



Ethno-religious
capital and its
preventative effect on
Jihadi radicalization:
A comparative mini-
ethnographic case
study in Germany

Master Thesis

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Abstract

The following research paper thematizes a new concept of social capital, namely ‘ethno-religious capital’ and its preventative effect on radicalization process of Muslim youth in Germany. The research makes use of interviews and a localized mini-ethnographic case study in Düsseldorf, Germany analyzing German-Turkish and German-Moroccan individuals and communities in order to explain if and how ethnic and religious social capital counteract push and pull factors of jihadi radicalization. The comparative case study elaborates on the different push and pull factors including the struggle of social identity, marginalization, discrimination, and the individuals’ perception of the West and its host society. It becomes apparent that ethno-religious capital counteracts radicalization to a large amount if local religious institutions possess (a) sufficient human and financial capital to introduce educational and social programs for struggled youth and (b) can rely on in-group connectedness and support within the ethnic community. This research contributes to the ongoing discussion in the literature on the role of push and pull factors regarding Muslims minorities and radicalization, as well as providing important insights to help policy development in the area, in particular where there is an implicit understanding that Islam and various forms of Muslimness are potentially a net asset to society as well as directly contributing in the fight against violent extremism, radicalization and terrorism.

1. Introduction

The bomb attacks on suburban trains in Madrid in 2004, the murder of Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004 or the terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris in the years 2016 and 2017 indicate that the radicalization of young Muslims in Europe is a phenomenon that grows in importance as these jihadist terror attacks in the West demonstrate that violent attacks carried out by fellow citizens are not seldom. The majority of academic research on radicalization focuses on socio-political factors judging the integration capacity of Muslim communities in Europe (cf. Murshed and Pavan, 2010). However, empirical studies show that the backgrounds and concrete motives of individuals and groups who eventually resort to terrorist violence vary greatly and can hardly be generalized (Hegemann and Kahl, 2015). This view is contrary to the hypothesis in question that people with integration problems are more likely to radicalize and join terrorist groups than individuals with no migration background. Triandafyllidou (2015) points out that ‘the seeds of minority Muslim youth recruitment in Europe has more to do with today’s global-local connections rather than with failed integration’ (p.4). The radicalization processes in the diaspora can be caused by various conditions: On the one hand, the experience of exclusion and discrimination of migrants is a determining element; on the other hand, the search for group affiliation is a decisive factor. With this regard, the question of identity and the rift between the host country and family’s culture plays a decisive role in identifying pull and push factors.

In Europe, most of the Muslim migrants are of Turkish and Moroccan origin (Smits et al, 2010). Since the 1960s guest workers from both countries immigrated to Germany in search of work and a potentially more financially secured future (Sunier et al. 2016). Over the years, many of the migrants took up citizenship or entered interracial marriages meaning that Turkish and Moroccan citizens have exerted a variety of influences on the host country (Elderling, 2014). In this process, the majority of the young descendants have become an integral part of European society and identify themselves as fellow Europeans. Taking these developments into account, one poses the question: how is it possible that Muslim youth in Europe is partially prone to Islamic radicalization? To answer this question, one should take a closer look at the social identity and social cohesion of minority groups in Germany. Although there have been integration challenges on both sides, Turkish- German migrants show a stronger affiliation to the Western culture since Turkey is considered a Eurasian country of which culture have been influenced by occidental and oriental elements (Elderling, 2014). German-Moroccans,

however, have been attributed with bigger challenges since some jihadist supporters have been identified to possess a Northern African and mostly Moroccan migration background (Sunier et al, 2016). Furthermore, 12% of Moroccan Europeans support jihadi movements, whereas only 5% of Turkish Europeans advocate for jihadist terror groups (Elderling, 2014). Elderling (2014) stresses the big differences between Turkish and Moroccan migrants concerning their reaction on terrorist attacks: After 9/11 only three percent of Turkish-Europeans supported the attacks, whereas more than a quarter of Moroccans in Europe supported the terror incident in New York City. The reasons for this disparity could lie in the different expression of Islam, the world view, but could also be rooted in the community and the imparted values among in-group members. Veldhuis and Staun (2009) stresses, there is not a single theory or discipline that explains radicalization, why this thesis makes use of pull and push factors of radicalization defined by various authors including Coolsaet (2013), Schmid (2013) and Renard (2012). Furthermore, there is a need for an interdisciplinary framework which takes into account individual and societal positions that are influenced by community dynamics.

Since religion and faith-based traditions are an integral part of minority communities, the thesis examines ethnicity and religion under the cultural socialization phenomenon. In this process, a theory on ethno-religious capital and its possible limiting effect on radicalization is facilitated by conducting interviews and a mini-ethnographic case study involving Turkish and Moroccan community members in Germany. Taking into account Putnam's 'social capital theory' (2000), Maselko et al's (2011) 'social religiosity theory', and Borjas (1992) 'ethnic capital theory', ethno-religious capital embraces social resources available to ethnic communities through their social linkages with a religious community or institution. For this very reason, a comparative case study between German-Turkish and German-Moroccan families sheds light on (a) to what extent young Muslims take advantage of ethno-religious capital and (b) if religious institutions function as a catch basin for struggled individuals ultimately hindering a radicalization process of young Muslims in Germany.

Relevance

The academic paper aims to shed light on possible counter-radicalization strategies that include religious stakeholders and social capital available to an ethnic community. Thus, this thesis aims to combine two areas of radicalization processes and religious social capital to (a) address

one of the possible root causes of jihadi terrorism for young Muslims in Germany and (b) to stress the importance of local religious institutions in the fight against radicalization. With regards to social positions and identity of young Muslims, it becomes apparent that Muslim identities are under scrutiny in Western societies inciting Islamophobia and discrimination of migrants (Van Bergen et al. 2017). However, radicalization became a security concern and policymakers aim to address the root causes of extremism and jihadism (Bakker, 2013).

