Leiden University

NEUTRALITY AND EU MEMBER STATE SUPPORT FOR THE CSDP AFTER THE UKRAINE CONFLICT

The cases of Ireland, Austria, and Finland

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Abstract

The Ukraine conflict of 2014 has increased geo-political tensions at the borders of the EU. This has increased the demand for security of many EU member states, especially those geographically close to Russia. However, EU member states that are neutral cannot rely on NATO for their security because their neutrality prevents them from joining this alliance. This may have led them to consider the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the EU to be an alternative to NATO. Consequently, they may have increased their support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict in order to benefit from its security potential. Using the theories of neorealism, sociological institutionalism, and neo-classical realism, this research analyzes how the Ukraine conflict has affected the support of the neutral EU member states of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP. It has found that these countries have supported the CSDP mostly in a symbolic way after the conflict, i.e. without transferring essential and costly competences to the CSDP. This lack of substantive support is not the result of the countries' neutrality policies, which indicates that the CSDP is currently not perceived as a valuable alternative to NATO; not even in the eyes of those member states that could benefit the most from the CSDP's security capabilities.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction 6

2. Background information on the CSDP and EU member state neutrality 10

  2.1 The historical development of European defense integration 10

  2.2 The neutrality of Ireland, Austria, and Finland 16

3. Theoretical framework 19

  3.1 Neorealist motivations for neutral EU member states to support the CSDP 19

    3.1.1 The performance of the CSDP in the international security and defense field and the related support of EU member states 19

    3.1.2 Neorealism and substantive support for the CSDP 21

  3.2 Sociological institutionalist motivations for neutral EU member states to support the CSDP 24

    3.2.1 The collective European security identity and the related support of EU member states for the CSDP 24

    3.2.2 Sociological institutionalism and symbolic support for the CSDP 25

  3.3 Neo-classical realist motivations for neutral EU member states not to support the CSDP 27

    3.3.1 The compatibility between the neutrality of EU member states and their participation in the CSDP 27

    3.3.2 Neo-classical realism and limited support for the CSDP 28

  3.4 Conclusion 30

4. Methodology 31

  4.1 Case selection 31

  4.2 Indicators and methods 32

  4.3 Limitations 44

5. Analysis 47

  5.1 Finland 50

    5.1.1 Government statements 50

    5.1.2 Public opinion 52

    5.1.3 Participation in CSDP missions 53

    5.1.4 Participation in PESCO projects 56

    5.1.5 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUTM Mali 57

    5.1.6 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUFOR RCA 59

    5.1.7 Conclusion 62

  5.2 Ireland 65

    5.2.1 Government statements 65

    5.2.2 Public opinion 67

5.2.3 Participation in CSDP missions 68
5.2.4 Participation in PESCO projects 71
5.2.5 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUTM Mali 71
5.2.6 Conclusion 72
5.3 Austria 75
5.3.1 Government statements 75
5.3.2 Public opinion 78
5.3.3 Participation in CSDP missions 79
5.3.4 Participation in PESCO projects 82
5.3.5 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUTM Mali 83
5.3.6 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUFOR RCA 83
5.3.7 Conclusion 85
6. Conclusion and discussion 88
6.1 Conclusion of the research 89
6.2 Discussion of the implications of the research 92
References 94
Appendix 105

Acronyms and abbreviations

CARD	Co-ordinated Annual Review on Defence
CEDC	Central European Defence Cooperation
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DoD	Department of Defense
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defense Agency
EDAP	European Defense Action Plan
EDC	European Defense Community
EDF	European Defense Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EUAM	European Union Advisory Mission
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Missions
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUFOR RCA	European Union Force Central African Republic
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law
EUMAM	European Union Military Advisory Mission
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Missions
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORDEFCO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUPOL-A	European Union Police Afghanistan
EUPOL/EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
IQAM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
MaAF	Malian Armed Forces

MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NB8	Nordic-Baltic Eight
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union

1. Introduction

While it may seem logical that the neutrality of a country precludes the participation of that country in any kind of international military organization, in reality this is not always the case. For example, even though their neutrality prevents them from joining NATO, the member states of the European Union (EU) that are neutral, which are Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Malta, and Finland, have actively participated in military and civilian missions of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the EU in the past (Devine, 2011, p. 341)**.** This is not because the security and defense policy of the EU simply lacks any substantive capabilities that would conflict with a policy of neutrality; in fact, aside from the collective defense clause of NATO (Article 5), several features of the CSDP are very similar to features of NATO (Lachmann, 2010, p. 1; Lachmann, 2013, p. 143). For example, both organizations can be considered international military organizations because they conduct military operations using the resources of their member states, and both organizations have the same goals and values concerning international security (Lachmann, 2010, p. 1). Also, many articles in the Lisbon Treaty, which shaped the current CSDP, are incompatible or are competing with elements commonly associated with the concept of neutrality. These elements include the non-membership of a military alliance, anti-militarism, the limitation of the use of force to self-defense, and impartiality in global power politics (Devine, 2011, p. 353). In other words, while the neutrality of EU member states precludes their NATO membership, it does not prevent them from actively participating in the CSDP, which contains features that are similar to those of NATO and that are incompatible with neutrality in general. Furthermore, most of the neutral EU member states participate in additional international security organizations such as the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8), the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC), and NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). Neutrality therefore is a complex concept; it does not seem to constrain the foreign policies of countries to such an extent that substantive international military cooperation is impossible. For this reason, it is argued that neutrality is an "illusive concept" (Andrén, 1991, p. 67), and that it "bears more than its fair share of different connotations" (Keatinge, 1984, p. 3).

This research will further investigate the complexity of the concept of neutrality and the implications this complexity has for the CSDP by analyzing how the neutral EU member states of Ireland, Austria, and Finland support the CSDP. Their support will be analyzed in a period where increased support for international security organizations can be expected, i.e. in a period where geo-political tensions are high. Their support will also be analyzed in a period where increased support for international security organizations cannot be expected, i.e. in a period where geo-political tensions are low. Thus, the goal of this research is to analyze whether the support of neutral

EU member states for the CSDP increases when their security is being threatened due to increased geo-political tensions, despite the fact that the CSDP is officially incompatible with their neutrality policies. The event that will be used to indicate a change in geo-political tensions is the Ukraine conflict, which comprises the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 as well as the efforts of Russia to destabilize the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine. Before the Ukraine conflict, there was no acute geo-political threat to the security of EU member states, whereas after the conflict many EU member states, especially those in the geographical proximity of Russia, increasingly feared for their security (Deubner, 2018, pp. 51-52). However, the western EU member states, which are geographically located further away from Russia, did not fear for their security to the same extent (Deubner, 2018, pp. 51-52). Since geographical distance from Russia appears to affect the threat perceptions of EU member states, which may in turn affect their support for the CSDP, this research will analyze cases that vary in their geographical distance from Russia: Ireland, which is geographically located far away from Russia; Finland, which is geographically close to Russia; and Austria, which is geographically located in between Ireland and Finland. In this way, the effect of geo-political tensions on the support of neutral EU member states for the CSDP can be analyzed better. In other words, this research aims to answer the following question:

> *How did the Ukraine conflict affect the support of the neutral countries of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP?*

Answering this question also provides insights about whether the CSDP currently constitutes an important alternative to NATO. If the CSDP truly possesses the security and defense capabilities that are necessary for it to play a significant role alongside NATO, it can be argued that the neutral EU member states are the first ones to recognize this, as they cannot join NATO but do have an interest in attaining more security. This is especially the case after the Ukraine conflict, which has resulted in increased geo-political tensions. In other words, the Ukraine conflict has likely increased the demand for security of neutral EU member states, but they cannot attain this security from NATO due to their neutrality, which is why they may have an interest in a powerful CSDP instead. Thus, a capable CSDP arguably matters the most for the neutral EU member states, who cannot attain the security they likely desire after the Ukraine conflict from NATO, but who can attain that security from the CSDP because, in the eyes of the neutral EU member states themselves, the CSDP does not violate their neutrality. The degree in which these member states support the CSDP likely determines how relevant they consider the CSDP to be as an international security organization. Thus, if they have increased their support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, it can be argued that they currently consider the CSDP to be a relevant security provider that can grant them the security they desire but cannot attain from NATO.

However, the relevance of the CSDP as an international security organization is an issue that concerns every EU member state, not solely those that have adopted a neutral foreign policy. This is because the survival of NATO can no longer be taken for granted, as United States (US) President Donald Trump has for example threatened to pull the US out of the alliance (Cooper and Barnes, 2019). Thus, the conclusion of this research, i.e. whether the EU is truly perceived as a relevant international security and defense actor by neutral EU member states, also contains implications for the non-neutral EU member states, who can no longer blindly rely on NATO for their security. In short, whether or not the CSDP currently constitutes a relevant alternative to NATO is an important question for all EU member states, but more so for those that are neutral, which makes them relevant cases to analyze in order to investigate the current relevance of the CSDP as an international security provider.

The research is structured as follows. Chapter 2 creates an overview of the historical development of European defense integration from the first years after the end of the Second World War until the most recent developments in the security and defense field of the EU. It also contains a discussion of what it means to be a 'neutral' EU member state, and what implications this neutrality actually has. The chapter is meant to provide the reader with the necessary background information in order to improve the comprehensibility of both the literature review and the analytical chapter of the research.

Chapter 3 discusses academic literature on the different ways in which and reasons why EU member states support the CSDP, as well as what role neutrality plays in this support. Based on this discussion, the theories of neorealism, sociological institutionalism, and neo-classical realism are presented, which together form the theoretical framework for the analysis.

Chapter 4 discusses the methodology and the indicators that are used, as well as the limitations of this research. These indicators take the form of public statements of government officials of Ireland, Austria, and Finland about the CSDP; the public opinion of these countries on the CSDP; the amount of personnel the countries have contributed to military and civilian CSDP missions and projects; and the amount of projects of the 'Permanent Structured Cooperation' (PESCO) initiative the countries have participated in. For each country, these indicators, except for the last indicator, will be measured before and after the Ukraine conflict. In this way, conclusions can be made about whether or not the support of the countries has increased after this conflict. Thus, the method of process tracing will be used to conduct the analysis, which means that the indicators are traced over time in order to identify the effects of the Ukraine conflict on the support of the neutral EU member states for the CSDP.

Chapter 5 contains the analysis, where the effect of the Ukraine conflict on the support of the neutral EU member states for the CSDP is assessed using empirical evidence. I expected that the Ukraine conflict would have increased the threat perception of Finland in particular, because Finland shares a border with Russia and therefore considered Russia to be a significant threat after the Ukraine conflict. This should in turn have increased Finland’s efforts to make the CSDP more capable, so that Finland could benefit from the CSDP’s security. However, the evidence shows that after the Ukraine conflict, Ireland, Austria, and Finland have supported the CSDP mostly in a symbolic way rather than by transferring essential competences to the CSDP in order to make it more capable. To an extent, this could be expected from Ireland and Austria, because these countries are geographically located far away from Russia and therefore have a lower threat perception after the Ukraine conflict and subsequently a lower interest in improving the security capabilities of the CSDP. However, Finland also did not make significant efforts to improve the CSDP’s capabilities, which is unexpected. This is because Finland shares a border with Russia, which has increased its threat perception, which in turn should have increased its interest in making the CSDP more capable. The fact that Finland nevertheless did not significantly support the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict indicates that geographical distance from Russia and the threat perception that accompanies that distance do not dictate the support of neutral EU member states for the CSDP. Instead, the support of the neutral EU member states for the CSDP is more complicated, which may have significant implications for the future effectiveness of the CSDP. Chapter 6 will discuss the conclusion of this research, and it will also discuss these implications.

2. Background information on the CSDP and EU member state neutrality

This chapter will provide information about the origins, tasks, and ambitions of the CSDP, as well as information about what it means to be a neutral EU member state. This information will constitute a stepping stone that is useful in order for the reader to better comprehend the literature review and the analytical chapter of this research. The chapter is comprised of two sections; the historical development of European defense integration is discussed in the first section, after which the neutrality of Ireland, Austria, and Finland is discussed in the second section.

2.1 The historical development of European defense integration

After the Second World War, the main threat to European countries was no longer Germany, but the Soviet Union. This allowed for the European countries, together with the US, to engage in defense integration. As a result, on March 17, 1948, the Treaty of Brussels was signed, in which the United Kingdom (UK), France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg pledged to cooperate on social, economic, cultural, and military dimensions (Howorth, 2013, p. 6).

After the signing of the Brussels treaty, the European countries increased their efforts to cooperate in the security field, both on a European level and on a transatlantic level with the US. While security cooperation with the US proved successful after the creation of NATO in 1949, European countries, with France in particular, proved unwilling to pool their resources and their sovereignty in a purely European context, which prevented the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) (Howorth, 2013, p. 6). Instead, the first European supranational institution, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was formed in 1950, which aimed to pool the raw resources of coal and steel owned by European countries. Since these resources are essential for waging war, pooling them would make it impossible for European countries to engage in another war with each other (Howorth, 2013, p. 6). However, the reluctance of the European countries to pool their sovereignty and engage in defense integration set the tone for the following decades, as it was only in the 1990s that this integration was seriously reconsidered (Howorth, 2013, p. 6). In short, from 1950 until the 1990s, European security integration remained at a standstill; therefore, NATO remained the predominant international security and defense organization in which European countries cooperated.

This did not mean however that the European countries were completely content with the NATO partnership; in fact, they were severely unsatisfied with their dependence on the US for their security. They became even more unsatisfied after the US seemed to make unilateral decisions on security issues with the Soviet Union that involved European countries as well, such as nuclear de-armament (Howorth, 2013, p. 7). While there was a willingness among European countries to reduce their dependence on the US for their security, they also realized that without the US, they were not able to attain the security they needed to defend themselves against the Soviet threat. However, after the actions of Gorbachev in the 1980s seemed to reduce the threat that the Soviet Union posed, the European countries were able to create initiatives for increased security integration in a purely European context (Howorth, 2013, p. 7).

The first of these initiatives was the reinvigoration of the Western European Union (WEU), the military alliance that was created in the Treaty of Brussels in 1948 and that comprised a small group of European countries. While the role of the WEU was severely limited after the creation of NATO, its symbolic function became more important after 1988, when the members of the WEU declared their support for a European community with an integrated security and defense framework (Howorth, 2013, p. 7).

After the WEU set the tone for increased security integration in the 1980s, the second initiative built on this spirit of increased integration: the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a part of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Howorth, 2013, p. 7). In line with the new ambitions of the European countries to increase their security integration, they established the EU and gave the Union a security identity with the CFSP. The initial version of the CSFP as described in the Treaty of Maastricht provided the EU with a main security objective: “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union” (Treaty on European Union, 1992, p. 123). Decisions within the CFSP would be made by unanimity, i.e. in an intergovernmental manner, in order to account for the fear of some member states that the EU would make security decisions that went against their will (Troitino, 2013, p. 324). However, this version of the CFSP did not incentivize states to take a proactive stance in terms of providing input to the decision-making procedure and defining the EU’s foreign policy; consequently, the CFSP was heavily criticized for its reactive instead of proactive nature (Monar, 1997, p. 416). The CFSP’s reactive nature, its intergovernmental decision-making procedure, as well as the fact that the EU lacked the necessary military instruments to act according to the security ambitions stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, resulted in a blunder: the EU failed to play an active role in the Balkan conflict (Vanhoonacker, 2012, p. 140). In short, up until the Treaty of Maastricht, there was a clear willingness among EU member states to integrate further in the field of security, but this integration arguably had not yet reached the point at which substantive measures were taken that made the EU a relevant and proactive international security actor.

In part to resolve the ineffectiveness of the CSDP and to further define the security dimension of the EU, the EU member states signed the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (Vanhoonacker, 2012, p. 140). One of the novelties of the treaty was the creation of the High Representative for the CFSP, whose main tasks were to express the position of the EU during negotiations between the European Council and other parties, and to assist in the formulation, preparation, and implementation of security policy decisions (Monar, 1997, pp. 423-424). Furthermore, in order to improve the effectiveness of the foreign and security decision-making procedure, the unanimity voting rule was replaced by a qualified majority voting rule for several elements of the CFSP, including decisions on ‘common strategies’: guidelines for the EU’s security policy regarding specific countries and regions. For those elements where unanimity voting was still present, a member state could now abstain from voting without completely preventing the adoption of a proposal (Vanhoonacker, 2012, pp. 140-141). Another particularly novel aspect that the Treaty of Amsterdam added to the CFSP was the pledge to secure the ‘integrity of the Union’, which mainly entailed that member states would increase their efforts to safeguard the territorial borders of the EU (Monar, 1997, p. 415). While this pledge did not equal NATO’s objectives and capabilities, it did give the EU a new security identity that strengthened the joint action capabilities of the EU member states, as it made it more difficult for each member state to pursue their own foreign security policy (Monar, 1997, p. 415). Lastly, the Amsterdam Treaty included the Petersburg Tasks, which were the objectives of the WEU that it stipulated in 1992. These objectives entailed mostly humanitarian missions, peacekeeping missions, and the deployment of combat forces in crisis management operations (Vanhoonacker, 2012, p. 141). However, a full integration of the WEU into the EU was prevented by the UK, as this integration could undermine the role of NATO, as well as by the neutral countries of Finland, Austria, Ireland, and Sweden, which did not want to become part of a military organization (Vanhoonacker, 2012, p. 141).

Nevertheless, despite the previous objections from the UK and the neutral countries, the UK and France agreed upon the transfer of competences from the WEU to the EU during the Saint-Malo Declaration on December 4, 1998 (Joint Declaration on European Defence, 1998, p. 2). Consequently, most of the tasks of the WEU were officially transferred to the EU after the Cologne European Council meeting in 1999, which was deemed “necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks” (European Council, 1999, p. 35). The integration of the competences of the WEU into the EU was part of a new policy, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which was created in the Cologne European Council meeting in order for the EU to be able to act autonomously in the international security field and to obtain the credible military forces that this autonomy required (Grevi, 2009, p. 19). Thus, the EU needed the (military) capabilities of the WEU in order to act upon its new ambitions as stipulated in the CFSP and the newly established ESDP. While an important goal of the ESDP was to allow the EU to make decisions on issues of security and crisis management autonomously from NATO, the Council repeatedly made it clear that NATO remained the main framework on collective security, and that the new security ambitions of the EU would not undermine NATO's capabilities (European Council, 1999, p. 33).

In 2003, the EU further increased its ambitions in the security field by creating the European Security Strategy (ESS). While the ESDP was mostly concerned with humanitarian missions and peace enforcement missions, the ESS added the reduction of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the fight against international terrorism to the EU's list of goals (Council of the EU, 2003, pp. 2-3). Furthermore, the ESS advocated an 'effective multilateral international order', meaning that EU member states should increasingly work together and with the United Nations (UN) when conducting ESDP missions. However, this meant that it would be the EU member states rather than the EU itself that would conduct ESDP missions, which proved to be problematic because different member states had different security interests (Quille, 2004, p. 422). Together with the fact that the ESS lacked concrete plans as to how member states should cooperate and what exact goals they should aim to achieve, the lack of a common security interest among EU member states undermined the EU's ability to act upon its security ambitions (Quille, 2004, p. 422).

Despite the integration of the WEU into the EU, the EU and its ESDP still lacked material capabilities, which led to the creation of the European Defense Agency (EDA) in 2004. The official goals of the EDA were developing defense capabilities; promoting and enhancing armaments cooperation between EU member states; strengthening the technological and industrial base of the EU's security field; creating a European Defence Equipment Market, where EU member states could exchange military material such as weapons and ammunition on a larger scale; and making the EU's defense Research and Technology more effective (Chang, 2011, p. 72). Where previous EU defense initiatives were mostly limited to stipulating ambitions and goals, the EDA was concerned with developing the actual material capabilities necessary to realize those ambitions and goals. While this in itself was a significantly novel development, the EDA was still an intergovernmental agency, meaning that EU member states could still decide for themselves whether they would participate in any of the EDA's policies (Chang, 2011, p. 79). Thus, one of the ESDP's foundational problems, i.e. that EU member states often act according to their own interests rather than that of the EU, was not solved by the creation of the EDA.

A further step in the process of European defense integration was the signing of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009. The Lisbon Treaty replaced the ESDP with the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and with this change came the possibility for EU member states to engage in

‘Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)’: a framework in which the member states can bind themselves to commitments in order to increase defense cooperation between them. The performance and the compliance of the member states that participate in PESCO are assessed by the EDA (Biscop and Coelmont, 2012, p. 87). Member states that participate in PESCO can cooperate for example by supplying the military needs of other member states; pooling and sharing their resources; specializing their military; making their forces more readily available, interoperable, flexible, and deployable; and by participating in equipment programs of the EDA (Biscop and Coelmont, 2012, p. 87). What makes PESCO different from previous defense integration initiatives is the fact that participation in PESCO is voluntary but binding: as soon as a member state commits itself to certain objectives in the PESCO framework, it has to actively pursue those objectives. If it does not, the EDA can suspend that member state’s membership of PESCO (Kolín, 2018). This sets PESCO apart from previous security and defense initiatives, which always remained non-binding. Another defense initiative introduced in the Lisbon Treaty was the ‘mutual defense clause’, which stipulates that “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, p. 35). The mutual defense clause was invoked for the first time by France, an active supporter of the EU defense agenda, after a terrorist attack in Paris in 2015. Germany and the UK responded by delivering military assets and by further supporting France’s fight against terrorism abroad (Tardy, 2018, p. 125). While the mutual defense clause seems similar to the collective defense clause (article 5) of NATO, it is different in the sense that member states are not obligated to assist other member states *militarily*; this makes the clause compatible with the neutrality policies of some EU member states, while NATO’s collective security clause is not (Tardy, 2018, p. 125).

After the Russian annexation of Crimea, the refugee crisis, the vote of the UK to leave the EU, and the threats of US president Trump to withdraw the US from NATO, the EU’s security environment had changed dramatically by 2016, which is why the EU replaced the ESS with the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS): a new security and defense strategy that emphasized the need to respond to external conflicts and crises, to build the capacities of partners as well as military capacities, to protect the Union and its citizens, and to further increase defense cooperation between EU member states (European Council, 2016, pp. 2-3).

