


## Master Thesis

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# A potentially dangerous discourse:

## The use of a collective nostalgia by Dutch political parties as a tool for political persuasion

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## **1. Introduction**

In times of hardship, people tend to look to the past for direction. Since the early 2000s, we have seen a rise of populist movements in the West. According to experts on nostalgia, this has led to an increase in the usage of collective nostalgia as a tool for political mobilization and persuasion. This is best exemplified by Trump's presidency and the Brexit referendum, filled with rhetoric about "a longing to the past" (Routledge, 2017; Forss & Magro, 2016, p.13). Nostalgia is a form of psychological sentimentality that is embedded in almost every person, but it can also be embedded in the collective. Nostalgia in itself can have a positive palliative effect on the individual level, reducing negative emotions, and boosting self-esteem and a positive self-image (Sedikides, Wildschut, Juhl & Cheung, 2017, pp.5-7). On the other hand, experts on nostalgia warn for the potential dangers of collective nostalgia and outgroup-directed anger and contempt. This can be a potential catalyst for further polarization, fueled by anger and contempt towards different groups within society (Cheung, Sedikides, Wildshut, Tausch & Ayanian, 2017b, p.303).

Also in the Netherlands, signs of polarization, group division, segregation, and failed integration are visible, which is mostly accompanied by the politicization of certain issues (De Wilde, 2011, p.567). The emergence of populist parties like the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), and more recently Forum voor Democratie (FvD), who have a radical view on immigration and refugees, are examples of this as well (Grande, Schwarzbözl & Fatke, 2018, pp.12-13). Security considerations should be taken into account when discussing the use of collective nostalgia (Tausch et al., 2011, p.129). Cheung et al. suggest a direct link between outgroup-directed actions and relative deprivation. Appraisals of unfair disadvantages of one group can lead to anger and contempt towards others. Outgroup-directed anger is mostly associated with normative actions like peaceful protest, petitions, discussions, etcetera. However, in an intergroup context, contempt can lead to psychological distancing between groups, and could even be a precursor to non-normative actions like violence toward outgroups, as studies in Germany, India, and the United Kingdom have shown (Cheung et al. 2017b, pp.304-313; Tausch et al., 2011, p.145). Collective nostalgia has ramifications for forging collective action. Cheung and others have shown that collective nostalgia can be a precursor to collective action toward outgroups based on anger and contempt. Therefore, collective nostalgia can even lead to security issues like violence (Cheung et al. 2017b, pp.311-313).

The research question this paper will address is: *“To what extent have Dutch political parties from 2017 to 2019 used different forms of collective nostalgia in party discourse as a tool for political persuasion”?*

Experts on collective nostalgia primarily warn for its dangers due to the rise of populism in the West (Kenny, 2017, p.256). As Routledge notes, it is of importance to be vigilant against the use of a false nostalgia, as it can be a powerful tool for political persuasion, which makes use of people’s fears and anxieties (Routledge, 2017). Therefore, the significance of this paper is to get a better understanding in terms of the discursive usage of a collective nostalgia by political parties, and, to understand it in terms of how nostalgia is constructed by Dutch political parties for political persuasion. Furthermore, making a distinction between different forms of collective nostalgia can help to understand how and why collective nostalgia is used, and if there is a potential danger within the usage of a collective nostalgia (Routledge, 2017).

Using a qualitative critical discourse analysis (CDA), the party discourse of different Dutch political parties from 2017 to 2019, will be assessed. By selecting political parties based upon the left-right distribution on the political spectrum, it can also be established if this may be a phenomenon exclusively reserved for populist and right-wing parties or if it is more broadly shared by other political parties as well. Therefore, this thesis will examine the discourse of, Forum voor Democratie (FvD) and GroenLinks (GL). First, because both parties gained significant electoral success over the last years, and both are led by a new generation of political leaders. Second, FvD can be characterized as a right-wing populist party, while GL is a green left-wing party (DNPP, 2018; Lucardie, 2014). By contrasting these parties it can be established whether or not there is significant difference in the usage of collective nostalgia between right-wing and left-wing parties.

The concept of collective nostalgia will primarily be based upon Boym’s two versions of collective nostalgia, namely restorative and reflective nostalgia. Restorative nostalgia is a rather static definition, in which a collective sees their version of the past as “truth”. Reflective nostalgia is a more flexible definition, that acknowledges different versions of the past (Boym, 2001, pp.69-80). Additionally, it draws upon the works of Bonnet who established the notion of radical nostalgia, which relates to the notion of anti-modernity within left-wing radicalism, and Sedikides et al. who argued that collective nostalgia is related to ingroup-collectivization and outgroup-directed anger and contempt (Bonnet, 2010, p.28; Cheung et al. 2017, p.303). In doing so, different versions of collective nostalgia can be analyzed with respect to the discourse of different political parties.

In the next section, the theoretical framework of this paper will be further elaborated, existing of a broad conceptualization of collective nostalgia. Afterward, in the research design section, the justification of the case selection and data-sources, and the validity of the research will be discussed, before presenting the methodology, and the CDA framework. The theoretical framework and research design of this paper form the theoretical basis for this research. The empirical research of this thesis can be found in chapters 4, 5, and 6. In chapters 4 and 5 a broad examination of FvD and GL discourse will be presented. In chapter 6 the findings on both discourses will be put in the context of collective nostalgia.

## **2. Theoretical framework**

### **Introduction to the field of nostalgia**

Nostalgia is a social emotion that stirs memories of the past (Cheung, Sedikides & Wildschut, 2017, p.89). The concept of nostalgia is nothing new. However, its meaning has changed significantly over time. Nostalgia is a Greek word comprising of the words “nostos”, roughly meaning “return to the homeland”, and “algos” referring to “grief and pain” (Bonnet, 2010, p.5). Sedikides summarized nostalgia as “the suffering due to relentless yearning for the homeland” (Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt & Routledge, 2008, p.304). Before the 20<sup>th</sup> century, nostalgia referred to a psychological disorder in which a person experiences feelings of homesickness. Symptoms like anxiety, depression, and sadness were related to nostalgia. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however increasingly, nostalgia was separated from homesickness. Even so, it can be found in almost every person in society. A 2008 study in the United Kingdom showed that 80% of students in this research, experienced feelings of nostalgia (Sedikides et al., 2008, pp.304-305).

### **Conceptualization of nostalgia**

There is a general consensus that nostalgia on the individual level primarily has a positive palliative effect on healthy individuals. This seems counterintuitive as nostalgia is mostly triggered by personal feelings of existential fear for the present or the future, but also by social emotions like loneliness, and meaninglessness. But it is nostalgia that can comfort an individual, experiencing negative feelings or emotions (Sedikides, Wildschut, Juhl & Cheung, 2017, pp.5-7). Nostalgia can be the bandage for negative emotions because it can reinforce a positive self-image and increase feelings of existential meaning (Sedikides et al., 2017, p.30; Routledge, 2017). Yet, it should be mentioned that nostalgia does not always have a positive palliative effect. Numerous studies have shown that nostalgia as a coping mechanism for individuals with depression has the exact opposite effect because it can worsen depression when people are confronted with idealized memories of the past. Garrido, therefore argues, that two archetypes of nostalgia must be distinguished. First, the individual who (unconsciously) uses past memories as a form of motivation, stirred by curiosity. Second, what he called the “brooding, neurotic ruminator” that fuels further psychological deterioration (Garrido, 2016, p.59). Nostalgic memories are not objective reflections of the past. Nostalgic episodes are influenced by an individual’s frame of reference. It does more often than not, exclude negative episodes of the past. Kammen stated that nostalgia is in

essence “a history without guilt” (Kammen, 1999, p.157). Additionally, Boym (2001, p.12) argues that nostalgia is related to feelings of displacement, but also with the romanticization of one’s own fantasies. Notwithstanding, in general nostalgia should be seen as a positive social emotion. As Sedikides and Wildschut (2016) argue: “The emotion is self-relevant, albeit deeply social, and is bittersweet, albeit predominantly positive” (p.319).

### **Conceptualization of collective nostalgia**

Although nostalgia on the individual level is primarily a positive social emotion, scholars like Sedidikes, Boym, and Routledge do warn for the dangers of collective nostalgia (Routledge, 2017). Collective nostalgia can be identified as a yearning for the collective past. This is fueled by the notion that a society was better off in the past. Sedikides and others have shown in their research, that collective nostalgia can be an important precursor for outgroup-directed anger and contempt. It can provoke hostility towards other groups, and increase the willingness for enhancing ingroup-collectivization and action (Cheung, Sedikides, Wildshut, Tausch & Ayanian, 2017b, pp.312-313). In other words, collective nostalgia can lead to favoring (political) action that benefits especially the ingroup and strengthens the social identity of that group. Scholars like Cheung, Sedikides, and Routledge have shown how group emotions of anger and contempt toward the outgroup can be fueled by collective nostalgia, and that the ingroup often blames certain (existential) threats on the outgroup. This, in turn, can lead to prejudice and normative actions toward the outgroup, and in extreme cases even non-normative actions like violence (Cheung, et al. 2017b, pp.304-305; Cheung, et al. 2017a, p.89). Furthermore, nostalgia proneness differs from person to person. Three studies have shown that individuals with high levels of nostalgic proneness are more susceptible to increased experiences of nostalgic memories when confronted with an existential threat or thoughts of existential fear. Therefore, there is a strong relationship between higher levels of nostalgia proneness and feelings of displacement or fear of existential threats (Juhl, Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides & Wildschut, 2010, p.313). Feelings of existential threats in collective nostalgia are also visible in Boym’s restorative nostalgia.

Boym also warns for the potential danger of collective nostalgia. However, she makes a distinction between two types of collective nostalgia, namely, restorative nostalgia and reflective nostalgia. Although both refer to an individual’s relation to the past and their perceptions, they are fueled through a collective identity. Collective nostalgia becomes more prominent when a group perceives a deterioration of present circumstances (Cheung et al., 2017, p.303). Restorative nostalgia is about “rebuilding the lost home”. It is encapsulated in a

person's notion that they hold the ultimate truth about the past (Boym, 2001, p.70). More often than not, it creates a false nostalgia that only focusses on the positives of the past, whilst ignoring the negatives (Routledge, 2017). This is in line with the notion of individual nostalgia as well. Nationalism, according to Boym, is strongly related to restorative nostalgia. It is about a static perspective that calls for national or ethnic homogeneity and endorses nativist ideas. Increased nationalist feelings, in Boym's perspective, incite anti-modern and/or anti-globalist world views. It is about mythicizing history and defending traditional values (Boym, 2001, p.72). However, she warns for a representation of the past based on one's personal biases, which can be seen in, for example, right-wing popular culture. Moreover, according to her, restorative nostalgia is enforced through conspiracies and group division (us versus them thinking). Misfortunes of a person are often blamed on others. It is a notion of "them" conspiring against "us", therefore we have to conspire against "them" to restore or reconstruct "our" version of the past or imagined community (Boym, 2001, p.73). "The past for the restorative nostalgic is a value for the present; the past is not a duration but a perfect snapshot" (Boym, 2001, p.81). In other words, the restorative nostalgic will try to create an image of the past based on a single, fixed, and in its eyes, true representation of the past, which then can be used as a value in the present (Boym, 2001, p.87).

Reflective nostalgia is more flexible than its counterpart. It does acknowledge differences in individual and cultural memory. Restorative nostalgia includes the desire to reconstruct the past, based on a personal biased reflection of that past. Reflective nostalgia, on the other hand, welcomes the different perceptions of the past, without wanting to reconstruct them. Moreover, it does acknowledge the negatives of the past as well. Furthermore, humor, irony, and inconclusiveness can be attributed to reflective nostalgia. Reflective nostalgia acknowledges that how one reflects upon the past, is based upon personal identity. This provides the possibility for not only thinking critically about the present but also the past (Boym, 2001, pp.81-82). Ironizing the past, and acknowledging its inconclusiveness, therefore, can be seen as a form of positive social usage of nostalgia, that creates a positive political tool for consumption (Bonnet, 2010, p.42). Where restorative nostalgia is in part based on national memory, reflective nostalgia is about collective memory. The difference here is that national memory "tends to make a single teleological plot" of the past, where gaps and discontinuities are fixed, as to create that single, almost perfect snapshot of the past" (Boym, 2001, p.87). Reflective nostalgia, on the other hand, tends to be made up of "frameworks of collective or cultural memory offer us mere signposts for individual reminiscences that could suggest multiple narratives" (Boym, 2001, p.87).

Bonnet also draws upon the works of Boym. He researched the usage of collective nostalgia on the left and coined the term “radical nostalgia”. Radical here, according to Bonnet, refers to the political left. As he stated: “my use of the term as synonymous with those traditions of anti-capitalist egalitarianism, social emancipation, and agitation which constitute the left” (Bonnet, 2010, p.6). Bonnet argues that the left mainly uses nostalgia as a means to radicalize the past, in comparison to romanticizing the past (Bonnet, 2010, p.169). Thus, for the radical left she states, nostalgia is a reminder to escape the past (Bonnet, 2010, p.22). Bonnet illustrates the ambiguous and sometimes paradoxical stance of the radical left concerning nostalgia. Yearning to the past was mostly seen as an embarrassing defect, counter-productive to the leftist movement which celebrated the “new” and “youthful” (Bonnet, 2010, p.1). Therefore, the radical left, in comparison to the radical right discarded the past, instead of embracing it. On the other hand, especially on the green left, calls for a return to earlier times of natural sustainability, can be observed, which do embrace certain episodes of the past (Bonnet, 2010, pp.34-35). Bonnet argues that the left has discarded nostalgia for a long time as it is seen as “a political offense of the first order, an enemy to progressives and modernity” (Bonnet, 2010, pp.2-3). However, in his book, he suggests that nostalgia can be integrated within the political left. It is a nostalgia that has overlap with Boym’s notion of reflective nostalgia that builds not on the notion of “longing to the past”, but one that does acknowledge a “sense of loss”. But the problem with contemporary left-wing politics of nostalgia, according to Bonnet (2010) is, “nostalgia has been presented as a field of acknowledgment, an integral aspect of the modern condition, something that is present whether or not we identify and engage it or repress and deny it” (p.169). This shows the paradoxical and often repressive nature of the left when it comes to engaging nostalgia.

The concepts of collective nostalgia are no absolute phenomena, but as Boym (2001) argues: “tendencies, or ways of giving shape and meaning to longing” (p.70). Boym showed that collective nostalgia can be seen from a narrow, ingroup notion of nostalgia, but also through a more positive, critical lens. Or in his words: “Restorative nostalgia takes itself dead seriously. Reflective nostalgia, on the other hand, can be ironic and humorous (Boym, 2001, p.81). These forms of nostalgia should be seen as archetypes, in which one person or collective does not necessarily have to fit perfectly in one or the other.

A last important note on the use of collective nostalgia. Nostalgia is a social sentimentality. Utterances about the past are not nostalgic in themselves. It is how nostalgic sentiments are evoked through uttering about the past. As stated by Boym, restorative nostalgia is about national memory. National memory tends to have a single historical plot

(Boym, 2001, p.86). Multiple recollections about a single historical event are not present in this type of collective nostalgia. Restorative nostalgia tends to align with a single narrative (Boym, 2001, p.81). On the other hand, reflective nostalgia is about a collective memory, rather than national memory. Collective memory according to Boym (2001) “constitute shared social frameworks of individual recollections. They are folds in the fan of memory, not prescriptions for a model tale” (p.86). In other words, the reflective nostalgic does acknowledge multiple narratives or interpretations.

### **Language as a materialized form of discourse**

To understand how collective nostalgia is used as a tool for political persuasion, language can be particularly useful. It gives an understanding of how memory is constructed. Moreover, it not only provides meaning on why the past is interpreted, but also how it is interpreted, and how it matches the present model of society (Schwartz, 2011, p.245). Interpretations of the past are subject to a particular time and place. It is continuously filtered, constructed and reconstructed (Davis, 2011, p.450). To achieve societal change, collective action is needed. It can motivate people to engage in it (Cheung et al. 2017b, p.302). Political parties play an important role in motivating collective action, by uttering a collection of normative beliefs and values to influence people’s perceptions. For each societal issue, generalities are formulated that fit into the program of the party (Foucault, Faubion & Hurley, 2002, p.291)

This thesis does not wish to engage in social theory in relation to societal issues, but to study the language of texts, in order to understand the construction of discourse and its societal effects (Fairclough, 2003, p.3). It, therefore, acknowledges that language is a materialized form of discourse, which is shaped by interpretations of the past by different political parties. Discourse in this sense is never neutral and interpretations of the past are always contemporary interpretations of the past (Fairclough, 2003, p.307). This can be useful to gain a better understanding of nostalgic discourse within Dutch politics as a tool for political persuasion.

### **Performativity: language as shaping force**

Before continuing to the methodology section, it is important to justify how the result of this research can be validated. Discourse analysis differs from other forms of social research. It is not interested in causal relations between independent and dependent variables. It is interested in validating through performativity. It is about meaning making by examining patterns in

texts. Hardy, Harley & Phillips (2004) stated on performativity that “patterns in the meaning of texts are constitutive of reality in some way” (p.21). Language and speech are not only a method to communicate something, but rather a method to act or consummate and act, or to construct an act or identity. Therefore, language is a shaping force. Utterances of language do not report or describe, neither are they just true or false, but uttering a sentence is part of the action it represents. To exemplify, when someone states “I will marry you”, this does not only serve as a means to communicate, but it also creates an action, namely that of marriage (Austin, 1962, p.5). Therefore, throughout this research language will not just be examined as a means of communication, but also on how it constructs actions and identities. Because the discourses examined in this paper are written or spoken in Dutch, English translations will be used during the research. In appendix D and E, the original Dutch texts can be found.