The investigation of local institutions and their effect on radicalization processes has not received adequate attention yet (RAN, 2016). Furthermore, religious institutions are not directly involved in deradicalization programs with public stakeholders, neither receive sufficient academic attention (ibid.). The radicalization process is not the same for every individual and not every framework is applicable for each case. However, it is significant to address the root causes of radicalization and how communities might respond to externalizing behavior of youth. With this regard, ethno-religious capital and counter-radicalization have not been put into relation yet, however, considering the evermore importance of multi-agency collaboration in fighting extremism this research is pivotal for further societal and academic discussion. There is a strong need for (1) examining to what extent young Muslims feel affiliated with the majority of society and their migration background and (2) whether migrants that experience identity struggles receive adequate attention of their respective community stakeholders. According to the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) of the European Commission (2016), existing academic literature does not provide sufficient answers to the relation of social cohesion and radicalization. Furthermore, quick research on the phenomenon of ethno-religious capital and its effect on radicalization reveals that there is no literature or valid information on a comparative case study. Although religious social capital was successfully related to decreasing health problems and countering substance use, academics did not provide sufficient evidence on the effect of ethnic capital and its limiting effect on radicalization. This thesis aims to close the research gap for both cases and to give the incentive to conduct further academic research and elaborate on policy-making concerning young migrant's radicalization paths.

Research Question

To analyze the influence of religious social capital on the radicalization of young Muslims in Germany, this thesis focuses on the following research question: **‘To what extent does ethno-religious capital prevent the radicalization process of young German Turkish and young German-Moroccan individuals in Germany?’** With this regard, religious social capital is the independent and the radicalization path of Muslim youth, resp. with Turkish and Moroccan ethnic background, the dependent variable. In structuring the analysis and providing the thesis with a guideline, following sub-questions are generated:

1. What factors contribute to the community’s ethno-religious capital?

To analyze what kind of resources are available for different communities.

2. How does parental cultural socialization influence an individual’s and community values?

To clarify which values and traditions are imparted to the community by family dynamics and parental cultural socialization. This question should clarify the willingness to engage in the available social capital of the communities.

3. How do faith-based organizations respond to struggled youths in the community?

To clarify which programs and activities are introduced by faith leaders to encounter externalizing behavior.

To provide a comprehensive analysis and presentation of the results, first a literature review including conceptualization of the independent and dependent variable is presented. After the research design section, the gathered data is analyzed and discussed, and a comparison between the two different communities is drawn. In the end, the research question is answered, and a theory is presented that corroborates the overall objective of the study.

2. Literature Review: Islam, extremism and ethnic religious capital

Islam in Germany (800)

The Islamic communities in Germany have their origin in the 1960s with the increasing number of ‘guest workers’ from Turkey, the Balkans and North Africa (Brinkmann & Sauer, 2016). 50 years and four generations later, the Islamic faith became an integral part of multicultural neighborhoods in Germany (Rohe, 2018). In 2015, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees counted more than 4.7 Mio Muslims living in Germany (BAMF, 2015). With the recent intake of refugees and migrants from the Middle East, experts estimate an increase of the Muslim population in Germany (Pick, 2020). Over the past decades, the presence of Muslims has not only advanced in numbers or level of organizations, but also in participation processes of socially relevant fields such as politics, education system and universities (Antes & Ceylan, 2017). This development is also accompanied with an increasing public perception of Muslims and Islam as the second largest religious community in Germany (ibid.). With regard to recent Islamic and Right-wing terror attacks in the West, as well as the foreign fighters leaving for the ‘Islamic State’ the integration of the Muslim community, Islamophobia and Islamism become highly contested (Brinkmann & Sauer, 2016).

Although a vast majority of Muslims reside in Germany for more than 50 years, the Federal Ministry of the Interior launched the German Islam Conference (DIK) initially in 2006 (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2020). This was the first time that a nationwide framework for dialogue between the German state and Muslims in Germany was created (BMI, 2020). The Federal Ministry of the Interior invites to the meetings and moderates the process. On the state side, in addition to representatives of the federal ministries, conferences of specialist ministers of the ‘Länder’ (federal states) and the municipal umbrella organizations are also represented (ibid.). On the Muslim side, representatives of ten Muslim umbrella organizations at federal level have been participating since 2013. Being now in an active cooperation with the Islamic communities in Germany, it should be noted that 90% of the Islamic organizations and mosques are funded by foreign countries in the Middle East and Africa (Antes & Ceylan, 2017). As a result, the participation and influence of foreign governments on the Islamic practice in Germany is immense.

In recent years there has been an increase of right-wing parties in Europe and attacks of radical rightwing extremists on mosques, Islamic institutions or multicultural localities (Massoumi, 2020). Islamophobic tensions and assaults increased triggering not only fear and insecurity but also anti-Western sentiments in Muslim communities (Ali, 2017). The resulting violence, discrimination, exclusion and prejudice that Muslims encounter pushes young Muslims in further isolation repudiating their identity (The Runnymede Trust, 1996). According to Abbas (2012) Islamic radicalization is sustained through Islamophobia and vice versa. As a result, a vicious cycle of Islamism and right-wing extremism occurs benefitting from each other's fears and hatred (ibid.). Beginning with an inaccurate depiction of 'traditional' Muslims in the West in media and television, stereotypes and prejudices encourage reluctant attitude towards Muslims who on the other hand feel alienated and develop distrust towards the host society (Morey and Yaqin, 2011). In this context, extremists exploit the fragile relationship between the Islamic minorities and the Western host societies creating a black and white picture of evil vs. good (Elkassem, 2018). Here, extremists do not only focus on recent atrocities towards the Islamic community but also make usage of historical events such as colonialism in the Middle East and South Asia (Abbas, 2012). Thus, Islamism is also fueled through colonial experience "when critical Muslim thinking and progressive development was replaced with regressive and reactionary tendencies in the face of hostility from and subjugation by the 'oppressor'" (Abbas, 2012, p. 353). As a result, a picture is created in which the West oppressed Muslims for centuries and thus, requires a fight against Western values to break free from injustice and maltreatment.

