages (i.e. van der Waal 2012, Madsen & Andric 2017, Latif 2015). Nearly all of these studies suggest that there is some negative impact of immigration on employment among natives, but the size and scope of this impact is up for debate. Borjas (2003) for example suggests that there is a sizable impact of immigration on native labor; on average, wages dropped around 3.2% nationwide. Other studies, such as Jean & Jiménez (2007) suggest that these numbers may be over exaggerated and that there is only a small impact of immigration on native employment, suggesting that the Figure may be as low as -0.04% over the entire population. However, every study concludes that the negative effect of immigration on wages is concentrated in the lower income bracket. This means that effects of immigration in a country via a depression of wages are mostly felt by people with low incomes. Averages therefore do not tell us the whole story. In our analysis later on in the thesis, we may still see pronounced effects despite average effects being negligible, as some groups are hit far harder than others (Dustmann, Frattini & Preston, 2013).

Most studies conclude that there is a moderate negative impact of immigration on employment, mostly on people of similar skill (so mostly low-skilled workers). This impact may be small (even negligible) but is often perceived by the population as substantial. The reason for mentioning this is that, for the purpose of this thesis, we are interested in attitudes. This means that besides the actual effects of immigration, perception and framing of the issue are also important. In the case of immigration this means that while the actual effects of immigration on wages and employment may be small, the perception of immigrants' influence on wages and jobs may be substantial (one does not have to look far to find 'they are taking our jobs'-esque populism for instance – pushing the perception of negative economic effects of immigration). Generally speaking, the perception of immigrants' influence on the economy is negative; natives tend to evaluate immigrants as an economic burden, even when economic analysis may yield that this is not the case (see: Borjas 2014: 63-130, Angrist & Kugler, 2003).

To conclude this section, a negative reaction to immigration has many economic factors to it, rather than just xenophobia. These economic concerns appear to be mostly grounded in the negative (albeit often small) economic impact that immigrants tend to have and natives' perception of the impact of

these economic matters. While immigrants do lag behind native populations on most socio-economic indicators such as employment, they do adjust over time. Differences between groups remain and perception and reality often do not line up, as there are also many proven benefits of immigration, such as increased labor market efficiency. As we are interested in attitudes, which are inevitably tied to perception, this means that the negative perceived impact of immigration will play a big role in evaluating its effect on welfare states.

### 2.2: Welfare state attitudes and immigration

In this chapter I will discuss the literature on the link between immigration and welfare state attitudes. While we now have an idea of what economic characteristics immigrants have and have rudimentary idea of what may cause them to shift attitudes, we still need to establish a link between immigration and attitudes in order to move forward.

In this section I will first give an overview of general literature on welfare state attitudes and the factors that may influence them. Secondly, literature that links immigration to changes in welfare state attitudes will be dealt with. Finally, this section will discuss possible mitigating factors between immigration and welfare state attitudes.

Welfare state attitudes can be summarized as the 'orientation toward welfare state scope and responsibilities, collective financing, different models of welfare, service delivery and the target groups and receivers of the welfare state'. Furthermore, welfare state attitudes also include evaluation of the performance of the welfare state in terms of its economic, moral and social consequences (Svallfors 2012: 12). These attitudes in turn are influenced by a myriad of (very general) factors. These include interpersonal and institutional trust, sociodemographic background, risk and threat perception, beliefs about welfare policies, social values and personal experiences. The way in which these factors influence the individual depends on resources they are endowed with (Svallfors 2012: 13).

An example of an analysis of welfare state attitudes is the European Social survey. Part of the data is in Figure 1 on the right, used in a study by Svallfors (2012). Respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought things such as care for the elderly and adequate care for the sick should be the government's responsibility, where 10 is full government responsibility and 0 is none at all. This may provide a good example of an indicator of attitudes and indicate that generally speaking, people are fairly positive about the welfare state. These numbers should be read with some caution however. Attitudes such as these are always embedded in a context and we cannot draw conclusions based solely on these numbers (Svallfors 2012: 13-15).

*Welfare index 0–10, by country*

| *Country* | *Mean* | *Standard deviation* | *N* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 7.13 | 1.21 | 1,740 |
| Bulgaria | 8.32 | 1.62 | 2,108 |
| Croatia | 8.16 | 1.75 | 1,422 |
| Cyprus | 8.11 | 1.28 | 1,173 |
| Czech Republic | 7.34 | 1.77 | 1,957 |
| Denmark | 7.59 | 1.18 | 1,549 |
| Estonia | 7.92 | 1.55 | 1,566 |
| Finland | 7.84 | 1.13 | 2,143 |
| France | 7.05 | 1.41 | 2,031 |
| Germany | 7.35 | 1.54 | 2,658 |
| Greece | 8.65 | 1.41 | 2,051 |
| Hungary | 8.24 | 1.45 | 1,494 |
| Israel | 8.32 | 1.55 | 2,394 |
| Latvia | 8.83 | 1.40 | 1,933 |
| Netherlands | 6.77 | 1.13 | 1,711 |
| Norway | 7.86 | 1.19 | 1,534 |
| Poland | 7.73 | 1.59 | 1,507 |
| Portugal | 8.11 | 1.54 | 2,300 |
| Romania | 7.65 | 2.13 | 1,944 |
| Russia | 8.31 | 1.63 | 2,311 |
| Slovakia | 7.24 | 1.64 | 1,693 |
| Slovenia | 7.80 | 1.46 | 1,250 |
| Spain | 8.30 | 1.24 | 2,326 |
| Sweden | 7.74 | 1.29 | 1,751 |
| Switzerland | 6.43 | 1.56 | 1,680 |
| Turkey | 7.90 | 1.95 | 2,314 |
| Ukraine | 8.79 | 1.52 | 1,756 |
| United Kingdom | 7.22 | 1.33 | 2,270 |
| *Total* | *7.82* | *1.61* | *52,566* |

*Figure 1: Welfare state approval by country. Source: Svallfors 2012: 15*

For instance, we cannot conclude from this table that people in the Netherlands are the most opposed to or skeptical about the welfare state. After all, the Netherlands is one of the most advanced welfare states in the world, yet if we look at the Table 1, it appears as if its citizens view their welfare state far more negatively than in less advanced welfare states. These numbers do not reflect a poorly functioning welfare state, rather they may paradoxically reflect a far more advanced and effective welfare state. Higher approval of the welfare state reflects a feeling that extension is necessary and vice-versa. A study conducted by Oorschot & Meuleman (2012) confirmed this; they found that a positive perceived welfare state performance has a negative influence on welfare state attitudes. Seemingly more paradoxical they found that *actual* welfare state performance increased perceived performance and thus slightly decreased support for the welfare state. People tend to support the welfare state more if they feel it cannot provide adequate standards of living. Positive attitudes are a cry for expansion of the welfare state, rather than an indication of satisfaction with the system (Oorschot & Meuleman 2012: 26-52).

Another element to interpreting these kinds of numbers is that negative welfare state attitudes do not necessarily reflect disapproval of the welfare state in general. Rather, these attitudes may reflect a sense that the welfare state is overburdened or too expensive to maintain in its current state or that certain elements of it do not function as they should. We are therefore interested in relationships between variables, rather than absolute levels of welfare state support, since levels of welfare state support do not tell us much on their own.

The manner in which the attitudes regarding the welfare state are established also has more deep-rooted causes than the functioning of the welfare state at any given moment. Attitudes regarding social order, perception of other social groups and the role of government, which differ greatly across different layers of the population, also determine how people may evaluate the welfare state's performance. These attitudes towards social order may be divided into different categories: authoritarian, libertarian or egalitarian as well as the way people view other social groups (Staerkle *et al.* 2012: 81-87).

There are several links between values and welfare state attitudes which are worth highlighting. Generally speaking, more authoritarian values lead to less support for government intervention, as authoritarianism supports punishment as a solution to problems, rather than redistribution. A high amount of distrust tends to lead to less support for government redistribution, as distrust leads to low cooperation in groups. The belief that welfare state dependency is real i.e. that welfare benefits make people lazy, is linked to less support for the welfare state. Similarly, ethnocentrism is negatively correlated with support for the welfare state, motivated by the desire to limit benefits for immigrants or other outsider groups. Finally, a strong sense of egalitarianism, that is, support for equality between subordinate and dominant groups (in our case natives and immigrants) will cause support for the welfare state to go up, as egalitarians tend to see social order as illegitimate and a result of privilege or birth, rather than achievement (Staerkle *et al.* 2012: 85-93).

In the context of the previous section, the strongest link between welfare state attitudes and immigration will most likely be an economic one. It is therefore worthwhile to take a better look into the literature dealing with the economic ties between immigration and welfare state attitudes. This topic has been explored in more detail in a seminal paper by Burgoon (2014) titled 'Immigration, integration and support for redistribution in Europe'. Burgoon investigates the effect of immigration on social policy and how social and economic integration may mediate this relationship. Burgoon argues that if 'gaps' between the native population and immigrants in terms of unemployment, social

benefit dependency and socio-cultural values are substantial, support for redistribution will go down. While immigration may cause support for the welfare state to go down in general, this influence may be enhanced if the gaps between natives and immigrants are large.

The unemployment gap may cause less support for redistribution politics because of two reasons. Firstly, higher immigrant unemployment lowers the tax base and increases reliance on social benefits, causing perceptions of the costs of redistribution to change for the worse (Burgoon 2014: 373-74). Secondly, immigrants are poorly integrated into the labor market and their joblessness may therefore not spark solidarity among natives, causing the natives' support for redistribution to go down. The social benefit gap works in a similar manner: higher social benefit dependency by immigrants (an 'outsider' group to natives) may cause solidarity to go down among the population, lowering support for redistribution (Burgoon 2014: 374-75). Finally, Burgoon argues that large gaps in socio-cultural values may also cause solidarity and thus support for redistribution to go down, but only in a very limited manner (Burgoon 2014: 375-76).

Burgoon's analysis therefore suggests that generally speaking, immigration causes support for redistribution to go down and that this influence is enhanced by gaps in unemployment and social benefits and very marginally by gaps in socio-cultural values. This is in line with my earlier point on the economic nature of immigration concerns: differences in race, values or culture matter very little if economic integration goes well. Another important result of his economic analysis is that having a large percentage of foreign-born citizens' decreases support for the welfare state as well. This is for similar reasons as the gaps, a more heterogeneous population may cause a decrease in solidarity, a stronger sense of an ingroup and an outgroup, a group identity, etc. (Burgoon 2014: 375-99).

Next, it is useful to take a closer look at high-risk social groups and how their attitudes are determined. I have already discussed natives' attitudes towards immigration but given that high-risk groups such as low-skilled workers are most affected by immigration, it is worthwhile to investigate how they respond. Generally speaking, high-risk groups will support government intervention more to protect them against the risks they have. This does not mean attitudes towards the welfare state are universally positive among high-risk groups however. Often, increased interaction and confrontation with elements of the welfare state cause a more negative attitude due to stigmatization, or slow bureaucratic processes recipients have to be involved in (Blomberg *et al.* 2012: 58-63).

