

Punishment – The Role of External Factors on Jihadist Prosecution

A British and German Case Study



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1. Introduction

Counter terrorism activities, such as the sentencing of terrorists, are generally grounded in efficient criminal justice processes which adhere to the principles of the rule of law and human rights (UNODC, 2018). Therefore, criminal justice systems around the world are capable of providing an accountable and legitimate response to terrorism (ibid.). This kind of response can thus help avoid and mitigate the risk of terrorist activities which pose a threat to national security. As the war in Syria and Iraq has drawn thousands of European citizens to its bloody battle fields since 2011, the need for adequate judicial responses to terrorism becomes evident (Scherrer, 2018). Such individuals have either attempted to or successfully joined insurgent terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and passively or actively supported their cause (ibid.). After years of terror, IS had to face repeated defeats since 2017 and had lost its last strongholds a few years later (Brzuszkiewicz, 2018, BBC, 2019). After the defeats in Syria and Iraq, the potential return of European foreign fighters to their home countries became a pressing concern. The return of such individuals does not only bring fear of terrorist activities and influence on European soil but also raises apprehensions regarding judicial consequences and adequate punishment (Scherrer, 2018). Considering the staggering number of 1.050 foreign fighters who left Germany since 2013, the extent and need for appropriate criminal justice responses for returning individuals as well as people on the path to extremism is highlighted (Verfassungsschutz, 2019). Various databases from the United Kingdom (UK) emphasize (BBC Database, 2017, Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism, n.d.) foreign fighters are not the only concern of European countries. Radicalized individuals present themselves in numerous shapes and forms and emerge in the legal system as supporters who distribute extremist related content online, financiers or recruiters. Combined, such radicalized and citizens pose a national security threat to the countries they call home.

The extent to which these individuals pose a national security threat to their country of residence became once again visible on 29.11.2019 in London. During an attack on London Bridge, a man stabbed two people before being shot dead by the police (Booth & Adam, 2019). As the attacker was a formerly convicted terrorist who was released after serving half of his 16-year sentence, the incident raised uncomfortable questions regarding early-release provisions for terrorism related offences in the UK. These questions loom as Britain, as well as other Member States struggle to cope with national jihadists and returning foreign fighters (ibid.). When asked about the incident, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said: "it is a mistake to allow serious and violent criminals to come out of prison early. It is very important that we get out of that habit and that we enforce the appropriate sentences for dangerous criminals,

especially for terrorists," (DW, 2019). This attack and the problems of adequate prosecution expose one of the many challenges that nations face when combatting terrorism throughout the years.

Many European countries have been targeted by terrorist activities in recent years (de Roy van Zuijdewijn & Sciarone, 2019). Well-known examples are the Paris attacks of 2015, the Brussels and Berlin attack of 2016, the Nice attack of 2016, as well as the Manchester and Barcelona attacks of 2017. These attacks gained sufficient public attention worldwide and led to policy changes within the affected nations (ibid.). Therefore, an initial relationship between terrorism and external factors such as terror attacks and the political discourse has been established. Furthermore, this relationship can be analyzed from a legal point of view which dives into the role of such external factors on jihadist prosecution in European countries. Therefore, within the European context of this study, this paper analyses which role external factors such as the political discourse or terror attacks play on the legal punishment of jihadist in the UK and Germany. Thus, this paper answers the following research question: *How did external factors in the United Kingdom and Germany exert influence over jihadist punishment between 2013 and 2018?*

By raising such question, this study observes jihadist prosecution from a macro and micro perspective. The macro perspective analyses the influence of external factors on the prosecution of jihadists in the UK and Germany while the micro perspective focuses on the conviction aspect of jihadist sentencing. This comparative analysis adds academic relevance as it has not been approached before within the context of this study. Therefore, this paper supplies crucial information to the wider academic community. Furthermore, the establishment of a German database offers the public as well as other scholars detailed insights into Germany's jihadists. This database identifies prosecuted individuals who have been convicted for terrorism offences such as membership in a terrorist organization abroad, financing or supporting terrorist organizations as well as individuals who are still awaiting trial. Considering the fact that Germany has not provided its public with the same access to such information as the UK, the creation of this database adds valuable insights on the matter. After identifying the problem of the potential return of foreign fighters to EU soil, it is crucial to tackle not only the returning foreign fighter phenomenon but also address the problems of radicalized individuals living in the UK and Germany. The fear of further terrorist activities within the EU and the influence of returnees on less radicalized citizens is apparent. The potential return of severely radicalized people has therefore profound implications on national security and state responses.

Building upon this, the paper is divided into five sections which gradually examine how external factors have played a role in the legal punishments in the UK and Germany. The first section outlines the theoretical framework of this study which conceptualizes crucial terms and outlines the UK's and Germany's legal responses to terrorism. It furthermore touches upon the complex relationship between external factors and legal procedures. The second section outlines the methodological aspects of this study and explains the case selection as well as the data collection process. The purpose of this section is to establish a triangulation approach. The third section introduces the database and the prosecuted individuals. Within this section crucial similarities and differences between the UK and Germany become apparent. The fourth section focuses on the analysis. It first, zooms in onto further similarities and differences with a focus on the sentencing aspect of this study. It therefore seeks to answer the following sub question: How do sentences of jihadists differ between the UK and Germany? It then compares the findings of the previous section to external factors and analyses whether or not differences in trends can be observed and whether external factors have had an impact on the sentencing procedure. The last section summarizes the main findings and answers the research question.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Literature Review

Terrorism poses a double-infinite risk which features both elements of uncertainty and catastrophe (Bonino, 2012). The emergence of these elements has molded governmental anti-terror laws, policing strategies and societal attitudes towards terrorism and global insecurities (ibid.). As it is impossible to predict such terrorism risks, the world has implemented various measures in recent years. The task of defining terrorism however is not as clear cut as newspaper outlets make it appear. Bruce Hoffmann (2006) criticized the overuse of the term in the public and argued that not even dictionaries are able to effectively define such crucial concept. He thus linked terrorism to politics and the pursuit of power. In essence, he claimed that terrorism is “violence – or, equally important, the threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim” (p.3). Throughout the academic sphere, distinctions have been made between the ‘old’ terrorism which began before 2001 and the ‘new’ threat of terror, introduced by the 9/11 attacks. Stevenson (2001) for instance highlighted that pre 9/11 terrorism threat could be contained through political liaison with terrorist representatives while post 9/11 terrorism requires strict counter terrorism measures such as the involvement of law

enforcements and intelligence services. The introduction of the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy and the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy of 2005 seemingly introduced this new era of countering violent extremism around the globe.

As the punishment of jihadists generally falls under the umbrella of countering terrorism, a number of scholars have taken on the challenge to assess the UK's and Germany's judicial response as means to combat terrorism (UNODC, 2018). With regards to the UK, scholars such as Irving R. Kaufman (1980) or Susan Hemming (2010) have taken a deeper look into criminal procedures. While Kaufman elaborated on that by comparing the legal systems in Britain and United States, Hemming provided a practical application of counter terrorism legislations in England and Wales. She identified developments in legislations and examined England and Wales criminal justice approach to terrorism from the prosecutor's perspective. With regards to Germany, authors such as Christoph J.M. Stafferling (2006) and Dr. Bernhard Kretschmer (2012) dove into the German Criminal Code and evaluated passages that referred to terrorism offences. While Kretschmer focused on the classifications and principles of the German Criminal Code section 129a StGB¹, Stafferling emphasized numerous responses to terrorism. Although both authors highlighted the importance of the German Criminal Code, Stafferling further outlined the impact of the German Code on Criminal Procedure or procedural idiosyncrasies of trials against terrorists.

Although numerous articles (Lazarus, 2004 or Badar and Marchuk, 2012) have compared Germany's and the UK's legal and prison systems, limited research has focused on the sentencing of jihadists and the role of external factors such as the political discourse, terror acts or public opinion on the matter. Few authors have taken on the challenge to observe the relationship between prosecution and external factors. Scholars such as Orley Ashenfelter et al. (1995) stated that "it is widely believed that the background and worldview of judges influence their decision" (p.257). They elaborated on previous studies by claiming that many appellate-level studies in the United States find that Democratic judges are more liberal than Republicans (ibid.). Although Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin (2012) acknowledged that research is conflicted between the relationship of external factors and case outcomes, their study confirmed Ashenfelter et al.'s (1995) statement and claimed that a judge's ideology indeed affects their decisions. They furthermore added that public mood is another statistically significant variable that associates public opinion and court's decisions. Nigel Walker (1985) elaborated on the public opinion debate by claiming: "In theory sentencing decisions are influenced only by officially approved considerations, whether embodied in stature, practice direction case law or

¹ Section 129 (a/b) is purely related to terrorism offences.

circular. In real life most sentencers admit to having some regard to what they believe to be public opinion” (p.64).

While numerous authors acknowledge that public opinion or political beliefs execute influence on case outcomes, research on the relationship between politics and jihadist prosecution remains largely missing. Beatrice de Graaf and Alex P. Schmid (2016) claimed that although research on political trials has matured in recent years, the focus on terrorism trials remains limited (p.11). No notable research has drawn a particular link between potential pressure arising from an increasing political discourse and jihadist punishments. This comes at a surprise considering that numerous cases have attracted political and public attention and have created a snowball effect which triggered an increase in prosecutions. One of the most dominant examples are the 9/11 attacks. Shields et al. (2009) claimed that the attack dramatically changed how the government investigates and prosecutes individuals that are suspected for participating in terrorist activities. These changes led to a notable increase in the number of cases that the US government prosecuted after the 9/11 attacks (ibid.). Considering the fact that research towards a correlation between external factors such as terror attacks or the political conversation on terrorism and jihadist prosecutions is severely lacking, this study builds a theory that intends to incite further research. By analyzing whether or not there is indeed a correlation between both variables, future researchers are able to build on these findings and expand the analysis towards a causation study.

2.2 Conceptualization

In order to provide clarity to the study, this section defines and conceptualizes crucial key terms. Arguably, a mere minority of incarcerated individuals was sentenced based on his or her intent to pursue power through terrorist activities or threaten violence to their home country. Therefore, this study does not define those sentenced individuals as terrorists despite the fact that the study of their incarceration is focused on terrorism offences. As terrorism can be executed from numerous actors, this study focuses on jihadist terrorism. Hegghammer (2006) brought together the notions of ‘global jihadism’ and ‘Islamism’. Hereby, he argued that both terms combined can be understood as ‘Islamic activism’ (p.12). Therefore, he reasoned that global jihadism is part of Islamic activism which refers to “nonviolent and violent, progressive as well as reactionary, political movements” (p.12). This definition highlights various aspects of jihadist actions which were deemed to be suitable within the context of this study. The use of the term ‘political movement’ can be linked back to Hoffman’s definition of terrorism which is closely associated to political aim. Furthermore, whereas some offenders have executed

violent acts, others have supported terrorist organizations passively. Consequently, one should differentiate between violent and non-violent individuals who have been subject to jihadist radicalization.

Throughout the academic literature, the discourse on conceptualizing ‘radicalization’ and ‘de-radicalization’ is still ongoing. Alex P. Schmid (2013) in particular outlined the discourse surrounding these terms and presents various definitions from academia, politics and justice. Despite the complex nature of defining radicalization and other associated terms, John Horgan and Kurt Braddock (2010) refer to radicalization as:

“the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology. Radicalization may not necessarily lead to violence, but is one of several risk factors required for this” (p. 279).

With regards to this study, this definition has been chosen above all the others, as it clearly distinguishes between violent and non-violent and political and religious radicalization. Within the framework of this study, such distinction is crucial, as the databases of convicted jihadists in the UK and Germany includes individuals who have indeed acted out terrorist activities with the intent of creating harm, whereas others have taken a more passive approach of spreading their ideology.

As incarcerated, radicalized individuals pose a potential security threat to the wider society upon release, the concept of national security is introduced. Assuming that the incarcerated jihadists pose a threat to the national security of their countries, the term itself should be elaborated on. Arnold Wolfers (1952) cited Walter Lipmann’s definition of national security which stated that a “nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war” (p.484). This implies that national security depends on the ability to prevent an attack or defeat it. Although this definition appears to be rather militarized, within the context of this study, it refers to the nation’s ability to withstand terrorism threats by diverging risks through the punishment of jihadists.

3. Methodology

The following section addresses the methodology of this thesis. It provides insights into the research design and introduces the two cases studies. In order to obtain a greater understanding of the data used, this section furthermore outlines the data collection and data analysis process.

Overall, this study follows an in-depth analysis which explains the complex relationship between the depended and independent variables. Therefore, this study examines what effect the independent variable, external factors, has on the dependent variable, jihadist punishment. In order to measure the relationship between the dependent and independent variable, it is essential to explain necessary indicators. The indicators that refer to external factors, include (1) politicization and (2) terror attacks. Politicization within the framework of this study refers to the political discourse on terrorism related issues. To measure politicization, parliamentary debates as well as notable political developments are examined between 2013 and 2018. To obtain a better understanding of the overall terrorism debate, any documents that refer to ‘terrorism’ are selected. In the UK, these documents are retrieved from the Hansard Dataset and contain both debates from the House of Lords and House of Commons. In Germany documents regarding parliamentary debates are retrieved from the Documentation and Information System (DIP) of the German parliament. Information regarding terror attacks are retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The search is limited to jihadist, Muslim extremist or ISIS attacks in Western Europe. Although the literature suggested an intriguing link between the public and prosecution, the public discourse has been left out of this study. This is due to the simple fact that there was no adequate data available.

By understanding the overarching relationship between the dependent and independent variable, this study follows an inductive reasoning approach. According to Yin (2018), this is likely to be “leading you further into your data and possibly suggesting additional relationships” (p. 109). Overall, this study begins with an observation (the different conviction trends between the UK and Germany), to the hypothesis (a relationship between punishments and external factors) and arrives at a theory. Considering this, the study employs a qualitative research design on a comparative case study in order to effectively highlight the role of external factors on jihadist prosecution in the UK and Germany. As this study follows a “how” research question and focuses on tracing operational processes over a time span of five years (2013-2018), a comparative case study has been chosen to guide the analysis (Yin, 2018, p.20). With the case study, a contemporary phenomenon (the influence external factors exert on jihadist punishment) is investigated within its real-world context (ibid.). Thus, a case study allows for

a successful analysis of the outlined, contemporary phenomenon. By choosing a comparative case study over a single case study, this study is able to provide an in-depth analysis of both the UK and Germany and highlight essential differences in their jihadist prosecution and the role of external factors within that context. The findings are therefore more compelling and more robust (Yin, 2018, p. 46). The study is furthermore able to dive into two vastly different legal systems and examine how they approach the issue of jihadist conviction, analyze which trends emerge between the given timeframe and how external events could have an impact on the prosecution processes. Therefore, a comparative study validates the findings. If this study only focused on either Germany or the UK, thus following a single case study, the findings could be less representable.

3.1 Case Selection

The following section outlines the comparability of the UK and German case study. The cases of the UK and Germany share a number of similarities and differences, which create an intriguing foundation for a comparative study. First, both nations share a large Muslim population which was introduced due to Britain's colonial past and Germany's *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) system after the second World War. As of 2018, 3,372,966 Muslims live in the UK, forming the second largest religious community (Office for National Statistics, 2018). Germany is currently home to 4,7 million Muslims which add to approximately 5.4 % of the overall population (BMI, 2019). Arguably, these communities present target groups for jihadist radicalization as well as societal demonization that comes together with the fear of uncertainty and risk from non-Muslim communities.