Turkish Islam in Germany:

According to the DIK study "Islamic Community Life in Germany" (BAMF 2012), there are about 2,350 mosque communities in Germany. One of the Sunni organizations with the largest number of members is DITIB, the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institute for Religion e.V. (Halm et al, 2012). It is subordinate to the Turkish State Presidium for Religious Affairs and with almost 800 independent mosque communities it exerts a great influence on the Turkish and Islamic communities (Diyanet, 2020). Since the organization maintains direct contact with the Turkish religious authorities and is also funded by them, the impact of the so-called 'Turkish Islam' practiced in Germany is great (Brinkmann & Sauer, 2016). Historically seen Islam and the nation state in Turkey are always separate entities, since laicism prevails in the

Turkish order (Eligür, 2010). Sunni Islam in Turkey is highly influenced by the Hanafi jurisprudence that is considered fairly moderate and liberal since the importance of the Islamic expression lies in the intention of the practitioner allowing a more flexible implementation of the faith (Wheeler, 1996). In this regard, secularism and Sufism play an important role in Turkey. According to a study by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP, 2004), Islam is regulated by the nation state, which administers the arrangement of democracy and Islam. This was also reflected in the policy of DITIB and the sermons in the mosques in Germany (Eligür, 2012). The respective Imams receive an academic education, in which the harmony of the Islamic religion and a nation-state would be in the foreground rather than the Islamization of the political and social life (SWP, 2004).

The historical development of Turkey is diametrically different from Moroccan history. According to Pott et al (2014), the Turkish reason of state is not comparable with Morocco's religious and political understanding of the state. Turkey is more influenced by the idea of the nation-state, the orientation towards the West and the secularization of public life (ibid.).

However, in Morocco politics, law and religion are very closely linked since the monarchy legitimises its claim to power based on religious foundations (Carol et al, 2014).

Moroccan Islam in Germany

Islam in Morocco plays a crucial role in politics and socio-economic dimensions of everyday life. Carol et al (2014) point out that the Moroccan legal system is strongly influenced by the Sharia, which after the colonial rule of France and Spain served to unify the different legal systems in the country. However, over the last years, enforced reforms point to a distancing from Sharia law. Not only has women's and family law been decoupled from Islamic law, but also the growing influence of Islamists in the country has been encountered through a politicization process in which a moderate Islam has been proclaimed by the government (Pott et al, 2014). The Maliki madhab to which the majority of Moroccan Muslims adhere does not only consider said tradition as a legitimate source of Islamic ruling, but also legal rulings for the four caliphs allowing an Islamization of politics (StiON, 2011). Although Moroccan guest workers emigrated to Germany in the 1960s, the unification of Islamic organizations began only in 2006 when the Moroccan Central Council emerged and established relations with the

Moroccan Hassan 2 Foundation that regulates policies for Diaspora Moroccans. Until then, the Islamic landscape for the Moroccan community was fragmented and religious services were held by unofficially designated clerics (Rafoud, 2010). Since the 'Hassan II Foundation' builds a stronger relationship with the diaspora community and established the 'Mohammad VI Institution' to train imams, more and more officially appointed clerics are sent out to European soil (Davis, 2020). The Moroccan government aims to promote an inclusive and spiritual interpretation of Islam to encounter extremists that have previously exploited the socio-economic problems in the country (ibid.).

Radicalization, Extremism and Terrorism: A terminological explanation

According to the European Radicalization Network (RAN) there is no particular definition of radicalization. It is rather a phenomenon, or a process accompanied by different factors and characteristics in which an individual develops extremist beliefs or emotions and becomes increasingly motivated to use violent means against a whole society (Renard, 2013). Radical groups point at achieving behavioral changes, political goals or even command of attention from government, society or the international community (Abbas, 2010). The term 'radicalism' came first forward in the 1790s in France to describe a political attitude which was utilized to describe "opposing reactionary political establishments" (Bötticher, 2017, p. 74). Originating in a pro-democratic, anti-monarchical movement, radicalism was committed to collective freedom and an individual's free expression of rights (ibid.). During the French revolution radicalism advocated universal male suffrage and a democratic parliamentary system aiming at overthrowing monarchy and perceived injustice (Smith, 1997). Eager to gain political support for a revolutionizing electoral system, radicalism did become a synonym for rationalism and civic movements as well as resistance to sole reign and suppression of liberty rights in the 18th and 19th century (ibid). However, the romanticized notion of radicalism changed within time since a distinction between political extremism and radicalism became harder and the lines intertwined (Hutton, 1986). The radicalization process of individuals embraces the extremist belief, emotion and behavior (Trip et al, 2019). Authors such as Schmid (2013) argue that radical groups renouncing dialogue and mediation might resort to political violence including combats and proclaimed fights against the elite.