The attitude of high-risk groups will naturally depend on their perceived risk and the state's ability to protect them. In our countries of interest and their corresponding welfare regimes, perceived risks of economic hardship and unemployment are among the lowest in Europe. In these countries, people in high-risk groups also evaluate the performance of the welfare state the best. Generally speaking, high-risk groups have been found to be more supportive of the welfare state, especially in Nordic and Continental regimes where states have succeeded to align perception and performance of the welfare state. A negative outlook causes greater support for the welfare state as well, because if people perceive unemployment or economic hardship ahead, they tend to be more supportive of the welfare state (Blomberg *et al* 2012: 58-78).

It is worthwhile to zoom in on the relationship of high-risk groups further, as it highlights an interesting problem in the context of immigration. High-risk groups suffer most from immigration and are more supportive of and reliant on the welfare state. We may then wonder how they feel about the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare system on which both groups tend to be more reliant. The reaction to inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state by native high-risk groups is usually negative. This attitude may be referred to as 'welfare chauvinism', where social benefits are only for those who

are part of the community or have contributed to it (Mewes & Mau 2012: 120). Welfare chauvinism is most likely to be found among the lower class for both sociocultural and economic reasons: people of the lower class are more materially vulnerable and have different (more authoritarian) values than the upper class (Mewes & Mau 2012: 119-121).

The economic explanation for welfare chauvinism by the lower class is first and foremost that immigrants are likely to compete with low-skilled natives. Furthermore, group membership becomes important when members of a group perceive that their proprietary claim is being endangered. The property of the 'ingroup' is in this case welfare benefits. Natives tend to perceive that immigrants, an 'outgroup' threatens their property of welfare, causing welfare chauvinism and increased sense of belonging to their group. This influence is strengthened if a country is economically worse off (Mewes & Mau 2012: 122-24).

For sociocultural differences we may find a similar explanation. Lower educated people are prone to have more authoritarian beliefs, these beliefs are 'awakened' when there is a perceived threat, such as immigration. This authoritarianism causes welfare chauvinism as it embodies hostility towards other groups including immigrants as well as other races. These authoritarian convictions are usually nullified by education and are more prominent in eastern than in western Europe (Mewes & Mau 2012: 124-38).

Empirical analyses of welfare state chauvinism in previous studies yields that welfare chauvinism is more prominent in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, northern- and western-European countries tend to be least chauvinistic when it comes to welfare. However, most people want some form of conditional welfare, for example, the requirement to have to work in a country for at least one year before access to full benefits is granted (Mewes & Mau 2012: 138). Conditional welfare has been found to be a broadly supported measure by other studies as well, Kvist (2004) for instance, described that (the threat of) mass-immigration does not cause welfare state retrenchment. Rather, it causes stricter eligibility rules for new arrivals. There is also empirical support for more general economic factors contributing to welfare chauvinism. Lower GDP levels, higher unemployment and a larger percentage of the population working in industry or agriculture contribute to welfare chauvinism. Interestingly enough, the number of immigrants in a country has no influence on welfare chauvinism. A larger established immigrant community does not influence people's attitudes as much as new arrivals do (Mewes & Mau 2012: 135-46).

On the individual level, income, education and perceived material risks are all strong indicators of welfare chauvinism. More education and income lead to decreased chauvinism, whereas more perceived material risk leads to less chauvinism. Similarly, authoritarianism is correlated with welfare chauvinism (Mewes & Mau 2012: 126-29).

Another element that may cause a shift in welfare attitude is a call for compensation. When certain high-risk groups are threatened by immigration, they may demand compensation for their risks by means of the welfare state. This applies in particular to low-skilled natives that are immobile, for whom job security and thus welfare state expansion would be preferable (Walter, 2010). Research into this so-called 'compensation effect' has been done by Gaston (2013) who argues that there is no such thing as a 'race to the bottom' for welfare. States do not see reduced welfare expenditure in the face of immigration, rather they see a slightly increased demand to compensate for the increased risk migration brings.

Compensation, chauvinism and immigration have been further investigated by Brady & Finnegan (2014). In their work, they look into the relationship between immigration and welfare attitudes and differentiate between different elements of the welfare states and different attitudes people may hold. They investigate three hypotheses, namely, the hypothesis that immigration undermines social policy, the compensation hypothesis and the chauvinism hypothesis. For their analysis they consider both immigrant stock and immigrant flow. Similar to Mewes & Mau, they argue that people of foreign origin that have lived in a country for a long-time matter less than a large influx of new immigrants.

They find that higher immigrant numbers decrease support for social policy, but that this relationship is not very strong. The biggest influence of a higher percentage of foreign-born citizens is that it causes support to go down for the idea that the government should provide a job for everyone. This may be seen as chauvinism, as jobs are finite and providing them to immigrants may be seen as competition with natives over their 'property'. Brady & Finnegan find a stronger relationship between net migration and positive welfare attitudes. This is evidence for the compensation hypothesis in that more migration causes demands for more government intervention. Net migration best explains the variation in welfare state attitudes. Migrant stock on the other hand, does not yield robust results and is not a meaningful determinant of welfare state attitudes (Brady & Finnegan 2014: 27-37).

They conclude that while we cannot rule out the 'generic' relationship between immigration and welfare attitudes, i.e. more immigration means less support for the welfare state, it is more likely that immigration causes compensation demands and chauvinism. The link between immigration and lower support for the welfare state is most likely limited to certain elements of the welfare state or mediated by other factors, rather than the welfare state as a whole (Brady & Finnegan 2014: 32-37). As such, when investigating this issue, as we attempt to do in this work, a lot of caution is needed. We cannot regard welfare state attitudes as a one-dimensional attitude people hold but have to analyze the different aspects that these attitudes consist of.




*Figure 2: Relations between immigration and welfare state attitudes*

I have summarized the ways in which immigration influences welfare state in Figure 2. A minus indicates a negative relationship, a plus indicates a positive relationship and an O indicates no or a negligible relationship. For example, immigration increases native employment risk and is thus has a '+' on the arrow. As we can see, the relationship between immigration and welfare state attitudes is quite complex if we follow the literature. Moving forward, we cannot investigate the link between migration and welfare state attitudes without taking chauvinism and compensation theories into account. This does not mean that a model like Burgoon's is discredited, but rather that there is a lot more mediation between migration and welfare state attitudes than the direct interaction that immigrants have with the welfare state.

### 2.3: Characteristics of countries of interest

The characteristics of our countries of interest have two sides that are relevant to our study: the natives' characteristics and the immigrants' characteristics. Immigrants' characteristics will mostly be relevant for looking at gaps and risks for the native population (and thus mostly for looking into compensation demands/support for the welfare state). Host country characteristics will be particularly relevant for investigating possible chauvinism. I will leave the influence of immigrant stock (the number of immigrants already living in a country) for what it is, because, as pointed out earlier, relationships and trends are more relevant than absolute levels of welfare state support. Existing differences in welfare state attitudes may be due to immigrant stock or may be due to other factors – the explanation for this difference is of little relevance here.

First, the most straightforward expectation should be addressed. All our three countries of interest have seen a relative and absolute increase in immigration in the past years (CBS 2017, SMA 2017,

Eurostat 2017). Therefore, we may expect that this increase in immigration has led to decreased support for the welfare state in all our countries of interest. Furthermore, we should also see an increase in welfare spending, a rise in conditional welfare and a rise in welfare recipiency by non-natives.

Second, let's investigate one if not the most prominent problem that immigrants may cause for a native population: employment risk for the working class. For the native population, immigrants may be a bigger risk if more people are employed in agriculture and industry. In our countries of interest, this number is low and has been on the decline since the 70s, as shown in Figure 3 and 4 below. All three countries rank far below the OECD average for working in agriculture and only Germany ranks higher than the OECD average for working in industry. Furthermore, as far as unemployment goes, all three of our countries are around the OECD average, with Germany ranking the lowest at 4.3% unemployment as shown in Figure 5. We may therefore expect that as far as employment risk goes, the influence should be unpronounced in our countries of interest. If there is a strong influence of employment risks (and therefore on compensation demands, leading to increased welfare state approval) we will most likely find it for Germany. The Figures are shown on the next three pages.




*Figure 3: Employment in industry in countries of interest (World Bank, 2017)*




*Figure 4: Employment in agriculture in countries of interest (World Bank, 2017)*

*Figure 5: Unemployment in countries of interest (World Bank, 2017)*

Third, we should determine our expectations regarding chauvinism. Like employment risk, we may expect the influence of employment in industry, agriculture and general unemployment to be low. Furthermore, because all three countries are in the top 20 of highest GDP per capita in the world, we may expect no increased chauvinism because of lower GDP. For perceived material risks, we will use the three indicators used by Mewes & Mau (2012: 132-33), i.e. the likelihood of being unemployed, the likelihood of not having money for household necessities and the likelihood of not receiving healthcare if one were to become very ill. On all three indicators, our countries of interest score lower than the global average. Especially on the household and healthcare matters, our countries score a full point lower than the global average on a 4 points scale, where 4 is most likely and 1 is least likely (Mewes & Mau 2012). It is therefore unlikely that there is a strong influence of perceived material risk on welfare chauvinism in our countries of interest.

Income and education should both have a major dampening influence on welfare chauvinism in all three countries. Median incomes as well as GDP per capita are high in all three countries of interest (OECD 2016). Furthermore, average education is among the highest in the world, with Sweden ranking lowest out of the three at 12$^{th}$ globally (UNDR 2016).

The most likely link in our countries of interest to increased welfare chauvinism will therefore be awakening of authoritarian values and an increase in non-native benefit claims. There seem to be no major shifts in the 'material' factors described above. We are not necessarily interested in existing claims of non-natives or the existence of authoritarian values amongst their population, but rather the changing of values in the face of immigration. We may expect to see a strong relationship between the recent influx of immigrants and an 'awakening' of more authoritarian values (as evidenced by the rise in anti-immigrant populism), even though existing authoritarian convictions may be low.

As far as the 'straightforward' relationship between immigration and welfare state attitudes go, we may expect first and foremost a decrease in welfare state support as immigration increases and therefore heterogeneity goes up and solidarity goes down. As pointed out in the first section, immigrants tend to be more reliant on benefits and be more often unemployed. Following Burgoon, this means that the recent influx in immigrants should cause a decrease in support for the welfare state given the 'gaps' between them and the native population.

The largest 'newcomer' group that is migrating in large numbers consists of Syrian refugees. If there is any impact of gaps between the recent wave of migrants and natives, it will most likely stem from this group. As pointed out, the general make-up of migrants is still true to the 'cliché' (young, mostly male) of migrants, despite the country of origin changing. This group has not self-selected in any other manner and we may assume that they are a fairly representative sample of the Syrian populace. The reasoning for this is that war hits everyone equally and that the incentive to flee to Europe is not directly economical. There will therefore be a slight bias towards those capable of fleeing (i.e. young, healthy), but economic characteristics will be less important. If anything, they may be slightly wealthier and well educated than average, as seeking refuge may be costly. Economic motives will be secondary at best as living safely will have priority over having a better economic life (this contrasts with other groups, e.g. Moroccan immigrants to the Netherlands that mostly came from poorer regions of Morocco).