Second, the number of individuals who left the UK and Germany to join insurgencies in Syria and Iraq since 2013 is another aspect that proves comparability of both cases. The first German citizens departed the country by May 2013 and up to date, an estimated 1.050 individuals left to fight or support terrorist organizations such as IS or al-Qaida (Verfassungsschutz, 2019). In comparison, a study by the European Policy Centre and Counter Extremism Project (2019) stated that approximately 900 British foreign fighters have left the countries to join the jihad in Syria and an estimated 400 people of "national security concern" have returned (Acheson & Paul, 2019, p. 99). Building upon this information, it becomes apparent that both nations face a similar challenge regarding potential returning foreign fighters. It is therefore of significance to establish to what extent both countries are prepared to prosecute.

Fourth, according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), differences between the UK's and Germany's history of terror related incidents emerge. The GTD is an open-source database published by the University of Maryland which presents information on terrorist incidents throughout the world from 1970 until 2018. Users are able to advance their searches in regard to types of attacks, regions and countries or fatalities. A rather general search of the UK yielded a result of approximately 5300 attacks since the 1970s and in Germany 1300. Although only a limited number of attacks resulted in casualties or injuries, the difference between both nations is staggering. After comparing those attacks, it becomes apparent that while the UK has experienced their first jihadi-inspired terror incident with numerous fatalities back in 2005, Germany had their first deadly event in 2016.

Fifth, the UK and Germany are home to two vastly different judicial systems. Within the German judicial system, the legislature and the public prosecutor or the trial courts share a relationship that is connected through provisions on sentencing (Nestler, 2003, p.111). The basis of such system is built around penal codes which have individual indications for each offense. The German Criminal Code (*Strafgesetzbuch* (Stgb)) for instance consists of 150 pages, thirty chapters and 358 sections (Bohlander, 2013). This comprehensive collection of the German Criminal Code outlines its application, various offenses, the applicable punishments as well as principals and secondary participants (ibid.). The offences summarized in the document reach from air pollution (§ 325) to offences causing a common danger such as arson (§ 306) or rioting (§ 125). Throughout the document, 'terrorism' or 'terrorist' is mentioned five times. §129a for instance outlines legal repercussions regarding the formation of a terrorist organisation or §129b examines consequences against joining or supporting criminal and terrorist organisations abroad.

Within penal codes such as the German Criminal Code, statutory penalty tends to be outlined rather broadly which allows room to navigate and adapt judicial sentencing to individual cases (Nestler, 2003, p.111). For instance, in the case of theft (§242), the German Criminal Code outlines the following:

“(1) Whosoever takes movable properties belonging to another away from another with the intention of unlawfully appropriating it for themselves or a third party incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine.

(2) The attempt is punishable” (Bohlander, 2013, p. 116).

As the example highlights, the definition of theft in itself is rather broad and the penalty for such action ranges from a fine to five years imprisonment. Such stark differences therefore allow prosecutors to examine individual cases and take other indicators into account when sentencing a person. For instance, the German Criminal Code outlines principles of sentencing (§46) which determines the guilt of the offender as the basis for sentencing (Bohlander, 2013, p.12). When weighing a defendant's guilt, the prosecution or courts take a number of circumstances into account. For instance, the motives and aims of the offender may change the outcome of a sentence as well as the attitude and the degree of force reflected during the criminal act (ibid.). In general, the German Criminal Code outlines that the minimum prison sentence for a fixed term an individual can receive is one month and the maximum sentence is set at 15 years (p.10). At the same time, the code gives a detailed overview of potential suspended sentences as well as early release conditions. As can be seen, the German judicial system provides a complex set of penalties which nevertheless allow room for judgement from the prosecutor or trial courts.

The UK, other than Germany has three legal systems; (1) England and Wales, (2) Scotland and (3) Northern Ireland (Rab, n.d.). Considering that the vast majority of sentenced individuals in the database are from England, this study focuses on the judicial system of England and Wales instead of all systems of the UK. While Germany has the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) or the German Criminal Code, the UK does not provide a single written document which outlines the rights of its citizens and rules as to how the government should respond (Rab, n.d.). Overall, the UK has a parliamentary system of governance and its supreme law-making body is the Westminster Parliament. The sovereignty of parliament means that courts have to accept that legislations endorsed by the parliament are superior than common law (ibid.). England and Wales practice a common law legal system which has been built upon case laws (Rab, n.d.). Although the UK does not have a written constitution, numerous crucial elements can be found in statutes introduced by the parliament. The most important documents include the Magna Carta 1215, Bill of Rights 1689 or the Human Rights Act 1998 (ibid.). It is furthermore important to understand that an individual does not need to commit a terrorism offense *per se* to be convicted (CPS, n.d.). Planning an attack, assisting an offender or collecting information on how to commit acts of terrorism are sufficient reasons to be convicted under British terrorism legislations (ibid.). The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) reviews terrorism cases the same way it reviews other criminal charges. However, the CPS and Metropolitan Police have set up specialized units such as the Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division (SCCTD) that deal with terrorism, war crimes and crimes against humanity cases (CPS, n.d.).

3.2 Data Collection Process

Within this section, the data collection process is addressed. Throughout the study, various sources have been analysed in order to gain a thorough understanding of the complex issue at hand. To fully examine the universe of data regarding external factors and their influence on the sentencing of jihadists, this study follows a triangulation approach which encompasses the analysis of two or more sets of data (Heale & Forbes, 2013). Triangulation therefore creates validity by observing the prosecution of British and German jihadists from various angles. To establish an in-depth analysis which validates the data used, this study collected three sets of data. At first, parliamentary debates are analysed in order to gain an insight into the relationship between the political discourse on terrorism and punishments in the UK and Germany. Second, the data found on the GTD is examined and compared to the jihadist conviction rate. This also provides insight into the relationship of external factors on jihadist prosecution. Third, the main database used in this study zooms in on numerous prosecuted individuals in the UK and Germany and therefore creates a micro perspective on the sentencing and punishment of jihadists in both nations.

The main database is composed of publicly available information from newspaper articles on convicted jihadists from the UK and Germany as well as data published by the *Generalbundesanwalt* (Federal Prosecutor). The information regarding sentenced individuals from the UK is primarily set together from the BBC Database (2017) and cross-referenced by the Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism database and newspaper articles. The BBC Database has been created by BBC journalists who scanned newspapers for information regarding names, regions, dates of incarceration, sentencing, and reasons for incarceration. To ensure the validity of this information, randomly selected individuals were cross-checked through newspaper articles prior to the establishment of this paper. With regards to information on German sentenced individuals, the German Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies (GIRDS) had previously published a database of 40 convicted jihadists. However, due to data protection issues, this study was unable to access this dataset. Considering this, an independent database has been established, using a similar data collection process as the BBC Database. By scanning the website of the *Generalbundesanwalt* various indictments of jihadists emerged. After filtering the names of each individual onto a separate sheet, every accused person was researched on, using newspaper articles or websites of local court of justice departments. This data gathering process focused on various variables which were filtered onto a code sheet. Details regarding the codes and justification process have been presented in table 1 of the

appendix. Throughout the data collection process, vast differences in data sharing between Germany and the UK emerged. These differences are further outlined in a separate section of this paper.

3.3 Method of Data Analysis

Due to the limited research on the relationship between external factors and jihadist convictions, this study therefore, makes use of the grounded theory approach. According to Strauss and Corbin (1994) grounded theory is a “general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analyzed” (p.273). The theory is eventually formed during the analysis and evolves through the interplay between analysis and data collection (ibid.). Glaser and Holton (as cited in Tie *et al.*, 2019) furthermore defined grounded theory as “a set of integrated conceptual hypothesis systematically generated to produce an inductive theory about a substantive area” (p.3). Thus, grounded theory, other than other approaches, does not start with a hypothesis however develops a theory during the analysis process. Within the framework of this methodology, this study aims at producing a theory that presents numerous conceptual relationships which provide an in-depth perspective in the issue at hand (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Therefore, the fluidity of this approach allows this study to explore *if, how* or *if not*, external factors play a role in jihadist prosecution (ibid.).

Although a number of other methods such as content analysis or interview analysis would have given an intriguing insight into the relationship between both variables, various factors came into play that would have limited the results. The main issue of these methods refers to information access. With regards to interviews, this study was unable to find suitable interviewees that would have provided a unique perspective to the effect of external factors on the legal punishments of jihadists. With regards to content analysis, this study was unable to access comparable documents from the UK and Germany. While Germany publishes sentencing documents of incarcerated individuals which would have given detailed information on grounds and motivations of a person’s punishments, the UK did not provide that information. Therefore, this study had to adapt and use the database as their main source of information. Considering these limitations, grounded theory provides a sense of flexibility within the scope of this analysis that other methods would not have offered.

3.4 Limitations of Data

Although the outlined framework provides a detailed overview of the study on the sentencing of jihadists, it is crucial to understand the limits of this data. Throughout the study numerous biases have emerged and various actions have been taken to minimize their effect on the reliability and validity of this study. Throughout the establishment of the database, selection and interpretation biases have occurred. When selecting and analysing the individuals that are either awaiting trial or are incarcerated in Germany, people who are affiliated with jihadi terrorist organisations in Syria or Iraq have been chosen. This excludes jihadists that are associated with other religious or politically motivated terrorist groups. Nevertheless, it is assumed that the laws and regulations that formulate sentencing procedures in the UK and Germany do not discriminate between jihadists following terror groups in Syria or for instance in Tajikistan. In addition to that, it is essential to keep in mind that numerous suspects around 2017 are still on trial or awaiting trial. Therefore, a drop in the data visualization is expected. Nevertheless, the years prior provide a clear picture. Therefore, this limitation does not significantly impact the overall findings.

The objective that addresses reliability derives from the certainty that “if a later researcher follows the same procedures as described by an earlier researcher and conducts the same study over again, the later investigator will arrive at the same findings and conclusions” (Yin, 2018, p.41). By giving a detailed account of the collected data and the analysis of stated datasets, future researchers are able to understand each step and decision taken. Therefore, the study follows a reliable research approach which can be traced back by other investigators. Moreover, scholars such as Yin (2018) examined the issue of external validity which highlights the problem of knowing whether the results of a study are “generalizable beyond the immediate study” (p.41). As the content of texts can be assessed from various perspectives, its results can be subject to interpretation bias from the researcher. Thus, in order to counteract this bias, this study has analyzed the content of various source outlets (triangulation) to ensure external validity.

It is crucial to note that this study refrains from stating a strong relationship between external factors and the punishment of British and German jihadists due to the limitation of data and resources available. This is mainly due to the fact that the current debate on that issue is almost non-existent. Therefore, this study aims at providing first insights into the relationship between the dependent and independent variable and lays a foundation for future research on the matter.

4. The ‘who is who’ of the database

The following section outlines who the convicted jihadists of the main database are. This information provides a solid foundation on which the analysis will be based on. Knowing vital differences and similarities between incarcerated individuals in the UK and Germany allows for a better understanding of both nations. Therefore, as both Germany and the UK have experienced numerous terrorist attacks on their soil and are two of the biggest foreign fighter exporters in the EU, it is of great significance to understand who their convicted jihadists are (Baker-Beall, 2019).

The database holds information regarding 123 British and 115 German sentenced individuals. It becomes apparent that both nations have a similar distribution of male and female convicts. The database reveals that 81% of the individuals which are convicted in the UK are male, while 19% are female. In comparison, Germany’s imprisoned jihadists are 88% male and 12% female. Therefore, it becomes obvious that both nations have a similar male/female ratio. Although, these findings would suggest that men are more likely to be engaged in violent extremism and studies in the past have placed their focus on that, recent years have shown a change in this mindset. Several studies (Seran de Leede (2018); AIVD (2017); ICAN (2019)) have paid attention to jihadist women and their involvement in national and international terrorism. Coolsaet and Renard (2018) for instance elaborated on a study by the Egmont Institute in Brussels, which assessed changing policies in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium with regards to returning foreign fighters. This study examined that individuals that left for a jihadi war zone are subject to judicial investigations the moment indicators of their departure emerge. The study observed that as of recently, Belgium and the Netherlands no longer distinguish between male and female returning foreign fighters. In Germany, this distinction is also declining (Coolsaet & Renard, 2018). Therefore, it seems that women have been mainly left out of the radicalization debate until recently, which could explain why only such a small number of them have been placed on trial. Another explanation however suggests that because men commit the majority of criminal offenses overall, legal systems are generally designed around the male perpetrator (OSCE, 2019). As an OSCE report (2019) implies “The lack of insight into gender aspects of criminal behavior can lead to law and justice stakeholders relying on gender stereotypes when dealing with men and women who come into contact with the law.” (p.50). Therefore, women are oftentimes regarded as emotional and psychologically instable offenders rather than the actual criminal (ibid.).




Chart 1: Age distribution of jihadists in the UK and Germany

After highlighting a similar male/female ratio within the sample population of the database, slight differences between the ages of the individuals in both countries emerge. As shown in the graph above, it becomes clear that both in the UK and Germany, the majority of convicted jihadists are in their 20s and 30s. However, individuals in the UK are on average younger than their German counterpart by the time of their conviction. In the more extreme forms of radicalization, individuals have joined insurgencies as foreign fighters and the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Verfassungsschutz*) suggests that those foreign fighters are on average in their 20s and 30s (Verfassungsschutz, 2019). Considering this, the information within the database confirms this statement. Such finding suggests that men and women within that age group are more prone to radicalization and more likely to be engaged in terrorist activity.

During the process of establishing the database, one major difference between the UK and Germany emerged. While the UK provides information regarding the city or region of residence of each individual, Germany focuses mainly on nationality. This lack of information proves problematic when scholars attempt to understand radicalization and why certain regions home to more radicalized individuals are than others. Within the database, Germany's jihadists are divided into two categories. The first category determines the city that a sentenced person originates from. The second category refers to the nationality of an individual. Within this category, the jihadists are divided into Germans and non-Germans. As the chart below highlights, only 40% of the individuals are linked to a German city, while 25% have the German nationality and 35% are of non-German origin.




Chart 2: Jihadist Origin

These findings however say very little about the incarcerated individuals. Other than many other EU nations, Germany did not allow dual citizenship which forced numerous migrant children (and children of parents with one parent who does not have the German nationality) to decide on one citizenship (BMI, n.a.). Therefore, although a staggering 35% of the individuals in the database are referred to as Syrian, Tunisian or Iraqi, there is a chance that they are nonetheless born in Germany. The information regarding nationality henceforth explains little as to why a person has radicalized in Germany or whether that process happened somewhere else. Out of the 35% individuals who are of non-German nationality, 12 people are from Syria, eight are from Iraq, eight have dual citizenship, two are from Tunisia, two from Lebanon, one from Pakistan, Cameroon, Tajikistan and Kosovo.




Chart 3: Jihadist City of Residence

When examining the hometowns of the remaining 40%, it becomes apparent that Berlin is home to the most incarcerated jihadists. Berlin with seven of its inhabitants sentenced, is followed swiftly by Bonn and Mönchengladbach. Furthermore, observing map 1 (which has been attached to the appendix), it becomes obvious that the jihadist distribution in Germany is uneven. The map highlights that the North of the country, which borders Scandinavia, is seemingly less affected by (violent) radicalization. Apart from Berlin, the East, bordering Poland, is also less home to sentenced radicalized individuals. Similarly, to the North, the South has only a fraction of sentenced jihadists. The western part of the country, however, is home to approximately 20 sentenced individuals.