In the context of extremist groupings, the rise of the extreme right wing groups such as the the anti-Semitic rallies in 1920 and the resulting invasion of power of the Nazi regime in 1930s show to what extent extremism can lead to discrimination, violent outbursts, ethnic cleansings or genocides (Berger, MIT Press, 2018). Regarding today's academic literature on religious extremism, Islamic extremism has been in the foreground of academic and political debates (Murshed, 2009). Newspapers, journals or even public discussions thematize radical extremists who speak out for Islamism and instrumentalize religion for their own violent purposes (Azzam, 2007). However, Islamic extremism, radical Islam and Islamism are no interchangeable terms and are differently conceptualized. Radical Islam (also Islamic fundamentalism) opposes any secular or westernized influences in their own religious community and seek to establish the Islamic law (Sharia) in their niche community (Bijorgo, 2005). Islamism on the other hand refers to a politicized Islam in which there are no differentiation between the religious and political domain in society and the ultimate goal is the spread and imposition of Islamic law (Schmid, 2017).

The transition from extremism to terrorism lies in the violence and deliberate destruction of people and systems. Among other things, terrorism is defined as an instrument used by individuals or groups to carry out violent and criminal acts (Bijorgo & Horgan, 2009). The basis and aim of their activities are to fulfill ideology and spread its message (ibid.). This might contain political, religious, cultural or social reasons (Martha, 1992). Islamist terror is equated with jihadism or radical Islamism (Coolsaet, 2013). Although there is no uniform definition or conceptualization on Islamic terror, it is seen as a violent act against civilians driven by religious extremism (ibid.). The justification of these acts is rooted in extreme interpretations of the Quran and Hadith, in which the fight against injustice to Muslims, the fight against infidels and the preservation of Sharia Law play an important role (Ashour, 2009). Extremist groups such as Al-Qaida, Taliban, Boko Haram and DAESH focus specifically on militant conflicts and violent struggles, in which the restoring of the Caliphate and the establishment of a so-called Islamic State are in the foreground (ibid.). However, it should be acknowledged some individuals who are radicalized do not become terrorists and do not engage in violent acts (Schuurman & Taylor, 2018). Renard (2013) and Abbas (2013) cite various reasons including strong family ties, their settled understanding of religion and non-violent outlets for expressing frustration. Since living in pluralist but cohesive society, most of the radicalized Muslims do not see a reason to engage with extremist groups but rather proclaim the supremacy of Islam and the implementation of Sharia law in the respective society (Dawson

and Amarasingam, 2014). Coolsaet (2013) emphasizes that extremists politicize religion leading to Islamization of radicalism, in which group dynamics play a bigger role than the ideology itself.

Bötticher (2017) further elaborates that the actual danger of violent outburst and terrorism lies in extremism rather than in radicalism. The author clarifies that for false reasons “all forms of radical rebellion – even legitimate resistance against corrupt and violent authoritarian regimes - are disqualified as illegitimate extremism” (p.76). However, the overall political notion on the danger of Islamic extremism is accompanied with the fear of radical movements that could push young people into a parallel society, in which the boundaries between extremism and radicalism becomes blurred (Adekson, 2004). Schmid (2017), Trip et al (2019) and McGilloway et al. (2014) emphasize that the radicalization process includes the indoctrination of extremist beliefs and opposing significant societal values, rule of law or universal human rights. Since also radical groups pertains to the supremacy of a particular group, it becomes apparent that radicalization is a threat to equality and emancipation in the public and private life.

The Radicalization process from different perspectives

The radicalization process of individuals is complex and cannot be based on a single factor (Bakker and de Roy van Zuidewijn,2016). It is rather multifaceted and theories of different academic disciplines such as behavioral psychology, educational sciences and sociology substantiate radicalization on the grounds of various aspects. This thesis focuses on the radicalization process of young Muslims in Europe and looks into the different school of thoughts in which ethnic religious capital and cohesive societies play a significant role in combating the radicalization process of juveniles.

Psychology: Understanding the psychological factors of radicalization

To understand an individual’s perspective and journey concerning its radicalization process, behavioral psychologists examine the different life circumstances, personal traits and individual journeys leading to terror activities and eventually attacks on societies (cf. Demant

et al, 2008). Since the radicalization process is accompanied by changing beliefs, emotions and behaviors, it is necessary to explore the psychological mechanisms forming extremists and potential terrorists. Trip et al (2019) emphasize that in the academic literature socio- economic effects and the emotive reaction towards uncertainty in life, and sense of failure and insecurity give a clarity about possible radicalization. One can deduce the frustration-aggression hypothesis in which the perception of unfairness, injustice and dissatisfaction with the system leads to hostile or forceful attitude resulting in extremist behavior. Moghaddam (2015) point out that the categorical thinking of “good vs. evil” and the increasing feeling of social alienation, missing affiliation and marginalization generate frustration and deprivation from societal goods. These feelings and beliefs are generated through motivational conflicts, social avoidance, economic and social deprivation (ibid.). Not being able to pinpoint the cause of personal uncertainty and fear, the sense of victimhood arises in which the individual perceives the government or society as the reason for personal defeat (Ranstorp, 2016). Jonas et al (2014) elaborate furthermore three types of conditions resulting in the sense of victimhood: (a) the need for a meaning in life and understanding is not met, (b) individual does not meet the expectation of in-group members which results in the devaluation of self-esteem and (c) the individual does not possess self-control over action, physical and social environment. Trip et al (2019) defines this phenomenon as social disconnectedness in which the lacking sense of belonging triggers violent attitudes towards the mainstream. Facing deprivation as a group member and experiencing uncertainty in life increases anxiety, depression and anger since the individual is not aware of any refuge or place of retreat (ibid.). Hogg and Andelman (2013), as well as Tajfel and Turner (1979), explain both in their dedicated “Uncertainty Identity Theory” and “Social Identity Theory” that group identification and sense of belonging are crucial factors to define his/her own identity. Social groups represent values and attributes and might determine behaviors and mind-sets to form affiliation (Raffie, 2013). Since we live in an unpredictable world, people strive for more control in which group affiliation functions as “approach-oriented defense mechanisms that help maintain their need for epistemic equilibrium, self-esteem, belonging, and control” (Kay and Eibach, 2013, in: Trip et al, 2019, p.3). Since dysfunctional emotions might lead to radical behavior, it becomes apparent that next to individual perceptions of uncertainty and unfairness, personal traits and the inability to deal with uncertainty leads to radicalization (McGregor et al, 2013).