### **Concluding remarks on the theoretical framework**

In the research section of this paper, the different forms of collective nostalgia will be used to assess the party discourse of Dutch political parties. It will primarily use Boym’s two versions of collective nostalgia, but additionally also the notions of ingroup-collectivization and outgroup-directed anger and contempt. Collective nostalgia is here a group-level emotion that has ramifications for both intragroup and intergroup relations (Cheung et al. 2017b, p.302). Furthermore, the work of Bonnet will only be used to review the left-wing party GL. It is not about how “radical nostalgia” is used, but whether or not nostalgia is used by left-wing parties as an integral part of left-wing rhetoric, or if left-wing rhetoric in this particular setting is fundamentally “anti-nostalgic” (no mentioning or insufficient mentioning). In other words, if there are *no nostalgic tendencies* identified in left-wing party discourse, this could mean that in this particular case, Bonnet’s assumption of “anti-nostalgia” in left-wing parties still holds ground. (Bonnet, 2010, p.7).

### **3. Research Design**

#### **Case selection**

Extensive research of the party discourses from 2017 to 2019 from Forum voor Democratie (FvD), and GroenLinks (GL) will be performed to establish how the two parties make use of collective nostalgia. FvD and GL are of particular interest in this research as both parties have gained significant electoral success during the 2017 parliamentary elections and the 2019 provincial elections (Hoekstra, 2019). Moreover, both parties are led by a new generation of political leaders, namely Thierry Baudet (36) and Jesse Klaver (32). Both claim to have the ambition to become prime minister and both want a radically different society. For Baudet radical change is about “breaking open the party cartel” and to reverse the course of Europeanization in favor of protecting the nation-state and state sovereignty (FvD, 2019a; FvD, 2019b). Klaver, on the other hand, sees radical change by implementing ambitious climate policy and by stating to only cooperate with the coalition if it does not violate core party principles. Moreover, it wants to break with the current economic and political status quo (GL, 2017a, p.7; Business Insider, 2019). Moreover, both party leaders have played an important role in the rise to prominence because of the charismatic appeal to their supporters. Furthermore, all parties in this research use rhetoric in which they are trying to appeal to the “ordinary citizen” (Business Insider, 2019).

The primary focus of this research will be on the electoral campaign programs from 2017 and 2019. Additionally, national electoral debates, notable interviews with party leaders and the official party websites will be used to establish the party discourse. The selection of these documents is based upon the level of media attention that was generated, before, during and after the elections of 2017 and 2019. Before continuing to the methodology section of this paper, a short overview of the social and historical context of the parties will be discussed.

#### **Forum voor Democratie (Forum for Democracy)**

FvD has been chosen for this research due to the recent unprecedented success in the Provincial elections of 2019. FvD was established in 2016 as a party that opposes, what they call, “the Party Cartel (Partij kartel) of the Hague”. FvD describes this as a small group of established political party members who control all high ranking jobs in the Netherlands (FvD, 2019a). FvD is a nationalist-conservative, populist, Eurosceptical party, and anti-immigration party. Nationalist-conservatism relates to the promotion of Dutch sovereignty

and Dutch history and culture. According to FvD, Dutch people should be proud again of their heritage and not promote cultural segregation. Even so, according to them the “incumbent rulers” are responsible for alienating the native Dutch with their history and culture (FvD, 2019b; FvD, 2019c). This is also reflected in FvD’s desire to stop any extension of the EU, and their promotion of a referendum about the Euro and open borders (FvD, 2019d). Furthermore, the party opposes large-scale immigration, especially from outside the EU, as it would destabilize Dutch society. FvD promotes an Australian based model of immigration in which the Dutch state decides who is allowed to enter and who is not. Therefore, immigrants with extreme political ideas that are not in line with Western civilization and illegal immigrants, should be expelled to their country of origin. Additionally, for refugees, the party promotes a more efficient regional reception of refugees. Moreover, to promote integration, immigrants already residing in the Netherlands, but who have not integrated well enough, should be assimilated within Dutch society (FvD, 2019e). FvD is also a proponent of direct democracy, which entails the implementation of binding referenda and elected mayors (FvD, 2019f). During the 2019 elections, the FvD positioned itself in opposition to all other parties in the climate change debate. The FvD strongly opposes the current climate policy of the government, which is backed by all opposition parties, except the FvD. Not only because they reject the notion of human-induced climate change, but primarily because of the high cost of implementing the measures of the climate policy. In addition, they do not believe that these measures will have any significant effect on reducing carbon dioxide emissions on a global scale (Rozendaal, 2018). FvD’s opposition to the current climate policy seemingly had a significant effect on the unprecedented electoral victory of FvD in the 2019 Provincial elections, in which a new political party became the biggest party in the first Provincial elections it competed in (von Piekartz, 2019).

The FvD has grown rapidly over the last two years, reflected by the rate of membership. It now has one of the largest memberships of all Dutch political parties. Moreover, FvD’s success had consequences for the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), who lost nearly 50% of its electorate at the 2019 elections. Since 2018 party leader Thierry Baudet has been criticized for its centralized control of the party. Consequently, the FvD has been actively trying to widen its organizational structure (DNPP, 2018).

### **GroenLinks (Green Left)**

GL has been established in 1990 through a fusion of four socialist and communist parties. The first years of the party can be characterized by a gradual ideological rapprochement. For example, the pacifist nature of the separate parties gradually faded. Nowadays discussions on NATO membership aren't as relevant anymore. The party is now primarily known for upholding a green agenda, and values like social justice, and international solidarity (Lucardie, 2014).

Since 2016, Jesse Klaver became party leader of GL, which resulted in significant electoral success in the 2017 elections. Even so, GL became the biggest left-wing party in the Netherlands. The party wants radical democratic reforms towards a model of an ecological and democratically driven economy in which market mechanisms should be subordinate to “global planning”. However, GL does not promote a dominant role of the state in this planned economy (Lucardie, 2014). GL promotes a radical shift towards a green society to combat climate change. Therefore, it proposed new climate legislation. In 2050 carbon dioxide emissions should be reduced by 95% and 100% of energy supply should come from renewable energy (GL, 2019a). Contrary to FvD, GL strongly opposes the use of nuclear energy to reduce the effects of climate change (GL, 2019b). Moreover, it promotes a multicultural society based upon principles of mutual respect, solidarity, and equality (GL, 2019c). GL is also a proponent of increased redistribution of welfare (GL, 2019d).

### **Data selection and timeframe**

This research will primarily focus on the official electoral campaign programs, election debates, and interviews with the party leaders from the selected political parties from 2017 to 2019. Studying a wide variety of (spoken) texts is particularly useful to study as it provides insight on how language is used and constructed for the purpose of electoral gains and if patterns can be observed. Moreover, by examining the discourses over multiple issues, it can provide insights on differences and similarities between them (Hansen, 2006, p.46). All the electoral campaign programs for this research have been retrieved from the Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen from the University of Groningen (University of Groningen – Documentation center for Dutch political parties).

Furthermore, in terms of collective nostalgia it can be established what discursive strategies have been employed to promote either societal inclusiveness or exclusiveness, in line with ingroup-collectivization and outgroup-directed anger and contempt (Cheung et al. 2017b, pp.312-313). This research will examine each party discourse one after the other.

Afterward, a cross-examination of both parties will be used to establish differences/similarities in the discourse and to put both discourses in the context of collective nostalgia.

### **Methodology**

Discourse analysis (DA) is used to study language practices in texts. By studying the subjects and social constructions of certain realities presented in texts, it can be researched how subjects are related to one another (Milliken, 1999, p.232). Examining words in relation to its practice is helpful for meaning making of the different perceptions of *Self* and *Other* (Hansen, 2006, pp.10-11). In other words, it is about understanding ourselves in relation to others. Potter (1997) states that through DA “different versions of society, the world, and the psychological world can be examined” (p.146). DA can therefore be useful to look at how different social realities are constructed, and how these different versions are competing with one another (Gill, 2000, p.176).

CDA is a particular branch of DA. Bryman (2016) states on CDA: “discourse does not just provide an account of what goes on in society; it is also a process whereby meaning is created (p.540). Language is here understood as being both political and social. Language is used to generate meaning by constructing identities and differences. The political discourse derived from language relies upon the construction of particular issues, identities, and subjectivities. Moreover, through these discourses previously non-existing issues, identities, and subjectivities can be constructed as well (Hansen, 2006, p.15). Hansen argues that politicians legitimize their stance not only through solid objective and scientific reports, but subjectivities play a role as well. Subjectivities are reports or references based on personal experiences and non-scientific forms of texts. In other words, political discourse is not only based on objective and scientific reports, but it is at least in part influenced by personal feelings and opinions that are subjective by nature (Hansen, 2006, preface). About collective nostalgia, this paper does not try to establish if the different versions of the past are objectively true. However, it is about understanding how discursive strategies are used to construct a particular discourse and how it relates to collective nostalgia. Language in political discourse is about understanding how meaning is created by producing and reproducing certain issues, identities and subjectivities, while simultaneously excluding others (Hansen, 2006, p.16).

Furthermore, CDA is useful to understand why certain discourses are privileged over others (Bryman, 2016, p.540). The notion of othering is important to understand how the discourses construct *Others*. It shapes understanding of how the *Other* is framed, and if the construction of the *Other* differs between discourses (Hansen, 2006, p.38). By doing this, differences and similarities of how the *Other* is constructed can be identified, as well as the actions that relate to it. Moreover, as Boym and Bonnet have shown, the use of nostalgia is to a fair amount issue-based, depending on the ideological affiliation, and can therefore differ between parties (Bonnet, 2010, p.1; Boym, 2010, p.72). Therefore, this paper does not primarily focus on one single-issue, as to be able to compare the use of different forms of nostalgia by political parties over multiple issues, as already discussed in the case selection.

This paper examines how Dutch political parties use nostalgic discourse for political persuasion. According to Fairclough, ideology is located in texts. Language here, is a materialized version of ideology, and language is in itself invested in ideology. According to Fairclough discourse is constrained by ideology and reflects underlying ideology (Mullet, 2018, p.127). In general, scholars like Fairclough and van Dijk assume that language is never neutral. CDA analysts reject neutral and objective research and state that all knowledge is socially constructed, and therefore subjective. In terms of ideology, scholars like Fairclough therefore reject that ideology is based on objective scientific reports (Mullet, 2018, pp.118-120). Although Fairclough states that language and ideology are interconnected, this does not mean that one can just “read off ideologies from texts” (Fairclough, 1995, p.71). However, using Fairclough’s three elements of discourse, namely, social practice, discursive practice (text production, distribution and consumption), and text analysis, are helpful to define how ideology both resides in the language, and is used as a tool for political persuasion. The style in which a text is placed can be important to define its relation to ideology or party identity. The style of writing can, at least in part, explain the image the writer is trying to construct (Fairclough, 1995, pp.74-75). CDA can therefore be helpful to understand how practices can differ between political parties, and how language practices are used to justify the goal of the discourse (Fairclough, 1995, p.83). Moreover, ideology is both located in social structures and the conditions of past and current events (Fairclough, 1995, p.72). It should be mentioned that this paper researches political parties. Whilst party ideology also resides in the electoral campaign programs, it will not directly research ideology in comparison to collective nostalgia, but rather the discourse of political parties in comparison to collective nostalgia. Future research however, could focus more on the link between ideology and collective nostalgia.

The CDA framework for this paper is established using Fairclough's three elements of ideological discourse. It will both use a micro-level analysis (stage 4) of the discourses of the selected political parties, and a macro-level analysis of the overarching relations and social structures (stage 2 and 3) of the Dutch political parties (Fairclough, 1995, pp.97-98). It should be mentioned that this paper makes use of a simplified version of Fairclough's model, which is further elaborated in table 1. The extensive framework is added in the appendix. Stage 4 and 5 are the core of this research. Stage 2 and 3 is used to give a brief overview of the social and historical context of the political parties on the macro-level. Moreover, questions of: who uses language; how, why and when; and to what effects, will be used to examine the political discourses (van Dijk, 1997, p.2). These questions will be asked concerning meaning making of collective nostalgia, language construction of *Self* and *Others*, and the (major and marginal) themes and actions that are constructed about temporal identities and subjectivities about the past.

A temporal identity is based on a contemporary construction of the *Self*, where the *Self* is constructed against an external *Other*, but it can also be constructed against one's own past. The contemporary *Self* can be constructed as a "continuous process of refinement", in which there is a continuity with the past. On occasion it can also be used to construct an "instantiation of a glorious past" (Hansen, 2006, p.40). Therefore, it is important to look at the language that is used in each discourse. In doing so, it can be established whether or not differences and similarities in the usage of a collective nostalgia can be observed between the political parties.

This paper will make use of an inductive research method, using the concepts of collective nostalgia as discussed in the preceding chapter on collective nostalgia. Using an inductive research method, discursive patterns can be established that fit the concepts of collective nostalgia. Moreover, using an inductive method, other patterns that do not fit the initial concepts outlined in the academic literature, can be included in the research as well to further understand the conditions under which dominant patterns include and exclude. The three forms of collective nostalgia that will be used are restorative nostalgia, reflective nostalgia and collective nostalgia as a form of ingroup-collectivization and outgroup directed anger. For this research a CDA is particularly useful as it gives insight on how rhetoric, framing and metaphors are used as 1) discursive strategies for meaning-making, and 2) to be able to put that into the context of collective nostalgia. A simplified example is a party discourse that is centered around glorifying the past and neglecting its negatives. Which in

turn can be put in the context of restorative nostalgia, as discursive strategies of this type of nostalgia focus on positives of the past, whilst ignoring the negatives (Boym, 2001).

In table 1, the analytical framework for this research will be further elaborated. The main focus of this research is in stage 4 and 5 of the framework. In stage 4 and 5 the different texts of the political parties will be examined. First an examination of the discourse using a critical discourse analysis as defined in the methodology section. After examining each political party discourse separately, a cross-examination of the differences and similarities between the discourses will be presented and both discourses will be placed in the context of collective nostalgia before continuing to the conclusion of this research.

**Table 1. CDA Framework**

<i>Stage of analysis</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>
1. Discourse selection	Discourse selection.	Selecting and preparing of documents for discourse analysis.
2. Explore background and context of the selected political parties (interdiscursivity)	Short examination of the social and historical context of the political parties.	Short introduction on the historical characteristics of the different political parties. Additionally noting the electoral results and key characteristics of the political parties.
3. Code texts and identify overarching themes	Identification of the major issues using choice of qualitative coding methods.	Process of open coding (inductive) of key categories of collective nostalgia and critical discourse analysis and the multiple issues it relates to.
4. Analyzing the internal relations in the texts	Examination of the language to indicate the aims of the texts (what does the text want to accomplish), representations of social context, actors, events, and the speaker's positionality.	Using the coding as defined in stage 3 to examine the texts, leading statements, textual organization, and the rhetorical vocabulary as used by the particular political party. Moreover, examining whether or not internal or external contradictory statements can be observed intertextually.
5. Interpretation of the data	Interpretation of the meaning of the major issues, external relations, and internal relations identified in stages 4, 5, and 6.	Analyzing the data from stage 2, 3, and 4 and evaluate them by using the concepts of collective nostalgia.

*Note:* For this CDA framework, the general analytical framework for CDA as presented by Mullet, was used as a baseline. Mullet defined a general analytical framework for CDA based upon the works of prominent CDA scholars like van Dijk and Fairclough (Mullet, 2001, p.122).

### **Clarifying the results in appendix A - E**

In chapters 4 and 5 both discourses of GL and FvD have been discussed separately, to gain a better understanding of how both parties have constructed their version of ‘social reality’. In appendices A, B, C, the concepts of restorative and reflective nostalgia and of ingroup-collectivization and outgroup-directed anger and contempt have been codified. For each form of collective nostalgia, its key categories have been identified. A definition and indicators help to understand each form of collective nostalgia. To each key category, a unique code has been assigned.

In appendix D and E the different quotes and transcripts from the articles and videos that have been used for the discourse analysis of FvD and GL, are archived. Moreover, in appendix D and E, a summary of the specific themes, and interpretation of the quotes/transcript are presented. Moreover, when it applies, the codes from appendix A through C are attributed to the different themes. Furthermore, in the column “Other and Self” in appendix D and E, identification of the Self and Other will be laid down. This column is also used to attributed different utterances to notions of ingroup-collectivization and outgroup-directed anger and contempt. The appendices are useful as reference work.

### **Limitations**

This paper examines the use of the different forms of collective nostalgia in Dutch political party discourse, as a tool for political persuasion. The findings of this research focus on a particular geographical location in a particular context (Dutch context). Therefore, the generalizability of the findings primarily concerns the Dutch context (Bryman, 2016, p.42). The framework of this research can also be applied to political parties in another state. However, the conclusions drawn in this paper have to be reviewed, specifically in the Dutch context. Furthermore, a DA relies on the interpretation of the data by the author. The interpretation of the data can, therefore, be subject to the author’s ideological viewpoints (Mullet, 2018, p.123). To minimize the author’s ideological influence on the interpretation of the data, the documentation selected needs to be as broad as possible and richly described. Therefore, appendices A through F will be included to be able to justify the interpretation of the data. Moreover, due to the limited timeframe of this research, only two political parties have been selected. For future research, it may be of interest to examine how other Dutch political parties discourses refer to collective nostalgia, and how strongly it relates to ideology.

The discourses examined are based upon publicly available documents, like electoral programs, interviews, and promotional videos. However, it could be possible that some viewpoints in the publically available documents, are internally disputed. It is only seldom that internal disputes are ventilated to the outside. Although an example of this is the internal party conflict within FvD between party leader Thierry Baudet and co-founder of FvD, Henk Otten. Here the internal dispute became public knowledge when Otten had wrongfully transferred 25.000 euro's from the party treasury to his own advisory bureau. However, according to insiders, the dispute concerned a broader discussion about the course of the party and the internal democratic rule within the party. This dispute shows that the public discourse is not always based on internal consensus (Stokmans & de Witt Wijnen, 2018). However, for this research, putting the political party discourses in the context of collective nostalgia will only be based on the publically uttered discourse, because the goal of this thesis is to analyze the political discourse in general and then to analyze how it relates to ideas on collective nostalgia.