The EUGS became the basis for further initiatives on defense integration, one of which is the Co-ordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which has been tested in 2017 and will be implemented in the autumn of 2019. The purpose of CARD is to allow EU member states to (voluntarily) synchronize and ‘mutually adapt’ the way in which they plan their defense, i.e. how much they spend on and invest in their defense and how much effort they put into defense research and technology (Tardy, 2018, pp. 126-127). CARD is an important instrument because it largely resolves the lack of defense coordination between EU member states, which is a significant flaw of the EU's security and defense sector (Tardy, 2018, p. 127).

Another initiative that came out of the EUGS was the so-called Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) of 2017, which created a permanent military-strategic headquarters for all of the EU's non-executive military projects, i.e. projects where the EU plays an advisory role (Tardy, 2018, p. 127). The creation of the MPCC was important mostly because it indicated that EU member states accepted that the EU should have its own command center for military missions, which is something that member states did not approve of in the past (Tardy, 2018, p. 127). In other words, the most significant novelty that the MPCC brings is the increased political will of EU member states to integrate their defense policies.

After the creation of the EUGS, PESCO was also given a more important role; whereas many member states opposed the idea of permanent structured cooperation when it was first introduced in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Council received the necessary support to formally establish PESCO in December 2017, and all EU member states except the UK, Malta, and Denmark joined it (Tardy, 2018, p. 127). Currently there are 34 adopted PESCO projects; 17 of them were adopted in the first round of PESCO projects in March 2018, and the other 17 were adopted in the second round in November 2018 (European Council, 2018). The establishment of PESCO testifies to the fact that the preferences of the member states towards EU defense integration have changed significantly ever since the introduction of the EUGS, even to such an extent that most of them are willing to bind themselves to defense commitments.

Lastly, the European Defense Fund (EDF), proposed in the European Defense Action Plan (EDAP) of 2016, has been provisionally agreed upon by the Parliament, Council, and Commission in February 2019 (European Commission, 2019). The goal of the EDF is to "foster an innovative and competitive defence industrial base and contribute to the EU's strategic autonomy" (European Commission, 2019a) by making defense spending part of the long-term EU budget of 2021-2027, the so-called Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The budget, aimed at incentivizing member states to participate in defense cooperation, will be spent on defense research and defense capability development (Tardy, 2018, p. 128). The EDF aims to spend €590 million from 2017 until 2020 and a total of €13 billion in the MFF 2021-2027, which would rank the EU among the top 4 largest investors in European defense research and technology (European Commission, 2019b).

In conclusion, whereas European defense integration remained largely overshadowed by NATO up until the 1990s, significant defense initiatives have been made over the last ten years. This not only indicates that the EU's military capabilities have vastly improved and are likely to improve further in the future, but also, and perhaps more importantly, that the preferences of EU member states have shifted from conservative positions that emphasized NATO as the main international security and defense actor towards a more Eurocentric position that favors the development of the EU as an international security and defense actor.

2.2 The neutrality of Ireland, Austria, and Finland

Ireland, Austria, and Finland have adopted a neutrality policy for different reasons. For instance, Ireland practically adopted a neutrality policy as early as 1950, when it was invited to join the NATO military alliance. Ireland refused this invitation because it did not want to become part of a military alliance that had the UK, which in the eyes of Ireland unjustly occupied Irish territory, as one of its members (Fanning, 1979, p. 38). Ireland kept its neutrality policy ever since. While the reason why Ireland adopted a neutrality policy is nationally specific, the reason why Austria and Finland became neutral is more general: to indicate their impartiality between the Western bloc, including the NATO military alliance, and the Eastern bloc during the Cold War (Doherty, 2002, p. 1). Even after the end of the Cold War, Austria and Finland kept their neutrality policies. Thus, Ireland, Austria, and Finland adopted their neutrality policies for different reasons, but there is one major implication for all neutral EU member states that comes from their neutrality: they cannot join NATO. Because all three countries retained their neutrality policies, they are still not members of NATO as of today.

Although the countries' neutrality policies have been maintained for a long period of time, the legal implications of these policies are arguably limited for most of the countries. This is because the neutrality of the countries is mostly a matter of government policy rather than a matter of legal requirements that the countries have to adhere to. For example, the neutrality of Ireland has no legal implications other than Article 29, section 4, subsection 9° of the constitution of Ireland, which states that "the State shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defence pursuant to Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union where that common defence would include the State" (Constitution of Ireland, 2018). Despite the lack of legal obstacles towards NATO membership, the Irish government wants Ireland to remain 'militarily neutral', i.e. it does not want Ireland to join NATO. The predominant reason for this is that the public opinion of Ireland is opposed to joining a military alliance that could undermine the autonomy of Ireland's foreign and security policy (Devine, 2011, p. 341). Furthermore, Finland has abandoned its official status of neutrality after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and changed its status to 'military non-aligned' instead (Devine, 2011, p. 335). This change marked the end of Finland's official and legal status of neutrality as it was indicated in the international treaties that were signed between Finland

and the Soviet Union after the Second World War, such as the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Devine, 2011, p. 348). While this change ended Finland's legal basis of neutrality, the principle of neutrality is still being maintained by Finnish government leaders today, which mainly means that the government of Finland still chooses not to join NATO in order to prevent any confrontation with Russia (Forsell and Rosendahl, 2017; MAŤÁTKOVÁ, 2016). Lastly, as opposed to the neutrality of Ireland and Finland, Austria's neutrality has been consolidated in its constitution ever since the year 1955. The 'Federal Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria' was implemented in October 1955 to ensure Austria's impartiality during the Cold War. This law, which is still active today, states that "Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on her territory" (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Austria, 2019). Thus, while non-membership of NATO remains mostly a political choice of the Irish and Finnish government leaders, the Austrian government is actually prohibited by law to join NATO.

While their neutrality policies thus prevent Ireland, Austria, and Finland from joining NATO, these policies do not prevent them from actively participating in other international security organizations, such as the UN, the EU's CSDP, NATO's PfP, and NORDEFCO (Devine, 2011, p. 341; Doherty, 2002, p. 1; Forsell and Rosendahl, 2017). This is because those organizations and programs are not formal 'military alliances', but rather aim to resolve international security disputes and enforce international law (Devine, 2011, p. 341). Therefore, the participation of Ireland, Austria, and Finland in these organizations and programs is often not considered a violation of their neutrality, which is predominantly focused on the 'non-membership of military alliances', i.e. on non-membership of NATO.

However, the CSDP has rapidly developed its military capabilities ever since the implementation of the EUGS, for example through the creation of CARD, EDF, MPCC, and PESCO. These increased military capabilities are arguably putting the CSDP more at odds with the neutrality policies of the neutral EU member states (Fägersten et al., 2018, p. 3). This seemingly incompatible relationship between the new developments of the CSDP and neutrality nevertheless does not seem to prevent the future participation of the neutral EU member states in the CSDP; they still argue that the new initiatives do not make the EU a formal military alliance and that the initiatives therefore do not preclude their participation in the CSDP (Andrews, 2018).

In conclusion, Ireland, Austria, and Finland have adopted their neutrality policies for different reasons, but their neutralities all share the same implication: it prevents the countries from joining NATO. While the countries' neutrality policies for the most part do not have a legal foundation, except for Austria's neutrality, the governments of the countries nevertheless choose not to join NATO. This is because NATO is a formal military alliance; joining this alliance would likely cause opposition either from the countries’ general public or, in the case of Finland, from Russia. While the CSDP has rapidly improved its military capabilities after the implementation of the EUGS, this does not seem to discourage the participation of the neutral EU member states in the CSDP.

3. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, the academic literature on the ways in which and reasons why EU member states support the CSDP will be discussed. The limitations of this literature will also be identified. These different motivations and types of support will be linked to the theories of neorealism, sociological institutionalism, and neoclassical realism in order to derive expectations about the research question: how did the Ukraine conflict affect the support of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP? These expectations will be tested in chapter 5 of this research.

3.1 Neorealist motivations for neutral EU member states to support the CSDP

This section will discuss how the CSDP has performed in the international security and defense field, as well as how this performance has affected the support of EU member states for the CSDP. It will first provide a general overview of how the CSDP and its predecessor, the CFSP, have performed in the eyes of EU member states as opposed to other international security and defense organizations such as NATO. Subsequently, it will indicate how this performance has affected the support of those member states for the CSDP, and why the support of neutral EU member states may be affected differently. The theory of neorealism will then be used to explain this support and to derive expectations for the support of the neutral EU member states for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict.

3.1.1 The performance of the CSDP in the international security and defense field and the related support of EU member states

Although many EU member states currently wish to further develop the CSDP, the CSDP has underperformed in the eyes of EU member states on many occasions in the past, as is illustrated by Larivé (2014). For example, the civilian European Union Police Afghanistan (EUPOL-A) mission, which was meant to support the military NATO mission that sought to democratize and legitimize the Afghan state, only deployed in 2007, six years after the start of the NATO mission. Consequently, most of the necessary work in Afghanistan had already been done by NATO (Larivé, 2014, p. 165). Furthermore, EUPOL-A was unsuccessful due to the limited amount of financial, material, and human resources that were made available to the mission (Larivé, 2014, p. 165). Additionally, powerful EU member states were not sufficiently committed to the mission; some even started additional missions in Afghanistan that had the same objective as EUPOL-A, but that did not suffer from the lack of resources and the constrained mandate that typically accompanies civilian missions like EUPOL-A (Larivé, 2014, p. 165). Similar cases include the war between Georgia and Russia in

2008, where the civilian EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) lacked necessary resources (Larivé, 2014, p. 166); the war in Libya in 2011, where the military and humanitarian mission called European Union Force Libya (EUFOR Libya) became stranded after the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs did not require the mission to be activated (Larivé, 2014, p. 166); and the destabilizing situation in Mali in 2013, where the creation of the European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali), which was focused on training the Malian police forces rather than actively addressing the issues of increased terrorism and illegal trafficking through military means like France had been doing, once again displayed the lack of ambition of the EU member states concerning the CSDP (Larivé, 2014, p. 167). These cases illustrate the challenges that the CSDP faces, namely a lack of ambition and leadership, a lack of enforcement power, deviating interests of the EU member states, and insufficient capabilities and resources (Larivé, 2014, p. 167). Larivé (2014) and Demetriou (2016) argue that due to these challenges, as well as the fact that the CSDP seems built to react instead of to act, the performance of the CSDP is often not in line with the expectations of the EU member states, and the relevance of the EU as an international security actor is undermined (Demetriou, 2016, p. 11; Larivé, 2014, p. 167).

It is commonly argued that since the CSDP often does not meet the expectations of its member states, many member states currently consider NATO to be their main security and defense provider (Demetriou, 2016, p. 7; Lachmann, 2013, p. 1). This supremacy of NATO in the European security and defense sector is also the result of the CSDP's focus on 'soft security', i.e. its focus on solving economic, social, and environmental problems rather than solving problems that require military efforts (Demetriou, 2016, p. 5). In other words, while NATO often takes a more proactive, aggressive, and military course of action, the EU prefers to take a socio-economic course of action, which is an important reason why the role of the CSDP in the international security and defense field is often considered less relevant than that of NATO, causing many EU member states to consider NATO their main security and defense provider (Demetriou, 2016, p.7; Lachmann, 2013, p. 1).

However, other authors argue that this situation may be changing because the EU has recently started to formulate a new security and defense framework, i.e. the EUGS, which has the ability to make the CSDP more effective and which allows a movement towards a Common European Defense Union (Nováky, 2018; Tardy, 2018; Drent and Zandee, 2016). This framework includes the establishment of PESCO in 2017, the testing of CARD, which is expected to be implemented in the autumn of 2019, the establishment of the European Defense Fund in 2017, the establishment of the MPCC in 2017, and the mutual defense clause of the Lisbon Treaty (Nováky, 2018, p. 98). The new framework thus has the ability to significantly improve the role of the EU in the international security and defense field because it allows EU member states to transfer more significant competences to the CSDP (Nováky, 2018, p. 98). These competences improve or could lead to a direct improvement of the essential capabilities of the CSDP, which include its budgetary resources, availability of military personnel, and availability of civilian and military materiel (Drent and Zandee, 2016, p. 2). Also, the framework improves the EU's collective defense capabilities, meaning that it allows the EU to better protect its borders and its citizens against attacks (Tardy, 2018, p. 120). Nevertheless, Nováky (2018) warns that it is as of yet unsure whether this framework will be successful, as it can be argued that it will not be effective if the EU member states do not increase their efforts beyond the minimal commitments they made in PESCO, if the implementation of PESCO is not properly monitored, and if the member states are not significantly sanctioned for not living up to their PESCO commitments (Nováky, 2018, p. 102). In other words, after a long period of underperformance, the CSDP now has the ability to become relevant in the international security and defense field, as long as the EU member states are sufficiently committed to PESCO and as long as the implementation of PESCO is monitored and enforced effectively.

While the literature indicates that EU member states traditionally prefer NATO over the CSDP when it comes to issues involving international security and defense, it does not sufficiently describe whether neutral EU member states think about this relationship between the CSDP and NATO in the same way. This is an important question to raise, as the neutrality of those member states has up until today prevented them from becoming a member of NATO (Devine, 2011, p. 353). This may cause them to rely on other international security and defense organizations, such as the CSDP, in order to attain their desired security, especially now that the EU could become a relevant international security and defense actor due to its new security framework. Furthermore, the relevance of this question has been amplified after the Ukraine conflict, as Russia's provocative behavior has raised concerns among many (neutral) EU member states, who now increasingly fear for their security (Deubner, 2018, p. 51). In short, while the EU member states often consider NATO to be a more significant security provider than the CSDP according to the literature, the same cannot be said for neutral EU member states because these states cannot rely on NATO for their security; this is an issue that has arguably become more problematic for those states after the Ukraine conflict. Taking these findings into consideration, this research aims to answer the following question: how did the Ukraine conflict affect the support of the neutral countries of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP?

3.1.2 Neorealism and substantive support for the CSDP

The theoretical line of reasoning that explains why EU member states rather support one international security and defense organization over another is neorealism. According to neorealism, relative power distributions between countries and the anarchical nature of the international community, i.e. the fact that no ‘universal sovereign’ exists that governs all states, largely determine a country’s foreign and security policies (Taliaferro et al., 2012, p. 7). This means that states prefer to join and support international security and defense organizations that are able to “provide some measure of security from external enemies” (Taliaferro et al., 2012, p. 14). Furthermore, neorealism argues that international politics is centered around groups of states that are uncertain of the current and future intentions of other (groups of) states; in order to protect themselves from these potentially hostile intentions of other groups, or to dominate those groups instead, the international groups rely on power as an instrument (Taliaferro et al., 2012, pp. 14-15). The variables that increase the threat perception of states, and that therefore make them more willing to join and transfer competences to international security organizations in order to increase the power of those organizations, are the geographical proximity of hostile states, the strength of the offensive capabilities of those hostile states, and the aggressiveness of their intentions (Dyson, 2013, p. 439). This geographical factor also became apparent after the Ukraine conflict, as countries located near Russia became significantly more concerned for their security than Western European countries (Deubner, 2018, pp. 52-53). In short, neorealism is concerned with the relative power distribution between states and groups of states, and it argues that states join and support groups in order to attain the power and security that is required to defend themselves against the aggressive intentions of other (groups of) states, especially when those states are geographically close and have strong offensive capabilities.

The theory of neorealism explains why EU member states traditionally support NATO more than the CSDP: since the CSDP has continuously underperformed in the eyes of the EU member states, these member states may find that the CSDP lacks the instrument of power. As a result, they rather attain their security by joining and transferring competences to the international security organization that has proven to be powerful, proactive, and effective in the past: NATO. However, the theory can also explain why neutral EU member states would still significantly support the CSDP: since their neutrality prevents them from joining NATO, they may choose to transfer competences to other international security and defense organizations that possess some measure of power, such as the CSDP, in order to protect themselves against the potentially hostile intentions of Russia. This can be expected especially now that the CSDP has arguably become more capable and powerful due to its new security framework that is stipulated in the EUGS, and now that the Ukraine conflict has caused many European countries to consider Russia a threat to their security.

As is indicated in the literature, EU member states can support the CSDP and increase its capabilities and power by transferring essential competences to the CSDP, which include budgetary resources, availability of military personnel, and availability of civilian and military materiel (Drent and Zandee, 2016, p. 2). I will call this type of support ‘substantive support’, because it entails the transfer of competences that are substantively relevant for the CSDP, i.e. that improve its essential capabilities. The threat perception of those EU member states that are geographically close to Russia have increased in particular, as they fear the most for Russia’s potentially hostile intentions after the Ukraine conflict (Deubner, 2018, p. 51). This may have caused them to increase their substantive support for the CSDP after the conflict in order to improve upon and benefit from the CSDP’s security. On the other hand, the threat perception of EU member states that are located geographically far away from Russia did not seem to have increased significantly (Deubner, 2018, p. 52), which indicates that their security needs did not increase significantly after the Ukraine conflict. This means that they had less incentives to increase their substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict than those countries that are geographically close to Russia.

Therefore, I expect Finland, which shares a border with Russia and therefore likely has the highest threat perception after the Ukraine conflict, to have increased its substantive support the most after the conflict. I expect Ireland, which is geographically located the furthest away from Russia compared to all other neutral EU member states and therefore likely has the lowest threat perception after the Ukraine conflict, to have shown the least substantive support after the conflict. I expect Austria’s substantive support after the Ukraine conflict to have increased less than that of Finland, but more than that of Ireland, as it is geographically located between Finland and Ireland. In short, based on the theory of neorealism, the following expectations can be derived from the literature:

Expectation 1a: Finland has increased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict to point where this support can be considered significant

Expectation 1b: Ireland has not increased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict

Expectation 1c: Austria’s substantive support has increased more than that of Ireland but less than that of Finland after the Ukraine conflict.

3.2 Sociological institutionalist motivations for neutral EU member states to support the CSDP

This section will discuss an alternative reason why neutral EU member states may support the CSDP: the international pressure to conform to the collective European security identity. First, this pressure and the effect it has on the support of EU member states for the CSDP will be discussed. The motivation behind this support will then be explained using the theory of sociological institutionalism. Finally, expectations will be derived from the literature on the collective European security identity as well as from the theory of sociological institutionalism about how Ireland, Austria, and Finland have supported the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict.

3.2.1 The collective European security identity and the related support of EU member states for the CSDP

While states may transfer competences to international security and defense organizations in order to increase the power of that organization and thus attain more security for themselves, there are other reasons why and ways in which states support international security and defense organizations. For example, Drent (2010) argues that an important reason why EU member states show support for the CSDP is because they want to be associated with the norms and values of the European community, i.e. because they want to conform to the collective European security identity (Drent, 2010). This collective European security identity revolves around one ambition: to emancipate from the US in the field of international security and defense, both instrumentally and principally (Drent, 2010; Hynek, 2009, p. 275). In other words, EU member states may support the CSDP not only because they seek to actually enhance the capabilities of the EU as an international security and defense organization, but also in order to show the European community that they form a part of the collective European security identity. This motive to support the CSDP is not founded purely on the need to be protected by a powerful security organization, but for a large part on the desire to conform to European security norms and values and to be seen as an active member of the European security community (Drent, 2010). According to Wessel (2016), the type of support that is associated with this motive is often, although not necessarily, of a symbolic rather than material nature; the EU member states that want to adopt the European security identity show a willingness to participate in the CSDP, but they are often reluctant to actually transfer the costly competences to the CSDP that it needs in order to be effective (Wessel, 2016, p. 394). These competences, as described above, predominantly include a sufficient budget, the availability of military personnel, and the availability of civilian and military materiel (Drent and Zandee, 2016, p. 2).

In short, the collective European security identity that has emerged mainly since the beginning of the century, and that has become more dominant especially after the attempts of Germany and France to further integrate the European security sector and emancipate it from the US (Hynek et al., 2009, p. 275), has provided EU member states with incentives to support the CSDP symbolically rather than materially; they want to show the European community that they have internalized the European security identity, but they often do not want to transfer the necessary and costly competences, i.e. budgetary resources, personnel, and materiel, to the CSDP.

3.2.2 Sociological institutionalism and symbolic support for the CSDP

The theory of sociological institutionalism explains why the norms and values of an international community can be a driving factor for states to change their foreign policies. For example, March and Olsen's (2011) 'logic of appropriateness' argues that actors in political communities and institutions display the behavior that is expected of them by other actors in those communities or institutions; they act according to "what is socially defined as normal, true, right, or good, without, or in spite of calculation of consequences and expected utility" (March and Olsen, 2011, pp. 478-479). The actors behave according to these 'role expectations' because if they do not, they cannot claim to be a legitimate member of their community (March and Olsen, 2011, p. 479). Important to note is the fact that the actors behave according to the norms of the community they are in, even if that behavior does not benefit them in terms of utility. This can explain why some EU member states indicate their support for the CSDP even though they do not necessarily seek to enhance the capabilities of the CSDP by transferring competences; they do so because it is expected of them as member states of the EU, not because they expect to benefit from the utility of the CSDP, such as the security that it provides.

Furthermore, another concept that is associated with the theory of sociological institutionalism, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) 'norm life cycle', adequately explains the dynamics that currently surround the CSDP. According to the norm life cycle, norms spread internationally because 'norm entrepreneurs' persuade a critical mass of states to adopt certain norms; these states in turn socialize other states to adopt those norms. In the final stage of the cycle, the norms are internalized by the states in such a way that they are taken for granted and are no longer debated (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). When applying the norm life cycle to the CSDP, it becomes apparent that Germany and France act as norm entrepreneurs; they advocate for the emancipation and integration of the EU's security sector, and this norm has diffused throughout the EU in such a way that supporting the CSDP has now become taken for granted. Consequently, supporting the CSDP has become a norm that EU member states are increasingly expected to adhere to (Breuer, 2012, p. 112).