According to forensic psychiatrist Leistedt (2016), the process of radical behavior begins with so-called risk factors, that lay the foundation for effective brainwashing techniques and result in reception and internalization of propaganda material, social engineering and

radical networks that completely capture the individual into extremism. The proposed risk factors are derived from personality traits, however, Leistedt explains that due to conceptual problems and outdated research, the personality traits cannot be grounded on psychological factors. Although the frustration-aggression hypothesis might resonate with radicalizing behaviour, the author suggests that research should refrain from detecting and pinpointing sociopathic traits as determining factors for radicalization but should broaden their perspective on multi-layered characteristics. As the recent tendencies of Muslim foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq show, most of the radicalized individuals share certain peculiarities (Leinstedt, 2016, p.1589): (1) the foreign fighters come from second or third generation immigrant families, (2) they have a criminal record due to juvenile offences, (3) the individuals have been in jail, (4) they experience socio-economic problems such as financial problems, identity crises or family problems. Once these factors interplay, the individual is more receptive towards brainwashing techniques and ultimately to coercive persuasion, behavioral control and exploitative persuasion (ibid.) As a result, individuals experience a paradigm shift of their own life history that is extremely reshaped and contains new approaches and correlations to world views (DiGuseppe et al, 2014). Furthermore, they develop a sense of co-dependency on the group and do not want to experience abandonment or alienation from the new group sense their sense of belonging result in a sense of achievement (Raffie, 2013).

According to Jonas-Kamil (2012), the non-recognition of dual identity status and the promoted negation and detachment from parental values lead to the weakening or loss of family conditions and a secure identity. Such identity crises can lead to an escape of reality in which i.e. the feeling of social inferiority is internalized into a negative self-image. As a result, personality splits arise, such as radicalization or anti-Western discourses (ibid.).

Educational Sciences and Radicalization: Understanding family and upbringing

Interviews with returnees confirm the following: The pursuit of a goal, the search for the true Islam and an understanding of their social conditions as well as their ethnicity or origin were aspects that they only thematized and acknowledged in the radical group (Schmid, 2017). Considering these pull-factors, the radicalization strategy of extremist groups targets either young people or socially marginalized individuals such as ex-convicts (Renard, 2013) According to Glaser (2015), young people are especially more susceptible to radicalization

since their identity formation is not yet fully completed in the youth stage - views, perspectives and ideas can still change in this phase of life. For this reason, current scientific findings show that adolescents are often more receptive to extremist ideas than adults. In the self-finding stage, they can be more open to new perspectives and ideologies (Frank, 2019). The search for social identity contributes to an easier acceptance of extremist views (Raffie, 2013). Adolescents often lack the experience and knowledge of life to be able to assess certain events correctly meaning that the own view on political, social and cultural topics as well as the ability to reflect on them is not yet consolidated (Frank, 2019).

Young people growing up in a Muslim family in Western society experience difficulties reconciling the lived tradition in the family and within the host culture (Jonas-Kamil, 2014). As a result, Muslim youth in Europe might feel alienated, discriminated or misunderstood in society and thus, struggle to build own social identities (Elderling, 2014). In a society in which the social gap between the minority and the host society is considerably large, young people develop a defensive attitude towards the majority, turning to factors that define them in the eyes of the host society - the religion or country of origin of their parents (Gardiner & Kosmitzki, 2008). Parallel societies are consolidated. For adolescents a "we" vs. "them" society is established (Haug, 2010). In this process, the identity building is dependent on the sense of affiliation to the own group and respective community (ibid.). Nevertheless, only a very small minority becomes radicalized, as other factors play a role in the radicalization process as well. The so-called phase of replacement and reorientation is a decisive factor for young people (Elderling, 2014). The youth's search for identity, questioning the meaning of life, as well as bad experiences including disappointments and helplessness are exploited by Islamists to emotionally link the individual's oppression and injustice with Western values and politics (Jonas-Kamil, 2014). By creating another reality and new truth, Islamic extremists introduce young people into a system in which the sense of victimhood and pursuit of a goal is enforced (Riany et al, 2018). The increasing efforts of government and law enforcement to tighten security environment and to broaden the surveillance of Islamic facilities led jihadis to rethink of new recruitment strategies. Haug (2010) explains that friendship and kinship ties facilitate recruitment into radical groups. The shared sense of unity and identity simplifies the recruitment since pre-existing networks such as an extended family radiate trust for most adolescents (ibid.).