Lastly, you cannot just read off collective nostalgia from discourse, because it is a social sentimentality. It is the use of historical metaphors and narratives that evoke nostalgic feelings. The interpretation of something being "nostalgic", is however influenced by the writer's perception. To minimize this, a multitude of quotes are used in chapters 4 and 5 to substantiate the connection to collective nostalgia. Moreover, the appendices are used as reference work to justify the author's interpretation of the discourse and the connection of key categories of collective nostalgia to the discourse.

## **4. FvD discourse**

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, the discourse of FvD from 2017 to 2019 will be examined. First, a short introduction on the primary temporal identity as constructed by the FvD will be discussed, before continuing how we can explain the social construction of FvD discourse, by explaining who uses language; how, why and when; and to what effects (van Dijk, 1997, p.2). In appendix D, the original Dutch quotes and transcripts, and the interpretation of the themes, *Self* and *Other* from FvD discourse are processed. In chapter 5 GL discourse will be discussed. Afterward, in chapter 6, both discourses will be put in the context of the different forms of collective nostalgia.

### **Major frame in FvD discourse**

FvD places itself in direct opposition to the ruling political elite, or as FvD frames it, the “party cartel”. According to FvD, the party cartel has been solely responsible for the deterioration of Dutch values and norms that have been historically embedded in Dutch culture. As stated by FvD (2017) in the 2017 campaign program for the Dutch primary elections, “There has been an attempt the past decennia to alienate Dutch society from its history, and to cut them loose from their own culture” (p.17). This quote forms the basis of FvD’s philosophy on the temporal identity and state of the current Dutch society. As will be further explained in the next paragraphs, the temporal identity of the *Self* in FvD discourse is about finding continuity with its own past, by making a single historical plot of Dutch history and culture. In other words, FvD states that *Others* are trying to break with Dutch history and culture (Hansen, 2006, p.40; See Appendix D). A temporal identity is shaped through themes or issues that are repeatedly predicated in a particular discourse. These themes can relate to progress, development, but also backwardness (Hansen, 2006, p.6). It is this notion that drives how meaning is constructed of the *Self* and *Other*, and how an interpretation of the past, present, and future is constructed. Keeping this in mind, we are able to further examine how the discourse of FvD is constructed.

### **Construction of *Self* and *Other***

The construction of one’s *Self* is important to understand how one frames the *Self* in relation to the *Other*. In FvD discourse the *Self* is constructed as a savior of Dutch history and culture because FvD sees itself as a party for the Dutch people. Self-preservation of Dutch culture, and in a broader sense European culture, is therefore embedded in this constructed *Self* (FvD,

2017, p.8). This self-preservation is constructed in relation to FvD's repetitive mentioning of existential threats, like mass-immigration, Europeanization, terrorism, security, and the subsequent demise of Dutch sovereignty (FvD, 2017, p.1). In the introductory paragraph for the 2017 elections these existential threats are neatly summarized. As stated by FvD (2017):

“The established media and parties want to let you believe otherwise, however, we live in a time of crisis. An existential crisis threatens the survival of Dutch society. Borders are no longer protected, and we are exposed to mass-immigration, that we cannot cope with and the terrorist threat is increasing. Sovereignty is transferred to Brussels, and we have less and less to say about our own society” (p.1).

Conceptually the *Self* and *Other* are the objects within the constructed social reality. Where the *Self* is often characterized as being threatened in its existence by different *Others* (Hansen, 2006, pp.5-6). Moreover, a critical attitude is always based on the relation between *Self* and *Others*. Because one cannot give critique without having an object to be critical about (Foucault, 1997, pp.24-25). FvD articulates a national *Self*, which is that all good that Dutch traditional society has brought us, is undermined by *Others*. These *Others* differ between issues but are summed up in the victory speech of the Dutch 2019 Provincial elections. *Others* are the “Universities, Journalists (media), people who receive subsidies for art and urban planning, but above all, our political leaders” (NOS, 2019, 1:20). Baudet continues on the *Others*: “Unfortunately, they control the decision-making bodies of our country and make the wrong choices time and time again in a curious mix of ignorance and cynical self-interest” (NOS, 2019, 2:36).

The identity of *Self* and *Other* are radically different from one another. However, there can be differing degrees of radical difference between *Others* (Hansen, 2006, p.6). The facilitator of existential threats here, according to FvD are the political elite. They are directly placed in opposition to the “interest of the Dutch people”(FvD, 2019a). To illustrate this, FvD (2017) states that:

“The arrival of large groups of (Islamic) immigrants has put a number of achievements and core values of our society under pressure. The party cartel has ignored this problem for the past 30 years – which got completely out of hand and resulted in entire population groups opposing each other” (p.3).

The quote above shows how the political elite, by ignoring this apparent problem, has facilitated the deterioration of Dutch society. The party cartel is mainly portrayed as a small group of political members who provide each other with jobs, or in as FvD puts it: “around 10.000 cartel members are spinning around in the administrative job carousel” (FvD, 2019a). Furthermore, the (Islamic) immigrants, according to FvD, used the facilitation to come to the Netherlands in masses. This was facilitated by the “party cartel that keeps on bringing in more disadvantaged immigrants (with support of the NPO and organizations like the Dutch Council for Refugees)” (p.20). This is the most radical difference between *Self* and *Other* that is constructed in FvD discourse. There is a distinction between *Others* as facilitators, and *Others* making use of the facilitation. The construction of strategies concerning *Self* and *Other* and different issues, create an identity and solidarity between the ‘we’ group, but also distantiation and marginalization of the ‘they’ group. Moreover, it serves as a mode of strategy to justify and maintain support for how, and concerning what issues the *Self* and *Other* are constructed (Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999, pp.92-93). Therefore, it is of importance to go more in-depth into the discourse of issues, to understand how these temporal identities are also used to justify views on certain issues.

### **Themes/issues in FvD discourse**

Discourse is always framed in terms of issues. As already mentioned, FvD frames the party cartel as being responsible for the numerous existential threats to the Dutch way of life. According to FvD, the party cartel has been primarily responsible for facilitating the development of these threats. The two primary threats to Dutch democracy and culture are according to the party, the massive influx of immigrants and Europeanization. The threat of mass-immigration is built on the notion that the integration of other cultures in Dutch society has failed. As stated by Baudet (2019) in his victory speech, “uncontrolled immigration has led to a deterioration of the street scene in the Netherlands, where a large group of native Dutch feel unsafe” (NOS, 10:30). FvD (2017) states that “everyone has the right to believe what they want” (p.3). On the other hand, they articulate that failed integration of (Islamic) immigrants has led to a deterioration of Dutch core values and norms. In doing so, they distinguish between cultures and their incompatibility. By establishing a new law called “Invoering Wet Bescherming Nederlandse Waarden” (Law for the Protection of Dutch Values), FvD is trying to make it compulsory for all organizations, religious or not, to conform to Dutch core values and norms (FvD, 2017, p.3). FvD discourse on culture emphasizes the incompatibility between Dutch (in a broader sense traditional European

culture) and other cultures (primarily Islamic culture). By highlighting the negatives of immigration like “higher levels of criminality” or the “backwardness” of immigrants, which in turn is fueled by “Left-wing indoctrination”, FvD tries to influence how people interpret cultural differences (NOS, 2019, 3:15; Mullet, 2018, p.135). The discursive strategy here is that FvD uses different metaphors to present a positive self-image, based on a single conception of Dutch cultures and norms, and a negative image of *Others* from different cultural backgrounds, by exclusively attributing negative traits to these *Others*, and in particular by promoting the idea that Islamic culture is incompatible with Western culture (Wodak & Reisigl, 2015, pp.585-586). In doing so, the discourse emphasizes that the behavior of *Others* is deviant and breaches the norms and values of the ingroup by referring to “them” as a threat (Wodak & Reisigl, 2015, pp.581).

### **Civilizational thinking**

A term frequently used by Baudet is Oikophobia. The term was first coined by Roger Scruton. Scruton was an influential conservative philosopher who was particularly praised within political conservative European circles. Scruton has been an important teacher for Baudet, especially when it comes to the more conservative stance on multiculturalism. In Baudet’s book Oikophobia, Scruton’s influence is clearly visible (Peters, 2020; van IJzendoorn, 2020). Oikophobia is the antonym of xenophobia. According to Scruton loyal people are increasingly ridiculed and demonized in their daily social routines by the media and educational system, by playing into people’s feelings of guilt towards their own culture (Lawler, 2016, pp.254-255). The term Oikophobia is frequently used in media appearances and writings of Baudet, like in his victory speech after the 2019 elections. Oikophobia is used as a means to justify FvD’s interpretation of culture and cultural differences. By placing the *Self* as cultural victims and *Others* like immigrants and the political elite as those who are responsible for the deterioration of that culture by stirring feelings of self-hatred among Dutch people (NOS, 2019, 6:30). FvD promotes an Australian model of immigration, which entails that we only let in those who can directly contribute to Dutch society and economy. FvD does not oppose to aiding refugees and immigrants. However, aid should only be restricted to the proximity of their homeland (Baudet, 2019). Moreover, they plea for “remigration” or “assimilation” where integration of immigrants fails (FvD, 2017, p.22). Predicating a narrative of assimilation however, can have consequences for immigrants within the Netherlands, as assimilation often leads to feelings of disconnection with one’s own culture and feelings of dissatisfaction because of not acquired accomplishments in their new social environment

(Shills, 2011, p.403). Moreover, through the social practice of assimilation, there is a probable cause for the exclusion of certain groups from social life (Fairclough, 2003, pp.24-25). Assimilation can therefore lead to exclusion and marginalization of groups with different cultural backgrounds. A 2016 study on populist radical right discourse in the Nordic countries, showed how anti-immigration and strong critique towards other cultures (primarily Islam) is fueled by constructing immigrants as *Others* who are more prone to threatening and deviant behavior (Sakki & Pettersson, 2016, pp.160-161).

A dominant feature of *Othering* in populist and radical right discourse is the construction of threatening ideologies and cultures, as opposed to groups of people. The most likely explanation for this in FvD discourse, is its tendency towards civilizational thinking. This means that strong fault-lines within society are constructed to maintain or protect the system itself, as well as its citizenry, whilst at the same time, it is presented as the cause of many societal problems. However, this also means that cultural minorities, like immigrants, are not the responsibility of the receiving society (Hansen, 2006, p.148). The discourse of radical right is shaped from the notion of incompatibility of Islamic culture and multiculturalism in comparison to Western culture. As shown in this chapter, this is also visible in FvD discourse. Thereby creating an ‘us versus them’ dichotomy (Sakki & Pettersson, 2016, p.162). FvD rhetoric frames ‘us’ as, those who are standing “amid the debris of what was once the most beautiful and greatest civilization the world has ever known” (NOS, 2019, 0:15). The third feature that was identified in the object of *Other*, is the constructing of inner enemies. This is related to shaping connections between (Islamic) immigrants and left-wing movements and politicians facilitating the “Islamization of the West” (Sakki & Pettersson, 2016, p.164). The three features of constructing a cultural threat, the incompatibility of cultures, and inner enemies, is also continuously established in FvD discourse. Like for example in frames like the “party cartel” as inner enemy of an apparent “existential crisis of achievements and values”, the framing of immigration and integration is problematic by “letting in hundreds of thousands of people from totally different cultures” and the subsequent deterioration of Dutch culture through ”weg-met-ons projects” (loosely translated as projects to get rid of us) (FvD, 2017, p.17; NOS, 2019, 3:15).

### **Europeanization and the climate debate**

Directly related to the issues of immigration is the constructed “threat of Europeanization”. The threat of the current political elite is not only reserved for Dutch political leaders, but also EU leaders. They are, according to FvD, as responsible for facilitating mass-immigration

through open borders, thereby threatening European and Dutch civilization. The FvD frames Europeanization as being problematic, as it is nothing more than a transfer of power away from the nation-states (FvD, 2017, p.8). In FvD (2017) phrasing, “it is a cartel on top of the cartel” (p.8). Although they do not oppose cooperation and trade between European member-states, this should not be controlled by supranational organizations of the EU, but rather by the nation-states themselves. FvD, therefore, promotes referenda for abolishing the Euro and leaving the EU (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 42:21). Hence, sovereignty is paramount to FvD discourse. This can also be illustrated by the promotional video of FvD’s research institute, named the “Renaissance Institute”. Here parallels are drawn between the 16th century Spanish inquisitional rule and the EU. As stated in the video of the Renaissance Institute (2019), “When in the 16<sup>th</sup>-century they wanted to implement the inquisition, we took up arms against the Spaniards. The Spaniards who just like the EU in Brussels nowadays, tries to rule in a tyrannical way” (0:26). Drawing this parallel, the EU is directly framed as radical *Other* that threatens the Dutch and European way of life (Hansen, 2006, p.34).

Another issue in which FvD plays a prominent role in the debate on climate change. The new climate change policy in the Netherlands is backed by almost every party within parliament. However, FvD positions itself in direct opposition to the rest. The FvD criticizes the entire climate change debate by stating that it has become a religion, a “green faith”, to which also parties on the right have succumbed (Baudet, 2019). According to FvD, the climate change debate is nothing more than “climate heresy”, fueled by the notion of “self-guilt”, that will lead to an economic collapse (NOS, 2019, 7:14). It should hardly be mentioned that the *Self* and *Other* have the same characteristics as with previously mentioned issues.

### **Interpreting FvD discourse**

In general, there is a continuing consistency in FvD discourse. The *Self* is portrayed as the cure for issues and issues are framed as existential threats, that are caused by *Others* like the political elite, immigrants, etc. The temporal identity constructed by FvD, positions the native Dutch in opposition to the political leaders and those who come from different cultural backgrounds. The discursive strategy used by FvD is, therefore, to radicalize the *Others*, by constructing existential threats, which are, according to them, the result of actions from *Others*. There is a strong tendency within FvD discourse towards civilizational thinking of the West in comparison to the surrounding world. This is done by constructing both external threats like mass-immigration, related terrorism, etc. and internal threats that are related to the

political elite essentially importing values that are alien to society (Hansen, 2006, p.148). Moreover, meaning making here is the construction of a view of how Dutch society should look like, which is primarily based upon the inclusion of Dutch core values and native Dutch traditions and the exclusion of influences from the outside. By establishing FvD discourse, we are now able to put it in the context of collective nostalgia.

## **5. GL discourse**

### **Introduction**

In this chapter GL discourse from 2017 to 2019 will be discussed. The sources that have been used are the electoral campaign program of 2017, numerous tv and newspaper interviews (2017-2019), and electoral campaign videos. The relevant texts can be reviewed in Appendix E. In this chapter first, a short introduction on the primary temporal identity as constructed by GL will be discussed, before continuing on how we can explain the social construction of GL discourse, by explaining who uses language; how, why and when; and to what effects (van Dijk, 1997, p.2).

### **Major frame in GL discourse**

In GL discourse there is a repetitive mentioning of the failure of the economic and political status quo (See Appendix E). The party advocates against the current status quo, which according to them is “dictated by lobbyists” and has led to “international competition of misuse of arguments against renewal” (GL, 2017a, p.7). Renewal can best be understood as a fundamental change of the economic and political system, rather than a change within the system. Therefore, GL constructs the Self as being a bringer of change, or as Klaver puts it “we have a robust program for change” (Nieuwsuur, 2019, 15:30). This change of the status quo, as will be shown in this chapter, forms the general frame of GL discourse. It is important to keep this in mind as meaning making in GL discourse all comes back to this frame of a major shift in thinking about political, economic, and societal issues. A general point of criticism of GL is that their plans are unattainable. But, as Klaver argued in an interview with Vice Nederland (2017), “You must always implement our plans in conjunction. So that means that if you introduce environmental taxes on the one hand, which makes environmental pollution more expensive, you will always have to give back by lowering labor costs” (9:15), he continues “What this shows is that we have a vision and that we do not want to make little adjustments to the system. No, we want to change our economy and we do that very considerably, with a total of 27 billion euros (Vice Nederland, 2017, 9:49). GL’s major frame should, therefore, be seen as a general criticism of the mechanics of the current system, a desire to change that system, and the positioning of the *Self* as a bringer of this change. The next quote in GL (2017a) electoral campaign program summarizes this well: “Economism has been ruling for 30 years. Short-term economic interests go beyond well-being, environment and, health. It is time for a change” (p.2). GL therefore, proposes that we need to make a shift

towards a system based on values like “inclusion” and “mutual connection”, instead of what they construct as a system based on “division” and “self-interest” (GL, 2017a, p.2).

Moreover, where FvD is against European integration, GL is a strong proponent. GL sees the Netherlands as a precursor for European and global cooperation to tackle issues like climate change, migration, and poverty (GL, 2008, p.11). The major frame that is constructed in GL discourse is one in which the status quo should be rejected in favor of a major change in going about society and the economic system. The *Self* is here the bringer of that change, a challenger of the status quo, or in other words, a challenger of current power relations (Fairclough, 1993, p.95). Now that the major frame and *Self* are identified, how are *Others* constructed in GL discourse? As with FvD, GL constructs *Others* as being responsible for numerous regional and global issues. However, there is a significant difference between GL and FvD discourse in terms of *Othering*, and the construction of major themes and actions.

### **Others in GL discourse**

GL positions itself as critical towards Dutch political parties in general. They are, according to them, responsible for institutionalizing a system of economism and exclusion. Economism, according to GL is deeply rooted in the global, and especially the Western economic system. It consists of “multinationals”, “lobbyists”, “bankers”, and the “political elite” that facilitate this economic system based on “short-term interests and exclusion”. This economic exclusion is central to GL discourse (GL, 2017a, p.2). As stated in the GL (2017a) electoral campaign program: “The difference between rich and poor has been increasing for 30 years. Wages at the top are rising year on year, while low and middle incomes do not benefit from economic growth” (p.15). These multinationals, lobbyists, bankers, and the political elite are therefore profiting disproportionately from the current status quo. This group is contrasted with another *Other*.