The theory of sociological institutionalism can explain why some EU member states indicate their support for the CSDP without actually transferring essential competences to the CSDP. They do so because the European community expects them to internalize the European security identity; if they do not, they risk delegitimizing their membership in the European community. At the same time, they are reluctant to materially support the CSDP, because there are costs involved in doing so (Wessel, 2016, p. 394). I will call this type of support 'symbolic support', because it does not entail the transfer of essential competences to the CSDP with the intention of increasing the CSDP's power and capabilities, but is rather meant to indicate and symbolize a member state's support for the CSDP.

As is indicated above, the threat perceptions of countries that are located far away from Russia in geographical terms did not seem to have increased significantly after the Ukraine conflict, which means that they did not have significant incentives to increase their substantive support for the CDSP after the conflict. However, not supporting the CSDP in any way could lead to a delegitimization of these countries' membership of the European community, which creates an incentive for them to support the CSDP symbolically, i.e. in the least costly way possible. The risk of this delegitimization has arguably increased after the Ukraine conflict, because increased defense integration has become a more dominant norm in the European community especially after the adoption of the EUGS in 2016 (Larik, 2017, p. 28). Therefore, I expect Ireland to have shown more symbolic support than substantive support after the Ukraine conflict because, of all EU member states, it is geographically located the furthest away from Russia. I expect Finland to have shown more substantive support than symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict because it is geographically located the closest to Russia. I expect Austria's symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict to be lower than that of Ireland, but higher than that of Finland, because it is geographically located in between those two countries. Lastly, I expect that Ireland, Austria, and Finland have all shown more symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict at least to some extent because increased defense integration has become a dominant norm in the European community, more so after the adoption of the EUGS in 2016 (Larik, 2017, p. 28). Complying to this norm is not costly, as it is not necessary for a member state to make significant costs by transferring competences to the CSDP in order to indicate that it supports the CSDP, while not complying to it could result in adverse consequences for that state as its EU membership may be delegitimized. In short, based on the theory of sociological institutionalism, the following expectation can be derived from the literature:

Expectation 2a: the symbolic support of Finland has increased after the Ukraine conflict but remains lower than its substantive support

Expectation 2b: the symbolic support of Ireland has increased after the Ukraine conflict and has become higher than its substantive support

Expectation 2c: the symbolic support of Austria has increased after the Ukraine conflict and has become higher than that of Finland, but remains lower than that of Ireland

3.3 Neo-classical realist motivations for neutral EU member states not to support the CSDP

Thus far, the literature that explains why and how neutral EU member states support the CSDP has been discussed. However, it may be possible that, due to their neutrality, these states have not supported the CSDP at all after the Ukraine conflict, or to a very limited extent. This section will describe how the neutrality of EU member states may preclude their support for the CSDP. It will first discuss the literature that describes how neutrality shapes the participation of neutral EU member states in the CSDP. Subsequently, the theory of neo-classical realism is used to explain why neutrality can constitute an obstacle for neutral EU member states to support the CSDP. Finally, expectations about the support of Ireland, Austria, and Finland after the Ukraine conflict will be derived from this literature and from the theory of neo-classical realism.

3.3.1 The compatibility between the neutrality of EU member states and their participation in the CSDP

While the most significant consequence of the neutrality of EU member states is arguably their exclusion from NATO, this neutrality also has implications for their role within the EU. For example, ever since the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which stipulated the ambitions for defense integration within the EU, neutral EU member states have been confronted with a dilemma: retain their neutrality policies and forego participation in the security and defense policy of the EU, or abandon their neutrality status and become active in EU defense integration (Devine, 2011, p. 347). As a solution to this dilemma, the neutral EU member states altered the meaning of the concept of neutrality multiple times: while neutrality for the most part of the twentieth century entailed the non-membership of military alliances such as NATO and the WEU, the countries later renamed the concept to 'non-alignment', 'non-participation in military alliances', and 'non-membership of military alliances with mutual defence clauses' in order to make their neutrality compatible with the security and defense ambitions stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty (Devine, 2011, pp. 342-344; Doherty, 2002, p. 1). In this sense, according to Devine (2011), the neutrality of EU member states historically hardly seemed to restrict their ability to participate in the security and defense field of the EU, which is why she argues that “the concept, in legal and political terms, is dead” (Devine, 2011, p. 360). Other authors seem to agree with this observation to some extent, as they argue that neutrality is an “illusive concept” (Andrén, 1991, p. 67), and that it “bears more than its fair share of different connotations” (Keatinge, 1984, p. 3).

While the literature indicates that the constant adaptation of the concept of neutrality significantly downplays its importance, it can be argued that neutrality is nevertheless still an important aspect of the foreign policies of the neutral EU member states. This is because, first of all, the general public of these member states often still support the neutrality of their countries; despite the attempts of their political leaders to downplay the significance of this neutrality in order to participate in the CSDP, the majority of the general public of the neutral EU member states still supported their countries’ neutrality as of 2011 (Devine, 2011, p. 360). In other words, there seems to be a mismatch between the opinion of the general public and that of their political leaders regarding the importance of the official state of neutrality of their countries, but that does not mean that the concept is ‘dead’, as is argued by Devine (2011). Another reason why the neutrality of the neutral EU member states still plays an important role in their foreign policies is because it has implications for their relationship with other countries, especially Russia. For example, an important reason why Finland became neutral and refrained from joining NATO after the dissolution of the Soviet Union is the fact that doing so would have significantly provoked Russia (MAŤÁTKOVÁ, 2016). Therefore, abandoning its neutrality could severely deteriorate the relationship between Finland and Russia. Also, Ireland’s neutrality is historically motivated by its reluctance to join NATO as long as northern-Ireland remains part of the UK (Fanning, 1979, p. 38). In short, the neutrality of EU member states still plays an important role in their foreign policies; they cannot simply ignore and dispose of their neutrality due to the opinion of the general public and due to the fact that some of their relationships with other countries are centered around their neutrality.

3.3.2 Neo-classical realism and limited support for the CSDP

The theory of neo-classical realism posits that both the external and the internal constraints faced by a state determine the foreign policies of that state (Taliaferro, 2012, p. 20). In this sense, neo-classical realism is different from neorealism; whereas the latter theory is mainly concerned with the effect of relative power distributions between states on the foreign policies of those states, the former theory adds the domestic constraints of a state as an intervening variable. In other words, according to neo-classical realism, “the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers' perceptions and state structure" (Taliaferro, 2012, p. 5). It is thus not enough to only consider the relative power distribution between states to explain a state's foreign policies, as neorealism does; the internal characteristics of states, such as government leaders' assessment of the power and intentions of other states, as well as the interests and opinions of subnational actors, which can differ significantly from those of their government leaders, also influence the foreign policy decisions that are ultimately made by a state (Taliaferro, 2012, p. 26). Neo-classical realism thus adds the opinions and interests of subnational actors as an intervening variable that can change how the national interests of a state, which are initially defined by the government leaders of that state, are ultimately defined and acted upon (Taliaferro, 2012, p. 26).

The theory of neo-classical realism can explain the foreign policies of neutral EU member states by accounting for the mismatch between the opinion of the general public of neutral EU member states and the opinion of their government leaders. While the government leaders have consistently downplayed the importance of neutrality in their foreign policies, the majority of the general public still considers neutrality an important and relevant aspect of their states' foreign policies. This has prevented government leaders from completely discarding neutrality and it has forced them to make their foreign policies compatible with neutrality in some way (Devine, 2011, p. 336). Thus, the opinion of the general public functions as an intervening variable which influences the foreign policies of the neutral EU member states, including their participation in CSDP. While this intervening variable has not prevented the neutral EU member states from actively participating in the CSDP in the past, the CSDP has rapidly developed since the adoption of the EUGS in 2016, which has granted the CSDP more elaborate military capabilities that arguably stand at odds with the neutrality of these member states (Fägersten et al., 2018, p. 3). While this has not raised doubts among the governments of the neutral EU member states about their countries' participation in the CSDP (Andrews, 2018), it may have caused the public opinion of neutral EU member states to oppose the participation of their countries in the CSDP after 2016. In that case, the public support of these countries for the CSDP after 2016 is expected to be low. According to neo-classical realism, this potential domestic opposition to participation in the CSDP would constitute an intervening variable that could obstruct the participation of the neutral EU member states in the CSDP. Therefore, based on the theory of neo-classical realism, the following expectation can be derived from the literature:

Expectation 3: the lower the public support of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP, the lower their substantive and symbolic support for the CSDP.

The data on the public support of Ireland, Austria, and Finland will be discussed in the analytical chapter, i.e. chapter 5, of this research. Therefore, no individual expectations for these countries about the effect of the public opinion on their support for the CSDP can be made as of yet. However, should the majority of the countries' public opinion on the CSDP be in opposition to the CSDP, and should the substantive and symbolic support of those countries be low, this finding can be explained with expectation 3 and the theory of neo-classical realism that lies at its foundation.

3.4 Conclusion

The literature identifies several possible motivations for Ireland, Austria, and Finland to support the CSDP, as well as different ways in which they could show their support: they could seek to attain more security by transferring competences to the CSDP in order to increase and benefit from the power, utility, and capabilities of the CSDP, in which case they show substantive support; or they could indicate to the European community that they support the CSDP while abstaining from actually transferring the costly competences to the CSDP that it needs to be effective, in which case they show symbolic support. Alternatively, the neutrality of the member states could constitute a barrier which prevents them from supporting the CSDP. In this case, the countries could show very little or even no symbolic and substantive support. In short, when discussing the support of the cases for the CSDP, I will make a distinction between substantive support, i.e. the transfer of competences to the CSDP that directly improve or could lead to a direct improvement of the capabilities of the CSDP, which include its budgetary resources, availability of military personnel, and availability of civilian and military materiel; symbolic support, i.e. measures that demonstrate that a country affiliates itself with the European security identity but that do not directly improve the CSDP's capabilities; and no/limited support. However, substantive and symbolic support are not always mutually exclusive, as a country can substantively support the CSDP while also supporting it symbolically.

This research has found that Ireland, Austria, and Finland have increased their symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, while their substantive support has either declined after the conflict or it can be considered insignificant. This indicates that geographical distance from Russia, which should determine the countries' threat perceptions and subsequently their substantive support for the CSDP, does not affect the countries' substantive support the way I expected it to. This low substantive support cannot be explained by the countries' neutrality policies. Instead, there are other factors that determine the countries' support for the CSDP, which may have significant implications for the future effectiveness of the CSDP.

4. Methodology

This chapter will discuss the methodology that will be used to answer the research question. First, the case selection strategy is discussed, which will indicate why Ireland, Austria, and Finland constitute appropriate and interesting case studies of neutral EU member states. Then, the indicators and the methods used to conduct the analysis will be identified. Lastly, the limitations of this research as well as their implications for the conclusion of the research will be discussed. By identifying these limitations, it will be made clear what conclusions can be made with the evidence retrieved in the analysis.

4.1 Case selection

Central to this research is the question how the Ukraine conflict affected the support of the neutral EU member states for the CSDP. However, as it is not possible to treat the Ukraine conflict itself as an observable variable in the analysis, I will use a 'proxy variable' instead: a variable that can be analyzed instead of the initial variable of interest, which cannot be measured, "because the researcher believes that it is highly correlated with the unmeasurable variable" (Frost, 1979, p. 323). In other words, I will analyze the effect of the Ukraine conflict using another variable: geographical proximity to Russia. As is indicated in the literature, a country's geographical proximity to another (potentially) hostile country largely determines the former country's threat perception (Taliaferro et al., 2012; Dyson, 2013), and it is that threat perception that, according to my expectations, significantly influences the countries' support for the CSDP. Thus, the expectations for each country as described above are not based on the actual Ukraine conflict, but on the countries' geographical proximity to Russia, which arguably illustrates the effect of the conflict on the countries' threat perceptions and subsequently their support for the CSDP.

Since the Ukraine conflict, replaced by the measurable variable 'geographical proximity to Russia', constitutes the main variable of interest in this research, the cases that are analyzed in this research are selected on the basis of this variable. This is done according to the case selection strategy called 'diverse cases', which means that the cases represent different values of a single dimension (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 300). In this research, this single dimension is the geographical proximity to Russia. Therefore, in order to make conclusions about the effect of the Ukraine conflict on the support of neutral EU member states for the CSDP, it is arguably useful to analyze neutral member states that in theory should show a diverse range of support due to their geographical proximity to Russia. Thus, if the cases "represent the full range of values" (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 300) of geographical proximity to Russia, more solid conclusions can be made about the conflict's effect on the general support of neutral EU member states for the CSDP than if the research only included cases that represented a small range of values, e.g. neutral EU member states that are geographically located close to Russia. Ireland, Austria, and Finland represent this full range of values because, out of the complete target population of this research, i.e. neutral EU member states, Finland represents an extreme value as it is located the closest to Russia, Ireland also represents an extreme value because it is located the furthest away from Russia, and Austria to some degree represents a median value because it is located closer to Russia than Ireland, but further than Finland.

While there are a total of five neutral EU member states, i.e. Ireland, Austria, Finland, Malta, and Sweden, the first three countries are chosen as empirical cases in this research because they arguably constitute the most relevant and practical cases for this research. This is because, first of all, Malta has a very limited military budget. As of 2016, this budget comprised roughly €46 million, which is very little compared to the military budgets of other EU member states, who often spend billions of euros on their military (Marrone et al., 2016, p. 18). Due to this very limited military budget, the ability of Malta to vary its support for the CSDP is severely constrained, which means that analyzing the difference in the support of Malta for the CSDP before and after the Ukraine conflict will not likely yield significant results. Second of all, although Sweden and Finland are neighboring countries, Finland has been chosen over Sweden because Finland shares a border with Russia. Therefore, I expect the effect of the Ukraine conflict on the support of neutral EU member states for the CSDP to be more apparent in the case of Finland than in the case of Sweden. The reason why they have not both been chosen as empirical cases is the fact that this research suffers from certain time limitations. Nevertheless, it can be argued that excluding Sweden as an empirical case does not undermine the value of this study, because maximum variation on the explanatory variable, i.e. geographical distance from Russia, is still achieved by studying the empirical cases of Ireland, Austria, and Finland.

4.2 Indicators and methods

To assess the support of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP, I will analyze the following indicators. First, the literature describes that EU member states may indicate that they support the CSDP without actually transferring competences to the CSDP, i.e. by showing symbolic support rather than substantive support. Therefore, I will analyze government reports and public statements made by government officials about the support of their country for the CSDP before and after the Ukraine conflict. This will illustrate whether the countries want to indicate to the European community that they support and affiliate themselves with the CSDP. This is an important indicator of symbolic support, as it is not costly to make these public statements, while it does show that the country has adopted the collective European security identity. Since a public statement does not directly improve and could not lead to a direct improvement of the capabilities of the CSDP, I will not consider it an indicator of substantive support.

This indicator will be used to empirically evaluate expectations 2a, 2b, and 2c. I expect the government statements of Ireland to have become more supportive towards the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict because Ireland is geographically located far away from Russia, which means that it has a relatively low threat perception after the conflict and is thus more likely to support the CSDP symbolically than substantively. I also expect the government statements of Finland and Austria to have become more supportive towards the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict at least to some extent, because it is not costly to do so.

The government reports of Finland will be retrieved from the Prime Minister's Office website, which publishes official government reports about Finland's governmental policies. The government reports of Austria will be retrieved from the website of the Federal Chancellery, which has a similar function as the Prime Minister's Office. Also, the website of the Austrian Ministry of Defense will be consulted, which contains the official security strategy of Austria. The government reports of Ireland will be retrieved from the website of the Ministry of Defense of Ireland, which contains the official security strategy of Ireland.

Second, I will analyze data of each country's public opinion on the CSDP before and after the Ukraine conflict. This is another important indicator of symbolic support, because it indicates whether the government reports and the public statements made by government officials truly reflect the public opinion of the citizens they represent. For example, if the officials of a country declare the support of their country for the CSDP, but the public opinion of that country clearly does not support the CSDP, the officials likely declared support for the CSDP because that is what they want to indicate to the European community, not because their citizens actually support it. In other words, the support of that country would only be based on a symbolic association with the dominant EU security norms, not on actual public opinion. Thus, this second indicator will be compared to the first indicator, which allows conclusions to be made about the symbolic support of each country, i.e. about expectations 2a, 2b, and 2c.

According to expectations 2a, 2b, and 2c, Ireland, Austria, and Finland should all have shown at least some more symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict because showing symbolic support is not costly and because European security integration has become a more dominant norm after the Ukraine conflict. Therefore, I expect that if the public opinion of Ireland, Austria, and Finland is opposed to participation in the CSDP, the governments of these countries will nonetheless have made public statements that are supportive towards the CSDP because it is not costly to do so. Thus, I expect the public statements of the countries to be supportive towards the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict no matter the public opinion on the CSDP, because there are very few costs involved in indicating symbolic support through public statements.

The data of the public opinion on the CSDP will thus be used to indicate whether there is a mismatch between the opinion of the public and the opinion of government leaders about the CSDP, which, according to expectation 3, could also constitute a reason why the symbolic and substantive support of a country is low. Therefore, if the public support for the CSDP of a country is low, and that country's symbolic and substantive support for the CSDP is also low or even non-existent, the latter finding could be explained with the former finding. Since public opinion does not and could not directly improve the capabilities of the CSDP, I will not consider it an indicator of substantive support.

The data of the public opinion of Ireland, Austria, and Finland on the CSDP will be retrieved from the European Commission's Eurobarometer, which contains a series of opinion polls of citizens of the EU.

Third, based on the literature, one of the ways in which EU member states can transfer competences to the EU in order to improve the CSDP's capabilities, i.e. show substantive support, is by contributing funds to the CSDP (Drent and Zandee, 2016, p. 2). However, most civilian CSDP missions and projects are funded by the EU budget, which is not solely used to finance the CSDP (European Parliament, 2016, p. 1). Thus, when EU member states contribute funds to the EU budget, it cannot be said for certain that they do so with the sole intention of improving the CSDP's capabilities. Therefore, the contribution of funds to the EU budget is arguably not a powerful indicator of substantive support for the CSDP. However, *military* CSDP missions and projects are funded almost completely by the participating member states themselves, which is part of the 'costs lie where they fall' principle (European Parliament, 2016, p. 1). This means that the resources that participating member states contribute to military CSDP missions, such as personnel and materiel, are funded by those member states themselves. Consequently, as is indicated by the European Parliament itself, for those member states that actively participate in the CSDP, the following rule applies: "the higher the number of (military) operations, the more the cost of participating in CSDP" (Terpan, 2015, p. 11). The amount of military CSDP missions EU member states participate in thus constitutes an adequate indicator of substantive support, as participating in those missions requires those states to contribute funds to the CSDP. How much funds the participating member states contribute depends on the resources, such as the amount of personnel, they commit to the military missions (European Parliament, 2016, p. 1). Therefore, the more personnel a country has contributed to military CSDP missions, the more funds that country has contributed to the CSDP, and the more significant that country's substantive support for the CSDP is. Additionally, contributing military personnel is in itself an indication of substantive support for the CSDP because the availability of military personnel is one of the essential capabilities of the CSDP (Drent and Zandee, 2016, p. 2). Thus, when EU member states contribute personnel to military CSDP missions, they show substantive support for the CSDP because they improve both the availability of funds and the availability of military personnel of the CSDP, which both constitute essential capabilities of the CSDP.

For these reasons, I will first of all compare the amount of military CSDP missions Ireland, Austria, and Finland participated in before the Ukraine conflict to the amount of military CSDP missions they participated in after the conflict. This will provide an indication of whether or not their substantive support has increased after the conflict. The current military CSDP missions are those that fall under the following categories: European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) missions, European Union Training Missions (EUTM), and European Union Force (EUFOR) missions (Creta et al., 2017, p. 14). Second of all, I will compare the amount of personnel the countries contributed to military CSDP missions before the Ukraine conflict to the amount of personnel they contributed to military CSDP missions after the conflict. This will give an indication of whether the countries contributed more funds to the CSDP after the conflict, as well as whether they contributed more personnel to the CSDP, which are both indicators of substantive support. The more personnel the countries contributed to military CSDP missions, the more significant their substantive support is. Third of all, while participation in civilian CSDP missions is not in itself an indicator of substantive support, because those missions are funded by the EU budget rather than by the participating member states themselves, it arguably is an indicator of symbolic support. This is because member states can indicate their support for the CSDP by participating in these civilian missions, while they do not have to transfer many competences to the CSDP to be able to participate. Therefore, I will compare the amount of civilian CSDP missions Ireland, Austria, and Finland participated in before the Ukraine conflict to the amount of civilian CSDP missions they participated in after the conflict in order to determine whether they have increased their symbolic support for the CSDP. The current civilian missions are those that fall under the following categories: European Union Capacity Building (EUCAP) missions, European Union Military Advisory Missions (EUMAM), European Union Advisory Missions (EUAM), European Union Police Missions (EUPOL/EUPM), European Union Border Assistance Missions (EUBAM), European Union Monitoring Missions (EUMM), and European Union Rule of Law (EULEX) missions (Creta et al., 2017, p. 14). Fourth of all, I will compare the amount of personnel the countries contributed to civilian CSDP missions before the Ukraine conflict to the amount of personnel they contributed to those missions after the conflict. This will indicate whether the countries' participation in these civilian CSDP missions was significant or not, and whether there was an increase in this significance after the Ukraine conflict. Lastly, if Ireland, Austria, and Finland have contributed no personnel to a particular CSDP mission, that will be considered an instance of no support. The amount of instances of no support before the Ukraine conflict will be compared to the amount of instances of no support after the conflict for each country, which will indicate whether the countries' total support for the CSDP has decreased or increased after the Ukraine conflict.