Regarding the role of the family in the radicalization process of young people, both culture and values that parents convey to their children influence socialization and identity building (Elderling, 2014). Families have a significant role in developing a child's world view, mindset and understanding of its surrounding (Gardiner & Kosmitzki, 2014). Riany et al (2018) emphasize that family aspects have an important role in transforming the beliefs to their children. Being the first social group, attachment figure and spokesperson, parents lay a foundation for confidence and strong attitudes towards externalizing behavior (Van Bergen et al, 2017). Phalet and Schönplflug (2001) elaborate on intergenerational transmission of collectivism and achievement values in the case of Turkish families in Germany and Turkish and Moroccan families in the Netherlands. The authors also capture disparities in values and their transmission between the Islamic minority societies in both countries. Thus, there are also differences in the Muslim communities based on ethical differences and values that the families bring with them from the country of origin. Accordingly, culture plays a major role in the integration of families and their religious affiliation. Once the parent experiences discrimination and marginalization by the host community, adolescents transfer this experience to their own self and identify with the suffering of their parents (Mansoob et al, 2010). A joint disapproval towards the majority and the host community develops in which the parents' point of view is accepted and internalized (ibid.) On the other side, if there is a lack of parental supervision, adolescents experience a lack of support, insecurity and uncertainty in which they struggle to build comfort and trust (Riany et al, 2018). Sikkens et al (2017) stresses that a problematic family situation and loose bonds between family members facilitate a radicalization process that is exploited by radical groups. Unaware of their child's radical interpretation of Islamic texts, parents and family members often react dilatory and communicate inefficiently to start a deradicalization process (Hafez, 2010). Thus, the young person devotes himself or herself to the new grouping, which grants this individual a sense of belonging. The analysis on "Externalizing Behaviors by Turkish and Moroccan-Dutch youth" by Van Bergen et al. (2017) explains how to encounter the radicalization mechanism of extremists: Adolescents who experience a greater cultural socialization by their parents are less likely to display externalizing behavior due to their increased connectedness with an ethnic in-group. Once the families introduce its child into a welcoming community which exudes trust and loyalty, the child feels comfort and strong bonds with group members resulting in a stronger bond within the community and possible host society (ibid.).

Sociology: Radicalization Path of Young Muslims in Europe (500)

Triandafyllidou (2015) emphasizes that urban problem and socioeconomic grievances facilitate Muslim youth recruitment. The author explains that politics confuse global geopolitical challenges with local integration tensions since the underlying causes of extremist radicalization lies in socio-economic dimension of Muslim marginalization (ibid.). Unequal opportunities, the structure of the educational system, and possible institutional discrimination generate the sense of victimhood and social injustice (Steinberg, 2012). Jonas-Kamil (2010) points out that the marginalization of Muslim minority in Germany might result to identity crises since a perceived compulsion for one-sided cultural regulation is particularly problematic for adolescents from Arab countries. Sirseloudi et al. (2009) states that the grievance of some Muslims may be due to the conjunction of socio-economic disadvantage and cultural offence. The resulting violence is not an ethnically determined phenomenon but due to the spatial concentration of immigration affected by disintegration (Haug et al, 2009). In so-called problem neighborhoods of large cities, the problem situations cumulate, which are not a question of passports, but of life circumstances. As a result, local grievances are transformed into individual grievances, since individual self-affirmation derives from behavior and the collective perception of social identity (Murshed & Pavan, 2010). Coolsaet (2013) argues that parallel societies which are not recognized by the majority society are much likelier to be affected by radicalization. Since radicalization is a socialization process, attention should be given to understanding the extremist group dynamics and the emerging loyalty among members rather than the ideology itself (ibid.).

In order to understand transnational Islamist militancy, foreign fighters are key elements in the war and struggle (Hegghammer, 2008). They can affect the conflict they join and empower mobilization of transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or DAESH (ibid.). According to Malet (2018) foreign fighters are non-citizens of a of a conflict state who join revolts voluntarily without any financial remuneration. Hegghammer (2008) identifies two significant components that are crucial for the occurrence of foreign fighter mobilization: (1) an ideology that strengthens a transnational community and (2) an active and powerful force of transnational activists. However, As Malet (2018) further elaborates foreign fighters are a phenomenon that is neither new or solely Islamic since the history of foreign fighters goes back beyond in time and in focus: During the Greek War of Independence in the year 1820 Britons joined Greek troops to fight alongside separatists. Jews from all over the world were recruited

to Palestine in order to fight for the foundation of the state of Israel in 1970s. History shows evidence of many examples in which foreign fighters shaped and determined the path and outcome of a war (ibid.). In the Islamic context, foreign fighters have not been always perceived as threats (de Roy van Zuidewijn and Bakker, 2014). The case of the Afghanistan and Bosnian war shows to what extent many Muslims all around the world were encouraged to fight and commit to the “jihad” - either to combat the Soviets or the Serbian Separatists in the respective countries (ibid.) Through recruitment efforts led by an US-led coalition, many Muslims from Arab-speaking countries joined the “jihad” in Afghanistan in the 1980s in order to help the domestic population in the fight against the Soviet Union (Malet, 2018). Despite the suspicion and communication struggles between the local Afghan warriors and the foreign fighters, the recruitment turned out to be fruitful since the Soviet Union declared shortly after their withdrawal from Afghanistan (ibid). According to de Roy van Zuidewijn and Bakker (2014) the paths of the foreign fighters derived from each other: While some were satisfied with fighting the Soviets and returned to their home countries, some stayed in Afghanistan (due to fear of being arrested by their local government) or continued their jihad in other places such as in Bosnia from 1992-1995. Kohlmann (2004) describes the foreign fighter wave of Arab commanders from Afghanistan as driven by hatred and anti-Western ideologies that they internalized during their time in Afghanistan war. According to de Roy van Zuidewijn and Bakker (2014) radical Islamist groups held uncontrollable access to new recruits who became radicalized by local groups in their home countries and then continued their jihad in Bosnia. Although the war in Bosnia ended in 1995, violence continued to escalate as the violent acts of the Serbs against Bosnian Muslims came to light and provided new radicalization material for extremists. Malet (2018) stresses, a new generation of Islamic foreign fighters emerged that were radicalized and eager to fight the West.