In GL discourse two contrasting *Others* can be identified. First, the *Others* as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the multinationals, bankers ,and lobbyists who are responsible for “evading taxes on a massive scale”, and therefore contributing to an “unjust economic system that is not sustainable for society” (GL, 2017a, p.15). And second, the ordinary citizen, or as they phrase it: “the low and middle incomes who pay their taxes”. According to GL, these “ordinary citizens” do not “profit from economic growth” within the current system (GL, 2017, p.15). By contrasting these *Others*, GL creates a discourse of winners and losers of the current system. The ordinary citizen, who is the loser of an unfair

economic system, and the multinationals, lobbyists, bankers and political elite as winners of the system, which according to GL led to “international competition that misuses the argument of economic growth to battle the debate around renewal” (GL, 2017a, p.7). In other words, according to GL, the status quo is driven by a misuse of power. It is about analyzing competing power interests between these groups, and identifying who gains and who loses from a specific situation, or who are the winners and losers of this particular social arrangement (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2005, pp.307-308). The result of this construction is that a large group, the ordinary citizen, is marginalized by the system, primarily because they are excluded from sharing in the profits, while the other group (the elite) is responsible for upholding an “unfair and unjust” system of exclusion. The following citation from the official GL website summarizes this ideological discussion: “GroenLinks wants to change the Netherlands by fighting this economism, the ideology that reduces all social issues to financial or economic problems” (GL, 2019d). These last two paragraphs are of importance to understand GL discourse because it reveals the major frame in GL discourse. The frame of an unfair economic and political system that creates marginalized minority groups (the losers) and a profiting elite (the winners). Furthermore, in this frame, the *Self* is the challenger of this system. Before, continuing to elaborate on the themes in GL discourse, there is still one recurring *Other* in GL discourse, not yet discussed.

Another important *Other* in GL discourse are populists. The GL speech after the 2017 elections was largely dominated by the loss of the populists parties in the Netherlands. As stated by GL party leader Klaver (2017c) during his speech: “The answer we have for Europe. No populism did not break through”(6:40). He continues, “In a time of populism, where politicians stir up feelings of hatred and fear, we choose for hope, optimism and change” (GL, 2017c, 7:10). The *Self* is positioned as a solution to hate and fear, a challenger of the populist movement. Therefore, the identity of populists is one based on hate and fear, according to Klaver. According to the website of the scientific office of GL, they define populist parties as those parties “who claim to speak on behalf of the people”. By closing borders and attacking minorities they want to protect the identity of the Christian Western civilization” (Wetenschappelijk Bureau GroenLinks, 2011). In the context of Dutch politics, FvD and PVV (Party for Freedom) are considered right-wing populist parties. GL’s *Othering* of populists is mainly based on a recurring debate in Dutch and to a larger extent European political arena, namely the refugee crisis (See Appendix E).

### **Themes/issues in GL discourse**

Within CDA it is important to review the major themes that are constructed in discourse. In GL discourse four major themes can be identified. These themes are, the economic and political system, the refugee crisis, the educational system, and climate change (GL, 2017c, 9:41). In the next section, these themes will be discussed in depth. What frames and dominant patterns can be observed, and what actions are related to these themes. The economic and political system has already been discussed in this chapter, as this forms the basis for understanding GL discourse. The last paragraph on populist *Other* already referred to the refugee crisis. For both parties in this research, the refugee crisis is a recurring and important theme. However, both parties have completely different views on the subject.

### **Populism, refugees and Islam**

As shown in the chapter on FvD discourse, FvD promotes a system of aiding refugees and immigrants from a distance. Moreover, for those refugees and immigrants already residing in the Netherlands, remigration and, assimilation are necessary if integration fails. FvD does not believe in the acceptance of large groups of refugees and immigrants, as it would lead to a deterioration of Dutch values, norms, and our shared identity. GL in turn interprets FvD discourse as being one that influences the public by playing into their emotions of hate and fear. In other words, GL believes that FvD, and in a broader sense, populists, use the refugee crisis as a means to polarize society and create a division of us (native Dutch people) versus them (refugees/immigrants). On the other hand, GL positions the *Self* as an advocate of rights for refugees, “a European Union for everyone” (GL, 2019h). This also resonated in their election speech of 2017. Here GL (2017c) dedicated their election victory to “those who oppose discrimination” (8:05). In the same speech, Klaver lashes out at the populists. He states that “in a time where politicians are stirring up feelings of hatred and fear, we are opting for hope, optimism, and change. And it is precisely when populists say that refugees should take care of themselves, we say that we stand for the reception of people fleeing war and violence” (GL, 2017c, 6:30 – 7:20). GL is a proponent of a humane approach to the refugee crisis (GL, 2017a, p.3). Again, as shown earlier in GL discourse, the contrasting of two *Others* is of importance. First, the refugees and immigrants, who according to GL, are being marginalized and disempowered. Second, the populists, who are responsible for discriminating and excluding the *Other*, by spreading fear and hate. It is about two groups in direct opposition to each other.

The refugee crisis is not an isolated issue. Also in GL discourse the discussion is broader, also highlighting the political debate on Islam. Here, GL, also criticizes other leftist parties. As stated by Klaver “My criticism of left-wing parties in particular, is that they often move with these tendencies. Like, no we have to watch out for Islam or no there are quite a lot of them. I don’t think you should do that. You have to be clear on where you stand” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 01:40-01:55). Moreover, in the 2017 election victory speech, Klaver stated something similar: “I hope that these elections are a lesson for other left-wing parties in Europe. Do not try to mimic populists, but stand for your principles and look at what the results can be” (GL, 2017c, 07:20 – 07:40). Actions concerning this theme should be based on a “humane and just refugee policy” (GL, 2019h). The scientific office of GL has published extensively on what they call the “new populism”. They make a distinction between the “old-school extreme right” and “new populism”. Where the first is for abolishing democratic rule, the latter is pro-democracy, and a proponent of more tools for direct democratic rule. Moreover, “A shift can also be observed from racial arguments to cultural elements and from collectivism to individualism – a shift that might be more than just a change in strategy”. There are however, certain similarities between the two, namely: “Both play on the mechanisms of exclusion and differentiation in order to be heard; both draw from the same source: a demagogic, protectionist and xenophobic nationalism” (Meijers, 2011). In essence GL constructs the phenomenon of populism/populist parties as one that stirs hatred and fear, and has xenophobic and discriminatory tendencies when it comes about people from other cultures.

### **The educational system**

A marginalized majority and an elite that profits disproportionately from the current economic and political system, is the major frame that underlines GL discourse in a broader sense. This means that other themes, like the educational system and the refugee crisis can be viewed from this perspective as well. GL (2017a) discourse is clear about how: “the educational system is being dominated by economism” (p.21). Like in the 2017 election program, it is stated that: “Already from a young age children are being trained to become products of the labor market. They continue “Education must reduce inequality, not increase it” (GL,2017a, p.21). The frame of inequality resonates in their frame of the educational system. An educational system that according to GL, reduces children to products and supports individualism (GL, 2017a, pp.26-31). Segregation is a key feature that is repetitively mentioned in GL discourse. Inequality is not just economic, but as stated: “Too many children

are classified at a lower educational level than they can handle, often based on prejudices about ethnicity or socio-economic background” (GL, 2017a, p.24). Continuing, “colonialism, migration history, and diversity” are underexposed in schools, according to GL leading to “segregation in education” (GL, 2017a, p.26). GL discourse on the current state of the educational system according to them is based on individualism, segregation, pessimism, and economism that facilitates inequality of opportunity for marginalized groups within society (GL, 2017a, p.31; GL, 2017b, 1:52). Therefore, GL proposes actions to improve inclusiveness through collectivization and empowering marginalized groups. They do so by proposing actions of “combatting false prejudice on gender, sexuality”, “improving our knowledge of colonialism, migration history, diversity and anti-discrimination”. This, according to GL will result in children growing up to be “world citizens who consciously deal with their living environment, become acquainted with art and can deal with moral issues and diversity in opinions and cultures” (GL, 2017a, p.22).

### **Climate change**

The last recurring theme in GL discourse is the issue of climate change. Climate change is at this time the single most important and tangible issue in GL discourse (Vice Nederland, 2017, 1:20). This sounds contradictory to earlier mentioned systemic changes that are envisioned by GL. Although the utterances for systemic economic and political change is a continuous thread through GL discourse, it is less tangible than climate change policy. And for good reasons, as climate change and environmental durability are one of the biggest issues discussed in politics of our time. As for climate change, GL has general criticism towards Dutch politics. As stated by GL (2017b): “It seems as if our politicians have been living under a huge rock for the past 30 years and have done nothing to reduce the effects of climate change” (02:07). Although, politics in general has reduced climate change to a “side issue”, according to GL it is very much “*the* main issue” (Vice Nederland, 2017, 1:15). Furthermore, climate policy in the Netherlands lagging behind. Strengthened by a “new generation that stood up”, GL proposes an ambitious climate law (GL, 2017a, p.7). This ambitious new law is to “increase renewable energy from a lousy 6% to more than 60% in 2030, whilst disposing of fossil fuels, like coal (GL, 2017b, 02:26; GL, 2017a, p.10).

### **Interpreting GL discourse**

In this chapter, the discourse of GL has been presented. Meaning making is about identifying patterns of meaning in texts that constitute social reality. In general, the identity of the *Self* in GL discourse can be described as a challenger of the conventions of the status quo. The *Self* is

about *change*. Change here means a fundamental change of the system, where the *Self* leads the way toward that change. A fundamental shift from contemporary economic and political structures. Moreover, there is a focus on prioritizing climate change and education as two major issues. This *Self* in GL discourse differs significantly from FvD discourse in which the *Self* relates to societal change, in which FvD does not try to break with the past, but instead tries to reconnect with it.

Two types of *Others* can be identified. First, the *negative Others*. These can be characterized as those who protect the status quo and profit from it disproportionately. This *Other* is responsible for constructing a system of inequality and exclusion, a system in which economism trumps all other interests. Second, the *positive Others*. These are identified in GL discourse as marginal groups in society, who are structurally excluded from profiting from the system. The *Self* here is a force for change in support of groups who are marginalized, excluded or discriminated against in society. Examples are refugees, the poor, groups from other ethnic or cultural backgrounds, and women. Generalizing the actions in GL discourse, it is about fundamentally changing the system, by advocating values like optimism, hope, and empathy, with the desire to create a system based on social inclusion, emancipation, and social justice. GL discourse is built on a constructed contemporary social reality of inequality. The inequality that reduces everything to an economic system of ‘us and them’. The *Self*, therefore, positions itself as a bringer of change, change toward a system that is based on equality, social inclusion and justice (See Appendix E).

## **6. Putting the discourses in the context of collective nostalgia**

### **Introduction**

In this final chapter, both discourses will be brought together, as to be able to make a comparison of both discourses, while putting it in the context of collective nostalgia. The concepts of collective nostalgia that are used in this research have already been presented in the conceptualization. In this chapter, it will be reviewed how the discourse of both FvD and GL fit in the two forms of collective nostalgia that have been coined by Boym (2001), namely restorative and reflective nostalgia. Furthermore, an examination of how the discourses relate to the notions of ingroup-collectivization and outgroup-directed anger and contempt, which has been written about by scholars like Sedikides, Routledge, and others. Lastly, the GL

discourse will be placed within the framework of “radical nostalgia”, the concept of nostalgia that Bonnet attributes to the “left, progressive” in her book “Left in the Past” (2001).

Before continuing putting the discourse of FvD and GL in the context of collective nostalgia, some general remarks have to be made. Collective nostalgia does not just relate to direct utterances about the past. Language here is the representation of how meaning is created in terms of past, present and future, where the past and future are always subjective interpretations influenced by contemporary understandings of time and space. Therefore, discourse does not directly have to refer to the past, but it will still have a connection to the subjective past (Mead, 2011, p.127). To give an example, when one states ‘the political elite has destroyed certain values’, this implies that these values have existed before. The subjective interpretation and framing of the past is used as a sort of gauge to which interpretations of current events within society are measured against (Schwartz, 2011, p.245). Above, is important to keep in mind because according to Bonnet in left-wing discourse more often than not, nostalgia is discarded altogether. As will be shown, there are no clear patterns visible in direct utterances of the past in GL discourse. However, that does not mean we cannot say anything sensible about GL discourse and collective nostalgia.

### **Collective nostalgia and the use of historical imagery**

The discourse of FvD and GL differ significantly in terms of meaning making and the interpretation of social reality. Restorative nostalgia uses (national) symbolism, rituals, etc. which are used to construct an image of the past or a national memory (Boym, 2001, p.72). Images can be particularly useful to visualize national symbols or rituals. The focus of this paper is primarily on spoken and written language. However, for FvD, images are an integral part of party discourse, especially concerning the past. For the restorative nostalgic, it makes use of images that relate to a national history for the “reconstruction of monuments of the past” (Boym, 2001, p.70). On the website of FvD various images that relate to Dutch national history and traditions are visible. For example, FvD proposes a “Law for the Protection of Dutch Values”. Here, an image is used of people partying in Amsterdam during Kingsday. This proposed law is an action that is constructed from a viewpoint that traditional Dutch values are threatened by “failed integration and that all organizations in the Netherlands have to endorse the law” (FvD, 2019i). Using the image of a Dutch tradition like Kingsday in this context could be interpreted as a tradition that is threatened by failed integration. Furthermore, the image of a large group of Islamic men coming into Europe is used in the context of “immigration and remigration”. This image is used to strengthen their viewpoint concerning

immigration, and refugees, which in FvD discourse is an existential threat to Dutch traditional society (FvD, 2019e).

Moreover, FvD also uses images of Dutch history, like the picture of the “The Threatened Swan” (de Bedreigde Zwaan), painted by Jan Asselijn during the Dutch Golden Age. This picture became synonymous to Johan de Witt’s (the Grand Pensionary of Holland in the 17th Century) fight against the enemies of Holland, and is used by FvD on their webpage about sovereignty (Rijksmuseum, 2020; FvD, 2019b). Also, on the website of the Renaissance Institute, the scientific bureau of FvD, historical imagery is used extensively. Meaning making in FvD discourse is consequently based on a historical narrative in which mythicizing history and national and cultural symbolism play an important role (Boym, 2001, p.70). This is evident in the continuing utterances of a glorified Dutch history, like “overcoming tyrannical (Spanish) rule”, emphasizing our fight for autonomy and sovereignty, and “our entrepreneurial spirit that dates back to the 1600s (Dutch Golden Age) and Dutch domination of the world seas” (Renaissance Instituut, 2019). FvD’s romanticization of Dutch history is captured in the promotional video of FvD’s research institute. Images of Dutch historical figures like Erasmus, Pieterszoon-Coen, van Oldenbarnvelt, Hugo de Groot, etc. Moreover, vivid images of the VOC flagships and maps of Europe illustrating the growing influence of the Spaniards in the 1600s, subsequently comparing it with the EU. The promotional video depicts a positive interpretation of Dutch history, and a construction of external threats (Renaissance Institute, 2019). The Netherlands is positively depicted as an economic superpower due to the development of the first stock market and the establishment of the VOC (Dutch East India Company) making it a successful global trader. Moreover, the Dutch are presented as scientific and cultural pioneers, referring to the achievements of Dutch scientists and inventors like Eisinga, Spinoza, Erasmus, and Coornhert, but also to artists like Rembrandt, and Vermeer. Moreover, the threats that are mentioned are the nobility, the Spanish rule during the 1600s, and the EU. The Dutch are presented in this context as resistance against these (external) threats (Renaissance Instituut, 2019). It is a projection not of the imperfection of history, but the construction of romantic history that makes use of national symbols to construct their version of the past. An interpretation of the past, not based on the imperfectness of history, but advocating their historical interpretation as ‘truth’, which can be labeled as restorative nostalgia (Boym, 2001, p.70). Images of prominent Dutch historical figures and traditions are an important tool for FvD to construct a history of the Netherlands that does not recognize any negatives of its past. Negative episodes like the

Dutch involvement in the global slave trade during the Dutch Golden Age, and the colonization are not mentioned in the video. It, therefore, fits Kammen's description of "a history without guilt" (Kammen, 1999, p.157). It is a glorification of Dutch history constructing a national memory used to create a cultural identity (Boym, 2001, p.72).

In GL discourse, the usage of historical imagery has not been identified. This could be a sign, to what Bonnet stated, that left-wing parties often ignore the past, as it is mostly seen as the antithesis to modernism. According to Bonnet, an explanation for that can be that the "progressive" – emphasizes a commitment to the future, while the words that describe the left's adversaries – 'conservative' and 'reactionary' suggest devotion to the past (Bonnet, 2001, p.3). Although the use of images of a national history are not present in GL discourse, that does not mean that collective nostalgia is not present in the spoken and written language of GL discourse. In the next paragraphs, the *Self* and *Others* in FvD and GL discourse will be discussed and put in the context of collective nostalgia.

### **Putting the discourse in the context of collective nostalgia**

In chapter 4 the *Self* in FvD discourse was identified. The temporal identity of the *Self* is about finding continuity with its own past. A past that in FvD discourse is constructed as a single historical plot of Dutch history and culture. Furthermore, *Others* are constructed as threatening to break with this continuity. In the *Self* both a savior and victim are embedded. Next, these characteristics are put in the context of collective nostalgia. Moreover, a third characteristic of the *Self* in FvD discourse is the favoring of ingroup-collectivization. First, the marginalization and victimization of the *Self*. This is found in the continuous utterances of loss of sovereignty, autonomy and cultural norms and values caused by the external threats of other cultures, EU leaders and internal facilitation of these threats by the political elite in the Netherlands (See Appendix D). The *Self* in FvD discourse can also be identified with the ingroup. The ingroup in FvD discourse is the native Dutch. There are continued utterances of "we" and "our" in the context of loss of one's homeland and longing toward a glorified past. In other words, FvD is trying to construct a social reality in which native Dutch should have feelings in which their own culture, norms, and values are threatened by external factors (Boym, 2001, pp.70-72).