What constitutes a 'significant amount of contributed personnel' depends on the median value of the total amount of personnel all EU member states have contributed to that particular mission. If Ireland, Austria, and Finland have contributed less personnel to a CSDP mission than this median value, that means they have transferred less competences than most other participating member states, which renders their contribution insignificant. If their contribution is equal to this median value, it will be considered moderately significant, because the countries in that case have transferred the same amount of competences as most other participating member states. Thus, the countries' contribution of personnel will only be considered significant if their contribution is higher than that of most other participating member states. The median value is used as a benchmark to assess the significance of the countries' contribution of personnel to the CSDP because there are a few EU member states that have contributed an exceptionally high amount of personnel to the missions. This skews the average value of the contribution of personnel. Therefore, using the median value as a benchmark allows for a more accurate conclusion of what amount of contributed personnel can be considered significant or insignificant than if the average value were to be used as a benchmark.

These indicators will be used to evaluate expectations 1a, 1b, 1c, as well as 2a, 2b, and 2c. This means that I expect Ireland to have increased its participation in civilian CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict, and that it has increased the amount of personnel it has contributed to those missions to the point where this contribution can be considered significant. I also expect Ireland to have participated in more civilian missions than military missions after the Ukraine conflict. This is because I expect Ireland to have increased its symbolic support more than its substantive support due to the fact that it is geographically far away from Russia and because European security integration has become a more dominant norm after the Ukraine conflict. I expect Finland to have increased its participation in military CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict, and that it has increased the amount of personnel it has contributed to those missions to the point where this contribution can be considered significant. I also expect Finland to have participated in more military missions than civilian missions after the Ukraine conflict. This is because I expect Finland to have increased its substantive support more than its symbolic support after the conflict due to its geographical proximity to Russia. I expect Austria to have participated in more military CSDP missions than Ireland after the conflict, but in less military CSDP missions that Finland, because Austria is geographically located in between Finland and Ireland. I expect both Finland and Austria to have increased their participation in civilian CSDP missions as well, but to a lesser extent than Ireland has, because I expect Ireland’s symbolic support to have increased the most after the conflict.

The data of the amount of personnel EU member states have contributed to the CSDP will be retrieved from the EU’s Global Engagement Database, which contains detailed information on all of the CSDP missions and projects until December 2017. This database is part of the Global Governance Programme of the European University Institute (European University Institute, 2016).

Fourth, other ways in which EU member states can transfer competences to the EU in order to increase the CSDP’s capabilities, i.e. increase their substantive support for the CSDP, is by making their civilian materiel and military materiel available to the CSDP (Drent and Zandee, 2016, p. 2). Much of this materiel is made available to the CSDP in PESCO projects, where EU member states have been pooling and sharing their civilian and military materiel in the context of the CSDP since 2018 (EDA, 2019). The relevance of PESCO for the capability development of the CSDP is also confirmed by the Council of the EU, which argues that participating in PESCO reflects “both support for capability development and the provision of substantial support within means and capabilities to Common Security and Defence Policy operations and missions” (Council of the EU, 2018a, p. 2). Thus, participation in PESCO projects arguably constitutes an adequate indicator of substantive support for the CSDP because this participation makes the CSDP more capable.

The significance of this substantive support arguably depends on what kind of competences are actually transferred to the CSDP in the projects that countries participate in. However, there is a lack of available information on the details of individual PESCO projects, such as what kind of competences each participating country transfers to which projects. This may be “due to issues of confidentiality, a lack of planning and understanding of what the projects will entail from their inception, or a combination of both” (Billon-Galland and Efstathiou, 2019, p. 6). Nevertheless, almost all projects have the potential to improve the EU’s security capabilities because most participating member states transfer competences that are essential to the CSDP in these projects (Billon-Galland and Efstathiou, 2019, p. 9), which is why active participation in PESCO projects can be considered an indicator of substantive support for the CSDP. Another reason why active participation in PESCO projects is an adequate indicator of substantive support is the fact that, once countries commit themselves to a project, they are legally obligated to commit their resources to that project (Kolín, 2018). This means that countries cannot simply make the impression that they want to improve the capabilities of the CSDP by participating in PESCO without actually committing their resources to the CSDP.

However, there are different ways in which EU member states can participate in PESCO projects: they can take on the role of ‘project members’, who “contribute to the project with their own resources and expertise” (Council of the EU, 2018c, p. 4); they can be ‘project coordinators’, who initiate a project and therefore have more responsibilities and make more elaborate commitments than the general project members (Council of the EU, 2018c, p. 4); or they can be ‘observers’, who observe the progress of the project but who “have no obligation to contribute to a project with their own resources and expertise” (Council of the EU, 2018c, p. 4). Thus, project coordinators transfer the most competences to the CSDP during PESCO projects, project members transfer slightly less competences, while observers have no obligation to transfer competences at all.

Therefore, I will analyze in how many PESCO projects Ireland, Austria, and Finland participate, and I will analyze what role they play in these projects, i.e. whether they are project coordinators, project members, or observers. If a country is an observer, I will consider that an instance of symbolic support, because observers can indicate their support for the CSDP by participating in PESCO without actually transferring their competences to the CSDP. However, as of yet there is no available data of the countries that participate as observers in the second round of PESCO projects, i.e. in the 17 projects that were adopted by the Council in November 2018. Therefore, no conclusions can be made about the symbolic support of Ireland, Austria, and Finland based on their participation as observers in this second round of projects. If a country is a project coordinator or a project member, I will consider that an instance of substantive support, because both of these roles require the countries to transfer relevant and significant competences to the CSDP. However, if the amount of instances where a country participates as a project coordinator or project member is less than the median value of the amount of instances all PESCO members participated as project coordinators and project members, I will consider that participation a case of insignificant substantive support. This is because, in that case, the country has participated in less PESCO projects as a project coordinator or project member than most other PESCO member states. If this amount is equal to the median value, I will consider that a case of moderately significant substantive support. If this amount is higher than the median value, I will consider that a case of significant substantive support, as the country has in that case participated in more PESCO projects as a project coordinator or project member than most other PESCO member states. Again, the median value of the amount of instances all PESCO members participated as project coordinators and project members is used as a benchmark to determine what the ‘regular participation’ is because there are a limited number of PESCO members that participate in an exceptionally high amount of PESCO projects. The average value is therefore skewed. This makes the median value a more accurate benchmark than the average value in order to determine the significance of Ireland’s, Austria’s, and Finland’s participation in PESCO, and thus whether their substantive support for the CSDP through PESCO can be considered insignificant, moderately significant, or significant.

This indicator will also allow for the evaluation of expectations 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, and 2c. I expect Ireland to have participated in PESCO projects predominantly as a project observer, and/or that it has participated in only a few projects as project member or project coordinator. This is because I expect Ireland’s substantive support after the Ukraine conflict to be low and its symbolic support after the conflict to be high due to its geographical distance from Russia. I expect Finland to have participated in more PESCO projects as project member or project coordinator than the median value, and I expect it to have participated in more projects as a project member or coordinator than as an observer. This is because, due to its geographical proximity to Russia, I expect Finland’s substantive support after the Ukraine conflict to be high and significant, and because I expect this substantive support to be higher than its symbolic support. Lastly, I expect Austria to have participated in more PESCO projects as a project member or project coordinator than Ireland, but in less projects as a project member or coordinator than Finland. Also, I expect it to have participated in more projects as an observer than Finland, but in less projects as an observer than Ireland. This is because, due to the fact that Austria is geographically located in between Ireland and Finland, I expect its substantive support to be higher than that of Ireland but lower than that of Finland, and I expect its symbolic support to be higher than that of Finland but lower than that of Ireland.

The data of the participation of Ireland, Austria, and Finland in PESCO projects will be retrieved from an updated list of all PESCO projects and their participants that was published by the Council of the EU in November 2018. Additional information will be retrieved from the website of the Finnish parliament, the ‘Eduskunta’, which has published a document that indicates which countries play an observer role in which of the first 17 PESCO projects.

Fifth, while the amount of military CSDP missions Ireland, Austria, and Finland have participated in and the amount of personnel the countries have contributed to those missions may provide an indication of the countries’ substantive support for the CSDP, these figures do not exclude the possibility that the countries contributed their personnel to military CSDP missions out of symbolic motivations nonetheless. In other words, it may be possible that the countries contributed personnel to military CSDP missions not because they seek to improve the capabilities of the CSDP, i.e. out of substantive motivations, but because they want to indicate to the European community that they have internalized the European security identity, i.e. out of symbolic motivations. To account for this possibility, I will conduct in-depth analyses of the background and the context of the military missions that the countries contributed most of their personnel to before and after the Ukraine conflict. In this way, it will be made clear why the countries chose to contribute most of their personnel to these specific military missions, i.e. whether they did so out of substantive motivations or out of symbolic motivations. Also, this indicator will identify whether the motivations behind these contributions have changed after the Ukraine conflict, because it will discuss the contribution of personnel to military missions before and after the Ukraine conflict.

This indicator allows conclusions to be made about expectations 1a, 1b, 1c, as well as 2a, 2b, and 2c. According to expectation 1a, Finland should have increased its substantive support after the Ukraine conflict because its threat perception should have increased due to its geographical proximity to Russia. Therefore, I expect that the motivation of Finland to contribute personnel to military CSDP missions before the Ukraine conflict was mostly of a symbolic nature, as its threat perception at that point is expected to be low, while I expect this motivation to be mostly of a substantive nature after the Ukraine conflict. According to expectation 1b, Ireland should not have increased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict. This is because its threat perception should not have increased due to Ireland’s geographical distance from Russia. Therefore, I expect that the motivation of Ireland to contribute personnel to military CSDP missions before the Ukraine conflict was mostly of a symbolic nature, as its threat perception at that point is expected to be low, and I also expect this motivation to be mostly of a symbolic nature after the conflict, as I do not expect that Ireland’s threat perception has increased after the conflict. According to expectation 1c, Austria’s substantive support should have increased more than that of Ireland but less than that of Finland after the Ukraine conflict. Since Austria’s threat perception before the Ukraine conflict is expected to be low, I expect that its motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions before the conflict was mostly of a symbolic nature. After the conflict, I expect Austria’s threat perception to have increased, which means that I expect its motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions to be mostly of a substantive nature. However, because I expect Austria to have shown less substantive support than Finland because it is geographically located further away from Russia, I expect that it has contributed fewer personnel to military CSDP missions than Finland after the conflict.

The information on the background and context of the military CSDP missions to which Ireland, Austria, and Finland have contributed most of their personnel will be retrieved from the website of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which contains information on the background and the mandates of CSDP missions; newspaper articles and speeches from the databases of Expatica and government embassies, which contain information on the background and context of the early phases of the military CSDP missions, including any statements made by government officials that indicate a pressure to conform to the European security identity; as well as scientific literature, which provides more information on the relevant obstacles or incentives for EU member states to participate in the missions.

The indicators for each country will thus be compared over time in order to take into account the effect of the Ukraine conflict on each country's support for the CSDP. The indicators will be analyzed from 2009, the year in which the Lisbon Treaty was established, which created the foundation of the CSDP, until the years for which the most recent data is available. The combination of the different variables across different points in time will provide a profile of each country's type of support for the CSDP, including its support before and after the Ukraine conflict. The only variable that is not traced over time in this way is the amount of instances where the countries participated as PESCO project members, coordinators, or observers. This is because PESCO became operational in December 2017, more than three years after the Ukraine conflict, which prevents the comparison of this indicator over time. Consequently, this indicator will only be used to make conclusions about the countries' support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict.

I will use the method of process-tracing to analyze the cases. While process-tracing is often considered a single method, three different forms of process-tracing can in fact be used: theory-testing process-tracing, where the researcher creates a theoretical causal mechanism and subsequently tests that causal mechanism using empirical evidence; theory-building process-tracing, where evidence of a particular case is used to identify a general causal mechanism; and explaining-outcome process-tracing, where the outcome of a case is explained using a minimally sufficient explanation (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 3). I will employ the first variant, theory-testing process-tracing, as I have deduced expectations from the literature described above and will test these expectations with empirical evidence derived from the case study analyses. Thus, by analyzing empirical data of the cases from before and after the Ukraine conflict, I will make conclusions about the existence of the expected causal mechanisms that are described in chapter 3.

Figure 1 summarizes the methodology of this research in a table. For each expectation, the corresponding variables as well as their types, i.e. whether they are explanatory variables or outcome variables, are listed. Also, the indicators that will be studied in order to test the expectations are listed, as well as their causal directions. For expectation 3, the causal direction of the public opinion on the CSDP is negative, which means that if the public support for the CSDP is low, the expected substantive and symbolic support is also low. Lastly, the data that will be analyzed as well as the methods that will be used to analyze this data are also listed in the table.

Figure 1 Summary of the methodology

Expectation(s)	Variable	Type of variable	Indicator(s)	Causal direction	Data	Method of analysis
1a, 1b, 1c	Substantive support for the CSDP	Outcome	- Amount of military CSDP missions participated in - Amount of personnel contributed to military CSDP missions - Amount of PESCO projects participated in as a project coordinator and/or project member - Motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions	+	- Figures of EU member state participation in CSDP missions, retrieved from the Global Engagement Database - List of EU member states that participate in PESCO projects, retrieved from the Council of the EU and the Eduskunta - Information on the background and context of military CSDP missions, retrieved from the EEAS, Expatica newspaper articles, speeches from government embassies, and scientific literature	Quantitative and qualitative content analysis
2a, 2b, 2c	Symbolic support for the CSDP	Outcome	- Government statements on the CSDP - Government statements on the CSDP compared to public opinion on the CSDP - Amount of civilian CSDP missions participated in - Amount of PESCO projects participated in as a project observer - Motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions	+	- Official government documents retrieved from the websites of Finland's Prime Minister's Office, Austria's Federal Chancellery, Austria's Ministry of Defense, and Ireland's ministry of Defense - Figures of public opinion on the CSDP, retrieved from the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey - Figures of EU member state participation in CSDP missions, retrieved from the Global Engagement Database - List of EU member states that participate in PESCO projects as a project observer, retrieved from the Eduskunta - Information on the background and context of military CSDP missions, retrieved from the EEAS, Expatica	Qualitative and quantitative content analysis

					newspaper articles, speeches from government embassies, and scientific literature	
3	Symbolic and substantive support for the CSDP	Outcome	- Public opinion on the CSDP	-	- Figures of public opinion on the CSDP, retrieved from the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey	Quantitative content analysis
1a, 1b, 1c; 2a, 2b, 2c	Geographical proximity to Russia	Explanatory	- Large geographical distance from Russia, small geographical distance from Russia, or medium geographical distance from Russia	N/A	N/A	N/A
2a, 2b, 2c	Sociological pressure to conform to the European security identity	Explanatory	- Statements made by government officials	N/A	- Newspaper articles and speeches	Qualitative content analysis
3	Domestic opposition to participation in the CSDP	Explanatory	- Public opinion on the CSDP	N/A	- Figures of public opinion on the CSDP, retrieved from the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey	Quantitative content analysis

4.3 Limitations

The method of process-tracing used in this research suffers from several limitations. Generally, process-tracing is useful for making conclusions about the presence of causal mechanisms within individual cases, but these conclusions cannot be generalized beyond those individual cases (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 88). In other words, studies that use the method of process-tracing suffer from a low external validity. However, it is not the intention of this research to establish a high external validity. In other words, this research does not intend to establish results that can be applied to other cases as well. Instead, it aims to provide a detailed profile of each country's support for the CSDP; a profile that is only applicable to that country. Thus, I do not argue nor imply that the results of the analysis of each country are applicable to any other country. This is also the reason why this research contains *expectations* rather than *hypotheses,* as the latter are commonly associated with deductive research designs with a high external validity.

Furthermore, there are specific limitations that apply to theory-centric process-tracing methods, such as theory-testing process-tracing. For instance, while the presence of an expected causal mechanism can be confirmed with empirical evidence, neither the necessity nor the sufficiency of that causal mechanism can be proven, as that would require a cross-case comparative method where the presence of the causal mechanism across different and similar cases can be tested (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 89). This is problematic because the outcome that is observed in a case is often the result of a variety of causal mechanisms, not solely the one that is expected and confirmed by the researcher; the only conclusions that can thus be made by the researcher is that the expected causal mechanism is present in the case, but not whether that causal mechanism is necessary or sufficient to produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 89). In the case of this research, that would mean that if for example Finland has increased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, that does not mean that this increased substantive support was solely the result of the Ukraine conflict. However, this research to a large extent accounts for alternative explanations and causal mechanisms, such as increased support due to geographical proximity, increased support due to the presence of role expectations, and no increased support due to the constraining effect of the countries' neutrality policies. These different explanations can also be distinguished from each other empirically, as, based on the literature, increased support due to geographical proximity to Russia likely results in more substantive support, and increased support due to role expectations likely results in more symbolic support. Although it is difficult to test empirically whether no increased support is truly the result of the countries' neutrality policies, I expect that, if a country did not increase its support for the CSDP because of domestic support for neutrality, the public opinion of that country is opposed to participation in the CSDP in that case. That opposition would indicate that the lack of support is indeed the result of the country's neutrality policy and the domestic support for that policy. In short, the limitations of the method of process-tracing, i.e. a low external validity and the presence of alternative explanations and causal mechanisms, are present in this research, but they are arguably accounted for to a large extent because this research does not intend to establish a high external validity and because it accounts for a variety of alternative explanations that are based on academic literature.

Another reason why a lack of external validity does not make this research less valuable is the fact that the larger target population that the cases in this research belong to, and to which inferences could be made if this research had a high external validity, are neutral EU member states; since there are only five neutral EU member states and this research already covers three of those states, there is arguably little need for a research design with a high external validity, as there are only two other states to which inferences could be made with such a research design.

As has become apparent in chapter 2, Ireland, Austria, and Finland are neutral for different reasons, and their neutrality has different foundations. One could argue that, because they are neutral in different ways and for different reasons, labeling these countries as universally 'neutral' EU member states and using them as case studies on that basis alone is questionable. However, it can also be argued that, for the purpose of this research, the fact that their neutrality prevents them from joining NATO suffices in order to include these countries as case studies. In other words, the countries arguably constitute valid case studies because their neutrality is 'functionally equivalent': their neutrality policies may not be identical, but the fact that the policies share one implication that lies at the basis of this research, i.e. that they prevent the countries from joining NATO, allows the countries "to be grouped into useful and exclusive categories" (Landman, 2000, p. 36), i.e. neutral EU member states. Thus, due to the functional equivalence of the concept of neutrality, neutral EU member states can be considered an exclusive category of countries, which allows them to be analyzed as such.

An arguably more significant complication in this research is that the theory of sociological institutionalism can also explain countries' substantive support for the CSDP. In other words, the countries' role expectations do not necessarily result in exclusively symbolic support; the role expectations may also cause the countries to transfer significant competences to the CSDP, i.e. to show substantive support. This constitutes an alternative explanation that is only partly accounted for in this research. For example, the reasons why the countries contributed most of their personnel to certain military CSDP missions are analyzed in chapter 5, which allows conclusions to be made about whether the countries contributed most of their personnel to these missions out of symbolic or out of substantive motivations. However, this analysis is not done for all CSDP missions, and it is not done for any of the PESCO projects. Therefore, the motivation behind the countries' contribution of personnel to the remaining CSDP missions, as well as their motivations for participating in PESCO projects, is not discussed in a similar in-depth manner. Nevertheless, it can be argued that when a country shows support for the CSDP only out of sociological motivations, i.e. without the clear intention of improving and benefiting from the CSDP's utility, that support would not likely entail the transfer of significant competences, as there are less costly alternatives for those countries to indicate their support. Thus, neorealism is arguably more suited to explain substantive support than sociological institutionalism; nevertheless, the possibility remains that the countries show substantive support out of sociological motivations.

5. Analysis

This chapter discusses the analyses of the cases of Finland, Ireland, and Austria, in that order. For each country, the following indicators will be analyzed. First, statements made by the government about its support for the CSDP are examined, which will indicate whether it has shown more or less symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict. According to expectations 2a, 2b, and 2c, Ireland, Austria, and Finland should all have shown at least some more symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict. However, I expect Ireland to have shown the most symbolic support, Finland to have shown the least symbolic support, and Austria to have shown less symbolic support than Ireland but more than Finland. Thus, I expect the public statements of the governments of all countries to be supportive towards the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, but I expect Ireland's government statements to be the most supportive, Finland's government statements to be the least supportive, and Austria's government statements to be more supportive than Finland's statements and less supportive than Ireland's statements.

Second, public support for the CSDP will be analyzed, which will indicate whether the symbolic support of the government matches the support of the public for the CDSP. If the government, or those officials that represent it, has made statements that indicate increased symbolic support for the CSDP, but the public support for the CSDP has decreased, the support of the government for the CSDP is based only on a symbolic association with the collective European security identity rather than the actual opinion of the public. This is another indicator of symbolic support. According to expectations 2a, 2b, and 2c, Ireland, Austria, and Finland should all have shown at least some more symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict because showing symbolic support is not costly and because European security integration has become a more dominant norm after the Ukraine conflict. Therefore, I expect that if the public opinion of Ireland, Austria, and Finland is opposed to participation in the CSDP, the governments of these countries will nonetheless have made public statements that are supportive towards the CSDP because it is not costly to do so.

Third, the amount of civilian and military missions the countries have participated in as well as the amount of personnel they have contributed to those missions before and after the Ukraine conflict will be assessed. Participation in military missions will be considered substantive support because most of the costs of these missions are paid for by the participating member states themselves, while participation in civilian missions will be considered symbolic support because most of the costs of those missions are not paid for by the participating member states but by the

EU fund. The amount of personnel the countries contributed to these missions will determine whether the substantive and/or symbolic support can be considered insignificant, moderately significant, or significant. I expect that Ireland has increased its participation in civilian CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict, and that it has increased the amount of personnel it has contributed to those missions to the point where this contribution can be considered significant. I also expect Ireland to have participated in more civilian missions than military missions after the conflict. This is because I expect Ireland to have increased its symbolic support more than its substantive support due to the fact that it is geographically far away from Russia and because European security integration has become a more dominant norm after the Ukraine conflict. I expect Finland to have increased its participation in military CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict, and that it has increased the amount of personnel it has contributed to those missions to the point where this contribution can be considered significant. I also expect Finland to have participated in more military missions than civilian missions after the conflict. This is because I expect Finland to have increased its substantive support more than its symbolic support due to its geographical proximity to Russia. I expect Austria to have participated in more military CSDP missions than Ireland after the conflict, but in less military CSDP missions that Finland, because Austria is geographically located in between Finland and Ireland. I expect that both Finland and Austria have increased their participation in civilian CSDP missions as well, but to a lesser extent than Ireland has, because I expect Ireland's symbolic support to have increased the most after the conflict.