Looking into the motivation of young European Muslims to join foreign conflicts, Dawson and Amarasingam (2017), Schmidt (2013) as well as de Roy van Zuidewijn and Bakker (2014) identified so-called “push- and pull factors” that offer an explanation of how socio-economic factors attract young Muslims in Europe into a radicalization wake. The authors base their findings on either primary data from interviews or on comparative studies with three other recent studies of European foreign fighters. The push factors identified in the case of Dutch foreign fighters indicate individuals come from lower or lower middle-class families and mainly attended most levels of education (Dawson and Amarasingam, 2017). Moreover, individuals experienced a strong frustration about their own societal position, a lack

of apathy and meaningfulness in their lives or experienced personal losses and significant disappointments in their lives prior to radicalizing (Schmidt, 2013). Going to Syria symbolizes and escape from a life that is seemingly without prospects and thus, pushes young Muslims to pursue another life, resp. the jihad abroad (Pokalova, 2018). The pull factors are connected with affirmations of the positive benefits of being jihadists and the new perspective the “Islamic State” could create for the individuals (Dawson et al, 2016). Coolsaet (2016) explains that Impartiality, complete acceptance of the group members, the perspective of a new beginning and the strive for the real jihad play an immense role. The new beginning as a fighter and as a hero among the jihadi community together with the supposed significance that one has now attained draw young people into the maelstrom of extremism (ibid.).

Reviewing the radicalization process demonstrates that individuals are more prone to radicalization and extremist behavior if (a) there are no secure environment to form an identity throughout their adolescence, (b) individuals have no certainty and prospects concerning their future, (c) society lacks strong and inclusive institutions and (d) community lacks a social identity and trust among the in-group members. The preventive counter radicalization strategy outlined by Schmidt (2013) suggests that the main focus of counter-radicalization should lie on strengthening and empowering of the community from which radicals might emerge. This involves also the embracement of mainstream Muslim voices and to address local grievances (ibid.). The United Nations Development Program (2016) focuses on dialogue and the active inclusion of religious institutions such as mosques or faith-based civil society organizations. Being the gatekeeper to communities and first in-house point of contact for in-group members, religious institutions have direct access to families and struggled individuals (ibid.) Agerschou (2014) presents in his paper “Preventing Radicalization and Discrimination in Aarhus” a model in which moderate faith-based organizations function as safe haven for struggled and radicalized individuals that resort to contact persons from their own faith community, since they put more trust in them than e.g. contact persons from the host community. The involvement of the cultural and religious community shows the importance of strong institutions and social cohesion for the successful integration of minorities in society (Putnam, 2000). Zhao (2010) underlines the necessity of trust, social protection and inclusion of Muslim minority groups and host community to encounter local grievances, uncertainty and marginalization. The author emphasizes that to prevent Islamic radicalism from spreading hatred and splitting society, the government has to ensure civic engagement and social protection for Muslim minority communities in Western societies.

Social Capital, Ethnicity and Religion: Ethnic-Religious Capital as a safe haven

Cohesive societies are regarded as important factors for long-term prosperity since it is an indicator for political stability, mental and physical well-being of a society and indicates the sense of solidarity among community members (Kawachi and Berkman, 2000). Social cohesion is considered to be the social glue determining the relationship, bonds and trust in a community (Foncesa, 2019). The radicalization path of conflicted Muslim youth in Western societies lies in the struggle to build a coherent social identity, the lack of prospects and confidence as well as the social marginalization and the losing trust in society and government (Coolsaet, 2013). Parallel societies and local grievances occur which result in lower social security, higher crime rates and enable easier access for extremist groups (Hafez, 2016). As outlined in understanding the radicalization process of Muslim youth in Europe, it becomes apparent that the inability to identity building, lack of prospects and weak local institutions exacerbate the establishment of a cohesive society (Sukhni, 2015). To generate social cohesion and to encounter the hampering factors outlined in the radicalization process, social capital is considered to be the prerequisite condition for long-term prosperity on a local level (Putnam, 2000). According to Herreros (2004), social cohesion is dependent on the accumulated amount of social capital, which in return indicates a range of resources available to individuals as a result of their cooperation with other community members. Social capital has two components: (1) it is a resource to connect groups and individuals through social networks and group memberships, (2) social capital is based on symbolic recognition and distinction between different group since it is adapted to the different needs of the groups (Siisiäenen, 2000). Bourdieu (1986) shaped the second notion in particular, which aims at social reproduction and symbolic power. The French sociologist saw social capital as a tool to exert power on the group meaning that the individual benefits from the given resources rather than the group. The more the individual invests in social capital, the more power and influence does it possess (ibid.). Putnam (2000) on the other hand conceptualizes social capital as a public resource embracing civic participation, social networks and trust in others. Social capital becomes a collective good in which the effort of the individual benefits the group (ibid.). In contrast to Bourdieu, Putnam regards social capital as the motor of social cohesion since trust, cooperation and civic as well as voluntary activities promote coherence and a common social identity. With this regard, the American sociologist divides social capital into three main categories: (i) bonds, which represent the links to people based on a common identity, (ii) bridges, which are links that go

beyond a shared sense of identity and (iii) linkages, connecting people or groups from different social stratum (OECD, n.d).