In our countries of interest, the largest non-EU immigrant groups originate from the Middle-East, particularly Turkey and Somalia. The Netherlands also has major Moroccan and Surinam immigrant groups (CBS 2017, SMA 2017, DSTATIS 2017). If education and GDP are good indicators of how well a group will do economically, we can expect no major impact of an influx of Syrians compared to

other non-EU immigrants. Syria performs worse on education than Turkey and at around the same level as Morocco or Surinam (World bank 2016). Similarly, its GDP per capita is lower than Surinam and Morocco, but not in any extreme manner. Comparison to Somalians is harder because hardly any data exists on Somalia's economy, but it is safe to say that Syrians are generally more educated and economically well-off. In short, we may expect Syrians to be like most non-EU migrants in that they will be more reliant on benefits and more often unemployed. Following Burgoon, we may therefore expect an influx of Syrians to cause approval of the welfare state to drop, in similar ways that other non-EU migrants may have caused shifts in welfare state approval before them.

**2.4: Welfare state regimes in countries of interest & their relevance**

As pointed out earlier, our countries of interest may be classified in different ways when we follow welfare state typologies. For the sake of simplicity and conciseness I will use the typologies rather than going into too much detail on specific welfare policies in our countries of interest (unless they are of very particular interest, which I do not expect) when formulating expectations on the influences of immigration. The reason for considering these typologies is straightforward: we cannot examine changes in the welfare state attitudes without considering the general characteristics of the welfare state we are interested in.

The most well-known work on welfare state typology (and possibly welfare states in general) is Esping-Anderson's (EA) Three *Worlds of welfare capitalism* (1990). In this book, EA develops a typology of welfare states, in which every modern western welfare state may be seen as belonging to one of three types. These three types are liberal, conservative, and social-democratic welfare states. The way in which these regimes may be identified is by looking at two factors. First, the degree to which there is decommodification, meaning the degree to which social services a right, rather than something which should be earned. Second, the type of social stratification and solidarities, how does the welfare state seek to classify society and how broad are the solidarities that are promoted (Esping-Andersen 1990: 70-85; Arts 2002: 140-43).

In liberal regimes where the free market and individualism are the most important, there is a low level of decommodification and social services are seen as a privilege rather than a right. Welfare is dependent on market forces and is usually provided privately. Liberal regimes will seek little social stratification, i.e. they will not try to preserve traditional social patterns, as they may be seen as being restraining for the individual (Arts 2002: 140-43; Scruggs & Allen 2006: 4).

Conservative regimes tend to have a moderate degree of decommodification. While there may be more state interference in conservative regimes than in liberal regimes, the benefits the state provide are usually dependent on work history and social status, rather than being universal. Benefits are usually only provided by the state if one's own family cannot provide for them (e.g. you may only be eligible for state-funded welfare if you are unemployed and single). Solidarities are, like the liberal regime, narrow and limited to the family, rather than having nation-wide solidarity (Arts 2002: 140-44). This is strongly related to social stratification in conservative regimes, which are aimed at reinforcing a more traditional social order, including traditional social structures and families (Scruggs & Allen 2006: 3-4). For example, conservative regimes may discourage women to work by taking away certain benefits if they do, in sharp contrast to liberal regimes were women may be encouraged to work and participate in the market (Arts 2002: 141-47). This type of welfare regime has also been called *corporatist*, as large professional and industrial interest groups tend to play a major role in shaping welfare state policies.

Finally, the social-democratic regime is characterized by a high degree of decommodification and very broad solidarities. Most benefits in these regimes are universal and not dependent or status or work history. Social-democratic regimes favour broad solidarity over the market and emphasize individual independence (Arts 2002: 142). Social-democratic regimes seek a different type of social stratification as well. Rather than subordinating social structures to the market like liberals or conserving traditional structures such as the conservatives, social-democrats seeks to achieve equality and broad solidarity amongst the entire population, removing barriers such as class or gender (Scruggs & Allan 2008).

These typologies have been the subject of much academic debate, as not every European state can be properly classified as one of the three types let alone non-European welfare states. Hybrid states do exist for instance, The Netherlands is seen by scholars as either social-democratic, corporatist/conservative or a mix of both. Several other typologies have been developed by academics, including more or different types based on different characteristics, Esping-Andersen largely ignores the role of women for example, something which other academics have used as a basis for a new typology (Arts 2002: 142-51).

For our research we cannot completely ignore these controversies, but our selection of countries will hopefully minimize the problems caused by using ideal types. While academics disagree about the way we should classify welfare states, they do tend to agree that Germany and Sweden are distinctly different welfare state regimes, while the Netherlands resembles both in several ways (Arts 2002: 148-51). Furthermore, most academics are in agreement that Germany most closely approaches the conservative/corporatist ideal type and Sweden most closely approaches the social-democratic ideal type. This will help us because we approach the welfare state as a whole when looking at welfare state attitudes, so it may be more useful to use general characteristics, rather than specific aspects of our countries of interest.

To give a brief example of how this may be useful, we can use social benefits in conservative regimes. If conservative/corporatist regimes mostly provide benefits based on work history and the branch of industry in which one is employed, then this may serve as a dampening influence on the relation between immigration and welfare state attitudes. While there will still be gaps between benefit recipiency of natives and immigrants, these will be smaller if a large part of benefits is conditional. Furthermore, if a society is organized in a more corporatist manner, it may protect the interests of industries that are vulnerable in the face of immigration.

On the other hand, a social-democratic regime may see an accelerated influence of immigration on welfare state attitudes for similar reasons. If benefits are universal immigrants, who are typically worse-off on employment, financial situation, etc. may cause a steeper rise in costs. This in turn may cause greater disapproval of the welfare state, as well as a rise in welfare chauvinism under social-democratic regimes.

### 2.5 Hypotheses

Our research is in a way timed very fortunately, as of writing this thesis, a new round of European Social Survey data has just been released, and it happens to include a round of welfare state related questions. This gives us an excellent opportunity to study the recent influx of immigrants (particularly refugees) on welfare state attitudes in Europe. This section will outline, based on the literature reviewed, my expectations regarding the influence of immigrants on welfare state attitudes in recent years.

First, we must formulate our main hypothesis, based on the numerous relations between immigration and welfare state attitudes mentioned earlier, this hypothesis is straightforward. Since immigration has been on the rise in our countries of interest, it is very likely that this puts the welfare state in distress, therefore:

> Hypothesis 1: There will be a change in the relationship between immigration and welfare state attitudes between 2008 and 2016, which can be attributed to the difference in time.

Secondly, we may formulate our expectations regarding compensation demands by the native population following the recent influx of immigrants. Since a large (or at least relatively larger) portion of new immigrants are refugees, rather than people seeking economic opportunity, the demands for compensation may be limited. In contrast to earlier waves of migrants seeking jobs, refugees may pose a lesser (perceived) threat to native employment, therefore:

> Hypothesis 2: Because a large portion of recent immigrants is a refugee, demands for compensation will be limited.

Thirdly, it seems probable that the recent influx of immigrants will cause an increase in welfare chauvinism. This is due to increased costs, especially on the short term, of newly arrived migrants. The third hypothesis is therefore:

> Hypothesis 3: Increased costs and welfare claims caused by a rise in immigration will cause welfare chauvinism to be more relevant in our countries of interest.

Finally, we may formulate our expectations for the different countries we are looking into. As pointed out in the previous section, conservative/corporatists regimes tend to have more requirements to be eligible for welfare, whereas social-democratic regimes have very few requirements. This may lead to exacerbated costs of new migrants in social-democratic regimes, while the increase may not be as drastic in conservative/corporatist regimes. In this case, we may expect Sweden to experience the most dramatic influences, whereas the influences on Germany will be limited. This can be formulated in the fourth and final hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 4: The influences mentioned in H1-3 will be most severe in Sweden, and least severe in Germany due to different eligibility requirements for welfare.

## 3: Methods

When analysing the relationship between welfare state attitudes and immigration we must be careful of our methodology. First and foremost, we must be aware of our limitations. In our case, these limitations are twofold; the way in which the country selection may influence our results, and the dataset we choose in order to compare our variables of interest. I will now briefly outline why I've chosen this subset of countries in more detail, afterwards I will explain why I chose the European Social Survey for our analysis.

### 3.1 Country selection

As explained in the literature review, our countries of interest fall within different typologies of welfare states. However, I think that, while the differences are numerous, our selected subset minimizes the number of external factors that may influence our results, and that we may be able to pinpoint the reason for differences easily. There are several similarities in our countries of interest which I will now discuss. I will take the Netherlands as a focal point in our analysis, as it is 'in between' Germany and Sweden as far as welfare states goes and therefore makes for a nice 'middle-ground' within our analysis. In our analysis however, all three countries will be discussed in great detail.

The Netherlands is chosen because it is a mature welfare state which has seen an increase in immigration in the past decade (CBS 2017). Furthermore, recent elections resulted in the fiscally conservative VVD being the largest party, followed by the anti-immigration Party for Freedom, as well as massive losses for the social-democratic labor party and a modest loss for the socialist party (Kiesraad, 2017). This may suggest dwindling support for the welfare state in the light of immigration.

Another reason to focus on the Netherlands is because it is often seen as a hybrid type of welfare state regime. Authors often put the Netherlands somewhere between corporatist/conservative and social-democratic welfare states. The Netherlands' welfare state regime is characterized by corporatist elements, such as work-related benefits and by social-democratic benefits, which tend to be unconditional (Arts 2002). Hybrid types are often excluded in studies (see for example: Staerkle et al. 2012) and it may therefore be worthwhile to analyze which elements of each of its components it takes from. This may also allow for a better comparison of the 'purer' welfare states in terms of typology, as a hybrid regime may provide us with a type of 'sliding scale' from one regime type to another, shedding light on both the influence of immigration on welfare attitudes, as regime related influences.

The states that will be used for this comparative perspective are Germany and Sweden. This has several reasons. First and foremost, for practical reasons, recent data on these welfare states is most easily accessible via the European Social Survey. This survey is very extensive but does not include all OECD countries; we therefore need to select. Secondly, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands are quite similar in many ways. All three are mature European welfare states with similar GDP per capita, similar representative governmental systems, a large service economy, etc. (World Bank, 2016). We therefore expect that external factors that may influence our results are minimized as much as possible.

Another reason to choose these countries is that they have experienced a very similar influx of migrants with similar make-up in recent years. All three countries have seen an increase in migrants, particularly from Syria, mostly between the ages of 15 and 40 and male. While some network effects remain within each country, such as immigrants from former colonies, major shifts in immigrant's

composition are similar. Finally, all have seen an increase in immigration, which may lead us to expect that any effects of immigration on the welfare state are more pronounced.

A final reason to compare these three states is that, as mentioned before, the Netherlands is a hybrid between corporatist/conservative and social-democratic welfare state regime types. Germany is often mentioned in literature on welfare regimes as a typical conservative/corporatist welfare state. Sweden, in turn, is often mentioned as being a clear example of a social-democratic welfare regime (Arts, 2002). Since these states are as close to the ideal types as possible, they make for excellent comparison to a hybrid state like the Netherlands.