Fourth, the amount of PESCO projects a country currently participates in, as well as the role that country plays in those projects, i.e. whether it plays an observer role, a project member role, or a project coordinator role, will be analyzed. This will provide additional evidence of the amount of competences each country has transferred to the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, and whether that transfer can be considered a case of symbolic support, substantive support, or no support. The significance of the amount of personnel a country has contributed to the CSDP and the amount of PESCO projects that country participates in as a project member or project coordinator depends on whether this contribution and participation is less, equal, or more than the contribution and participation of most other EU member states. Thus, the median value constitutes the benchmark that will determine whether the contribution of personnel to CSDP missions and the participation in PESCO projects can be considered insignificant, moderately significant, or significant substantive support. I expect that Ireland has participated in PESCO projects predominantly as a project observer, and/or that it has participated in only a few projects as project member or project coordinator. This is because I expect Ireland's substantive support to be low and its symbolic support to be high due to its geographical distance from Russia. I expect Finland to have participated in more

PESCO projects as project member or project coordinator than the median value, and I expect it to have participated in more projects as a project member or coordinator than as an observer. This is because, due to its geographical proximity to Russia, I expect Finland's substantive support after the Ukraine conflict to be high, and because I expect this substantive support to be higher than its symbolic support. Lastly, I expect Austria to have participated in more PESCO projects as a project member or project coordinator than Ireland, but in less projects as a project member or coordinator than Finland. Also, I expect it to have participated in more projects as an observer than Finland, but in less projects as an observer than Ireland. This is because, due to the fact that Austria is geographically located in between Ireland and Finland, I expect its substantive support to be higher than that of Ireland but lower than that of Finland, and I expect its symbolic support to be higher than that of Finland but lower than that of Ireland.

Lastly, the analysis will discuss to which military CSDP missions Ireland, Austria, and Finland contributed most of their personnel before and after the Ukraine conflict. Subsequently, the motivations behind this contribution will be discussed for each country. In this way, conclusions can be made about whether the countries truly contributed their personnel to these missions out of substantive motivations, or whether they contributed their personnel out of symbolic motivations nonetheless. I expect that the motivation of Finland to contribute personnel to military CSDP missions before the Ukraine conflict was mostly of a symbolic nature, as its threat perception at that point is expected to be low, while I expect this motivation to be mostly of a substantive nature after the Ukraine conflict. According to expectation 1b, Ireland should not have shown more substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict. This because its threat perception should not have increased after the conflict due to Ireland's geographical distance from Russia. Therefore, I expect that the motivation of Ireland to contribute personnel to military CSDP missions before the Ukraine conflict was mostly of a symbolic nature, as its threat perception at that point is expected to be low, and I also expect this motivation to be mostly of a symbolic nature after the conflict, as I do not expect that Ireland's threat perception has increased after the conflict. According to expectation 1c, Austria's substantive support should have increased more than that of Ireland but less than that of Finland after the Ukraine conflict. Since Austria's threat perception before the Ukraine conflict is expected to be low, I expect that its motivation to contribute personnel to military CSDP missions before the conflict was mostly of a symbolic nature. After the conflict, I expect Austria's threat perception to have increased, which means that I expect its motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions to be mostly of a substantive nature. However, because I expect Austria to have shown less substantive support than Finland because it is geographically located further away from Russia, I expect that it has contributed fewer personnel to military CSDP missions than Finland after the conflict.

5.1 Finland

5.1.1 Government statements

Before the Ukraine conflict, which started in February 2014, the government of Finland identified the following developments as the most significant threats to Finnish security: “organised crime, terrorism, traficking in narcotics and humans, infectious diseases, environmental threats, disruptions in energy supply and cyber attacks” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a, p. 23). The Finnish government was less concerned with the threat posed by other states, as it argued that “the changes in global power structures that have taken place in recent years have primarily been the result of differences in countries’ economic development” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a, p. 11). In other words, the Finnish government did not consider the relative power distributions between states as a major threat to Finnish security, as this distribution was considered to be economic in nature, rather than military. It even stressed its desire to cooperate with Russia and that “the development of EU-Russian cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy is also an important goal which Finland supports” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a, p. 11). Despite its apparently low threat perception, the Finnish government indicated that it wanted to further cooperate in the international security field, such as with the EU’s CSDP, NATO’s partnership program, the UN, and NORDEFCO. While it did consider the development of the CSDP to be important for Finnish security (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013b, pp. 55-56), the Finnish government also indicated that “Membership of the European Union is a fundamental value-based choice for Finland” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a, p. 12). Furthermore, it made an explicit reference to its neutrality: “As a militarily non-aligned country Finland prepares to repel military threats without outside assistance” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a, p. 15), which meant that the Finnish government “maintains all of the capability areas in the defence system” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a, p. 15).

After the Ukraine conflict, the Finnish government clearly indicated that Russia posed a significant threat to Finland’s security, as it for examples argued that “the security of Europe and the Baltic Sea region has deteriorated. Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and created the crisis in eastern Ukraine” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016, p. 11). Also, after Russia had ‘challenged’ and ‘destabilized’ the security in Finland’s vicinity, the Finnish government argued that “the use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be excluded” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016, p. 11). One year later, in 2017, the ‘Government’s Defence Report’ was published, which contains Finland’s defense ambitions up until halfway the 2020s. This report indicates that Finland is facing a changing security situation, in part due to the hostile behavior that Russia has displayed in the Ukraine conflict. The implementation of the Defence Report, which emphasizes increased support for the CSDP, “will ensure Finland’s defence capability in a changing security situation” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016, p. 4). Thus, according to the report, Finland aims to increase its cooperation with and support for the CSDP in order to respond to the changing security situation that is in part the result of the Ukraine conflict. This increased support becomes apparent throughout the report. For example, while the Finnish government indicated that EU membership was predominantly a value-based choice before the Ukraine conflict in 2012, this report of 2017 indicated that “for Finland the European Union is a security policy choice and a value community” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2017, p. 17). Also, the report notes that Finland supports the CSDP’s mutual defense clause, that it actively participates in developing and implementing the CSDP, and that it seeks to improve the capabilities of the CSDP (Prime Minister’s Office, 2017, p. 17). The Finnish government thus emphasizes the importance of the EU’s security field, arguably more so than before the Ukraine conflict because the EU is now also Finland’s ‘security policy choice’. The report even indicates that “The defence system will be developed without creating any practical impediments to a potential membership in a military alliance” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2017, p. 6), which would violate Finland’s neutrality. However, the report does not only mention that Finland will increase its security and defense cooperation with the EU, but also through NATO’s ‘Enhanced Opportunities Partners’ program, which is a custom program that allows Finland to cooperate with NATO on certain projects, NORDEFCO, and individual countries that Finland cooperates with on a military basis, such as Sweden and the US (Prime Minister’s Office, 2017, p. 18).

In short, the threat perception of Finland’s government seems to have increased after the Ukraine conflict, as the government has indicated in the Government’s Defence Report of 2017 that Finland faces a changing security situation partly due to Russia’s hostile behavior. Furthermore, the government noted in the report that due to this changing security situation, it wants to increase its international security and defense cooperation with the EU. However, this cooperation is not limited to the EU alone, despite the EU being Finland’s ‘security policy choice’. Also, whereas the Finnish government spoke of retaining Finnish neutrality before the Ukraine conflict, it seemed prepared to violate it afterwards by becoming a member of a military organization. These findings indicate that Finland has shown increased symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict; the Finnish government has indicated that it wants to increase its cooperation with and support for the CSDP partly due to the Ukraine conflict. This is in line with expectation 2a, which argues that Finland has increased its symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict at least to some extent because it is not costly to do so and because European defense integration has become a more dominant norm after the Ukraine conflict. Furthermore, these findings are in line with parts of expectation 1a, which argues that Finland’s threat perception in particular has increased after the Ukraine conflict due to its geographical proximity to Russia. Whether this increased threat perception has also increased Finland’s substantive support for the CSDP will be analyzed in sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4.

5.1.2 Public opinion

When analyzing the Eurobarometer data of the public opinion of EU member states on the CSDP, it becomes apparent that the Finnish public opinion seems to match the policy preferences of the Finnish government. For instance, as is indicated in figure 2, in 2010, which is the first year after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty of which data on Finnish public support for the CSDP is available, 58% of the respondents supported the CSDP, while 36% was against the CSDP, and 5% did not know. The Finnish public support for the CSDP peaked in 2018 at almost 72%, while 22% was against it, and 5% did not know. Thus, from 2010 to 2018, Finnish public support for the CSDP increased roughly 14%. Furthermore, while Finnish public support for the CSDP already started to increase gradually since November 2012, there is a sharp increase in the support one year after the Ukraine conflict: whereas in May 2014, three months after the Ukraine conflict, the support was 58%, the support had increased by 13% to almost 71% in February 2015. Although the support slightly decreased in the subsequent years, it has increased again since May 2016. These findings indicate that the Ukraine conflict increased the Finnish public support for the CSDP, similar to how the conflict made the Finnish government more willing to cooperate with its ‘security policy choice’, i.e. the EU and its CSDP. In short, the public statements made by the Finnish government, which show an increase in the government’s support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, match the data on the Finnish public opinion on the CSDP, which has also increased after the conflict. Thus, the Finnish government has indicated that it wishes to increase Finland’s support for the CSDP, but this increased support is not solely based on the desire to conform to the collective European security identity; it is also based on the actual opinion of the Finnish public.



Source: European Commission (2018) Eurobarometer

5.1.3 Participation in CSDP missions

As can be seen in figure 3, Finland has been a relatively active participant in CSDP missions ever since the CSDP was created in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. Of the 11 CSDP missions that were created since 2009, Finland has contributed personnel to seven of those missions. However, the country slightly decreased its participation in CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict. Of the five missions before the conflict, Finland participated in four and it did not participate in one; of the six missions after the conflict, Finland participated in three and it did not participate in the other three missions. This indicates a decrease in the general support of Finland for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict. Furthermore, the amount of military missions Finland participated in decreased from two missions before the Ukraine conflict to one mission after the conflict. There was no change in the amount of civilian missions Finland participated in; both before and after the conflict, Finland participated in two civilian CSDP missions. This indicates that there was a slight decrease in substantive support after the conflict, and that there was no change in symbolic support after the conflict. In total, in t rticipation in CSDP missions, Finland has shown more symbolic support than substantive support after the Ukraine conflict.

Figure 2

The significance of Finland's substantive support in terms of its participation in CSDP missions remained moderately significant after the Ukraine conflict. Before the conflict, Finland's contribution of four personnel to the military mission of EUTM Somalia in 2010 was equal to the mission's median value of four personnel, which makes this contribution moderately significant. Its contribution of 11 personnel to the military mission of EUTM Mali in 2013 was even more than that mission's median value of eight personnel, which makes this contribution significant. After the Ukraine conflict, Finland's contribution of 30 personnel to the European Union Force Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) military mission was equal to the mission's median value of 30 personnel, which makes this contribution moderately significant. Thus, while Finland's substantive support for the CSDP slightly decreased after the Ukraine conflict, this support remained moderately significant.

The significance of Finland's symbolic support in terms of its participation in civilian CSDP missions slightly increased after the Ukraine conflict. Finland's contribution of one person to the civilian mission of EUCAP Somalia in 2012 was less than the mission's median value of three personnel, which makes this contribution insignificant. Its contribution of six personnel to the civilian EUBAM Libya mission was more than the mission's median value of three personnel, which makes this contribution significant. After the Ukraine conflict, Finland's contribution of four personnel to the civilian EUAM Ukraine mission in 2014 was more than the mission's median value of two personnel, which makes this contribution significant. Lastly, its contribution of two personnel to the civilian EUCAP Sahel Mali mission in 2014 was equal to the mission's median value of two personnel, which makes this contribution moderately significant. Thus, Finland's symbolic support for the CSDP did not change after the Ukraine conflict, while the significance of this symbolic support increased slightly from the two instances of insignificant and significant support before the conflict to the two instances of moderately significant and significant support after the conflict.

In conclusion, in terms of its participation in CSDP missions, Finland has shown a decrease in substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, while the symbolic support the country has shown did not change. This has made its symbolic support higher than its substantive support after the conflict. Its substantive support remained moderately significant after the conflict, whereas the significance of its symbolic support increased slightly. The decrease in Finland's substantive support after the Ukraine conflict is not in line with expectation 1a, according to which Finland should have increased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict due to its geographical proximity to Russia. Furthermore, according to expectation 2a, Finland should have slightly increased its symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, but this symbolic support should not have exceeded Finland's substantive support. While Finland did indeed show slightly more symbolic support after the conflict because the significance of its contribution to civilian CSDP missions increased slightly, this symbolic support also exceeded Finland's substantive support. Therefore, the findings are partially in line with expectation 2a.

Participation of Finland in CSDP missions

EUTM Mali - Military (2013)	EUBAM Libya - Civilian (2013)	EUAM Ukraine - Civilian (2014)	EUCAP Sahel Mali - Civilian (2014)	EUFOR RCA - Military (2014)	EU NAVFOR Med - Military (2015)	EUMAM RCA - Civilian (2015)	EUTM RCA - Military (2016)
8	3	2	2	30	155	7	9
11	6	4	2	30	0	0	0
Substantive - Significant	Symbolic - significant	Symbolic - significant	Symbolic - moderately significant	Substantive - moderately significant	No support	No support	No support

	EUTM Somalia - Military (2010)	EUCAP Somalia - Civilian (2012)	EUCAP Sahel Niger - Civilian (2012)
Median value	4	3	2
Personnel contributed by Finland	4	1	0
Score	Substantive - moderately significant	Symbolic - Insignificant	No support

Source: Krotz et al., 2017. EU Global Engagement Database

5.1.4 Participation in PESCO projects

As can be seen in the appendix, of the 34 PESCO projects that are currently operational or that will soon become operational, Finland participates as a project member in four projects (Council of the EU, 2018b). Finland does not participate in any project as a project coordinator (Council of the EU, 2018b). Also, of the first round of PESCO projects, i.e. the 17 projects that were adopted in March 2018, Finland participates as an observer in two projects (Eduskunta, 2018). The median value of the amount of PESCO projects all PESCO-members participate in, either as project members or as project coordinators, is six (Council of the EU, 2018b). This means that Finland participates in less PESCO projects as a project member or project coordinator than most other PESCO-members. Thus, Finland's substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict in terms of its participation in PESCO as a project coordinator or project member can be considered insignificant. Its symbolic support is even lower than its substantive support, as Finland has participated as an observer in only two projects.

The findings of Finland's participation in PESCO projects are different from the findings of Finland's contribution of personnel to the CSDP. In the latter case, Finland showed moderately significant substantive support, while it also showed more symbolic support than substantive support. In the former case, Finland showed insignificant substantive support, and it showed even less symbolic support. The fact that Finland's participation in PESCO can be considered a case of insignificant substantive support is not in line with my expectations, as I expected that Finland would have increased its substantive support after the Ukraine conflict to a point where this substantive support could be considered significant. However, the fact that Finland has participated in more PESCO projects as a project member than as an observer indicates that its substantive support is higher than its symbolic support, which is in line with expectation 2a.

5.1.5 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUTM Mali

As can be seen in figure 3, in the pre-Ukraine conflict period of 2009-2013, Finland contributed most of its personnel to the military mission of EUTM Mali of 2013. This section will investigate in an in-depth manner why Finland chose to contribute most of its personnel to this mission. It will assess whether Finland truly transferred most of its competences to this mission in order to improve the capabilities of the CSDP, or whether it transferred these competences in order to indicate to the European community that it supports the CSDP. First, a background of the mission will be provided, after which Finland's motivation behind contributing its personnel to this mission will be discussed.

The conflict that led to the creation of EUTM Mali arguably started in the 1990s, when a nomadic group in Mali called the 'Tuareg' started a rebellion in order to gain territory from the Malian government. This conflict intensified after the 2011 Libyan revolution caused a high influx of weaponry in Mali and an increasingly unstable situation in especially northern Mali. This instability and availability of weaponry allowed the Malian branch of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, called Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (IQAM), to group with the Tuareg. After IQAM later turned on the Tuareg, IQAM headed south towards the Malian capital, Bamako. At this point, Mali, which is a former colony of France, asked for the help of both France and the EU, but only France immediately responded with a military intervention through Operation Serval. This led to a ceasefire between Malian state forces and the IQAM, although violence continued to erupt periodically (Dicke, 2014, pp. 97-98).

The EU practically responded to the conflict three months after France had already militarily intervened in Mali in the beginning of January 2013 (Dicke, 2014, p. 99). The EU began EUTM Mali on 2 April 2013, which was meant to "train, educate and advise the MaAF (Malian Armed Forces) under the control of legitimate civilian authorities, in order to contribute to the restoration of their military capacity" (EEAS, 2016, p.1). It can be argued that the motive of the EU to launch this training mission was for a large part based on the efforts of France to get the EU involved in Mali, as is indicated in the following statements made in a French white paper on defense and national security of 2013:

> "Not all our partners and allies give the same weight to the strategic importance, for Europe, of its eastern neighbours, the Mediterranean and the part of Africa from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa. However, for France there is no doubt that these regions are of priority interest for the whole of the European Union, and that a common vision of the risks and threats is both desirable and urgent. It is even more important to affirm this collective European priority in that our American and Canadian allies expect us to assume an essential share of our responsibilities in regions where they consider themselves to be less directly concerned" (Ministry of Defence, 2013, p. 55).

This statement shows that France tried to get EU member states involved in Mali because, according to France, EU member states should adopt a ‘common vision of the risks and threats’, and because the US and Canada expect the EU to be active in areas where they are ‘less directly concerned’. By making this statement, France appealed to a collective European security identity, and it expected EU member states to adhere to that identity. Initially, EU member states hesitated to respond to France’s call for collective action; for instance, upon approval of EUTM Mali in February 2013, only ten member states signed up to participate: Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and the UK (Dicke, 2014, p. 101). This shows that the initial response of most EU member states, including Finland, to France’s call for a collective security identity was reluctant rather than supportive. Nevertheless, when it became apparent that the mission would in fact be realized by April 2013, an additional 13 member states signed up for participation. Eventually, all member states except for Cyprus, Denmark, Malta, Croatia, and Slovakia participated (Dicke, 2014, p. 101).

Next to the fact that most member states did not immediately decide to participate in EUTM Mali, other factors that indicated that most EU member states were reluctant to commit themselves to the mission include their decision to appoint a French mission commander instead of choosing a commander from their own country, as well as their decision not to provide actual military assistance to France and the MaAF (Hühnerfuß, 2016, p. 55). Instead, most member states were only willing to participate by offering political and logistical support, which means that they let France perform the most risky and resource-intensive tasks such as securing instruction sites (Dicke, 2014, p. 99). However, the UK, Spain, Belgium, Germany, and the Czech Republic arguably form an exception to this because they either contributed a large number of troops or contributed valuable military equipment to the mission (Dicke, 2014, pp. 102-105).

In conclusion, the motivation of the EU to commence EUTM Mali was largely based on France’s call for a collective European security identity. Finland was one of the last EU member states to decide to participate in EUTM Mali, and it was not part of the member states that showed considerable efforts to substantively support the CSDP mission by contributing a large number of personnel and valuable military equipment. Therefore, despite the fact that Finland contributed more than the median value of personnel to EUTM Mali, as can be seen in figure 3, it can be argued that Finland’s motivation behind participating in the mission was largely symbolic: it decided to participate in order to respond to France’s call for a collective European security identity, and it was even among the last member states to do so. Finland also did not make considerable efforts to substantively support EUTM Mali by contributing a large number of personnel or valuable military materiel, like the UK, Spain, Belgium, Germany, and the Czech Republic did, which is in line with what can be expected from its largely symbolic motivation to participate in the mission. However, it must be said that most member states joined EUTM Mali at a late point in time, and that most member states did not make considerable substantive contributions. Thus, Finland is part of a large group of member states that joined EUTM Mali out of symbolic motivations and that did not make considerable substantive contributions.

The fact that the motivation of Finland to contribute personnel to the military EUTM Mali mission of 2013 was mostly of a symbolic nature is in line with expectation 1a, which argues that Finland increased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict. This is because, before the Ukraine conflict, Finland's threat perception was expected to be low, which means that Finland had more incentives to support the CSDP symbolically rather than substantively before the Ukraine conflict.

5.1.6 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUFOR RCA

According to figure 3, after the Ukraine conflict, Finland contributed most of its personnel to the military EUFOR RCA mission of 2014. This section will investigate whether this contribution was made out of substantive or symbolic motivations. First, a background of the EUFOR RCA mission will be provided, after which the motivation of Finland to contribute its personnel will be discussed.

The situation that led to the creation of EUFOR RCA arguably started in 2012, when mostly Islamic rebel groups in the country formed an alliance called the 'Séléka' and conquered the capital of the RCA. Consequently, the parliament was disbanded, and the rebel groups installed a transitional leader that represented these rebel groups. However, due to a lack of financial resources, the transitional leader did not manage to keep the rebel groups unified, which caused these groups to start pillaging and murdering civilians. Without a central government and a strong security system, the groups could not be stopped. The situation worsened when ethnic tensions between Muslims and Christians in the country emerged (Christensen et al., 2018, p. 6). As a result of these worsening atrocities, France brought the situation in the RCA, which is also France's former colony, to the agenda of the UN and the EU specifically on 24 September 2013 ("French president focuses on", 2014). There was no immediate response of the EU, but after France launched the military operation 'Sangaris' in the RCA, the EU felt that it had to act as well. This resulted in the launch of EUFOR RCA on 1 April 2014 (Nováky, 2016, p. 101).