Although a number of reasons may be behind such uneven distribution, one explanation may be a country's Muslim population or its geographic location. The majority of West German incarcerated jihadists are from North-Rhine Westphalia, which is closely located to Belgium and the Netherlands. North-Rhine Westphalia is home to almost 1/3 of Germany's Muslim population who are on average 30,1 years old (Ministerium für Arbeit, Integration und Soziales, 2010). The fact that so many young Muslims live in that area shows that it could be an ideal breeding ground for recruiters to spread their ideology. Considering that most incarcerated jihadists are around 30 years old, the average age group of Muslims in North-Rhine Westphalia might furthermore make them a target of radicalization. Moreover, Germany, together with Belgium and the Netherlands is home to a third of all European foreign fighters (Renard & Coolsaet, 2018). Belgium alone has reportedly the highest ratio of foreign fighters per capita across Europe (Renard & Coolsaet, 2018, p.19). Therefore, North-Rhein Westphalia's high numbers of incarcerated jihadists may be explained through its geographic location, bordering the Netherlands and Belgium. The spread of ideology may be easier when bordering countries with a high number of radicalized individuals than for instance from countries such as Poland who has no notable numbers of jihadi terrorists (Europol, 2019, p.11 & 29).

In contrast to Germany, the UK rarely addresses the nationality of their jihadists and focuses on the region, city or town instead. The graph below as well as map 2 in the appendix highlight that similar to Germany, the capital city is the main producer of radicalized individuals. Out of the 123 jihadists of the database, 31 lived in London, which identifies a potential radicalization issue within the capital. London is followed by the West Midlands and its capital Birmingham and the cities of Walsall and Luton.




Chart 4: Jihadist City of Residence

Similarly, to Germany, most of the incarcerated jihadists come from areas which host the most Muslims in the country. London for instance is home to 1,012,823 Muslims which adds to a 37.4% of the overall Muslim population in the UK (Ali, 2015, p. 25). London is followed by the West Midlands who host 376,152 or 13.9% of the British Muslim population (ibid.). As identified in Germany, larger Muslim populations may be subject to radicalization and targeted by recruiters, which could be one of the many explanations as to why these two regions are home to the largest incarcerated jihadist community. Nevertheless, geographic location or Muslim population are just two explanations as to why a region is more prone to radicalization than another. Scholars such as Alex P. Schmid (2013) or Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam (2016) have identified a number of push and pull factors that eventually lead to an individual's radicalization and potential terrorist activity. Schmid for instance argued that there is not a single cause for internal or external pull and push factors that lead to radicalization. Dawson and Amarasingam claimed that push factors may include economic instability in the home country, low prospects, social networks as well as the search for a purpose and self-fulfillment.

Throughout the preparation period, in which the database was established, further difference between the UK and Germany emerged. While crosschecking the BBC database with other publicly available data, it became obvious that the country does not seem to have strict data protection laws in place regarding personal information of an incarcerated individual. While in Germany merely the first name and the initial of their last name is available to the public, the UK publishes full names, including middle names. The UK furthermore publishes pictures of a number of their jihadists. This is problematic in many ways. First, by publishing detailed information about an individual on a jihadist database brands them a jihadist terrorist. Being publicly associated with terrorism, whether due to small acts such as disseminating terrorist publications or actively participating in terrorist activities, could hinder de-radicalization in the long run. This could have a severe impact on the rest of the individuals lives, their education and job prospective. Second, by providing such personal data online, families of the individual might suffer through that person's actions. Families as a whole might be branded as dangerous or a threat to their neighborhood. This could also lead to the loss of jobs or social networks and will have a profound impact on the family. As outlined earlier, economic instability, low economic prospects as well as social networks are crucial components as to why people radicalize or not. Thus, publishing detailed information on those individuals may create new push factors and radicalize people in the sentenced jihadist's imminent surrounding.

5. Analysis

5.1 Differences in sentencing of jihadists in the UK and Germany

After establishing vital differences between British and German jihadists in the database, it is crucial to dive into the sentencing aspects of this study. As part of any Counter Terrorism Strategy, the pursuit of jihadists becomes an essential component in the fight of providing national security (The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2005). Therefore, this section outlines differences in the sentencing of jihadists in the UK and Germany which helps answer the research question later on. To obtain a clear overview, the number of sentenced jihadists throughout the years are evaluated and afterwards the conviction categories of this study are examined.




Chart 5: UK and Germany Prosecution Rates

The chart above, visualizes the number of sentencing individuals from 2012-2019. Although this chart includes data from 2012 and 2019, these years were excluded in this study as the data was not considered representative enough. Even though 2013 has also no significant convictions, it was used as the starting point to identify emerging trends².

Building upon this, the chart highlights a steep increase in jihadist convictions in the UK. The numbers of sentenced individuals jump from eleven to 28 between 2014 and 2015 and further reach its maximum with 54 punished jihadists in 2016. Between 2016 and 2017, the number of sentenced individuals drops significantly to 23 people and further declines to four in 2018. As mentioned earlier, the drop between 2017 and 2018 (in both the UK and Germany) can be explained through the large number of people still waiting for or being on trial. Nevertheless, the drop from 2016 to 2017 is staggering and could be explained through the influence of external factors. Other than the sentencing trend in the UK, Germany's jihadists appear to be prosecuted more gradually. The trend evolves slower and grows progressively between 2014 and 2018. Between 2014 and 2015, ten radicalized individuals were sentenced, and the first steep increase emerged around 2015 and 2016 where 25 people were prosecuted for terrorism offences. A slight increase emerges in 2017 when 29 people were punished and was followed by a drop to nine jihadists in 2018. This fall can be explained the same way as the plunge in the UK.

To establish a clearer overview of German and British prosecution, the convictions of each individual have been categorized into 20 separate offences. Within these categories, four

² It should be noted that although the graph shows no jihadist arrests in 2013, it does not necessarily mean that no convictions have occurred in the UK and Germany. It simply states that within the scope of this dataset, no arrests have been observed.

types of offences stand out. To provide further clarity, these four main offences are therefore evaluated and put into national perspective.




Chart 6: UK and Germany Offences

As can be seen in the chart above, four offences appear more often than any other one. First, and one of the most staggering difference between both nations refers to the offence of membership in a terrorist organization. While Germany has convicted 44% of the individuals in the database on those grounds, merely 2% of British jihadists were convicted for the same offence. Second, in the UK, 41% of individuals in the database were convicted for preparing acts of terrorism. In Germany merely 4% were sentenced for the same offence. Third, while Germany has sentenced 21% of its jihadists on the base of encouraging and supporting terrorism, the UK has only punished 12%. Fourth, with regards to disseminating terrorist publications, the UK has found 19% of the individuals in the database guilty and Germany a mere 1%.




Chart 7: UK and Germany “Membership in a Terrorist Organization”

As just outlined, four main offences overshadowed the rest. The first offence referred to membership in a terrorist organization. The graph above highlights the evolving trend in the prosecution on these grounds between 2013 and 2018 and immediately, stark difference between the UK and Germany emerge. In the UK, the first conviction for membership in a terrorist organization was in 2016 and doubled to two convictions in 2017. Afterwards, the database does not disclose any further convictions of that kind for 2018. In contrast, Germany convicted its majority of people based on membership. In 2014, the first person was convicted for membership in a terrorist organization which grew to six convictions in 2015. As the graph displays, between 2015 and 2016, the conviction rate accelerated, and 15 people were punished for their membership in a terrorist organization abroad or in Germany. The year 2017 also sentenced 15 individuals and was followed by a plunge in 2018 in which a mere five people were convicted. Again, the drop can be explained through the simple fact that various people are still waiting for trial. In the database, the majority of Germany’s individuals who were sentenced based on membership in a terrorist organization are returning foreign fighters, who travelled to Iraq/Syria. According to the *Verfassungsschutz* (2019), the number of foreign fighters leaving Germany almost doubled between 2013 and 2014, presenting a dangerous trend. That trend was slowed down between 2015 and 2016, which would indicate why such a high number of people was arrested for the membership offence (ibid.). In this case, it can be argued that the foreign fighter movement slowed down because the German government prosecuted individuals based on their membership and incarcerated them before they left. Another explanation could be that in 2015 250 foreign fighters returned to Germany where they would be subject to legal consequences (Boutin et al., 2016). Therefore, with the return of such

high numbers, it is likely that these individuals are part of the conviction rates in 2016. Furthermore, although many of the foreign fighters have participated in terrorist training or have been known to support the active terrorist organizations, they were nonetheless solely convicted for the membership. This could be another reason as to why such high number of people were convicted for membership in a terrorist organization.




Chart 8: UK and Germany “Preparing Acts of Terrorism”

While membership in a terrorist organization was the leading offence in Germany, preparing acts of terrorism was the primary offence in the UK. As the graph above presents, the UK saw four convictions in 2014 which rose rapidly to 13 convictions in 2015. From 2015 to 2016, the numbers almost doubled, and 24 people were convicted for preparing acts of terrorism. After 2016, the rate plunged to ten convictions in 2017 and further dropped to two convictions in 2018. These drops could be explained once again through the fact that a number of people are still awaiting trial or could be explained through the changing political climate within the country. Other than experienced in the UK, Germany has convicted rather few individuals for preparing acts of terrorism. Until 2016, no one has been found guilty for plotting terrorist acts. In 2017, two people were punished for this crime and 2018 saw once again no one convicted. One explanation could be that the German Criminal Code incorporates the preparation for acts of terrorism in its membership offence. Section 129a, which focuses on founding and participating in a terrorist organization, states that causing serious physical or mental harm to another person or committing offences under section 305 (“destruction of buildings and structures”) and even the attempts to do so are punishable (Bohlander, 2013, pp. 71 &139).

Therefore, preparing acts of terrorism is generally already included in the punishment for the membership in a terrorist organization.




Chart 9: UK and Germany “Engaging/Supporting Terrorism”

After visualizing stark differences between the UK and Germany, the graph above presents similar prosecution trends. In both the UK and Germany, the first group of people that was punished for encouraging or supporting terrorism was convicted in 2015. While the UK punished three people in 2015, Germany sentenced five. Both countries peaked in 2016 and convicted eight and twelve individuals. Afterwards both nations experienced a drop in 2017, with Germany sentencing eight people for encouraging or supporting terrorism and the UK three. In 2018, the UK did not punish any person for this crime while Germany convicted four people. One explanation could be that the support or encouragement of terrorism is explicitly outlined as an offence in both the German Criminal Code (p.70) and in the Terrorism Act 2006. This would explain why both nations present a similar prosecution rate on that offence.




Chart 10: UK and Germany “Disseminating a Terrorist Publication”

The above graph, similar to the first and second one, presents obvious differences in jihadist prosecution. Between the years 2013 and 2018, Germany did not convict any jihadists for disseminating terrorist publications. The reason for that could be found in the German Criminal Code. The German Criminal Code gives a detailed overview on the criminal acts behind disseminating propaganda materials of unconstitutional organizations (Section 86) however does not specify this act to terrorist organizations *per se* (Bohlander, 2013, pp. 50-51). The fact that the German Criminal Code does not explicitly refer to terrorist organizations when sentencing individuals for distributing propaganda materials might explain the reasons why there is no information available on the punishment of jihadist. While Germany did not convict any person for disseminating terrorist publications, the UK found six people guilty in 2015 and 2016. After 2016, the conviction rate increased, and seven people were convicted for the distribution of terrorist materials in 2017. Between 2017 and 2018, once again the rate drastically dropped to zero convictions. While in Germany distributing propaganda material is punishable, the UK explicitly outlines the defense of disseminating terrorist publications in the Terrorism Act of 2006. This could therefore be one reason as to why the UK has convictions on that matter and Germany does not.

As all these graphs visualize, the trends of convictions vary greatly throughout the years and differ significantly in the UK and Germany. This could be explained for one through the different legal systems, the fact that people are currently still awaiting trial or through external factors that have had an influence on both the prosecution and the rise of jihadist activities in the UK and Germany. Thus, the next section zooms in on the different years and evaluates whether external factors such as terrorist activities and the political climate played a role in jihadist punishments in the UK and Germany.

5.2 Emergence of External Factors

After understanding the conviction trends in the UK and Germany, this section gives a detailed timeline of external events that occurred between 2013 and 2018. Numerous aspects such as the political climate as well as terrorist activities are observed. This section, therefore, identifies whether or not external factors have exerted influence over the sentencing processes and whether or not these trends have established differences in the prosecution of jihadists in the UK and Germany.

5.2.1 2013

The year 2013, marks the two-year anniversary of the Syrian civil war that has since then drawn thousands of European fighters to its soil (Scherrer, 2018). It also marks the first year in which German fighters left their homes to join insurgencies in Syria and Iraq (Verfassungsschutz, 2019). By the end of 2013, 240 German and between 200 and 350 British citizens have travelled abroad to become fighters in the raging civil war (Verfassungsschutz, 2019; Maher, 2013). Despite the slowly developing foreign fighter movement to Syria and Iraq, data from the GTD (2019) indicates that terrorism *per se* has not yet been a serious threat to European nations. As the GTD indicates, 2013 was home to two small scale terror attacks (inspired by either jihadist extremists, Muslim extremists or the Islamic State) in Western Europe which did not result in casualties and harmed individuals. In the UK and Germany specifically, no jihadist attacks have been reported (GTD, 2019). This information, together with the emerging European foreign fighter movement suggests that terrorism was not of grave concern to EU nations such as the UK and Germany. As chart 5 in the previous section highlights, both Germany and the UK did not record any jihadist convictions in 2013. Therefore, this information suggests that terror incidents and jihadist convictions could share a positive correlation,³ as both variables are not present in 2013. A possible positive correlation would help identify whether or not there is a link between both variables and assists in identifying whether or not external factors have exerted an influence on jihadist punishment. However, to obtain a clearer picture on the true relationship of both variables in the UK and Germany, it is essential to assess the following years. When assessing whether or not there is a correlation between both variables, a potential one-year delay in jihadist prosecutions is expected. This is based on the idea that the conviction process of individuals is likely to take several months, if not years. Therefore, although a person may have committed a crime in late 2013, it is likely that they will not receive a punishment until 2014.

In the UK, as the Hansard Dataset shows that the House of Commons and House of Lords have had seven separate debates throughout the year discussing measures such as proscribing terrorist organizations and the threat of terrorism on UK soil. Out of those seven debates, two focused on the terrorist organization Imerat Kavkaz, also known as the Caucasus Emirates and discusses whether or not it should be proscribed (ibid.). The other debates namely focused on Terrorism Prevention and Investigation measures as well as the drafting of the

³ A correlation refers to the relationship of two variables. In a positive correlation both variables move in the same direction. In a negative correlation, the variables move in opposite directions.

Terrorism Act 2000 order of 2013. This allows for the conclusion that with regards to UK politics, terrorism was not particularly high up on the agenda, which correlates to the findings of chart 5 of in the previous section.

