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*Examining state motivations behind contributions
to UN peacekeeping operations in the Horn of Africa*

A comparative study of Ethiopia and Kenya



Crisis and Security Management
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List of Abbreviations

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA: African Peace and Security Architecture
AU: African Union
AUPRC: African Union Permanent Representatives Committee
EDF: Ethiopian Defence Forces
EIPKTC: Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre
EPRDF: Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPSTC: The Ethiopian Peace Support Training Centre
FANSPS: Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy
FDRE: The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority of Development
IPSTC: International Peace and Support Training Centre
KAF: Kenyan Armed Forces
KANU: Kenyan African National Union
KDF: Kenyan Defence Forces
KNAP: Kenyan National Action Plan
MONUSCO: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NARC: National Rainbow Coalition
NSC: National Security Council
ONUB: The United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC: The United Nations Operation in the Congo
PKO: Peacekeeping Operations
PSC: Peace and Security Council
TCC: Troop Contributing Countries
TFG: The Transnational Federal Government
UIC: The Union of Islamic Courts
UN: United Nations
UNAMID: The African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNAMIR: The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL: The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNIIMOG: Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNISFA: The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMEE: The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL: The United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS: The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOMIL: The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNPBC: The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
UNPKO: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNPROFOR: The United Nations Protection Force in Croatia
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
UNTAG: The United Nations Transition Assistance Group

I. Introduction

Peacekeeping missions are often an essential foreign policy tool for countries to intervene militarily. Peacekeeping comes in various forms, but the main two comprise of United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) missions. In many conflict zones around the world, UN peacekeepers make up the second-largest military force and enforcers of order after the United States (Auteserre, 2019). The contributions of UN peacekeepers are not constant, as the level of peacekeeping contributions varies significantly through time. For example, in 1991, contributions to UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) were approximately 10,000, which increased ten times in the last 20 years (Perry & Smith, 2013). Multiple reasons might explain these shifts over time. At one point, a state might be willing to contribute to peacekeeping operations (PKO) to a great extent, whereas at a later point in time, the state does not participate. The lack of contributions might be the result of significant failures in a peacekeeping mission, leading to a lower willingness to participate in the future. One of the most prominent examples is during the 1990s; the West dominated peacekeeping. However, this declined rapidly after the negative experiences in Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans (Koops & Tercovich, 2016; Henderson, 2015).

Despite the failures during the 1990s, post-Cold War peacekeeping has seen a rise in contributions to UN peacekeeping missions from developing countries (Coleman & Nyblade, 2018). In fact, in a short period between 2002 to 2008, the number of contributions coming from African countries doubled, exceeding the total number of European contributors to peacekeeping missions (Perry & Smith, 2013, p. 5). As of September 2019, the supply of peacekeepers and top three contributors of personnel came from Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Rwanda (United Nations, 2020). In Africa, the demand for peacekeepers is high due to the escalating violence and instability with the presence of terrorist groups such as al-Shabab and al-Qaeda (Williams, 2015).

Fundamental to the idea of peacekeeping is the concept of neutrality. In theory, the involvement of peacekeeping does not suggest any political incentives, but rather a means to support the concept of global peace and security. However, some authors such as Neack (1995) have indicated that during Cold War peacekeeping, states "participate in peacekeeping to serve their own interests" (Neack, 1995, p. 194). Even under an umbrella organization such as the UN, every state has its rationales for contributing to peacekeeping missions. For example,

theoretical stances that would offer explanations for the motives of states often come from realist and liberal schools. The former would argue that security interests and power of states explain the differences in peacekeeping missions. In contrast, proponents of the liberal school would argue for the need of defending liberal norms and values (Bellamy & Williams, 2013). These theories may provide relevant explanations for the supply of peacekeepers and continue the debate on ‘peacekeeping by whom’ (Durch et al., 2006). However, to understand the rationales of states, we would be better off questioning peacekeeping by whom and why? (Hadley, 2018).

Research question and relevance

States participate in UNPKO either financially or militarily. However, the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) carry out the burden of sending out its troops. Even though countries send troops to missions, the contributions vary as some send thousands, while other states free ride without paying any costs (Velázquez, 2010). The differences in participation are researched by gaining a better understanding of the domestic conditions as to why certain countries would decide to bear the burden of deploying troops. The motivations of states behind contributing to peacekeeping is useful to research as it uncovers reasons why states would deploy armed forces in dealing with conflicts outside its borders. Pertinent to this study, the motivations of countries in the African continent to tackle regional security issues have not received much attention in the literature (Hadley, 2018, p. 8). This thesis serves to bridge the gap between academia that have identified factors that can explain motivations of state contributions to UNPKO, and policymakers that work in this field. This study adds to the debate as current literature pays little attention to evaluating why and for what reasons states decide to contribute troops to UNPKO, by focusing on the Horn of Africa as a region (Velázquez, 2010; Blum, 2000; Hadley, 2018).

After a decade of dramatic peacekeeping failures during the 1990s, peacekeeping operations are returning in the 21st century as a response to the imminent threats posed to civilians and aim to mitigate armed conflict. The Horn of Africa especially is witnessing a rise in peacekeeping missions due to the ongoing conflicts and instability in the region (Malley, 2008). However, the states located in the Horn of Africa respond differently to the ongoing instability and contributions to support UNPKO. This research tries to narrow the focus of state contributions by focusing on two case studies, namely Ethiopia and Kenya. Although both

countries have been contributing to peacekeeping missions ever since the establishment of the UN peacekeeping, the most significant changes in contributions take place from the 21st century onwards as seen in Figure I. Therefore, this leads us to the research question *'What explains Ethiopia's and Kenya's varying contributions to UN peacekeeping operations since 1990?'*




Figure I: Illustrating contributions to UNPKO from 1990-2020 for Ethiopia and Kenya (United Nations, 2020).

The time frame (1990-2020) is chosen because this is the only suitable period for accessing publicly available and reliable databases regarding the number of UNPKO contributions (Perry & Smith, 2015, p. 5). Considering Figure I, Kenya increased their contributions from 1990 until around 2004, but have reduced overall contributions ever since. In contrast, contributions in Ethiopia did not exceed the number of 1000 peacekeeping contributions during the 1990s. Ever since the early 2000s Ethiopia's UNPKO contributions have been rising, including being ranked as the top contributor in 2019 with 7,046 personnel (United Nations, 2020). Although contributions are still changing, research is conducted until the start of the data collection (January 2020). The research attempts to explain the reasons and motivations of states for contributing to UNPKO in the Horn of Africa. The study focuses on the decrease in overall contributions in the case of Kenya, by comparing the bordering country Ethiopia. Ethiopia as

a case study is a suitable comparison as it has witnessed a significant increase in overall UNPKO contributions in a similar period Kenya has decreased overall UNPKO contributions.

Control variables in this study also explain the varying contributions. For example, relative army size and population of each country are variables for supplying large numbers of peacekeepers. Ethiopia's army size has remained relatively stable consisting of at least 100,000 personnel, while Kenya's army size has consisted of approximately 30,000 personnel over the past 30 years (ISS, 2020). Fundamental to note is that it is not the objective of this investigation to examine the total number of troops that states are capable of sending to UNPKO. It goes beyond the scope of this research because it considers the rationales of state contributions. UNPKO contributions are voluntary, and the most considerable number of peacekeepers lies in the Horn of Africa for both countries (United Nations, 2020).




Figure II: Illustrating the population of Kenya and Ethiopia between 1990-2018 measured in millions (World Bank, 2020).

Bearing in mind the demographics of both Ethiopia and Kenya, Ethiopia, over the years shows a population twice as large as Kenya's as can be seen in Figure II. Moreover, Figure III indicates the UN peacekeepers as a percentage of the domestic population. Similar to the trend shown in Figure I, it illustrates that over time the rate of UN peacekeepers increases for

Ethiopia, while on the contrary, the rate for Kenya decreases. This information regarding the army and population sizes shows that Ethiopia relative to Kenya is able to send a lot more peacekeepers due to the larger numbers. This information provides to some extent an explanation for the significant difference in the number of personnel sent to UNPKO. However, these variables alone do not give a satisfactory answer to the research question. It does not explain the motivations and timing of contributions to specific UNPKO for both countries. The control variables do not explain why Kenya has declined its overall contributions to UNPKO despite maintaining similar army sizes over time. In the case of Ethiopia, it does not necessarily explain what has motivated the rise of overall UNPKO contributions considering the armed forces sizes have not changed considerably. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate multiple variables that would explain the differences in contributions to UNPKO between the two chosen case studies.




Figure III: Illustration of UN peacekeepers as a percentage of the domestic population (United Nations & World Bank, 2020).

This topic fits within Crisis and Security Management since it relates to matters of international security, specifically related to peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is a foreign policy tool which is debated as to whether it is a suitable method of conflict management and crisis prevention. These themes are discussed within the master's programme, thus making this research relevant. Besides, this topic is academically relevant to scholars in this field that are interested in understanding state contributions to peacekeeping. Based on the research conducted, many researchers address the broad study on peacekeeping motivations in a one-dimensional fashion or limited to individual motivations. On an academic level, it addresses the importance of analyzing state contributions and motivations multi-dimensionally. It is important to address state motivations from several angles since there is always a conjunction of various factors playing a role. This research aims to extend the discussion in comparatively analyzing reasons for varying contributions to UNKPO located in a similar regional context. On a societal level, this research is valuable to policymakers working in both Ethiopia and Kenya. As this research offers an academic perspective in analyzing foreign policy, it is helpful to policymakers interested in the Horn of Africa by predicting the likelihood and composition of future peacekeeping operations. It is not limited to policymakers, but also to a multitude of actors, including foreign policy analysts, diplomats, and UN personnel in evaluating and dealing with peacekeeping. The results of this research are useful since it considers underlying motivations as to why individual states do or do not contribute to peacekeeping missions. This information is valuable as it examines what factors lead to participation in UNPKO for Ethiopia and Kenya, which may explain similar trends other states as well.

The thesis is organized in the following order: The second chapter consists of the theoretical framework, defining the concepts used, a literature review, and the theory presented. The third chapter under the heading research design outlines the research approach and the operationalization of hypotheses. Further, the fourth chapter starts with the data collection and ends with the limitations to the research. The fifth chapter comprises of the empirical analysis of the cases, including the presentation of cases. The presentation of cases consists of a brief overview, UNPKO participation and decision-making related to UN peacekeeping for Ethiopia and Kenya. After the presentation of case studies, the remaining chapter consists of the analysis of hypotheses followed by a discussion. Lastly, the sixth chapter provides a conclusion about the findings, the research question and other final remarks.

II. Theoretical framework

For the theoretical framework, it is first necessary to clarify what is meant by ‘varying’ and ‘contribution’ in the research question. The term ‘varying’ means the differences in UNPKO contributions over time. The research focusses on the reasons for the ‘shift’ in contributions over time. What this shift means is that it attempts to understand why Kenya witnessed a decrease in overall contributions after a period of increasing contributions. The case is compared to Ethiopia, which after a period of low contributions has increased overall contributions to UNPKO. However, the analysis focusses on the UNPKO motivations in the Horn of Africa in the late 2000s until now. The reason for focussing on this period is due to a lack of data availability during the 1990s and early 2000s.

The concept ‘contributions’ are understood as all uniformed personnel deployed by states to peacekeeping missions. These include contingent troops, police, experts on mission, and staff officers sent out by countries in peacekeeping missions. It must not be confused with financial contribution since the contributions by Kenya and Ethiopia are in the form of troops and the personnel mentioned above (United Nations, 2020). The varying contributions and the rationales that states have for contributing to peacekeeping will be analyzed by the framework later in this chapter. Before doing this, a brief review of relevant literature and previous works investigating why states decide to contribute to UNPKO is presented.

Literature review

The motivations to supplying peacekeepers to UNPKO are diverse because it involves understanding of national incentives to peacekeeping missions. It consists of the interplay between various motives, which are identified by multiple scholars in the field. Certain scholars focus on the internal processes of states, namely when a government experiences domestic pressure on its decision-making processes. Bueno de Mesquita (2013) argues that the politics of decision-making is related to a leader's quest for survival and political power. Other scholars who promote the selectorate theory explain that leaders retain authority by satisfying their core domestic constituencies (Hanon, 2019).

Other approaches, such as the public goods theory view the participation in UNPKO through self-interested behaviour (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, pp. 13-14). It posits that a state will provide peacekeepers when it produces private benefits such as the resolution of conflicts

damaging state interests, or the acquisition of economic or social benefit (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, pp. 13-14). Bobrow & Boyer (2005) find that states that extract private goods such as middle and great powers will most likely provide peacekeepers. For example, the participation of African states in UNPKO might be explained by the specific benefits states retrieve by resolving conflicts in neighbouring states. However, this theory lacks the empirical evidence suggesting that only self-interests drive states to provide peacekeepers.

Peacekeeping literature also focuses on the importance of regime type as essential factors for understanding varying UNPKO contributions between states. Duursma and Gledhill (2019) suggest that democratically elected leaders are reluctant to contribute peacekeepers as voters will object to deploying troops to high-risk areas. In contrast, non-democratically elected leaders in authoritarian type regimes tend to reject public opinion and are more willing to send peacekeepers for resources or reputational benefits. Lebovic (2004) claims that in the post-cold war era, there is strong support that UNPKO relied on democratic countries contributions. This argument states that stable democracies are more likely to contribute to peacekeeping missions due to a more significant commitment to peace, stability and upholding human rights. However, as Passmore (2017) argues, we have seen in the recent trend of peacekeeping contributions, the provision of personnel to UNPKO by developing countries typically contain weak democratic institutions.

In the extant literature, the significance of a state's characteristics experiencing a civil war are a valid set of explanations for the deployment of peacekeepers (Stojek & Tir, 2014). The inherent logic is that states with larger armies, economies, and stable governments will likely not be targets of peacekeeping. One assumption would be that states will most likely use their military or economic resources to solve internal disputes. On the contrary, these arguments imply that countries that are militarily weak and economically poor will be receivers of peacekeeping missions (Stojek & Tir, 2014, p. 355). Similar to this, Kathman & Melin (2016) argue that states experiencing an ongoing civil war are less likely to provide peacekeepers as they require the military capabilities for their domestic instability. These explanations might predict reasons as to why states are unwilling or unable to send peacekeepers. Yet, it is limited in explaining reasons as to why states are willing to contribute to peacekeeping missions despite being in a state of civil war or domestic instability.

The domestic pressure, public goods, regime type, and civil war theories are good starting points in analyzing reasons as to why states might contribute. However, these theories alone do not present adequate information explaining the bigger picture of state contributions to UNPKO. Therefore, the research is tackled multi-dimensionally by investigating varying motivations of states to contribute to UNPKO. The research adopts a framework that combines several dimensions known as the Bellamy and Williams (2013) framework, explained further in the next section.

Theory and hypotheses

Some authors would frame the focus on rationales for state contributions as too broad. However, this research uses a framework provided by Bellamy and Williams (2013) to specify the research focus. These consist of rationales and inhibitors. Rationales are factors explaining why states contribute, whereas inhibitors are factors why states do not contribute. This framework emphasizes five main rationales for states contributions to peacekeeping missions. These being: 1) Political; 2) Economic; 3) Security; 4) Institutional; and 5) Normative.

The first political rationales emphasize that states participate because it fulfils other political objectives, as increasing a countries voice in the UN or national prestige (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 18). Economic rationales refer to the fact that financial incentives such as reimbursements or compensation payments exemplify important explanations for providing peacekeepers (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 19). Security rationales discuss that states provide peacekeepers to promote broader national security rationales such as resolving regional conflicts, contribute to global peace or due to the level of perceived security threats (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 19). Institutional rationales posit that motives of civil-military relations explain participation in peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 20). Finally, normative rationales consider that states contribute due to normative reasons wishing to become good international citizens and supporting principles of the UN (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 20).

The inhibitors refer to the distinct reasons for not contributing to UNPKO. The political inhibitor posits that the domestic political environment plays a role in being hostile to contributions in UNPKO (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 420). Economic inhibitors relate to the fact the UN compensation does not reimburse the costs for deploying to UNPKO (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 421). Security inhibitors refer to the choices that states make by deciding to address security issues through alternative organizations or unilaterally (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 421). The institutional inhibitors concern the impact of negative experiences or scepticism on UNPKO has on participating (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 422). Lastly, the normative inhibitor addresses discomfort with the normative agenda of the UN, regarding the mandate, collective security system or the values UNPKO promote (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 422). The separation of the five rationales and inhibitors is illustrated in Table I.

	Rationale	Inhibitor
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National prestige - Voice in International Affairs/UN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Difficult domestic politics
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Financial rewards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Imposes additional costs
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Resolve regional conflicts - Contribute to global peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preference for non-UN solutions
Institutional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gain operational experience - Improve interoperability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military antipathy to the UN
Normative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support the UN system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discomfort with normative agenda

Table I. Rationales and inhibitors of providing peacekeepers (Derived from Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 423).

Recent studies that have adopted this framework note, the justification for focussing mainly on these five variables is that it is the most suitable model to be utilized on case studies (Fauzia, 2018; Hadley, 2018). It is not to discredit the findings of previous research addressing the phenomenon one-dimensionally by, for example, focusing on economic rationales. However, this research aims to understand the bigger picture of states motivations to UNPKO comprehensively and multi-dimensionally, which is not feasible in a one-dimensional fashion. The Bellamy and Williams model provides a useful framework in approaching a phenomenon multidimensionally and to answer the proposed research question.

This research analyzes the rationales of states by testing five preliminary hypotheses derived from the Bellamy and Williams framework: 1) *Political*; 2) *Economic*; 3) *Security*; 4) *Institutional*; and 5) *Normative*. Each individual hypothesis can be summarized as followed:

1. *Political: When participating in UNPKO is perceived to enhance its national image, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*
2. *Economic: When participating in UNPKO is financially beneficial, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*
3. *Security: When participating in UNPKO is perceived as beneficial to contain armed conflicts, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*
4. *Institutional: When participating in UNPKO is militarily beneficial, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*
5. *Normative: When participating in UNPKO is perceived to support the UN system, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*

The testing of each hypothesis is elaborated in the operationalization section. The similarities and differences between the two case studies are assessed through the relevant interests, actors, and institutions concerning UNPKO. In general, the research expects that both Ethiopia and Kenya have varying incentives for contributing to UNPKO as a result of national threats, interests and experiences with the UN.

III. Research Design

Research approach

This research investigates what effect the five independent variables (Political, Economic, Security, Institutional, Normative) have on the dependent variable of state contributions to UNPKO. Based on the literature collected, it is expected that a state's inhibitors for contributing to UNPKO most likely explain the differences in contributions to UNPKO.

The hypotheses are tested to analyze whether they have an impact on state contributions to UNPKO. For the research, the primary method is a qualitative comparative analysis between Ethiopia and Kenya, which is an original comparison. Previous studies that have applied this framework examine a single case study (Indonesia) by using a middle powers theory (Fauzia, 2018). The comparative design is a most similar systems design since the outcome of state contributions vary significantly. The two cases are identical in context as both participate in comparable UN and AU peacekeeping operations (PKO) in the Horn of Africa. Both cases lie in the same regional context and border each other as well, while still differing significantly in contributions.

Ethiopia and Kenya have contributed most of their personnel to the UN and AU PKO in Africa. The reason for choosing Ethiopia in the first place is that stood out as a TCC and sends significant numbers of peacekeepers compared to the bordering countries in the Horn of Africa (United Nations, 2020). The reason for comparing it to Kenya is that it sends relatively much fewer peacekeepers to UNPKO, which in itself is an interesting observation considering it borders Ethiopia. The focus of peacekeeping missions studied in this research lie within the geographic proximity of the Horn of Africa. These include, missions deployed in Sudan, South-Sudan and Somalia. A justification for this focus is because both states have contributed most of their personnel to these missions (United Nations, 2020). Moreover, Ethiopia and Kenya both refer to the security developments in Somalia and the Sudans as the two main cases discussed in the UNGA general debates.

Although there are similarities in the context of deploying UN peacekeepers, it is also essential to describe differences that exist that might impact decisions for sending troops in the first place. A difference that taken into consideration is the regime type and political system of both

countries. Derived from the Centre for Systemic Peace polity dataset, Ethiopia's polity has been autocratic and ruled by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) since 1991. In contrast, Kenya polity has been democratic ever since its independence in 1963 (CSP, 2017). This knowledge is helpful to explain how the political system and whether any constitutional changes over time affects the decisions to send troops to peacekeeping missions. Where available, the specific political and constitutional changes from 1990-2020 for both states are analyzed.

Operationalization of variables

The dependent variable states' contributions to UNPKO is operationalized by observing the patterns of participation for Ethiopia and Kenya from the UN contributions database. The independent variables will be operationalized by exploring causal relations and weighing Ethiopia and Kenya's rationales against the inhibitors for contributing to UNPKO. Multiple hypotheses mention the term 'perception' as this research aims to look at how Ethiopia and Kenya perceive their participation to UNPKO. The information primarily consists of official statements in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), official publications from relevant Ministries, and constitutions representing both states' positions regarding UNPKO. The official statements comprise of representatives in the UNGA to understand how Ethiopia or Kenya perceive their participation about UNPKO. For Ethiopia, the representative in the UNGA is typically the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whereas, for Kenya, it is the President or a representative of the President. The data from the speeches in UNGA concerns the political, security and normative rationales, as the hypotheses test the perceptions of states. The collected data for the economic and military rationales is explained below.

For the analysis, each hypothesis is tested separately. A condition for the support of a hypothesis must be that either state witnesses an overall increase in contributions to UNPKO. The analysis identifies the presence or absence of rationales and inhibitors explaining the varying contributions for Ethiopia and Kenya. In the discussion section, a table for each hypothesis summarizes the presence or absence of the rationales or inhibitors based on the analysis.

The first hypothesis *"When participating in UNPKO's is perceived to enhance its national image, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO"* is related to the political rationale of states. The hypothesis considers the foreign policy goals concerning contributions to peacekeeping for both countries. The foreign policy goals are related to the participation of UNPKO and rationales for enhancing its image as a state. This includes, to increase national prestige and have a larger voice in the UN. The presence of 'national prestige' is found whether in it is stated in the foreign policy documents that national prestige is an important aspect of its foreign policy. Whereas the other rationale 'voice in international affairs' is found whether either country is willing to increase its voice by participation in UN international forum. As Fauzia (2018) notes, achieving foreign policy goals by participating in the UN is by, for example, having a larger voice in the UN. One method to increase standing in the UN is by gaining recognition in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by obtaining a non-permanent seat or being a member of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNBPC). The hypothesis focusses how Ethiopia and Kenya promote its image towards the UN. For example, by referring to its accomplishments in peacekeeping, a longstanding contributor to peacekeeping or a TCC. On the other hand, if a state has faced the inhibitor 'difficult domestic politics' a country is more reluctant to provide peacekeepers. The political inhibitor is tied to certain political changes and increasing domestic pressure a country experiences (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 420). This information analyzes the political or constitutional changes that occur, that would impact the decisions for deploying peacekeepers and contributions to UNPKO. If there are no significant political inhibitors to participating in UNPKO and a state witnesses an increase in contributions, then this hypothesis is supported. This data consists of the speeches in the UNGA from 1990-2020, documented foreign policies, and constitutions.

The second hypothesis *"When participating in UNPKO is financially beneficial, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO"* considers the economic rationales of states. To operationalize the hypothesis, the research looks at the financial benefits of contributing to UNPKO at the national level. It examines the impacts of contributing to UNPKO on national budgets, by focussing on both countries' military expenditure. This variable is measured by looking at the type and frequency of UN compensation for participating in UNPKO over time. Also, it identifies the reimbursements each country earned as a percentage of military expenditure to analyze whether reimbursements increase military expenditure. The data is calculated by finding the number of UNPKO contributors in a given year multiplied by the rate

of UN reimbursements for that year. This sum is then the UN reimbursements received by contributing to UNPKO, divided by the military expenditure in the same given year. The presence of the rationale 'financial benefits' is found as either state receives financial rewards from the UN. For both countries, it assesses whether the benefits are increasing or declining based on the overall trend. Unfortunately, the inhibitor concerning the 'imposes additional costs' for contributing to UNPKO is not available. Due to data availability, it is not possible to comparing national costs of deploying peacekeepers with the financial benefits received through participation. In general, this hypothesis is supported when a state experiences an increase in military expenditure as a result of increasing contributions to UNPKO. The information on military expenditure is retrieved from the SIPRI database, whereas the UN database provides information on troop contributions and resolutions on reimbursement rates.