Where FvD victimizes the *Self* and ingroup, in GL discourse also signs of a victim narrative are present. However, this victimization does not relate to the *Self*, but rather to *Others*, namely minority groups that they identify as being marginalized and excluded from

society. The *Self* in GL discourse is a challenger of the status quo. A status quo that according to them is fundamentally flawed and unfair toward certain groups and members of society. Utterances of “we and “our” should be seen in the context of changing the system, by advocating hope, optimism, and actions to improve inclusion for those groups who are marginalized by that system (See Appendix E). The focus of the *Self* in FvD discourse is towards favoring ingroup-collectivization. However, in GL discourse the *Self* is positioned as a protagonist for challenging the status quo in favor of inclusion of *Others* whom they deem as being sidelined. Both the Selves articulated by FvD and GL distinguish between groups. However, the first favors action to improve the relative condition of the ingroup (native Dutch) and fuels anger and contempt toward outgroups, like (Islamic) immigrants and the political elite (Cheung, et al, 2017a, pp.303-304; See Appendix D). The focus of FvD is on specific traits of one’s own culture, the creation of a common social context for the ingroup, and the continued utterances about the incompatibility of Dutch culture with other cultures, and in particular, with Islamic culture. This again fits the description of restorative nostalgia (See Appendix A and E).

GL, on the other hand, proposes collectivization in which “all groups” within society feel represented. GL discourse shows that the party favors a society that embraces cultural and individual differences. There is no clear sign of restorative nostalgia. Moreover, there are no clear indications that reflective nostalgia is present within the *Self* in GL discourse (See Appendix E). However, there are utterances about the past in GL discourse. These utterances mainly refer to the status quo of the economic and political system. Utterances like “Economism has been ruling for 30 years. Short-term economic interests go beyond well-being, environment and health” (GL, 2017a, p.2); “The difference between rich and poor has been increasing for 30 years” (GL,2017a, p.15); “The last year’s inequality has increased (GL, 2017b, 0:55). These are all utterances that refer to a past in which inequality and exclusion of minority groups have been facilitated. These utterances however, also in the context of a continuous need for change, can be attributed to radicalizing or escaping the past (Bonnet, 2010, p.22). The direct utterances of the past in GL discourse, therefore, seem to fit the notion of radical nostalgia, rather than reflective nostalgia.

When zooming in on GL discourse on education and culture, the pattern of radical nostalgia is particularly evident. According to GL, they want to “teach children the knowledge and skills that fit in with the 21st century” (GL, 2017a, p.22). Furthermore, they state that the educational system is based on social exclusion rather than inclusion, and inequality rather

than equality. Therefore, proposing action to improve opportunities for groups from different backgrounds, and focusing on emancipation and diversity (GL, 2017a, pp.21-24). Moreover, according to GL, the current educational system does not reflect enough on “our” negatives of the past, therefore proposing that our “colonial past, migration history, diversity, and anti-discrimination become core-objectives in education” (GL 2017a, p.26). There is no mentioning of the past in which positives are uttered. GL discourse about the past rather focuses on the negatives of the past. GL discourse therefore still fits the notion of Bonnet that nostalgia most of the time is not uttered in left-wing discourse, except for utterances related to radicalizing the past. It should however be mentioned that the number of utterances in GL discourse about negatives of the past are limited (See Appendix E).

Besides the victim, there is a second characterization of FvD’s *Self*. FvD identifies itself as an advocate for, or savior of Dutch traditional society. This is supported by uttering a single historical interpretation of Dutch history. This is best illustrated by framing the *Self* as the “flagship of the Dutch Renaissance fleet”, that will “fight to restore the pride of our nation and democracy” (NOS, 2019, 20:50). Restorative nostalgia plays an important role here, because of the construction of a group perception that is built on feelings of deteriorating present circumstances (Cheung et al., 2017, p.303). Where the victimization of the *Self* and ingroup corresponds with notions of rapid development of new traditions that threaten to take down old traditions, the *Self* will also “restore the pride of our country” (FvD, 2019g, 20:50; Boym, 2001, p.71). Moreover, as Boym argued, restorative nostalgia is built on the notion that others conspire against us (Boym, 2001, p.73). In FvD discourse this is about the Dutch and EU political elite (party cartel) opposing ‘us’ (the Dutch people), and in a broader sense conspiring against European traditions (See Appendix D). This is a result of the facilitating mass-immigration and Europeanization. As Boym (2001) argues, this conspiracy becomes existent when: “we for whatever reason feel insecure in the modern world and find a scapegoat for our misfortunes, somebody different from us whom we don’t like” (p.74). Moreover, it leads to action, namely protecting “our imagined community” (Boym, 2001, p.73). This is the essence of FvD discourse. Feelings of insecurity of the *Self* on the current state of Dutch society, and its future, subsequently lead to blame Others, for their misfortunes.

### **FvD discourse: restorative nostalgia and ingroup-collectivization**

As already shown in the last paragraphs, FvD discourse almost neatly fits Boym’s concept of restorative nostalgia. The *Others* in FvD discourse are all part of the conspirators against “us”.

It, is therefore, no coincidence that anger, contempt, and hostility are fueled towards *Others*. FvD positions itself as the “flagship” that will restore “our heritage” (NOS, 2019, 20:50). FvD discourse is about creating two opposites that are incompatible with one another. There is strong motivation for in-group collectivization and action, underpinned by nationalist symbolism and glorifying our shared history through a fixed interpretation of the past. On the other hand, stirring outgroup-directed anger and hostility towards *Others*, like the political elite and immigrants. Moreover, there is a tendency in FvD discourse about wanting to reconstruct the past. This is visible in the strong conservative stance of the party. FvD is a proponent of a world system of nation-states who are sovereign and autonomous, accompanied by a desire to wanting to reconstruct the past. It is a call for anti-modernism that fuels conservative and traditional values within FvD discourse (Boym, 2001, p.71). Anti-modernism here means not that the discourse only favors a reconstruction of the past, and is completely opposed to modernity. It is, however, about a paradox between modernity and the past. First, between the increasing pace of modernization, and the increasing desire to shift towards more traditional thinking, based on pre-existing values. And second, the bigger the desire towards traditional thinking, the stronger the tendency is towards selectivity in thinking about the past (Boym, 2001, p.72).

In terms of collective nostalgia, FvD discourse fits almost neatly within the categorization of restorative nostalgia and notions of ingroup-collectivization and outgroup-direct anger and contempt. Reflective nostalgia and notions of diverse interpretations of the past and cultural memory have not been established in FvD discourse (See appendix D). Scholars have warned for the potential of outgroup-directed contempt in relation to this type of collective nostalgia. As the literature suggests, it can lead to non-normative actions directed to outgroups. Although FvD discourse fits the categorization of restorative nostalgia, this research does not suggest that the aim of FvD is to incite non-normative action like violence. However, we should be vigilant toward this use of this type of collective nostalgia as it can have a strong negative influence on intergroup relations.

### **GL discourse: radical nostalgia and violence?**

Only a limited number of references in GL discourse have been identified which implicitly or explicitly referred to the past. The limited references that are identified are used in conjunction with GL’s interpretation of the present. GL proposes a shift towards a more inclusive economic system, which is based on core values like “freedom, equality, empathy and tolerance” (GL, 2017a, p.7; See Appendix E). References about the past are primarily

based on highlighting negative episodes of Dutch history. A history that is surrounded by the exclusion of particular minority groups. The negative episodes, therefore, focus on issues related to that exclusion like colonialism, discrimination, and migration history. Moreover, some references were made specifically about the rise of economism and how this “reduced people” to “products of the labor market”, which has led to a system of economic inequality (GL, 2017a; See Appendix E).

In terms of collective nostalgia, it can be established that GL rather stays away from the past altogether, instead of using it as a tool for political persuasion. There is no clear pattern of references to the past in GL discourse. Except, that the past serves as a phenomenon with which to break. In particular to break with the continuity of the political and economic system. Although there are some references that could be interpreted as a means to radicalize the past, a clear pattern cannot be observed (See Appendix E). Bonnet’s argument that left-wing politics discards or ignores nostalgia altogether seems to hold ground in this case.

Unlike FvD discourse, GL discourse does not fit the description of restorative nostalgia, but rather Bonnet’s description of radical nostalgia (See Appendix E). This radical nostalgia relates to radicalizing the past to use it as a means to justify radical change of the current political and economic system. It should be mentioned that radical nostalgic discourse seemingly has the potential to lead to non-normative action. Within climate/ecological activism non-normative action is increasingly used as a means to protest against the inaction of governments in tackling climate change (Extinction Rebellion, 2020a). For example, Extinction Rebellion, an international social movement, has been increasingly using non-normative methods to spread messages about “the climate crisis”. As Roger Hallam, one of the founders of the movement stated:

“The planet is in ecological crisis – we are in the midst of the sixth mass extinction event this planet has experienced,” he said. “Children alive today in the UK will face the terrible consequences of inaction, from floods to wildfires, extreme weather to crop failures and the inevitable breakdown of society. We have a duty to act” (Taylor, 2018)

Nowadays Extinction Rebellion is the fastest-growing green grass-roots movement in the World, already counting 700 local and regional departments. The movement has openly stated to not only use “peaceful actions, but also disruptive actions”. Their modus operandi is using disruptive actions that result in arrests, as it would give more exposure to the cause and it will

put pressure on the economy and government. The movement clearly states that disruptive actions and arrests are allowed, but that violence is prohibited (NOS, 2020, 3:23). A local branch of GL summarized a presentation by Extinction Rebellion as “It's like preaching for your own parish to a group that knows the awkward truth, but the presentation of Extinction Rebellion was clear, factual, and impressive” (GL Haarlem, 2019). Moreover, former GL party leader and current mayor of Amsterdam, Femke Halsema stated that the protests of Extinction Rebellion do not reflect criminal action, but only civil disobedience (Couzy, 2019). Extinction Rebellion advocates a radical change of the economic and political system to combat the “unprecedented ecological crisis”, by using non-violent civil disobedience. However, because the actions of Extinction Rebellion are used for what they describe as “causing maximum impact on the streets”, it is questionable whether or not the protesters themselves become more prone to violence, or those who are affected by the disruptive actions will in turn use violence against the protesters (Extinction Rebellion 2020b). Violence already occurred in London in late 2019, where members of Extinction Rebellion were trying to disrupt the London underground system, but subsequently were attacked by angry commuters (ABC News, 2019).

Although GL does not have formal links with Extinction Rebellion their discourse does show similarities. Both discourses are about (radical) change, a break with the current economic and political system, towards an ecological driven economy (See Appendix E; Extinction Rebellion, 2020a). This thesis started by stating the warnings of different scholars that restorative nostalgia and outgroup-directed contempt can lead to non-normative action like violence. However, there is seemingly also a connection between non-normative actions and radical nostalgia. Although further research should be done to confirm a direct relationship between non-normative action and radical nostalgia, in the case of Extinction Rebellion, the disruptive and disobedient nature of their protests, seemingly increases the potential for the use of non-normative action, and even violence (ABC News, 2019).

## 7. Conclusion

Every individual is more or less prone to nostalgia. A strong social sentimentality, nostalgia predominantly has a positive effect on an individual. However, collective nostalgia can be dangerous, as multiple scholars have shown. There is a relationship between restorative nostalgia and outgroup-directed anger and contempt, which in turn, leads to actions that favor the interests of the ingroup and increases ingroup-collectivization. This research has shown that Boym's concept of restorative nostalgia almost neatly fits the discourse of the populist, right-wing party FvD. References to the past in FvD discourse are more often than not based upon constructing a Dutch history without guilt. There is a continuous pattern of rhetoric and symbolism that glorifies Dutch history and culture. Subsequently, existential and mostly external threats are used to divide and exclude *Others* from a shared national history. These *Others* are more often than not outgroups like (Islamic) immigrants, but also the (EU and Dutch) political elite who are framed as a "party cartel". This *Othering* can be a powerful catalyst for increased anger and contempt of the ingroup toward these outgroups. The ingroup that FvD constructs are the native Dutch. Furthermore, anger and contempt are used to justify actions or policies that favor ingroup-serving action and is a means to strengthen the social identity of the ingroup. In other words, there is a common thread of "us versus them" running through FvD discourse.

FvD discourse fits in almost all categories of restorative nostalgia. It constructs a single historical plot of Dutch history, that excludes any negative episodes of the past, whilst romanticizing its positive episodes. Moreover, the discourse reflects the willingness to defend traditional norms and values, continuously points toward scapegoats, and seemingly calls for national homogeneity. Although scholars warn for the dangers of restorative nostalgia, it must be mentioned that this paper does not try to suggest that FvD is advocating strong outgroup-directed actions or even violence. It should, however, be mentioned that restorative nostalgia can be a powerful influence on individuals or groups, which eventually could spiral toward actions that negatively influence particular groups or in extreme cases can lead to violence.

On the other hand, GL discourse shows no signs of restorative nostalgia. Furthermore, reflective nostalgia is not evident in GL discourse as well. The sporadic utterances about the past are mainly used as a means to radicalize the contemporary economic, political and educational system. There are only a few direct utterances about the past identified in GL discourse. In the context of education, GL discourse suggests that the core-objectives should be educating in colonial and migration history for example. Here, GL refers only to negative

episodes of Dutch history. However, there is insufficient evidence that GL discourse makes use of collective nostalgia. GL discourse, therefore, follows the assumption of Bonnet, that left-wing parties often repress nostalgia altogether, as it is mostly seen as the anti-thesis of left-wing ideology. Bonnet states that the left can potentially profit from incorporating a reflective notion of nostalgia, as it should be acknowledged that everyone, to an extent, is prone to nostalgia. However, GL discourse has shown that it has not yet embraced this.

The results of this paper have shown that the discourse of FvD and GL follows the assumptions of the different forms of collective nostalgia. The populist, right-wing party, in this case, follows the notion of restorative nostalgia and ingroup-collectivization and outgroup-directed anger and contempt. On the other hand, the left-wing party in this research follows Bonnet's assumption that there is general repression of (collective) nostalgia in left-wing discourse. In the case of radical nostalgia however, it seemingly can lead to non-normative actions as well. As shown in the last chapter, GL discourse and the discourse of grass-root movements like Extinction Rebellion show multiple similarities. Where GL advocates that movements like Extinction Rebellion only use normative action like civil disobedience, there is willingness within these movements to use disruptive actions within the public space. It is questionable whether or not these disruptive actions are normative of nature or if they also constitute non-normative behavior that could spiral towards the use of violence.

For further research, it is interesting to look at the relationship between radical nostalgia and its potential dangers. Moreover, further research could also focus on other political parties, to be able to make more generalized statements about the phenomena of collective nostalgia in political party discourse. This paper will end with a quote by Routledge (2017):

“A year has passed since Donald Trump’s highly unorthodox ascension to the White House, and many people are still asking how he accomplished such a feat. While Russian interference in the election dominates the conversation, there was another force at play that shouldn’t be ignored: the power of nostalgia. Using the slogan “Make America Great Again,” Trump didn’t simply invoke the idea of an idealized past. He provoked the anxious feelings that make nostalgia especially attractive — and effective — as a tool of political persuasion”.

Routledge tries to warn that collective nostalgia can be a powerful tool for political persuasion. This paper has re-established that we should be vigilant for the restorative nostalgic, as it can lead to further polarization within society. Additionally, this vigilance should also be directed toward radical nostalgia. Although this paper mainly focused on the different forms of collective nostalgia, which do not mention the dangers of radical nostalgia, there are some signs that radical nostalgia discourse can also lead to non-normative actions, and maybe even violence. However, to end on a positive note, Boym also taught us that collective nostalgia can be used as a positive tool for the collective. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that the past is inconclusive, ironic, and multi interpretable.