In Germany, the DIP Dataset search did not yield a detailed and useful overview of terrorism related documents. Therefore, an advanced search (called PIPr) within the DIP has been conducted and has been limited to debates and sessions by the *Bundestag*. After running the advanced search, over 22 documents emerged that discussed matters on terrorism. This debate is almost three times higher than in the UK. These documents generally covered terrorism from an outside perspective and discussed issues such as international terrorism, counter terrorism abroad as well the question whether Hezbollah and other groups should be added to the proscribed terrorist organization lists. This matter as well as the counter terrorism debate have also been found in the UK documents of 2013. While the UK already focused on terrorism prevention and the adaptation of the Terrorism 2000 Act, Germany's debate appears to be rather top down, viewing it from an outside perspective and as part of the overarching fight against organized crime. Although Germany widely discussed terrorism throughout the year, the fact that national terrorism was not a significant part of the discussion, leads to the conclusion that Germany, similarly to the UK, has not considered terrorism to be of grave concern to its national security. These findings align with the graph that highlights the overall jihadists prosecution rate which states that in neither the UK nor Germany, any individuals in the dataset have been found guilty of terrorism offences. In order to obtain more certainty whether or not the political discourse played a role in jihadist convictions, the following years have to be assessed.

5.2.2 2014

After observing a potential positive correlation between external factors such as the political discourse on terrorism or terror attacks and the conviction of jihadists in the UK and Germany in 2013, the analysis becomes more complex for 2014. As the GTD (2019) data highlights, similar to the previous year neither the UK, nor Germany have experienced any terrorist attacks and throughout Western Europe, two small scale attacks have been reported. In 2014, Germany has still not convicted any jihadists which leads to the conclusion that there remains a potential positive correlation between Germany's conviction rate and terror attacks. Other than Germany however, the UK recorded eleven convictions for 2014. Despite the fact that no terrorist attacks have been recorded, this increase presents a negative correlation between terror attacks and

jihadist conviction in the UK. Overall, it continues to be necessary to observe the remaining years to form an adequate picture of the influence of terror attacks on jihadist punishments in the UK and Germany.

While discrepancies emerged within the relationship between terror attacks and jihadist convictions in both nations, the political sphere provides some more insight. In 2014, the House of Commons and House of Lords have discussed issues regarding terrorism in 16 separate debates, a stark increase from 2013. Within these debates matters such as the seizure of passports from suspected terrorists, the Counter Terrorism and Security Bill, the Counter Terrorism Strategy and the question regarding terrorist prosecution were addressed. Considering the fact that the number of British foreign fighters who left for Syria or Iraq has almost doubled between 2013 and 2014, the discussion regarding passport seizure and prosecution comes as no surprise (Bakowski & Puccio, 2015). When re-assessing chart 5 from the previous section, it becomes obvious that the prosecution rate in the UK has accelerated from no convictions in 2013 to eleven convictions in 2014. This suggests a link between the increase in debates surrounding terrorism and the actual growth in punishments. As the overall debates surrounding terrorism in the UK have more than doubled within the political sphere, it is assumed that the issue itself has become more pressing. As explained earlier, the conviction rate for preparing acts of terrorism has increased in 2014 and the issues of disseminating terrorist publications has sky rocked in the course of the same year. Therefore, these findings suggest a positive correlation between the political discourse and jihadist prosecution.

Similarly, to the UK, Germany has experienced a dramatic increase in terrorism debates in 2014. According to the DIP dataset, 39 documents discussed the matter of terrorism, almost twice as many as in the previous year. Although a vast number of issues such as terrorism in Iraq or Syria and Germany's involvement in humanitarian action against IS appear within these 39 documents, the general topics that re-emerge in the course of 2014 refer to rightwing terrorism, terrorist organizations such as PKK and the Islamic State (IS) and German foreign fighters. As the number of German foreign fighters, similar to the British counterparts, has more than doubled from 240 in 2013 to almost 600 in 2014, an increased focus on that issue within the debates was anticipated (Verfassungsschutz, 2019). Furthermore, although the debates still have their primary focus on terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria, the conversation has also slowly shifted to a national level in which topics such as the migration crisis and the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA) are addressed. While the UK already discussed Counter Terrorism Strategies on a national level, this discussion is absent within the German debate. Although the 2014 debates have started to zoom in on terrorism's

effect on the security of refugees and PEGIDA's growing influence in Germany, the majority of the discussions still remained on an international level. As chart 5 of the previous section indicates, Germany has not prosecuted any individuals in 2014. Therefore, it can be argued that although the political sphere is increasingly debating terrorism, its effect on the jihadist prosecution remains limited. This, however, could be explained by the fact that the overall debate continues to be on an international terrorism level rather than a national security concern as expressed in the UK. In essence, while a positive correlation appears to be more visible in the UK, the role of external factors on jihadist conviction in Germany remains less clear.

5.2.3 2015

The year 2015 was off to a rough start when Said and Chérif Kouachi attacked the office of the French satire magazine Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015 (Littlewood, 2017). Eleven people were killed that day and another eleven injured (ibid.). This attack however was the mere beginning of a multitude of terrorist attacks across Western Europe. As data collected by the GTD (2019) highlight, the year 2015 saw 21 terrorist attacks in Western Europe, a dramatic increase to the two terror attacks in 2013 and 2014. The most notable incidents refer to the Paris attacks of January 7 and 9, the Copenhagen attacks of February 14 and another Paris attack on November 13 (GTD, 2019). After the January attacks, millions gathered in marches across France including 40 world leaders, linking arms in solidarity (BBC, 2015). Thousands furthermore came together in London and Berlin to show solidarity with the victims (ibid). This behavior shows that while some attacks have no societal impact at all, others exert an influence that goes beyond national borders and creates a sense of unity and solidarity, which is widely discussed through national and international media.

Out of the 21 recorded terrorist attacks in Western Europe, one took place in Germany and two took place in the UK (GTD, 2019). In the UK, the conviction rate increased rapidly from eleven punished jihadists in 2014 to 28 in 2015. This steep increase does not align with the limited emergence of terrorist activities in the UK. Therefore, these findings would suggest a negative correlation between jihadist conviction and UK terror attacks. However, the steep increase in convictions could nonetheless be traced back to the numerous terror incidents in France throughout 2015, which would indicate a positive correlation. In Germany, the prosecution rate increased for the first time from no convictions to ten sentenced jihadists. The German terror attack in 2015 was not impactful enough to have executed any influence over

the prosecution rate of jihadists, which would suggest a negative correlation between both variables. However, considering the dramatic increase in Western European terror attacks, it is likely that an attack on an EU Member State triggers the same reaction as an attack on UK or German soil. As the Charlie Hebdo attack occurred in January 2015, it is likely that the increased conviction rate of jihadists in Germany and the UK throughout 2015 could nonetheless be traced back to it. In essence, the steep increase in Western European terror attacks and the steep increase in the prosecution rates in both the UK and Germany suggests a positive correlation between both variables.

Considering the terrorist attacks in France, it comes as no surprise that the UK has dramatically increased its debates on terrorism. According to the Hansard dataset, 36 debates have taken place in 2015 and discussed various topics on terrorism. A number of issues were addressed within these debates, ranging from the adaptation of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and changing security threats such as the matter of international aviation, concerning planned attacks and terrorism threats to airports and planes, to the increasing issues of foreign fighter movements to Syria and Iraq. Although these issues appear to be of great concern to UK politics, the Charlie Hebdo shooting, together with the looming migration crisis, which have also been mentioned multiple times throughout the debates, are likely to have played a major part in the increased discussion surrounding terrorism in the UK. The developments of the migration crisis that was attracting EU wide attention furthermore resulted in further societal challenges across the UK. In a debate from September 7, 2015, Yasmin Qureshi noted that crimes against Muslims have increased dramatically and that anti-Muslim sentiment is on the rise in the UK and Europe (HC Deb, 2015). This indicates that in 2015, terrorism has not only influenced politics but has also led to increasing stereotyping of Muslim communities across the country. Considering this, as well as the dramatic increase in debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords, it becomes apparent that terrorism is increasingly moving up the political agenda in the UK. Bearing this in mind and observing that the charts of the previous section experienced drastic accelerations of convictions between 2015 and 2016, these findings suggest a positive relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Thus, within the framework of the data collected, it appears that politicization is linked to the prosecution of jihadists in the UK.

Similarly, to the previous years and the UK, Germany has experienced a further increase in parliamentary debates on the topic of terrorism. In 2015, 47 documents were found on the DIP database which discussed terrorism in greater detail. This increase suggests that the issue is further moving up on the political agenda. Once again, the 47 documents report on numerous

terrorism related issues such as right-wing extremism, terrorism abroad or the migration crisis as a result of terrorism. However, when assessing the debates one trend stands out. Although terrorism in Syria and Iraq is still widely discussed, the debate is starting to zoom in on European and national terrorism. Similarly, to the UK, Germany mentioned the January and November Paris attacks. In various documents, the *Bundestag* began addressing terrorism from a national point of view, which it had not done to such extent in the previous two years. Bearing this development in mind, together with the increase in parliamentary debates in 2015, this information suggests that terrorism is increasingly becoming a pressing national concern within Germany's political sphere. When observing the charts from the previous section, it becomes apparent that in 2015, the number of jihadist convictions has accelerated. This, together with the increase in terrorism related parliamentary debates and European terror attacks, suggests a positive correlation between external factors and jihadist prosecutions in Germany.

Scholars such as Stephen J. Toope furthermore claimed that the January 2015 attacks were a crucial moment due to the fear the attacks created, and because they inevitably led to hardened political attitudes and increased law responses towards terrorism (Littlewood, 2017). Considering that both Paris attacks were widely discussed in both German and UK politics, it is likely that they have shaped the overall terrorist conversation within both nations. Therefore, terror incidents such as the Paris attacks have shown to guide the political discourse which suggests that some external factors execute an influence over others. Overall, it can be argued that there is indeed a positive correlation between jihadist convictions and external factors such as the political discourse and European terrorist attacks. Thus, external factors have played a role in the jihadist conviction in both the UK and Germany.

5.2.4 2016

Similarly, to 2015, Western Europe was widely targeted by jihadist terrorists in 2016 (GTD, 2019). According to the GTD (2019), 28 separate incidents occurred in 2016, which reports an increase from the 21 attacks in 2015. Some of the most notable attacks were the Brussels airport attack, the Nice attack and the Berlin Christmas Market attack (de Roy van Zuijdewijn & Sciarone, 2019). On December 19, 2016, Anis Amri drove a truck into the Berlin Christmas Market and killed 12 people and wounded another 65 (Diel, 2017). The attack was arguably the most memorable jihadist terror attack in Germany (ibid.). Therefore, the Christmas Market attack, has been considered a turning point in Germany's approach to limiting the threats of jihadist terrorists (Aerne, 2018). By implementing various new security methods such as the

RADAR-iTE, a risk assessment tool as well as a new law regulating computer and network surveillance, the German government tackled the issue of national terrorism (ibid.). Due to those measures, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) claimed that nine further terror attacks have been prevented since 2016 and numerous suspected terrorists have been arrested (DW, 2019). Considering that the attack took place in December 2016, it is crucial to observe whether or not the conviction rate of 2017 has increased. Although the conviction database did record an increase from 25 sentenced jihadists in 2016 to 29 in 2017, it is, though not unlikely, less likely that the terror attacks have played a notable role in this increase. As the conviction rate increased gradually rather than spiked in the aftermath of the Christmas market attack (as well as the other nine attacks in 2016), it is unlikely that both variables share a positive correlation. The fact that the conviction rate is growing gradually rather than spiking, as would be expected after such terror incident, could be linked to the seven people who are still on trial in 2017. Adding those individuals to the overall conviction rate, would suggest a steep increase and could therefore indicate a correlation between both variables. Thus, the relationship between terror attacks and the conviction rate remains unclear.

Although it remains unclear to what extent terror incidents play a role in the jihadist convictions, the attacks across Europe, together with the escalating migrant crisis in Germany have triggered other forms of crimes (BBC, 2017). Throughout the course of 2016, not only terror attacks in Germany increased but also hate crimes against migrants soared (ibid.). According to the German Interior Ministry, ten attacks against migrants have been recorded per day throughout 2016 (ibid.). As Ranstorp (2016) claimed external factors such as individual socio-psychological, social or political factors contribute greatly to the radicalization process of individuals (p.3). The increase in hate crimes against migrants in Germany after terror attacks and an influx of refugees, could have therefore generated individual socio-psychological factors which include grievances and negative emotions (Ranstorp, 2016, p.3). In essence, hate crime and a hostile environment against Muslims are likely to cause grievances and a strong sense of injustice as well as a sense of victimhood (ibid.). As Ranstorp described, those emotions create push-factors that can ultimately result in the radicalization of individuals in Germany. Although radicalization may not always lead to violence, scholars such as Horgan and Braddock (2010) claimed it is one of several risk factors. This idea, together with the fact that counter terrorism strategies such as the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy (2005) focus on the prevention of radicalization, it is possible that push factors created through terrorist attacks and other external factors lead to future terrorist activities. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that although there is no direct link observed in 2016 between terror attacks and the conviction of jihadists, it is

possible that the attacks together with additional external factors such as the migration crisis provide a breeding ground for radicalization. An increase in radicalized individuals is therefore likely to lead to an increase in terrorism offences (such as sharing terrorism publications, financing or in its more extreme form plotting terrorist attacks), which result in an increase in jihadist convictions. Thus, bearing the process in mind, terrorist attacks and other external factors such as the refugee crisis could play an indirect role in jihadist convictions in Germany.

In contrast to Germany, the UK experienced three small-scale terror attacks, which indicates a small increase from the two reported incidents in 2015. When comparing the terror incident rate with the conviction rate (as outlined in the previous section) it becomes apparent that there is no clear relationship between both variables. Although the conviction rate increased significantly throughout 2016, it is highly unlikely that the small terror incidents played a role in that. This therefore indicates that there is no positive correlation between national terror incidents and the conviction of jihadists. Although it could be argued that the gradual increase in Western European terror attacks is likely to have influenced national conviction rates in Germany and the UK, there is no indefinite proof that would confirm this. Although the 9/11 terror attacks led to a dramatic increase in suspected jihadist arrests and convictions in the United States, the same phenomenon is not observed in the UK and Germany in 2016 (Shields et al., 2009). This would suggest that although it is likely that terrorist incidents play a role in jihadist convictions, not every attack has the same effect. This however could be an intriguing starting point for further research on that matter.

In the UK, the year 2015 saw a dramatic increase in terrorism related debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords. In 2016 however, the discussion surrounding terrorism in the UK has dropped to 18 debates (Hansard, 2016). Throughout the year, a number of issues were once again discussed, ranging from preventative measures to combat terrorism, to EU measures to tackle terrorism threats (as observed in France and Belgium) and to terrorism risks arising from Northern-Ireland. In 2016, Northern Ireland, together with the rest of the UK, faced new challenges arising from the Brexit referendum (O'Toole, 2016). The drop in political debates could be explained through the rise of the pressing Brexit matter, which was discussed 41 times by the House of Lords and House of Commons throughout 2016. This would indicate that the Brexit debate moved up on the political agenda while terrorism became less urgent.