The third hypothesis is related to the security rationale *"When participating in UNPKO is perceived as beneficial to contain an armed conflict, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO"*. This variable concerns either state's goals in containing armed conflicts from spreading outside its origin. The definition of armed conflict utilized in this research is "a protracted armed confrontation occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups" (Amnesty International, 2020). This definition makes it possible to investigate multiple threats to national security concerning armed groups. This hypothesis concerns whether a state perceives participation to UNPKO as beneficial for its national security as a means to contain armed conflict from neighbouring countries (Beardsley, 2011). For example, the increasing contributions to UNPKO can be to prevent regional specific armed conflicts and terrorist threats from spilling over and undermining a states' security. The presence of this rationale 'resolve regional conflicts' relates to the willingness of countries to resolve conflicts located in a specific region. Especially in the Horn of Africa, it is in the interest of countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya to resolve conflicts in neighbouring countries. The presence of the rationale 'contribute to global peace', has to do with being committed to promoting global peace. On the other hand, the security inhibitors for contributing to UNPKO would be that countries will prefer alternatives by taking action unilaterally or contributing to other missions. The presence of the inhibitor 'preference for non-UN solutions' implies that states prefer to contribute to other PKOs at the expense of UNPKO, meaning a decline of UNPKO contributions relative to other PKOs (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 421; Fauzia, 2018, p. 24). In this case study comparison, it concerns the preference of AU PKO compared to UNPKO in the region. Therefore, when a state aims to contain an armed

conflict from spreading further by increasing contributions to UNPKO, the hypothesis is supported. This information is retrieved by analyzing the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) by Ethiopia and Kenya's Defence White paper. Also, the analysis of speeches in the UNGA considers how Ethiopia and Kenya position themselves towards global peace and resolving regional conflicts in Somalia and Sudan. The data gathered indicates how either country perceives the presence of armed conflicts and instability as a threat to its national security.

The fourth hypothesis institutional rationales state *"When participating in UNPKO is militarily beneficial, it will lead an increase in state contributions to UNPKO"*. This hypothesis is tied to Velázquez (2010) conceptualization of civil-military relations (Velázquez, 2010, p. 173). The central assumption is that the benefits for military institutions are understood as the advantages the military gains when participating in UNPKO. The presence of the rationales includes 'gaining operational experience' and 'improving interoperability'. One manner of understanding the significance of UNPKO for the military is by setting up training centres for UNPKO. The presence of the inhibitor 'military antipathy' is based on the negative experiences with the UN during a UNPKO resulting in a reduction in contributions. This inhibitor relates to the decisions within the UN command and control mechanisms of UNPKO, leading to further resistance to participate. The hypothesis is supported if the military benefits or rationales are present, and there are no significant inhibitors that prevent countries from participating further to UNPKO. However, a condition is that a state witnesses an increase in overall contributions to UNPKO. This data is retrieved by analyzing the foreign policies of both countries on the importance of military benefits for contribution to UNPKO. The data also analyzes secondary data sources concerning the importance of participation in UNPKO for the military and training centres for Ethiopia and Kenya.

The fifth hypothesis *"When participating in UNPKO is perceived to support the UN system, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO"* relates to the normative rationales of states. It considers the willingness of countries to support the UN by for example, supporting UN's multilateralism and collective security. The presence of the rationale 'support of the UN' finds evidence of support towards the UN's multilateralism and the role of women as a result of participating in UNPKO. The inhibitor, 'discomfort with the normative agenda' is found if there has been any evidence concerning the discomfort of the UN's expanding peacekeeping agenda. The discomfort includes concerns over the lack of an effective mandate, discontent

with UN's collective security system or other peacekeeping elements that states find controversial (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p. 442). This normative hypothesis is operationalized by looking at how both Ethiopia and Kenya position themselves to be in support of the UN. It also presents a practical example of how either state is willing to support the UN system, namely, by increasing the representation of women in UNPKO. This hypothesis is supported when either state has no significant objections (inhibitors) to support the UN system over time. However, a condition for the support of the hypothesis is that it must witness an increase in support of women in peacekeeping and overall UNPKO contributions. This information utilizes both countries' constitutions and official foreign policy documents with references to the importance of multilateralism, the UN as an organization, and the role of women in peacekeeping. Besides, speeches of official representatives in UNGA are analyzed as it illustrates the perceptions of countries in normatively supporting the UN.

IV. Data Collection

The analysis starts by providing an overview of both countries, referring to the specific contributions to UNPKO, which actors are involved, and the decision-making process for UNPKO. The reasons for contributing are analyzed by the five rationales in the analysis and are found primarily by the publicly available information, including press releases, speeches and official government statements. The study utilizes a qualitative approach as it is the most suitable research design as the data collected and analyzed is secondary literature. Secondary sources include think-tank research, academic journals and media reports. The secondary sources provide valuable insights for the background information of case studies and participation in UNPKO for Ethiopia and Kenya. The research also examines Governmental documents, including national security, Foreign Policy documents and the constitutions of both countries referring to peacekeeping where available. On the international level, speeches, and official statements of Ethiopia and Kenya used for analyzing the perceptions and found on the UN's official website. This information is published on the UNGA database, also known as the Dag Hammarskjöld Library. However, the research also uses statistics to illustrate uniform personnel contributions per country from 1990-now and the UN reimbursement rates retrieved from the UN database, as seen in Figure I. This research also uses data from the SIPRI database to collect information about the military expenditure per country. Lastly, the World Bank and the Military Balance sources identify useful statistics such as relative population and army sizes.

This study uses the method of qualitative content analysis. It is an approach of empirical and methodological value, as the controlled analysis of texts allows researchers to understand the broader phenomena of topics such as peacekeeping (Mayring, 2000). The speeches analyzed in the UNGA are separated in three sections, political, security, and normative (see Appendix C). The three sections are separated based on the information available related to the rationales and inhibitors. The political is based on the promotion of a countries image and prestige. This is found by referring to the accomplishments of UN peacekeeping, emphasizing the role of the UNSC and UNBPC, and any other references to the domestic political developments in either country. The security section is related to the contribution of global peace, references to the resolution of conflicts and regional security threats, and the importance of regional organizations. The normative section is traced in the speeches by considering how either country supports the UN system. This section focusses on the commitment to multilateralism,

references to women in peacekeeping, and the UN as an organization. The research utilizes a within-case study that attempts to find causal relations of the independent variables (Political, Economic, Security, Institutional, Normative) and the impacts the motivations have on the dependent variable (Contributions) to UNPKO over time. It adopts a deductive approach in data analysis as the research starts with a pre-existing theory and framework presented by Bellamy and Williams (2013), and tests it in a new context, namely, Ethiopia and Kenya.

Assessment of limitations

The limitations of this research in terms of validity would be that not all information about the true intentions or motivations of states and leaders is publicly available. In both states, it is not always known what happens in the back-door decision-making regarding whether or not to contribute peacekeepers to missions. This research will deal with this by applying data triangulation to raise the validity of the relevant and accessible sources. The focus is on official speeches in the UN and statements published by state leaders, but also from official governmental publications available online. The triangulation of sources will enable the consistent examination of different official documents throughout varying periods within the same method of data analysis (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014, p. 5748). In terms of reliability, some might say that this method of qualitative content analysis might lead to subjective biases and overgeneralization. However, this limitation is tackled by analyzing the information and drawing general conclusions as objective as possible. Most information comes from official sources such as reports from governments, organizations, ministries, and direct quotes or statements from representatives of the state. Although we cannot be a hundred per-cent certain about the true intentions of these sources, it is a fair representation and most reliable means to understand Ethiopia and Kenya's motivations for contributing to peacekeeping. Unfortunately, state motivations for UNPKO outside the Horn of Africa have been challenging to research due to a lack of available data. This research could not overcome this hurdle due to a lack of data availability, leading to the focus on the Horn of Africa.

V. Analysis

This part presents both Ethiopia's and Kenya's participation in UNPKO, by primarily focusing on an overview of both countries first. After that, it provides background information on the specific UNPKO both countries have contributed to. The last sub-section highlights the decision-making procedure of both contributing states. After the presentation of case studies, the research continues by analyzing the five hypotheses (national image, financial benefits, containing armed conflict, military benefits, and UN support). The analysis finds the rationales and inhibitors of participating in UNPKO where relevant. The final section of this chapter consists of the discussion, which evaluates and summarizes the findings.

Overview of Ethiopia

After decades of ruling, the EPRDF overthrew the Marxist military Derg Regime in 1991. Three years later, a new constitution was adopted in 1994 which restructured Ethiopia on ethnic lines. This new system of ethnic federalism divided the country into nine separate federal states based on ethnicity, which is still intact today (Pusch, 2019). The system is still intact because since 1991, the EPRDF's coalition has continued its dominance and maintained political control over Ethiopia (Veen, 2016). This changed at the end of 2019 as the Prosperity Party succeeded the EPDRF. The current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed established the pan-Ethiopian Prosperity Party. Whether this has any effects on any significant political changes in the countries is still to be seen (Gedamu, 2019).

Historically, Ethiopia was found in the region to be a state distinguishable for its experiences with civil wars and instability within the Horn of Africa. The geographical proximity and bordering of six states mean that Ethiopia is common to the experiences with armed conflicts as in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan (Sigatu, 2018, p. 213). The threats by armed conflicts such as terrorism have been handled well by Ethiopia's effective counter-terrorism strategies. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia stands out as being very efficient in the fight against terrorism and is yet to have faced an attack by an internationally recognized terrorist group (Maru, 2015; Kessels et al., 2016). However, Ethiopia has experienced the border war with Eritrea between 1998-2000, which cost the lives of more than 80,000 people in the space of two years. Although the war ended with the signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement in December 2000, the two states relations still tense and peace has remained elusive (Araia, 2018). However, after decades

of tension in 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for restarting peace negotiations with the President of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki. These developments signified the aspirations for contributing to peace and stability in the region (Gridneff, 2019). This information is relevant for this study as the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the late 1990s explains the minimal involvement of its armed forces outside the conflict with Eritrea.

Ethiopia's participation in UNPKO

The aspiration of Ethiopia to contribute to peace and stability in the region is proven by the most recent data on contributions to peacekeeping. According to the UN, Ethiopia ranked as the top TCC to UNPKO from 2016 till now (United Nations, 2020). Besides, since 2012 Ethiopia has also been one of the four largest TCCs in the world. However, the contributions by Ethiopia have not been at such high rates. Historically, one of the main reasons for the participation of Ethiopia to UNPKO in the first place was the failure of the League of Nations in 1936 in defending Ethiopia from Italian aggression. The Ethiopian government was motivated to contribute to the UN's collective security due to the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations in defending these core principles of collective security. Ethiopia did not want the same failures to occur to other states under the UN (Sigatu, 2018, p. 212; Haile, 2006, p. 35).

As a result, the first international contributions took place during the Korean war in 1951-54 where approximately 3000 soldiers of the Imperial Guard of Ethiopia were sent to fight with UN forces (Sigatu, 2018, pp. 204-205). After that, the second contribution and first UN blue helmets operation were in a UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964. Although this illustrates Ethiopia's early contributions to UNPKO, Ethiopia did not participate in any UNPKO until the end of the Cold War. An explanation for the lack of contributions has to do with the military Derg government ruling from 1974, until its fall in 1991 (Sigatu, 2018, p. 206).

Ethiopia contributed to the mission (UNAMIR) in Rwanda in 1994, which was the first response by the new government to a UNPKO following the genocide. In Ethiopia, the deployments during the 1990s consisted of approximately 800 personnel towards the UN mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). Since then, Ethiopia is actively involved in multiple UNPKO, which primarily lie in the Horn of Africa (Sigatu, 2018, p. 205). Since the 1990s, Ethiopia has

contributed significant numbers for UNPKO in Burundi (ONUB) and Liberia (UNMIL) in the early 2000s. Later, the most substantial contributions have been towards Abyei (UNISFA), the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The most substantial contributions from Ethiopia are for these three UNPKO in the Sudans, which is still ongoing. Smaller contributions have also taken place in Haiti and Mali (Dersso, 2017, p.1). Appendix A provides a comprehensive look into the number of contributions for Ethiopia since 1990 per year. Considering the number of contributions from Ethiopia, the timing of implementing UNPKO in the Horn of Africa also plays a role in understanding the overall increase in contributions. The authorization of UNPKO in the Sudans from 2008 onwards have resulted in the significant increase in Ethiopian contributions to UNPKO as seen in Appendix A. The analysis attempts to uncover reasons for the motivations of contributing such considerable numbers to the UNPKO in the Horn of Africa.

Besides the UN, Ethiopia's significant contributions have been the unilateral deployments in Somalia (2006 and 2011) supporting the Somali government and the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2014. Ethiopia became the third largest TCC to this mission after Uganda and Burundi, deploying 4,400 uniformed personnel. However, Ethiopia's peacekeeping contributions have mainly been to UNPKO since the 1990s (Dersso, 2017, p. 2). In terms of composition, Ethiopian contributions to peacekeeping mainly consist of military contributions, with military experts and police contributions being relatively small (Dersso, 2017, p. 2). Figure IV below provides detailed information on current Ethiopian personnel involved in UN peacekeeping operations as of February 2020. The chart illustrates the current top 3 UNPKO contributions for Ethiopia, all situated in Sudan or South Sudan, combining a total of 6648 out of 6650 personnel contributions.




Figure IV: Illustrating the top 3 UNPKO contributions for Ethiopia as of February 2020 (United Nations, 2020).

While the Ethiopian deployment to UNAMID has been the most sustained contribution, Ethiopia set an impressive record for supplying over 4,400 personnel to UNISFA, which is nearly the entire military component of the mission. Besides, this contribution has been notable considering the timing of deployment because the rapid Ethiopian deployment took place within one month of adopting UNSC resolution 1990 in June 2011 (Dersso, 2017, p. 1).

Decision-making procedure for UNPKO in Ethiopia

There is no straightforward decision-making procedure and lack of a specific policy for Ethiopia concerning peacekeeping operations. Moreover, there is no specific constitutional provision under the 1994 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution that governs how national decisions are made pertaining to PKO deployments. However, under Article 74(1) of the constitution specifies that the “The Prime Minister is the Chief Executive, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the Commander-in-Chief of the national armed forces” (WIPO, 1994). Also, Article 74(6) states that the Prime Minister “exercises overall supervision over the implementation of the country’s foreign policy” (WIPO, 1994). The constitution holds that the decisions of the national armed forces lie with the Prime Minister. However, as noticed in the assessment of UNGA speeches, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

represents the country internationally. The Minister of Foreign affairs leads the discussions with the UN about the terms and conditions for Ethiopian contributions to UNPKO (Dersso, 2017, p. 3).

Compared to many states, the Parliament does not have an active role regarding decisions for UNPKO. However, the decisions for deploying for combat operations based on a declaration of war are discussed in Parliament. An example being the deployment of troops of the Somali war in 2006, debated in Parliament. The Prime Minister decides on final deployments with the consultation of the Ministry of Defence and Ethiopian National Defence Forces (Dersso, 2017, p.3). All in all, Ethiopia's participation in peacekeeping is not as clear-cut as many states that participate in peacekeeping due to a lack of transparent decision-making and strategy. However, this is a valuable finding as it demonstrates the limited political scrutiny or approval for the deployment of peacekeepers by Parliament. This observation is necessary as it serves as a potential explanation for the significant numbers of peacekeepers contribution compared to the neighbouring countries in the Horn of Africa, such as Kenya.

Overview of Kenya

Ever since its independence from Britain in 1963, Kenya was a one-party state until 1991 named the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). KANU agreed to introduce a multi-party system and retained its position until 2002 under President Arap Moi. Following the step down of President Moi under domestic pressure, the democratic elections reflected an essential shift in Kenya's democratic trajectory. The ethnical opposition parties formed the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), and Mwai Kibaki was elected President in December 2002 (IBP, 2007). Following the general elections of 2007, Mwai Kibaki was seeking re-election for a second term. Immediately after the announcement of the re-election of Kibaki in December 2007, Kenya suffered the worst civil unrest since independence (Tsuda, 2013). This post-election violence was a political crisis associated with the discontent and suspicions surrounding rigged elections by supporters of the opposition leader Raila Odinga (Tsuda, 2013, p. 3). The violence led to the deaths of more than 1,500 individuals and displacing hundreds of thousands from their home. Fortunately, with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the forefront of mediation efforts, a power-sharing deal was agreed, and a new cabinet formed on February 28, 2008 (BBC, 2008). Following this hopeful development, a referendum in 2010 approved the new constitution transforming the way political power was managed and distributed. These

changes included, among others the parliamentary oversight of presidential decisions, limits on the number of cabinet posts, and a senate reviewing parliament decisions (Greste, 2010). Other relevant political changes that occurred over the years was the subsequent election of President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2013, also re-elected for a second term in 2017 (Tamura, 2017).

Over the years, Kenya has been affected by threats specifically related to national security. Kenya faced violent political elections in 2008 and other internal security threats such as the rise of terrorism and escalation of armed cattle raids in the North of Kenya (Ahere, 2017, p. 3). The country has been struck by terrorism since the 1990s. In 1998, Kenya experienced its first major terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda when US citizens were targeted, and the US embassy was bombed, killing and injuring hundreds. In 2002, a hotel in Mombasa was bombed by suicide bombers where numerous Israeli tourists were staying. The next major terrorist attack occurred in 2013 at the Westgate mall in Nairobi. The most recent attack was the Al-Shabaab massacre at Garissa University College in 2015, where over 100 people lost their lives (Momanyi, 2015, p. 3). The terrorist threats have several impacts on the country, particularly on the public. Terrorism has aimed to cause fear and concern for the safety of Kenyans. As a result, the Kenyan government is finding ways to regain public confidence as an attempt to recover from the horrific attacks (Momanyi, 2015, p. 32).

Kenya's participation in UNPKO

Kenya has been a supporter of UNPKO efforts by being receptive to requests to PKO based on the consent of parties in host states (Ahere, 2017, p. 1). In the post-Cold War environment, the Kenyan Armed Forces (KAF) began to shift its focus to PKO. Like Ethiopia, Kenya seems to have contributed a vast majority of its peacekeepers to specific missions during the 1990s. Kenya sent out a large majority of its peacekeepers consisting of approximately 1000 personnel to the UNPROFOR mission from 1992-1995. This participation outside of the continent signified the development in the role of KAF in contributing to international peace and security (Chau, 2010, p. 43). Ever since the end of the Cold War, Kenya was one of the main contributors to UNPKO. In fact, until the mid-2000s, Kenya ranked in the top ten TCC for UNPKO by providing an average of 2000 personnel annually (Amar, 2013).

Kenyan contributions to UNPKO have primarily consisted of troop contingents to missions. The first contributions to the UN were military observers in the Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) from 1988-1990. Other primary UN missions being the UN protection force in Croatia (UNPROFOR), UN transition Assistant Group (UNTAG), the two mission in Liberia (UNOMIL and UNMIL), the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB), United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), UNAMID, and UNMISS. Despite contributing to multiple UNPKO over time, Appendix B indicates that many missions have consisted of a small number of contributions from Kenya. The numbers also show that Kenya has witnessed an overall decline in contributions to UNPKO since 2005 (Ahere, 2017, p.2). Important to consider is the timing of UNPKO due to the completion of the objectives or mandate. The timing plays a part in understanding the trends in contributions for both Kenya and Ethiopia. For example, the ONUB completed its mandate in December 2006, leading to a drawdown in military and civilian components (UN, 2006). Although the timing plays a role in understanding contributions per country, the timing alone does not provide an adequate explanation for overall decreasing contributions for Kenya. Especially since the establishment of UNPKO missions in the Horn of Africa, the research analyzes why Kenya has witnessed an overall decrease in UNPKO contributions.

The most recent data on UNPKO contributions in February 2020 is provided by the UN as illustrated in Figure V. Kenya contributed a total of 156 personnel in 2020, which is a stark contrast to the high contributions during the 1990s and early 2000s. Besides contributions to UN missions, the most significant Kenyan deployments have been in the neighbouring country Somalia. The first unilateral deployment into Somalia occurred in October 2011, where Kenya launched a military offensive called 'Operational Linda Nchi' meaning 'Operation Protect the Nation'. Led by the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF), the rationale for the operation was aimed to push back Al-Shabaab from Southern Somalia and weaken their presence (Momanyi, 2015, p. 11). The KDF troops deployed for the initial unilateral intervention into Somalia where eventually re-hatted for the AMISOM after the adoption of UNSC resolution 2036 in 2012. In total, there are currently approximately 4,400 personnel deployed to AMISOM (Ahere, 2017, p. 2).




Figure V: Illustrating the top 3 UNPKO contributions for Kenya as of February 2020 (United Nations, 2020).

Decision-making procedure for UNPKO in Kenya

The conduct of Kenya’s foreign policy has traditionally always been the prerogative of the President. According to the Armed Forces Act in 1980, Kenya’s President is the commander in chief of the KAF, who is ultimately responsible for troop deployments (Mwangi, 2016, p. 252). The decision-making procedure for Kenya changed since the adoption of the new constitution in 2010. The new constitution established that the primary decisions for regional or international PKOs lie in the hands of the National Security Council (NSC). More specifically, Article 240 of the constitution mentions “The Council may, with the approval of Parliament— (a) deploy national forces outside Kenya for (i) regional or international peace support operations; or (ii) other support operations” (WIPO, 2010, p. 146). The crucial decision-maker concerning the deployment of troops remains the President of the Republic of Kenya. The President also is the Commander in Chief of the KDF and decides based on advice provided by the NSC. However, the decisions regarding personnel deployments are only permitted with the approval of the National Assembly (Ahere, 2017, p. 2). Section 18 (c) of the Kenya Defence Act outlines the functions the KDF under Article 240 of the constitution “Deploy Defence Forces outside Kenya, with the approval of Parliament, for (i) regional or international peace support operations; or (ii) other support operations” (The Kenya Defence Forces Act, 2012, p. 39).

In general, the decision-making procedure for peacekeeping in Kenya is more clear-cut since the adoption of new constitution in 2010. This significant political reform highlighted that decisions concerning KDF deployments must require the approval of the parliament. These political developments since 2010 have resulted in increased parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny, which has meant that national decisions are weighed against prevalent costs and inherent security challenges (Ahere, 2017, p. 6).

Rationales for peacekeeping

The previous subchapter of the analysis provided a brief overview of the developments in Ethiopia and Kenya, including the UNPKO participation since the 1990s and decision-making process regarding the deployment procedure to UNPKO. This subchapter considers specifically the analysis of the rationales and inhibitors for both Ethiopia and Kenya. To avoid repetition, the conclusions drawn between comparing the two countries is presented in the discussion section. By starting with the political rationales, the research focusses on enhancing its national image, namely, increasing their national prestige and having a voice in international affairs.

Political rationales

Ethiopia

When discussing the political rationales of Ethiopia, the most recent foreign policy goals are mentioned in the Foreign Affairs and National Security strategy published in 2002. The strategy mentions that national security policies “need to be essentially based on, and cause the promotion of, development and democracy” (FDRE, 2002, p. 7). The promotion of the two core policies is intertwined with the peace and security of its neighbouring countries (FDRE, 2002, p. 8). Indeed, the promotion of regional peace and security is a political motivation for Ethiopia to contribute to peacekeeping. One of the secondary principles in the foreign policy mentions that by participating in peacekeeping, it enhances its regional and international influence (FDRE, 2002; Dersso, 2017, p. 3). Also, the FANSPS emphasizes the importance of national pride and prestige as a basis for Ethiopia’s foreign policy (FDRE, 2002, p. 9). Internationally, Ethiopia perceives that the participation within UN frameworks is tied to its national interest as “We have no more realistic option than a commitment to enlightened national interest” (UNGA, 2014, p. 34). Ever since the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991 and the establishment of the FDRE in 1994, the domestic and international expectations have increased regarding Ethiopia’s leading role as a member of the international community (Haile, 2006, p. 75). Considering the domestic expectations first, late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was a key champion regarding Ethiopian participation in peacekeeping operations. As the critical foreign policy architect, Meles Zenawi confirmed this in 2004 “In view of the firm

support of the Ethiopian people and government to African peace, I would like to assure our readiness to become involved in the peacekeeping mission in an intensified manner” (Haile, 2006, p. 59).

On the international domain, Ethiopia has increased its national prestige and developed its image of a peace promoting state by becoming a member of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and as a non-permanent member in the UNSC. Considering the UNPBC first, Ethiopia increases its voice internationally by becoming a member of the UNPBC. By being a member of the UNPBC, Ethiopia raises its voice for discussing, coordinating and providing advice on peacebuilding frameworks within the UN (UN, 2006). Established in 2005, one of the conditions to become a part of this commission is to sit at the top-five position in UNPKO TCCs, which Ethiopia has fulfilled since 2010. Being a part of the UNPBC is a political advantage as Ethiopia automatically becomes a member. Ethiopia can, therefore, contribute to the maintenance of peace by participating in UNPKO decisions and becoming more involved in peacebuilding (Fauzia, 2018, p. 52).