EUFOR RCA was given the following mandate: protecting citizens of the RCA from further violence, providing humanitarian aid, and providing political support for the transition of government (EEAS, 2015). EUFOR RCA was arguably one of the most dangerous missions the EU had ever conducted because EU forces were authorized to protect citizens using any means necessary (Tardy, 2015, p. 1). These risks constituted one of the reasons why EU member states were reluctant to actively participate in the mission, and why the entire process of gathering enough personnel and materiel to be able to launch the mission took six months and six force generation conferences (Christensen et al., 2018, p. 7). Another factor that explains the reluctancy of the member states to commit to the mission is the fact that the Ukraine conflict occurred at that time, i.e. in February 2014, which means that many EU member states, especially Central and Eastern EU member states, rather kept their military forces and materiel at home due to Russia's unpredictable and hostile behavior. Thus, the security situation in the RCA was not in the immediate interest of many EU member states at that time. Lastly, contributing personnel to the EUFOR RCA mission was considered expensive by many member states (Nováky, 2016, p. 103). Because of these reasons, only a few member states were willing to contribute personnel and materiel to EUFOR RCA. In the first conference of force generation, which was held on 13 February 2014, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, and Finland offered to contribute personnel and materiel. In the subsequent conferences, only Italy, Germany, and Spain offered additional personnel and materiel (Nováky, 2016, p. 105).

While Finland thus already offered to contribute personnel in the first conference of force generation, this was only a small part of the total amount of personnel Finland eventually contributed. While Finland eventually contributed 30 personnel to the mission, it only offered to contribute a total of six staff officers to the mission in the first round of force generation (Nováky, 2016, pp. 102-103). This means that Finland contributed the rest of its 30 personnel after the mission had already started.

Due to the lack of commitment of most EU member states, there was a risk that the EUFOR RCA mission could not be launched (Nováky, 2016, p. 103). France was already committed to resolving the situation in the RCA through its Sangaris mission, which is why successful deployment of EUFOR RCA was in the interest of France. Therefore, France urged the other EU member states to increase their commitment of troops and materiel to the EUFOR RCA mission so that the mission could deploy. France furthermore argued on 21 March 2014 that if they did not, 'Europe's credibility' would be undermined ("France calls for", 2014). However, France's call for increased commitment and its warning for an undermined credibility of the EU did not work to significantly increase the contribution of troops and materiel of other member states, which led France to fill these capability gaps itself. This last-minute contribution of France allowed the mission to be launched (Nováky, 2016, p. 103).

In conclusion, the EUFOR RCA mission suffered from a lack of commitment of EU member states, which almost prevented the mission from launching. While France successfully managed to gather support for the EUTM Mali mission of 2013 by appealing to the collective European security identity, it was not successful in gathering support for the EUFOR RCA mission of 2014 by appealing to that same identity. A significant reason for this is the fact that many EU member states preferred to keep their military personnel and materiel at home because the Ukraine conflict caused the security priorities of these countries to be focused on Russia and its potentially hostile intentions. While Finland was one of the countries that proposed to contribute personnel to the EUFOR RCA mission already in the first force generation conference, this contribution consisted of only six staff officers. It was only after France had appealed to the collective European security identity and after the mission had already started that Finland contributed the rest of its 30 personnel. Thus, Finland did not contribute most of its personnel at a time where this personnel was needed the most, i.e. just before the launch of the mission when the lack of personnel and materiel threatened to prevent the mission from launching. It only did so after France had appealed to the collective European security identity, and after the setup of the mission was already completed by other EU member states. Therefore, it can be argued that Finland contributed its moderately significant amount of personnel to EUFOR RCA for the most part out of symbolic motivations, i.e. because France appealed to the collective European security identity, not because it wanted to actually improve the CSDP's capabilities in the EUFOR RCA mission.

These findings are not in line with expectation 1a. According to expectation 1a, Finland should have increased its substantive support after the Ukraine conflict due to its geographical proximity to Russia. This section has shown that before the Ukraine conflict, Finland contributed its personnel to the military mission of EUTM Mali out of symbolic motivations; it only contributed the personnel after France had appealed to the collective European security identity. Furthermore, compared to other member states, Finland was very late to contribute this personnel, and it was not among those member states that showed considerable efforts to substantively support the CSDP mission. This indicates that Finland's motivation behind contributing troops to EUTM Mali of 2013 was of a symbolic rather than substantive nature; Finland arguably did so to respond to France's appeal to a collective European security identity, not to improve the capabilities of the CSDP during the EUTM Mali mission. While Finland was among the first member states to contribute personnel to the EUFOR RCA mission after the Ukraine conflict, this contribution only consisted out of six personnel. This means that Finland contributed most of its personnel to EUFOR RCA after the mission had already started, and after France appealed to the collective European security identity. This indicates that Finland's motivation behind contributing personnel to EUFOR RCA was also mostly of a symbolic rather than substantive nature. Thus, it can be said that Finland's support for the CSDP in terms of its motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions did not change; both before and after the Ukraine conflict, this motivation was mostly of a symbolic nature. This is not in line with expectation 1a, according to which Finland should have shown more substantive than symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict. It could even be argued that the Ukraine conflict *prevented* Finland from substantively supporting the CSDP, because many EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe did not contribute personnel to EUFOR RCA because of Russia's potentially hostile intentions after the Ukraine conflict.

5.1.7 Conclusion

The government of Finland has shown increased symbolic support for the CSDP by arguing that, due to its changed security environment which is partly the result of the Ukraine conflict, the EU has become Finland's 'security policy choice'. The Finnish government also indicated that it wished to increase its cooperation and support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict. Finland's threat perception thus seems to have increased after the Ukraine conflict, which has caused the government of Finland to declare the CSDP their security policy choice. This increased symbolic support for the CSDP correlates with the public opinion of Finland, which has increased notably after the Ukraine conflict. This indicates that the government support for the CSDP is not solely based on the desire to conform to the collective European security identity, but also on the actual opinion of the Finnish public.

In terms of its participation in CSDP missions, Finland has shown a slight decrease in overall support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict. It participated in fewer military CSDP missions after the conflict, so the quantity of its substantive support declined. The significance of its substantive support also declined slightly from being significant to being moderately significant. Finland has shown the same quantity of symbolic support for the CSDP after the conflict, while the significance of this support increased slightly. Ultimately, in terms of its participation in CSDP missions, Finland's symbolic support has become higher than its substantive support after the Ukraine conflict. Finland has shown more substantive support than symbolic support after the conflict in terms of its participation in PESCO projects, although this substantive support cannot be considered significant.

Lastly, the motivation of Finland to contribute troops to the EUTM Mali mission of 2013 was mostly of a symbolic nature because Finland only contributed these troops after France had appealed to the collective European security identity, and after the mission had already started.

Furthermore, Finland did not contribute considerable substantive support to the mission, whereas other member states did. Finland's motivation to contribute troops to the EUFOR RCA mission of 2014 was also mostly of a symbolic nature; whereas Finland was one of the first EU member states to contribute personnel to the mission, this contribution only consisted of six staff officers. This means that most of the 30 personnel that Finland contributed to the mission were contributed after France had again appealed to the European security identity. Also, Finland did not contribute most of its personnel at the point in time where this personnel was needed the most, i.e. just before the launch of the mission when the lack of personnel and materiel threatened to prevent the mission from launching. This makes Finland's motivation behind the contribution of its personnel to EUFOR RCA symbolic rather than substantive.

These findings are not in line with expectation 1a, but they are partially in line with expectation 2a. According to expectation 1a, Finland should have shown an increase in substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict because its geographical proximity to Russia should have increased its threat perception. In reality, even though Finland's threat perception appears to have increased after the Ukraine conflict, its substantive support decreased slightly in terms of its participation in military CSDP missions, while its substantive support through PESCO was insignificant. Also, Finland did not show an increase in substantive support after the Ukraine conflict in terms of its motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions. However, according to expectation 2a, Finland should have shown a slight increase in symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict, which has been confirmed. While the amount of instances where Finland participated in civilian CSDP missions did not increase after the conflict, the significance of Finland's participation in these missions did increase slightly. Nevertheless, Finland participated in more civilian CSDP missions than military ones after the conflict, which means that its symbolic support after the conflict is higher than its substantive support. This is not in line with expectation 2a. However, in the case of its participation in PESCO projects, Finland did show more substantive than symbolic support, as it participated in more projects as a project member than as an observer. This is in line with expectation 2a. Nevertheless, this substantive support cannot be considered significant, which is not in line with expectation 1a. The decrease in the substantive support of Finland cannot be explained by expectation 3, i.e. by the fact that domestic opposition to the CSDP can undermine a country's substantive and symbolic support for the CSDP, because the public opinion of Finland was supportive towards the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict.

	Before Ukraine conflict	After Ukraine conflict	Change in substantive support	Change in symbolic support	In line with expectations
Government statements	Symbolic	Symbolic	N/A	Increase	Yes
Public opinion compared to government statements	No mismatch	No mismatch	N/A	N/A	N/A
Participation in CSDP missions	Quantity: substantive = symbolic Significance: substantive > symbolic	Quantity: symbolic > substantive Significance: symbolic > substantive	Quantity: decrease Significance: decrease	Quantity: no change Significance: increase	No
Participation in PESCO projects	N/A	Quantity: substantive > symbolic Significance: substantive = symbolic (both insignificant)	N/A	N/A	Partially
Motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions	Symbolic	Symbolic	No change	No change	No

Figure 4 Results of Finland

5.2 Ireland

5.2.1 Government statements

Before the Ukraine conflict, the Irish Department of Defense (DoD) stated in a Green Paper of 2013 that “at present, the main international threats to domestic security arise from terrorist acts or a major emergency incident (e.g. nuclear accident, medical epidemic, etc.)” (Department of Defence, 2013, p. 32). This statement was based on the developments that occurred since the last government’s White Paper on Irish defense in the year 2000, which included “9/11, the Iraq War, the war in Afghanistan, and the Arab Spring” (Department of Defence, 2013, p. 17). Thus, interstate conflicts were not considered a major risk to Irish security prior to the Ukraine conflict of 2014, which means that the threat perception of Ireland concerning relative power distributions was relatively low before the Ukraine conflict. The Green Paper also indicated that Ireland wished to cooperate more internationally because “deeper international collaboration and cooperation will be the hallmark of security and defence into the future” (Department of Defence, 2013, p. 8). This deeper cooperation in international security and defense would take place predominantly in a EU context, as “Ireland’s approach to security is underlined by its engagement in EU Common Security and Defence Policy together with other EU Member States” (Department of Defence, 2013, p. 3). However, the UN and NATO’s PfP were also mentioned as contexts in which Ireland wished to further increase its international security cooperation (Department of Defence, 2013, p. 6). Furthermore, in the Green Paper, the DoD argued that Ireland’s neutrality policy had always been respected by the EU, and that “therefore all of the defence participation and activity, outlined in this Green Paper, has a clear legislative and policy basis” (Department of Defence, 2013, p. 8). However, according to the DoD in 2013, since the Irish policy of neutrality had been introduced as a response to inter-state conflicts, and these type of conflicts had made way for other threats that were not affected by national borders, such as terrorism and cyber-security, it is important to recognize “the limitations of military neutrality as a policy response to these broader threats” (Department of Defence, 2013, p. 9).

In August 2015, the DoD published a White Paper on defense, which stipulated the ambitions of the Irish government concerning its security and defense policies for a period of ten years. This White Paper identified the same most important threats to Irish security as the Green Paper of 2013, i.e. cyber-security and terrorism, but it also added a new threat: armed aggression from Russia. According to the DoD, Russia displayed this armed aggression in the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008, as well as in the Ukraine conflict in 2014, which made “the Government view the requirement to defend the State from a conventional military attack as a contingency i.e. the requirement to do so is unlikely, but possible” (Department of Defence, 2015, p. 24). Russia, the Ukraine conflict, and the threat that Russia poses to Ireland was not mentioned again in the White Paper. The fact that the White Paper identified the same threats to Ireland’s security as the Green Paper did in 2013, and that the Irish government considered a military attack on Ireland after the Ukraine conflict a mere ‘contingency’ rather than a significant threat, indicates that Ireland’s threat perception did not significantly increase after the Ukraine conflict. Also, the White Paper discussed the same role for Ireland in the field of international security and defense as the Green Paper did; the EU was considered an exceptionally relevant international security and defense actor for Ireland because “if Ireland wishes to safeguard its own security, defend and protect its strategic interests … then continued active and positive engagement by Ireland in the Union’s CSDP is essential” (Department of Defence, 2015, pp. 27-28), but it also indicated that Ireland would continue to cooperate with the UN and NATO’s PfP (Department of Defence, 2015, p. 27). Lastly, while the Green Paper of 2013 emphasized the limitations of the policy of neutrality, the White Paper of 2015 noted that “the Government’s recent review of foreign policy confirmed that Ireland will continue to maintain a policy of military neutrality” and that “in the event of an attack, Ireland must be prepared to act alone” (Department of Defence, 2015, p. 24). The fact that the public statements emphasized the importance of Ireland’s neutrality more after the Ukraine conflict indicates that Ireland has given a larger role to this neutrality after the conflict.

In conclusion, Ireland’s threat perception does not seem to have increased after the Ukraine conflict, as the Irish government in 2013 did not consider inter-state conflicts a significant risk to Irish security, and the government in 2015 considered a conventional military attack on Ireland, i.e. an inter-state military conflict between Ireland and Russia, a contingency and thus unlikely. This is in line with parts of expectation 1b, which argues that Ireland’s threat perception should not have increased significantly after the Ukraine conflict. Whether this unchanged threat perception has also led to unchanged substantive support of Ireland for the CSDP will be analyzed in sections 5.2.3 and 5.3.4. Also, there was no significant change in the symbolic support of the government of Ireland for the CSDP before and after the Ukraine conflict; the government indicated its support prior to the conflict by arguing that the CSDP underlines Ireland's security, and it did so after the conflict by arguing that the CSDP is essential for Ireland's security. While expectation 2b argues that Ireland's symbolic support in terms of its government statements should have actually increased after the Ukraine conflict, it can be argued that because Ireland's government statements were already very positive towards the CSDP before the conflict, they could not have been significantly more positive after the conflict. Thus, while Ireland's symbolic support through its government statements did not increase significantly, this is arguably because Ireland's symbolic support was already very high. Therefore, these findings can be considered in line with expectation 2b, according to which Ireland should have shown a high amount of symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict. However, both before and after the conflict, the UN and NATO's PfP were also considered important international security and defense actors for Ireland. Additionally, the support of the Irish government for Ireland's neutrality seems to have increased after the Ukraine conflict, as the limitations of this neutrality were emphasized before the conflict, but the government's support for this neutrality was emphasized after the conflict.

5.2.2 Public opinion

While the symbolic support of the Irish government for the CSDP remained unchanged after the Ukraine conflict, the public opinion of Ireland on the CSDP actually increased after the conflict. As can be seen in figure 5, 50% of the respondents of the Eurobarometer survey on public support for the CSDP in Ireland in November 2010 indicated that they were in favor of a common security and

Figure 5



Source: European Commission (2018)
Eurobarometer

defense policy among EU member states, 26% was against such a policy, and 23% did not know. In November 2018, 61% was in favor of the CSDP, 26% was against it, and 10% did not know. While Irish public support for the CSDP thus increased by 11% from 2010 to 2018, there was no change in the amount of respondents that were against the CSDP, while there was a decrease of 13% in the amount of respondents that did not have an opinion about whether or not they supported the CSDP. This indicates that the Irish public has become more aware of the CSDP, which has led to an increase in the Irish public support for the CSDP from 2010 to 2018. While this public support has been increasing gradually since May 2012, there is a sudden increase of 12% in the support after November 2015. This indicates that the Irish public support for the CSDP has increased significantly after the Ukraine conflict of 2014. This is different from the symbolic support of the Irish government, which did not show a significant increase after the Ukraine conflict. In short, the Irish government has indicated that it supported the CSDP in a similar way both before and after the Ukraine conflict, and this support is based on the actual public opinion of Ireland, which has even increased after the Ukraine conflict.

5.2.3 Participation in CSDP missions

Ireland's overall participation in CSDP missions is limited. As can be seen in figure 6, of the 11 CSDP missions in the period 2009-2016, Ireland only participated in four missions. Furthermore, its participation in these missions has declined after the Ukraine conflict. In the pre-Ukraine conflict period of 2009-2013, Ireland participated in three out of five CSDP missions: EUTM Somalia of 2010, EUCAP Somalia of 2012, and EUTM Mali of 2013. After the Ukraine conflict, Ireland only participated in one of the five CSDP missions: EUAM Ukraine of 2014. In short, Ireland's total support for the CSDP in terms of its participation in CSDP missions is limited, and this support has declined after the Ukraine conflict.

Furthermore, Ireland's substantive support for the CSDP has declined the most after the conflict. Before the Ukraine conflict, Ireland participated in two military CSDP missions: EUTM Somalia of 2010 and EUTM Mali of 2013. Ireland's participation in these missions can be considered moderately significant, because Ireland's contribution of four personnel to EUTM Somalia is equal to the mission's median value of four personnel, and its contribution of eight personnel to EUTM Mali is also equal to that mission's median value of eight personnel. Thus, Ireland's substantive support before the Ukraine conflict can be considered moderately significant. After the conflict, Ireland participated in no military CSDP missions. Thus, Ireland's substantive support for the CSDP in terms of its participation in military CSDP missions has declined; while it participated in two military CSDP missions before the conflict in a moderately significant way, it did not participate in any military CDSP missions after the conflict .

Ireland’s symbolic support for the CSDP remained equally low. Before the Ukraine conflict, Ireland participated in one civilian CSDP mission: EUCAP Somalia of 2012. Ireland’s participation in this mission can be considered insignificant, because its contribution of one person to the mission is less than the mission’s median value of three personnel. After the Ukraine conflict, Ireland also participated in only one civilian CSDP mission: EUAM Ukraine of 2014. Its participation in this mission can be considered moderately significant, because its contribution of two personnel is equal to the mission’s median value of two personnel. Thus, Ireland’s symbolic support for the CSDP remained equally low after the Ukraine conflict, but the significance of this support increased from being insignificant to being moderately significant.

In conclusion, in terms of its participation in CSDP missions, Ireland’s substantive support has declined; whereas it participated in two military CSDP missions before the Ukraine conflict in a moderately significant way, it did not participate in any military CSDP mission after the conflict. This is in line with expectation 1b, which argues that Ireland’s substantive support should not have increased after the Ukraine conflict. Ireland’s symbolic support did not change in terms of the amount of civilian CSDP missions Ireland participated in, but the significance of this participation did increase slightly. Also, Ireland has shown more symbolic than substantive support after the Ukraine conflict because it participated in more civilian CSDP missions that military ones after the conflict. These findings are in line with expectation 2b, which argues that Ireland’s symbolic support should have increased after the Ukraine conflict to a point where it is higher than its substantive support. However, this symbolic support remained very limited after the conflict.

Participation of Ireland in CSDP missions

EUCAP Sahel Niger - Civilian (2012)	EUTM Mali - Military (2013)	EUBAM Libya - Civilian (2013)	EUAM Ukraine - Civilian (2014)	EUCAP Sahel Mali - Civilian (2014)	EUFOR RCA - Military (2014)	EU NAVFOR Med - Military (2015)	EUMAM RCA - Civilian (2015)	EUTM RCA - Military (2016)
2	8	3	2	2	30	155	7	9
0	8	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
No support	Substantive - moderately significant	No support	Symbolic - moderately significant	No support	No support	No support	No support	No support

	EUTM Somalia - Military (2010)	EUCAP Somalia - Civilian (2012)
Median value	4	3
Personnel contributed by Ireland	4	1
Score	Substantive - moderately significant	Symbolic - insignificant

Source: Krotz et al., 2017. EU Global Engagement Database

5.2.4 Participation in PESCO projects

As is shown in the appendix, Ireland participates in two PESCO projects as a project member. It does not participate in any PESCO project as a project coordinator. Ireland participates in seven PESCO projects as an observer. The median value of the amount of PESCO projects all PESCO-members participate in, either as project members or as project coordinators, is six. Thus, Ireland participates in less projects than most other PESCO members as a project member or project coordinator, which means that its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict in terms of its participation in PESCO is insignificant. However, Ireland's symbolic support is relatively high, as it participates in seven projects as an observer.

These findings are different from the findings of Ireland's participation in CSDP missions. Whereas Ireland showed a high symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict through its participation in PESCO projects as an observer, Ireland showed relatively little symbolic support after the conflict through its participation in CSDP missions because it participated in only one civilian CSDP mission after the conflict. Thus, Ireland has shown more symbolic support through its participation in PESCO projects than through its participation in CSDP missions. Nevertheless, in both cases, Ireland's symbolic support was higher than its substantive support, which was either insignificant or absent. This is in line with expectation 2b.

5.2.5 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUTM Mali

According to figure 6, Ireland also contributed most of its personnel before the Ukraine conflict to the military EUTM Mali mission of 2013. The mission was created by the EU as a reaction to France's appeal to the collective European security identity, as France argued that the EU should adopt a 'common vision of the risks and threats' (Ministry of Defence, 2013, p. 55). Most EU member states responded hesitantly to France's appeal, which also included Ireland (Dicke, 2014, p. 101). It was only after most EU member states eventually decided to participate in the mission that Ireland also contributed its personnel (Dicke, 2014, p. 101). Additionally, Ireland did not offer to appoint an Irish mission commander to the mission, and it did not offer to aid the French with resource-intensive military tasks (Hühnerfuß, 2016, p. 55). Lastly, Ireland was not among those member states that made a considerable substantive contribution to the mission in terms of personnel and military materiel (Dicke, 2014, pp. 102-105).

These findings indicate that the motivation of Ireland to contribute most of its personnel to the military EUTM Mali mission of 2013 was of a symbolic rather than substantive nature. This is because Ireland only contributed its personnel after France had appealed to the collective European security identity, and only after it became an absolute certainty that the mission would in fact commence. Furthermore, the fact that Ireland did not make considerable efforts in terms of performing resource-intensive military tasks and contributing personnel and materiel further indicates that Ireland did not participate in the mission with the clear intention of improving the capabilities of the CSDP. Rather, it seems that Ireland participated in the mission because it was expected of Ireland, and that it participated in a way that did not impose significant costs on Ireland.