The referendum's Leave campaign saw an increase in racism towards European immigrants and used Turkey's potential EU membership to further accelerate that prejudice sentiment (Erlanger, 2016). The Vote Leave campaign was considered dangerous and Philip Stephens, a columnist for the Financial Times summarized its message by stating: "E.U.

membership talks with Turkey, we are to understand, will soon see Britain overrun by millions of (Muslim) Turks — most of them thugs or welfare-scroungers” (ibid). This public campaign against EU nationals and (Muslim) Turks, together with the overall issue of Brexit, seemingly caused a great divide within the country. These notions can be grouped up under social and political factors which pave the path to violent extremism (Ranstorp, 2016). According to Ranstorp social factors, include social marginalization, limited social mobility as well as discrimination (whether it is real or perceived) (p.3). Political factors can be conceptualized within the narrative of “West is at war with Islam”, which feeds the notion of “them and us” (ibid.). This ‘us vs. them’ mentality was particularly present within the Brexit campaign. Therefore, it seems possible that Brexit and the increase in racism, similar to terror attacks and the migrant crisis in Germany, have paved the path for grievances and marginalization of Muslims and minorities in the UK. This could therefore be understood as an additional external factor that exerts influence over jihadist prosecution. The increase in anti-Muslim sentiments are possibly, similar to Germany, a breeding ground for factors that ultimately push individuals towards radicalization. Therefore, an increase in radicalized individuals also results in an increase in terrorist offences and has the potential to lead to an increase in jihadist prosecution. Thus, it can be hypothesized that the political debate and the Brexit campaign in itself have played an indirect role in jihadist prosecution.

In 2016, the German *Bundestag* debated terrorism issues 49 times, which compared to 2015 presents a slight increase. The majority of the debates widely discussed, similarly to the previous years, international terrorism and aspects of counter terrorism. With regards to international terrorism, German politicians discussed the overall impact and fight of organizations such as IS and Boko Haram. With regards to counter terrorism they predominantly focused on terrorism and organized crime, in particular terrorism financing. The charts in the previous section highlighted that only a mere 4% of convictions in Germany were based on terrorism funding. Nonetheless, as the chart below presents, Germany convicted twice as many people for terrorism funding in 2016 than in 2015. Therefore, this could suggest a connection between the growing attention on terrorist financing and the conviction of individuals based on that activity.




Chart 11: UK and Germany “Funding Terrorism”

Although a majority of debates focused on terrorism and crime such as terrorist financing, a number of other debates focused on the Brussels attack as well as terrorist attacks in France. As the Christmas Market attack occurred at the end of the year, it was not discussed within the political debates of 2016. Despite that, it becomes evident that terrorist attacks of 2016, similar to 2015, have influenced the terrorism debate in German politics. When observing the increased conviction rate of the previous section with the increase in political debates in 2016, it can be argued that both variables share a positive correlation in Germany.

Overall, the role of external factors on the conviction rate of jihadists in the UK and Germany in 2016 is not clear cut. While the political debate on terrorism and the punishment of jihadists in Germany does present a positive correlation, the British discourse does not. However, in both countries the emergence of additional variables has been observed which give reason as to why in the UK the political discourse dropped, and the conviction rate nevertheless rose. The sudden appearance of Brexit would explain why terrorism moved down on the political agenda. As outlined, Brexit allows for a new theory to emerge as to why the conviction rate continued to grow. Although the growth could be explained through a delay in jihadist convictions, it is also possible that Brexit allowed for anti-Muslim sentiments to flourish. It, therefore, provided the foundation for social and political factors to emerge, which contribute to an individual’s path to extremism and ultimately result in an increase terrorism offences. A similar trend has been observed in Germany with the influence of terror attacks and the refugee crisis on hate crime. Thus, it can be argued that external factors play a role in the conviction of jihadists in both nations, however the relationship is not as direct and linear as previously assumed.


5.2.5 2017

As the GTD (2019) states, Western Europe experienced 25 jihadist inspired terror attacks in 2017, a slight drop from the 28 attacks in 2016. While Germany reported ten separate attacks in 2016, the rate declined significantly to one attack in 2017. When bearing the potential conviction delay in mind, it can be argued that, the drop of terror attacks in 2017 resulted in the plunge in jihadist convictions in 2018. However, considering the fluctuating relationship between terror attacks and prosecution rates in Germany in the past, the decrease in convictions is more likely to be attributed to the numerous individuals that are still awaiting trial. The database recorded that 18 people in Germany are still waiting for their conviction. Furthermore, as the year 2016 has already suggested a link between the migrant crisis and terror attacks and the overall conviction rates, it seemed necessary to cross-check with 2017. According to the hate crime reporting data of the OSCE (2017), the year 2017 reported further growth in hate crimes. Although this data includes various kinds of hate crimes, it becomes obvious that 2017 is the first year in which crimes against Muslims has been presented separately, indicating a concerning anti-Muslim trend. As Germany experienced a steep increase in hate crimes against migrants and Muslims in 2016, this development is not unexpected. Bearing in mind that Germany's most notable terror attack emerged in December 2016, it is not unlikely that it has led to a surge in hate crimes across the country. Thus, similar to the UK, the theory emerges which draws an indirect link between external factors and jihadist prosecution. External factors such as terror attacks or the political environment might exert an influence on the overall radicalization process by offering a fertile ground in which push factors such as societal marginalization or a sense of victimhood can flourish. With an increase in potentially radicalized individuals through such push factors, a rise in terrorist offenders is possible to emerge. These offenders in turn could be convicted on terrorism charges, closing the indirect link between external factors and jihadist prosecution.

While Germany's terror rate decreased drastically, the UK experienced a slight increase and was targeted five times by terrorists. In May 2017, Salman Abedi detonated a home-made bomb during an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, killing 22 people and injuring another 116 (BBC, 2017a). The Manchester attack, however, was just one of several deadly incidents in the UK in the course of the same year (GTD, 2019). After the terror incidents, the database recorded a further drop of convictions in the UK which would indicate a negative correlation between the two variables. However, as previously mentioned, the drop is likely to be caused by the fact that numerous individuals are still waiting for trial.

Although thus far, terrorist attacks do not appear to play a particular role in jihadist convictions, a paper by the Home Office (2017) drew attention to the relationship of Brexit and the 2017 terror attacks and the increase in hate crime (O’Neil, 2017). As the graph below highlights, after each attack, hate crime rose significantly. This development strengthens the theory that terror attacks as well as other external factors such as Brexit (or the migrant crisis in Germany) provide a breeding ground for the development of push factors that ultimately pave the path to radicalization and violent extremism (as outlined by Ranstorp, 2016). Thus, although it appears that the number of terror attacks has little influence on the conviction of jihadists, it becomes more likely that they have an impact on further radicalization which in its most extreme form is expressed through violent action (Horgan and Braddock, 2010).

Figure A1: Number of racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded by the police, January 2016 to August 2017



Source: Provisional police recorded crime, Home Office

Chart 12: O’Neil, 2017

After the drastic change in the political landscape of 2016 and despite the recent terror attacks in the UK, the issue of terrorism appears to be receiving increasingly less attention in Britain. According to the Hansard database the House of Lords and House of Commons have discussed the matters of terrorism eleven times throughout the course of 2017. The debates that did take place once again included issues regarding changes in the Terrorism 2000 Act and adaptations to the Prevent Strategy. The debates furthermore included the definition process of the term domestic extremism. The difficulty to define extremism and radicalization has already been

touched upon by Schmid (2013) who outlined that the debate on defining these terms is still ongoing and widespread within various fields such as academia, politics or criminology. Another matter discussed in 2017 was the prosecution of terrorist related offenders and in particular British foreign fighters. Several debates highlighted that the number of terrorist prosecutions has increased drastically in the previous years which confirms the results of the dataset used in this study. Nevertheless, the charts show a significant drop in jihadist prosecution in 2017, which corresponds to the decrease in terrorism related debates published on the Hansard Dataset. This however is likely to be linked to the ongoing investigations and the fact that people are still awaiting trial.

For the year 2017, Germany discussed the issue of terrorism 31 times which is less than in 2016 in which 49 debates took place. The overall topics discussed during these debates focused similarly to the previous years on international terrorism including IS, refugee migration as a result of terrorism and the drafting and adaptations of criminal laws. In addition to such vital issues, national terrorism is an essential component of those debates. The case of Amri (the Berlin Christmas Market attacker) as well as gaps in Germany's counter terrorism strategy are mentioned numerous times. Those gaps for instance include, slow registration of asylum seekers which is considered a risk factor in times of increasing migration. When comparing the drop in the terrorism related political debate with the graphs of the previous section, it becomes apparent that although the political discourse on terrorism decreased, jihadist prosecution reached its peak in 2017. The prosecution rate however dropped in 2018, which, keeping the potential one-year delay in convictions in mind, could suggest a positive correlation between both variables. However, the drop is furthermore likely to be caused by the number of people still awaiting trial. Therefore, the relationship between both variables is inconclusive for 2017.

5.2.6 2018

Throughout 2018, Western Europe experienced 16 jihadist inspired terror attacks, which presents a stark drop from the 25 attacks of 2017 (GTD, 2019). While national terror attacks in the UK dropped from three to one and rose in Germany from one to three, these attacks remain largely small-scale, without severe implications on the wider community (ibid.). The rise in attacks in Germany and the drop of jihadist prosecution therefore present no correlation instead between both variables and questions the influence that terror attacks have exercised on jihadist punishment. In the UK, the drop of terror attacks and the decrease in jihadist prosecutions might

suggest a positive correlation. However, as the previous years indicated, it is less likely that there is a direct relationship between terror attacks in Europe and the conviction rate. Instead, as has been identified in 2016 and 2017, it is more likely that terror attacks and the prosecution share an indirect relationship in which terror incidents (as seen in the UK) fuel hate crime against Muslims which in turn lay the foundation for push factors that lead individuals down the path of radicalization. This development has furthermore been observed within the political sphere which suggests that terror attacks and the societal developments influence the political discourse.

With regards to the UK, the Hansard Dataset showed that the past two years experienced a drop in the terrorism discussion in the House of Lords and House of Commons. The year 2018 however concluded once again 31 debates on terrorism. The increase in terrorism debates could be linked to the terrorist attacks in the UK in 2017. Due to the gravity of these attacks, terrorism gained more importance again, after the Brexit debate seemingly overshadowed the issue in the previous two years. Overall, the 2018 debates discussed issues ranging from Terrorism in Northern Ireland as well as the rest of the UK and Hate Speech / Islamophobia to Victims of Terrorism. Islamophobia and hate speech are issues that have not been addressed in detail in the previous years which highlights a shift within the terrorism discussion. While in 2013, the issues of national security and counter terrorism were of concern, post-Brexit Britain is increasingly tackling the issues of racism within those debates. This would suggest that racism as expressed through hate crimes is linked to terrorism, which strengthens the emerging theory of an indirect relationship between external factors and jihadist convictions. Furthermore, throughout the 2018 debates, prosecution remains a topic of significance. When comparing the increase in debates with the charts of the previous section, it becomes apparent that there is no visible positive correlation between politicization and jihadist conviction. While the House of Commons and House of Lords have concluded almost three times as many debates regarding the issue of terrorism as in the previous year, which suggests an increased interest in the matter, the graph presents a continuous plunge since 2016. As already mentioned before, this can be explained through the number of individuals that are still waiting for trial. Therefore, the number of convictions is likely to go up in the following years.

In Germany, terrorism related discussions have similar to the UK again increased since 2017. Overall, in 2018, 40 documents emerged in which politicians debated a number of terrorism related matters. Once again, international terrorism appears to be dominating the debates, focusing on the situation in Iraq and stabilizing efforts in war zones across the world. The issues of international terrorism are furthermore extended to the matter of (returning)

refugees. National terrorism debates mainly rotated between the fight against terrorism and counter terrorism strategies. An increased discourse between the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AFD) (a right-wing party) and other center and leftist parties is observed. The position of the AFD is continuously drawing attention to right-wing terrorism as well as Islam related terrorist activities. The rise of right-wing terrorism therefore, similar to the Islamophobic notion in the UK, are likely to create push factors that have the potential to lead individuals towards radicalization. In general, in the UK and Germany, the political debate surrounding terrorism dropped significantly in 2017 and rose drastically in 2018. Although this would not suggest that external factors played a role in jihadist prosecution, the discrepancies can be explained through the large number of people that are remaining on trial and waiting to be prosecuted. To be certain whether or not there is a relationship between both variables, it would be vital to observe developments in the upcoming years.

5.3 Recap

As the analysis shows, the relationship between external factors and jihadist convictions is rather complex. Therefore, this section serves as a recap in which the findings are summarized and visualized. The chart below depicts the debates conducted by Germany and the UK with regards to terrorist issues between 2013 and 2018 as well as national terror incidents. As can be seen, with regards to the political debate of terrorism, both nations followed a similar trend throughout the years, although the UK's peak was reached in 2015 after a sharp increase in debates in 2014, while Germany's development was more gradual, with its peak being recorded in 2016. Germany has furthermore been discussing the issue of terrorism more frequently than the UK, though this discussion remained on an international rather than national level. With regards to terror attacks, no similarities emerge. While Germany has been targeted excessively throughout 2016, the UK has experienced their peak in jihadist attacks in 2017. The charts of the following sections therefore present a recap of the analysis and outline the relationship between the independent and dependent variables in the UK and Germany.




Chart 13: UK and Germany: Comparison

5.3.1 Recap UK




Chart 14: UK Recap

For the UK, the chart above visualizes the relationship between external factors such as terrorist attacks or the political debate on terrorism and the prosecution rate of jihadists. As can be seen, the chart does not indicate a relationship between UK terror attacks and the prosecution rate. However, after analyzing each year in detail, it becomes visible that although the graph does not depict a correlation between both variables, terror attacks have played an indirect role in jihadist prosecution. As the analysis suggests, not the number of attacks are important, but the impact of the incidents is. It has been shown that the 2015 Paris attacks, which have hardened

political attitudes and increased law responses in Europe, have played a crucial role within British and German politics and could be linked to the increase in jihadist convictions between 2015 and 2016 (Littlewood, 2017). Therefore, although the UK experienced only two small-scale terror attacks themselves in 2015, it is more likely that the Paris attacks amplified the political debate on terrorism within those years. This would suggest that terrorist attacks as an external factor has exerted influence on the political discourse on terrorism rather than the conviction of jihadists themselves. As for 2017, the UK experienced five terror attacks, which as a number, seen in the chart, does not play a significant role in the conviction of jihadists. What can be seen however, is that after 2017, the political discourse on terrorism increased dramatically again. This would confirm the hypothesis that terror incidents influence the political debate more than the jihadist punishment in the UK.

Bearing the 2017 terror attacks in the UK in mind, the analysis suggested further relationships between variables which made room for a theory on the indirect relationship between external factors and jihadist convictions to emerge. As a Home Office (2017) report indicated, after each large-scale terror attack in the UK, the number of hate crime increased dramatically. Considering this, hate crimes or xenophobic notions and terror incidents put a strain on societies which could pave the path to societal marginalization and a sense of victimhood, which are components of an individual's journey towards radicalization and extremism (Ranstorp, 2016). An increase of radicalized individuals in the UK could therefore lead to an increase in (non-) violent terrorist offenders which could be linked to terrorism convictions. Considering the lack of data on the matter, this study suggests that based on the analysis there is a potential relationship between those variables, however it also acknowledges that further research is required to provide a definite answer.

With regards to the political discourse on terrorism, it becomes apparent that between 2013 and 2015, the political debate aligned with the prosecution of jihadists, suggesting a positive correlation between both variables. However, while the political debates on terrorism dropped drastically in 2016, the prosecution rate further increased. This can be explained through a number of reasons, one being the fact that, as the database shows, prosecutions take months, if not even years to be finalized. Therefore, the crimes that emerged between 2013 and 2015 could be finalized in 2016. Thus, although the charts do not particularly align in 2016, it is essential to keep the time it takes to prosecute an individual in mind.