Another notable achievement in Ethiopia to increase its standing as a member of the international community is by becoming a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2016. The UNGA elected Ethiopia to serve two-year non-permanent member terms starting on 1 January 2017 until 2018. Quite significantly, even though a requirement of two-third majority support is needed, Ethiopia was elected in one round of voting gathering the support of 185 member states of the 193 members assembly (Mesle, 2016). Being a non-permanent member of the UNSC is a significant breakthrough in the international standing of a country. It allows Ethiopia to participate in the discussions and agenda of the UNSC meetings. After being absent for 26 years, Ethiopia campaigned for a seat to ensure peace and stability in the region (Solomon, 2016). The fact that Ethiopia had become a TCC for UNPKO since 2011 onwards has been a useful tool in showing other UN member states Ethiopia’s commitment to peacekeeping. It is a tool to campaign for a non-permanent seat as the Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn addressed to the UNGA “It is on the basis of that conviction that Ethiopia has been an active contributor to advancing the principles and purposes of the United Nations, including by deploying its forces as part of the Blue Helmets since the Organization’s early days. It gives us great satisfaction to note that Ethiopia is now the second-largest contributor of troops to United Nations peacekeeping” (UNGA, 2015, p. 56).

The emphasis on being an active contributor has been a useful tool in promoting Ethiopia's image as a top TCC as one of the main tools to campaign for a seat as a non-permanent member in the UNSC. One of the main benefits of sitting in the UNSC for peacekeeping is that it participates in the decision-making structure of UNPKO. The active involvement means that Ethiopia can take part in discussing the composition of the future of UNPKO, by voting for these decisions and other matters in the Council (Fauzia, 2018, p. 51). During the campaign for a seat in 2015, the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs Tedros Adhanom stated that Ethiopia's desire to become a member of the Security Council is a "strong and real belief that our solid record of continued contribution to the maintenance of international peace and stability puts in a well-placed position to shoulder the responsibility. Ethiopia has always responded to UN calls for collective action on international peace and security" (Sigatu, 2018, pp. 215-216). Not only does Ethiopia shoulder the responsibility as an individual country, but Ethiopia raises its voice also to address the importance of increasing African representation in the UN.

Concerning the domestic politics of Ethiopia, there have been not many changes in Ethiopia's constitution or other political developments. The 'difficult domestic politics' inhibitor is absent in the case of Ethiopia, as there have not been any changes in the decision-making procedure, which would impact decisions for contributing to UNPKO. The key decision-makers since the establishment of the FDRE have not faced further domestic scrutiny or parliamentary oversight on the decisions to contribute to UNPKO since the 1990s. Following the unexpected death of Meles Zenawi in 2012, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn took the position and shares the same disposition as Zenawi about Ethiopian support in peacekeeping missions. Following this transition, the provision of peacekeepers has remained the exclusive preserve of the Prime Minister, the same goes for the current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Besides, Ethiopia has not witnessed any key domestic public opponents that are against the further contributions and involvement to UNPKO over time (Dersso, 2017, p. 6). These findings indicate that there have not been any major political transitions from the heads of state that have changed their perceptions on the importance of peacekeeping.

Kenya

Kenya has been instrumental in the implementation of peace agreements and the facilitation of numerous peace processes in Africa. Kenya has been actively involved in multiple peace processes, including those in, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. Especially in the latter two

cases, the deployment of peacekeepers has enhanced Kenya's image as an international stabilizer and image by being involved in international diplomatic circles and peacekeeping (Ahere, 2017, p. 3). The participation in peacekeeping is in line with one of Kenya's main foreign policy objectives to "project Kenya's image and prestige" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, p. 19). Kenya recognizes that the participation in the UN and "enhanced multilateral engagement as fundamental components of its foreign policy and entry points for achieving its national interests" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, p. 29). One manner in which Kenya can promote its image and prestige to the UN is by being a member of the UNPBC. Rather than obtaining membership through being a TCC, Kenya has been elected by the UNGA to be a part of the UNBPC. Kenya was elected by the UNGA to chair the UNPBC in 2016, placing Kenya in the frontline in advising the UNSC. By being elected as a chair, it further enhances Kenya's international reputation as a champion for peace in Africa (UN, 2015). In 2016, the Vice-President William Ruto addressed that "Kenya, as the current Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, has been at the forefront of advocating for a new peacebuilding architecture for sustainable peace throughout the world" (UNGA, 2016, p. 32).

Besides the UNPBC, Kenya is currently undergoing a campaign to acquire a non-permanent seat in the UNSC for the period 2021-22. After winning the vote and support during AU's Permanent Representatives Committee (AUPRC), the Ministry of Foreign affairs said: "Given Kenya's Foreign Policy which is strongly afro-centric, the elections to the UNSC will give the country the opportunity to build consensus across regional and global matters that affect Africa," (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). It stands out that Kenya has referred to the commitments of UN peacekeeping in recent years while seeking for a seat in the UNSC. President Uhuru Kenyatta stressed in 2019 to the UNGA "We hope that our experience, competencies and unrelenting quest for peace and prosperity in our neighbourhood, on our continent and in the wider world will persuade the entire United Nations membership to support the African Union's candidate for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council during the elections scheduled for June 2020" (UNGA, 2019, p.11). The recent references to Kenya's contributions to peacekeeping projected its image strategically to persuade other UN member states to vote for Kenya in the UNSC.

The participation and support provided by Kenya overtime still indicate that Kenya is a staunch ally of the UN. The past three presidents of the Republic of Kenya have maintained to be a respected contributor to UNPKO (Ahere, 2017, p.6). However, the domestic political

developments provide practical explanations for the overall decline in UNPKO contributions. One political development that has significantly impacted the decisions for the deployment of peacekeepers to UNPKO is the presence of the inhibitor ‘difficult domestic politics’. As mentioned in the presentation of case studies subchapter, the political crisis in 2008 resulted in the adoption of new constitutional changes in 2010. Specifically, Article 240 of the new constitution states that the decisions to deploy peacekeepers require the approval of the Parliament (WIPO, 2010). In the UNGA, President Uhuru Kenyatta referred to the adoption of the new constitution “Drawing on that, we have re-engineered our system of governance, making it more democratic, inclusive, devolved and responsive. We have also significantly expanded participation in political and development decision-making” (UNGA, 2014, p. 23). The constitutional changes in expanding political participation in decision-making have impacted the ability to contribute to UNPKO. Due to increasing parliamentary oversight, the deployment and withdrawal of peacekeepers require the approval of the Kenyan people. In this national political system with the advancement of opinion polling as well, many politicians and members of parliament can measure the current mood of the public and often discuss the deployment troops to peacekeeping concerning the rising insecurity at home (Ahere, 2017, p. 6).

Economic rationales

In order to test the economic rationale of states, it is important to measure the possible reasons why financial incentives lead to further contributions to UNPKO. This hypothesis pays attention to the reimbursement system that states receive when contributing to UNPKO, in the form of payments per peacekeeper and the impact it has on the military expenditure of Ethiopia and Kenya. The study expects that either country receives financial benefits from the UN as a result of contributions, but whether this has positively contributed to increasing military expenditure differs per country. Important to note is that the compensation rates per peacekeeper has changed over time. The rates have not changed considerably, as in the period 1990-2002 for each peacekeeper per month, 1000 USD was received. From 2002 till 2014, the rate was 1028 USD per peacekeeper per month. Whereas in 2014 till 2016 the rate was 1332 USD per month. After that, in 2016, the rate changed to 1365 per peacekeeper per month, and the most recent rate stands at 1410 USD per peacekeeper per month established in 2017 (UNP, 2020).

Ethiopia

After the fall of the military Derg regime, the military expenditure decreased drastically after the establishment of the FDRE in 1994. However, running from 1999 till 2000, the military expenditure increased significantly. This peak has to do with the preparations for the Ethiopian-Eritrean war running during this period (SIPRI, 2003, p. 46). After the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, military expenditure increased steadily until 2018. This trend is illustrated in Figure VI and shows that the military expenditure over the years has varied.




Figure VI: Graph of military expenditure for Ethiopia (SIPRI, 2020).

One of the rationales for a TCC to contribute to UNPKO in the first place is because of compensation. The more uniform personnel a country provides to the UN, the more a country receives as compensation for contributing to UNPKO. The impact of the reimbursement system of the UN on the military expenditure is shown in Figure VII. The figure illustrates the significance of the money coming in from the UN as a result of contributing to UNPKO. Figure VII indicates that, especially after 2002, the UN reimbursement system contributes to some extent positively to the military expenditure. As contributions have increased over time, so has Ethiopia's compensation received by the UN. Even though UN reimbursements as a percentage of peacekeepers do not surpass 2,5 per cent, it does confirm that increasing contributions over time do positively contribute to the military expenditure of Ethiopia.




Figure VII: Illustrating UN reimbursements as a percentage of military expenditure for Ethiopia (United Nations, 2020; SIPRI, 2020).

On the national level, this pecuniary gain for the country's national budget serves as one of the explanations for Ethiopia's greater willingness to contribute to UN missions, rather than AU missions (Dersso, 2017, p. 4). In particular, Ethiopia deploys peacekeepers primarily in the Horn of Africa region to further national economic interests (ICG, 2010, p. 12; Dersso, 2017, p. 4). Another important rationale for the deployment of peacekeepers to UNPKO on the national level is that it brings opportunities to receive support from donor countries. The single largest financial supporter for PKOs in Africa besides the UN is the United States. The US provides voluntary support to TCCs and regional organizations with training assistance, logistical and communications support, and other military-related support (Williams, 2015, pp. 16-18). This assistance received because of participating in peacekeeping helps supplement Ethiopia's national budget in addition to the compensation payments received from the UN.

Kenya

For Kenya, the overall military expenditure has been increasing significantly since 1990. As Figure VIII demonstrates during the 1990s, Kenya's military expenditure was around 200 million USD for the period the country was a top ten TCC to UNPKO. This is quite a contrast compared to reaching more than 1000 million USD in 2018. The stable growth in military expenditure particularly has to do with the guiding principle of founding president Jomo Kenyatta. This principle holds that Kenya should maintain only modest and professional armed forces that guarantee the security of the country and people from external aggression. This philosophy and modest budget were upheld over the years, including former President Daniel Arap Moi until 2002 (SIPRI, 2003, p. 63-64). According to Nan Tian, an arms researcher at SIPRI, the rapid expenditure increase over the years is related to Kenya's improvement in its capabilities against terrorism, and the regional security issues in Somalia and South Sudan (Tubei, 2017).




Figure VIII: Graph of military expenditure for Kenya (SIPRI, 2020).

Figure IX shows that by contributing to the UN peacekeeping missions, Kenya’s military budgets have been supplemented by the UN. The reimbursements received by the UN enables the KDF to build, equip and train its forces with the financial support (Ahere, 2017, p.3). However, as seen in the data, the UN reimbursements since 2005-onwards have contributed minimally to the military expenditure. By not exceeding 1 per cent of the military expenditure, the trend for Kenya shows that the decline in UN reimbursements as a percentage of military expenditure correlates to the overall decline in contributions to UNPKO. Even though military expenditure has increased drastically over time, the data indicates that the economic impacts of UN reimbursements do not necessarily explain the increase in military expenditure. Other explanations for the rise include Kenya receiving funding from major donors for participating in the UN and regional organizations, as explained in the case of Ethiopia. Kenya receives funding as it is recognized as an oasis of stability in East Africa. Besides, it is regarded as a key strategic ally in the global ‘War on Terror’, leading to significant funding from the US. Kenya is one of the top five recipients of US State Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance funding, which is needed to reinforce border security (Mabera, 2016, p. 367).




Figure IX: Illustrating UN reimbursements as a percentage of military expenditure for Kenya (SIPRI, 2020; United Nations, 2020).

Security rationales

In terms of participation in peacekeeping, security considerations are one of the most pressing reasons for deploying uniform personnel to PKO. However, the issues of national security and the level of perceived threats to national security vary per country. Each country is hit differently by conflicts with neighbours, internal issues, or emerging threats from non-state actors. Explicitly related to Ethiopia and Kenya, the main PKO both states have contributed to lie in the regional proximity of the Horn of Africa. These mainly include the contributions to UNAMID, UNMISS, UNISFA, and AMISOM missions both located in the Sudans and Somalia respectively. The motivations for contributing to these missions within this region is tied to a state's current national security developments and how a state perceives to tackle the threats by armed conflicts in the neighbouring countries.

Ethiopia

The security rationales play a significant role in the deployment of Ethiopia's peacekeepers. Ethiopia's foreign policy is premised on the fact that "Security policy is a matter of ensuring national survival. Foreign affairs and security policy must be formulated first and foremost to ensure national security. Issues of prosperity, sustainable peace, and stability and other related concerns then follow." (FDRE, 2002, p. 5). Thus, the primary focus of the FANSPS includes the threats to Ethiopia based on potential and actual threats to its territorial integrity. The policy also aims at protecting its sovereign border against any external aggression. What this entails is that it becomes clear that the FANSPS stresses that military aspects of security come first, whereas non-military aspects of security come second (Fentaw, 2009, p. 1). It is, therefore, not surprising to see the sheer scale of the Ethiopian armed forces (Fentaw, 2009, p. 1).

The rationale 'contributing to global peace' is grounded in Ethiopia's foreign policy and statements in the UNGA. The FANSPS emphasizes that Ethiopia needs to "protect national security, work for peace and respect for international law" (FDRE, 2002, p. 154). Before the publication of the FANSPS, Ethiopia reiterated the importance of contributing to global peace and in the sub-region. During the 1990s, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seyoum Mesfin, addressed "But no matter how challenging the task, Ethiopia will continue to be committed to promoting peace, stability and cooperation throughout Africa in general and in its subregion in particular. My country attaches great importance to full cooperation with countries of its subregion with a view to promoting peace" (UNGA, 1995, p.31). It is in Ethiopia's national interest that peace is secured, as Mr Mesfin stressed "Ethiopia is prepared to do whatever is humanly possible for peace. There is no greater priority for us than ensuring peace in our

country and stable and mutually beneficial relations with all our neighbours” (UNGA, 2004, p. 19). To this day, Ethiopia still believes in contributing to global peace as “Ethiopia has been resolute in defending global peace and security through our contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations for 70 years” (UNGA, 2019, p. 30). These statements have signified that there has been a clear advocate for promoting and contributing to global peace through contributing to UNPKO.

The rationale ‘resolve regional conflicts’ is also evident in Ethiopia’s case. In both policy and praxis, Ethiopia believes that its national security is intertwined with the security of its neighbours (Dersso, 2017, p. 4). In an official statement when campaigning for the Ethiopia non-permanent seat in the UNSC, Tedros Adhanom confirms this by stressing “We do not see the peace and stability of our neighbours and our region as different from our own. This has been the driving force for our peacekeeping and peace-making efforts in our sub-region and, indeed, in Africa at large” (Adhanom, 2016). As seen by the number of contributions over time, Ethiopia’s increase in the number of peacekeepers correlates with the periods of intensified violence and instability in the neighbouring states Sudan and South Sudan. As emphasized by Seyoum Mesfin “Peace and stability in the Sudan is so critical for our subregion and for that reason Ethiopia will continue to do the best it can” (UNGA, 2004, p. 20). The role and reasons why Ethiopia is actively involved in the Sudans are due to the negative impacts a full-blown border war would have on the region and Ethiopia. Indeed, the fact that Ethiopia borders both Sudan and South Sudan, armed conflict between the two Sudans would have a spillover effect on Ethiopia. Hence, this explains why Ethiopia is genuinely interested in peace between and within the countries (Mulugeta, 2014, p. 25). One prime example is the UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan. Ethiopia had started to contribute to UNAMID in 2008, and since then has been the largest sustained contributor to the mission (Dersso, 2017, p.1). In general, Ethiopia is willing to do as much as they can to resolve regional conflicts as “Peace and security in the Horn of Africa are extremely critical for us, and we are doing everything we can with others in the region to tackle the conflicts afflicting our neighbours” (UNGA, 2016, p.14).

Ethiopia’s active presence in the Sudans also adheres to one of the fundamental principles of the UN peacekeeping mission. For UN peacekeeping, the consent of the host state is needed for the deployment of peacekeepers. As mentioned earlier, the deployment in Abyei (UNISFA) was rapid and is one of the only UNPKOs that consists almost exclusively of Ethiopian peacekeepers. Both governments of Sudan and South Sudan had requested Ethiopian troops to participate in UNISFA, which expressed trust in Ethiopia’s peacekeeping capabilities (Maru, 2011). In the UNGA, Prime-Minister Hailemariam Desalegn expressed “Let me thank both the Sudan and South Sudan for placing their trust in us, as has been so manifest in the deployment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei” (UNGA, 2012, p.8). The deployment accounted for the increase of 3795 additional personnel contributions in 2011, thus serving as a vital explanation for the substantial rise of contemporary contributions since

2011. Like deploying peace to the disputed Abyei region, Ethiopia also recognizes that the peace of neighbouring country South Sudan (UNMISS) is intrinsically linked with the peace in Ethiopia. As the Ethiopian ambassador in South Sudan highlighted “The peace of South Sudan is our peace. The peace of Ethiopia is the peace of South Sudan. The link is direct” (UN peacekeeping, 2018). Considering that South Sudan has been in a civil war between government and opposition forces since 2013, it has demonstrated that the armed conflict has raised domestic concerns over the possible spillover of violence. Therefore, sending peacekeepers to the UNMISS mission to create a stable and functioning government is a matter of national security for Ethiopia (Sigatu, 2018, p. 214).

Concerning the inhibitor ‘preference for non-UN solutions’, Ethiopia has intervened unilaterally and contributed to other PKO in the region. However, the inhibitor is not proven in the case of Ethiopia as the presence would imply that the contributions towards alternative resolution mechanisms are preferred over UNPKO. Because of Ethiopia’s sheer scale of its armed forces, it can contribute to both UN and non-UN PKOs, and even intervene unilaterally in other states. Ethiopia’s unilateral involvement in Somalia in 2006 to support the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) illustrates this (ICG, 2010, p. 13). One of the main reasons for Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention in Somalia in 2006 was in order to oust the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and fight against Al-Shabaab (Mulugeta, 2014, p. 17). Another justification for intervening in Somalia is that Eritrea has been active in arming and providing a base for armed insurgent groups that are fighting against Ethiopia. Eritrea has been using insurgent groups, such as the UIC to put pressure on Ethiopia (Mulugeta, 2014, p. 28). As a response, the Ethiopian government has used a significant number of its forces to combat armed forces in Somalia. These include armed insurgent groups and terrorist organizations who are considered a ‘clear and present danger’ to Ethiopia (Williams, 2017, p. 184).

Despite officially withdrawing in 2009, Ethiopia has remained deeply involved in the security developments in Somalia (ICG, 2010, p. 13). Later in 2014, Ethiopia integrated around 4400 troops into AMISOM after the authorization of the UN Security Council in 2013 (Williams, 2017, p. 184). The integration of troops into AMISOM implies that Ethiopia has been utilizing AU conflict management strategies as a means to tackle armed conflict threats in Somalia. Ethiopia’s deployment of troops into AMISOM has been a response to the terrorist threat across the region, following the terrorist attack by Al-Shabaab on the Westgate Mall in Kenya in 2013 (Dersso, 2017, p.4). Besides contributing to non-UN PKOs to tackle armed conflicts, Ethiopia has been a firm supporter of regionalization efforts by hosting the AU headquarters in the capital Addis Ababa (Sigatu, 2018, p. 213). However, this support in regionalization and contributions to the AMISOM has not suggested that Ethiopia prefers non-UN solutions as seen by the increasing overall number of contributions to UNPKO.

Kenya

Located in the extremely volatile region in the Horn of Africa, Kenya has been a longstanding contributor to UNPKO and global peace. The rationale ‘contribute to global peace’ is present as seen in Presidential statements and Kenya’s foreign policy. As former President Moi mentioned: “The peaceful resolution of conflicts is a fundamental tenet of Kenya’s foreign policy” (UNGA, 2001, p. 4). Kenya has also “Recognized early that peace and stability should be the cornerstone of both its national and foreign policies” (UNGA, 2004, p. 27). The belief in the contribution of peace is engrained in Kenya’s foreign policy objectives and pillars. One of the national objectives is to “Enhance regional and global peace and security” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, p. 19). Besides, Kenya’s foreign policy rests on five inter-linked pillars, namely, peace, economic, diaspora, environmental and cultural diplomacy. Of particular interest for this research is the peace diplomacy pillar, which states that Kenya aims to enhance mediation, conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, p. 23). In achieving this peace diplomacy pillar, Kenya’s foreign policy aims at “reducing further tension and potential for conflict in our region and the world at large” (Ministry of Defence, 2017, p. 3).

The peace diplomacy pillar is also related to the rationale ‘resolve regional conflicts’ as it emphasizes the importance of reducing the potential for conflict in the region. Minister of Foreign Affairs to Kenya, Stephen Musyoka emphasized “Wars and conflicts continue, and peace, stability and socio-economic development remain elusive, particularly in Africa. Kenya, therefore, continues to give priority to the prevention, management and peaceful resolution of conflicts” (UNGA, 2003, p. 10). Concerning the methods of conflict resolution, Kenya posits “emphasis will be on political and diplomatic efforts, rather than military means as the first recourse” (Ministry of Defence, 2017, p. xiv). Also, one of the key principles of Kenya’s foreign policy is that in their “dealings with other states, force is the option of last recourse. Our military posture will therefore remain defensive” (Ministry of Defence, 2017, vii). The defensive military posture means that Kenya’s armed forces are used for the “sole purpose of defending and protecting the people and their will shall therefore be upheld” (Ministry of Defence, 2017, p. 4). Based on these findings, it indicates that Kenya prefers to conduct political and diplomatic efforts for the mediation of conflicts. Also, Kenya’s foreign policy states that the armed forces serve to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Kenya wishes to resolve regional conflicts by contributing to UNPKO in the Sudans. The prospects of peace in the Sudans is essential for Kenya as former President Kibaki stressed: “Kenya will continue to support efforts to find a peaceful and lasting solution to disputes between the people of the Sudan and South Sudan” (UNGA, 2012, p. 25). Kenya’s national security interests in the Sudans include the need to prevent extreme humanitarian and economic consequences as a result of a new war (ICG, 2010, p.

3). Despite the decline in deployments the past decade, Kenya provided a large number of uniform personnel to the UNMISS. Kenya was also praised for the swift acceptance of the UNSC to deploy additional troops which indicated that the country is open to support the South Sudan peace process (Ahere, 2017, p. 5). In 2014, Kenya's senate approved the UNMISS deployment under the premise that "... soldiers will not be a fighting force but ... mandated to defend civilians and provide a safe corridor for those seeking refuge in UN camps" (Ahere, 2017, p. 5). The KDF soldiers were deployed for UNMISS with the mandate of protecting civilians. This approach taken for the deployment of troops differs from the use of force applied by KDF troops in AMISOM. The underlying reason for this has to do with Kenya's perceptions and experiences with the armed conflict in the region.

The security inhibitor 'preference for non-UN solutions' focusses on Kenya's experiences with armed conflicts. The spillover of conflicts has had devastating consequences within Kenya's borders as well. The national security challenges have consisted of strategic terrorist attacks from terrorist organizations in the Horn of Africa. Following 9/11, Kenya has been a strategic ally in the 'War on Terror', which requires the need for effective counter-terrorism policies and increasing border security to address the terrorist threat (Mabera, 2016, p. 372). One of the most important considerations for the choices Kenya makes for deploying peacekeepers is their perception of armed conflicts and threats. For Kenya, "terrorism is and continues to be greatest threat to international peace and security" (Ministry of Defence, 2017, p. xiv). This has also been emphasized by former President Mwai Kibaki: "Needless to say, the threat posed by today's Somalia to international peace and security is greater than that of any other conflict in the region" (UNGA, 2010, p. 30). The preference for AU missions relates to the fact that AMISOM is the only active peacekeeping mission in the Horn of Africa tackling terrorism in Somalia.