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<b>Appendix A: Key categories restorative nostalgia</b>				
<i>Code</i>	<i>Key categories</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Source</i>
A1	Past as ultimate truth	The <i>Self</i> sees their version of the past as ultimate truth. There is no room for ambivalence or the complexity of history.	Fixed interpretation/perception of past events.	Boym, 2001, pp.70-72
A2	Invented traditions	Set of practices governed by overtly and tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual of symbolic nature, that incorporates values and norms of behaviour, and through repetition implies a continuity with the past.  It offers a collective narrative for individual longing.	Cohesion  Repetitive mentioning of (conservative) norms and values.  Unchangeability of tradition  Symbolism/ritualization  Rhetoric of continuity  Recreated practices of national commemoration	Boym, 2001, p.71
A3	Cultural identity	Based on certain “cultural intimacy”. The use of common frameworks of memory and stereotypes.	Unwritten rules of behaviour  Focus on specific traits of one’s culture  Common social context	Boym, 2001, p.71
A4	Wanting to reconstruct the past	Reconstruction through enhancing traditional values and reconstructing monuments of the past. Reconstructing the past through a mythicized interpretation of the past.	Defending traditional values  Nostos: “rebuilding of the lost home”	Boym, 2001, pp.70-71
A5	Nationalism	Relates to nationalist revivals. Using	Utterances of national(ist) symbols,	Boym, 2001, p.72

		national symbolism and myths	traits, etc.  Call for more national or ethnic homogeneity	
A6	Anti-modern / anti- globalist views			
A7	Mythicizing/ romanticizing the past and home	The creation of a delusionary homeland. Blaming others for your misfortunes and finding scapegoats. Feelings of being persecuted by “them”.	Romanticization of the past  Focus on positives of the past  Ignoring negatives of the past  <i>Scapegoating Other</i>	Boym, 2001, pp.70-72
A8	Conspiratorial worldview	Premodern conception of good and evil. Requires defence against the plotting enemy.	Single trans historical plot  Good/versus evil  <i>Scapegoating Other</i>	Boym, 2001, pp.72-73
A9	Us” versus “them”	An imagined community based on exclusion, rather than affection and inclusion. Based upon a narrative of “those who are not with us are against us”.		Boym, 2001, p.73

<b>Appendix B: Key categories reflective nostalgia</b>			
<i>Code</i>	<i>Key categories</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Source</i>
B1	No ultimate truth about the past	Acknowledges that there are different perceptions/interpretations of the past.  Acknowledges personal bias in reflecting upon the past.	Boym, 2001, pp.81-82
B2	Differences in individual and collective culture	Acknowledging that there are individual and collective differences in perceiving the past.	Boym, 2001, pp.81-82
B3	Inconclusiveness in understanding the past and present.	Acknowledging that the past is not fixed.  Use of humour and irony in reflecting upon the past.  Acknowledging the negatives of the past.	Boym, 2001, pp.81-82
B4	Past is a reflection of personal identity	Acknowledges personal bias in reflecting upon the past.	Boym, 2001, pp.81-82
B5	Critical thinking about past and present	Past is a reflection of personal identity.  Different interpretations are possible.	Boym, 2001, pp.81-82

**Appendix C: Key categories of collective nostalgia for in-group and out-group**

<i>Code</i>	<i>Concept</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Source</i>
C1	Ingroup-collectivization and outgroup-directed anger and contempt.	Favouring of ingroup-serving action and participation and the strengthening of the social identity of the ingroup. Ingroup-collectivization often occurs when there are feelings within the group of unfair treatment, displacement, or (existential) threats, for which an external person/group is held responsible. This can lead to normative actions towards other groups, or in extreme cases to violence towards other groups	Utterances that relate to favouring ingroup-serving actions or interests. Specifically targeted at improving the relative condition of the ingroup.	Cheung, W. Y., Sedikides, C., & Wildschut, T. (2017a).
			Utterances that mention (existential) threats/unfair treatment, but where also another group is held responsible. <i>Other</i> is responsible for deterioration of ingroup position or relation towards other group(s).	Cheung, W. Y., Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., Tausch, N., & Ayanian, A. H. (2017b).
			Look at utterances of the <i>Self</i> like ‘we’, ‘our’, etc. in combination to utterances that are hostile/prejudiced towards <i>Other(s)</i> , and/or mentioning of ingroup favouritism.	Juhl, J., Routledge, C., Arndt, J., Sedikides, C., & Wildschut, T. (2010).

**Appendix D: Schematic overview discourse FvD**

<b>Indicators (keywords/rhetoric/frames)</b>	<b>Quote/ transcripts</b>	<b>Theme/issue</b>	<b>Other and Self</b>	<b>Interpretative level</b>	<b>Coding collective nostalgia</b>
<p>Kansarm Islam/Islamitsisch Bedreiging/dreiging Verdedigen/zich verzetten Open grenzen Ongecontroleerd Terreur Culture achtergrond Consequenties</p>	<p>“Een existentiële crisis bedreigt het voortbestaan van de Nederlandse samenleving” (FvD, 2017, p.1).</p> <p>“Grenzen worden niet langer verdedigd, we staan bloot aan massale immigratie die we niet aankunnen en de terreurdreiging neemt steeds verder toe” (FvD, 2017, p.1).</p> <p>“Door de komst van grote groepen (islamitische) immigranten zijn een aantal verworvenheden en kernwaarden van onze samenleving onder druk komen te staan” (FvD, 2017, p.3).</p> <p>“De open grenzen leiden tot ongecontroleerde immigratie en een hoger risico op terreuraanslagen” (FvD, 2017, p.8).</p> <p>“Ons immigratiebeleid moet gericht zijn op wie wij hier nodig hebben en wie wij (ook op basis van culturele achtergrond)</p>	<p>Massale / massa immigratie</p>	<p><i>Self</i> as defender of traditional norms and values. (positive)</p> <p><i>Other:</i> political elite (negative)</p> <p><i>Other:</i> Immigrants (negative)</p>	<p>The issue of (mass) immigration is constructed by the <i>Self</i> as an existential threat to Dutch society, values, and norms. Repetitive mentioning of ‘defending (traditional) norms and values’.</p> <p>The ingroup (Native Dutch) are threatened in their existence. Favouring actions that target the outgroup, in this case immigrants. The protection of ingroup interests.</p> <p>The ingroup here are native Dutch. The rhetoric and framing of this issue show utterances of protecting the national identity.</p> <p>Action towards this outgroup come in the form of closing borders, and remigration where</p>	<p>A2 A4 A5 A8 A9 C1</p>

	<p>kunnen opnemen” (FvD, 2017, p.20; FvD, 2019e).</p> <p>“Maar ook Europa krijgt te maken met de bittere consequenties van de instabiele situatie aldaar: ongecontroleerde immigratie en verhoogde terreurdreiging” (FvD, 2017, p.22)</p> <p>“Waar integratie niet lukt, is remigratie de beste oplossing” (FvD, 2017, p.20).</p> <p>“Bevorderen remigratie waar integratie (assimilatie) mislukt” (FvD, 2017, p.20).</p> <p>“De samenleving kan dit niet meer behappen, maar het partijkartel blijft maar doorgaan met het binnenhalen van ongehoorde aantallen kansarme immigranten” (FvD, 2017, p.20; FvD, 2019e).</p> <p>“Met alle immigratie en integratie problemen die we al hebben, werden opnieuw honderdduizenden mensen uit totaal andere culturen als de onze binnengelaten en stemde de coalitie ook nog eens tegen onze motie om de Syriërs die</p>			<p>integration has failed. There is no clear distinction between integration and assimilation and no clear distinction between refugees and immigrants.</p> <p><i>Other</i> (immigrants) constructed as being responsible for a change in the “street scene” and increasing violence. Targeted at the ingroup (native Dutch) who feel ‘unsafe and threatened’.</p> <p><i>Other</i> (political elite) As facilitator of the threat of mass-immigration.</p> <p>Us versus them dichotomy. Ingroup framed as being the victim of political choices. The <i>Self</i> plays into emotions of ingroup anger and contempt toward <i>Others</i>.</p> <p>The issue of mass-immigration shows</p>	
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	<p>terug kunnen ook te helpen terug te keren” FvD, 2019g, 3:15).</p> <p>“Als de ongecontroleerde immigratie ons straatbeeld zo vertekend” (FvD, 2019g, 10:30).</p> <p>“Er is zo’n verandering van het straatbeeld te zien, zo’n oververtegenwoordiging van immigranten in de criminaliteit. Pappen en nat houden en meer immigratie, die mensen worden afgestraft” (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 2:07:26).</p> <p>“We have a fundamentally different approach to immigration from what was dominant in the West for the past several decades” (Baudet, 2019).</p> <p>“That is why all who opposed mass-immigration were denounced in the most vile ways” (Baudet, 2019).</p> <p>“The main themes of our campaign for the past elections were stopping uncontrolled immigration, fighting climate mysticism, and restoring purchasing power” (Baudet,</p>			<p>signs of calls for more national homogeneity.</p>	
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	2019).				
Partijkartel Invloed Self-interest Breken democratie Soevereiniteit Autonomie Niet afwachten Baas	<p>“Onder invloed van het partijkartel is de overheid veel te groot geworden. Dit leidt tot een gezapig land van te veel afwachters, klagers, procesbegeleiders, risico-managers en kuddedieren” (FvD, 2017, p.14).</p> <p>“partijkartel blijft maar doorgaan met het binnenhalen van ongehoorde aantallen kansarme immigranten” (FvD, 2017, p.20).</p> <p>“Een zeer kleine klik van kartelleden bestuurt nu al decennia ons land. Het gaat om slechts 10.000 mensen die ronddraaien in een baantjescarrousel en de gelederen onderling gesloten houden” (FvD, 2017, p.30).</p> <p>“Er moet nu echt iets veranderen. Forum voor Democratie is het enige serieuze alternatief voor de huidige politiek. Wij gaan het partijkartel breken en Nederland weer opstoten in de vaart der</p>	Partijkartel/ Europeanisering (European elite)	<p>The <i>Self</i> is challenger of the “party cartel”.</p> <p><i>Other:</i> Party cartel (political elite) And the European Union</p>	<p>The <i>Self</i> is constructed as challenger of the <i>Others</i> (political elite and the EU).</p> <p>These <i>Others</i> are framed as cynical and selfish, who do not represent the people.</p> <p>Ingroup are the Dutch people. They are being influenced by the <i>Self</i> placing the political elite in direct opposition of the interests of the people. Rhetoric of a deterioration of own sovereignty and autonomy that threatenens the very existance of ‘our’ democracy. Framing can results in anger and contempt toward the <i>Others</i>.</p> <p>Strong rhetoric is used in which the ingroup is being victimized, and the political elite is framed as a threat.</p>	A2 A4 A9 C1

	<p>volkeren... Dat ligt echt binnen de mogelijkheden! We zijn in staat tot renaissance.”(FvD, 2017, p.30).</p> <p>“De leden van het kartel ze geloven in niets, maar vereren tegelijkertijd 1 afgod, genaamd transitie. 100 miljard willen zij offeren aan dit altaar van de afgod” (FvD, 2019g, 6:28).</p> <p>Deze afgod in de vorm van windmolens, warmtepompen, zonnepanelen en andere volkomen onrendabele projecten... Wij moeten boeten, zo papegaaien de machtszoekende bestuurders van dit land, de ecologische hogepriesters na. Het is pure oikofobie (FvD, 2019g, 6:45).</p> <p>“Zodat wij eindelijk weer de baas worden in ons eigen land. We zullen niet rusten totdat onze democratie is hersteld en het partijkartel is gebroken” (FvD, 2019g, 19:30).</p> <p>“De afgelopen decennia is een aantal supranationale organisaties</p>				
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	<p>opgericht die de soevereiniteit ernstig hebben ingeperkt” (FvD, 2019b).</p> <p>De EU is grenzeloos uitgedijd en verworden tot een volstrekt ondemocratische moloch. Het is een achterhaald bestuursmodel; een kartel bovenop het kartel. Forum voor Democratie is van mening dat de EU onhervormbaar is en is daarom voorstander van een NEXIT (FvD, 2017, p.7; FvD,2019d).</p> <p>“Zij beheersen helaas de besluitvormingsorganen van ons land en maken in een merkwaardige mengeling van onkunde en cynisch eigenbelang keer op keer de verkeerde keuzes. Niet lang meer” (FvD, 2019g, 2:45).</p> <p>“Op dit moment subsidieert de Nederlandse overheid segregatie-bevorderende, weg-met-ons projecten; terwijl we datgene waar we trots op mogen zijn, het mooiste en het beste dat het Westen heeft voortgebracht, onderschoffelen” (FvD, 2017, p.17; FvD, 2019c).</p>				
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	<p>“Hun belangen zijn vaak tegengesteld aan de belangen van de Nederlandse bevolking. Ze werken voor zichzelf - niet voor het land...openbreken van het partijkartel’.” (FvD, 2019a).</p> <p>“Forum voor Democratie streeft ernaar de soevereiniteit zoveel mogelijk terug te brengen naar het nationale parlement; en de organisaties die de soevereiniteit ondermijnen (zoals de EU, het Internationaal Strafhof, en het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens) te hervormen of te ontmantelen” (FvD, 2019b).</p> <p>“Het is tijd om te stoppen met de muntunie en de open grenzen, en daarna de EU te verlaten” (FvD, 2019d).</p> <p>“invloed van het partijkartel serieus terug te dringen en de macht van de partij-elites te doorbreken” (FvD, 2019f).</p> <p>“Wij gaan niet afwachten totdat het partijkartel ooit eens tot verandering overgaat, maar geven de Nederlanders nu al meteen zelf de mogelijkheid om actief de eigen stem te laten horen en meer invloed te krijgen</p>				
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	<p>op de koers die ons land moet uitzetten” (FvD, 2019f).</p> <p>“Het gaat om een ontspoorde EU. Maar de EU heeft veel teveel macht naar zich toe getrokken. Een platform van Euro sceptische partijen te bouwen van partijen tegen de EU (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 42:45).</p> <p>“En als men hier de inquisitie wil invoeren nemen we aan het eind van de 16e eeuw de wapens op tegen de Spanjaarden. Spanjaarden die net als tegenwoordig de Europese Unie vanuit Brussel op tirannieke wijze bestuurd” (Renaissance Instituut, 2019, 0:28).</p>				
Western culture	<p>“Op dit moment subsidieert de Nederlandse overheid segregatie-bevorderende, weg-met-ons projecten; terwijl we datgene waar we trots op mogen zijn, het mooiste en het beste dat het Westen heeft voortgebracht, onderschoffelen” (FvD, 2017, p.17).</p> <p>“en het gedachtegoed van filosofen als Erasmus en Spinoza ontsluiten voor een breder publiek, bijvoorbeeld via</p>	Dutch/Western culture			

	<p>educatieve documentaires” (FvD, 2017, p.17).</p> <p>“De afgelopen decennia is gepoogd de Nederlander van zijn geschiedenis te vervreemden en van zijn cultuur los te snijden. Dit moet niet alleen stoppen, het moet worden teruggedraaid.” (FvD, 2017, p.17).</p> <p>“Invoering van de Wet Bescherming Nederlandse Waarden (Wet BNW). Alle instanties (scholen, religieuze instellingen, etc.) dienen vijf fundamentele waarden te onderschrijven” (FvD, 2017, p.3).</p> <p>“Ons immigratiebeleid moet gericht zijn op wie wij hier nodig hebben en wie wij (ook op basis van culturele achtergrond) kunnen opnemen (FvD, 2017, p.20).</p> <p>“Versterking van de culturele diplomatie naar Frans model – dus vertaalde Nederlandse literatuur als relatiegeschenken op ambassades; documentaires over onze geschiedenis Engels</p>				
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	<p>laten ondertitelen en beschikbaar stellen op internet, enzovoorts” (FvD, 2017, p.22).</p> <p>“Een misverstand uit de weg ruimen. FvD is warm voorstander van het continent Europa. De cultuur de beschaving, en samenwerking” (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 42:21).</p> <p>“werden opnieuw honderdduizenden mensen uit totaal andere culturen als de onze binnengelaten (FvD, 2019g, 3:15).</p> <p>“Maar in al dat ongelooft, in dat immense vacuüm, in dat culturele en spirituele vacuüm is tegelijkertijd haast ongemerkt een grandioze ketterij binnengedrongen. Een nieuwe immanente religie en politieke theologie” (FvD, 2019g, 5:53).</p> <p>“Het zijn ook wieken om lucht mee te slaan om een veranderingswind in gang te zetten, om ons land weer van ons te maken en een einde te maken aan het tijdperk van culturele,</p>				
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	<p>economische en politieke capitulatie” (FvD, 2019g, 9:35).</p> <p>Opnieuw gaan we voorbij onze horizon reiken. We gaan een renaissance teweeg brengen, waarin ons zelfvertrouwen is hersteld, waarin we weer veilig kunnen leven in een vertrouwde omgeving, waarin de democratische rechtstaat is hersteld, en de economische en culturele dynamiek kan terugkeren (FvD, 2019g, 19:30).</p> <p>Want wij zijn het vlaggenschip van de renaissance vloot en andere schepen kunnen zich bij ons voegen. De trots van ons land herstellen, de democratie herstellen. En vandaag is de eerste veldslag gewonnen (FvD, 2019g, 20:50).</p> <p>“We worden ondermijnd door de universiteiten, journalisten... mensen die nog nooit een boek hebben gelezen in hun leven en geen idee hebben wat op de lange termijn de belangrijke issues zijn” (FvD, 2019g, 1:30).</p> <p>“Bevorderen remigratie waar</p>				
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	<p>integratie (assimilatie) mislukt” (FvD, 2017, p.20).</p> <p>Beste vrienden, wij zijn het product van 300.000 jaar evolutie. Wij hebben meerdere ijstijden overleefd, we hebben mammoetten gevloerd, wij zijn erfgenamen van de grootste beschaving die ooit heeft bestaan. Wij dragen een unieke kracht. En tientallen jaren van indoctrinatie door de media, het onderwijs kunnen dat nooit begraven (FvD, 2019g, 12:00).</p> <p>Yes. I think that under the influence of cultural Marxism...the entire elite of our society have been bewitched by that idea (Baudet, 2019).</p> <p>“In each country we see politicians and writers and pundits that are trying to develop a new approach to politics and society which includes the cultural narrative, which includes the national traditions and recognizes the shared heritage of our shared civilization, our shared Western world” (Baudet, 2019).</p> <p>“We’re not merely against the</p>				
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	<p>EU; we are also for European values, European culture, and European cooperation” (Baudet, 2019).</p> <p>“Het is een avontuur dat nu al 400 jaar duurt. Een avontuur dat eeuwen geleden begon en voortgaat tot de dag van vandaag. Dit prachtige land, dit vlakke land. Het land van onze voorouders, het land van onze kinderen. Dit is het land van Forum voor Democratie” (Renaissance Instituut, 2019, 2:56).</p> <p>“‘Europa’, de Europese beschaving en Europese samenwerking zijn zeer belangrijk en Forum voor Democratie is daar dan ook erg voor” (FvD, 2017, p,8).</p>				
<p>Duurzaamheidsafgoderij Transitie Afgod onrendabele projecten Masochistische ketterij Een manie Totale ondergang Schuldgevoel Klimaathekserij Ecologische hogepriesters</p>	<p>“De leden van het kartel ze geloven in niets, maar vereren tegelijkertijd 1 afgod, genaamd transitie. 100 miljard willen zij offeren aan dit altaar van de afgod. Deze afgod in de vorm van windmolens, warmtepompen, ... Een manie vergelijkbaar met de doodscultus die ooit Paaseiland teisterde. En deze duurzaamheidsafgoderij stort niet alleen onze economie in een</p>	Climate			