The fact that Ireland contributed personnel to the military EUTM Mali mission of 2013 out of symbolic motivations is in line with expectation 1b. This is because I expected that Ireland had a low threat perception before the Ukraine conflict, which would provide it with incentives to support the CSDP symbolically rather than substantively.

According to figure 6, Ireland did not participate in any military missions after the Ukraine conflict. This means that no in-depth analysis of Ireland's motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict can be made. However, the fact that Ireland did not participate in any military mission after the conflict is in line with my expectations; due to its geographical distance from Russia, I did not expect Ireland's threat perception to have increased after the conflict. This means that I expected that Ireland did not increase its substantive support after the conflict, which is indeed the case. Thus, the fact that it did not participate in any military CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict is in line with expectation 1b.

5.2.6 Conclusion

Both before and after the Ukraine conflict, the government of Ireland showed symbolic support for the CSDP by arguing that the CSDP 'underlines' Irish security and that it is 'essential' for this security. In terms of statements made by the Irish government, there was no apparent increase in the symbolic support of Ireland for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, but this is likely due to the fact that the statements were already very supportive of the CSDP before the conflict. Also, Ireland's threat perception did not increase after the conflict; both before and after the Ukraine conflict, the government of Ireland did not consider inter-state conflicts to be a threat to Irish security. The symbolic support of the Irish government for the CSDP is not solely based on the desire to conform to the collective European security identity, but also on the actual opinion of the Irish public, which has even become more supportive towards the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict.

In terms of Ireland’s participation in CSDP missions, the country has decreased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, even to the point where it has shown no substantive support at all after the conflict. Its symbolic support remained equally low after the Ukraine conflict, while the significance of this symbolic support slightly increased from being insignificant to being moderately significant. On the other hand, Ireland has shown a relatively high amount of symbolic support through its participation in PESCO projects, as it participated in seven projects as an observer. The substantive support Ireland has shown through its participation in PESCO can be considered insignificant.

Ireland’s motivation behind contributing personnel to the EUTM Mali mission of 2013 was mostly of a symbolic nature. This is because Ireland contributed this personnel only after France appealed to the collective European security identity and after most EU member states eventually decided to participate in the mission. Also, Ireland did not make any considerable substantive contributions to the mission, and it did not participate in a resource-intensive way. No in-depth analysis of Ireland’s motivation behind participating in military CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict could be made because Ireland did not participate in any of those missions.

These findings are largely in line with my expectations. According to expectation 1b, Ireland should not have shown an increase in substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict because, due to its geographical distance from Russia, its threat perception after the conflict was expected to be low. The government statements indeed indicated that Ireland’s threat perception remained low after the conflict, while Ireland’s participation in CSDP missions, its participation in PESCO projects, and its motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions all indicated that the country did not increase its substantive support after the Ukraine conflict. In fact, its substantive support even declined. Furthermore, according to expectation 2b, Ireland’s symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict should have increased after the conflict, and it should be higher than its substantive support after the conflict. The government statements did not indicate a notable increase in Ireland’s symbolic support for the CSDP after the conflict, but this is arguably because the government statements were already very supportive towards the CSDP. Ireland’s participation in civilian CSDP missions and its motivation behind participating in military CSDP missions indicate a high symbolic support for the CSDP before the Ukraine conflict. After the conflict, the significance of Ireland’s symbolic support in terms of its contribution of personnel to civilian CSDP missions increased slightly, but it did not participate in more civilian missions. However, it did participate in more civilian missions than military missions after the conflict. Ireland also participated in more PESCO projects as an observer than as a project member. These findings confirm expectation 2b, which argues that Ireland should have increased its symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict to a point where it exceeds its substantive support. Lastly, expectation 3, i.e. the fact that domestic opposition to the CSDP can undermine a country's substantive and symbolic support for the CSDP, cannot explain why Ireland's substantive support after the conflict is low because a vast majority of the public opinion of Ireland was supportive towards the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict.

	Before Ukraine conflict	After Ukraine conflict	Change in substantive support	Change in symbolic support	In line with expectations
Government statements	Symbolic	Symbolic	N/A	No change	Yes
Public opinion compared to government statements	No mismatch	No mismatch	N/A	N/A	N/A
Participation in CSDP missions	Quantity: substantive > symbolic Significance: substantive > symbolic	Quantity: symbolic > substantive Significance: symbolic > substantive	Quantity: decrease Significance: decrease	Quantity: no change Significance: increase	Yes
Participation in PESCO projects	N/A	Quantity: symbolic > substantive Significance: symbolic > substantive	N/A	N/A	Yes

Motivation behind contributing	Symbolic	N/A	No change	No change	Yes

Figure 7 Results of Ireland

5.3 Austria

5.3.1 Government statements

In 2013, the government of Austria published a document called the ‘Austrian Security Strategy’, which contains the official security strategy of Austria that is still largely in effect today. In this document, the Austrian government indicates that conventional attacks against Austria, i.e. inter-state conflicts involving Austria, are unlikely. Thus, Austria’s threat perception concerning inter-state conflicts and relative power distributions was limited before the Ukraine conflict. Instead, the government considered Austria to be affected by other kinds of security threats, which “include first and foremost: international terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (also amongst non-state actors); domestic and regional conflicts or turmoil that affect Europe or have global repercussions; ‘state failure’”(Federal Chancellery, 2013, p. 7); as well as issues such as cyber-attacks, climate change, illegal migration, drug trafficking, and financial crises.

Due to these threats, which “will become progressively more international in scope” (Federal Chancellery, 2013, p. 7), Austria “benefits from the existence of efficient, strong, solidarity-based communities and is also required to contribute adequately to their operational and functional capacity” (Federal Chancellery, 2013, p. 7). This means that Austria wished to continue shaping its security policies together with the UN, EU, and with NATO’s PfP (Federal Chancellery, 2013, pp. 14-15). For the CSDP, this means that Austria wished to “continue to participate in the entire spectrum of CSDP activities” (Federal Chancellery, 2013, p. 13), which include the EU Battlegroups, PESCO, the strengthening of the EDA, and even the “common defence policy, which may potentially lead to a common defence” (Federal Chancellery, 2013, p. 13). While becoming a member of an organization with a common defense can be considered a violation of neutrality, this was not considered a problem according to the Austrian government because “the security of neutral Austria is now largely interconnected with the security of the EU as a whole” (Federal Chancellery, 2013, p. 4). Also, due to this interconnectivity, the Austrian government did not consider it a violation of neutrality if Austria participated with the EU on the following objectives: “actively working towards shaping a situation that is conducive to the security of Austria, its population and the European Union (EU) as a whole; preventing threats from emerging or taking effect; protecting against and coping with threats” (Federal Chancellery, 2013, p. 4).

In 2018, the Austrian government published another document that outlined the general direction of Austria’s security policy over the subsequent years. In this document, the government describes a changing international security environment, which means that “große Herausforderungen für das Österreichische Bundesheer, aber auch für die Republik Österreich insgesamt gegeben sind” [there are great challenges for the Austrian Armed Forces, but also for the Republic of Austria as a whole] (Commenda, 2018, p. 6). However, the government indicates that these new challenges are not centered around “konventioneller militärischer Angriffe” [conventional military attacks] (Commenda, 2018, p. 6), i.e. challenges that are the result of the relative power distribution between states, but rather around “der Überlebensfähigkeit des politischen, gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Systems Österreichs” [the survivability of the Austrian political, societal, and economic system] (Commenda, 2018, p. 6). This includes the “Bewältigung von systemgefährdenden Krisen, Terrorgefährdungen und Großschadensereignissen” [management of systemic crises, terrorist threats, and catastrophic events] (Commenda, 2018, p. 6). Mass migration, hybrid conflicts, and cyber-attacks are also considered challenges to the Austrian security (Federal Ministry of Defense and Sports, 2018, p. 12). This indicates that the Ukraine conflict has not significantly increased the Austrian government’s threat perception concerning the relative power distribution between states, which is confirmed later in the document: a military conflict with Russia is not considered a significant threat to Austria’s security because “diese ist im Sinne der pragmatischen Außen-, Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftspolitik Moskaus nicht intendiert bzw. strategisch nicht nachvollziehbar” [this is, in the sense of Moscow’s pragmatic foreign-, security-, and economic policy, not intended nor strategically comprehensible] (Federal Ministry of Defense and Sports, 2018, p. 21).

Regarding the CSDP, the Austrian government is quite skeptical, as it argues that the CSDP now faces ‘the hour of truth’, and that “der Erfolg des gesamten Vorhabens, nämlich der Aufbau einer Verteidigungsunion mit einem gemeinsamen Fähigkeitspool … wird wesentlich vom Umsetzungswillen in Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien abhängig sein” [the success of the entire project, namely the establishment of a defense union with a common capability pool ... will be heavily dependent on the will of Germany, France, and Italy to implement it] (Federal Ministry of Defense and Sports, 2018, p. 18). Also, it states that “die Handlungsschwäche der Europäischen Union bleibt insofern eine Belastung, als der künftige Kurs der EU in außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Fragen nach wie vor offen ist, trotz der positiven Perspektive einer Ständigen Strukturierten Zusammenarbeit (PESCO)” [the European Union’s limited capacity to act remains a burden insofar as the future EU course on foreign and security policy questions remains open, despite the positive perspective of a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)] (Federal Ministry of Defense and Sports, 2018, p. 26). However, the government also argues that “Österreich hat im Falle des Gelingens, insbesondere aufgrund der isolierteren Position in der NATO-Initiative „Partnership for Peace“, ein hohes Mitgestaltungsinteresse” [in case the CSDP is successful, Austria has a high interest in participating in the CSDP, especially because of Austria’s isolated position in NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ initiative] (Federal Ministry of Defense and Sports, 2018, p. 18). In other words, after the Ukraine conflict, Austria is somewhat skeptical towards the feasibility of the CSDP and towards the general capacity of the EU to act, but the country does have a high interest in participating in the CSDP if it becomes successful because Austria feels isolated as a non-NATO member. This indicates that, should the CSDP succeed in creating a defense union, this union would constitute an alternative to NATO for Austria in the sense that it would give Austria a sense of security that it currently lacks because it is not a member of NATO. While becoming a member of a defense union would violate Austria’s neutrality, which is even part of Austria’s constitution, the government does not mention Austria’s neutrality as a factor that limits Austrian participation in the CSDP. In fact, Austria’s neutrality is not even mentioned once in this document on Austria’s future security strategy, which indicates that the government does not consider neutrality to be a dictating factor in Austria’s future security policy, aside from the fact that it will also prevent Austria from joining NATO in the future.

In conclusion, before the Ukraine conflict, the Austrian government had a low threat perception of inter-state conflicts and relative power distributions, but its symbolic support for the CSDP was relatively high as it indicated that it wanted to participate in all CSDP programs and that the security of Austria is interlinked with that of the EU. After the Ukraine conflict, Austria’s threat perception remained relatively low, as it did not consider Russia to pose a significant future threat to Austrian security. Whether this low threat perception has translated into low substantive support for the CSDP will be analyzed in sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4. However, after the conflict, the government seemed to have become more skeptical towards the EU and the CSDP by emphasizing the EU’s limited capacity to act, as well as the fact that it remains to be seen whether the new security framework of the CSDP will actually be effective. Furthermore, by arguing that the success of the CSDP depends on the future efforts of Germany, France, and Italy, the Austrian government indicates to the European community that it is not willing to take the initiative to improve the capabilities of the CSDP. This skepticism towards the EU as well as the implicit refusal to take the initiative indicate that Austria's symbolic support for the CSDP in terms of its government statements has declined after the Ukraine conflict. This is not in line with expectation 2c, which argues that Austria's symbolic support should have increased at least to some extent after the Ukraine conflict. Lastly, neutrality did not play a significant role in shaping Austria's security policy nor in its symbolic support for the CSDP; the government indicated that participation in the CSDP did not conflict with Austria's neutrality before the Ukraine conflict, while neutrality was not even mentioned in Austria's security strategy after the conflict.

5.3.2 Public opinion

Figure 8 shows the public support of Austria for the CSDP. In November 2010, this support was remarkably high, as 68% of the respondents indicated that they supported a common security and defense policy among EU member states. In November 2018, this support was at 65%, showing a minor decrease of 3% in public support for the CSDP over the period 2010-2018. However, while the support was still at 64% in May 2014, it decreased by 9% to 55% in February 2015. In the same period of time, opposition against the CSDP increased by 11%; while opposition against the CSDP was at 29% in May 2014, it increased to 40% in February 2015. There was no significant change in the amount of respondents that did not have an opinion about the CSDP, which indicates that most of the additional 11% of respondents who opposed the CSDP in February 2015 still supported it in May 2014. These figures indicate that, although the majority of the Austrian respondents still supported the CSDP, public support for the CSDP in Austria has declined rather than increased after the Ukraine conflict. These findings are largely in line with the public statements made by the Austrian government, which displayed a decrease in symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict.



Source: European Commission (2018)
Eurobarometer

Figure 8

5.3.3 Participation in CSDP missions

According to figure 9, Austria's overall participation CSDP missions is relatively limited, as Austria only participated in five of the 11 CSDP missions that were created after the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, the country increased its participation after the Ukraine conflict. In the pre-Ukraine conflict period of 2009-2013, Austria only contributed personnel to one of the five missions: the military EUTM Mali mission of 2013. It did not contribute personnel to the four other CSDP missions. In the post-Ukraine conflict period of 2014-2016, Austria participated in four CSDP missions, while it did not participate in two missions. Thus, Austria increased its participation in CSDP missions from one mission before the Ukraine conflict to three missions after the conflict, which indicates that Austria's general support for the CSDP has increased after the conflict.

Furthermore, Austria's substantive support increased slightly after the conflict. While it participated in only one military mission before the conflict, i.e. EUTM Mali in 2013, it participated in two military missions after the conflict: EUFOR RCA in 2014 and EUTM RCA in 2016. This indicates a slight increase in substantive support after the Ukraine conflict. However, the significance of this substantive support, i.e. the significance of Austria's contribution of personnel to military CSDP missions, decreased after the conflict. Austria's contribution of eight personnel to the EUTM Mali mission of 2013 was equal to the mission's median value of eight personnel, and can thus be considered moderately significant. However, its contribution of six personnel to the EUFOR RCA mission of 2014 was far lower than that mission's median value of 30 personnel, which renders this contribution insignificant. Furthermore, Austria's contribution of five personnel to the EUTM RCA mission of 2016 was lower than the mission's median value of seven personnel, which means that this contribution was also insignificant. In short, even though Austria's substantive support slightly increased after the Ukraine conflict, the significance of this support decreased from being moderately significant to being insignificant.

Austria's symbolic support for the CSDP in terms of its participation in civilian CSDP missions also increased after the Ukraine conflict; while the country did not participate in any civilian CSDP missions before the Ukraine conflict, it participated in two civilian missions after the conflict: EUAM Ukraine in 2014 and EUMAM RCA in 2015. Thus, Austria's symbolic support for the CSDP has increased after the Ukraine conflict. However, Austria's contribution of personnel to these missions can be considered insignificant. Austria's contribution of one person to the EUAM Ukraine mission is less than the mission's median value of two personnel, which renders this contribution insignificant. Its contribution of five personnel to the EUMAM RCA mission is also less than that mission's median value of seven personnel, which makes this contribution insignificant. In short, Austria has shown more symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, but this support can be considered insignificant.

In conclusion, in terms of its participation in CSDP missions, Austria has slightly increased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict; whereas it participated in only one military mission before the conflict, it participated in two of these missions after the conflict. This participation is higher than that of Finland, which participated in one military CSDP missions after the conflict. However, Austria's substantive support after the conflict can be considered insignificant, while Finland's substantive support after the conflict was moderately significant. These findings are partially in line with expectation 1c, which argues that Austria's substantive support should be lower than Finland's substantive support after the Ukraine conflict. In reality, Austria showed more instances of substantive support than Finland, but Finland's support was more significant than that of Austria. The slight increase in Austria's substantive support is also unexpected because Austria's threat perception remained low after the Ukraine conflict. The country also increased its symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, as it increased its participation in civilian CSDP missions from zero missions before the conflict to two missions after the conflict. According to expectation 2c, Austria's symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict should be lower than that of Ireland but higher than that of Finland. Ireland participated in only one civilian mission after the conflict; Austria in two. However, Austria’s symbolic support after the conflict can be considered insignificant, while Ireland’s symbolic support after the conflict can be considered moderately significant. This is partially in line with expectation 2c, as Austria has shown more instances of symbolic support than Ireland, but this support is less significant than that of Ireland. However, while Finland and Austria both participated in two civilian missions after the conflict, Finland’s symbolic support can be considered significant, while Austria’s symbolic support is insignificant. This is not in line with expectation 2c, which says that Austria’s symbolic support should be higher than that of Finland.

EUAM Ukraine - Civilian (2014)	EUCAP Sahel Mali - Civilian (2014)	EUFOR RCA - Military (2014)	EU NAVFOR Med - Military (2015)	EUMAM RCA - Civilian (2015)	EUTM RCA - Military (2016)
2	2	30	155	7	9
1	0	6	0	5	3
Symbolic - insignificant	No support	Substantive - Insignificant	No support	Symbolic - insignificant	Substantive - insignificant

Figure 9
Participation of Austria in CSDP missions

	EUTM Somalia - Military (2010)	EUCAP Somalia - Civilian (2012)	EUCAP Sahel Niger - Civilian (2012)	EUTM Mali - Military (2013)	EUBAM Libya - Civilian (2013)
Median value	4	3	2	8	3
Personnel contributed by Austria	0	0	0	8	0
Score	No support	No support	No support	Substantive - moderately significant	No support

Source: Krotz et al., 2017. EU Global Engagement Database

5.3.4 Participatio ESCO projects

The appendix shov at Austria participates in five PESCO projects as a project member. Austria does not play a pr coordinator role in any of the PESCO projects. Also, Austria does not participate in any project of the first round as an observer. The median value of the amount of PESCO projects SCO-members participate in, either as project members or as project coordinators, is six means that Austria participates in less projects than most other PESCO members as a proj nember or project coordinator, which renders its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukr conflict in terms of its participation in PESCO insignificant.

These find o an extent correlate with the findings of Austria's contribution of personnel to CSDP missions he Ukraine conflict. In both cases, Austria's substantive support for the CSDP can be considered nificant. However, while Austria increased its symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict th its participation in civilian CSDP missions, it showed no symbolic support through its partici in PESCO projects as an observer. The findings of Austria's participation in PESCO are not in li ith expectation 1c, because Austria participated in more PESCO projects as a project member th nland. The findings are partially in line with expectation 2c, because Austria participated in less PESCO projects as an observer than Ireland, but it also participated in less of these projects than Finland.

5.3.5 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUTM Mali

As can be seen in figure 9, Austria contributed most of its personnel before the Ukraine conflict to the military EUTM Mali mission of 2013, just like Finland and Ireland. This mission was initiated by the EU as a response to France's appeal to the collective European security identity, as France argued that the EU should adopt a 'common vision of the risks and threats' concerning the conflict in Mali (Ministry of Defence, 2013, p. 55). Most of the EU member states, including Austria, did not immediately respond to this appeal by contributing their personnel and materiel (Dicke, 2014, p. 101). Austria only contributed its personnel after most other EU member states had also decided that they would participate in the mission (Dicke, 2014, p. 101). Furthermore, there was no offer from Austria to appoint an Austrian mission commander to the mission, and Austria also did not offer to support France's military effort with resource-intensive military tasks (Hühnerfuß, 2016, p. 55). Additionally, Austria was not among the member states that made a considerable substantive contribution to the mission in terms of personnel and military materiel (Dicke, 2014, pp. 102-105).

This indicates that the motivation of Austria to contribute most of its personnel to the military EUTM Mali mission of 2013 was of a symbolic rather than substantive nature. This is because Austria only contributed its personnel after France had appealed to the collective European security identity, and only after it became apparent that the mission would actually be launched. Also, Austria did not perform resource-intensive military tasks, and it did not contribute a considerable amount of personnel and materiel to the mission. Therefore, it cannot be said that Austria participated in EUTM Mali with the clear intention of improving the capabilities of the CSDP. Rather, Austria seems to have participated in the mission in order to respond to France's appeal to the collective European security identity, like many other member states also did. Furthermore, Austria's participation in the mission did not impose significant costs on the country. These are all characteristics of symbolic support.

These findings indicate that Austria contributed personnel to EUTM Mali out of symbolic motivations, which is in line with my expectations. I expected that Austria had a low threat perception before the Ukraine conflict, which would provide it with incentives to support the CSDP symbolically rather than substantively.

5.3.6 Motivation behind contributing personnel to EUFOR RCA

According to figure 9, similar to Finland, Austria contributed most of its personnel to the military EUFOR RCA mission of 2014 after the Ukraine conflict. The EU launched EUFOR RCA because it felt that it had to act after France already launched a unilateral military mission in the RCA (Nováky, 2016, p. 101). However, before the mission could commence, it already became apparent that many member states were not willing to participate; in the first force generation conference, only Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, and Finland offered to contribute personnel and materiel to EUFOR RCA. In the force generation conferences that followed, only Italy, Germany, and Spain offered additional personnel and materiel (Nováky, 2016, p. 105). This means that Austria did not offer to contribute personnel and materiel in any of the force generation conferences, and that it only contributed its personnel after France had appealed to the collective European security identity and after the mission had already launched. This also means that Austria did not offer to contribute its personnel when the need for that personnel was very high, i.e. just before the launch of the mission, when the lack of personnel and materiel threatened to prevent the mission from launching (Nováky, 2016, p. 103). One of the reasons why especially the Central and Eastern European member states were reluctant to contribute their military personnel and materiel to the mission is the fact that the Ukraine conflict shifted their security priorities towards Russia instead of Africa (Nováky, 2016, p. 103). This could explain why Austria, which is a Central European member state, did not contribute much personnel to the mission. Therefore, the Ukraine conflict may have *prevented* rather than *increased* the substantive support of Austria for the CSDP, which may also be the case for Finland.