The current terrorist threats have stretched Kenya's security resources for being able to prevent armed conflict from spreading further. Indeed, the request for Kenya to deploy to UNPKO or any peacekeeping missions for that matter is weighed against Kenya's domestic challenges (Ahere, 2017, p. 4). The increasing security challenges Kenya has faced have changed the overall perception of the public and politicians regarding the deployment of peacekeepers. Especially with the rise of insecurity, it is often popular sentiment that rather than deploying troops to peacekeeping missions, personnel should be used to maintain law, order, and prevent terrorist attacks from occurring within Kenya (Ahere, 2017, p. 4). Tied to the domestic political developments, politicians within Kenya campaign for the withdrawal of troops to AMISOM. The withdrawal is deemed necessary for certain politicians as Kenya has witnessed a rise in terrorist attacks at home since the deployment of the KDF into Somalia in 2012. The reason for this is that terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab have demanded that Kenya should withdraw troops from Somalia, or Kenya faces increasing attacks within their borders (Ahere, 2017, p. 4). As Uhuru Kenyatta mentioned "To date, Al-Shabaab terrorists have been targeting the civilian population in

Kenya on the pretext that Kenya has deployed its troops in Somalia” (UNGA, 2015, p. 14). In sum, the pressing security dilemma Kenya faces makes it a challenging task to weigh the benefits against the costs for contributing to peacekeeping missions.

In addressing the security challenges, one explanation for the preference of non-UN solutions over time is Kenya’s transition in foreign policy in 2002: “The other causal factor for a major foreign policy transition has been the expansion of the space for regional and continental diplomacy. The rebirth of the African Union in 2002 and the creation of its new structures such as the AU Peace and Security Council presented opportunities for collective action to resolve regional conflicts and stabilize the continent” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, pp. 16-17). Kenya’s increasing role as a protagonist in the regionalization of security is visible since the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2002. Kenya has been promoting the increasing role of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as the decision-making body for the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa (Ahere, 2017, p. 4). The promotion of regional conflict management bodies has further been stressed by Presidents of the Republic of Kenya, such as Mwai Kibaki “The role of regional organizations in the mediation and resolution of conflicts is of increasing importance. On the African continent, the African Union (AU) and regional organizations such as the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) continue to serve as significant building blocks in the search for global peace and security” (UNGA, 2011, p. 5). The preference for regional PKOs has been shown considering Kenya’s contributions since 2012. In the past decade, Kenya contributed approximately 4000 personnel to AU missions (AMISOM), compared to approximately 1000 personnel sent to UNPKO.

Institutional rationales

This next section pays close attention to the institutional rationales, also known as the military advantages, that states gain when contributing to UNPKO. It considers the advantages of contributing to UNPKO, such as improving interoperability or gaining international experience. The advantages play close attention to the importance of training centres for UNPKO as each state is responsible for the deployment and training of its personnel. The analysis finds whether any negative experiences or ‘military antipathy’ during UNPKO with the UN, have led to a reduction in contributions.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s participation in UNPKO plays a significant part in the development of its military. The FANSPS mentions that Ethiopia wishes to maintain modern army and national security infrastructure “It is possible to create an army which is determined, committed, military and theoretically skilled, modern, efficient and organized” (FDRE, 2002, p. 46). One manner that Ethiopia’s wishes to modernize its army and improve its interoperability is by setting up training centres. The first training support centre established was the Ethiopian Peace Support Training Centre (EPSTC). The EPSTC is responsible for training individuals and military personnel for the deployment of peacekeeping missions anywhere in the world (Haile, 2006, p. 67). The main aim of this training centre is to provide valuable expertise within the Ethiopian Defence Forces (EDF) for the development of peacekeeping techniques based on lessons learned from previous peacekeeping operations (Haile, 2006, p. 68). Besides the EPSTC, Ethiopia has also established the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) in 2011. The EIPKTC was established to facilitate the implementation of operational and technical steps, including the selection and training of personnel to be deployed (Dersso, 2017, p. 3). The objective of this centre is “strengthening the capacity of middle- and senior level military, police, and civilian officers to effectively deliver peace operation mandates, thereby promoting peace and security in the continent” (UNDP, 2011).

Related to military staff officers and observers, one way to maintain a modern army is by having an FDRE peacekeeping department. The Ministry of Defence provides Ethiopia’s officers with the availability of training infrastructures and other facilities. Before the deployment of UNPKOs, the FDRE facilitates well-designed curriculum and instruction manuals as well as qualified instructors. Based on this preparation for UNPKO, it enhances individuals professional and technical competencies for participating in UNPKO (Gebreegziabher, 2018, p. 72). The military training infrastructures are valuable to adequately prepare and qualify staff officers and military observers for UNPKO (Gebreegziabher, 2018, p. 74). Therefore, the presence of the rationale related to the military benefits obtained from participating in UNPKO is proven, as these developments indicate that Ethiopia wishes

to improve its interoperability and develop its military. Based on lessons learned from previous peacekeeping deployments, Ethiopia wishes to ensure that peacekeeping preparations for future operations are effective in delivering its mandates.

Ethiopia has been a top-TCC for UNPKO the past decade, which has been an excellent opportunity for contributing personnel in sharing their experiences. It is mainly for those that have participated in UNPKO and gain operational experience to be able to share valuable knowledge and skills based on their experiences (Gebreegziabher, 2018, p. 72). The close cooperation and sharing of experiences between contributing countries make UNPKO more focused, adapted and achievable in yielding strong results (Lacroix, 2019). In general, the institutional benefits gained by participating in UNPKO is that it enables the military and police to expand their knowledge in a wide range of areas related to peacekeeping (Dersso, 2017, p. 4). This knowledge gained during peacekeeping include multi-cultural skills, respecting diversity, and professionalism which can be transferred to other countries in developing their own peacekeeping units and training centres (Adeto, 2018, p. 377).

Regarding the institutional inhibitors, after reviewing the documents and statements, it does not suggest that there has been any 'military antipathy' against the UN. There has been no significant event or negative experience during a UNPKO, which would lead to strong resistance to further contributing to UNPKO. The absence of the inhibitor is confirmed by Ethiopia's commitment and willingness to further contribute to UNPKO over time, especially in the 21st century. Moreover, there are no recognizable public opponents in Ethiopia that have been against increasing the number of contributions to UNPKO (Dersso, 2017, p. 6). However, one obstacle regarding Ethiopia's contributions is the persistent language difficulties held by the Ethiopian personnel. As the official working language of the UN, English has been a hurdle for certain Ethiopian personnel to communicate efficiently with other peacekeepers (Gebreegziabher, 2018, p. 73). The problem of language proficiency is particularly a challenge for increasing police contributions to UNPKO. Poor communication skills are said to be one of the main reasons for low levels of representation and leadership in missions. If these language skills were to be improved, it could enhance the opportunity for further Ethiopian contributions to UNPKO (Dersso, 2017, p. 6). However, because a large majority of the personnel consists of troop contributions, no evidence was found that language difficulties have directly impacted or even prevented Ethiopia from further contributing to UNPKO.

Kenya

One of the institutional rationales for contributing to peacekeeping for Kenya's army is that the "capacity and capability of the KDF is developed" (Ministry of Defence, 2017, p. xiv). One manner to develop the KDF is by participating in UNPKO. The experiences gained in UNPKO adds to the benefits of building a capable armed force in Kenya as "Going forward, the lessons learnt from past engagements emphasise the need for multi-agency operations. KDF aspires to remain a premier, credible and mission capable force deeply rooted in professionalism" (Ministry of Defence, 2017, p. xiii). Kenya's willingness to develop the KDF and contribute to peacekeeping has been shown by setting up the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in 2009. The centre has evolved into the largest peacekeeping training centre for the Eastern African region, which is considered a great symbolic achievement for Kenya. The main objectives of this training centre are to conduct training, education and research concerning peace support operations located in Nairobi. The IPSTC also informs the military, police and civilian personnel from various backgrounds to prepare and improve the effectiveness in responding to various emergencies in broad and multidimensional contexts (IPSTC, 2020). As a specific goal to improve the interoperability of peacekeeping forces, it has aimed to enhance the regional capabilities in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in East Africa. This is because the staff placed at the IPSTC are regularly nominated for Kenyan deployments to UNPKO (Jowell, 2018, p. 81). The building of the training centre indicates that Kenya is willing to contribute to UNPKO peacekeeping by training police, military and other uniform personnel. Kenya takes great pride in hosting the IPSTC and showing it is committed to UNPKO as "Kenya reaffirms its commitment to continuing to provide training facilities for United Nations programmes, as part of its pledge to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping operations" (UNGA, 2016, p. 32).

An institutional rationale for contributing to peacekeeping missions is the opportunity in participating in operational activities and training within UN frameworks. In order to be deployed for UNPKOs in the first place, it is a requirement to fulfil a rigorous three months of peace operations training. This training is combined with following a mandatory curriculum with an emphasis on negotiation, impartiality, and mediation in order to adequately prepare for PKO (Ahere, 2017, p. 3). For those that are able to complete the training courses, participation in UNPKO is an important steppingstone for further developing individual careers. (Jowell, 2018, p. 80). It provides the KDF personnel with opportunities to grow their careers by being involved in military operations (Ahere, 2017, p. 5). Indeed, by being a part of UNPKO, it provides KDF troops with valuable operational experiences abroad and respect by the international community for participating. By contributing to UNPKO, KDF forces can communicate and share a mandate with other peacekeepers from other TCC's. The communication with other peacekeepers leads to an improvement in the military interoperability as it enhances the ability to

work with peacekeepers from different backgrounds (Ahere, 2017, p. 4; Chau, 2010, p. 47). All in all, Kenya's military establishment has remained key champions of deployment for UNPKO for many years, which has demonstrated the willingness to contribute to UNPKO (Ahere, 2017, p. 5).

The military rationales for contributing to UNPKO have been beneficial for the development of the KDF and association with the UN. However, the relationship of respect between the KDF and the UN soured in 2016, leading to a degree of 'military antipathy'. The dismissal of Lieutenant General Johnson Mogoia Kimani Ondieki in working as a commander of the UNMISS had severe consequences for Kenya's UNPKO contributions. The reasoning behind the dismissal was that the UN and Ban Ki-moon believed that the Kenyan commander failed to protect civilians and represented a lack of leadership in Juba, South Sudan on 11 July 2016 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). The government of Kenya disagreed and believed that given the complex nature of the conflict, the responsibility for the protection of civilians could not be borne by a single individual (Ahere, 2017, p. 5). In an official publication by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohammed stressed that "Firing one of our generals for the systemic weaknesses of UN peacekeeping and without prior consultation is not only disrespectful, but dishonors Kenya's contribution to peace in South Sudan" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

As a response, the events in the UNMISS led to the gradual withdrawal of Kenyan troops in South Sudan. The deployment was considered "no longer tenable", saying that Kenya will "withdraw, immediately" its peacekeeping forces there (Bays, 2016). In an official statement, President Uhuru Kenyatta mentioned: "Kenya is committed to regional and global peace but that should not come at the expense of the country's dignity, honour and pride" (Kenyatta, 2016). Before this decision by the Kenyan government, the KDF forces served approximately 1000 personnel to UNMISS. As a result of this decision in 2016, Kenya has gradually removed its UN peacekeeping forces every year, reaching its lowest point in 2020 with 28 personnel still involved in UNMISS. In sum, the sacking of the Kenyan commander resulted in a degree of military antipathy against the UN. It showed that although Kenya finds they are committed to regional peace and security, it does not come at the expense of national disrespect, pride and a country's dignity.

Normative rationales

Under the normative rationale, a state would be more inclined to participate in UNPKO if it perceives contributions to UNPKO as beneficial for showing that it is a good state and supports the UN system. Many participating states to UNPKO support the UN system by subscribing to norms set out in the UN Charter. A practical example that directly impacts the number of contributions is the increasing number of female peacekeepers in UNPKO. The UN adopted the landmark resolution 1325 on women, peace and security on 31 October 2000. The resolution reaffirms the critical role of women in the resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. The resolution also stresses the importance of contributing states to promote gender equality and to recognize the need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations. One manner this call can be appreciated is by increasing the participation of women in matters of peace and security (UNSC, 2000). Figures illustrate the numbers about the female peacekeeping contributions to UNPKO for Ethiopia and Kenya. Data has been collected from 2009-2020 as there was no official publication by the UN precisely stating the division of male and female peacekeepers before 2009.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia normatively supports the UN as one of the principles of the FANSPS stresses that Ethiopia should always abide by the international norms and should strengthen its cooperation with institutions such as the UN (FDRE, 2002, p. 154). Cooperation and multilateralism is in line with Ethiopia's ideology to abide by international norms and addressing common objectives as the UN "Remains the only universal Organization we have, whether we are big or small, rich or poor, providing us with a unique platform for advancing our common objectives and addressing the myriad problems we collectively face" (UNGA, 2015, p. 56). This statement signifies that cooperation and trust in the UN is beneficial for addressing Ethiopia's shared goals with other member states. Tied to peacekeeping, one of the shared goals of the UN includes the maintenance of peace and security. Ethiopia believes that "There is no better guarantee for peace and stability than the nurturing of mutual confidence and trust, regardless of differences in outlook or in political or other values. This also explains Ethiopia's legendary commitment to the United Nations and to its principles and purposes" (UNGA, 2006, p. 17). Considering Ethiopia's overall increasing contributions, it signifies that cooperation and

trust in the UN is beneficial for Ethiopia's maintenance of peace, particularly in the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopia's strong commitment and support for the UN has not always been as evident as today. It is clear from the speeches analyzed that Ethiopia disagreed with certain dealings of the UN system, especially in the late 1990s moving towards the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in 1998-2000. A specific example of this discontent of the normative agenda was expressed concerning the lack of attention being paid to Somalia, Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia to be on top on the UN's agenda in 1999. Ethiopia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seyoum Mesfin went as far in saying "In short, the United Nations has failed Africa, and now stands, one foot into the next century, with this record. I should like to focus on one issue: collective security, especially in relation to its impact on developing countries, those in Africa in particular, and how the United Nations has failed them in this critical area" (UNGA, 1999, p. 25). Also, the former Minister emphasized "It is indeed difficult to keep intact our trust in the United Nations and in international cooperation. It is also difficult to have faith in the efficacy of the United Nations collective security system." (UNGA, 1999, p. 28). The expressed normative discomfort regarding the collective security system during the late 1990s has to do with the lack of responsibility and action by the UNSC in responding to Eritrean aggression at the border. The 'discomfort in the normative agenda' in the UN's collective security serves as a plausible explanation for the lack of contributions for UNPKO during the late 1990s. However, there is no evidence suggesting this has directly impacted Ethiopia's contributions to UNPKO but could serve as an explanation for the lack of contributions during this period.

Despite the period of normative discomfort with the UN during the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, Ethiopia still has supported the UN and multilateralism as mentioned by Seyoum Mesfin "My own country has also been disappointed in the past. But we have never abandoned hope in the United Nations or in multilateralism, because we know, at the end of the day, that the United Nations is indispensable. That is why Ethiopia will always be committed to the United Nations and its ideals" (UNGA, 2003, p. 14). A clear example of this support to the UN is Ethiopia's commitment to the participation of women in UNPKO over time. Ethiopia has recognized in its constitution that "Women shall, in the enjoyment of rights and protections provided for by this Constitution, have equal rights with men" (WIPO, 1994, p. 13). Ethiopia's constitution states that gender equality and the rights of women are essential pillars in national law. However, the research has found no official document that has mentioned an equal role for

women in peacekeeping, peacebuilding or security matters. One example of the lack of involvement in security matters is that women were completely excluded from the peace processes regarding the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict (Fentaw, 2009, p.7). However, since the return to UNPKO in the mid-2000s, Ethiopia has increasingly recognized the role of women in peacekeeping. Especially since Ethiopia has become the top TCC, Ethiopia has gradually promoted the increasing role of women in peacekeeping which has increased the overall contributions to UNPKO over time, as can be seen in Figure X.




Figure X: Illustrating the number of female peacekeeping contributions by Ethiopia for UNPKO from 2009-2020 (United Nations, 2020).

Ethiopia is currently ranked as the leading country in women contributions for the UNPKO over the past few years. The contributions reached its highest point in 2017 with more than 600 female peacekeepers. Unfortunately, no evidence points out the exact reasons for increasing female contributions by Ethiopia, but the increasing number of contributions illustrates the willingness to support the UN. Only recently have the achievements of female peacekeepers been emphasized by the first elected female President Sahle-Work Zewde in 2018. The President recently pointed out “Particularly we are very proud that Ethiopia is one of the leading contributors of female peacekeepers with more than 600 of them deployed under the UN Peace Keeping Missions”, and adding, “Ethiopia welcomes the progress made in

mainstreaming the agenda perspective in the works of the UN” (APO, 2019). The President also addressed that “We are currently working to strengthen the efficiency and accountability of peacekeepers, increase the role of women in peace and security activities” (UNGA, 2019, p. 30). The example of increasing female peacekeepers illustrates the presence of Ethiopia’s support of the UN system. The increasing overall contributions it shows that Ethiopia is increasingly normatively committed, proud and willing to contribute female peacekeepers to UNPKO. The rationales for increasing female peacekeepers has to do with mainstreaming a gendered perspective and promote the role of women in peace and security.

Kenya

Kenya is a state that has always been historically committed to the UN’s principles and Charter. Dating back to its first peacekeeping contributions in the late 1980s, Kenya has considered the UN as an essential entity in the de-escalation of civil wars and the maintenance of peace and security (Ahere, 2017, p. 5). Kenya’s commitment to the UN is one of the key objectives and principles of Kenya’s foreign policy. One of Kenya’s national objectives is to “Promote international cooperation and multilateralism” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, p.19). The Foreign Policy also mentions that “Kenya will continue to promote the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter and play its rightful role in supporting the work of the United Nations system in the promotion of peace and security” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, p. 31). The support of the UN is emphasized as important for Kenya as “The ideals and principles of the United Nations are, today more than ever, the surest hope for a more prosperous and equitable world” (UNGA, 2009, p. 30). Based on the analysis of UNGA statements, Kenya refers to the importance of cooperating with the UN in maintaining international peace and security. This was emphasized by former President Mwai Kibaki “The United Nations is the only vehicle that can help us attain those solutions and give legitimacy to our actions. The United Nations remains indispensable in the maintenance of international peace and security” (UNGA, 2005, p. 14).

One manner to illustrate Kenya’s support to the UN in the maintenance of peace and security is by considering the increasing number of female peacekeepers. Kenya’s constitution emphasizes increasing the rights of women and gender equality. Article 59 of the constitution specifies “To promote gender equality and equity generally and to coordinate and facilitate

gender mainstreaming in national development” (WIPO, 2010, p. 40). Kenya has even gone further to implement a Kenyan National Action Plan (KNAP) for the implementation of UNSC resolution 1325 in 2016. The action plan stresses that “Our security sector is taking measures to improve the quality of women’s participation in and contribution to security in the country, and increase their numbers” (KNAP, 2016, p. 10). One of its national implementation strategies for KNAP is to “Promote collaboration with regional and international bodies to promote the women, peace, and security agenda through diplomatic, development, and peacekeeping initiatives in conflict and post-conflict environments” (KNAP, 2016, p. 25). These findings indicate that Kenya advocates the promotion and increasing female participation in peacekeeping. One manner to illustrate this is by looking at the number of contributions to UNPKO over time. As shown by Figure XI, Kenya increasingly contributed female peacekeepers to UNPKO until the decision to withdraw a vast majority of personnel from the UNMISS in 2016.




Figure XI: Illustrating the number of female peacekeeping contributions by Kenya for UNPKO from 2009-2020 (United Nations, 2020).

Even though the number of female peacekeeping contributions from 2016 decreases with the withdrawal from UNMISS, it does not suggest that Kenya is against the participation of female peacekeepers at all. Kenya has increased its number of female peacekeepers over the years despite declining overall contributions. Kenya remains committed to the principles of the UN

system, by focussing on the role that women play. The development of a national action plan for the implementation of UNSC 1325 indicates that Kenya is committed to supporting the UN by promoting the role of women and gender equality in peacekeeping.

Although Kenya has supported the UN, the country has also experienced a degree of normative discomfort with the UN. The inhibitor ‘normative discomfort’ is tied to the events of UNMISS in 2016, which have directly led to the withdrawal of peacekeepers from UNPKO. The discomfort is mainly related to the lack of an effective mandate for the UNMISS. President Kenyatta stated one of the main reasons for the withdrawal of peacekeepers, “For our part, we will no longer contribute to a mission that has failed to meet its mandate, and which has now resorted to scapegoating Kenyans” (Kenyatta, 2016). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated, “What is clear is that UNMISS suffers from fundamental structural and systemic dysfunctionality, which has severely hindered its ability to discharge its mandate since its inception” (Bays, 2016). For Kenya, this indicates that the normative discomfort related to the mandate of the UNMISS and structural weaknesses of the UN has resulted in the unwillingness to further support this mission. However, this normative discomfort has not meant that Kenya is no longer willing to support the UN as an organization and what it stands for. One year following the events in the UNMISS, an official representative of President Uhuru Kenyatta emphasized this by stating “Kenya is a firm believer in multilateralism. We acknowledge the remarkable role that the United Nations has played in sustaining peace in our world and in providing a global platform for cooperation and solidarity among nations” (UNGA, 2017, p. 23). The statement indicates that despite the events tied to the mandate and systemic weaknesses of the UNMISS the year before, Kenya still supports the UN and believes in the importance of multilateralism.

Discussion

In the discussion, the hypotheses, based on the findings, is tested. In general, the hypothesis is supported if a state witnesses an increase in state contributions and there are no significant inhibitors present that would directly impact increasing contributions. The hypothesis is not supported if a country experiences a decrease in contributions or if there are significant inhibitors that would directly result in decreasing contributions to UNPKO. The hypotheses tackle the five rationales one by one. Following the same order as in the analysis, it tests Ethiopia first, followed by Kenya. The discussion divides the presence and absence based on the findings in the analysis section. This chapter also provides a table that summarizes the presence and absence of rationales and inhibitors for both countries. In general, this research argues that the best way to understand the varying contributions between Ethiopia and Kenya is to understand the inhibitors for further participating in UNPKO. Understanding the decisions or motivations for not further contributing to UNPKO, greatly impacts the number of personnel sent to missions.

Political rationale

The motivations to participate politically, have to do with each country's ambitions to promote its national image. These are related to increasing their national prestige and voice in the international forum. According to the findings, Ethiopia wishes to promote its image by being a member of the UNPBC and a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Participating in UN bodies is important to achieve foreign policy goals related to promoting national prestige abroad. It is regarded as strategically beneficial to be a non-permanent member of the UNSC, as Ethiopia plays a role in the decision-making system regarding issues surrounding peacekeeping. Also, as seen from statements in the UNGA over time, Ethiopia emphasized the fact that it has become a TCC, which is a useful campaign strategy for obtaining a non-permanent member seat in the UNSC. Apart from these observed rationales, there are no significant political inhibitors present that could suggest that Ethiopia would be unwilling to further contribute to UNPKO. Because of Ethiopia's regime type and domestic political situation, Ethiopia can send its peacekeepers abroad with little to none parliamentary scrutiny. This is because decisions of by its armed forces over time have remained in the hands of the Prime-Minister. Therefore, the hypothesis "*When participating in UNPKO is perceived to enhance its national image, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*" is supported. The hypothesis is supported as the relation between enhancing its image and the

increase in contributions to UNPKO is proven positive. Ethiopia perceives UNPKO contributions to play a role in lifting its prestige as a top TCC. Also, enhancing its national image contributed to its election campaign for candidacy as a non-permanent member in the UNSC. Finally, by being a top TCC, it allows Ethiopia to have a say in the UNPBC without having to be elected.

In the case of Kenya, one of the core foreign policy objectives is also to project its image and prestige. As seen in the statements in the UNSC, Kenya only recently referred to the fact that the country has been one of the most consistent contributors to UNPKO. The timing makes sense as Kenya is currently undergoing a national campaign for obtaining a non-permanent seat in the UNSC for 2021-2022 and is campaigning for an African voice in international affairs. Like Ethiopia, Kenya is currently a member of the UNPBC. Being a member is strategically beneficial to promote its national image and prestige, as well as participate in meetings in the UN peace architecture. However, Kenya has witnessed a steady decline in UNPKO contributions from 2005 onwards. One leading explanation for this decline in UNPKO contributions relates to the political inhibitors within Kenya. The difficult domestic politics Kenya has faced since the adoption of a new constitution in 2010 has made it more challenging to send peacekeepers to peacekeeping missions. This is due to the need for parliamentary approval for decisions regarding the deployment of KDF. Therefore, the hypothesis "*When participating in UNPKO is perceived to enhance its national image, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*" is not supported. The hypothesis is not supported because Kenya perceives the participation in UNPKO as a means of contributing to enhancing its national image but has witnessed a decline in state contributions to UNPKO. One of the explanations has to do with the fact that the political inhibitors, namely, the difficult domestic politics has a significant impact on decreasing contributions to UNPKO.