### 3.2 Dataset selection

The ways in which we can test our hypotheses is unfortunately limited in several ways. There are few datasets which allow for proper cross-country comparison of welfare state attitudes, within country analyses are numerous but are often hard to compare as phrasing of questions, measurements as well as specific policies vary greatly. Our only two options as far as datasets go are the World Value Survey or the European Social survey (ESS). The World Value survey is not very suitable in this case, as it only addresses welfare state attitudes very generally (it has one very general question on welfare state attitudes) and does not investigate specific policies/elements of welfare states.

Therefore, we will use the ESS which has extensive questions on different elements of the welfare state. The problem with the ESS however, is that welfare state attitudes are amongst one of the many rotating topics they deal with in their surveys. Therefore, data on welfare state attitudes from the ESS are limited to data from 2008 and 2016 respectively.

### 3.3 Statistical methodology

Our best available option is a pooled ordinary least squares analysis of both the 2008 and 2016 data on welfare state attitudes in addition to a regular ordinary least squares analysis of both years. The reason to use a pooled data is to account for the difference in time. If the year dummy for 2016 is significant in the pooled regression, we may conclude that the link between welfare state attitudes and attitudes towards migration have shifted in 2016 in a meaningful way, i.e. that the different times have an impact in addition to existing relations between immigration and welfare attitudes. This analysis will also show us whether the relationship between attitudes towards immigration and welfare state attitudes are significant over time to begin with; if they are not, little can be concluded from our data.

I will use the regular regressions to demonstrate some of the points made in the literature review. Most importantly, they will be used in conclusions regarding specific elements of the welfare state. I suspect that for the most part, these regressions will demonstrate the insignificant relationships between attitudes towards migration and those elements of the welfare state that immigrants take very little benefit of (i.e. childcare and elderly care). This will be done in order to make sure that there is no upset in any specific element of the welfare state; and that we are indeed investigating more general attitudes. If these do turn out significant, it may point to a country specific policy change, rather than a more general trend such as an increase in migration causing the shift in attitudes.

To summarize we will do several pooled OLS analyses using ESS data as well as regular OLS for both years separately. While this may not yield results that are as a robust as in a longitudinal study, it is the best option given the limitations of our data. This follows on Svallfors (2012) who at the end of his book ‘Contested Welfare state in Europe and beyond’ states: ‘But a repetition of the *European Social*

*Survey* module we used in this book would also be highly valuable in analysing the dynamics of attitudes. Even if this were a repeated cross section and not a longitudinal study, it would allow several of the outstanding issues we have mentioned to be addressed'. There is still a lot of uncovered ground in this topic and our analyses will therefore hopefully deliver useful results, even though proper longitudinal data is lacking on this topic. Pooling data is, for now, our best bet on uncovering relationships between attitudes on the welfare state and immigration.

## 4: Operationalization

To perform this analysis, we need to choose which indicators we use to test our hypotheses. The European Social Survey provides several indicators of welfare state approval. This is convenient as it allows us to pinpoint not only the influence of immigration of welfare state attitudes, but also allows us to determine which parts of the welfare state are most affected. For example, we may expect approval of unemployment benefits to be hit harder than approval of elderly care, as immigrants tend to be younger. The numbers I cite in the upcoming paragraphs are the ESS question numbers from the 2016 survey, Figure 6 summarizes all questions and provides the corresponding number from the 2008 survey.

For the operationalization of welfare state attitudes, I will use European Social Survey questions E6-12. These questions deal with seven different key elements of welfare state approval. These variables have scores from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates 'not at all' and 10 means 'in its entirety'. Question E6 asks respondents whether it is the government's responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old. Question E8 asks whether it is the government's responsibility to ensure sufficient childcare services for working parents. These will be analysed in a regression but will only be used to check if any particular part of the welfare state is hit. The reason for this is that while we are more interested in general welfare state attitudes which are dealt with in questions E9-12, we still need to see if certain elements of the welfare state are hit particularly hard; if only a few elements of the welfare state change dramatically, it may be harder to conclude that welfare state attitudes in general are influenced, rather than just specific elements of it. Question E7 is not used as a control variable directly as it is more relevant of our analysis of compensation demands.

Questions E9-12 relate to the perceived costs of the welfare state, these questions use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is 'strongly agree' and 5 is 'strongly disagree.  Question E9 asks if social benefits place too great a strain on the economy. Question E10 asks if social benefits prevent widespread poverty, question E11 asks if social benefits lead to a more equal society and question E12 asks if they cost businesses too much in taxes and back charges. These will be our main outcome variables with regard to welfare state attitudes and in particular hypothesis 1.

To measure compensation demands, we are mostly interested in matters relating to unemployment, as we want to measure if a (perceived) increased risk of unemployment due to immigration causes demands government funded compensation. As with welfare state attitudes, we will use question E7 of the European Social Survey, which asks if the government should be responsible for ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed. If this measure goes up, it tells us that demands for compensation in the face of higher migration go up.

To measure welfare chauvinism, I will use question E15, which asks respondents when people from other countries should be entitled to the same benefits as natives. This may range from immediately, to after a few years of work to never.

I will use question F42 to determine the impact of social-economic status of the respondent. This question asks how the respondent feels about his or her household's income. I have used the perception of incomer rather than absolute income, as we are interested in attitudes rather than actual influence. A perceived potential threat to one's economic well-being is far more important than an actual threat in this case. This is because, as discussed in the literature review, the actual threat may be minimal, but it may still have a massive impact on the values people hold due to a shift in perception.

Finally, for independent variables I will use the different attitudes people have towards migrants, these attitudes are examined in question B38-43 of the ESS. I will analyse the relationship between different attitudes people have towards migrants and the different elements of the welfare state in terms of approval/disapproval. Questions B38-43 ask if the government should allow people of the same/different race, poorer countries should be allowed into the country. They also ask what people think the influence of immigrants is in general, economically and culturally. This extensive amount of analysis is needed to make sure we pinpoint the source of change between 2008 and 2016 accurately. Given that immigration has gone up in this period it will allow us to pinpoint what attitudes towards migrants changed most in this period and what influence this in turn had on welfare state approval, if any. The questions and corresponding ESS numbers are summarized in the table on the next page.

| ESS Number (2016/2008) | ESS question |
|---|---|
| E6/D17 | Should it be the government's responsibility to provide a reasonable standard of living for the old? |
| E7/D18 | Should it be the government's responsibility to provide a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed? |
| E8/D19 | Should it be the government's responsibility to provide a reasonable standard of childcare for working parents? |
| E9/D20 | To what extent do you agree that social benefits and services place too great a strain on the economy? |
| E10/D21 | To what extent do you agree that social benefits and services in your country prevent widespread poverty? |
| E11/D22 | To what extent do you agree that social benefits lead to a more equal society? |
| E12/D23 | To what extent do you agree that social benefits in your country cost businesses too much in taxes and charges? |
| E15/D38 | Thinking of people coming to live in your country, when do you think they should obtain the same rights and benefits? |
| B38/B35 | To what extent do you think your country should allow people of the same race or ethnic group to come and live here? |
| B39/B36 | To what extent do you think your country should allow people of a different race or ethnic group to come and live here? |
| B40/B37 | To what extent do you think your country should allow people from poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here? |
| B41/B38 | Would you say it is generally bad or good for your country's economy that people come to live here from other countries? |
| B42/B39 | Would you say that your country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? |
| B43/B40 | Is your country made a worse or better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? |
| F42/F33 | Which of the descriptions on this card best describes how you feel about your household's income nowadays? |

*Figure 6: Overview of ESS variables used in our (pooled) regressions*

## 5: Empirical analysis

Before we start with our analysis, we need to remember that analysis of this type is concerned with relationships, not absolute levels; we are analysing change, not absolute approval/racism/chauvinism/etc. Our analysis is quite extensive and accounts for many factors; I will therefore only go into detailed interpretation of the data where it seems necessary. I will include the results of the regular regressions in appendix I and of the pooled regressions in appendix II at the end of this thesis; below I will discuss the most relevant empirical findings.

### 5.1: Interpretation regarding existing theory

First, we will look at our analyses regarding specific elements of the welfare state. While these are not as interesting as more general attitudes, it is worthwhile to check if attitudes relating to particular elements of the welfare state may be strongly influenced by attitudes towards immigration. This may also tell us something about issues discussed in the literature review, in particular regarding the type of welfare benefits immigrants may receive (i.e. higher unemployment benefits than natives, but lower elderly care).

If we look at our regressions in tables 12, 19 and 26 in the appendix, there appears to be a weak relationship between attitudes towards care for the elderly and immigration. Very few of our regressions have shown to be significant with regards to care for the elderly in all our countries of interest. This is in line with the expectation that immigrants tend to be younger and thus do not cause a strain on the provision of elderly care. No country stands out in this regard; in all cases, the relationships are insignificant. In short, we can do away with the idea that these attitudes towards the welfare state are meaningfully impacted by immigration.

There is a similarly small influence for the provision of childcare services as shown in tables 14, 21 and 28. As expected, immigrants take up little childcare compared to natives, as they tend to come at alone at first and generally do not have children. In most cases, the relationship appears diminished and insignificant.

Furthermore, a similar effect for the provision of unemployment benefits is observed. Tables 13, 20 and 27 show that in very few cases there is a significant difference between 2008 and 2016 in the attitudes regarding the government's role in providing for the unemployed and attitudes towards migrants. This may be a more complex factor than other provisions such as elderly care and childcare however, but we will discuss the implications of these regressions further when we get to hypothesis 3.

Finally, and also in line with our expectations, the relationship between attitudes on the welfare state and immigration is the strongest in the case of broader economic concerns, i.e. whether or not social services place to great a strain on the economies and businesses as shown in tables 15, 18, 22, 25, 29 and 32. This fits with our literature review; immigration remains a mostly economic concern. Attitudes seem to be more of 'the boat is full' type than anything else. Relationships for economic concerns are significant across the board. We will analyse these welfare state attitudes in more detail using our pooled regressions. Additionally, we will look into more detail into the role of the welfare state; in particular, the more general perception of the welfare state as a tool to alleviate poverty and increase equality.

### 5.2: Interpretation regarding hypotheses

Since the dataset we are dealing with is very large and there is a very high number of factors determining welfare state attitudes, we cannot just look at the results and say something matters or not – it will require some theoretical justification. Despite the pooled regression allowing for more detailed analysis, we will need to do some hefty interpretation in order to reach a conclusion about our hypotheses.

In particular, we need to pay attention to how we interpret significant results. A lot of attitudes may have significant correlations (i.e. people who dislike different ethnicities coming to Europe may also favour stricter eligibility requirements for welfare for migrants), but these do not directly tell us anything other than that people may tend to hold certain clusters of attitudes. This is to be expected and possibly interesting in certain studies, but it does not directly address our hypotheses.

What we are more interested in, is the way in which the changes between 2008 and 2016 have had an impact on the attitudes people hold, i.e. if the change in time has significantly impacted our model. In addition, we are interested whether or not differences between countries have had a meaningful impact on our results. To isolate these factors, I have used a country dummy and a year dummy in the model. The year dummy is used to measure the difference between 2008 and 2016 and the country dummy is used to measure the difference between countries. If these dummies turn out significant, it may tell us more about the shift in immigration and welfare state attitudes that we observe.