A second reason that could have influenced the punishment of jihadists is the Brexit referendum. As the chart above highlights, Brexit emerged in 2016 and dramatically rose since. With the increased Brexit debate, the terrorism discourse plunged in the course of the same

year, which indicates that Brexit became more urgent to British politics than terrorism. Furthermore, Brexit and the anti-Muslim sentiment of the leave campaign are factors that could have pushed individuals towards radicalization. As outlined earlier, authors such as Schmid (2013), Ranstorp (2016) or Dawson and Amarasingam (2016) argued that radicalization is closely linked to push and pull factors that drive an individual towards terrorism. Societal marginalization for instance plays a crucial part in that (Ranstorp, 2016). Therefore, it can be argued that in 2016 radicalization as an interfering variable emerged. Thus, instead of a linear relationship between the political discourse on terrorism and jihadist prosecution, radicalization could have led to an increase in terrorist offences which in turn led to an increase in jihadist punishments. To be certain of such relationship, further research on an individual level is necessary to draw a strong connection between both variables.

Between 2016 and 2017, both, the terrorism discourse as well as the number of prosecuted individuals fell in the UK, which once again suggests a positive relationship between both variables. In 2018, the prosecution graph continued to fall while the political debates graph once again rose. One explanation for this development is the possibility that people remain on trial. Considering this, the years 2013 to 2015 and 2017 indicate a positive correlation between both variables, suggesting that the political debate on terrorism indeed played a role in jihadist prosecution in the UK. Although there are some discrepancies in 2016 and 2018, it highlights that other political external factors such as Brexit have had an impact on jihadist punishment.

In essence, while the number of terrorist attacks does not show a correlation with jihadist prosecution in the UK, large-scale attacks such as the Paris or Manchester attacks have played an indirect role in the punishment of jihadists. As the previously outlined theory suggests, factors such as hate crimes, push factors and radicalization emerged, drawing a connection between terror incidents and jihadist prosecution. Nevertheless, this theory does not allow for a definite answer due to the lack of data available at this point in time. However, the analysis of the political discourse suggests a more positive correlation between both British politics and jihadists punishment. Although discrepancies emerge in the visualization, factors such as Brexit could have affected the 2016 developments. Similar to the just mentioned theory, Brexit also allows for the theory of an indirect relationship between politicization and jihadist conviction to emerge.

5.3.2 Recap Germany




Chart 15: Germany Recap

After providing a recap on the UK, the chart above visualizes the relationship between both external factors and jihadist prosecution in Germany. Although the study focuses on the years 2013-2018, the year 2019 has been added to provide an insight into further developments. Similar to the UK, the visualization does not indicate a relationship between German terror incidents and the prosecution rate of jihadists. When diving into the separate years however, a possible indirect connection between both variables has been observed. As perceived in the UK, the number of terror incidents does not play a particular role, but the nature of the attack does. Both countries experienced an increase in jihadist convictions in the aftermath of the Paris attacks in 2015, which would suggest a potential link between both variables (BBC, 2015). As the attacks in France resulted in widespread solidarity movements across Europe, it can be stated that the societal impact of such incidents is of greater importance than the overall number of attacks. Large-scale terror incidents have furthermore contributed to a shift in the political discourse on terrorism in Germany. While in 2013-2014 the discussion remained mainly on an international level, the conversation shifted to a more European and national level in 2015. This, similar to the UK, indicates that terror attacks play a role in the overall terrorism debate amongst German politicians. Thus, although the relationship between terror incidents and jihadist prosecution remains uncertain, a connection has been established between terror attacks and the political discourse in both countries. This emphasizes that not every external factor plays the same role on jihadist prosecution and are likely to exert influence on one another.

Terrorist attack as well as the migrant crisis in Germany have furthermore greatly contributed to the increase in hate crimes against migrants throughout the country (BBC, 2017). As the hate crime reporting data of the OSCE (2017) demonstrates, the year 2017 saw further growth in hate crimes in Germany. Although this data includes numerous kinds of hate crimes, it becomes apparent that 2017 is the first year in which crimes against Muslims has been presented separately, indicating a concerning anti-Muslim trend. Considering that Germany experienced a significant increase in national terror attacks in 2016, with the most notable one being the Christmas Market incident, this development comes as no surprise. Bearing this in mind, similar to the UK, the theory emerges which draws an indirect link between external factors and jihadist prosecution. As previously mentioned and similar to the UK, external factors such as terror incidents or the political climate exert an influence on radicalization by providing a fertile ground in which push factors such as societal marginalization or a sense of victimhood can flourish. With a rise in potentially radicalized individuals, a growth in terrorist offenders is likely to emerge. These offenders in turn could receive legal punishments, closing the indirect link between external factors and jihadist prosecution. This theory, however, requires further research on a longer period of time, to ensure validity.

Similar to the British chart, the German chart depicts a similar progression between the political discourse on terrorism and the actual prosecution rate. The above visualization shows that while there were no prosecutions found in the database for 2013, a relatively large discussion in politics revolved around issues of terrorism at the same time. At first sight, this would suggest that there is little to no evidence that the political discourse in Germany has any influence on the punishments of jihadists. However, as the analysis indicates, the German *Bundestag* debated the matters of terrorism from an international perspective rather than a national level. Therefore, they did not anticipate terrorism to be of particular concern to Germany.

Similar to the UK, both the political discourse rate as well as the prosecution rate increased until 2016, which would indeed suggest a positive correlation between both variables. However, while first discrepancies occurred in the UK in 2015, differences emerged in 2016 in Germany. While the political debate on terrorism dropped drastically in 2016, the prosecution rate further increased until 2017. Although a number of external factors, such as Brexit in the UK, could have an influence on such fluctuation, the most plausible reason refers once again to the delay in jihadist prosecution. As the database revealed, the majority of 2017 convictions were terrorist offences committed in 2015 and 2016, which would despite the one-year delay indicate a positive relationship between both variables. The drop in prosecuted individuals in

2018 is furthermore explained through the high number of people waiting for trial in the database. As the grey line in the graph above indicates, a number of individuals are currently still awaiting trial, which would ultimately increase the overall prosecution rate once the trials are over. Thus, although the year 2018 does not suggest a positive relationship between both variables, the lack of prosecuted individuals of 2018 does not allow for an adequate answer as the prosecution rate will increase later on. Considering these findings, this study acknowledges the difference in 2016, which can be explained through a number of external factors. It nonetheless demonstrates that an increase in the political debate around terrorism also resulted in an increase in jihadist prosecution, thus presenting a positive correlation between both variables.

Although there is a positive correlation visible between politicization and the prosecution rate, the relationship between terror attacks and the punishment of jihadists is more complex. As the terror attacks chart suggests, there is no direct correlation between terrorism and jihadist conviction. However, as the analysis of the political discourse shows, terrorism has been widely discussed on an international level amongst German politicians and has only shifted in 2015 to an increasingly national level. As the DIP debates suggest, this shift was predominantly triggered by Paris incidents, which received widespread media attention beyond the French borders and amongst EU Member States. This development indicates similar to the UK, that terror incidents are more likely to exercise an influence on the political debate rather than jihadist convictions themselves.

Overall, both the UK and Germany share a number of similarities and differences throughout the years. Although the trends developed more gradual in Germany than in the UK and discrepancies between terror attacks and the jihadist prosecution emerged, both nations lay the foundation for a theory to surface. As the flow chart below depicts, external factors do not appear to have a direct but rather indirect influence on the punishment of jihadists. The analysis showed that in the aftermath of events such as Brexit, terror incidents (Manchester attack) or the migrant crisis, hate crimes rose in the UK and Germany (O'Neil, 2017; BBC, 2017). It is possible that hate crimes trigger social marginalization as well as a sense of victimhood (both being some of many push factors of radicalization) (Ranstorp, 2016). The creation of such negative emotions arising from xenophobic attacks, could make vulnerable individuals more prone to radicalization attempts, which could ultimately result in the execution of terrorist offences. Thus, an increase in such offences is likely to result in an increase in jihadist punishments.

Bearing this in mind, the analysis has furthermore established that some external factors such as the foreign fighter movement in 2013, or the migrant crisis of 2014 and 2015, execute an influence on another factor. For instance, in both the UK and Germany, terror incidents such as the Paris attacks or Brussels attacks have been widely discussed within both parliaments. In the UK, it has furthermore been observed that although the overall terrorist discussion amongst British politicians decreased dramatically after Brexit, the 2017 terror attacks in the UK have reignited terrorism debates in 2018. Considering the interplay between various external factors and the political debate, it has been examined that to an extent each factor contributed to the overall terrorist debate in both nations.




Chart 16: Indirect Link between External Factors and Jihadist Punishment

6. Conclusion

Through the course of this analysis, numerous differences and similarities between the UK and Germany emerged. Differences first materialized when the study zoomed in on the individuals in the database. While in Germany, convicted individuals remain largely anonymous, with merely their first name published, the UK has not shied away from presenting its jihadists with their full names and pictures. By being publicly associated with terrorism, whether due to non-violent acts such as disseminating terrorist publications or being actively participating in terrorist activities, could impede on de-radicalization attempts in the future. Another difference between both nations referred to the city of origin. While the UK has published information concerning the convicted individual’s place of residence, Germany has largely focused on nationality. This could lead to difficulties when attempting to find root causes of radicalization.

Despite those differences, both nations share various similarities, such as the gender division or the fact that major cities such as London or Berlin are particular hotspots of radicalization.

Although overall, the UK and Germany share several differences and similarities amongst their convicted jihadists, further dissimilarities emerged when examining the prosecution rates. While the UK experienced a steep increase in prosecutions and peaked in 2016, Germany's rate is more gradual, with its peak recorded in 2017. Both nations furthermore convict their jihadists on diverse grounds, which is due to the fact that they are home to two vastly different legal systems. While the UK has 41% of its jihadists prosecuted on preparing acts of terrorism charges, Germany punished 44% on membership in terrorist organization charges. Nevertheless, both countries share a similar prosecution rate concerning encouraging or supporting terrorism, which as an offence is widely discussed in both the German Criminal Code as well as the Terrorism Act of 2006. Thus, diving into the differences and similarities of both nations with regards to their jihadists and their convictions, further resemblances and divergences came to light.

As the analysis above demonstrates, the relationship between external factors such as terror incidents or politics and the conviction of jihadists in the UK and Germany is multifaceted. While 9/11 has dramatically shifted how the United States' government investigates and prosecutes individuals suspected to be involved in terrorist activities, similar changes have been observed in Germany after the Christmas Market attack in 2016 (Shields et al., 2009). However, other than the United States, neither Germany nor the UK, have experienced a significant increase in prosecutions that can be traced back to a specific terror incident. This leads to the conclusion that terror attacks have not played a particular role in jihadist prosecutions in the UK or Germany. Throughout the analysis however, different connections emerged. After significant incidents such as the Paris attacks in 2015, the political discourse changed in both countries. While Germany, other than the UK, has always practiced a thorough political debate on terrorism, the 2015 attacks moved that debate from an international to a national level. It appears that terror attacks as well as the foreign fighter movement (in the years 2013 and 2014) have greatly contributed to the political discourse on terrorism in both nations which emphasizes the possibility that some external factors exert influence over others.

Other than terrorist attacks, the political discourse demonstrates a clearer relationship with jihadist punishments in both nations. Although some discrepancies emerge, in general, both the UK and Germany share a positive correlation with the dependent variable. The analysis however, extended the initial examination of the terrorist discourse in UK and German politics,

by recognizing newly emerging factors such as Brexit or the migration crisis. Both events have laid the foundation for a theory on the indirect link between external factors and jihadist prosecution. Due to the dramatic rise in hate crimes against Muslims and minorities in the aftermath of terror incidents such as the Manchester attacks, the Brexit referendum or in the wake of the migration crisis, this study outlines a potential connection between those factors and jihadist punishment. Such incidents, followed by hate crime, are theorized to cause societal marginalization or a sense of victimhood (whether perceived or not) as well as other push factors. Those push factors can therefore draw individuals towards radicalization and result in terrorist offences, which ultimately cause legal punishments.


It is essential to keep in mind that this study refrains from making strong claims about these relationships as the data at hand is not sufficient. However, the foundation laid by this study allows further research on the matter to emerge from numerous angles. Therefore, this study suggests that to obtain conclusive findings, future researchers should focus on a longer time frame and possibly collect interviews with individuals who can either confirm or reject the idea that external factors have exerted influence on their radicalization process. Furthermore, to get a more detailed overview of the evolving political debate on terrorism issues in the UK and Germany, a thorough discourse analysis of parliamentary documents would be insightful. However, considering the scope of this study, the analysis has obtained an understanding of the main terrorism related matters discussed between 2013 and 2018 and was nevertheless able to generate an intriguing insight into the changing political climate and the relationship between terror attacks and the political discourse and jihadist prosecution. Although further research would be necessary to provide a conclusive answer to the research question, it nevertheless demonstrated that while the UK and Germany are home to different legal systems, prosecute their jihadists on diverse grounds and approach the conviction of jihadists differently, external factors have overall exerted a similar influence on the punishment of jihadists in both nations.

7. Appendix

Table 1: Coding procedure of sentenced jihadists within the database

Information	Code	Justification
Name of the suspect	s:name	Clarification purpose
Gender of the suspect	s:gender	Identifying differences between male and female perpetrators, this information may add to the overall discourse on how to deal with radicalized females.
Age of the suspect	s:age	In the more extreme form of radicalization, individuals have joined insurgencies as foreign fighters. Those foreign fighters are on average in their 20s and 30s (Verfassungschutz, 2019). By highlighting the various age groups, such statement is either confirmed or denied and may add to future research.
Region the suspect originates from	s:from	The region radicalized individuals were brought up in plays a crucial role in analysing radicalization patters. If a particular region is more prone to bring up radicalized men and women, future studies could assess this information.
Conviction date	c:date	The conviction date is crucial when assessing highlighting trends.
Offence	offence	This information provides a micro perspective on the various reasons for incarceration.
Conviction	conviction	Comparing the convictions of each individual, patterns and changes can be observed.
Release Year	y:release	The release year is of importance as it provides insight into how many individuals are released from prison each year. This information is crucial as it highlights the problem of deradicalization and after prison reintegration.
Juvenile	juvenile	This information has merely been added to identify differences in sentencing based on age.