The summary of the presence or absence of rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya is presented below:

	Rationales	Inhibitors
Ethiopia	National prestige: Present Voice in international affairs/UN: Present	Difficult domestic politics: Absent
Kenya	National prestige: Present Voice in international affairs/UN: Present	Difficult domestic politics: Present (from 2010 onwards)

Table II: The political rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya.

Conclusion

Ethiopia and Kenya share certain similarities with regards to the political rationale. Like Ethiopia, Kenya is currently a member of the UNPBC. Being a member of the UNPBC is strategically useful for either Ethiopia or Kenya's national interests to promote its image and prestige by participating in meetings in the UN peace architecture. Both countries also find it is in line with their national interests to promote their international image in the UN by campaigning for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC. However, the main differences lie in the domestic political developments of either country. Indeed, the main political difference between the two countries is that Ethiopia has not suffered from difficult domestic politics, whereas Kenya has since 2010. The political system and differences between the level of parliamentary oversight are vital in understanding UNPKO contributions as they refer directly to the decision making on the numbers and frequency of peacekeeping contributions over time.

Economic rationale

According to the findings, it is financially beneficial for Ethiopia to contribute to UNPKO as the UN reimbursements positively benefits Ethiopia's military expenditure. Even though the UN reimbursements as a percentage of military expenditure have not exceeded three per cent, it was still a positive contribution since Ethiopia's military expenditure has remained relatively stable, especially after the Ethiopian-Eritrean war. The findings indicate that by increasing Ethiopia's contributions, it positively contributed to its military expenditure as shown by the trend. Therefore, the hypothesis "*When participating in UNPKO is financially beneficial, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*" is supported for Ethiopia. The hypothesis is supported because since Ethiopia has returned to peacekeeping from 2002 onwards, it has progressively increased its contributions to UNPKO. As a result of increasing contributions, the financial benefits received from the UN related to military expenditure rise as well.

Concerning Kenya, the financial benefits received from the UN over time have been different from those of Ethiopia. For Kenya, the UN reimbursements as a percentage of military expenditure have decreased over time. The decrease in financial benefits received from the UN is in correlation with Kenya's substantial increase in military expenditure and decreasing contributions over time. Especially as a result of decreasing contributions to UNPKO, Kenya received fewer financial benefits from the UN as reimbursements. It indicates that the national economic benefits regarding UN reimbursements for Kenya have contributed minimally to its military expenditure. Therefore, the hypothesis "*When participating in UNPKO is financially beneficial, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*" for Kenya is not supported. The hypothesis is not supported when considering the decline of overall UNPKO contributions until now. During this period, Kenya has not increased contributions to UNPKO as reimbursement rates per UN peacekeeper have been the same for each contributing country. What the findings suggest is that although the UN reimbursements per peacekeeper have increased over time, it has not necessarily resulted in an increasing willingness for Kenya to contribute due to the financial benefits associated with UNPKO.

The summary of the presence or absence of rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya is presented below:

	Rationales	Inhibitors
Ethiopia	Financial rewards: Present and increasing	Additional costs: Absent
Kenya	Financial rewards: Present and declining	Additional costs: Absent

Table III: The economic rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya.

Conclusion

In sum, the economic rationales do play, to some extent, play a role in explaining the differences in UNPKO contributions over time. Although not very substantial, it shows that UN reimbursements for Ethiopia have contributed positively to Ethiopia's military expenditure. Bearing in mind the UN reimbursements as a percentage of military expenditure does not exceed 2.5 per cent, the positive trend signifies that UN compensation is financially beneficial to Ethiopia as a result of increased personnel contributions over time. In the case of Kenya, it is found that the financial benefits of UN reimbursements as a percentage of military expenditure are much smaller compared to Ethiopia. The findings indicate that Kenya's contributions to UNPKO have not necessarily been driven by economic interests to increase its military expenditure, considering that the financial benefits from reimbursements decline over time.

Security rationale

For the security rationales, it is critical to identify what Ethiopia or Kenya perceives as the most pressing national security threats. The security threats from armed conflict are perceived nationally, which means the most pressing threats are approached differently. As elaborated in the findings for Ethiopia, it regards its foreign policy to be focused first and foremost on its national security and survival. Ethiopia is a longstanding contributor to UNPKO and the maintenance of global peace as Ethiopia has witnessed a significant increase in contributions in 2011. This increase has to do with the development of specific UN missions in the Horn of Africa, mainly related to the UNPKO in Abyei (UNISFA). In general, Ethiopia believes that resolving regional conflicts and preventing armed conflicts in the Sudans are essential for its peace. Also, the fact that Sudan and South Sudan have requested only Ethiopian peacekeepers for the UNISFA mission indicates the importance of relations and consent of host states with countries deploying UN peacekeepers. As a result, Ethiopia primarily sent many of its UNPKO peacekeepers to the Sudans. Ethiopia has contributed to almost the entirety of the UNISFA mission which has resulted in Ethiopia becoming a consistent top ten contributor for UNPKO since 2011.

The inhibitors for the security rationale ‘preference for non-UN solutions’ is not necessarily present considering the armed conflicts Ethiopia tackles outside UNPKO. It is not necessarily the case that Ethiopia prefers AU missions to UNPKO missions. Although the country supports the idea of regional PKOs, there is no evidence to suggest that it prefers alternative conflict mechanisms. The contribution to alternative mechanisms such as the use of regional peacekeeping efforts led by the AU (AMISOM), has not meant a decrease in overall state contributions to UNPKO. Indeed, also because of the sheer scale of Ethiopia’s armed forces, the country can contribute both to the UN and AU PKOs. Therefore, the hypothesis “*When participating in UNPKO is perceived as beneficial to contain armed conflicts, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*” is supported. The hypothesis is supported as Ethiopia considers participation in UNPKO as a useful tool in ensuring and promoting the peace of its neighbours. As explained in the findings, this is because the peace of its neighbours is intrinsically linked with Ethiopia’s peace. Indeed, Ethiopia has specifically participated in UNPKO missions at locations that are perceived as a threat to its national security. As a result, Ethiopia has increased its contributions to UNPKO since the establishment of UNAMID, UNISFA, and UNMISS in Sudan and South Sudan.

Considering Kenya, the state has also been a generous contributor to UNPKO since the 1990s. Kenya's foreign policy strongly believes in its peace diplomacy pillar that the resolution of conflicts in the region is essential for peace. Also, the contributions to global peace is engrained in Kenya's foreign policy and speeches in the UNGA. Realized by its contributions to UNPKO in the Sudans, Kenya wishes to resolve regional conflicts to prevent a full-blown war from escalating. However, the decline of UNPKO contributions in the Sudans and the rise of contributions to regional PKOs explains Kenya's position regarding the most pressing national security threats. Being struck by terrorism since its first major attack in 1998, Kenya weighs its internal security threats caused by terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab for the deployment of peacekeepers to UNPKO. Tied to the domestic political situation in Kenya, politicians have campaigned for the withdrawal of personnel used abroad for PKOs to be used for its internal security.

The security inhibitor 'preference for non-UN solutions' is evident. Kenya has stated in the UNGA speeches that it experienced a shift in foreign policy since 2002. With the launch of the AU, it has meant that Kenya has played an increasing role as a protagonist in promoting regional peacekeeping initiatives with the establishment of the PSC. In the case of Kenya, it essential to consider the substantial contributions to the AMISOM, in comparison to any other contributions to UNPKO. Looking back to the AMISOM, it has constituted to this day the largest number of peacekeeping contributions ever sent by Kenya. This is because Kenya perceives the threat posed by terrorism and extremism as the most significant national security threat. Therefore, the hypothesis "*When participating in UNPKO is perceived as beneficial to contain armed conflicts, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*" is not supported. Considering the decline in overall contributions to UNPKO, Kenya has not increased UNPKO contributions as a means to contain armed conflicts. The reason being the main armed conflicts that Kenya wishes to contain lie in Somalia due to the rise of terrorist threats. Considering AMISOM is an AU led mission which in line with Kenya's national security interests, Kenya has contributed significant numbers to this PKO. Based on these findings, the national security threats and the preferences for non-UN solutions are one of the main reasons as to why Kenya has witnessed a decline in UNPKO contributions.

The summary of the presence or absence of rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya is presented below:

	Rationales	Inhibitors
Ethiopia	Resolve regional conflicts: Present Contribute to global peace: Present	Preference for non-UN solutions: Absent
Kenya	Resolve regional conflicts: Present Contribute to global peace: Present	Preference for non-UN solutions: Present

Table IV: The security rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya.

Conclusion

In the case of the security rationales, the decisions made for contributing to specific missions can best be explained best by national security situations and the perceptions on to contain best the threats posed by armed conflicts. In the case of Ethiopia, the number of contributions for UNPKO is relatively high since they have sent many of their peacekeepers to the Sudans. Indeed, Ethiopia maintains its contributions to UNPKO in the Sudans as Ethiopia perceives these contributions as beneficial and in line with their national security interests. In the case of Kenya, the country has contributed personnel to UNPKO in the Sudans. However, there has been a clear preference for contributing to non-UN missions as seen by the decline in overall UNPKO contributions. The reason why Kenya prefers to contribute to missions such as the AMISOM is because it is in line with their national security interests. Kenya has witnessed an increase in popular sentiment and politicians campaigning for the use of KDF forces to tackle internal security challenges, instead of deploying its forces to peacekeeping missions. Especially with the rise of terrorist threats within Kenya's borders, Kenya faces a difficult security dilemma on how to effectively use its armed forces to tackle challenging national security threats.

Institutional rationale

The military benefits gained for both countries have mostly been at the domestic level, particularly the national and individual level. For Ethiopia, the institutional rationales for contributing to UNPKO include its ability to improve interoperability by setting up both training centres by the FDRE. Ethiopia wishes to maintain a modern army by developing the EPSTC and EIPKTC. These centres have played a part in the modernization and training of personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions. The training infrastructures in Ethiopia indicate that it wishes to improve its interoperability in UNPKO. Also, the central institutional benefits for Ethiopia are that by participation in UNPKO, it allows its personnel to gain experience and expand their knowledge on peacekeeping matters.

What institutional inhibitors are concerned; no evidence was found of negative experiences during a UNPKO which had led to military antipathy from Ethiopia towards the UN. The only limitation that has the potential to inhibit contributions to UNPKO has been the language difficulties in further participating in UNPKO. As the working language for UNPKO is English, Ethiopian peacekeepers are often at a time unable to communicate efficiently with other peacekeepers. This has resulted in low levels of leadership and representation. However, no evidence suggests that language difficulties have prevented Ethiopia from further contributing to UNPKO, considering that most contributions consist of troops. Based on the findings, the hypothesis *“When participating in UNPKO is militarily beneficial, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO”* is supported for Ethiopia. This hypothesis is supported because Ethiopia has increased its state contributions over time as well. Participation in UNPKO is militarily influential for Ethiopia because of two main reasons. First, Ethiopia has improved its interoperability by participating in UNPKO. Second, Ethiopia’s army and individual personnel have gained valuable operational experience as a result of participating in UNPKO. Also, this hypothesis is supported, considering that there are no significant inhibitors present that would directly impact the number of contributions to Ethiopia.

In the case of Kenya, the institutional benefits gained from participating adds to the benefits of building a capable armed force. More on the individual level, participation in UNPKO is considered an important steppingstone for the careers of individuals. It provides KDF personnel with an opportunity to make a career and to gain valuable operational experience in UNPKO. Although Kenya believes participation in UNPKO is military beneficial to improve both interoperability and the quality of its personnel, Kenya has witnessed an overall decline

in contributions. This decline indicates that although contributing to UNPKO has benefitted the KDF, it does not necessarily explain why Kenya has reduced contributions over time.

Instead, the institutional inhibitor towards the UN explains the recent decline in UNPKO contributions. The degree of military antipathy has directly impacted the number of contributions to UNPKO. Following the dismissal of the Kenyan commander, it has resulted in a gradual withdrawal of a large majority of its personnel to UNMISS explaining the significant decrease in contributions from 2016 onwards. The statement by President Kenyatta following the events in UNMISS has indicated that Kenya's contribution to UNPKO does not come at the expense of the country's national pride, especially related to the UNMISS. Based on the findings, the stated hypothesis "*When participating in UNPKO is militarily beneficial, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*" is not supported for Kenya. Kenya has experienced military benefits from participating to UNPKO but has decreased contributions over time. The main military rationales Kenya include improving its interoperability and gaining valuable operational experience from UNPKO participation. However, the military benefits have not been that substantial that it would lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO. The hypothesis is not supported either due to the impacts of military antipathy against the UN. This inhibitor to contributing to UNPKO highlights a direct impact on the number of contributions for Kenya.

The summary of the presence or absence of rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya is presented below:

	Rationales	Inhibitors
Ethiopia	Gain operational experience: Present Improve interoperability: Present	Military antipathy: Absent
Kenya	Gain operational experience: Present Improve interoperability: Present	Military antipathy: Present, from 2016 onwards

Table IV: The institutional rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya.

Conclusion

The military benefits for contributing to UNPKO have not been significantly different for Ethiopia or Kenya. For both countries, contributing to UNPKO is valuable for gaining international experiences, improving individual careers and expanding individual personnel knowledge in areas related to peacekeeping. However, the specific differences between the two countries involve the fact that Ethiopia has not experienced any military antipathy or negative experiences against the UN during a UNPKO. The military antipathy for Kenya, in turn, has directly impacted Kenya's recent involvement in UNPKO. As a result, Kenya has called back more than 1000 personnel that were active in UNMISS, which is a direct cause for the significant decline of UNPKO contributions from 2016 to this present day. The reason for the withdrawal is because Kenya has not been prepared to contribute to UNPKO at the expense of national dignity and pride. The findings indicate that the institutional inhibitors tell a larger story for the differences in contributions between Ethiopia and Kenya compared to the rationales.

Normative rationale

The normative support to the UN is engrained in Ethiopia's foreign policy, which emphasizes that Ethiopia believes in the importance of multilateralism and the UN's collective security system. However, this has not always been the case. The analysis finds that Ethiopia has experienced discomfort with the normative agenda of the UN. This discomfort concerns the efficacy of the collective security system during the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in 1998-2000. The normative discomfort concerning the collective security system during a period Ethiopia was involved in the conflict, provides a plausible explanation for the lack of UNPKO contributions during the late 1990s.

After this period, Ethiopia has supported the UN system as can be seen by its increase in female participation in UNPKO missions. This support is illustrated by looking at the number of female peacekeepers provided to UNPKOs from 2009-now. For Ethiopia, it has significantly increased the numbers of female peacekeepers to such an extent that it is currently providing the largest number of female peacekeepers to UNPKO. As seen by the statements of President Sahle-Work Zewde, Ethiopia has promoted the role of women in peacekeeping and supported the normative agenda of the UN by contributing to UNSC resolution 1325. Therefore, the hypothesis "*When participating in UNPKO supports the UN system, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*" is supported. The hypothesis is supported as Ethiopia has experienced an increase in contributions to UNPKO as it supports the UN system. It does so by being a supporter of the UN's multilateralism and system of collective security through peacekeeping. One way to express Ethiopia's support to the UN is by increasing the number of female peacekeepers to UNPKO, which has contributed to an increase in overall contributions as well.

In the case of Kenya, its constitution and foreign policy pillars highlight the commitment to the UN's principles. Especially its peace diplomacy pillar emphasizes multilateralism to be essential for the promotion of peace and security. As found in the speeches, Kenya has maintained its position to normatively support the UN system in terms of multilateralism and promotion of female peacekeepers. Despite the decline in overall peacekeeping contributions, Kenya has witnessed an increase in the number of female peacekeeping contributions from 2009 until the withdrawal of peacekeepers in the UNMISS in 2016. The findings indicate that Kenya has continued to support the UN system by promoting the role of women in peace and

security in line with UNSC resolution 1325. Kenya even developed a national action plan in 2016 for the realization of this commitment to female peacekeepers.

Regarding the normative inhibitors for contributing to UNPKO, Kenya has experienced a degree of discomfort with the UN’s normative agenda. Tied back to the negative experience in UNMISS, one of the main reasons for the withdrawal of contributions was the lack of an effective mandate in UNMISS. Considering the findings, the hypothesis “*When participating in UNPKO supports the UN system, it will lead to an increase in state contributions to UNPKO*” for Kenya is not supported. The hypothesis is not supported as Kenya is willing to support the UN system by its commitment to multilateralism and the promotion of female peacekeepers. However, it has not resulted in an overall increase in state contributions to UNPKO. Especially during the UNMISS in 2016, the discomfort with the normative agenda has been one of the main reasons for the significant decline of UNPKO contributions.

The summary of the presence or absence of rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya is presented below:

	Rationales	Inhibitors
Ethiopia	Support the UN system: Present	Discomfort with normative agenda: Present, only during Ethiopian-Eritrean war 1998-2000.
Kenya	Support the UN system: Present	Discomfort with normative agenda: Present, only regarding the mandate of UNMISS in 2016.

Table V: The normative rationales and inhibitors for Ethiopia and Kenya.

Conclusion

When comparing Ethiopia and Kenya, both countries have normatively supported the UN system. The findings have shown that both Ethiopia's and Kenya's general foreign policy aims to contribute usefully to the UN and multilateralism. The normative support is also found in the speeches in the UNGA and contributions to UNPKO. Both Ethiopia and Kenya wish to play a key role in the UN's peace and security as seen in its increasing female peacekeepers' contributions in line with UNSC resolution 1325. However, the main differences lie in their individual experiences with the UN. In the case of Ethiopia, the country expressed a degree of normative discomfort regarding the effectiveness of the UN's collective security during the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in 1998-2000. In the case of Kenya, the lack of an effective mandate was one of the main reasons for the decline of contributions to UNPKO. This highlights that when either country feels there is a degree of normative discomfort with the UN system, it is considered a valid reason to not contribute or even withdraw peacekeeping personnel.

VI. Conclusion

This thesis has researched the motivations of states contributions to UNPKO by conducting a comparative analysis between Ethiopia and Kenya. The thesis presented the research question '*What explains Ethiopia's and Kenya's varying contributions to UN peacekeeping operations since 1990?*', for understanding the motivations why states would or would not contribute to UNPKO. The research found that most of the previous literature seems to address the motivations of states one-dimensionally. What this means is that the literature has rarely focused on more than one variable. However, this study argued that in order to understand why states are motivated to contribute to UNPKO, a multi-dimensional and comprehensive approach is needed. In order to understand the bigger picture, the decision to participate is not only driven by one interest or variable. Therefore, this research approached this phenomenon of UNPKO contributions from multiple angles.

The research approached this phenomenon multi-dimensionally by applying the Bellamy and Williams mode to a case study comparison between Ethiopia and Kenya. This model emphasizes that there are five main rationales or motivations for understanding why states decide to contribute to UNPKO. These being, political, economic, security, institutional and normative rationales. These five rationales were proposed as five hypotheses to see how the independent variables impacted the dependent variable of states contributions to UNPKO. The five independent variables (national image, financial benefits, contain armed conflict, military benefits, and support the UN system) were tested separately and derived from the Bellamy and Williams model. The research performed a within-case study for both countries and utilized content analysis as the primary method of analysis. The collected data consisted primarily of speeches from the UNGA from 1990-2020, which were most relevant to the perceptions of states. The analysis also consisted of secondary sources, namely, documented foreign policies, constitutions, official statements, journal articles, and databases for statistics. The findings were compared based on the presence or absence of rationales and inhibitors.

To answer the research question, multiple explanations answer why there is such variance in contributions between Ethiopia and Kenya. For Ethiopia, all five hypotheses were supported as a result of increasing contributions over time. Whereas for Kenya, the decline in contributions over time means the hypotheses were not supported. The main reasons for the differences in contributions lie in the presence or absence of inhibitors for further contributing

to UNPKO. As seen in the findings and discussion, most rationales for contributing to UNPKO are present for both cases. The presence of rationales does explain why countries are willing to participate in UNPKO. However, it does not necessarily explain the variance of peacekeeping contributions for Ethiopia and Kenya, which is the aim of this study. Therefore, the research has argued that the inhibitors between both countries explain the main variance in contributions over time. The difference that has impacted state contributions are the political variable for contributing to UNPKO, based on the difficult domestic politics Kenya has faced compared to Ethiopia. The security variable related to the perception of threats and how to tackle armed conflicts for both countries has also varied. The inhibitors have shown that Kenya has a preference for non-UN solutions compared to Ethiopia as it is in line with its national security interests.

Considering the institutional inhibitors, the military antipathy Kenya has faced towards the UN directly resulted in the withdrawal of peacekeepers in the UNMISS in 2016. Tied to this event, the normative discomfort concerning the mandate for UNMISS has also led to the unwillingness to further contribute from 2016 onwards. The discomfort of the normative agenda was also present for Ethiopia. In combination with the war with Eritrea, it led to the low levels of contributions during the late 1990s. Lastly, for the economic variable of states, it has been particularly challenging to research the inhibitors for participating in UNPKO by calculating the specific costs of deploying to UNPKO. Therefore, this study recommends that further research comes up with a specific methodology or framework that could calculate the economic benefits from UN reimbursements against the national costs for deploying UN peacekeepers.

This research has contributed to the literature by drawing a multi-dimensional comparison between Ethiopia and Kenya about UNPKO contributions, which has not been done before. It has raised the importance of looking at the inhibitors for participating in the UN in comparing two bordering countries that vary significantly in contributions over time. The study also contributed to the literature by raising issues of membership of states in the UNSC and UNBPC, considering the importance of domestic politics to UNPKO, and the significance of non-UN PKOs on limiting further UNPKO contributions. However, it would make this research more fruitful to have also conducted interviews with peacekeepers that have participated in UNPKO for both countries. The interviews could be carried out by contacting the training centres and interviewing peacekeepers on training and preparing for UNPKO. As

this research has mainly focussed on what occurs at the national level, it would give more insight into the main reasons for participation according to individual personnel, including police and civilians in UNPKO. This research would provide a more in-depth analysis of what occurs on the individual level. It is especially relevant for gaining information in terms of the deployment process for personnel, the financial incentives regarding salaries and other individual rationales for participating in UNPKO. This study hopes that this approach can be reflected in future research pertaining to the motivations for participating in UNPKO.

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Appendix

The appendix illustrates two tables with the number of contributions per country per UNPKO since 1990. The first appendix for Ethiopia's UNPKO contributions and the second appendix for Kenya. The information is retrieved from the United Nations database on personnel contributions per mission per year. The tables provide the year, the number of contributions per UNPKO, and the total number of contributions for the given year.

Notes:

- The number of contributions per mission per year for Ethiopia (Appendix A) and Kenya (Appendix B) is retrieved from the United Nations troop contributions database (United Nations, 2020).