In conclusion, Austria's motivation behind contributing personnel to the EUFOR RCA mission of 2014 was of a symbolic rather than substantive nature. Austria only contributed its personnel after France had appealed to the collective European security identity. Furthermore, Austria's participation in the mission did not impose significant costs on the country, because the amount of personnel that Austria contributed to the mission, and thus the amount of resources that Austria contributed to the mission, was insignificant. This can be seen in figure 9; Austria only contributed six personnel EUFOR RCA, while the median value of the amount of personnel all participating member states contributed to the mission is 30. It is also apparent that Austria did not contribute its personnel with a clear intention to improve the capabilities of the CSDP during the EUFOR RCA mission, because Austria did not contribute its personnel when the lack of personnel threatened to prevent the mission from launching. Thus, Austria's motivation behind contributing its personnel to EUFOR RCA is clearly of a symbolic rather than substantive nature.

These findings are not in line with my expectations. I expected that Austria's participation in military CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict would mostly be of a substantive nature because I expected Austria's threat perception to have increased after the conflict. Instead, this motivation was largely of a symbolic nature. However, according to expectation 1c, I did expect Austria to have contributed less personnel to these military CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict than Finland, which is indeed the case; Austria contributed a total of nine personnel to military CSDP missions after the conflict, while Finland contributed 30 personnel to those missions.

5.3.7 Conclusion

Before the Ukraine conflict, the government of Austria showed symbolic support for the CSDP by arguing that it wanted to participate in all CSDP programs and that the security of Austria is interlinked with that of the EU. After the conflict, this symbolic support seemed to have decreased, as the government became more skeptical towards the EU's capacity to act and towards the future effectiveness of the CSDP. Furthermore, the threat perception of the Austrian government did not increase notably after the Ukraine conflict. Before the conflict, the government did not consider inter-state conflicts a major risk to Austrian security, while after the conflict the government did not consider Russia to be a threat to Austrian security. The decrease in the symbolic support of the government of Austria is largely in line with the public opinion of Austria, which increasingly opposed the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict but did remain supportive overall.

In terms of participation in CSDP missions, Austria slightly increased its substantive and symbolic support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict to a point where they can be considered equal. However, both its substantive and symbolic support in this case can be considered insignificant. This correlates with Austria's participation in PESCO projects, which can also be considered a case of insignificant substantive support. However, because Austria did not participate in any PESCO project as an observer, it did not show any symbolic support through its participation in PESCO.

Lastly, Austria's motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions before the Ukraine conflict was mostly of a symbolic nature, because it only contributed its personnel to EUTM Mali after France had appealed to the collective European security identity and after it became clear that the mission would in fact commence. Furthermore, Austria was not among those countries that made considerable substantive contributions to the mission, and it did not help France with resource-intensive military tasks. Austria's motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions after the Ukraine conflict was also mostly of a symbolic nature, because Austria only contributed its personnel after France had again appealed to the collective European security identity, and after the mission had already launched. Austria also did not contribute a considerable amount of personnel and materiel to the mission, and it also did not contribute its personnel when it was needed the most. This further indicates that Austria participated out of symbolic motivations, and not in order to improve the capabilities of the CSDP, i.e. out of substantive motivations.

These findings are partially in line with my expectations. According to expectation 1c, Austria should have shown more substantive support than Ireland after the Ukraine conflict, but less than Finland. This is because Austria is geographically located in between Ireland and Finland, which means that its threat perception should be higher than that of Ireland but lower than that of Finland. In reality, after the Ukraine conflict, Austria participated in more military CSDP missions and in more PESCO projects as a project member than both Ireland and Finland. However, Austria's substantive support after the conflict in terms of its participation in military CSDP missions can be considered insignificant, while Finland's substantive support can be considered moderately significant. Thus, while Austria showed more instances of substantive support than Finland, this support is insignificant compared to that of Finland, which makes these findings partially in line with expectation 1c. Furthermore, according to expectation 2c, due to the fact that Austria is geographically located in between Ireland and Finland, Austria should have shown more symbolic support than Finland after the Ukraine conflict, but less than Ireland. In reality, Austria's symbolic support in terms of the public statements made by its government decreased after the Ukraine conflict, which means that it is lower than that of Ireland and Finland; the government statements of the latter two countries remained supportive towards the CSDP. This is not in line with expectation 2c. Austria's symbolic support in terms of its participation in civilian CSDP missions is slightly higher than that of Ireland, and somewhat equal to that of Finland; Austria participated in two civilian CSDP missions after the conflict, Finland also participated in two, and Ireland participated in one. However, Finland's symbolic support in this case was more significant than that of Austria, which is not in line with expectation 2c. Also, Austria did not participate in any PESCO project as an observer, while Ireland participated in seven projects as an observer and Finland in two. Thus, Austria's symbolic support in terms of its participation in PESCO projects as an observer is lower than that of Ireland and that of Finland. This finding is partially in line with expectation 2c. Furthermore, Austria's motivation to contribute personnel to military CSDP missions was of a symbolic nature both before and after the Ukraine conflict. This is not in line with my expectations; I expected Austria's motivation after the conflict to be of a substantive nature due to its expected increased threat perception. Lastly, Austria's insignificant substantive support after the Ukraine conflict cannot be explained with expectation 3, i.e. by the fact that domestic opposition to the CSDP can undermine a country's substantive and symbolic support for the CSDP. This is because even though public support for the CSDP in Austria declined after the Ukraine conflict, the majority of the respondents was still in favor of the CSDP.

	Before Ukraine conflict	After Ukraine conflict	Change in substantive support	Change in symbolic support	In line with expectations
Government statements	Symbolic	Limited support	N/A	Decrease	No
Public opinion compared to government statements	No mismatch	No mismatch	N/A	N/A	N/A
Participation in CSDP missions	Quantity: substantive > symbolic Significance: substantive > symbolic	Quantity: substantive = symbolic Significance: substantive = symbolic (both insignificant)	Quantity: increase Significance: decrease	Quantity: increase Significance: increase	Partially

Figure 10 Results of Austria

Participation in PESCO projects	N/A	Quantity: substantive > symbolic Significance: substantive > symbolic	N/A	N/A	Partially
Motivation behind contributing personnel to military CSDP missions	Symbolic	Symbolic	No change	No change	No

6. Conclusion and discussion

This research has provided insights into the support that the neutral EU member states of Ireland, Austria, and Finland show for the EU's security and defense sector: the CSDP. In particular, it has analyzed how the Ukraine conflict of 2014 has affected this support. In short, the following question has been addressed in this research: how did the Ukraine conflict affect the support of the neutral countries of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP? This question has been analyzed because after the Ukraine conflict, the geo-political tensions on the borders of the EU have increased, which has in turn increased the threat perception of many EU member states. While most of these EU member states are also members of the NATO military alliance, and can thus rely on NATO for their security, the neutral EU member states are not members of this alliance and must therefore consider alternative security providers. Since the CSDP has become more capable over the last decade, and especially after the adoption of the EUGS of 2016, this research also provides implications about whether the neutral EU member states currently consider the CSDP to be a relevant security provider that constitutes a valuable alternative to NATO.

This section will first provide a conclusion of the results of this research. Afterwards, it will discuss how these results add to the debate on the neutrality of EU member states, as well as to the debate on the relationship between NATO and the CSDP.

6.1 Conclusion of the research

The aim of this research has been to analyze how the Ukraine conflict has affected the support of the neutral countries of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP. Chapter 2 first provided background information on European defense integration, as well as on the neutrality of Ireland, Austria, and Finland. This chapter discussed that the CSDP has often been considered ineffective in the past, but that it has become more capable after the adoption of the EUGS. Also, it has shown that although the neutrality policies of Austria, Ireland, and Finland have different foundations, they share the same implication: it prevents the countries from joining NATO.

Chapter 3 indicated that EU member states can show different kinds of support for the CSDP for different reasons, which can be explained with different theoretical lines of reasoning. According to the theory of neorealism, countries join and transfer costly competences to international security organizations such as the CSDP in order to protect themselves from the potentially hostile intentions of nearby states especially. Sociological institutionalism argues that states often adopt and act according to the dominant norms of an international community because if they do not, their membership of that community may be delegitimized. Therefore, EU member states may support the CSDP only because that is expected of them by the European community, which may incentivize them to support the CSDP in the least costly way possible. Lastly, the theory of neo-classical realism argues that subnational actors can influence the foreign policies of their countries. This means that a low support of a neutral EU member state for the CSDP could be the result of the interests of the general public of those states, which may be in support of neutrality and therefore in opposition to the increasingly militarized CSDP. Based on these theories, when discussing the support of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP, I have made a distinction between substantive support, i.e. the transfer of competences to the CSDP that directly improves or could lead to a direct improvement of the capabilities of the CSDP; symbolic support, i.e. measures that demonstrate that a country affiliates itself with the European security identity but that do not directly improve the CSDP’s capabilities; and no/limited support. The methodology that was used to measure this symbolic and substantive support, as well as the limitations that are associated with this methodology and with the research in general, were discussed in chapter 4.

The evidence gathered in chapter 5 indicate that Finland has shown slightly less substantive support and slightly more symbolic support after the Ukraine conflict. Its symbolic support has also become higher than its substantive support for the CSDP after the conflict. Finland’s decreased substantive support for the CSDP is not likely the result of domestic support for neutrality, because a vast majority of the Finnish public was in favor of Finland’s participation in the CSDP. This is not in line with my expectations because I expected that Finland would have increased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict because of its geographical proximity to Russia, which should have increased its threat perception and subsequently its substantive support for the CSDP. Also, I expected its symbolic support to have increased at least to some extent, because it is not costly to do so and because European defense integration has become a dominant norm after the adoption of the EUGS in 2016. The findings confirm this expectation. However, I did not expect Finland to have shown more symbolic support than substantive support after the conflict.

Ireland decreased its substantive support after the conflict, while it slightly increased its symbolic support. In the end, it has shown more symbolic than substantive support after the conflict. Ireland’s low substantive support for the CSDP also cannot be explained by the support of subnational actors for neutrality, because the public opinion of Ireland was always in favor of Ireland’s participation in the CSDP, even more so after the Ukraine conflict. This is largely in line with my expectations because I expected that Ireland would not have increased its substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict because of its geographical distance from Russia, which should have kept Ireland’s threat perception and thus its substantive support for the CSDP after the conflict low. I also expected its symbolic support to have increased after the conflict because European security integration has become a more dominant norm ever since the adoption of the EUGS. Also, not supporting the CSDP in any way could lead to a delegitimization of Ireland’s membership of the European community, which provides Ireland with incentives to support the CSDP at least in a symbolic way. I also expected Ireland’s symbolic support to have exceeded its substantive support after the Ukraine conflict, which has been confirmed.

Austria has slightly increased its substantive support after the conflict, although that support was mostly insignificant. It has also shown more symbolic support after the conflict, but not in terms of its government statements. In the end, both Austria’s symbolic and substantive support after the Ukraine conflict can be considered insignificant. This insignificant substantive support cannot be explained by the fact that domestic opposition to the CSDP can undermine a country’s support for the CSDP. This is because even though public support for the CSDP in Austria declined after the Ukraine conflict, the majority of the respondents was still in favor of the CSDP. These findings are partially in line with my expectations, as I expected that Austria would have shown more substantive support than Ireland after the Ukraine conflict, but less than Finland. This is because Austria is geographically located in between Ireland and Finland. The evidence shows that this expectation is only partially confirmed. Also, I expected that Austria's symbolic support would have increased at least slightly after the Ukraine conflict because European security integration has become a more dominant norm after the conflict and because it is not costly to show symbolic support. I expected that Austria's symbolic support would have become higher than that of Finland, but lower than that of Ireland. The analysis has shown that this is only partially true.

The findings of this research do not provide convincing support for the theory that geographical proximity to Russia increases the substantive support of neutral EU member states for the CSDP. This is because Finland, the neutral EU member state that shares a border with Russia, decreased rather than increased its substantive support. Thus, the theory of neorealism cannot adequately explain the findings. However, the findings do provide support for the theory that the pressure to conform to the collective European security identity increases the symbolic support of EU member states for the CSDP. This is because Ireland, Austria, and Finland all increased their symbolic support for the CSDP now that European security integration has become a more dominant norm. One could argue that Austria constitutes an exception to this theory, because it became more skeptical towards the effectiveness of the CSDP after the conflict. This indicates that its symbolic support somewhat declined. However, Austria nevertheless remained supportive towards the CSDP in its government statements, as it also argued that participation in the CSDP is in the interest of Austria due to its isolation from NATO. Another finding that supports the theory that the pressure to conform to the dominant security norms in the EU leads to more symbolic support of EU member states is the fact that Ireland, Austria, and Finland contributed most of their personnel to military CSDP missions partly because France appealed to the collective European security identity. Ireland, Austria, and Finland only contributed most of their personnel to these military missions after France appealed to this identity, which indicates that their motivation to contribute personnel was of a symbolic nature. Thus, the theory of sociological institutionalism adequately explains the findings of this research. Lastly, no convincing support has been found for the theory that the neutrality of Ireland, Austria, and Finland constitutes a barrier for them to participate in the increasingly militarized CSDP. This is because although Ireland, Austria, and Finland all showed little substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict, this was not the result of public opinion that supports neutrality and therefore opposes their countries' participation in the CSDP. In fact, the public opinion in all countries was mostly supportive towards the CSDP. Thus, the findings cannot be explained with the theory of neo-classical realism.

6.2 Discussion of the implications of the research

The findings of this research have implications for the meaning of the neutrality of Ireland, Austria, and Finland. The findings indicate that the countries have not significantly increased their substantive support after the Ukraine conflict. Theoretically, this low substantive support could be the result of the countries' neutrality policies. This is because domestic support for neutrality can constitute a barrier for the governments of Ireland, Austria, and Finland to substantively support the CSDP, especially now that the improved military capabilities of the CSDP have exacerbated the incompatibility between the CSDP and neutrality. However, it can be said that in reality, the low substantive support of Ireland, Austria, and Finland for the CSDP is not the result of domestic opposition to the CSDP. In fact, there is even domestic support for the CSDP in Ireland, Austria, and Finland, as the public opinion in these countries was mostly supportive towards the CSDP. In Ireland and Finland, this public opinion even notably increased after the Ukraine conflict. This is in line with the statements made by the governments of these countries, which also indicated an increase in support for the CSDP. In Austria, the government statements and public opinion indicated a decrease in support for the CSDP, but this support was still positive after the Ukraine conflict. In short, it can be said that the low substantive support of the countries is not the result of their neutrality policies.

This is in line with the existing literature on the neutrality of EU member states, which also indicates that neutrality does not prevent EU member states from participating in the CSDP. What this research has added to the existing literature is the fact that this neutrality still does not undermine the participation of neutral EU member states in the CSDP even now that the CSDP has become more militarily capable, which puts the CSDP more at odds with neutrality. Furthermore, this research has indicated that it is not only in the interest of the governments of neutral EU member states to participate in the CSDP, but also that the majority of the public opinion in these countries supports participation in the CSDP. In other words, there is no mismatch between the opinion of the governments of neutral EU member states, which support the CSDP, and the opinion of the general public in those states. Further research could seek to explain what exactly drives the persistence of the neutrality of neutral EU member states if both their governments and their general public support their participation in an international security organization that has developed extensive military capabilities and that will continue developing those capabilities in the future. In other words, now that it has become apparent that the governments and the general public of neutral EU member states do not undermine the active participation of these states in international military organizations such as the CSDP, further research could attempt to identify what forces drive the retainment of neutrality and prevent it from being discarded completely. If the

CSDP has become similar to NATO except for the fact that NATO is a formal ‘military alliance’ and the CSDP is not, and if the governments and the general public of neutral EU member states support participation in the CSDP, is this formality truly the only factor that withholds neutral EU member states from supporting NATO membership and from discarding their neutrality? Or are there other factors that explain why the governments and the general public of neutral EU member states still want to retain their neutrality despite the fact that they are already actively participating in capable international military organizations?

Additionally, the fact that the neutral EU member states have not increased their substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict also has certain implications for the perceived utility of the CSDP. It can be argued that because the neutral EU member states cannot join NATO and therefore cannot rely on the security that this military alliance provides, they should have a particularly high interest in an effective and capable CSDP that can pose a valuable alternative to NATO. This is especially the case after the Ukraine conflict, which has increased geo-political tensions on the borders of the EU and has therefore increased the threat perception of many EU member states. However, this research has indicated that the neutral EU member states of Ireland, Austria, and Finland have not increased their substantive support after the Ukraine conflict. Instead, they supported the CSDP mostly in a symbolic way arguably in order to conform to the collective European security identity. The lack of substantive support of Ireland and Austria can be explained to a certain extent because, as has become apparent in the analysis, their threat perception did not increase notably after the Ukraine conflict. Therefore, it can be argued that their interest in a capable CSDP did not increase after the conflict. However, Finland’s threat perception did increase notably after the conflict, while its substantive support did not increase. This is unexpected because, theoretically, a higher threat perception should lead to a higher interest in a capable CSDP and therefore in more substantive support for the CSDP. As is discussed above, Finland’s low substantive support is not the result of its neutrality. Another possible explanation for Finland’s low substantive support is that Finland does not consider the CSDP to be a valuable alternative to NATO. In other words, Finland may not have an interest in substantively supporting the CSDP because it may not consider the CSDP to be capable enough in order to grant Finland the security that it desires after the Ukraine conflict. If Finland, which theoretically should have the highest interest in a capable CSDP due to its neutrality and its geographical proximity to Russia, does not show significant substantive support for the CSDP after the Ukraine conflict because it does not believe in the security potential of the CSDP, then the EU member states that are not neutral and that should have a lower interest in a capable CSDP because of their NATO membership are even less likely to substantively support the CSDP. This has significant implications for the future effectiveness of the

CSDP because it could mean that as long as the majority of EU member states are members of NATO, they are unlikely to support the CSDP substantively. In addition, substantive support for the CSDP arguably has become more necessary now that the existence of NATO can no longer be taken for granted, as US President Donald Trump has for example threatened to pull the US out of the alliance. Thus, at a time where the EU may have to look after its own security, EU member states may not be inclined to support the CSDP substantively. This could mean that the CSDP will keep suffering from a lack of resources put at its disposal by the EU member states, which will undermine the effectiveness of the CSDP in the future. Further research could investigate this proposition by analyzing the substantive support of non-neutral EU member states for the CSDP and for NATO. More specifically, it could compare the substantive support of EU member states for the CSDP to their substantive support for NATO. This would provide additional insights into how EU member states perceive the relevance and utility of the CSDP in relation to NATO.

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Appendix

List of PESCO projects and member states participating as project members, project coordinators, and observers

PESCO Project	Project members	Project coordinator	Observers
European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC)	Germany, Belgium, Czechia, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Romania, Sweden	Germany	Portugal, Slovenia
European Training Certification Centre for European Armies	Italy, Greece	Italy	Spain
Helicopter Hot and High Training (H3 Training)	Greece, Italy, Romania	Greece	N/A
Joint EU Intelligence School	Greece, Cyprus	Greece	N/A
EU Test and Evaluation Centres	France, Sweden, Spain, Slovakia	France	N/A
Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package	Italy, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Austria	Italy	Portugal, Bulgaria, Ireland
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured	Italy, Greece, Slovakia	Italy	Czech Republic, Estonia,

Vehicle			Hungary, Slovakia, Ireland
Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery)	Slovakia, Italy	Slovakia	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary, Slovenia
EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC)	Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus	Germany	Belgium, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Netherlands
Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS)	Estonia, Belgium, Czechia, Spain, France, Latvia, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Finland	Estonia	N/A
EU Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) Land Battlefield Missile Systems	France, Belgium, Cyprus	France	N/A
Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM)	Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania	Belgium	Ireland, Estonia, Spain
Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO)	Italy, Greece, Poland, Portugal	Italy	Belgium, Netherlands
Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance	Greece, Bulgaria, Ireland, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus	Greece	None
Deployable Modular Underwater Intervention Capability Package (DIVEPACK)	Bulgaria, Greece, France	Bulgaria	N/A
European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – MALE RPAS (Eurodrone)	Germany, Czechia, Spain, France, Italy	Germany	N/A
European Attack Helicopters TIGER Mark III	France, Germany, Spain	France	N/A
Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS)	Italy, Czechia	Italy	N/A
European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR)	France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Finland	France	Estona, Spain, Ireland
Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform	Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Austria, Portugal	Greece	Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Ireland
Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security	Lithuania, Estonia, Spain, France, Croatia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Finland	Lithuania	Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Slovenia
Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations	Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal	Spain	Luxemburg
European High Atmosphere	Italy, France	Italy	N/A

Airship Platform (EHAAP) – Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability			
One Deployable Special Operations Forces (SOF) Tactical Command and Control (C2) Command Post (CP) for Small Joint Operations (SJO) – (SOCC) for SJO	Greece, Cyprus	Greece	N/A
Electronic Warfare Capability and Interoperability Programme for Future Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) Cooperation	Czechia, Germany	Czech Republic	N/A
European Medical Command	Germany, Czechia, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden	Germany	Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Belgium
Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations	Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia	Germany	Portugal, Finland, Lithuania, Luxemburg
Military Mobility	Netherlands, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden	Netherlands	Ireland
Energy Operational Function (EOF)	France, Belgium, Spain, Italy	France	Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Surveillance as a Service (CBRN SaaS)	Austria, France, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia	Austria	N/A
Co-basing	France, Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Spain, Netherlands	France	N/A
Geo-meteorological and Oceanographic (GeoMETOC) Support Coordination Element (GMSCE)	Germany, Greece, France, Romania	Germany	N/A
EU Radio Navigation Solution (EURAS)	France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy	France	N/A
European Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network (EU-SSA-N)	Italy, France	Italy	N/A

Source: Eduskunta, 2018; Council of the EU, 2018b