Map 1: Germany: Origin of Jihadists



Created with mapchart.net ©

Map 2: UK: Origin of Jihadists

- Origin of UK jihadists**
- 1 sentenced jihadist
 - 2 sentenced jihadists
 - 4 sentenced jihadists
 - 6 sentenced jihadists
 - 7 sentenced jihadists
 - 16 sentenced jihadists
 - 32 sentenced jihadists



Created with mapchart.net ©

Table 2: Germany: Sentenced Jihadist Database

s:name	s:gender	s:age when Convicted	s:from	c:date	offence	conviction	y:release	Juvenile	Info	Source
Amal E.	Female	17	Neuss	24.08.18	Support of a terrorist organ	9 months, suspended	0	1	In dem Verfahren g	http://www.c
Fatih I.	Male	27	German	0	Membership in a terrorist o	0	0	0	Conviction cannot b	https://www.w
Kais B. O.	Male	34	German	06.04.17	Support of a terrorist organ	min. 8 month	0	0	Group perscution: f	http://www.c
Leila B. O.	Female	29	German	06.04.17	Support of a terrorist organ	min. 8 month	0	0	Group sentencing: f	http://www.c
Mirza Tamoor	Male	60	German	06.04.17	Support of a terrorist organ	min. 8 month	0	0	Group sentencing: f	http://www.c
Mohammed	Male	37	German	06.04.17	Support of a terrorist organ	min. 8 month	0	0	Group sentencing: f	http://www.c
Muhammad R	Male	34	Pakistani	06.04.17	Support of a terrorist organ	min. 8 month	0	0	Group sentencing: f	http://www.c
Samy (Samidd	Male	20	Waldshut	0	Membership in a terrorist o	0	0	0	No data found on d	https://www.w
Sultan K.	Male	52	Syrian	13.12.18	Support of a terrorist organ	1 year, 9 mon	0	0	Suspended sentenc	https://rsw.b
Ahmed-Sadiq	Male	23	Bonn	Jun 15	Support of a terrorist organ	1 year, 9 mon	2017	0	300 Sozialstunden	http://www.f
Ashraf al-T.	Male	27	Tunisia	0	Membership in a terrorist o	deported	2017	0	Der 27-jährige mit	Verfassungssc
Ali F.	Male	32	German Lebanese	Oct 16	Support of a terrorist organ	2 years	2018	0	Der Senat hat bei d	http://www.c
Aria Ladjevard	Male	21	German/Iranian	12.06.16	War crimes	2 years	2018	0	The accused was ar	http://www.i
Azzedine A. H.	Male	29	0	20.06.16	Support of a terrorist organ	2 years	2018	0	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Ebrahim H.B.	Male	26	0	07.12.15	Membership in a terrorist o	3 years	2018	0	Danach steht fest, d	https://oberl
Ezzedine I.	Male	33	Stuttgart	Mar 15	Supporter of a terrorist org	3 years	2018	0	Der in Mönchengla	https://www.w
Hassan A.S.	Male	30	0	Oct 16	Support of a terrorist organ	1 year, 9 mon	2018	0	Der Senat hat bei d	http://www.c
Kreshnik B.	Male	20	Bad Homburg	05.12.14	Membership in a terrorist o	3 years, 9 mo	2018	1		https://www.w
Mohammad S	Male	37	Mönchengladbach	Mar 15	Supporter of a terrorist org	2 years, 9 mo	2018	0	Der in Mönchengla	https://www.w
Mounir R.	Male	41	0	20.06.16	Support of a terrorist organ	1 year, 6 mon	2018	0	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Nezet Alija S.	Male	22	Mühlheim	01.10.15	Membership in a terrorist o	2 years, 6 mo	2018	0	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Nuran B.	Male	50	German	Oct 16	Support of a terrorist organ	2 years	2018	0	Der Senat hat bei d	http://www.c
Ufuk C.	Male	21	0	29.04.15	Membership in a terrorist o	3.5 years	2018	1	Der Staatsschutz	https://www.w
Yusup G.	Male	29	0	20.06.16	Support of a terrorist organ	1 year, 6 mon	2018	0	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Azad R.	Male	18	Syria	19.09.17	Membership in a terrorist o	2 years	2019	1	2 years probation	https://www.w
Bedrettin K.	Male	58	0	Aug 16	Support of a terrorist organ	3 years	2019	0	„Drei Jahre Haft wi	https://www.w
Ismail I.	Male	24	Stuttgart	Mar 15	Support of a terrorist organ	4 years, 6 mo	2019	0	Ismail I. hielt sich E	https://www.w
Karolina R.	Female	26	Bonn	Jun 15	Support of a terrorist organ	3 years, 9 mo	2019	0	Der Senat sieht es	http://www.f
Mohamed A.	Male	24	0	03.11.16	Membership in a terrorist o	2 years, 9 mo	2019	0	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Mustafa P.	Male	26	0	03.11.16	Membership in a terrorist o	2 years, 9 mo	2019	0	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Sabri El-D.	Male	30	Bonn	Jun 16	Attempt to become a mem	3 years	2019	0	In ihrer Urteilsbeg	http://mw-d
Abdiwahid W	Male	24	German Somali	07.07.16	Membership in a terrorist o	3 years, 6 mo	2020	0	Möglichkeit revisio	https://orden
Abshir A.	Male	29	0	27.10.17	Membership in a terrorist o	2 years, 10 mo	2020	0	Abshir A. wurde w	https://www.w
Abshir Ahmed	Male	29	Frankfurt am Main	27.10.17	Membership in a terrorist o	2 years, 10 mo	2020	0	Der aus Frankfurt	https://orden
Ali R.	Male	32	Berlin	Apr 17	Membership in a terrorist o	3 years	2020	0	Ein deutscher Vate	https://www.w
Ayoub B.	Male	27	0	07.12.15	Membership in a terrorist o	4 years, 3 mo	2020	0	Danach steht fest, d	https://oberl
Harry S.	Male	28	Bremen	Jul 17	Membership in a terrorist o	3 years	2020	0	Erst nach dem Proz	https://www.w
Hekmat T.	Male	21	0	Jun 17	Membership in a terrorist o	3 years	2020	1	Erst kämpfte er in	https://www.w

Hossam A.	Male	19	0	29.03.17	Membership in a terrorist o	3 years, 3 mo	2020	1	Juvenile judgement	https://rsw.bi
Kassem El R.	Male	33	Lebanese	Oct 16	Support of a terrorist organ	3 years, 6 mo	2020	0	Der Angeklagte ka	http://www.c
Mikail S.	Male	19	0	19.05.17	Support of a terrorist organ	3 years	2020	1	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Mounir T.	Male	32	0	07.07.16	Membership in a terrorist o	3 years, 9 mo	2020	0	Möglichkeit Revisi	https://www.o
Nils D.	Male	27	Dinslaken	Mar 16	Membership of a terrorist o	4.5 years	2020	0	Gegen den bereits	https://www.w
Özkan C.	Male	28	0	27.10.17	Membership in a terrorist o	2 years, 8 mo	2020	0	Özkan C. wurde ab	https://www.w
Sebastian B.	Male	28	Herford	Apr 16	Membership of a terrorist o	4 years, 6 mo	2020	0	Das Oberlandesger	https://www.w
Abdullah W.	Male	30	German Somali	07.07.16	Membership in a terrorist o	5 years	2021	0	Möglichkeit Revisi	https://www.o
Abdulsalam W	Male	25	German Somali	07.07.16	Membership in a terrorist o	4 years, 9 mo	2021	0	Möglichkeit Revisi	https://www.o
Fadil Rudolf S	Male	26	0	03.11.16	Membership in a terrorist o	4 years, 6 mo	2021	0	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Fatih K.	Male	36	Berlin	Sep 15	Membership in a terrorist o	6 years	2021	0	2. Strafe als FFI De	https://www.w
Ibrahim M.	Male	20	Syria	Mar 18	Membership in a terrorist o	3.5 years	2021	1	Der IS hatte die An	https://www.w
Kamel T.H.J.	Male	25	Syria	19.09.17	Membership in a terrorist o	4 years	2021	0	Der Senat sah es al	https://www.w
Mahir Al-H.	Male	19	Syria	Mar 18	Membership in a terrorist o	3.5 years	2021	1	Der IS hatte die An	https://www.w
Mustafa K.	Male	45	Syria	13.12.18	Support of a terrorist organ	2 years, 9 mo	2021	0	Der Senat sah es al	https://rsw.bi
Soufiane K.	Male	29	Rüsselheim	May 16	Membership in a terrorist o	5 years	2021	0	Der Staatsschutzse	https://resear
Steven N.	Male	28	Saxony	07.07.16	Membership in a terrorist o	4 years, 9 mo	2021	0	Möglichkeit Revisi	https://www.o
Wajid S.	Male	20	0	Oct 17	Membership in a terrorist o	4 years	2021	1	Wegen Mitgliedsch	https://www.w
Kamel Ben Yaf	Male	40	Tunsia / Aachen	20.06.16	Support of a terrorist organ	5 years, 6 mo	2022	0	2018 deported to T	http://www.c
Kevin T.	Male	22	Neuss	24.08.18	Support of a terrorist organ	3 years, 9 mo	2022	1	In dem Verfahren g	http://www.c
Mukhamadsal	Male	31	Tadschikistan	13.07.17	Membership in a terrorist o	5 years	2022	0	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Mustafa C.	Male	28	Mönchengladbach	Apr 16	Membership of a terrorist o	6 years, 3 mo	2022	0	Das Oberlandesger	https://www.w
n.A.	Male	36	Bad Münstereifel	Jan 19	Preparing for acts of terror	3.5 years	2022	0	Ein 27-jähriger Deu	https://rp-on
Shaas Al M.	Male	20	Syria	May 17	Membership in a terrorist o	5 years	2022	0	Fünf Jahre Haft ver	https://www.w
Sven Lau	Male	37	Mönchengladbach	Jul 17	Membership of a terrorist o	5.5 years	2022	0	Scheduled for early	https://www.w
Tarik Süleyma	Male	23	German	06.04.17	Membership in a terrorist o	5 years	2022	1	Zur Überzeugung d	http://www.c
Emin F.	Male	45	Berlin	Jul 17	Membership/Support of a t	6 years	2023	0	Sechs Jahre Freihei	https://www.w
Emrah C.	Male	33	Berlin	14.03.19	Support of a terrorist organ	3 years, 10 mo	2023	0	Der 1. Strafsenat d	https://www.w
Ismet D.	Male	43	Berlin	Jul 17	Support of a terrorist organ	6 years	2023	0	Sechs Jahre Freihei	https://www.w
Kerim Marc B.	Male	23	Dortmund	06.10.16	Membership in a terrorist o	6 years, 9 mo	2023	0	Ursprünglich war e	https://www.w
n.A.	Male	18	Iraq	Jan 19	Homicide, involvement in	4 years	2023	1	Der heute 18-jähri	https://www.w
Resul K.	Male	47	Berlin	14.03.19	Support of a terrorist organ	3 years, 10 mo	2023	0	Der 1. Strafsenat d	https://www.w
Saffa S.	Female	16	Hannover	Jan 17	Attempted murder of Polic	6 years	2023	1	Die deutsch-marok	https://www.w
Samir K.	Male	34	Heilbronn	02.08.19	Membership in a terrorist o	4 years	2023	0	Der Deutsch-Algeri	https://www.w
Soufiane A.	Male	24	Berlin	14.03.19	Support of a terrorist organ	3 years, 10 mo	2023	0	Der 1. Strafsenat d	https://www.w
Yusup B.	Male	30	Brandenburg	25.06.19	Financing a terrorist organi	3 years, 9 mo	2023	0	Der Staatsschutzse	https://www.w
Abdelkarim El	Male	30	German	25.02.16	Membership of a terrorist o	8 years, 6 mo	2024	0		http://www.i
Mohammed A	Male	27	Syria	Mar 18	Membership in a terrorist o	6.5 years	2024	0	Der IS hatte die An	https://www.w
n.A.	Male	27	Bad Münstereifel	Jan 19	Membership in a terrorist o	5 years, 3 mo	2024	0	Ein 27-jähriger Deu	https://rp-on

Sabine S.	Female	32	0	Jul 19	Membership of terrorist org	5 years	2024	0	Es ist das erste Urte	https://www.
Thomas K.	Male	37	0	10.12.18	Membership in a terrorist o	6 years	2024	0	Unter der Leitung d	http://www.c
Yusuf T.	Male	18	Gelsenkirchen	Mar 17	Preparing for acts of terrori	7 years	2024	1	Das Landgericht Ess	https://www.
Saleh A.	Male	31	Syria	Jun 18	Membership in a terrorist o	7 years	2025	0	Von der Französisch	http://www.c
Saleh S.	Male	18	Hannover	08.06.17	Attempted murder, suppor	8 years	2025	1	Saleh S. soll am 5. d	https://www.
Harun P.	Male	27	Munich	15.07.15	Membership in a terrorist o	11 years	2026	0	On 15 July 2015, G	http://www.i
Tayfun S.	Male	27	German	Apr 17	Founding and support of a	9 years, 6 mo	2026	0	Zusammen mit Mal	http://www.c
Enea B.	Male	46	Albanian	Apr 17	Founding and support of a	12 years	2029	0	Zusammen mit Mal	http://www.c
Koray D.	Male	28	German Turkish	Apr 17	Founding and support of a	12 years	2029	0	Zusammen mit Mal	http://www.c
Marco G.	Male	30	German	Apr 17	Placement of a bomb at Borj	min. 15 years	2032	0	Das Gericht sah es	https://blogs.

Table 3: Germany: Jihadists on Trial Database

s:name	s:gender	s:age	when cd	s:from	c:date	accused of	conviction	y:release	Juvenile	Info	Source
Abbas R.	Male	19		Iraq	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Die Angeschuldigte	https://www.oberfla.de
Ahmad Abdul	Male	33		Iraq	0	Membership in	0	0	0	u.a. wegen Mitglie	https://oberfla.de
Ahmed F. Y.	Male	27		Cameroon	0	Membership in	0	0	0	u.a. wegen Mitglie	https://oberfla.de
Ahmed S.	Male	51		German	0	Support of a ter	0	0	0	Gegen Ahmed S. so	https://www.oberfla.de
Boban S.	Male	37		Dortmund	0	Membership in	0	0	0	u.a. wegen Mitglie	https://oberfla.de
Carla-Joseph	Female	32		German	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Die Beschuldigte ist	https://www.oberfla.de
Dasbar W.	Male	29		German Kurd	0	Preparing for ad	0	0	0	still under investig	https://www.oberfla.de
Derya Ö.	Female	26		German	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Die Angeschuldigte	https://www.oberfla.de
Fares A. B.	Male	31		Syria	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Der A ngeschuldigte	https://www.oberfla.de
Fatima M.	Female	31		0	0	Preparing for ad	0	0	0	Still under investig	https://www.oberfla.de
Hamad A.	Male	37		Syria	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Der A ngeschuldigte	https://www.oberfla.de
Hasan C.	Male	51		Duisburg	0	Membership in	0	0	0	u.a. wegen Mitglie	https://oberfla.de
Hasan Sabbar	Male	27		Iraq	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Muqatil Ahmed Os	https://www.oberfla.de
Hassan Rejan	Male	31		Kosovo	0	Support of a ter	0	0	0	Hassan Rejan B. ste	https://www.oberfla.de
Jamer Amer Ja	Male	29		Iraq	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Dem Beschuldigten	https://www.oberfla.de
Jennifer W.	Female	27		Lohne	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Expected Convictio	https://www.oberfla.de
Mahmoud O.	Male	28		German	0	Membership of	0	0	0	u.a. wegen Mitglie	https://oberfla.de
Mine K.	Female	46		German	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Die Beschuldigte ist	https://www.oberfla.de
Mohamed A. C	Male	32		Syria	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Der Beschuldigte is	https://www.oberfla.de
Mohammed R	Male	28		Iraq	0	Assistance to m	0	0	0	Gegen Mohammed	https://www.oberfla.de
Muqatil Ahme	Male	29		Iraq	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Muqatil Ahmed Os	https://www.oberfla.de
n.A.	Male	28		German	0	Membership in	0	0	0	In Hamburg ist ein	https://www.oberfla.de
Perihan S.	Male	48		German	0	Support of a ter	0	0	0	Gegen Ahmed S. so	https://www.oberfla.de
Raad A.	Male	43		Iraq	0	War cimes, mer	0	0	0	Trial not yet sched	https://trialin.de
Sabine Ulrike	Female	32		German	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Die Angeschuldigte	https://www.oberfla.de
Sarah O.	Female	21		Konstanz	0	Human trafficki	0	0	0	still under investig	https://www.oberfla.de
Sarah O.	Female	21		German Alger	0	Membership in	0	0	0	Die Angeschuldigte	https://www.oberfla.de
Songül G.	Female	41		Hamburg	0	Support of a ter	0	0	0	Ongoing investigat	https://www.oberfla.de