Appendix A

Year	Ethiopia's UN Missions & Contributions	Total contributions
1994	UNAMIR (805)	805
1995	UNAMIR (812)	812
2003	UNMIL (1064)	1064
2004	ONUB (864), UNMIL (2568)	3432
2005	ONUB (864), UNMIL (2546)	3410
2006	UNMIL (1611), UNOCI (2)	1613
2007	UNMIL (1837), UNOCI (2)	1839
2008	UNAMID (1479), UNMIL (996), UNMIS (15), UNOCI (1)	2491
2009	MINURCAT (13), UNAMID (1724), UNMIL (423), UNMIS (10), UNOCI (2)	2172
2010	UNAMID (2276), UNMIL (13), UNMIS (10), UNOCI (2)	2301

Year	Ethiopia's UN Missions & Contributions	Total contributions
2011	UNAMID (2406), UNISFA (3795), UNMIL (12), UNMISS (9), UNOCI (2)	6224
2012	UNAMID (1938), UNISFA (3900), UNMIL (13), UNMISS (4), UNOCI (2)	5857
2013	UNAMID (2580), UNISFA (4015), UNMIL (14), UNMISS (8), UNOCI (2)	6619
2014	UNAMID (2533), UNISFA (3988), UNMIL (14), UNMISS (1270), UNOCI (2)	7807
2015	MINUSTAH (9), UNAMID (2552), UNISFA (4425), UNMIL (11), UNMISS (1297), UNOCI (2)	8296
2016	MINUSMA (1), MINUSTAH (8), UNAMID (2570), UNISFA (4406), UNMIL (5), UNMISS (1303), UNOCI (2)	8295
2017	MINUSMA (1), UNAMID (2450), UNISFA (4445), UNMISS (1524)	8420
2018	MINUSMA (1), UNAMID (984), UNISFA (4453), UNMISS (2159)	7597
2019	MINUSMA (1), UNAMID (828), UNISFA (3657), UNMISS (2164), UNMHA (1)	6651

Year	Ethiopia's UN Missions & Contributions	Total contributions
2020	MINUSMA (1), UNAMID (834), UNISFA (3651), UNMHA (1), UNMISS (2163)	6650

Appendix B

Year	Kenya's UN Missions & Contributions	Total contributions
1990	UNIIMOG (1)	1
1991	UNIKOM (7), MINURSO (10)	17
1992	UNTAC (100), UNAVEM (6), MINURSO (10), UNPROFOR (963)	1079
1993	UNIKOM (6), MINURSO (10), UNPROFOR (1034), UNOMIL (16)	1066
1994	UNIKOM (7), MINURSO (10), UNPROFOR (1075), UNOMIL (7)	1099
1995	UNIKOM (7), MINURSO (10), UNPROFOR (1071), UNOMIL (9)	1097
1996	UNIKOM (7), UNAVEM (10), MINURSO (8), UNTAES (55), UNPREDEP (2), UMOP (2), UNOMIL (11)	95
1997	UNIKOM (7), UNAVEM (10), MINURSO (8), UNTAES (55), UNPREDEP (2), UMOP (2), UNOMIL (11)	95
1998	UNIKOM (4), MONUA (9), MINURSO (8), UNMIBH (11), UNPREDEP (2), UNMOP (1), UNOMSIL (4)	40
1999	UNAMSIL (844), UMIBB (7), UNMIK (21), UNIKOM (4), UNMOP (1)	886

Year	Kenya's UN Missions & Contributions	Total contributions
2000	MINURSO (8), MONUC (9), UNAMSIL (879), UNIKOM (4), UNMEE (21), UNMIK (27), UNMOP (1), UNMIBH (7), UNTAET (290)	1241
2001	MINURSO (8), MONUC (27), UNAMSIL (1094), UNIKOM (3), UNMEE (622), UNMIBH (7), UNMIK (27), UNTAET (12)	1801
2002	MINURSO (9), MONUC (29), UNAMSIL (1090), UNIKOM (4), UNMEE (662), UNMIK (45), UNMISSET (2)	1841
2003	MINUCI (1), MINURSO (10), MONUC (37), UNAMSIL (1003), UNMEE (685), UNMIK (39), UNMIL (11), UNMISSET (2)	1788
2004	MINURSO (9), MONUC (43), ONUB (1001), UNAMSIL (207), UNMEE (909), UNMIK (29), UNMIL (23), UNOCI (9)	2230
2005	MINURSO (9), MONUC (44), ONUB (1,002), ONUCI (9), UNMEE (333), UNMIK (18), UNMIL (32), UNMIS (35)	1482
2006	MINURSO (3), MONUC (36), UNIOSIL (2), UNMEE (186), UNMIK (16), UNMIL (34), UNMIS (850), UNOCI (8)	1135

Year	Kenya's UN Missions & Contributions	Total contributions
2007	MINUSO (5), MONUC (39), UNAMID (1), UNIOSIL (2), UNMEE (127), UNMIK (17), UNMIL (30), UNMIS (833), UNOCI (8)	1062
2008	MINURSO (1), MONUC (22), UNAMID (87), UNMIL (24), UNMIS (846)	980
2009	MINURCAT (4), MONUC (21), UNAMID (84), UNMIL (21), UNMIS (749)	879
2010	MONUSCO (24), UNAMID (86), UNMIL (17), UNMISS (736)	863
2011	MONUSCO (21), UNAMID (88), UNMIL (17), UNMISS (708)	834
2012	MONUSCO (23), UNAMID (80), UNIFIL (1), UNMIL (25), UNMISS (723)	852
2013	MINUSMA (1), MONUSCO (27), UNAMID (82), UNIFIL (1), UNMIL (25), UNMISS (739)	875
2014	MINUSCA (11), MONUSCO (22), UNAMID (115), UNIFIL (1), UNMIL (26), UNMISS (763)	938
2015	MINUSCA (13), MINUSMA (7), MONUSCO (25),	1231

Year	Kenya's UN Missions & Contributions	Total contributions
	UNAMID (114), UNIFIL (1), UNMIL (19), UNMISS (1052)	
2016	MINUSCA (22), MINUSMA (7), MONUSCO (21), UNAMID (116), UNIFIL (1), UNMIL (13), UNMISS (188)	368
2017	MINUSCA (13), MINUSMA (10), MONUSCO (17), UNAMID (119), UNIFIL (1), UNMIL (1), UNMISS (29), UNSOS (1)	191
2018	MINUSCA (13), MINUSMA (11), MONUSCO (8), UNAMID (87), UNFIL (2), UNMISS (36)	157
2019	MINUSCA (14), MINUSMA (13), MONUSCO (10), UNAMID (88), UNFIL (2), UNMISS (37), UNSOS (1), UNMHA (1),	166
2020	MINUSCA (14), MINUSMA (14), MONUSCO (10), UNAMID (88), UNIFIL (3), UNMHA (1), UNMISS (28), UNSOS (1)	159

Appendix C

The next two tables provide the evidence of the speeches researched in the General Debates of the UNGA from 1990-now. The table consists of four columns, the first mentioning the factor i.e. political, security or normative. The second and third column points to the rationales and inhibitors found for the analysis. The fourth column provides the evidence of the findings related to the political, security or normative variables. The methods for the separation and selection of evidence is reflected in the data collection section of the thesis.

All speeches were retrieved from the Dag Hammarskjöld database available online. For both countries, the speeches were searched by using the keywords ‘general debate’ and adding the countries name after. For example, ‘General Debate Ethiopia’, or ‘General Debate Kenya’. The speeches per year were selected by selecting the date of publication, which could be filtered on the left side of the database. As all the evidence comprises of UNGA General Debate speeches, the evidence shows the year in parentheses the statements were mentioned.

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National prestige - Voice in international affairs/UN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Difficult domestic politics 	<p>I should also like to reiterate Ethiopia’s readiness to participate in all endeavours aimed at enhancing the role of our Organization in the maintenance of international peace and security (1992).</p> <p>A solution to the problem can come only through the continued efforts of the countries of the region and the international community’s support for those efforts (1994).</p> <p>This is an Ethiopia inspired by grass roots democracy and a genuine devolution of power within a federal system as stipulated in the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia - a country which would be one of the pillars of peace and cooperation in its own subregion and in the African continent as a whole (1995).</p> <p>I would like to say a few words on how vital it is that the reform of the Security Council be completed as speedily as possible. The reform of the Council is critical for the credibility of the United Nations and for its increased legitimacy (2000).</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>We have embarked on a fundamental shift in the country’s foreign and national security policy, focusing on the internal needs of our country and on ensuring its viability, which can be realized only through rapid economic development and the nurturing of democratic governance (2003).</p> <p>At the end of the day, nations must assume responsibility for their future, for their development and for their peace and stability. Ethiopia has no illusions in that regard. We realize fully that, in the final analysis, it is what Ethiopians do that will shape and determine our future (2004).</p> <p>Another modest contribution we are making is in joining the efforts under way for the restoration of peace in Liberia as part of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (2004).</p> <p>Since the early 1950s, Ethiopia has been an active participant in United Nations peacekeeping operations. At the moment, Ethiopia is among the major troop-contributing countries to United Nations peacekeeping missions (2010).</p> <p>The reason I am here on this rostrum, making my maiden speech to the General Assembly as Head of Government of the new Ethiopia, is because we lost our leader only a little more than a month ago. The passing of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is a huge loss for Ethiopia, and undoubtedly for Africa as well. He was a man of prodigious intellect who was uncompromising in his insistence that Ethiopians and Africans should own and protect their development strategies and their approaches to governance and democratization. The late Ethiopian Prime Minister, and the party he led, have facilitated the emergence of a new Ethiopia, rekindling the hopes of Ethiopians for the future and strengthening their confidence in their ability to overcome adversity (2012).</p> <p>We have no more realistic option than a commitment to enlightened national interest (2014).</p> <p>It is on the basis of that conviction that Ethiopia has been an active contributor to advancing the principles and purposes of</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>the United Nations, including by deploying its forces as part of the Blue Helmets since the Organization's early days. It gives us great satisfaction to note that Ethiopia is now the second-largest contributor of troops to United Nations peacekeeping, and I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our unwavering commitment to playing an active role in helping to ensure that the United Nations becomes more effective and secures greater legitimacy (2015).</p> <p>A comprehensive reform of the United Nations system, particularly the Security Council, is indeed imperative if we are to reflect current geopolitical realities and make the United Nations more broadly representative, legitimate and effective. In that context, it is only proper that we seize this opportunity to once again echo Africa's call to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council (2015).</p> <p>Ethiopia is indeed honoured to have been elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the 2017-2018 term. Let me take this opportunity to express our profound appreciation to all the Members of the United Nations for their support and confidence (2016).</p> <p>They need the collective and coordinated responses of all of us, and for our part we are always ready and willing to continue to contribute positively in close partnership with others in our region and beyond in tackling such challenges (2016).</p> <p>As a leading troop-contributing country, Ethiopia attaches great importance to strengthening the role of United Nations peacekeeping in addressing challenges to international peace and security (2017).</p> <p>In that regard, we welcome the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 2378 (2017), which we introduced on Wednesday, and we thank all delegations that sponsored the resolution, which reaffirms the central role of United Nations peacekeeping as one of the most effective tools available to the world in the promotion and</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p data-bbox="1098 232 1535 293">maintenance of international peace and security (2017).</p> <p data-bbox="1098 331 1535 517">Ethiopia’s contribution to United Nations peacekeeping is second to none. We remain totally committed to that noble endeavour as we reform and adapt to the new and challenging realities of peacekeeping (2018).</p> <p data-bbox="1098 555 1535 1070">Six months ago, a peaceful transfer of power took place in Ethiopia. It opened a new chapter in our country’s political and social history, offering realistic and genuine possibilities for change that will meet the hopes and expectations of our youthful population. Those changes are in line with the new political and democratic realities that we are implementing and have been welcomed and embraced by Ethiopians across the length and breadth of the country. Creating a just, peaceful, equitable and sustainable society is the vision that we are supporting as we build a new society on the foundations and achievements of the past (2018).</p> <p data-bbox="1098 1108 1535 1384">The new Government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, is taking a series of measures — opening up the democratic space in every direction, opening up the economy and tackling obstacles to development, such as corruption, human rights violations, and failures of administration and governance (2018).</p> <p data-bbox="1098 1422 1535 1664">As a non-permanent member of the Security Council, we have been doing everything we can to support that important and noble cause, and we will continue to do so in the spirit of and with a commitment to nurturing peace, security and stability for the common good of our countries (2018).</p> <p data-bbox="1098 1702 1535 1888">I am proud to say that Ethiopia is now the leading troop- contributing country to United Nations peacekeeping. Our troops discharge their responsibilities with the highest levels of professionalism, dedication and courage (2019).</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Resolve regional conflicts - Contribute to global peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preference for non-UN solutions 	<p>The effort of the countries of the Horn of Africa is a practical manifestation of the principle that regional conflicts should, as far as possible, be resolved by the countries of the area concerned (1992).</p> <p>On other areas of conflict in Africa, Ethiopia appeals to its brothers in Rwanda, Mozambique and Liberia to continue the momentum towards the establishment of peace in their respective countries. Likewise, it is Ethiopia's fervent hope that our brothers in the Sudan will soon discover the happy medium that brings peace and tranquillity (1993).</p> <p>It seems therefore overdue for the United Nations, when it comes to addressing conflict situations such as those in Africa, to think and to act with the clear assumption that traditional notions of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and peace-making, although important, are not enough to maintain the peace and to make it durable. "An Agenda for Peace" will be far from sufficient if it does not go side by side with, and made an integral part of, "An Agenda for Development" (1994).</p> <p>But no matter how challenging the task, Ethiopia will continue to be committed to promoting peace, stability and cooperation throughout Africa in general and in its subregion in particular (1995).</p> <p>My country attaches great importance to full cooperation with countries of its subregion with a view to promoting peace (1995).</p> <p>In our own subregion, we have continued to exert the necessary efforts for peace in the Sudan and to assist the people of Somalia in achieving national reconciliation and establish a broad-based Government and a central authority. In both cases, while success has not been easily won, the efforts we are making have nonetheless continued because of the conviction, including on the part of our partners in the international community, that there is no effective alternative to these efforts carried out at the sub regional level through the mechanism of the</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (1998).</p> <p>Peace can never be promoted through appeasement of aggression or by creating the impression that, depending on circumstances, on where they take place and to whom they happen, some acts of aggression can be tolerated (2000).</p> <p>It would indeed be a tragedy and a recipe for further bloodshed in Somalia if efforts are not made to build on the peace and stability that have already been achieved by some regions and parts of Somalia (2000).</p> <p>It is also our view that a broader national reconciliation in the Sudan can easily be achieved on the basis of democratic principles and mutual accommodation. Ethiopia will continue to be committed to peace in the Sudan on this basis and to cooperate with all those who have the goodwill to contribute to peace in our subregion (2000).</p> <p>Let me reiterate: Ethiopia will do the maximum possible for peace and durable stability in Africa as a whole, with the full knowledge that without peace we in Africa will have little chance to ensure a better future for our peoples (2000).</p> <p>Africa's development continues to be arrested by problems of insecurity, instability and lack of peace. On the other hand, it appears unrealistic to expect durable peace in Africa without hope in the future that could be brought about only by visible indications of possibilities for progress (2000).</p> <p>Peace can never be promoted through appeasement of aggression or by creating the impression that, depending on circumstances, on where they take place and to whom they happen, some acts of aggression can be tolerated (2000).</p> <p>Terrorism is not new to Ethiopia. For the past 10 years, we have been victims of terrorist attacks, and we have combated it. That is why we remain committed to doing our utmost to enhance the</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>international effort to root out terrorism (2001).</p> <p>The problem in Somalia needs to be resolved as speedily as possible. There is no reason why the situation should be allowed to continue festering, to the detriment of the people of Somalia and of the subregion in general. The parties to the conflict have to sit down without preconditions to establish a broad-based Government (2001).</p> <p>We are also prepared to do our level best to assist in the process of national reconciliation in Sudan. We plan to be more active in this undertaking as well. We believe that to bring the peace process forward, the will and determination of the parties is critical. But they need to be assisted, and assist we will, in good faith and with all the necessary responsibility (2001).</p> <p>There should be no doubt about Ethiopia's commitment to peace and stability and to carrying out its responsibilities to the best of its abilities on matters that affect the international community as a whole — first of all in its own subregion and in Africa (2001).</p> <p>Ethiopia will leave no stone unturned for peace in our subregion and in Africa as a whole. The effort we have been making for peace in Somalia within the framework of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development is being made in that spirit. It is also in that same spirit that we shall continue to do our share for peace and national reconciliation in the Sudan. Most of all, we draw satisfaction from the fact that we have managed to come out of a war that was imposed on us. For our part, we are determined to leave behind the crisis we had with Eritrea. We shall remain committed to the peace process until its conclusion (2002).</p> <p>But the promotion of the cause of peace in the Horn of Africa has not been that easy. Our subregion is an area of the world that has long been vulnerable to terrorist activities (2002).</p> <p>It is our conviction that success in the fight against international terrorism</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>requires the genuine cooperation and solidarity of the entire international community, no matter who might be the target of such terrorism (2002).</p> <p>Few regions of the world have suffered as a result of conflict as much as the Horn of Africa. We in Ethiopia are committed, along with others in our subregion, to change this existing reality. With the progress that continues to be made in the peace process to resolve the conflict in Somalia, we are today more hopeful than ever that the long saga of the Somali people might be about to end (2003).</p> <p>We are also deeply encouraged by the peace process aimed at resolving the conflict in the Sudan, which has also entered into a very delicate phase. The parties deserve to be commended for the great resolve they are demonstrating in addressing the common challenges they are facing (2003).</p> <p>These developments show that the situation in the Horn of Africa is not hopeless. The challenges we are facing are nonetheless formidable. We in Ethiopia are determined to contribute more than our share to assist in the regeneration of our subregion, which has also been the target of international terrorism. The achievement of peace and national reconciliation in Somalia is extremely critical in the fight against this scourge as well. That is why all those who are willing to join in the fight against international terrorism should be automatically supportive of the peace effort by IGAD in Somalia (2003).</p> <p>The renewed vigour with which we in Africa have begun to be proactive in the area of peace and stability within the framework of the Peace and Security Council of the AU is, indeed, a promising beginning. But despite the efforts being made by Africa, the progress that we have made so far has been modest and thus insufficient to bring about hope for the future of the continent (2004).</p> <p>Ethiopia is prepared to do whatever is humanly possible for peace. There is no greater priority for us than ensuring peace in our country and stable and</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p data-bbox="1093 237 1544 297">mutually beneficial relations with all our neighbours (2004).</p> <p data-bbox="1093 336 1544 790">The peace process in Somalia has now come to a very critical point, with the Somalis having now come closer than any time in the last 13 years to establishing a national Government. Ethiopia will continue, as a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Facilitation Committee, to contribute to the achievement of national reconciliation and work to help the Somali State rise from the ashes. That is an obligation for Ethiopia and it is also consistent with the vital interest Ethiopia has in peace and stability in our subregion (2004).</p> <p data-bbox="1093 828 1544 1041">Peace and stability in the Sudan is so critical for our subregion and for that reason Ethiopia will continue to do the best it can, including as a member of the AU Peace and Security Council, to assist that sister country to overcome the challenge it is facing (2004).</p> <p data-bbox="1093 1079 1544 1355">On the fight against terrorism, Ethiopia will continue to discharge its responsibility in cooperation with other peace-loving countries. Ethiopia rejects terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We in Ethiopia are determined to work with the international community to implement the counter-terrorism strategy (2005).</p> <p data-bbox="1093 1393 1544 1543">On the continental level, we are encouraged by the dynamism that the new African Union has injected into the joint African effort for peace and stability (2005).</p> <p data-bbox="1093 1581 1544 1704">Ethiopia strongly believes that the prevalence of peace and security in the country and its region is an absolute necessity (2006).</p> <p data-bbox="1093 1742 1544 1977">Ethiopia that peace, stability and national harmony prevail in that country. It is precisely for that reason that we have spared no effort over the past 15 years — working together with partners in the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) — to help the Somalis to</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>achieve peace and national reconciliation (2006).</p> <p>The international community would do itself a great disservice if it failed to appreciate the implications of what is currently happening in Somalia and did not respond in an appropriate manner (2006).</p> <p>There should be no doubt that Ethiopia will continue to be a pillar of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. That is Ethiopia's vocation, whether with respect to the problem in Somalia or in connection with the difficulty we have in ensuring that Eritrea chooses the peaceful path. Resort to force is never a basis for sustainable peace. That is the philosophy that underpins our policy towards Eritrea and towards the crisis in Somalia (2006).</p> <p>It is not just the absence of conflict and dispute, but the reality of peace and cooperation, which is, we know, an absolute necessity. Without this we cannot achieve our aims, whether in Ethiopia, our region, or in Africa (2007).</p> <p>Ethiopia has consistently helped to promote peace and stability in our region. We have no doubt that sustainable development will be possible only with durable peace and security. Those form the very foundation of our subregional organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). As the current Chair of IGAD, Ethiopia is determined to ensure that its revitalization will become a reality, enhance regional integration and promote peace, security and development (2008).</p> <p>At the same time, we urge the Security Council to discharge its responsibility by deploying a peacekeeping mission to Somalia as soon as possible or at least by allocating the necessary resources to strengthen the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). We commend the deployment of troops from Uganda and Burundi to AMISOM. It is never too late for others to follow their example (2008).</p> <p>Terrorism is a scourge that impedes peace and development in any part of the world. As its occurrence in any form</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>threatens global security as a whole, Ethiopia believes that it should be addressed collectively. In that regard, we attach great significance to the ability of dialogue among civilizations to build a culture of tolerance that will enable us to create closer understanding among nations — all nations (2008).</p> <p>The first is in the area of peace and security. Obviously, Ethiopia is part of the Horn of Africa. As a neighbour sharing a longer border with Somalia than any other country and with a large population of Ethiopian Somalis, we have been affected by what goes on in that sisterly country; indeed, it would be a miracle if that were not the case (2009).</p> <p>However, it appears that the Council does not consider Somalia to be a priority (2009).</p> <p>That is why the peace process in the Sudan, and in particular the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, is so critical for us. The Horn of Africa cannot afford the consequences of failure in the Sudan peace process. We are very close to both parties in the Sudan, and that is an asset that we want to use wisely (2009).</p> <p>Among the challenges that the international community faces in the area of peace and security is the scourge of terrorism. Like many other countries, we have been at the receiving end of this problem. We believe that unreserved international cooperation is the only viable way to combat terrorism. Ethiopia will continue to do its level best in that regard (2010).</p> <p>Any discussion of peace and security on the international scene today will inevitably have to take up the situation in the Horn of Africa. It is regrettable that we still cannot talk about the situation in Somalia with a great deal of optimism. On one hand, the threat of extremism continues unabated in Somalia, as does the danger posed by international terrorist networks and their sponsors to Somalia, and beyond. On the other hand, it is clear that there is little chance for making progress in Somalia until there is harmony and greater seriousness of</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>purpose at the highest level within the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia (2010).</p> <p>With regard to the situation in the Sudan, Ethiopia is of the firm view that conceivably there is no other conflict on the continent today comparable to that of the Sudan. Hence, we believe that success in the Sudan will mean significant success for Africa as a whole. By the same token, failure may entail a serious catastrophe for Africa (2010).</p> <p>Realizing the fact that one of the major factors hindering development in our region is related to security and the lack of durable stability, apart from doing our best to lay the basis for the integration of our subregion through various infrastructure-related projects, we have continued to strengthen our common endeavour for peace and security in the IGAD region (2011).</p> <p>No regional group has been as closely identified with peace-making in the Sudan as IGAD. In Somalia, in close collaboration with the East African Community, the African Union and the United Nations, IGAD has been the lynchpin in the effort to assist the people of Somalia in achieving peace, stability and national reconciliation (2011).</p> <p>That is why the successful cooperation of the IGAD countries for stability and security in the Horn of Africa, and in the fight against terrorism and extremism, has been so vital. It requires the wholehearted support of the international community, the General Assembly and, most particularly, the Security Council (2011).</p> <p>For our part, we have been guided by the objective of protecting and defending the collective security interest of the people of our region. That has guided our policy in the Sudan and in the effort that we have been making to nurture mutual confidence between us and both the Republic of Sudan and the new nation of South Sudan. We have also followed that signpost in conducting our policy with respect to Somalia (2011).</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>We in Ethiopia have never had a short-sighted perspective on what we need to do to ensure that our national interest and our national security are protected (2011)</p> <p>We salute all those, most particularly the contributors of troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia, for the sacrifice they have made. The African Union (AU) has made an enormous contribution to laying the basis for the progress that Somalia has made. We also acknowledge the very useful cooperation between the AU and the United Nations, including their two Councils responsible for security. We have to recognize the role of partners as well. But much more needs to be done in Somalia to ensure that the new Government stands on its own feet. We would be naive, however, if we believed that the enemies of peace of Somalia and the region are completely defeated. That is why it is so critical that the momentum is not lost in Somalia and Somalia's ownership of the process of national reconciliation is strengthened. We will continue to assist Somalia and the new President of the country, Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and the people of Somalia can count on that (2012).</p> <p>Peace between the Sudan and South Sudan and a close partnership between the two, above and beyond the benefit it has for us all, has for us Ethiopians an additional emotional and sentimental value. That was an issue that our late Prime Minister, even as he was struggling for his life, was following with the same intensity as before, and he continued to offer whatever added value he could bring to bear on the peace process. Let me thank both the Sudan and South Sudan for placing their trust in us, as has been so manifest in the deployment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (2012).</p> <p>Indeed, we are proud of our troops in Abyei, as we are of all our people serving under the United Nations flag, including those in Darfur (2012).</p> <p>Let me begin by condemning the terrorist attacks in Kenya that claimed the lives of innocent civilians and left many more injured. I wish to express my heartfelt condolences to the people and</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>Government of Kenya, as well as to the families of the victims of that callous attack. That incident once again demonstrates the need for us to renew our commitment to fight terrorism and extremism in all its forms and manifestations (2013).</p> <p>The security and humanitarian situation in Central African Republic is still a matter of serious concern. I wish to reiterate our call to the United Nations to provide multifaceted support to the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic, which will be deployed in that country to protect civilians and restore security and public order. On the other hand, the escalation of tension in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo also poses threats to the peace and security of the Great Lakes region and the continent as a whole. The only durable solution is for both the Government and the armed opposition to conclude their peace talks under the auspices of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) (2013).</p> <p>We derive satisfaction from the significant progress made in Somalia towards peace in the country, and we are also encouraged by the agreement reached between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Juba Interim Administration, which constitutes a significant milestone in promoting peace and national reconciliation (2013).</p> <p>I am addressing the Assembly today not only on behalf of my country but also as the representative of the African Union (AU), which Ethiopia has the honour of chairing this year. It is a welcome coincidence that Ethiopia, which played host to the founding Conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 50 years ago, has assumed the rotating chairpersonship of that premier continental organization at a time when its golden jubilee is being celebrated (2013).</p> <p>I would like to raise one important issue that has been a matter of serious concern for us in our efforts to promote peace, security and national reconciliation on the continent and regarding which there</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>is a strong consensus in Africa. Time and again, we in Africa have affirmed our unflinching commitment to fighting impunity and promoting democracy, rule of law and good governance throughout the continent, in conformity with the Constitutive Act of the African Union. That commitment has been empirically validated by bold actions taken recently by the African Union (2013).</p> <p>In our part of the world, progress made over the past decade is being undermined by new cycles of violence and conflict. The crisis in South Sudan is an example. We in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region are doing everything we can to resolve the South Sudanese crisis through peaceful means with the support of the United Nations, the African Union and international partners. But progress, let alone a breakthrough, has not been easy to come by. The situation highlights an often encountered challenge. Progress in peacemaking can hardly be contemplated when there is a lack of sufficient commitment to a peaceful resolution of a crisis by the parties to the conflict. But IGAD is determined to expend every possible effort to find a lasting solution to the crisis through an all-inclusive political dialogue (2014).</p> <p>In contrast with the situation in South Sudan and with situations in many parts of the world, the situation in Somalia has been improving over the course of the year. Al-Shabaab may not have been entirely removed as a threat, but it has been greatly degraded. The recent setback it suffered is bound to speed up its demise. The military gains made on the ground cannot, however, be sustained without progress on the political track through the establishment of local administrations and the maintenance of law and order in the newly liberated areas (2014).</p> <p>Conflict is not an exclusively African phenomenon. What has become obvious lately is how much the global security situation is becoming a source of concern. Never since the end of the cold war has the global security situation been as fragile as it is today. The threat of terrorism has affected ever greater and</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>wider areas of the world. At no time over the past many decades has the need for effective cooperation at the international and regional levels been as pressing and as urgent as it is today (2014).</p> <p>In that context, peace and security in the Horn of Africa are extremely critical for us, and we are doing everything we can with others in the region to tackle the conflicts afflicting our neighbours. We have been making tremendous efforts to assist South Sudan to resolve its internal problems. What happened in July was indeed a serious setback for the implementation of the peace agreement that the South Sudanese parties had signed under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Plus. We in the IGAD region met on a number of occasions at various levels to address the issue and made concrete proposals on the way forward. The proposals were subsequently supported by the African Union and the United Nations. We are confident and hopeful that the South Sudanese parties will heed the call of the regional and international communities and restore peace for the sake of their people, who have suffered so much (2016).</p> <p>Ethiopia has been resolute in defending global peace and security through our contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations for 70 years (2019).</p> <p>It has not been easy, but we have laid down a firm foundation for development in Ethiopia and durable peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. The rapprochement with Eritrea was a clear demonstration of the capacity of Africans to solve their problems through constructive dialogue. We are working to transform the whole region into an inclusive zone of peace and prosperity, and we are confident that the international community will support us (2019).</p> <p>Somalia has come a long way in recent years and is now consolidating State institutions, with elections scheduled for 2020. At the same time, Al-Shabaab remains a serious danger to Somalia and</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>to the wider region. Any reversal of the progress made through the enormous sacrifices of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMISOM) and the Somali national forces must be prevented. In this regard, sustainable financing and support for AMISOM remains critical. Our partners must recognize this and reaffirm their commitments (2019).</p> <p>With the recent meeting between President Kiir and Mr. Machar, the South Sudanese parties have taken encouraging steps towards the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. The parties should continue to show a strong commitment to increase the momentum for the full implementation of all the pre-transition objectives set forth in the agreement. We hope that the international community will redouble its efforts to deliver on the support pledged (2019).</p>
Normative	- Support the UN system	- Discomfort with normative agenda	<p>It is our considered view that this international organization, whose cardinal objective is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, should have spoken out with sufficient vigour, instead of hiding behind a convenient excuse to justify inaction when confronted with the most egregious human rights violations and continual bloodshed (1991).</p> <p>Ethiopia has attained the requisite self-confidence that makes it a true partner in the community of nations. I wish therefore to reiterate the continued faith of my country in the collective wisdom of our global Organization and to pledge anew our unreserved support for the laudable efforts of the United Nations system. We believe that as the guarantor of international peace and stability, the United Nations should expand its efforts by stepping up its activities in the field of preventive diplomacy (1993).</p> <p>There can be no doubt that the degree to which the United Nations is effective in promoting peace and in ensuring development for all is the most appropriate yardstick for judging how effective and vital the United Nations has</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>been and will be in fulfilling the purposes for which it came into being (1995).</p> <p>For Ethiopia, and for all those who have trust in the efficacy of multilateralism, there is no alternative to the United Nations (1998).</p> <p>I therefore wish to conclude by renewing Ethiopia's commitment to the United Nations and to what it stands for (1998).</p> <p>Instead, I should like to focus on one issue: collective security, especially in relation to its impact on developing countries, those in Africa in particular, and how the United Nations has failed them in this critical area (1999).</p> <p>Whether it is in the area of economic cooperation or with respect to peace and security, our continent continues to be a region of the world which is the least favoured for effective and meaningful cooperation. The "We the peoples of the United Nations" mentioned in the Preamble to the Charter and the lofty aspirations contained therein continue to be distant dreams for Africa (1999).</p> <p>That country has failed to be on the top of the United Nations agenda, not because it has no legitimate claim to be a priority for the United Nations collective security system, but because the interests of those who count are not affected. This also applies more or less to Angola and Sierra Leone, and earlier to Liberia (1999).</p> <p>In short, the United Nations has failed Africa, and now stands, one foot into the next century, with this record (1999).</p> <p>The experience of my own country over the last year and a half and more speaks volumes about how the United Nations can fail an African country deemed to have no option other than submit to unjust decisions by the powerful. In effect, what the United Nations said to Ethiopia was that Article 51 of the Charter, which provides for the inherent right of sovereign nations to self-defence, did not apply to poor nations such as Ethiopia (1999).</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>In the light of this experience, it is indeed difficult to keep intact our trust in the United Nations and in international cooperation. It is also difficult to have faith in the efficacy of the United Nations collective security system (1999).</p> <p>The United Nations is at a crossroads. It cannot limp along and enter the next century with all its weaknesses unattended. Reforms are necessary. The Security Council cannot remain as it is, unrepresentative and unresponsive to the interests of the majority. It is still not too late to restore confidence in the collective security system envisioned in the Charter of our Organization more than half a century ago. The credibility of the United Nations needs to be revived (1999).</p> <p>We are also delighted that the United Nations and the Secretary-General were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for this year. It is a testimony to and a recognition of the important work the United Nations has been doing (2001).</p> <p>Its commitment to the United Nations endures. Ethiopia is a country that has always been true to principles of international law and to their scrupulous observance. We are proud of this tradition and we cherish it (2001).</p> <p>I would like to conclude by renewing Ethiopia's commitment to the United Nations and to what it stands for. We wish to see the United Nations become an even a more effective universal Organization and a more forceful and faithful custodian of the principles of international law. Our hope and our dream is that the United Nations will be an even more robust universal Organization catering to the legitimate interests of both big and small countries. We in Ethiopia will continue to contribute our share to the greater nurturing of multilateralism and to making the United Nations an effective custodian of those values (2002).</p> <p>Ethiopia is committed always to being a peaceful country. We have always been second to none in our commitment to the principles of international law. This will remain one of our people's distinguishing</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>features. This is a tradition we will continue to maintain and foster (2003).</p> <p>My own country has also been disappointed in the past. But we have never abandoned hope in the United Nations or in multilateralism, because we know, at the end of the day, that the United Nations is indispensable. That is why Ethiopia will always be committed to the United Nations and its ideals (2003).</p> <p>I would like to conclude by reaffirming Ethiopia's commitment to the United Nations and to the principles and purposes for the promotion of which it was created. It is our earnest hope that the United Nations will continue to enhance its credibility with respect to its entire membership. That is why the reform of the Organization is so critical and imperative, including the reform of the Security Council, so that regions, including Africa, can have the fair representation they aspire to. Without a doubt, enhanced democratization will make the United Nations more transparent and therefore more credible. The future of the Organization rests on it. In the meantime, Ethiopia will continue to be devoted to the United Nations and to the values it stands for (2004).</p> <p>Ethiopia has always been committed to the rule of law and to the maintenance of peace and stability (2005).</p> <p>I would like to conclude by reiterating Ethiopia's commitment to the United Nations, and its preparedness to do whatever is necessary to contribute to efforts designed to make the Organization more effective and more representative (2005).</p> <p>There is no better guarantee for peace and stability than the nurturing of mutual confidence and trust, regardless of differences in outlook or in political or other values. This also explains Ethiopia's legendary commitment to the United Nations and to its principles and purposes. As I conclude, therefore, I would like to reaffirm Ethiopia's devotion to the United Nations and to the</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>values of interdependence, which the Organization embodies (2006).</p> <p>Ethiopia, a founding Member of the United Nations, will continue to be devoted to multilateralism and the fullest cooperation with the United Nations (2007).</p> <p>That is why we need the United Nations as never before. It is a body that remains vital to the future of us all, developing and developed countries alike (2008).</p> <p>Ethiopia remains committed to the United Nations reform process and its revitalization. They are critical to the credibility of the United Nations and the future of multilateralism. As a founding Member of the United Nations, Ethiopia will always remain loyal to its purpose and principles (2008).</p> <p>The United Nations is an Organization which we cannot live without. We benefit from the Organization in more ways than one. We also take our obligation to it very seriously. It is in that spirit that we continue to strengthen our contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping efforts. In this we shall continue without fail. It is for that reason that I wish to conclude by reiterating Ethiopia's commitment to the United Nations and by affirming our commitment to all efforts at reforming the Organization, including the Security Council (2009).</p> <p>In conclusion, let me reiterate, as a founding Member, Ethiopia's enduring commitment to the ideals of our Organization and the fulfilment of its objectives, as set out in the Charter, which remains a living document and a source of inspiration for the international community (2010).</p> <p>Africa is no longer the marginalized continent of the 1980s or even of the period a little later than that. Ethiopia will continue to play its part to ensure the success of the transformation and the success of multilateralism under the auspices of the United Nations (2011).</p> <p>Ethiopia is not a newcomer to international diplomacy. As a founding</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>member of the United Nations, we take our responsibility as members of the human family seriously. We view our vocation to be a factor for strengthening international peace and security and for enhancing friendly relations among nations, large or small, on the basis of full equality (2011).</p> <p>I believe we should adopt a flexible and innovative approach in implementing Chapter VIII of the Charter in order to enhance our partnership and address our common challenges (2013).</p> <p>In conclusion I wish to underline Africa’s enduring commitment to this indispensable global body — a universal organization whose viability is an existential necessity. It is in that spirit that Africa will continue to nurture its close cooperation with the United Nations (2013).</p> <p>I wish to conclude by stressing Ethiopia’s commitment to multilateralism, to joining hands with all like-minded countries in order to contribute to regional and international peace and security and to the successful realization of the major projects that we will undertake in connection with the post-2015 agenda. As a founding member of the Organization and as a member of the League of Nations — although Ethiopia was abandoned by the League — Ethiopia attaches the highest priority to cooperation among peoples and countries with a view to addressing common challenges. It is our conviction that might does not make right. There is no substitute for the pursuit of mutual advantages as a guideline for a realistic and just foreign policy. That is our guide for all the friendships and partnerships we have and will continue to develop (2014).</p> <p>The fact that nations are driven by the pursuit of national interests has always been self-evident. But at this juncture in world history and in the light of the many common challenges that we all face, we have no more realistic option than a commitment to enlightened national interest, which can be promoted only</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>within the framework of multilateralism (2014).</p> <p>Ethiopia is indeed proud to be one of the founding Members of the United Nations. Although in our hour of need we could not count much on the support of the League of Nations, of which we were also a member, Ethiopia has nonetheless never lost confidence in multilateralism and has remained a staunch supporter of the principle of collective security enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (2015).</p> <p>The United Nations is an Organization that none of us can afford to live without. In spite of its shortcomings, it remains the only universal Organization we have, whether we are big or small, rich or poor, providing us with a unique platform for advancing our common objectives and addressing the myriad problems we collectively face (2015).</p> <p>That, I believe, is the main essence of the anniversary celebration aptly captured in the slogan “Strong UN. Better World”. But the United Nations is, after all, an intergovernmental Organization whose strengths and weaknesses cannot be understood independently of the role of its members. It is therefore up to us to empower the Organization to fulfil its promises in a new era (2015).</p> <p>We have seen what the United Nations can deliver as a unique intergovernmental platform for a common and collective response to the myriad challenges facing humankind as a whole (2016).</p> <p>I would like to conclude my remarks by reaffirming our commitment to effectively discharging our responsibilities and upholding the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter (2016).</p> <p>We are meeting at a time when multilateralism is facing serious challenges, and yet there has never been a time when we needed multilateralism more. That is why this gathering of nations under the umbrella of the United Nations is so important. It remains the only universal Organization whose very</p>