	<p>totale ondergang... de ecologische hogepriesters na. Het is pure oikofobie (FvD, 2019g, 6:28).</p> <p>“fighting climate mysticism” (Baudet, 2019).</p> <p>“Everything that is pertaining to the EU must therefore, in the end, be unraveled... The same is true for the whole climate change thing” (Baudet, 2019).</p> <p><i>“You mean that the climate change is man-made, for instance? Yes. The whole thing is wrong”</i> (Baudet, 2019).</p> <p>“And that’s what we did in the Netherlands by making opposition to climate policies our main electoral theme. The winning ticket is bluntly to say that we don’t believe in their stuff anymore. That we want something completely different” (Baudet, 2019).</p> <p>“Technologie heeft ons ver gebracht, en kan ons ook bij de juiste innovaties helpen de aarde te ondersteunen en duurzaamheid te bevorderen, zoals in het geval van alternatieve methoden voor</p>				
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	<p>energiewinning. Als kenniseconomie hebben we een kans voorop te lopen in de energietransitie en daar zelfs rendement op te behalen” (FvD, 2017, p.27).</p> <p>“Stimuleren onderzoek naar innovatieve technologie” (FvD, 2019h).</p>				
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**Appendix E: Schematic overview discourse GL**

**Discourse Analysis (open coding) – GroenLinks**

Indicators (keywords/ rhetoric/frames)	Quote/ transcripts	Theme/issue	Other and Self	Interpretative level	Coding collective nostalgia
<p><i>Negatives</i> Economisme Status quo Kortetermijnbelangen Lobbyisten Multinationals Misbruik int. Concurrentie Arm/rijk Belastingontwijking Tegenstellingen ongelijkheid</p> <p><i>Positives</i> Verandering Rechtvaardig/sociaal beleid gelijkheid Samenwerking Groene politiek Vernieuwing Empathie Duurzaamheid Circulaire economie Herverdeling/ eerlijk delen Solidariteit Welzijn</p>	<p>“Al dertig jaar regeert het economisme. Economische kortetermijnbelangen gaan boven welzijn, milieu en gezondheid. Het is tijd voor verandering” (GL, 2017a,p.2).</p> <p>“GroenLinks wil dat Nederland vooroploopt in de samenwerking binnen Europa” (GL, 2017a,p.2).</p> <p>“Alleen samen kunnen we zorgen voor eerlijke belastingen, rechtvaardig sociaal beleid en een humane vluchtelingenaanpak” (GL, 2017a, p.3).</p> <p>“koers wordt gedictieerd door de lobbyisten van de gevestigde orde” (GL, 2017a ,p.7).</p> <p>“Internationale concurrentie wordt misbruikt als argument om vernieuwing tegen te houden. GroenLinks wil af van deze status quo” (GL, 2017a ,p.7).</p> <p>“We richten de groene industriepolitiek op de ontwikkeling van de circulaire economie” (GL, 2017a, p.11).</p> <p>“Al dertig jaar wordt het verschil tussen arm en rijk groter” (GL, 2017a, p.15).</p> <p>“De lonen aan de top stijgen</p>	<p>Economic and political system</p>	<p><i>Self</i>: as challenger status quo. Bringer of change (positive)</p> <p><i>Other</i> Multinationals, lobbyists, bankers (negative)</p> <p><i>Other</i> Political elite (negative)</p>	<p>The economic and political status quo is challenged by the <i>Self</i>. The <i>Self</i> is identified as the bringer of change. Change refers to a fundamental change of the system. Moreover, the <i>Self</i> is a precursor for European cooperation.</p> <p><i>Others</i> are constructed as being responsible for an economic/political system that is abused by the other for the purpose of self-interest.</p> <p>System of economism leads to economic inequality, contradictions in society.</p> <p>Actions are redistribution of welfare toward low incomes. Focus not on economic growth, but on welfare, health, empathie, just system and</p>	<p>No clear utterances about the past.</p> <p>References toward the past are based on ‘blaming Others for upholding an unjust economic and political system.</p> <p>No clear indications for ingroup collectivization. Anger and contempt toward <i>Others</i> is represented in rhetoric.</p>

	<p>jaar op jaar, terwijl de lage en middeninkomens niet profiteren van de economische groei” (GL, 2017a, p.15).</p> <p>“De tegenstelling tussen belastingbetalende burgers en belastingontwijkende multinationals is onrechtvaardig en maatschappelijk onhoudbaar” (GL, 2017a, p.15).</p> <p>“We kunnen kiezen voor eerlijk delen en eerlijk bijdragen. GroenLinks wil de trend naar meer ongelijkheid keren” (GL, 2017a, p.15).</p> <p>“We stoppen belastingontwijking en saneren de financiële sector. Een ontspoorde financiële sector en de rijksten die hun geld verbergen in belastingparadijzen: het is geen natuurwet, het is het gevolg van politieke keuzes. In Europa wordt Nederland aanjager van de internationale aanpak van belastingontwijking” (GL, 2017a, p.15).</p> <p>“Er komt een Piketty-belasting: een progressieve belasting op vermogen op basis van reëel rendement” (GL, 2017a, p.19).</p> <p>“Het onderwijs wordt gedomineerd door het economisme. Vanaf jonge leeftijd worden kinderen opgeleid tot producten voor de arbeidsmarkt” (GL, 2017a, p.21).</p> <p>“Het pessimisme in de samenleving is groot. Gaan we verder op de weg van doorgeslagen individualisering of verleggen we de koers? De</p>			<p>cooperation.</p> <p>The <i>Self</i> advocates a complete change of the system, toward social inclusion and green politics.</p>	
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	<p>samenleving wil het anders. Mensen zijn de tegenstellingen zat” (GL, 2017a, p.31).</p> <p>“ik geloof in een samenleving waarin we eerlijk delen. Ik geloof in een samenleving die gebouwd is op duurzaamheid en waarin we omkijken naar elkaar” (GL, 2017b, 0:00).</p> <p>“De ongelijkheid is aanzienlijk vermindert. We zijn weer eerlijk gaan delen” (GL, 2017b, 0:45).</p> <p>“Wat zijn onze plannen? 1. Het verschil tussen arm en rijk verkleinen. De afgelopen jaren is de ongelijkheid in Nederland alleen maar toegenomen. En dat wil ik stoppen” (GL, 2017b, 0:55).</p> <p>“We verhogen de belasting op milieuvervuiling en pakken belastingontwijking aan. We verlagen de belasting op werk en inkomen. Het gaat om het maken van keuzes” (GL, 2017b, 3:23).</p> <p>“Ik wil ook leven in een land wat mijn Nederland is. Waar de waarden wij voor staan, vrijheid, gelijkheid, empathie en tolerantie die hoog in het vaandel staan. En er zijn soms grote opdrachten. Bij de emancipatie van vrouwen, zeker binnen de islam” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 0:14).</p> <p>“geld’ niet het voornaamste doel van de politiek moet zijn. Andere waarden zijn minstens zo belangrijk: gezondheid, duurzaamheid en gelijkheid. Door deze waarden weer terug te brengen, maakt GroenLinks de politiek menselijker” (GL, 2019d).</p>				
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	<p>“Maar laat mij het principe daarom uitleggen. Je moet onze plannen altijd in samenhang uitvoeren. Dus dat betekent dat als je aan de ene kant milieubelasting invoert, door milieuvervuiling... ja dat zou het allerbeste zijn, voor Nederland” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 9:20).</p> <p>“Wat het laat zien is dat wij een visie hebben en dat het niet gewoon een heel klein beetje aanpassen hier van het systeem is en daar nog een klein beetje meer en minder. Nee wij willen een omslag van onze economie. Wij doen dat heel fors he, met in totaal 27 miljard euro” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 9:59).</p> <p>“Nee waar het omgaat is dat wij zo’n stevig veranderingsprogramma hebben en een andere kijk hebben op de Nederlandse economie” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 15:30).</p> <p>“Dit is de verandering waar wij voor staan. Een andere economie die beter werkt voor iedereen niet alleen nu, maar ook over tien jaar” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 17:02).</p> <p>“Omdat ik een enorme gedrevenheid heb om dit land beter te maken. Om ervoor te zorgen dat we in Nederland eerlijk delen, dat mensen niet in armoede hoeven te leven...Dit zijn de veranderingen waar ik voor sta. Ik sta voor mijn principes en ik merk dat dat is wat de politiek nodig heeft” (GL, 2017, 20:25).</p> <p>“Omdat zij, hoe je het ook wend of keert,</p>				
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	<p>dezelfde wens hebben als wij, hetzelfde diepe verlangen naar een eerlijk land. En ook dat is het succes van onze campagne” (GL, 2017c, 9:30).</p> <p>“Het succes is dat onze partij is verbonden aan de brede beweging van empathie, een beweging voor verandering. We hebben een prachtige overwinning ... het begin van een maatschappelijke verandering. En onze beweging gaat door” (GL, 2017c, 9:41).</p> <p>“Het idee dat het anders moet en de overtuiging dat het anders kan. Met hen gaan wij door” (GL, 2017c, 11:10).</p> <p>Ik wil uitstralen wie ik ben. Een gast met idealen. Die als ambitie heeft de wereld te veranderen, te beginnen in Nederland” (Vice Nederland, 2017, 10:01).</p> <p>“GroenLinks wil Nederland veranderen door de strijd aan te gaan met dit economisme, de ideologie die alle maatschappelijke kwesties reduceert tot financiële of economische problemen” (GL, 2019d).</p> <p>“GroenLinks vindt dat ‘economische groei’ of ‘meer geld’ niet het voornaamste doel van de politiek moet zijn. Andere waarden zijn minstens zo belangrijk: gezondheid, duurzaamheid en gelijkheid...eerlijker delen, dan gaat iederéén er op vooruit. We kiezen voor een samenleving met minder competitie, minder onzekerheid en minder stress” (GL, 2019d).</p>				
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	<p>“We willen dat grote bedrijven hun eerlijke deel belastingen gaan betalen” (GL, 2019f).</p> <p>“Grote multinationals gebruiken de Nederlandse belasting regels echter om zo min mogelijk belasting te betalen. GroenLinks vindt dit onacceptabel” (GL, 2019f).</p> <p>“Via ingewikkelde belastingconstructies en slim opgezette ‘brievenbusmaatschappijen’ sluizen multinationals...Dat zijn geen gelijke spelregels” (GL, 2019f).</p> <p>“ We kiezen voor een sociaal Europa dat de ondemocratische lobby van multinationals rechts laat liggen. Dat actie onderneemt tegen belastingontwijking. En levert aan de mensen” (GL, 2019h).</p> <p>“Een Europa waarin we pal staan voor onze rechtsstaat... en de doorgeslagen marktwerking terugdringt” (GL, 2019).</p> <p>“We weten dat de oude economie niet gaat zorgen voor werk in de toekomst. Toch houdt de overheid hieraan vast, want de koers wordt gedicteerd door de lobbyisten van de gevestigde bedrijven” (GL, 2019i).</p> <p>“Groene waarden en de kwaliteit van leven zijn voor ons onlosmakelijk verbonden met sociale rechtvaardigheid...voor mondiale solidariteit met mensen die in de verdrukking zitten. Ons hart is groen en het zit links” (GL, 2008, p.5).</p>				
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	<p>“De economie staat altijd in dienst van het milieu en van welzijn en geluk van de mens. Waar deze geschaad worden door voortgaande economische groei kiezen we voor krimp” (GL, 2008, p.5).</p> <p>“GroenLinks staat voor ontspannen sociale verhoudingen met een rechtvaardige inkomensverdeling ...vergaande herverdeling van betaalde en onbetaalde arbeid” (GL, 2008, p.7).</p> <p>“GroenLinks staat voor internationale solidariteit en sociale rechtvaardigheid. Iedere wereldburger heeft recht op werk... GroenLinks staat voor een eerlijke en open wereldhandel waarin alle economische, sociale en milieukosten worden doorberekend” (GL, 2008, p.7).</p> <p>GroenLinks staat voor een pluriforme, solidaire samenleving, waaraan iedereen in gelijke mate en in zo groot mogelijke vrijheid kan deelnemen (GL, 2008, p.7).</p> <p>“GroenLinks staat voor een open wereld die de voordelen en risico’s van globalisering eerlijk verdeelt” (GL, 2008, p.8).</p> <p>“GroenLinks staat voor het democratisch ideaal van gelijke zeggenschap voor iedereen” (GL, 2008, p.9).</p> <p>“GroenLinks kiest voor een overheid die borg staat voor het publieke belang” (GL, 2008, p.9).</p>				
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	<p>GroenLinks staat voor – en ziet de noodzaak van – een wereldwijde samenwerking ... universele en individuele rechten van de mens staan daarbij centraal (GL, 2008, p.11).</p> <p>“GroenLinks kiest voor een groen, sociaal en democratisch Europa dat een voortrekkersrol in de wereld speelt. De toekomst van Nederland ligt in Europa en de toekomst van Europa in de wereld” (GL, 2008, p.11).</p>				
<p><i>Negatives</i> Populisme Haat Angst Discriminatie Uitsluiting Meebewegen</p> <p><i>Positives</i> Optimisme Verandering Hoop Humaniteit Vluchtelingen (menswaardige) opvang Rechtvaardig Sociaal Eerlijk principes</p>	<p>“Breekt het populisme door in Nederland. Nee gejuich. Wat zeiden jullie? Meer nee gejuich. Dat is het antwoord dat we voor Europa hebben. Nee, het populisme is niet doorgebroken... Juist in een tijd als politici haat en angst proberen aan te wakkeren, kiezen wij voor hoop en optimisme en verandering. En juist als populistten als populistten zeggen dat vluchtelingen het maar zelf moeten uitzoeken, zeggen wij dat wij staan voor de opvang van mensen die vluchten voor oorlog en geweld... Ga niet proberen populistten na te doen, sta voor je principes en kijk wat het resultaat kan zijn” (GL, 2017c, 6:30).</p> <p>“We hebben deze verkiezingen gewonnen voor Romano die mij een brief schreef over zijn zorgen over discriminatie en uitsluiting in Nederland” (GL, 2017c, 8:05).</p> <p>“En voor Johnny die een inspiratie is voor al die mensen die geloven in de menswaardige opvang van vluchtelingen... Want wij moeten het antwoordt zijn op de verdeeldheid en angstzaaijerij in Europa” (GL, 2017c, 8:40).</p>	<p>Populism Refugee crisis</p>	<p><i>Self</i>: challenger to the populist movement.</p> <p><i>Other</i> Populists</p> <p><i>Other</i> Refugees</p>	<p>The <i>Self</i> is positioned as challenger tot he populist movement, and a defender of principles of social justice.</p> <p>Construction of <i>Other</i> (populists) who is responsible for the exclusion of an outgroup, namely refugees. <i>Self</i> criticizes <i>Other</i> for creating a narrative that is build on stirring hatred and fear against outgroup (refugees).</p> <p><i>Self</i> advocates actions based on hope, optimism and change.</p> <p><i>Self</i> is constructed as being responsible for aiding people fleeing war</p>	<p>No clear utterances about the past.</p> <p>No clear indications for ingroup collectivization. Anger and contempt toward <i>Others</i> is represented in rhetoric.</p>

	<p>“Maar we hebben het ook gedaan voor de familie de Graaf uit Dordrecht die misschien vandaag wel op de PVV heeft gestemd, en misschien ook niet. Mensen die zich zorgen maken om de samenleving. Niet omdat ze vluchtelingen vrezen, maar omdat ze willen dat de echte problemen in ons land worden aangepakt” (GL, 2017c, 9:02).</p> <p>“of de opvang beter willen regelen voor vluchtelingen...Met al die mensen die gedreven worden door die hoop op verandering” (GL, 2017c, 10:30).</p> <p>“En meneer Baudet, om mij maar rechtstreeks tot u te wenden. Vanavond debatteren we niet alleen als politici, maar ook als vaders. U kunt zeggen ik ga maar achter die 3% wetenschappers staan die zeggen er is geen klimaatverandering. Ik ga het risico niet nemen. Voor mijn kinderen en toekomstige generaties. Ik ga alles op alles zetten om klimaatverandering te stoppen. Wat u er ook van zegt. En ik kan u een ding beloven, de nieuwe eerste kamer gaat Nederland groener maken” (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 30:00).</p> <p>“Ja der is iets verandert sinds een paar jaar. Kijk, na 20 maart zijn we nodig voor een meerderheid. Dan kan het kabinet ook niet gaan shoppen bij wie ze dan terecht moeten. Ja u kunt misschien naar Forum voor Democratie. Maar dat lijkt mij niet wat u gaat doen. Dan zou u naar GroenLinks moeten kijken. En dan is er niet</p>			<p>and violence.</p> <p>Action for this major issue of refugee crisis, should be based on considerations of human rights and international law.</p>	
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	<p>zoveel keuze meer” (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 34:18).</p> <p>“Alleen samen kunnen we zorgen voor eerlijke belastingen, rechtvaardig sociaal beleid en een humane vluchtelingenaanpak” (GL, 2017a, p.3).</p> <p>“Mijn kritiek zeker op linkse partijen, is dat er vaak een beetje wordt meebewogen. Nee we moeten ook wel oppassen voor de islam. Of oh nee we ook al vluchtelingen, nee dat zijn er toch best wel veel. Ik denk dat je da niet moet doen. Je moet gewoon helder zijn waarvoor je staat” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 1:40).</p> <p>“Ik vind dat we mensen moeten opvangen die vluchten voor oorlog en geweld en dat daar geen maximum aanzit” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 1:55).</p> <p>“koesteren en een humaan en rechtvaardig vluchtelingenbeleid voeren. Een Europese unie dat werkt voor iedereen” (GL, 2019h).</p>				
<p><i>Negatives</i> Economisme Producten van de arbeidsmarkt Kansongelijkheid Marktwerving Wij tegen zij</p> <p><i>Positives</i> Inclusie Verschillende achtergronden Emancipatie</p>	<p>“Het onderwijs wordt gedomineerd door het economisme. Vanaf jonge leeftijd worden kinderen opgeleid tot producten voor de arbeidsmarkt” (GL, 2017a, p.21).</p> <p>“De vroege selectie begrenst de kansen van kinderen. Afkomst bepaalt welke opleiding zij volgen” (GL, 2017a, p.21).</p> <p>“Onderwijs moet ongelijkheid verkleinen, niet vergroten” (GL, 2017a, p.21).</p> <p>We willen inclusieve scholen waar leerlingen hun eigen ontwikkeltempo kunnen volgen, waar</p>	Education Culture	<i>Self</i> as protagonist for an inclusive educational system.	The identity of <i>Self</i> is constructed as a protagonist of inclusion for all (minority) groups, but also connecting their vision to groups opposing them. Framing of the <i>Self</i> as a party of the people.  Current educational system is defined by the <i>Self</i> as a system that “makes children into products of the labor	Direct mentioning of changing basic education, by also focussing on negatives of the past. “Colonial past, migration history, diversity, and anti-discrimination as core