Table 4: UK: Sentenced Jihadists Database

s:name	s:gender	s:age	when Cq	s:from	c:date	offence	conviction	y:release	Info	Source
Amal El-Waha	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Hana Gul Khal	Female	22	0	0	23. Feb 15	Funding Terror	0	0	Convicted of sending	https://assets
Jamila Henry	Female	22	0	London	03. Jul 15	Possession of	12 months su	0	East London woman	
Abubakar Abdul	Male	22	0	Manchester	Jan 16	Possessing ter	2 years superv	0	Manchester man w	
Mohammed S	Male	31	0	London	28. Jun 16	Disseminating	0	3	Under the usernam	
Mohammed Id	Male	26	0	Walsall	Aug 16	Funding terror	0	0	Hussain was convic	
Mohammed S	Male	32	0	Walsall	Aug 16	Funding terror	0	0	Rohaman was conv	
Mohammed A	Male	27	0	Walsall	Aug 16	Funding Terror	0	0	Warehouse distribu	
Jabed Hussain	Male	22	0	London	22. Nov 16	Preparing for	0	0	A West London ma	
Patrick Kabel	Male	32	0	London	Feb 17	Preparing for	custody	0	A Londoner who wa	
Haroon Syed	Male	19	0	London	Apr 17	Preparing an	0	0	A teenage student	
Taha Hussain	Male	21	0	Slough	31. Jul 17	Disseminating	0	0	Taha Hussain, who	
Ghulam Hussa	Male	30	0	Batley, West Y	04. Aug 17	Preparing an	0	0	Hussain, who is fro	
n.A.	Female	16	0	Manchester	15. Oct 15	Possessing inf	12 month refe	0	A 16-year-old scho	
Suhaib Majeed	Male	21	0	London	23. Mar 16	Conspiracy to	Life	0	Suhaib Majeed was	https://assets
Tarik Hassane	Male	22	0	London	23. Mar 16	Conspiracy to	Life	0	Tarik Hassane was	https://assets
Nadeem Hussa	Male	35	0	Coventry	Dec 16	Funding Terror	0	0	A Coventry engine	
Mary Kaya	Female	57	0	Batley, West Y	Mar 17	Disseminating	0	0	A woman from Bati	
Sabbir Miah	Male	24	0	London	May 17	Disseminating	0	0	An East London ma	
Shamim Ahm	Male	24	0	London	May 17	Disseminating	0	0	An East London ma	
Tahir Bhatti	Male	44	0	Watford	20. Jan 15	Assisting an	of 21 months	2016	Pleaded guilty to a	https://assets
Asim Ali	Male	33	0	0	20. Jan 15	Funding Terror	21 months	2016	Pleaded guilty to e	https://assets
Hassan Munir	Male	27	0	Bradford	24. Apr 15	Disseminating	18 months	2016	Bradford man whos	https://assets
Angela Shafiq	Female	22	0	London	31. Jul 15	Preparing for	15 months	2016	West Londoner wh	
Majdi Shajira	Male	23	0	Liverpool	08. May 15	Funding Terror	12 months su	2016	The son of a police	https://assets
Amal el-Waha	Female	28	0	0	13. Nov 14	Funding Terror	2 years, 3 mor	2017	She tried to trick h	
Hamza Nawaz	Male	24	0	London	26. Nov 14	Conspiracy to	3 years	2017	Pleaded guilty to co	
Nazimabee Gd	Female	45	0	London	03. Oct 16	Funding Terror	10 months	2017	Ibid.	
Mourad Mosel	Male	34	0	0	09. Dec 15	Encouraging t	2 years	2017	A former Algerian s	https://assets
Mohammed S	Male	25	0	High Wycombe	20. May 15	Funding Terror	21 months	2017	High Wycombe mar	https://assets
Mounir Ramo	Male	26	0	0	Oct 2014	Possessing a tr	3 years	2017	https://www.theeu	https://assets
Erol Incedal	Male	27	0	London	17. Nov 14	Possessing a tr	3.5 years	2018	Incedal, a law stud	https://assets
Brusthom Zial	Male	19	0	0	19. Feb 15	Preparing for	3 years	2018	A teenager who wa	https://assets
Syed Choudhu	Male	19	0	Cardiff	18. Jun 15	Preparing for	3 years, 4 mor	2018	Cardiff man who ple	
Afshheen Khan	Female	28	0	Bradford	Jan 16	Preparing for	12 years, 11 mo	2018	A Bradford woman	
Shah Jahan Kh	Male	63	0	Luton	29. Jan 16	Inviting supp	2 years	2018	A driving instructor	
Lorna Moore	Female	33	0	Walsall	24. Feb 16	Information a	2.5 years	2018	A trainee maths te	
Atzaz Khan	Male	40	0	Bradford	Apr 17	Disseminating	12 months	2018	A Bradford man wh	

David Sounaal	Male	20	Serbia	17. Dec 14	Preparing for	3.5 years	2018	Arrested at Heathr
Alaa Abdullah	Female	22	London	18. May 15	Encouraging t	3.5 years	2018	Iraqi woman living
Mashudur Ch	Male	31	0	20. May 14	Preparing for	4 years	2018	The first person in t
Atiq Ahmed	Male	32	Oldham	30. Oct 15	Disseminating	2.5 years	2018	A supporter of IS li
Ahmad Ismail	Male	19	Coventry	Dec 16	Failling to dis	18 months	2018	A Coventry teenag
Abdul Hamid	Male	31	Barking	Dec 16	Disseminating	2 years	2018	A man from Barking
Fatima Peer-M	Female	22	Sheffield	Mar 17	Disseminating	20 months	2018	Peer-Mohamed, wh
Kerry Thomas	Female	24	Walsall	May 16	Preparing for	2 years	2018	Thomason was part
Mohammed N	Male	30	London	26. Nov 14	Conspiracy to	4.5 years	2019	Pleaded guilty to c
Mohammed A	Male	32	Newcastle	09. Nov 15	Disseminating	3.5 years	2019	An IS follower from
Ibrahim Ande	Male	38	Luton	29. Jan 16	Inviting suppd	3 years	2019	Anderson was jailed
Zahera Tariq	Female	33	London	23. Feb 16	Child abducti	3 years	2019	A woman from Lond
Ziaur Rahman	Male	39	Luton	13. Jan 17	Arranging me	2.5 years	2019	A Luton man who v
Mohammed Jas	Male	22	London	Feb 17	Encouraging t	2 years	2019	A West London man
Mohammed G	Male	48	London	03. Oct 16	Funding Terror	2 years, 3 mor	2019	A South London ma
Ednane Mahm	Male	19	Blackburn	11. Dec 15	Preparing for	4 years	2019	A Blackburn underg
Mashoud Mia	Male	28	London	23. Dec 16	Funding Terror	2.5 years	2019	Miah, who is from t
Shivan Azeez Z	Male	21	0	24. Dec 16	Preparing for	3 years	2019	An illegal immigran
Zakaria Boufas	Male	26	West Midland	6. Dec 16	Preparing for	3 years	2019	Boufassi and co-def
Stephen Must	Male	31	0	22. Sep 15	Preparing for	5 years	2020	A former RAF servi
Yahya Rashid	Male	19	0	13. Nov 15	Preparing for	5 years	2020	A teenager with le
Mohammed A	Male	37	Sunderland	13. Nov 15	Preparing for	5 years	2020	A father of six from
Kristen Brekke	Male	19	Cardiff	10. Feb 16	Preparing for	4.5 years	2020	Brekke, who is a te
Cubeyda Hass	Male	19	Finland	Jul 16	Preparing for	3.5 years	2020	A Finnish computer
Khawla Bargh	Female	21	London	Jun 18	Failing to disc	2 years, 4 mor	2020	Khawla Barghouthi
n.A.	Male	15	Blackburn	02. Oct 15	Inciting terror	min. 5 years -	2020	From the bedroom
Runa Khan	Female	35	Luton	12. Dec 14	Promoting an	5 years, 3 mor	2020	Mother-of-six from
Mustafa Abdul	Male	34	London	15. Dec 15	Possessing ter	4.5 years	2020	A London convert t
Zafreen Khada	Female	25	Sheffield	18. May 16	Disseminating	4.5 years	2020	Zafreen Khadam, fr
Jamshed Javed	Male	30	Bolton	27. Oct 14	Preparing for	6 years	2020	Javeed, a science t
Tuhin Shahen	Male	27	Portsmouth	18. Nov 15	Preparing for	6 years	2021	One of two brother
Mustakim Jam	Male	23	Portsmouth	18. Nov 15	Preparing for	6 years	2021	One of two brother
Ijaz Khan	Male	28	Bradford	Jan 16	Preparing for	5 years	2021	A Bradford man wh
Forhad Rahm	Male	21	Cirencester	10. Feb 16	Preparing for	5 years	2021	Rahman, who is fro
Adeel Ulhaq	Male	21	Nottinghamst	10. Feb 16	Preparing for	5 years	2021	Ulhaq, who is from
Alex Nash	Male	22	Walsall	24. Feb 16	Preparing for	5 years	2021	A trial at the Old B
Mohammed N	Male	23	Dagenham	01. Apr 16	Encouraging t	5 years	2021	A prolific tweeter c
Rajib Khan	Male	38	0	Aug 16	Encouraging s	5 years	2021	Khan was found guil
Yousaf Bashir	Male	36	0	Aug 16	Encouraging s	4.5 years	2021	Bashir was found Bl

Gabriel Rasmul	Male	29	Birmingham	07. Nov 16	Preparing for 4 years, 3 months	2021	During an undercover
Mohammed C	Male	23	Maidenhead	13. Jan 17	Encouraging \$ 4 years	2021	A Maidenhead accomplice
Akeem Samuel	Male	22	London	Apr 17	Encouraging \$ 4 years	2021	A Jamaican national
n.A.	Female	34	Bradford	09. Dec 15	Child abduction	2021	A woman from Bradford
Abdalraouf Ab	Male	23	Manchester	11. May 16	Preparing for 5.5 years	2021	A British-Libyan male
Anas Abdalla	Male	27	Birmingham	13. Oct 16	Preparing for 5 years	2021	During an undercover
Zakariya Ashid	Male	20	Coventry	26. May 15	Preparing for 6 years	2021	Unemployed Coventry
Tareena Shaki	Female	26	Birmingham	01. Feb 16	Membership of 6 years	2022	A former health worker
Mohammed N	Male	33	0	28. Jul 16	Inviting support of 5.5 years	2022	An extremist preacher
Anjem Choud	Male	49	0	28. Jul 16	Inviting support of 5.5 years	2022	The extremist cleric
Mohammed A	Male	37	0	Aug 16	Encouraging \$ 6 years	2022	Alamgir was found
Mohammed N	Male	23	London	Feb 17	Disseminating \$ 5 years, 2 months	2022	A West London male
Lee Griffiths	Male	26	Swansea	19. Jun 17	Disseminating \$ 5 years, 4 months	2022	A Muslim convert
Mudassir Huss	Male	31	Derby	11. Jul 17	Preparing for 5 years, 3 months	2022	A barber from Derby
Syed Hoque	Male	37	Stoke-on-Trent	23. Dec 16	Funding Terror	2022	A former probation
Mohammed U	Male	29	Ilford	Feb 16	Preparing for 7 years	2023	Uddin, who is from
Abduallah Jam	Male	20	Manchester	11. Feb 16	Preparing for 7 years	2023	An A-level student
Aras Hamid	Male	26	0	24. Dec 16	Preparing for 7 years	2023	Hamid was found in
Awat Hamasa	Male	35	Birmingham	June 17	Membership of 6 years	2023	An Iraqi Kurd who is
Naseer Taj	Male	26	Bedfordshire	12. Feb 16	Preparing for 8 years	2024	A Bedfordshire taxi
Shazib Khan	Male	25	Luton	01. Apr 16	Preparing for 8 years	2024	Shazib Khan, from Luton
Aine Davis	Male	30	London	09. May 17	0	2024	Davis is a former driver
Ali Akbar Zeb	Male	19	West Midlands	15. Dec 16	Disseminating \$ 8 years	2024	Part of a network of
Mohammed A	Male	27	West Midlands	6. Dec 16	Preparing for 8 years	2024	Ahmed and co-defendant
Muhiddin Mir	Male	30	London	08. Jun 16	Attempted murder	2025	CCTV and mobile phone
Mina Dich	Female	44	London	Jun 18	Assisting an offence	2025	Members of Britain First
Humza Ali	Male	20	West Midlands	15. Dec 16	Preparing for 9 years	2025	Part of a network of
Samata Ullah	Male	34	Cardiff	Mar 17	Preparing for 8 years	2025	An unemployed male
Ayman Shaukat	Male	27	Walsall	24. Feb 16	Preparing for 10 years	2026	A law graduate from
Yusuf Sarwar	Male	22	Birmingham	08. Jul 14	Preparing for 12 years, 8 months	2027	Sarwar pleaded guilty
Mohammed N	Male	22	Birmingham	08. Jul 14	Preparing for 12 years, 8 months	2027	Ahmed pleaded guilty
Imran Khawaj	Male	27	London	20. Jan 15	Preparing for 12 years	2027	A former immigrant
Junead Khan	Male	25	Luton	01. Apr 16	Preparing for min. 12 years	2028	A delivery driver from
Nadir Syed	Male	0	London	Jun 16	Preparing an offence	2031	Syed, who was west
Safaa Boular	Female	18	London	Aug 18	Preparing for min. 13 years	2031	A jury found that Syed
Tahir Aziz	Male	38	West Midlands	03. Aug 17	Preparing for Life with min.	2032	Aziz was jailed for
Rizlaine Boula	Female	22	London	Jun 18	Preparing for min. 16 years	2034	Members of Britain First
Gavin Rae	Male	36	0	27. May 16	Possessing a firearm	2034	A former British soldier
Naweed Ali	Male	29	West Midlands	03. Aug 17	Preparing for Life with min.	2037	Ali was jailed for life

Khobaib Huss	Male	25	West Midland	03. Aug 17	Preparing for	Life with min.	2037	Hussain was jailed	
Mohibur Rahr	Male	32	West Midland	03. Aug 17	Preparing for	Life with min.	2037	Restaurant worker	
Mohammed S	Male	21	Rochdale	16. Sep 16	Murder	24 years	2040	Student and part-ti	
Sana Ahmed K	Female	24	Bershire	20. Dec 15	Preparing for	min. 25 years	2040	Khan was convicted	
Mohammed R	Male	25	Bershire	30. Dec 15	Preparing for	min. 27 years	2042	A. Berkshire man w	
Nazam Hussai	Male	34	Stoke-on-Tren	2012	Preparing for	early release	2018	azam Hussain, who	https://www.
Usman Khan	Male	29	Stoke-on-Tren	2012	Preparing for	early release	2018	azam Hussain, who	https://www.

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