Ethiopia	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>ideals of freedom, equality and justice are still as valid today as they were at its inception (2018).</p> <p>That remains profoundly true. Let me take this opportunity today to assure the Assembly that Ethiopia, as a founding Member of the United Nations, will continue to adhere to those ideals and to the principles of multilateralism as we face unprecedented challenges and threats to our community of nations (2018).</p> <p>We are currently working to strengthen the efficiency and accountability of peacekeepers, increase the role of women in peace and security activities (2019).</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National prestige - Voice in international affairs/UN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Difficult domestic politics 	<p>Peace-keeping operations have increasingly become among the most utilized and widely acceptable instruments of the Organization, especially in discharging its primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. Kenya is happy to be closely associated with peace-keeping operations. We have contributed military and police personnel to many peace-keeping operations worldwide (1993).</p> <p>Kenya is substantially involved in United Nations peace-keeping activities, having contributed military and civilian police personnel to various peace-keeping operations world-wide. The enormous rise in the number and scope of peace-keeping operations demands that the ability of the United Nations Secretariat to cope with such large-scale operations be strengthened (1994).</p> <p>It is in this spirit that Kenya has always supported and participated in many United Nations peacekeeping missions throughout the world. We will continue to contribute personnel and remain actively involved in United Nations peacekeeping activities (1999).</p> <p>With regard to the United Nations Centre in Nairobi, my delegation welcomes the improvement in the level of utilization of the conference facilities. We encourage the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure that all meetings and activities on environment and matters related to human settlements are held at the United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON) so as to utilize the excellent facilities there and to further strengthen the role of the Organization in all matters charged to it in conformity with the headquarters rule (2002).</p> <p>On issues of world security, Kenya has a long record of participation in peacekeeping operations. Today, Kenya is the sixth largest troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world (2002).</p> <p>For peace and stability to flourish, good governance is a necessity. This challenge is one that Kenya has been able to meet. In December 2002, Kenya saw a historic</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>moment, when we held general elections which were universally recognized as free, fair and, indeed, democratic. Every citizen of Kenya was provided an opportunity to have a voice in determining his or her Government, successful and strong evidence that Africans can and will embrace democracy (2003).</p> <p>On the international arena, Kenya has long been a major troop-contributing country in peacekeeping operations and will continue to actively participate with other nations under the aegis of the United Nations (2004).</p> <p>We strongly support the Secretary-Generals proposal to establish a Peacebuilding Commission and fund by 31 December 2005. We believe such a peacebuilding commission will contribute to the realization of real peace in many regions (2005).</p> <p>We are a major contributor to United Nations peace missions around the world (2006).</p> <p>Kenyans, fellow Africans and the international community held on to the hope that our country would obtain a peacefully negotiated outcome to the political crisis. That hope was realized on 28 February with the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008).</p> <p>I am confident that, over the past few months, Kenya has regained its glory and redeemed its image as a peaceful nation, a safe tourist and investment destination and the regional hub for peace and humanitarian efforts (2008).</p> <p>We need to ensure that its composition reflects equitable geographical representation of the entire United Nations membership. Africa therefore deserves permanent representation on the Security Council (2008).</p> <p>In order to better equip the United Nations for meeting these challenges, we must continue to press for reform in the Organization. The Security Council, in particular, must be enlarged and made</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>more democratic and representative of current day reality. Part of the enlargement must include permanent, veto-bearing seats for Africa (2009).</p> <p>I am very proud to say that despite the terrible post-election violence and the subsequent multiple reverses that made reconciliation and reconstruction even more difficult, our people have shown an extraordinary maturity and resilience in rising to unprecedented challenges. We were able to overcome the bitterness over the election with an accord that we signed with the help of the African Union and the mediation of Kofi Annan, as well as with the support of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who personally visited Kenya at the height of the crisis — for which we are deeply grateful (2009).</p> <p>The new Constitution greatly improves the structures of governance and lays a firm foundation for political stability and economic prosperity. It has created new vitality and a sense of renewal (2010).</p> <p>Kenya is at a time in its history that is full of hope for a bright future. Over the past 10 years, our country has enjoyed a sustained blossoming of democracy. In the year 2010, Kenya adopted a new Constitution. With that constitution, we further secured the human rights and civil liberties of our citizens and entrenched constitutional governance and justice (2012).</p> <p>Kenya is a member in good standing of the international community and it intends to continue to shoulder its global and regional responsibilities. Kenya is especially proud of the scores of Kenyans who work for the United Nations here in New York, but also further afield in peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and in many United Nations organizations in various United Nations stations around the world, including Nairobi. I salute all those Kenyans — every single one of them — for their dedication and commitment. We in Kenya believe that no nation is too poor or too rich, too big or too small to play its rightful role in making the world a better place for all (2014).</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>Importantly, in 2010 we adopted a new democratic Constitution, which expanded and guaranteed a wider range of rights for our people and defined new institutions for the advancement of those rights. Drawing on that, we have re-engineered our system of governance, making it more democratic, inclusive, devolved and responsive. We have also significantly expanded participation in political and development decision-making (2014).</p> <p>Last year, here at the United Nations, Kenya made pledges during the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping. I would like to confirm today that Kenya has indeed lived up to every pledge it made. The first engineering capability troop training for African peacekeepers is ready and has been completed in Nairobi. That was done with the collaboration of our own Kenyan defence forces and the United Nations and with support from the good Governments of Japan and Switzerland (2016).</p> <p>Kenya reaffirms its commitment to continuing to provide training facilities for United Nations programmes, as part of its pledge to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping operations. Kenya, as the current Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, has been at the forefront of advocating for a new peacebuilding architecture for sustainable peace throughout the world (2016).</p> <p>While we build the peacebuilding architecture, we must also dedicate greater efforts to rebuilding and transforming the United Nations system as a whole. We need to transform our global Organization into a more effective and responsive entity that reflects the complex challenges and realities of the twenty-first century (2016).</p> <p>Kenya welcomes the creation of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and looks forward to robust and productive engagement with it (2017).</p> <p>Of particular concern to Africa is the fact that the Security Council continues to be dominated by a small club of countries, which totally excludes the rest of us. That</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>exclusion continues to undermine the legitimacy and efficiency of the Security Council, while its operations, on the other hand, raise issues of accountability and transparency. Therefore, it is imperative that the United Nations embrace reforms on all of the five core areas that have been identified. We call for Africa’s representation in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Security Council, as stated in the African Common Position (2017).</p> <p>The clearest sign that change is real will be in reforms to the membership of the Security Council. Kenya joins the demand for two permanent seats for Africa — with the rights and prerogatives of current members, including the right of veto, as well as additional non-permanent seats. As we all know, Africa is underrepresented in the non-permanent category of the Security Council, and we are not represented at all in the permanent category. That historical injustice is a clear indication of the skewed system that has perpetuated an exclusive model of governance that fuels the trust gap between nations. The governance, leadership and employment in United Nations funds, programmes and agencies must also become more noticeably inclusive of the global South, especially Africa (2018).</p> <p>Kenya is honoured to host the United Nations Office in Nairobi, the only one of its kind in the global South, and looks forward to facilitating the establishment and hosting of the regional United Nations global service delivery model centre (2018).</p> <p>I would like to take this opportunity to thank the African Union for its endorsement of Kenya’s candidature for the Security Council for the period from 2021 to 2022 (2019).</p> <p>Over the years we have contributed more than 40,000 peacekeepers and engaged in post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts across the world. We therefore hope that our experience, competencies and unrelenting quest for peace and prosperity in our neighbourhood, on our continent and in the wider world will persuade the entire</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>United Nations membership to support the African Union's candidate for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council during the elections scheduled for June 2020. I request the vote of each and every State Member of the United Nations family (2019).</p>
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Resolve regional conflicts - Contribute to global peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preference for non-UN solutions 	<p>Kenya believes that peace is not merely the absence of war but the absence of the threat of war or of the use of force in international relations and in all spheres of life as well (1992).</p> <p>The case of Somalia is particularly distressing. We strongly believe that keeping United Nations personnel in Somalia is critical to the pursuit of peace in that country (1993).</p> <p>In this connection, regional bodies need to be strengthened, as their role in supporting development and facilitating solutions to national conflicts cannot be overstressed (1994).</p> <p>The decision to scale down the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda at that critical time contributed to the vacuum that resulted in the estimated loss of 1 million lives, with about 4 million people being internally displaced or fleeing as refugees. The experience of Rwanda calls for fundamental changes to United Nations peace-keeping operations to ensure an adequate, timely and effective response (1994).</p> <p>The situation in Somalia continues to be a matter of great concern to Kenya. As long as the situation in Somalia remains unstable, the countries of the region, and in particular my own, will continue to experience problems associated with the influx of refugees and with a lack of security in the border region (1995).</p> <p>Kenya supports the legitimization and strengthening of regional bodies in peacekeeping. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), under the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in West Africa, stand out as examples of regional organizations that</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>have contributed immensely to peacekeeping in conflict situations (1998).</p> <p>In the Eastern African region, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) continues to promote political dialogue between the warring factions in the Sudan and Somalia (1998).</p> <p>We the neighbouring countries, as well as the international community, have an important role in facilitating the process leading to a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the conflict (1999).</p> <p>Recently, Kenya decided to tighten its border controls with Somalia. However, we remain committed to facilitating ongoing humanitarian operations, which continue with numerous daily flights into Somalia from our territory (1999).</p> <p>The tragic bombing of the embassies of the United States of America in Nairobi and Dar-es- Salaam in August 1998 is still fresh in our memories. This incident, not to mention the recent terrorist attacks in Moscow, has heightened our resolve to work closely with the international community to fight and eradicate terrorism (1999).</p> <p>Africa recognizes the primary role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It also recognizes the need for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in peacekeeping and peace-building. Such efforts have yielded positive results in some countries. However, there are others, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the United Nations has been slow to act (2000).</p> <p>The recent unfortunate experience in Sierra Leone calls for a review of peacekeeping operations, particularly with regard to the safety, commissioning and deployment of troops (2000).</p> <p>Terrorism is another matter of grave concern to us. The effects of the August</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>1998 terrorist bombing in Nairobi are still evident in our economy and in the lives of Kenyans (2000).</p> <p>The proliferation of conflicts in Africa continues to pose serious threats to peace, security and stability. Conflicts have had a negative impact on the continent's development capacity and continue to undermine efforts to improve the living standards of our peoples (2000).</p> <p>In order to carry out one of its fundamental objectives, that of the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations, and in particular its membership, must intensify efforts to resolve all outstanding and persistent conflicts raging in many parts of the world. We the Member States of the United Nations must work very closely to ensure that we completely disable the terrorist machinery. We must particularly support the coalition against terrorism (2001).</p> <p>Conflicts steal the dreams, hopes, aspirations and opportunities of many, many people, especially children. We must intensify our efforts in the search for the peaceful and speedy resolution of conflicts (2001).</p> <p>The peaceful resolution of conflicts is a fundamental tenet of Kenya's foreign policy. It is a matter of record that I have spared no effort throughout my political career in search of peaceful solutions to conflicts in our region and elsewhere. Currently, Kenya is involved in peace negotiations in southern Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We would like more international involvement in peace efforts in Africa (2001).</p> <p>Africa is a continent ravaged by conflicts and instability. However, the recent progress in the resolution of some of these conflicts is very encouraging. In particular, the signing of a protocol between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Machakos, Kenya on 20 July 2002 was a very welcome development. Other</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>positive developments towards lasting peace in Africa include the signing of an agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Rwandese Republic, the holding of peaceful elections in Sierra Leone after years of bitter civil war, and continuing efforts towards reconciliation of the warring factions in Somalia. We also welcome the recent positive developments in Angola. Kenya will continue with its mediation efforts in the region and in the continent as a whole (2002).</p> <p>The launching of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) have rekindled great hopes in the African continent. These initiatives have made it clear that the primary responsibility for the development of Africa lies in the hands of the Africans themselves (2002).</p> <p>With the establishment of the Peace and Security Council as an important organ of the new African Union, Africa must now play its rightful role in matters of international peace and security (2002).</p> <p>Greater emphasis should be put on the deployment of adequate force levels to missions in Africa. In particular, we would like to see greater support in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2002).</p> <p>Terrorism has become a disturbing trend. We who live in Kenya know this all too well, as we do not have the option of ignoring the threat of terror. The people of Kenya have been targeted by terrorists on two recent, separate occasions — in 1998 and in 2002 (2003).</p> <p>Against this backdrop, Kenya is totally committed to the fight against terrorism, as we have been subjected to the loss of innocent lives, untold human suffering, loss of property and social and economic hardship (2003).</p> <p>Wars and conflicts continue, and peace, stability and socio-economic development remain elusive, particularly in Africa. Kenya therefore continues to give priority to the prevention, management and peaceful resolution of conflicts. We have spearheaded the Inter-</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>Government Authority on Development (IGAD) peace processes on the conflicts in southern Sudan and in Somalia. Negotiations on a peaceful solution are ongoing in both Naivasha and Nairobi, respectively (2003).</p> <p>I therefore wish to pay tribute to the Government of the Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), IGAD and the international Partners Forum for their concerted efforts and dedication to the peace process (2003).</p> <p>We call upon the international community to assist the African Union in realizing the establishment of the force, which will be one of the key tools for ensuring peace and stability on the continent (2004).</p> <p>Kenya recognized early that peace and stability should be the cornerstone of both its national and foreign policies. Consequently, Kenya has taken an active part in the search for peaceful solutions to conflicts in our subregion, in Africa and in the rest of the world (2004).</p> <p>I would like to appeal to the international community to redouble its support and commitment in assisting the people of the Sudan to achieve peace through constructive dialogue. It is also my hope that events in the Darfur region will not subsume the positive developments achieved by the Naivasha process (2004).</p> <p>As regards the Somali peace process, I am pleased to report encouraging developments in the past few weeks that indicate a willingness on the part of the people of Somalia to embrace peace after 14 years of turmoil (2004).</p> <p>Kenya welcomes vital contributions to peace and security made by regional organizations forging predictable partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations (2005).</p> <p>Furthermore, Kenya endorses the proposal to establish a strategic military capacity to reinforce United Nations peacekeeping and the creation of a</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>standby brigade for rapid deployment of the Organization is civilian police in peacekeeping operations (2005).</p> <p>In our own neighbourhood, the importance of post-conflict peacebuilding has become a bigger priority after the recent successes of the Sudan and Somalia mediation efforts, which Kenya chaired under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (2005).</p> <p>Kenya welcomes the proposal to develop a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations. For Africa, there is abundant political will in our continent to make the African Union succeed. I believe that external support, especially from the United Nations and the international community at large, would make the African Union work better (2005).</p> <p>The establishment of an African Union Peace and Security Council and of the intervention force planned to be set up by 2009 are measures aimed at advancing political stability in Africa to underpin economic development. Already, the African Union has taken the lead in Burundi and in Darfur, in the Sudan, where deployments of peacekeeping missions have preceded international action by the United Nations (2005).</p> <p>As criminal elements establish their safe enclaves in a country like Somalia, the neighbouring countries and the international community are soon forced to intervene, even militarily, to free hostages, to hunt terrorists or to flush out rebels (2006).</p> <p>We in our region are sure that humanitarian intervention now will yield better and faster results than military intervention and at a much cheaper price than sending troops to pursue criminal elements in a failed State (2006).</p> <p>We believe that, as in all situations of conflict, the final resolution is best achieved through dialogue (2006).</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>The international community must work to help Somalia and not inadvertently compound the problem in that country (2006).</p> <p>My delegation commends the African Union for its support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). We pay special tribute to the Ugandan troops for the important role they are playing in Somalia under very trying circumstances. We appeal for the deployment of the remaining peacekeeping troops to strengthen AMISOM. Kenya also urges the United Nations to assume greater responsibility in Somalia in line with Security Council resolution 1772 (2007). A United Nations presence on the ground in Somalia would complement regional and international efforts to promote peace, stability and reconciliation in that country (2007).</p> <p>For our part, as the international community, we must honour our pledges to provide the necessary resources to Somalia. The problem with Somalia may be less visible today, probably because it has been overshadowed by the conflict in Darfur, but the Somalia crisis is far from over (2007).</p> <p>According to the Human Security Report 2005, the number of armed conflicts in the world has fallen by over 40 per cent during the past 13 years. The report's overall conclusion that conflict is becoming less common in the world in general as well as in Africa is very encouraging. Conflict is a major disincentive to investment and poses an intolerable burden in terms of human suffering. The end of wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Southern Sudan is a welcome development in Africa (2007).</p> <p>While we may celebrate the end of those wars, it is imperative that the international community make the urgent and essential investments that will contribute to the prevention of recurrence of such conflicts. The local populations should experience peace dividends so as to sustain peace (2007).</p>