<p>Diversiteit in opvattingen en culturen Onderwijzen in negatieve episodes geschiedenis Wereldburgers Gender/seksualiteit Sociale rechtvaardigheid</p>	<p>ze leeftijdsgenoten met verschillende achtergronden ontmoeten en waar leerkrachten trots kunnen zijn op hun vak. We pakken kansongelijkheid aan (GL, 2017a, p.21).</p> <p>“Onderwijs is de motor voor emancipatie. Iedereen moet mee kunnen doen” (GL, 2017a, p.21).</p> <p>“GroenLinks wil dat ons onderwijs kinderen de kennis en vaardigheden geeft die aansluiten bij de 21e eeuw, zodat ze uitgroeien tot kritisch denkende wereldburgers die bewust omgaan met hun leefomgeving, kennismaken met kunst en kunnen omgaan met morele vraagstukken en diversiteit in opvattingen en culturen” (GL, 2017a, p.22).</p> <p>“Te veel kinderen worden ingeschaald op een lager onderwijsniveau dan ze aankunnen, vaak gebaseerd op vooroordelen rondom etniciteit of sociaaleconomische achtergrond” (GL, 2017a, p.24).</p> <p>“Koloniaal verleden, migratiegeschiedenis, diversiteit en anti-discriminatie worden onderdeel van de kerndoelen in zowel het basis- als voortgezet onderwijs” (GL, 2017a, p.26).</p> <p>“Bestrijding van vooroordelen over gender en seksualiteit wordt onderdeel van de zorgplicht van alle scholen” (GL, 2017a, p.26).</p> <p>“Segregatie in het onderwijs op en door scholen wordt tegengegaan” (GL, 2017a, p.26).</p>			<p>market”.</p> <p>Education is defined in terms of economism.</p> <p>Actions are for creating an educational system based on inclusion and equality. Inclusion is based on improving opportunity for (disadvantaged) minority groups. Emancipation, diversity and educating also about negative episodes of the past.</p>	<p>objectives for education”.</p> <p>Radicalizing the past, by positing that it was not based on inclusion.</p> <p>No clear indications for ingroup collectivization or utterances based on anger or contempt.</p>
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	<p>“We investeren in onderwijs. We investeren in de toekomst van onze samenleving. De afgelopen jaren zijn kansen in het onderwijs steeds minder geworden. Die trend, die moeten we keren” (GL, 2017b, 1:52).</p> <p>“Meer investeren in cultuur” (GL, 2017b, 0:25).</p> <p>“Of ze nu betere zorg voor ouderen willen, of de opvang beter willen regelen voor vluchtelingen, het onderwijs beter willen organiseren of klimaatverandering aan willen pakken. Met al die mensen die gedreven worden door die hoop op verandering. Het idee dat het anders moet en de overtuiging dat het anders kan. Met hen gaan wij door” (GL, 2017c, 10:30).</p> <p>“Uit een recent onderzoek van het Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau bleek dat 77% van de ondervraagde Nederlanders polarisatie als grootste bedreiging voor ons land ziet. Dat zegt iets over de luide toon waarop sommige mensen het maatschappelijke en politieke debat voeren. Terwijl we eigenlijk allemaal hetzelfde willen voor onze kinderen: goed onderwijs, een eerlijke verdeling van rijkdom en schone lucht om in te ademen. En vooral: een samenleving waarin we zoeken naar wat ons bindt in plaats van wat ons scheidt” (GL, 2019c).</p> <p>“het publieke debat in Nederland is de afgelopen jaren steeds verder verhard. Verschillen worden uitvergroot, groepen in de samenleving tegen elkaar opgezet. Nederlanders met een niet-</p>				
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	<p>Westerse achternaam vinden vaak pas na veel bloed, zweet en tranen een baan. Het conflict wordt vaker gezocht dan de dialoog. Omdat iemand een andere mening heeft. Omdat iemand een andere huidskleur heeft. Omdat iemand een andere levensstijl heeft” (GL, 2019c).</p> <p>“Altijd - op voorwaarde van wederzijds respect. Wij willen een zelfbewust en ontspannen Nederland. Waarin minder wordt geschreeuwd en meer wordt geluisterd. En waarin iedereen zich realiseert dat met het aanwakkeren van ‘wij’ tegen ‘zij’ nog nooit iets is bereikt” (GL, 2019c).</p> <p>“GroenLinks staat voor een onderwijsstelsel dat emancipatie en zelfontplooiing als ideaal heeft. Wij willen onderwijs dat alle kinderen kansen geeft om hun talenten en ambities te ontplooiën, ongeacht hun herkomst, sekse of sociale klasse. Een goed opgeleide, divers samengestelde beroepsbevolking is immers een belangrijke voorwaarde voor een solidaire samenleving” (GL, 2008, p.6).</p> <p>“culturele botsingen en wantrouwen in de democratie” (GL, 2008, p.5).</p> <p>“GroenLinks zet zich daarbij in voor gelijkwaardigheid in economische, juridische, maar ook in sociaal-culturele en levensbeschouwelijke zin” (GL, 2008, p.7).</p> <p>“Als ik in de kantines ben dan spreek ik met mensen in het onderwijs, dan springen de tranen</p>				
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	<p>je echt in de ogen als een docent verteld dat ze gewoon niet meer de aandacht kan geven aan die leerlingen. Als je dat in de zorg ziet, hoe de marktwerking daar is doorgeslagen” (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 54:20).</p> <p>“Voor het onderwijs, voor de zorg dan moet u opstaan, helder zijn en zeggen die grote bedrijven die gaan wij ook belasten. Dat zou ook mooi zijn als we het daar over eens kunnen worden” (RTL Nieuws, 201, 55:40).</p> <p>“Ik constateer dat dit debat volgens mij geen enkele oplossing heeft geboden voor wie dan ook in Nederland. Het heeft de huren niet omlaag gebracht, we hebben geen oplossing voor de problemen in de zorg, in het onderwijs. Het is een kakofonie van politici die even hun puntje wilde maken” (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 1:42:22).</p>				
<p><i>Negatives</i> Kolencentrales Kernenergie Vervuilers Klimaatverandering</p> <p><i>Positives</i> Koploper Hernieuwbare energie Duurzaam Ambitieuw klimaatbeleid Groen</p>	<p>We zijn de eerste generatie die de gevolgen van klimaatverandering merken en de laatste die haar kunnen stoppen. Daarom moeten er de komende jaren grote stappen worden gezet om de opwarming van de aarde tegen te gaan” (GL, 2019g).</p> <p>“Op Luxemburg na doen alle Europese landen het beter op het gebied van schone energie dan Nederland. Dat is beschamend. Wij willen hier verandering in brengen. Nederland moet een koploper in hernieuwbare energie worden door windmolens op zee te plaatsen, zonnepanelen op onze daken betaalbaar te maken én energie te besparen” (GL, 2019g).</p>	Climate	<p><i>Self</i> as early advocate for tackling climate change.</p> <p><i>Other</i> Dutch politics in general</p> <p><i>Other</i> (big) polluting companies</p>	<p><i>Self</i> is identified as an early advocate for addressing and fighting climate change.</p> <p><i>Others</i> are constructed as being responsible for ignoring this ‘existential threat’.</p>	<p>Utterances about the past are about ‘the unwillingness of politics and big companies to combat climate change’. Can be seen as radicalizing the past.</p> <p>No clear referencing</p>

	<p>“GroenLinks verzet zich tegen kolencentrales en het opwekken van kernenergie. Aan boren naar schaliegas maakten we met succes een einde. Er zijn immers voldoende alternatieven die wel gezond en duurzaam zijn” (GL, 2019g).</p> <p>“In ons land lopen we al jarenlang achter met ons klimaatbeleid. Daarom voeren we een ambitieuze Klimaatwet in” (GL, 2017a, p.7).</p> <p>“Zo zorgen we dat bedrijven niet langer grondstoffen gebruiken die medeoorzaak zijn van oorlogen, uitbuiting en milieuvernietiging” (GL, 2017a, p.8).</p> <p>“We stappen zo snel mogelijk af van het gebruik van fossiel gas. Nederland moet hierbij een leidende rol vervullen” (GL, 2017a, p.10).</p> <p>“Het lijkt wel alsof de politiek de afgelopen 30 jaar onder een enorme steen heeft gezeten, en niets heeft gedaan om het klimaatprobleem terug te dringen. We moeten klimaatverandering aanpakken. We hebben het meest ambitieuze klimaatbeleid ooit. We zorgen ervoor dat het aandeel duurzame energie stijgt, van een lousy 6% naar meer dan 60% in 2030” (GL, 2017b, 2:07).</p> <p>“beter willen organiseren of klimaatverandering aan willen pakken” (GL, 2017c, 11:00).</p> <p>“Nou ja. Soms heb ik wel eens het idee dat</p>				<p>about returning to</p>
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	<p>klimaat een soort van luxewoord wordt beschouwd. Dat we wel een beetje erbij doen. Dat is vooral het beeld van afgelopen jaren. Ik zie het nu echt wel keren. Dat er een nieuwe generatie opstaat die zegt, hoho, wacht even, het is geen bijzaak, het is hoofdzaak” (Vice Nederland, 2017, 0:59).</p> <p>“Kijk grote bedrijven worden in Nederland ontzettend bevoordeeld. Fossiele brandstoffen worden gewoon zwaar gesubsidieerd. Dat gaan we afschaffen” (Vice Nederland, 2017, 1:20).</p> <p>“Het enige argument waar wij gevoelig voor zijn, zijn inhoudelijke argumenten. En al die bedrijven die dreigen dat ze weg gaan, ... We zullen veel meer moeten investeren in innovatie” (Vice Nederland, 2017, 2:10).</p> <p>“Mensen, jong en oud, zijn het zat om te wachten op klimaatbeleid. Met duizenden gaan ze de straat op om te protesteren tegen de klimaatcrisis. Mensen willen verandering. Het is tijd voor actie in Europa” (GL, 2019h).</p> <p>“Ik ben onwijs optimistisch. Al 30 jaar is GroenLinks bezig en zeggen we klimaatverandering moeten we aanpakken. En nu zijn we bij een groot lijsttrekkersdebat en is het eerste onderwerp van de avond en iedereen heeft het over klimaat. Aankomende zondag gaan hier tienduizenden mensen de straat op. Dus die aanpak van klimaatverandering gaat er echt wel komen. De vraag is hoever gaan we hier aan meewerken als politici.” (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 29:44).</p>				
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	<p>“En meneer Baudet, ...U kunt zeggen ik ga maar achter die 3% wetenschappers staan die zeggen er is geen klimaatverandering... En ik kan u een ding beloven, de nieuwe eerste kamer gaat Nederland groener maken” (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 30:00).</p> <p>“Meneer Dijkhof, de Co2 belasting, zijn wij al 30 jaar mee bezig. ...is dat we straks met allerlei ambitieuze plannen komen, maar dat we niet durven om ook die grote bedrijven de rekening te laten betalen. En als we dat niet doen, dan daalt het draagvlak in Nederland en terecht” (RTL Nieuws, 2019, 34:40).</p> <p>“Brandstoffen ingeruild voor duurzame energie (GL, 2017b, 0:35).</p> <p>“Helemaal naar 100% zullen we in 2050 zitten, maar ik denk dat we met ons programma, dat weet ik want dat is uitgerekend, maar met ons programma zouden we in 2030 al 60% van onze energiebehoefte zou duurzaam kunnen zijn. Dat is een vertienvoudiging van wat we op dit moment doen. Op dit moment is het ongeveer 6%” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 31:06).</p> <p>“De balans tussen economie, sociale rechtvaardigheid en duurzame ontwikkeling vraagt om scherpe politieke keuzes voor duurzame landbouw, milieuvriendelijke mobiliteit en duurzame energieproductie” (GL, 2008, p.6).</p>				
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	<p>“GroenLinks is een open politieke beweging die strijdt voor een betere, andere wereld die schoner, groener, duurzamer en eerlijker is” (GL, 2008, p.8).</p>				
<p><i>Negatives</i> Ongelijke samenleving is ongelukkige samenleving Wantrouwen democratie</p> <p><i>Positives</i> Verandering Verbinden Één samenleving Eerlijk delen Duurzaamheid Inleving Hoop Idealen Wereldburger Burgerschap</p>	<p>“Het is tijd voor verandering. Het is tijd om te kiezen voor één samenleving, een samenleving die mensen verbindt in plaats van slijt. Waar iedereen deel van uitmaakt, op zijn of haar manier” (GL, 2017a, p.2).</p> <p>“Ik geloof in een samenleving waarin we eerlijk delen. Ik geloof in een samenleving die gebouwd is op duurzaamheid en waarin we omkijken naar elkaar. Dat zijn de waarden die mij elke dag drijven in de politiek, dat zijn de waarden die ten grondslag liggen die ik aan jullie in deze video ga presenteren” (GL, 2017b, 0:00).</p> <p>“Maar ik vind het wel belangrijk dat millennials zien, we moeten nu opstaan, omdat dit jouw land is en dat het de goede richting opgaat dan moet je nu gaan stemmen” (Nieuwsuur, 2017, 14:00).</p> <p>“Nee we zijn geen racistisch land. Maar met het eerste deel van het betoog, was ik het wel eens. Nederland is echt een land waar we van alles kunnen zeggen en heel grof kunnen zijn... Probeer je eens te verplaatsen in de ander. Hoe is het voor iemand anders en is het dan zo erg om je gedrag aan te passen of tradities aan te passen of dingen op een andere manier te zeggen...Het zegt dat we nog grote stappen te zetten hebben. Maar dat gaan we doen” (Vice</p>	Society	<i>Self</i> as an advocate for a society that binds, rather than divides.	Constructs the <i>Self</i> as protagonist of a society based on inclusion, welfare distribution and sustainability.	

	<p>Nederland, 2017, 7:36).</p> <p>“Dus dezelfde hoop, dezelfde dromen en idealen deelt, dan stem je op ons. En anders maar niet. Dat is hoe wij campagne voeren en dat is hoe ik politiek wil bedrijven en dat is hoe politiek zou moeten zijn. Het is een ideeënstrijd. Geen beauty contest om te kijken, hoe kan ik zoveel mogelijk mensen aan mij binden” (Vice Nederland, 2017, 11:00).</p> <p>“wij kiezen voor een land waarin we rijkdom eerlijk delen. Een land waarin mensen met een klein inkomen, er flink op vooruitgaan. Een land waarin mensen die financieel aan de grond zitten, niet langer worden achtervolgd door onnodige en wantrouwende regels, maar de kans krijgen om uit het dal te klimmen. Want ongelijke samenlevingen zijn ongelukkige samenlevingen: in ongelijke samenlevingen is er meer stress, meer criminaliteit en meer drugsmisbruik” (GL, 2019d).</p> <p>“GroenLinks vindt dat ‘economische groei’ of ‘meer geld’ niet het voornaamste doel van de politiek moet zijn. Andere waarden zijn minstens zo belangrijk: gezondheid, duurzaamheid en gelijkheid. Door deze waarden weer terug te brengen, maakt GroenLinks de politiek menselijker (GL, 2019d).</p> <p>“Juist onze antwoorden zijn nodig voor de nieuwe grote maatschappelijke problemen in de wereld en dichtbij huis: de opwarming van de aarde, teveel mensen die langs de kant van de</p>				
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	<p>arbeidsmarkt staan, culturele botsingen en wantrouwen in de democratie (GL, 2008, p.5).</p> <p>“GroenLinks staat voor ecologische duurzaamheid en sociale rechtvaardigheid: iedere wereldburger heeft recht op een evenredig aandeel in de schaarse natuurlijke hulpbronnen, nu en in de toekomst” (GL, 2008, p.5).</p> <p>“Een culturele en maatschappelijke verandering is nodig om de wereld leefbaar te houden voor volgende generaties” (GL, 2008, p.6).</p> <p>“Een samenleving waarin alle mensen zich kunnen ontplooiën zonder discriminatie, racisme, seksisme en andere vormen van onderdrukking (GL, 2008, p.7).</p> <p>“Iedereen heeft fundamentele rechten en vrijheden. Iedereen moet beschermd worden tegen argwanende en autoritaire overheden” (GL, 2008, p.9).</p> <p>“Een ideaal van burgerschap waarin iedereen volledig in de democratische processen kan participeren en zich verantwoordelijk voelt voor de inrichting van de samenleving” (GL, 2008, p.9).</p>				
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