On the next few pages, in table 7-11 as well as in the appendix in tables 33-37, the results of the pooled regression are summarized. Each table includes results for all three countries of interest and uses an * to indicate significant results at the $\leq 0.05$ level. The dependent variable which is analysed is indicated below each table.

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.045*<br>(0.017) | -0.007<br>(0.017) | -0.034*<br>(0.017) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.036<br>(0.020) | 0.005<br>(0.020) | 0.009<br>(0.019) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | 0.034*<br>(0.016) | 0.058*<br>(0.016) | 0.029<br>(0.016) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.020*<br>(0.004) | -0.007<br>(0.005) | -0.017*<br>(0.005) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.007<br>(0.049) | -0.011*<br>(0.005) | -0.009<br>(0.005) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.024*<br>(0.006) | -0.035*<br>(0.006) | -0.031*<br>(0.006) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | 0.042*<br>(0.012) | 0.072*<br>(0.011) | 0.066*<br>(0.012) |
| *Year Dummy* | -0.040*<br>(0.016) | -0.039*<br>(0.016) | -0.040*<br>(0.016) |
| *Country Dummy* | 0.332*<br>(0.017) | -0.214*<br>(0.019) | -0.190*<br>(0.020) |
| *N* | 11011 | 11011 | 11011 |
| $R^2$ | 0.063 | 0.045 | 0.041 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the $\leq$ 0.05 level*

*Table 7: Pooled regression results for 'Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society' as dependent variable*

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.009<br>(0.019) | -0.023<br>(0.019) | 0.019<br>(0.019) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.080*<br>(0.021) | -0.078*<br>(0.021) | -0.103*<br>(0.021) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.018<br>(0.017) | -0.031<br>(0.017) | -0.029<br>(0.017) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.031*<br>(0.005) | 0.027*<br>(0.005) | 0.024*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.011*<br>(0.006) | 0.012*<br>(0.005) | 0.013*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.024*<br>(0.006) | 0.026*<br>(0.006) | 0.030*<br>(0.006) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | 0.032*<br>(0.13) | 0.029*<br>(0.013) | 0.016<br>(0.013) |
| *Year Dummy* | 0.095*<br>(0.018) | 0.094*<br>(0.018) | 0.094*<br>(0.018) |
| *Country Dummy* | -0.080*<br>(0.019) | 0.173*<br>(0.021) | -0.090*<br>(0.021) |
| *N* | 10930 | 10930 | 10930 |
| $R^2$ | 0.049 | 0.049 | 0.045 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the $\leq$ 0.05 level*

*Table 8: Pooled regression results for 'Social benefits/services place too great strain on the economy' as dependent variable*

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.003<br>(0.020) | -0.030<br>(0.020) | -0.049*<br>(0.019) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.125*<br>(0.022) | -0.099*<br>(0.022) | -0.098*<br>(0.021) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.039*<br>(0.018) | -0.026<br>(0.018) | -0.044*<br>(0.018) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.031*<br>(0.006) | 0.038*<br>(0.006) | 0.032*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.017*<br>(0.006) | 0.015*<br>(0.006) | 0.016*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.019*<br>(0.006) | 0.013*<br>(0.006) | 0.015*<br>(0.007) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | -0.021<br>(0.013) | -0.003<br>(0.013) | -0.007<br>(0.013) |
| *Year Dummy* | 0.252*<br>(0.018) | 0.252*<br>(0.018) | 0.252*<br>(0.018) |
| *Country Dummy* | 0.196*<br>(0.020) | -0.122*<br>(0.021) | -0.118*<br>(0.022) |
| *N* | 10769 | 10769 | 10769 |
| $R^2$ | 0.081 | 0.075 | 0.074 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the $\leq$ 0.05 level*

*Table 9: Pooled regression results for 'Social benefits cost businesses too much in taxes/charges' as dependent variable*

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.005<br>(0.017) | 0.016<br>(0.016) | -0.009<br>(0.016) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.036<br>(0.019) | 0.034<br>(0.018) | 0.049*<br>(0.018) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.038*<br>(0.015) | -0.032*<br>(0.015) | -0.032*<br>(0.015) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.038*<br>(0.015) | -0.015*<br>(0.005) | -0.014*<br>(0.005) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.018*<br>(0.005) | -0.019*<br>(0.005) | -0.019*<br>(0.005) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.002<br>(0.006) | 0.001<br>(0.005) | -0.001<br>(0.005) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | 0.045*<br>(0.011) | 0.046*<br>(0.011) | 0.054*<br>(0.011) |
| *Year Dummy* | -0.004<br>(0.016) | -0.003<br>(0.016) | -0.003<br>(0.016) |
| *Country Dummy* | 0.040*<br>(0.017) | -0.099*<br>(0.0180 | 0.059*<br>(0.019) |
| *N* | 11009 | 11009 | 11009 |
| $R^2$ | 0.012 | 0.015 | 0.013 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the $\leq$ 0.05 level*

*Table 10: Pooled regression results for 'Social benefits/services prevent widespread poverty' as dependent variable*

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.060*<br>(0.019) | 0.029<br>(0.019) | 0.092*<br>(0.019) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.127*<br>(0.022) | 0.137*<br>(0.021) | 0.096*<br>(0.022) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | 0.152*<br>(0.017) | 0.136*<br>(0.017) | 0.134*<br>(0.017) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.015*<br>(0.006) | -0.020*<br>(0.006) | -0.025*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.037*<br>(0.006) | -0.036*<br>(0.006) | -0.034*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.042*<br>(0.006) | -0.041*<br>(0.006) | -0.034*<br>(0.006) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | 0.006<br>(0.013) | 0.007<br>(0.013) | -0.017<br>(0.013) |
| *Year Dummy* | -0.095*<br>(0.018) | -0.096*<br>(0.018) | -0.096*<br>(0.018) |
| *Country Dummy* | -0.075*<br>(0.019) | 0.247*<br>(0.021) | -0.181*<br>(0.022) |
| *N* | 10901 | 10901 | 10901 |
| $R^2$ | 0.149 | 0.159 | 0.153 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the $\leq$ 0.05 level*

*Table 11: Pooled regression results for 'When should immigrants be granted access to social goods/services' as dependent variable*

**Hypothesis 1: There will be a change in the relationship between immigration and welfare state attitudes between 2008 and 2016, which can be attributed to the difference in time**

To test this hypothesis, we will take a look at the pooled regression results shown in tables 7-11. These pooled analyses have more general welfare attitudes as the dependent variable. They focus on the costs of the welfare state, the cost of the welfare state to businesses as well as the role of the welfare state in alleviating poverty and creating equality. The other dependent variables have been excluded, as regular regressions have shown that they are only related to immigration attitudes in a limited way, if at all. When looking at these pooled regressions, we should first determine the relationships between immigration attitudes and welfare state attitudes, next if there is a significant impact of the time difference, i.e. if 2016 is a significant determinant of the relationship vis-à-vis 2008.

As it turns out, relationships between immigration attitudes and welfare state attitudes are significant in nearly all cases in our pooled regression. The only notable exception are attitudes that directly relate to race and attitudes that relate to country of origin of migrants. In particular, attitudes towards people of the same ethnicity have little relation to attitudes regarding the welfare state. In line with our literature review, it seems that race plays little role in determining people's attitudes to welfare, and more economic concerns, such as poverty in the origin country of a migrant are more important in determining attitudes.

Given that the relationships between immigration and welfare attitudes are significant across the board, we need to investigate whether or not there is a significant difference in time, i.e. if the difference in time between 2016 and 2008 is significant. To do so, I have used a dummy for the year 2016 in the pooled regression. This dummy turned out significant for all countries in table 7-9 and 11. It only turned out insignificant in all cases for the attitude that 'Social services prevent widespread poverty'.

This dummy is significant for both 'Social benefits place too great a strain on the economy' and 'Social benefits costs businesses too much in taxes/charges' as shown in tables 8 and 9. This is in line with our literature review; namely that economic concerns over immigration are most relevant when investigating the link between immigration and the welfare state. The year dummy's significance tells us that there is a significant difference between 2008 and 2016, these change in time and the respective change in immigration have thus meaningfully impacted welfare state attitudes.

The analysis of the difference in time tells us something interesting about the way people view the welfare state when immigration is on the rise. Attitudes towards the welfare state's purpose do not shift completely; the year dummy is insignificant when people were asked whether or not the welfare state is equipped to fight poverty. It did however turn out significant when people were asked about the welfare state as a tool for achieving social equality. When faced with increased immigration, it would appear as if people remain supportive of the welfare state as a 'last resort' for those struck by poverty but abandon ideals of equality in the face of greater heterogeneity.

In conclusion, hypothesis 1 is mostly supported by our empirical analysis, the regressions show a significant impact of the difference in time in almost all cases. The only exception is possibly the role of the welfare state as a tool for equality in the face of increased immigration. For all other roles of the welfare state however, our pooled regression, in addition the regular regressions yield very little change in the perception of the general role of the welfare state.

**Hypothesis 2: Because a large portion of recent immigrants is a refugee, demands for compensation will be limited.**

This hypothesis may be approached from different angles, as there is no direct question on compensation demands in the ESS. As discussed in section 5.1, the relationship between immigration attitudes and the role of government in providing for the unemployed is very limited and there appears to be very little change between 2008 and 2016 as shown in 13, 20 and 27. In both years, very few relationships are significant and even fewer are consistently significant. Following on discussion of hypothesis 1, we can conclude that demands for compensation are most likely limited; as the more general attitude of welfare state's role in alleviating poverty do not change significantly between 2008 and 2016. In other words, there is little evidence from our regressions that suggests increased demands for compensation, as the attitudes that could relate to compensation in one way or another are insignificant, or barely change between 2008 and 2016. Our analysis thus supports hypothesis 2.

**Hypothesis 3: Increased costs and welfare claims caused by a rise in immigration will cause welfare chauvinism to be more relevant in our countries of interest**

To measure this hypothesis, the results regarding question E15/D38 are most relevant, as this question deals with when immigrants should be eligible for receiving welfare benefits. I have again used a pooled regression with a year dummy to see if there is a significant change between 2008 and 2016 regarding welfare chauvinism. The results of this pooled regression can be found in table 11.

First and foremost, the relationship between immigration attitudes and the question of when people should receive welfare after arriving in the host country are significant in all countries and all cases. As is to be expected, attitudes towards migration and attitudes to when people should receive welfare benefits are strongly related to one another.

Second, we will need to investigate if there is a difference due to the time period. Looking at our year dummy in table 11, we can see a significant relationship in all our three countries of interest. This means that there has been a significant shift between 2008 and 2016 in welfare chauvinism, as there is a meaningful impact of the time difference between the two. We can therefore conclude that the difference in time has had an impact on this attitude and in turn, that welfare chauvinism has become more important between 2008 and 2016.