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			<p>Kenya urges a strengthening of partnerships between the African Union and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the area of political and technical cooperation, as well as partnerships with the continent's subregional organizations (2007).</p> <p>In this regard, my delegation welcomes the Secretary- General's initiative to provide assistance to the African Union to enhance its military capabilities and mediation role in conflict resolution (2007).</p> <p>While I pay tribute to the Governments of Uganda and Burundi for providing troops as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia, I urge the deployment of the remaining troops to strengthen the Mission. I also urge the United Nations and the international community to assume greater responsibility in Somalia so as to nurture the emergence of a stable and democratic country (2008).</p> <p>No one is more eager than we are to help defeat the forces of extremism in Somalia, which have so much sway because of the help of external elements (2009).</p> <p>To succeed in the quest for peace in Somalia, we must recognize that the present focus primarily on the use of force has not led to any curbing of extremism. Indeed, the security and humanitarian crises are worse than ever. We must therefore take a more comprehensive approach in tackling the extremists — an approach that includes encouraging the Transitional Federal Government to much more aggressively pursue its commitment to a more inclusive political process, by bringing into the Government all forces that eschew violence (2009).</p> <p>Since the early 1990s, Kenya has borne the full weight of insecurity in Somalia. Today, as this Assembly meets, the security situation in Somalia continues to deteriorate and threaten peace and stability across the entire region and beyond. Needless to say, the threat posed by today's Somalia to international peace and security is greater than that of any other conflict in the region. Yet Somalia</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>continues to suffer benign neglect from the international community, leading to many lost opportunities to resolve the crisis (2010).</p> <p>It is against this background that Kenya urges the United Nations and the entire international community to seize the opportunity created by the African regional initiative and lend support to the proposed measures, which include the appointment of an eminent high- level personality for Somalia, the effective deployment of the proposed 2,000 troops, a review of the current mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia to enhance its peace enforcement capacity, and the extension of support to the Transitional Federal Government to bolster its effectiveness countrywide (2010).</p> <p>As the Chair of the IGAD Committee on the Sudan, I have remained actively engaged with the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). I have done so because we in the IGAD region believe that the CPA holds the key to peace and stability in the Sudan and the region (2010).</p> <p>Referendum on 9 January 2011, and to accept the outcome of the vote. We in the region are looking forward to the holding of a successful and peaceful referendum that promotes regional peace and stability (2010).</p> <p>In that context, the role of regional organizations in the mediation and resolution of conflicts is of increasing importance. On the African continent, the African Union (AU) and regional organizations such as the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) continue to serve as significant building blocks in the search for global peace and security (2011).</p> <p>As the Assembly is aware, IGAD is at the forefront of efforts to bring peace to Somalia and the Sudan. I am pleased that Kenya's role in both cases has been, and remains, crucial (2011).</p> <p>I would like to reiterate Kenya's continued commitment to engage with</p>

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			<p>both the Sudan and South Sudan, through IGAD as well as bilaterally, in their efforts to resolve the outstanding issues under the just concluded Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2011).</p> <p>The recent improvement in the security situation in Mogadishu gives us great optimism. This has been achieved through the concerted efforts of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), supported by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the international community (2011).</p> <p>As a first step, I call upon the international community to enhance the mandate of AMISOM by providing it with the necessary enablers and resources. Only then can AMISOM have the required capacity to extend its coverage and control. In addition, we must support the TFG in the implementation of the Kampala Accord, which spells out a range of political processes necessary for the attainment of sustainable peace and development in Somalia (2011).</p> <p>That is why we are convinced that Kenya's own well-being and prosperity are hinged on sustained peace, security, stability and inclusive democracy in our region. My country therefore remains supportive of efforts spearheaded by the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the East African Community for the peaceful and inclusive settlement of disputes and situations. Such regional efforts are central to the future of multilateral peacebuilding. They must be the building blocks of international efforts to maintain peace and security in our region and the world (2012).</p> <p>With regard to Somalia, Kenya joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and through the combined efforts of AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government forces, we have witnessed the progressive liberation of large areas of Somalia from Al-Shabaab occupation (2012).</p>

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			<p>With regard to Somalia, Kenya joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and through the combined efforts of AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government forces, we have witnessed the progressive liberation of large areas of Somalia from Al-Shabaab occupation (2012).</p> <p>With regard to the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, Kenya is appreciative of the positive developments of 4 August related to the long-standing dispute over oil resources. We hope that that important agreement marks a first step towards reducing tensions between the two sister countries. Kenya also appreciates the efforts of the international community, both directly and through the African Union, and encourages the two sides to work towards reaching a compromise. I especially commend the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for its determination and leadership in steering the negotiations. We are confident that both countries will agree to urgently address contentious issues on border disputes. Kenya will continue to support efforts to find a peaceful and lasting solution to disputes between the people of the Sudan and South Sudan (2012).</p> <p>It is important that, as the community of nations, we invest in the peaceful settlement of international disputes. However, we must invest first in the prevention of disputes and, secondly, in addressing the root causes of conflicts, such as poverty, inequality, disregard for international law and disrespect for each other's sociocultural and religious beliefs, among others. Only by addressing the root causes of conflict and disputes can we hope to find lasting peace in a just and equitable world (2012).</p> <p>The most immediate of these are terrorism and violent extremism. In Kenya, we stand at a critical moment. As we deepen our democracy, we find our nation thrust onto the front line of a regional and global war against terror. We have become acutely aware that the interplay between democratization, on the one hand, and effective counter-terrorism, on the other, presents severe challenges to our security and our</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>governance institutions. Increasingly, terrorist actors are exploiting the expanded democratic space, sometimes feeding into and even influencing local politics. Unless we can provide an effective buffer to fight back against that tendency, Kenya and indeed other countries will find it difficult to entrench democracy and the post-2015 development agenda (2014).</p> <p>In Somalia, Kenya continues to sacrifice lives and resources in an effort to bring peace to our neighbour. We do this trusting that the international community will stay the course in Somalia (2014).</p> <p>I thank the Security Council for its continued cooperation with IGAD in the search for peace in South Sudan. It is this concert of action that will help to bring about lasting peace, which in turn will form the basis for a transformative post-2015 development agenda for South Sudan and all of its neighbours (2014).</p> <p>The maintenance of international peace and security continues to face increasing challenges owing to the growing intensity and complexity of conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, especially in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. The continuing grave security situation in Eastern Africa and further afield is of particular concern to Kenya, which has continued to invest millions of dollars in the maintenance of regional peace and security, while many Kenyans have lost their lives in the quest for peace. We therefore urge the international community, in particular the Security Council, to shoulder its responsibilities in such a way as to make a direct impact in the resolution of those conflicts (2015).</p> <p>Global terrorism and violent extremism remain a major threat not only to the Republic of Kenya, but also to the entire world. To date, Al-Shabaab terrorists have been targeting the civilian population in Kenya on the pretext that Kenya has deployed its troops in Somalia. The continued threat by Al-Shabaab has had a major impact on Kenya's national security and economy in general. Kenya therefore calls upon the international community to take strong and enforceable action in combating Al-</p>

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			<p>Shabaab, together with other terrorist groups, including foreign fighters. At the same time, we must collectively address the radicalization of youth as the pipeline for global terrorism, including its financing at the grass-roots level, where most young people are radicalized (2015).</p> <p>Somalia is an important neighbour of Kenya. Kenya and Somalia share strong historical, cultural and trading ties that have benefited both societies. Somalia remains of major concern to the international community, and to Kenya in particular, owing to long-standing crises and the security situation, which remains a grave threat to peace and security in the East Africa region and throughout the Horn of Africa. While Al-Shabaab's capacity to launch terrorist acts inside Somalia has greatly diminished owing to the presence of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its troops, Al-Shabaab's continued presence in Somalia has a negative impact on the security, stability and prosperity of that country. The Kenya Defence Forces, within the framework of AMISOM, will continue working closely with the Somali National Army (2015).</p> <p>Urges the international community, especially the United Nations, to support the IGAD-Plus peace process and other initiatives geared to the realization of a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in South Sudan. That should be achieved through the enforcement of the peace and security arrangements, support for the institutions of governance and democracy, support for the demilitarization of South Sudan and a response to the current humanitarian crisis. South Sudan needs to find the path of peace, development and reconstruction, and that needs to happen urgently (2015).</p> <p>Today, our world is confronted by large-scale instability and fragility, which are causing unprecedented human suffering and forced displacement. Furthermore, new security threats — including violent extremism, terrorism and radicalization — threaten to roll back the gains we have made so far (2016).</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>For the past two and a half decades, the region has been seized with a situation in Somalia. Throughout that time, Kenya has stood with Somalia, provided a safe haven for refugees, joined peacekeeping missions and invested heavily in resources to combat Al-Shabaab and its affiliates. That solidarity has helped to substantially weaken Al-Shabaab, liberate large swaths of land in Somalia and provide space for the Somali Government to begin the journey of rehabilitation and reconstruction (2016).</p> <p>I call upon the parties to the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan to honour their commitment and work towards its full implementation. That is the only basis for durable peace and reconciliation in that troubled country. The efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), buttressed by the African Union Peace and Security Council, have been vital to these processes. The history of conflict resolution demonstrates that regional mechanisms are the best avenues towards sustainable outcomes. It is therefore imperative that the international community channel its efforts and support through IGAD (2016).</p> <p>Kenya has played a prominent role in the search for peace and security in various countries, especially in Somalia and South Sudan. Thanks to our collective efforts as an international community, tremendous progress has been made in Somalia. In particular, the credible elections that took place last year and the formation of a broad-based Government marked a watershed moment that laid the foundation for a stable, democratic transition in Somalia. In order to consolidate the gains already made and prevent a relapse into conflict, we support the strengthening of the African Union Military Observer Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). We also welcome Security Council resolution 2372 (2017), which extends AMISOM with revised core tasks (2017).</p> <p>The fragility of our world is also manifest in instability and conflicts, as in the case of both Somalia and South Sudan. In Somalia, the African Union Mission in</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>Somalia (AMISOM) is a unique regional effort that has deeply degraded one of Al-Qaida's most ambitious affiliates. Kenya has been part of that journey from the start. It was in Nairobi where a transitional federal State was negotiated into existence, with the material and moral support of the Kenyan people. We have never wavered. Kenyans have lost lives and property in pursuit of peace and stability in Somalia, and we appreciate our regional and international colleagues and partners. In Somalia, a historic chapter on Africa's will to peace and security is being written. We appreciate the partners standing with the region (2018).</p> <p>But the job is not yet done. We must ensure military success over Al-Shabaab if other political and economic solutions are to take firm root. So far, the troop-contributing countries continue to bear a disproportionate burden. We have consistently sought the kind of international support that is commensurate with the threat scenario, including in the form of enablers and force multipliers. These have not been forthcoming. What the international community is doing with regard to Somalia is not good enough. We understand that these are difficult times economically, but global terrorism must be faced boldly. If we have learned any real lessons in the past 20 years, we should appreciate that AMISOM needs support, and it is up to all of us to make that happen (2018)</p> <p>Kenya is proud of having walked with the Sudan and South Sudan in their pursuit of peace and stability. We have always known and firmly believe that the constancy of our efforts would yield the fruit of a prosperous and free South Sudan (2018).</p> <p>Today, we call on all Member States to join us in that endeavour for peace and stability in South Sudan. I appeal to all Members, development partners, international agencies and friends of South Sudan to redouble their efforts and support this cause to end the suffering of the children, women and men of South Sudan (2018).</p>

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			<p>A commitment to pursuing peace and security remains at the core of our foreign policy, and I am pleased to say that our combined efforts to advance peace and security in the region continue to bear fruit. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Sudan on arriving at a path to sustainable peace, which it negotiated internally with the help of the African Union. Kenya shares the optimism of the people of the Sudan, and we believe that the transitional process will pave the way for democratic elections in 2022. And I warmly commend the role of women in the Sudan in driving and facilitating an excellent outcome laden with lessons that makes the entire African continent proud (2019).</p> <p>I am also encouraged by the progress made in South Sudan. Security has improved, with a decrease in violence across the country, since the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. I am convinced that pending issues can be resolved in a consultative and collaborative manner. I commend Mr. Riek Machar for travelling to Juba for a face-to-face meeting with his brother and colleague President Salva Kiir in order to engage on the outstanding issues. Kenya supports the creation of an all-inclusive transitional mechanism and institutions for undertaking the required political processes and reforms. That will ensure a smooth transition to the next phase of the peace process (2019).</p> <p>In the same spirit, my administration continues to reach out to the Federal Republic of Somalia in an effort to find an amicable and sustainable solution to our maritime boundary dispute. In that regard, I welcome the decision on 3 September of the African Union Peace and Security Council urging both parties to engage. As we all know, the Charter of the United Nations privileges the use of negotiation as the preferred mechanism for the settlement of disputes (2019).</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
Normative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support the UN system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discomfort with normative agenda 	<p>Kenya is fully committed to the ideals of this Organization. Indeed, Kenya's motto, "Harambee" which means "pull together", and the national philosophy of peace, love and unity, are fitting expressions of what the United Nations and the Kenyan people aspire to. Kenya has always championed the principles of democracy and the pursuit of socio-economic development to enhance the living standards of the people (1995).</p> <p>We submit that peace-keeping and peace enforcement should remain the primary responsibility of the United Nations. These responsibilities are enshrined in the Charter and cannot be transferred to regional organizations (1995).</p> <p>The maintenance of international peace and security is a collective responsibility of us all (1996).</p> <p>Kenya welcomes the need to summon the political will to seriously promote good governance, human rights and democracy (1998)</p> <p>Kenya supports the Secretary-General in these efforts (1998).</p> <p>All peacekeeping missions must be established in accordance with the United Nations Charter (1999).</p> <p>The promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms is firmly on the international agenda (2000).</p> <p>I would also like to extend my sincere congratulations to Mr. Kofi Annan, the Secretary- General, for his re-election to a second term in office and for the richly deserved Nobel Peace Prize awarded to him and the United Nations Organization. This is an acknowledgement of his tireless efforts in the service of mankind and, as the Secretary-General has said, of a challenge to do better and, I hope, faster. I would like to assure the Secretary-General of my Government's cooperation and firm commitment in that regard (2001).</p> <p>Kenya believes in the rule of law and will support all genuine efforts to this end. We</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>subscribe to peaceful settlement of disputes through regional efforts, the International Tribunals and the International Court of Justice. Kenya fully supports the historic milestone of the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998 and its entry into force on 1 July 2002. Impunity for serious war crimes is indeed a denial of justice, which must be brought to an end (2002).</p> <p>As a country that faced a similar attack in 1998, Kenya strongly believes that terrorism can never be justified under any circumstances. We fully support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and have already ratified the 12 anti-terrorism conventions (2002).</p> <p>We are convinced that this fight can be won only by collective action by the community of nations. We should all address terrorism under the rubric of the United Nations and develop measured, long-term strategies to eliminate terrorism once and for all. Self-interest and unilateral action do not provide a firm basis for a global alliance against terrorism. Only principled international solidarity will defeat terrorism (2003).</p> <p>However, in order to consolidate and guarantee a long-lasting peace, it is vital for the international community to play a greater role in the process. In this connection, I would like to urge the United Nations to play a leadership role in the post-conflict reconstruction of the Sudan and to request Member States to support that reconstruction (2003).</p> <p>While appreciating the important role the United Nations plays in consolidating peace and stability in the world, Kenya advocates greater United Nations participation in African initiatives, such as the peace processes led by IGAD and ECOWAS (2003).</p> <p>Kenya has been a victim of terrorist attacks in the recent past. We are therefore more convinced than ever of the need to address this issue collectively. No single country, however resourceful, has the capacity to successfully deal with it on its own. I would like to assure the Assembly that Kenya fully supports</p>

Kenya	Rationales	Inhibitors	Evidence
			<p>international efforts in dealing with this problem. Collective efforts to address the issue must be through international cooperation, information and intelligence sharing, coordinated by the United Nations (2004).</p> <p>I would like to emphasize the important role the United Nations plays in global affairs. It could be greatly enhanced through adherence to the provisions of the Charter and to the rule of law. Member States should respect those instruments in the conduct of their international relations (2004).</p> <p>Kenya embraces the principles of the Charter, which serve as a basic reference point for the reform of the United Nations. Those principles are the core of its inner strength. We believe that the principle of democracy is as central to this Organization and its future health as it is to the prosperity of our own nations. Kenya deeply cherishes that principle and seeks its generous spread around the world and in this institution (2005).</p> <p>Global problems require global solutions. The United Nations is the only vehicle that can help us attain those solutions and give legitimacy to our actions. The United Nations remains indispensable in the maintenance of international peace and security (2005).</p> <p>I am happy to note that although some of the proposals have been adopted, we should now move quickly to implement them. I refer especially to the proposals that do not require amendment of the Charter. They include the adoption of a robust counter- terrorism strategy, strengthening peacekeeping, creating a Peacebuilding Commission and Fund and the reform of the human rights system (2005).</p> <p>Kenya also supports proposals for the enhancement of peace-support operation capabilities of the United Nations. Any mandate for peacekeeping forces should be clear and precise. Adequate resources must be made available to the commanders in the field to enable them to execute their mandates effectively. Intervention in crisis situations must also</p>

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			<p>be timely to prevent undue loss of life (2005).</p> <p>We subscribe to the principles and ideals of this Organization and have always upheld its Charter (2006).</p> <p>A more effective and accountable United Nations is therefore needed to meet and overcome these challenges (2008).</p> <p>The ideals and principles of the United Nations are, today more than ever, the surest hope for a more prosperous and equitable world. Multilateralism in this globalized age is the only sure way to ensure that peace, development and unity prevail at a time when the world is riven with so many divisions. We need a genuine partnership among all nations and peoples, so that everyone feels that he or she is a critical stakeholder in national and international decision-making (2009).</p> <p>In this regard, Kenya fully reaffirms the central role of the United Nations in global governance, consistent with its Charter and international law. It is, therefore, imperative that the ongoing United Nations reforms be accelerated in order to ensure that this institution of multilateral engagement is representative and transparent, is accountable to its 192 members and optimally achieves the aspirations of today's world (2010).</p> <p>In conclusion, I wish to express my hope that through our unity, solidarity, cooperation and commitment, the challenges facing the international community will be overcome. Let us rise to the occasion and demonstrate our political will and ability to work together for the good of all humankind (2010).</p> <p>No one people, nor one country, not even any one continent, can inhabit the world peaceably alone in isolation from the rest of the globe. We are in this world together to succeed together, to win together and to build a better future for all everywhere, together (2014).</p> <p>Finally, Kenya is a firm believer in multilateralism. We acknowledge the remarkable role that the United Nations</p>

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			<p>has played in sustaining peace in our world and in providing a global platform for cooperation and solidarity among nations. We know that the United Nations can do better. We believe that the Sustainable Development Goals and the Agenda for Sustainable Development have given the United Nations a blueprint for creating greater peace in our world and for making globalization and development fair and equitable for all. That is the future that we want for ourselves and for future generations (2017).</p>