Interestingly enough, this seems to be an attitude that is not directly related to perceived socio-economic status. The relationship between one's perceived socio-economic situation and welfare chauvinism is insignificant in all our three countries of interest. Unlike other attitudes towards the welfare state, which mostly show significant relationships to perceived socio-economic status, chauvinism seems to be an attitude held across all socio-economic statuses. A possible explanation may be that no matter what group you belong to, you prefer people belonging to the 'in-group' (in this case, fellow nationals) over any type of outsider. Cost related concerns play less of a role than just straightforward preference for one's own group.

We can thus conclude that our pooled regression analysis supports hypothesis 3, between 2008 and 2016 welfare chauvinism has become more relevant in the face of shifting attitudes towards immigration. Additionally, we may conclude that this increase in welfare chauvinism is not limited to the people that benefit from welfare, but that there is broader support for stricter eligibility requirements across all social groups in the face of greater immigration. While our three countries of interest are well-educated and wealthy, this does not seem to have caused a dampening effect on

welfare chauvinism. In any case, not so much that it has become an irrelevant factor; in all cases, welfare chauvinism has become of greater relevance between 2008 and 2016.

**Hypothesis 4: The influences mentioned in H1-3 will be most severe in Sweden, and least severe in Germany due to different eligibility requirements for welfare.**

When analysing this hypothesis, we will mostly have to investigate the effects in hypothesis 1 and 3 as hypothesis 2 turned out to have few significant results in our countries of interest. I have included a country dummy to measure the impact of country selection on results in the pooled regression between 2008 and 2016. In almost every case, the country dummy turns out as a significant indicator of welfare state attitudes, be they regarding chauvinism, general purpose, or concerns about costs.

All our three countries see similar shifts in similar domains, no single one stands out. Most likely, the general economic characteristics of these states play a bigger role than their welfare regime. This has to do with the fact that we are discussing attitudes. If this were an analysis of the real economic costs these states suffer because of immigration, regime differences would have most likely been more visible.

In this case however, perception of costs, as well as perception of migration are more important. In all three countries, immigration has been a hotbed issue in public debates (The Economist 2015). Changing sentiments are related to the attitudes we have analysed here – these are not necessarily economic calculations among native populations. Attributing these shifts in attitudes towards actual cost changes (which differ from country to country due to different welfare regimes), rather than perception, would have been attractive for our research, but this is not supported by our analysis.

At best, minor differences between our countries in terms of changing attitudes towards migration exist, but generally all three countries follow the same trend: people have more economic concerns in the face of increased immigration but do not change their perception regarding the general role of the welfare state much. For future research, it may be worthwhile to investigate how people perceive the downsides of the recent wave of immigration and offset it against the actual economic costs modern welfare states face due to these immigrants. Analysing such an issue goes beyond the scope of this thesis, however.

## 6: Policy implications and future research

What should our research mean for future immigration and welfare policies? There is never a fully right answer to this question, but there are several considerations in light of our findings. First, how our findings may relate to trends in welfare, second how they relate to trends in immigration and integration. I will discuss these two topics and suggest ways in which policymakers may deal with possible conflicts related to the trends we observe.

First, as far as welfare goes a popular idea in the past years is the so-called universal basic income. The universal income would be a welfare state provision that grants every citizen an unconditional amount of money, regardless of his or her social status or other sources of income. While only small experiments with this idea have been performed in the past few years, it has gained momentum; Switzerland even held a referendum and while the majority voted against the idea, it shows how universal basic income is entering the political mainstream. A major argument for this type of welfare provision is that there will be a limit to the amount of jobs available in the future (The Economist, 2015).

In particular, 'blue collar' type work will be increasingly automated. As this type of jobs usually make up a big chunk of a country 's employment and the amount of work where it is useful to have a human, rather than a machine in charge is limited, a big chunk of the population may become structurally unemployed. Since this unemployment may not be solvable for good reasons, i.e. our technology has become so advanced that it is simply impossible to employ everyone, a basic income may be justified. The basic income would be a way to deal with the disruption technological advancement would almost certainly cause (The Economist, 2016).

The biggest consideration, based on existing literature and the analysis we have conducted, is that if such a system were implemented, it would almost certainly mean harsher attitudes towards immigration. Since the universal basic income would be unconditional and very expensive – even a relatively small basic income would mean a large raise in taxes (The Economist, 2016) – it seems likely that attitudes towards migrants or 'outsiders' that would seek to reap the benefits of this system would be hostile, as our analysis has shown that welfare chauvinism has become more relevant in the past decade.

This would not only be a concern due to welfare chauvinism; given that concerns over general welfare state costs dominate our results and such policy measures would increase costs dramatically, the shift in attitudes among natives would be massive. If the main concern of native populations when immigration is on the rise is increased general costs of the welfare state, a (perceived) more expensive welfare state under a policy such as Universal basic Income would almost certainly harshen attitudes towards migration.

How to handle migration and welfare is obviously something that every country decides for itself, however, in some cases this may pose policy dilemmas. Restricting migration would not be a problem when migrants move to a country for economic reasons alone – in this case, there are good economic reasons to restrict immigration slightly to keep the welfare state sustainable. In the case of a refugee crisis such as the Syrian one however, a large ethical and political dilemma will arise if admission of refugees becomes unaffordable due to the basic income. This would mean either pursuing electorally unfavourable policies of driving up welfare state costs for basic income (way more than currently is the case) or sending people back to war. If the current refugee debates seem harsh, a universal basic

income would most likely make it worse as the economic side of immigration remains a strong determinant of attitudes.

The most important policy implication for future crises such as these may be then that quick integration and changing perception in the case of 'inevitable' migration (e.g. in the case of political refugees with slim chances of returning home soon) is the way forward. Integration has not failed us completely, but welfare chauvinism is still very much relevant if we look at our results. This may be where policymakers should seek to gain ground; aim to integrate people faster, prevent them from becoming an outsider group, rather than seeking to refuse them at the border.

If this perception can be changed by better integration of migrants and changing native perceptions on what constitutes an 'outsider', we may be able to deal with refugee crises without committing electoral suicide or humanitarian atrocities. Normative considerations aside – this may just be the most reasonable and utilitarian path to take. My suggestion is that while expanding welfare states make prospects for migrants look grim, there are many gains to be made in terms of perception of migrants. It may be helpful to view certain types of immigration, in particular refugees, as inevitable and view attitudes as changeable. We can deal with migration in a multitude of ways and as our data suggests, perception in addition to economics may be important. For instance, closing the gap between the perceived costs of migration and the actual costs of migration, as many people may overstate the real costs of migrants moving here. This is demonstrated in our empirical analysis; our countries of interest see similar shifts in attitudes despite having different regimes and corresponding costs.

The idea that there are substantial gains to be made in terms of integration of immigrants has substantial theoretical and empirical support. In particular, I would like to draw attention to a work by Scholten and Van Breugel published in 2017 titled 'Mainstreaming integration governance'. Their work analyses the influences of so-called 'mainstreaming' policies of integration which have become the default mode of integration in the EU. Mainstreaming policies refer to policies that abandon target-group specific policy and seek to integrate integration into to other policy fields i.e. integration as generic, inclusive, decentralized and deconcentrated rather than specific and centralized (Scholten & Van Breugel 2017: 148).

Where possible, all policy fields should contribute to integration. For example, immigrants should integrate both at work by working with natives and at home by living in areas that have a native majority. There are theoretical and pragmatic reasons to adopt such a strategy. Theoretically, it seems more effective to integrate integration in many aspects of life rather than treating it as a single issue, as it encompasses many factors of life. Pragmatically, immigrants are a very heterogeneous group, meaning that targeting specific groups is very difficult (Scholten & van Breugel 2017: 3-15).

The mainstreaming approach seems attractive; accordingly, most European countries have adopted such policies in one form or another. For example, many public policies aimed at integration focus on civic integration rather than ethnic or racial divides. Policies focus on the poor and disadvantaged (including migrants of this kind) in a broad sense and incorporate integration measures where necessary. This is a type of colour-blind ideal; we treat everyone according to his or her economic status, rather than his or her origins (Scholten & van Breugel: 30-42).

This approach yields mixed results as mainstreaming policy may ignore special needs and may not result in immigrants actually integrating better. For example, The Netherlands targeted at risk areas rather than groups with social policy. While this approach benefited migrants disproportionally, it reached less than 30% of the immigrant population that suffered integration problems. Another

example is requirements for welfare, while more migrants were drawn to job centres by mainstreaming policy, their need for additional language education was not accounted for (Scholten & van Breugel 2017: 35-42).

Another issue in current mainstreaming integration policy and hence the public debate on integration policy is that the divide between natives and immigrants remains. It fails to incorporate perception among citizens that diversity and integration policies are part of policies aimed at all of us. Rather, the narrative is still one where natives/citizens are separate from immigrants and non-citizens. Integration measures, while integrated in all policy, still target an outsider group and not the entire population (Zapata-Barrero 2017:196-99). This also gives rise to negative attitudes towards those parts of broader policies that help migrants integrate. Empirical evidence suggests that especially in times of economic crises, policies that target immigrant groups become increasingly difficult to defend for policy makers as they cause native backlash (Scholten & van Breugel 2017: 125-49).

Mainstreaming is in other words, still very much incomplete in the way that western European governments implement it as evidenced by (among others) the examples given above. The current mainstreaming trend seems to cause integration to be everyone's responsibility, but no one's in particular (Scholten & van Breugel 2017: 237-40). This does not mean all is lost for this type of policymaking, in particular, empirical evidence suggests that mainstreaming policies have booked successes on the local and European level. Mainstreaming policy at the national level (which is arguably the most influential) leaves a lot to be desired however (Scholten & van Breugel: 244-45).

The policy implication in light of the findings in this thesis is therefore that there is potential in other areas than welfare spending and immigration control. As long as European integration policy, in its current mainstreamed form remains at least partially ineffective, it may be time to consider improving integration as a priority. This is not because it is more effective in dealing with the problems that increased immigration causes for the welfare state in general, but because it may be the only option when faced with the type of immigration that Europe has seen in the past years. Refugees are distinct in that it is far harder to refuse them on economic or cultural grounds; and allowing most of them to stay for a substantial amount of time may be inevitable.

While the economic dimensions of immigration will most likely be an important (or the most important) factor in determining attitudes, situations such as a refugee crisis may force us to at the very least take the costs for what they are. In such a situation, the policy should be to focus our attention on integration, where substantial gains can be made. If integration issues were to become a thing of the past, policy makers may be able to adopt effective and necessary policies towards immigrants without facing the electoral backlash for doing so. And if they do face backlash, it would be for economic reasons, not due to a lack of understanding between natives and migrants. In short, the way to deal with the problematic relationship between immigration and the welfare state may be to look beyond budgets and borders for a solution.

## 7: Conclusion

This thesis has explored the influences of the recent influx of migrants, particularly refugees, on welfare state attitudes in the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany. First and foremost, we have examined what the links between immigration and welfare state attitudes may be and if they have changed in recent years. We have also examined how there may be so-called 'welfare chauvinism', an attitude among natives that immigrants (or any 'outsider' group) are less deserving of welfare than natives. Finally, we have examined the types of welfare regimes our countries of interest have, in the hope that they might have an influence on our outcomes.

The analysis we performed yielded some surprising results. In particular, it seems that the type of welfare regime does not matter that much. One may expect the most extensive and unconditional welfare regime, in this case Sweden, to suffer the most from mass migration. On the other hand, we may expect the least extensive and most conditional welfare regime, in this case Germany, to be influenced least. As it turned out, welfare regime did not matter, and similar trends were observed in all three countries of interest. Perception rather than the absolute costs of welfare was more important in determining people's attitudes. Additionally, we found that welfare chauvinism has become increasingly important in all our three countries of interest in recent years and that the new wave of refugees may have caused a stronger sense of 'ingroup' and 'outgroup'.

To conclude, we have addressed the implications for policymakers following our research. I have suggested that cases such as the refugee crisis are different from regular migration. Refugees cannot be refused on the same grounds as people seeking better opportunities – refugees may drive up costs but refusing them may have humanitarian consequences. Therefore, we need to seek ways to deal with the problems refugees bring for the welfare state and among the native population. I have suggested that the way forward may be to improve integration of refugees, as current mainstreaming integration policy in the EU is often insufficient. This would not take away the economic pressures of mass immigration, but it would at least dampen the negative perceptions of immigrants and their costs among the native population. If integration becomes more effective, policymakers may avoid the problematic choice of either letting in refugees and being electorally unpopular or refusing them and causing great ethical and humanitarian conflicts.

I think that looking at a crisis such as this through such a lens may have benefits in a broader context. In the case of refugees, there is almost universal agreement that they have a right to flee and leave the desolation that was their home. The debate is however often determined by the question *if* we should take in refugees rather than *how* we should deal with them. I feel that this is not the right way of dealing with this problem. The question is how we should deal with them, given that their home is uninhabitable and how we may keep natives happy while doing so. I suggest then that focusing on integration is not a normative issue but seems empirically more favourable in terms of dealing with the actual results of migration. Our data showed that many natives still hold relatively hostile attitudes towards outsiders, which may indicate that there is a lot to gain in terms of integration. While integration may not be the root problem, it may be something we are more readily equipped to deal with.

Finally, in terms of future research it may be interesting to further investigate the role of perception among native populations. In particular, whether their economic motivations for welfare chauvinism and anti-immigration are based on actual rising costs, or perceived rising costs. It may also be worthwhile to investigate the links between integration and welfare chauvinism and whether better integration policy significantly reduces hostility to outsiders in terms of welfare. In short, there is still

a lot of ground to be covered on this topic, but worthwhile to do so. Not every refugee crisis has to be a crisis if we use the right set of tools.

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# Appendix I: Regression analysis results

The appendix is ordered by independent variable, then by country (Netherlands-Sweden-Germany). All tables include a legend; colour is added in some tables as referred to in the text to indicate important results.

| ***Independent Variables*** | **2008** | **2016** |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | 0.000<br>(0.039) | -0.016<br>(0.044) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.099<br>(0.087) | 0.123<br>(0.094) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.127<br>(0.094) | -0.063<br>(0.099 |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.003<br>(0.066) | -0.112<br>(0.071) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.029<br>(0.024) | -0.025<br>(0.027) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.003<br>(0.023) | -0.054<br>(0.025) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.026<br>(0.023) | -0.020<br>(0.028) |
| $R^2$ | 0.004 | 0.011 |
| *N* | 1646 | 1520 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0*

*Table 12: Regression results for 'Responsibility of Government to provide a reasonable standard of living for the old' in the Netherlands*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.130** | -0.045 |
| | (0.44) | (0.045) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.001 | -0.057 |
| | (0.100) | (0.095) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.196 | 0.016 |
| | (0.109) | (0.100) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | 0.062 | -0.134 |
| | (0.076) | (0.072) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.026 | 0.024 |
| | (0.027) | (0.027) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.039 | 0.054** |
| | (0.026) | (0.026) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.039 | 0.055** |
| | (0.026) | (0.029) |
| $R^2$ | 0.033 | 0.041 |
| *N* | 1642 | 1516 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 13: Regression results for 'Responsibility of Government to provide a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed' in the Netherlands*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.197***<br>(0.057) | -0.088<br>(0.060) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.231<br>(0.128) | -0.046<br>(0.128) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.273<br>(0.139) | 0.287<br>(0.134) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.188**<br>(0.098) | -0.139<br>(0.096) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.024<br>(0.035) | 0.032<br>(0.036) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.109***<br>(0.034) | 0.086<br>(0.034) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.077<br>(0.034) | 0.084<br>(0.038) |
| $R^2$ | 0.042 | 0.027 |
| *N* | 1628 | 1511 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 14: Regression results for 'Responsibility of government to provide a reasonable standard of childcare' in the Netherlands*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.020<br>(0.024) | -0.005<br>(0.025) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.031<br>(0.054) | -0.080<br>(0.054) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.040<br>(0.059) | -0.062<br>(0.057) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.020<br>(0.041) | 0.008<br>(0.041) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.051***<br>(0.015) | 0.010<br>(0.016) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.009<br>(0.014) | 0.062***<br>(0.015) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.027<br>(0.014) | 0.013<br>(0.016) |
| $R^2$ | 0.046 | 0.059 |
| *N* | 1614 | 1489 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 15: Regression results for 'Social benefits place too great a strain on the economy' in the Netherlands*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | 0.045<br>(0.020) | -0.008<br>(0.023) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.024<br>(0.045) | -0.060<br>(0.048) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.092<br>(0.049) | 0.054<br>(0.051) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.040<br>(0.035 | -0.024<br>(0.036) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.002<br>(0.012) | -0.036**<br>(0.014) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.014<br>(0.012) | -0.025<br>(0.013) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.007<br>(0.012) | 0.003<br>(0.041) |
| $R^2$ | 0.009 | 0.016 |
| *N* | 1631 | 1506 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 16: Regression results for 'Social benefits provide widespread poverty' in the Netherlands*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | 0.024<br>(0.021) | 0.033<br>(0.024) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.053<br>(0.048) | 0.005<br>(0.050) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.007<br>(0.052) | -0.060<br>(0.053) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.016<br>(0.036) | 0.097**<br>(0.038) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.13<br>(0.013) | -0.027<br>(0.014) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.014<br>(0.012) | -0.041***<br>(0.014) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.011<br>(0.012) | -0.012<br>(0.015) |
| $R^2$ | 0.013 | 0.043 |
| *N* | 1624 | 1504 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 17: Regression results for 'Social benefits lead to a more equal society in the Netherlands*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.046<br>(0.024) | -0.003<br>(0.027) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.006<br>(0.055) | -0.030<br>(0.057) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.057<br>(0.060) | -0.130**<br>(0.060) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.033<br>(0.042) | -0.045<br>(0.043) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.000<br>(0.015) | 0.037<br>(0.016) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.044<br>(0.014) | 0.057**<br>(0.015) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.052<br>(0.014) | 0.006***<br>(0.017) |
| $R^2$ | 0.057 | 0.086 |
| *N* | 1581 | 1464 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 18: Regression results for 'Social benefits cost businesses too much in taxes/charges' in the Netherlands*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | 0.002<br>(0.043) | -0.110<br>(0.044) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.187<br>(0.075) | 0,301*<br>(0.073) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0,380**<br>(0.087) | 0.133***<br>(0.081) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0,394<br>(0.076) | -0.103<br>(0.067) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.102***<br>(0.023) | 0.001<br>(0.023) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.073***<br>(0.023) | 0.012<br>(0.024) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.107***<br>(0.029) | -0.013<br>(0.028) |
| $R^2$ | 0.055 | 0.013 |
| *N* | 2503 | 2709 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 19: Regression results for 'Responsibility of Government to provide a reasonable standard of living for the old' in Germany*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.103<br>(0.047) | -0.159*<br>(0.046) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.085<br>(0.081) | -0.057<br>(0.075) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0,391***<br>(0.095) | 0.063<br>(0.083) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0,400***<br>(0.083) | -0.195<br>(0.068) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.054*<br>(0.025) | -0.011**<br>(0.023) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.008<br>(0.025) | 0.047<br>(0.025) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.003<br>(0.032) | 0.082***<br>(0.029) |
| $R^2$ | 0.018 | 0.046 |
| *N* | 2495 | 2700 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 20: Regression results for 'Responsibility of Government to provide a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed' in Germany*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.044<br>(0.041) | -0.050<br>(0.037) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.018<br>(0.071) | 0.098<br>(0.060) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.154<br>(0.083) | 0.034<br>(0.067) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.123<br>(0.073) | -0.007<br>(0.055) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.030<br>(0.022) | 0.003<br>(0.019) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.137***<br>(0.022) | 0.064***<br>(0.020) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.081<br>(0.028) | -0.019<br>(0.023) |
| $R^2$ | 0.018 | 0.007 |
| *N* | 2495 | 2711 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 21: Regression results for 'Responsibility of Government to provide a reasonable standard of childcare for working parents' in Germany*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.092<br>(0.022) | -0.075***<br>(0.021) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.035***<br>(0.037) | -0.016<br>(0.035) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.079<br>(0.043) | -0.083<br>(0.039) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.035<br>(0.038) | -0.022<br>(0.032) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.009<br>(0.011) | 0.040***<br>(0.011) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.023*<br>(0.011) | 0.029**<br>(0.011) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.020<br>(0.014) | 0.013<br>(0.014) |
| $R^2$ | 0.018 | 0.079 |
| *N* | 2455 | 2677 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 22: Regression results for 'Social benefits place too great a strain on the economy' in Germany*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.012<br>(0.019) | 0.028<br>(0.019) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.063*<br>(0.032) | 0.058<br>(0.030) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.038<br>(0.037) | 0.107***<br>(0.034) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.021<br>(0.033) | -0.060**<br>(0.028) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.018<br>(0.010) | 0.009<br>(0.009) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.010<br>(0.010) | -0.022**<br>(0.010) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.014<br>(0.013) | -0.002<br>(0.012) |
| $R^2$ | 0.004 | 0.023 |
| *N* | 2482 | 2695 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 23: Regression results for 'Social benefits prevent widespread poverty' in Germany*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | 0.007<br>(0.020) | 0.034<br>(0.020) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.017<br>(0.034) | 0.111***<br>(0.033) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.029<br>(0.040) | -0.072*<br>(0.036) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | 0.013<br>(0.035) | 0.033<br>(0.030 |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.020<br>(0.011) | -0.004<br>(0.010) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.014<br>(0.011) | 0.009<br>(0.011 |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.035<br>(0.013) | -0.054***<br>(0.013) |
| $R^2$ | 0.011 | 0.031 |
| *N* | 2481 | 2695 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 24: Regression results for 'Social benefits lead to a more equal society' in Germany*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.069***<br>(0.022) | -0.034<br>(0.021) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.037<br>(0.037) | -0.001<br>(0.035) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.107*<br>(0.044) | -0.151***<br>(0.039) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.070<br>(0.038) | -0.008<br>(0.032) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.019<br>(0.012) | 0.034**<br>(0.011) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.031***<br>(0.012) | 0.042**<br>(0.011 |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.025<br>(0.015) | -0.011<br>(0.013) |
| $R^2$ | 0.034 | 0.069 |
| *N* | 2434 | 2661 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 25: Regression results for 'Social benefits cost businesses too much in taxes/charges' in Germany*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.047**<br>(0.035) | -0.019<br>(0.041) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.146<br>(0.107) | 0.183<br>(0.136) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.110<br>(0.124) | 0.040<br>(0.145) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.036<br>(0.093) | -0.040<br>(0.104) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.069<br>(0.024) | -0.019<br>(0.028) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.062<br>(0.024) | 0.068<br>(0.026) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.036<br>(0.028) | -0.031<br>(0.030) |
| $R^2$ | 0.015 | 0.009 |
| *N* | 1615 | 1364 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 26: Regression results for 'Responsibility of Government to provide a reasonable standard of living for the old' in Sweden*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.095<br>(0.044) | -0.175***<br>(0.048) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.164<br>(0.137) | 0.105<br>(0.159) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.125<br>(0.159) | -0.054<br>(0.169) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0,224<br>(0.119) | -0.083<br>(0.122 |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.012<br>(0.030) | -0.014<br>(0,32) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.023***<br>(0.030 | 0.032<br>(0.031) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.012<br>(0,36) | 0.070<br>(0.036) |
| $R^2$ | 0.023 | 0.032 |
| *N* | 1610 | 1364 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 27: Regression results for 'Responsibility of Government to provide a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed' in Sweden*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.045<br>(0.042) | -0.078<br>(0.050) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.121<br>(0.132) | 0.134<br>(0.164) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.113<br>(0.152) | -0.132<br>(0.174) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.010<br>(0.114) | -0,217<br>(0.126) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.061***<br>(0.029) | 0.014<br>(0.033) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.095<br>(0.029) | 0.047<br>(0.032) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.042<br>(0.035) | -0.013<br>(0.037) |
| $R^2$ | 0.017 | 0.022 |
| *N* | 1599 | 1360 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 28: Regression results for 'Responsibility of Government to provide a reasonable standard of childcare' in Sweden*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.102<br>(0.021) | -0.111***<br>(0.024) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.137<br>(0.064) | -0.093<br>(0.079) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.073<br>(0.074) | 0.043<br>(0.084) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.064<br>(0.055) | -0.069<br>(0.061) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.036<br>(0.014) | 0.033**<br>(0.016) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.013***<br>(0.014) | 0.010<br>(0.015) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.033<br>(0.017) | 0.046<br>(0.018) |
| $R^2$ | 0.067 | 0.099 |
| *N* | 1593 | 1345 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 29: Regression results for 'Social benefits place too great a strain on the economy' in Sweden*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | 0.010<br>(0.019) | 0.046**<br>(0.021) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.003<br>(0.058) | -0.023<br>(0.069) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.026<br>(0.068) | -0.018<br>(0.074) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.008<br>(0.051) | 0.056<br>(0.054) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.029<br>(0.013 | -0.038**<br>(0.014) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.039***<br>(0.013) | -0.001<br>(0.013) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.003<br>(0.015) | 0.001<br>(0.016) |
| $R^2$ | 0.034 | 0.154 |
| *N* | 1584 | 1344 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 30: Regression results for 'Social benefits prevent widespread poverty' in Sweden*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | 0.029<br>(0.018) | 0.068***<br>(0.021) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.005<br>(0.058) | 0.067<br>(0.069) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.051<br>(0.067) | 0.006<br>(0.075) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | 0.020<br>(0.050) | -0.020<br>(0.055) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.041*<br>(0.013) | -0.033**<br>(0.014) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.012<br>(0.013) | -0.027<br>(0.014) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.003<br>(0.015) | 0.004<br>(0.016) |
| $R^2$ | 0.039 | 0.047 |
| *N* | 1598 | 1349 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 31: Regression results for 'Social benefits lead to a more equal society' in Sweden*

| *Independent Variables* | 2008 | 2016 |
|---|---|---|
| *When Should immigrants obtain rights to social services? (E15)* | -0.120***<br>(0.021) | -0.107***<br>(0.024) |
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.077<br>(0.067) | -0.105<br>(0.079) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.042<br>(0.078) | -0.071<br>(0.085) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.077<br>(0.057) | 0.066<br>(0.062) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.058***<br>(0.015) | 0.015<br>(0.017) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.012<br>(0.015) | 0.049***q<br>(0.015) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.008<br>(0.017) | 0.028<br>(0.018) |
| $R^2$ | 0.076 | 0.097 |
| *N* | 1543 | 1324 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: Standard Error in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

*Table 32: Regression results for 'Social benefits cost businesses too much in charges/taxes' in Sweden*

# Appendix II: Pooled regression results

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.045*<br>(0.017) | -0.007<br>(0.017) | -0.034*<br>(0.017) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.036<br>(0.020) | 0.005<br>(0.020) | 0.009<br>(0.019) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | 0.034*<br>(0.016) | 0.058*<br>(0.016) | 0.029<br>(0.016) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.020*<br>(0.004) | -0.007<br>(0.005) | -0.017*<br>(0.005) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.007<br>(0.049) | -0.011*<br>(0.005) | -0.009<br>(0.005) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.024*<br>(0.006) | -0.035*<br>(0.006) | -0.031*<br>(0.006) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | 0.042*<br>(0.012) | 0.072*<br>(0.011) | 0.066*<br>(0.012) |
| *Year Dummy* | -0.040*<br>(0.016) | -0.039*<br>(0.016) | -0.040*<br>(0.016) |
| *Country Dummy* | 0,332*<br>(0.017) | -0,214*<br>(0.019) | -0.190*<br>(0.020) |
| *N* | 11011 | 11011 | 11011 |
| $R^2$ | 0.063 | 0.045 | 0.041 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the $\leq$ 0.05 level*

*Table 33: Pooled regression results for 'Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society' as dependent variable*

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.009<br>(0.019) | -0.023<br>(0.019) | 0.019<br>(0.019) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.080*<br>(0.021) | -0.078*<br>(0.021) | -0.103*<br>(0.021) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.018<br>(0.017) | -0.031<br>(0.017) | -0.029<br>(0.017) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.031*<br>(0.005) | 0.027*<br>(0.005) | 0.024*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.011*<br>(0.006) | 0.012*<br>(0.005) | 0.013*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.024*<br>(0.006) | 0.026*<br>(0.006) | 0.030*<br>(0.006) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | 0.032*<br>(0.13) | 0.029*<br>(0.013) | 0.016<br>(0.013) |
| *Year Dummy* | 0.095*<br>(0.018) | 0.094*<br>(0.018) | 0.094*<br>(0.018) |
| *Country Dummy* | -0.080*<br>(0.019) | 0.173*<br>(0.021) | -0.090*<br>(0.021) |
| *N* | 10930 | 10930 | 10930 |
| $R^2$ | 0.049 | 0.049 | 0.045 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the $\leq$ 0.05 level*

*Table 34: Pooled regression results for 'Social benefits/services place too great strain on the economy' as dependent variable*

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | -0.003<br>(0.020) | -0.030<br>(0.020) | -0.049*<br>(0.019) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | -0.125*<br>(0.022) | -0.099*<br>(0.022) | -0.098*<br>(0.021) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.039*<br>(0.018) | -0.026<br>(0.018) | -0.044*<br>(0.018) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | 0.031*<br>(0.006) | 0.038*<br>(0.006) | 0.032*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | 0.017*<br>(0.006) | 0.015*<br>(0.006) | 0.016*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.019*<br>(0.006) | 0.013*<br>(0.006) | 0.015*<br>(0.007) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | -0.021<br>(0.013) | -0.003<br>(0.013) | -0.007<br>(0.013) |
| *Year Dummy* | 0.252*<br>(0.018) | 0.252*<br>(0.018) | 0.252*<br>(0.018) |
| *Country Dummy* | 0.196*<br>(0.020) | -0.122*<br>(0.021) | -0.118*<br>(0.022) |
| *N* | 10769 | 10769 | 10769 |
| $R^2$ | 0.081 | 0.075 | 0.074 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the $\leq$ 0.05 level*

*Table 35: Pooled regression results for 'Social benefits cost businesses too much in taxes/charges' as dependent variable*

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.005<br>(0.017) | 0.016<br>(0.016) | -0.009<br>(0.016) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.036<br>(0.019) | 0.034<br>(0.018) | 0.049*<br>(0.018) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | -0.038*<br>(0.015) | -0.032*<br>(0.015) | -0.032*<br>(0.015) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.038*<br>(0.015) | -0.015*<br>(0.005) | -0.014*<br>(0.005) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.018*<br>(0.005) | -0.019*<br>(0.005) | -0.019*<br>(0.005) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | 0.002<br>(0.006) | 0.001<br>(0.005) | -0.001<br>(0.005) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | 0.045*<br>(0.011) | 0.046*<br>(0.011) | 0.054*<br>(0.011) |
| *Year Dummy* | -0.004<br>(0.016) | -0.003<br>(0.016) | -0.003<br>(0.016) |
| *Country Dummy* | 0.040*<br>(0.017) | -0.099*<br>(0.0180 | 0.059*<br>(0.019) |
| *N* | 11009 | 11009 | 11009 |
| $R^2$ | 0.012 | 0.015 | 0.013 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the ≤ 0.05 level*

*Table 36: Pooled regression results for 'Social benefits/services prevent widespread poverty' as dependent variable*

| *Independent Variables* | Germany | The Netherlands | Sweden |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Allow people of the same ethnic group (B38)* | 0.060*<br>(0.019) | 0.029<br>(0.019) | 0.092*<br>(0.019) |
| *Allow people of different Ethnic group (B39)* | 0.127*<br>(0.022) | 0.137*<br>(0.021) | 0.096*<br>(0.022) |
| *Allow People from poorer countries outside Europe (B40)* | 0.152*<br>(0.017) | 0.136*<br>(0.017) | 0.134*<br>(0.017) |
| *Immigrants are good for a countries economy (B41)* | -0.015*<br>(0.006) | -0.020*<br>(0.006) | -0.025*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country's cultural life is enriched by immigrants (B42)* | -0.037*<br>(0.006) | -0.036*<br>(0.006) | -0.034*<br>(0.006) |
| *Country is made a better/worse place by people from other countries coming here (B43)* | -0.042*<br>(0.006) | -0.041*<br>(0.006) | -0.034*<br>(0.006) |
| *Perceived household income/socio-economic status (F42)* | 0.06<br>(0.013) | 0.007<br>(0.013) | -0.017<br>(0.013) |
| *Year Dummy* | -0.095*<br>(0.018) | -0.096*<br>(0.018) | -0.096*<br>(0.018) |
| *Country Dummy* | -0.075*<br>(0.019) | 0.247*<br>(0.021) | -0.181*<br>(0.022) |
| *N* | 10901 | 10901 | 10901 |
| $R^2$ | 0.149 | 0.159 | 0.153 |

*Source: ESS (2008, 2016)*

*Notes: * indicates significance at the $\leq$ 0.05 level*

*Table 37: Pooled regression results for 'When should immigrants be granted access to social goods/services' as dependent variable*