The biggest Muslim minority groups derive from mainly Middle Eastern and North African cultures in which religion plays a significant role in the home countries (Jonas-Kamil, 2010). As religious traditions and customs are an integral part form everyday life and determine daily structures, the aspect of ethnic capital becomes ever more important. However, it should be noted that this research takes into consideration the Turkish and Moroccan culture that differ in the practice and expression of their religion through factors such as secularization and democratic processes in their home countries. Thus, it is necessary to consider the ethnic and cultural differences between Turkish and Moroccan minorities. Borjas (1992) states that ethnicity plays a key role in the accumulation of human capital since the skills of the next generation immigrants depend on parental culturalization and the ethnic environment. The derived ethnic capital is influenced by the culture, values and “macro environment” of the country of origin and can only be utilized by in-group members of the ethnic environment (Maani et al, 2015, p.5). As a result, ethnic capital is not only the product of cultural association, but also reflects the acculturation process in a community in which parents impart values of the home countries onto their children and foster networks for in-group members (Borjas, 1992). Considering Portes’ “ethnic enclaved theory” (1987), the ethnic enclave functions as a catch basin for disadvantaged ethnic in-group members that utilize the available capital in their ethnic community to accelerate their social position. Contrary to the assimilation theory in which ethnicity is seen as a liability rather than an asset, ethnic capital embraces the cultural component in which relationships between co-ethnic group members lead to a legitimate monetary and social bond that are exchanged within the community (Zhou & Lin, 2005, p. 264). Furthermore, since immigrants as ethnic enclaves built up an ethnic environment of social, economic and commercial networks, “resources generated from the ethnic environment in the destination country are considered to have a more profound effect on immigrants’ assimilation than the resources from their source country“ (Maani et al, 2015, p. 6). The authors state the reason for this phenomenon lies in local socio-economic factors influencing previous cohorts of immigrants generating the social capital for in-group members over time. Modood (2004) explains that ethnic social capital combines Bourdieu’s cultural capital acquired through family bonds with Putnam’s social capital which is generated by social networks and group memberships. The advantage of social capital for ethnic minorities lies in networks that prevent adolescents from externalizing behaviors and providing access to education and academic

achievement (Shah et al, 2010). Furthermore, familial and community norms facilitate social mobility for working class since ethnic community organizations assist in finding working opportunities and advancing the education level (ibid.). The formation of ethnic capital is attributable to an interaction between financial, human and social capital including (a) money and liquidable assets of a community, (b) education, language and job skills and (c) social relations and access to resources and opportunities (Zhou & Lin, 2005).

Regarding the cultural traditions of Muslim communities in Europe, it becomes apparent that religion plays a crucial and determining role in customs and practices (Khatib, 2015). According to Pickel and Gladkich (2015), cultural religious traditions, religious social capital generates a large amount of social capital. Applying this to the Muslim community in Germany, one can detect that social networks in these communities rely on in-group relations and kinship (Haug et al, 2009). Van Bergen (2017) focuses on the cultural socialization of Muslim migrants in the Netherlands and shows to what extent social capital in the community influences the externalizing behavior of Turkish and Moroccan Dutch youth on site. The author outlines that the increased connectedness to the ethnic group and the higher trust among the community members indicates increasing mental health benefits for Turkish-Dutch youth in the Netherlands. In the Moroccan-Dutch community is the in-group connectedness and the trust among community members reportedly lower compared to the Turkish-Dutch community. Van Bergen (2017) sees a connection between the access to social capital and integration as well as criminality rate of minorities and suggests further analysis on the different ethnic and probably faith-based institutions on site. Religion plays a significant role in social capital and therefore generating social cohesion within a community (Putnam, 2000). Being the social glue of a religious multi-ethnic community, religious social capital embraces available resources through social connections, social integration, values, norms and group membership within a religious community (Maselko et al, 2011). Deriving from Putnam's theory (2000) on social capital and civic engagement, religious social capital serves as one of the determining factors for social cohesion (Pickel and Gladkich, 2015). Berger and Hefner (2003) define religious social capital as the power and influence of a community or a group established through membership in a church and joint spiritual practice. According to the author, collective identity determines to what extent social networks and civic engagement are employed. Religious social capital enhances interpersonal trust and membership affiliation leading to broader social networks and in a common social identity (ibid.). Weller (2005) indicates that for minority groups religious social capital as an alternative form of identification and influences the social

position of community members. As a result, the unification of religious capital is crucial for integration and acceptance in society. Hopkins (2011) explains that although fragmentation of religious landscape in society are considered to weaken social cohesion, social networks through religious social capital contribute to inter-ethnic harmony and mutual trust in a community. In Mason et al.'s (2012) 'Dimension of Religiosity and Access to Religious Social Capital' social religiosity and religious support have been protective measures against alcohol and substance use. The proximity of religious institutions and the support of the broad in-group members functioned as safe harbor for struggled individuals who had reportedly drug problems and searched for help in their communities (ibid.). Furthermore, Todd and Allen (2010) presented in their study on "Religious Congregations as Mediating Structures for Social Justice" a multilevel examination on how religious social capital enhances volunteerism, civic engagement and support for social justice in society. The more social capital is derived from congregational gatherings, the more do spiritual groups engage in social justice activities (ibid.) The authors stress that stronger bonded individuals are more aware of the needs of in-group members and thus, feel it is the congregation's responsibility to meet the needs and encounter injustice (Todd and Allen, 2010). Pickel and Gladkich (2015) allocates social capital religious social capital into Putnam's classification of bonding and bridging social capital (2000): On the one hand, religious capital involves social networks and increases the level of inter-religious trust indicating its bridging nature. On the other hand, the particular religious ideology and church affiliation excludes alternative social and religious groups from participating in the same networks. Individuals specifically identify with their own religious group members with whom they share ideology and faith. A sense of belonging and responsibility emerges that influences the social identity of the group.

Conceptualization of "Radicalization" and "Ethnic Religious Capital"

For the research and the resulting analysis, the conceptualization of the independent and dependent variable is decisive since the researcher has to take into consideration different factors in the data collection and methodology to measure the outcome. In this regard, the independent variable of 'Ethnic Religious Capital' does not only take into consideration the breadth and width of religious services and propositions by the institutions but also the social integration, bonds and connection within families and ethnic in-group members. This research takes Borjas (1992), Maselko et al's (2011) and Weller's (2005) definition of ethnic capital and

religious social capital as a basis: Ethnic religious capital embraces the religious capital in an ethnic community that advances not only the social mobility but also challenges the disadvantages of ethnic in-group members by facilitating educational and academic achievements. At the same time, it is crucial to look into the societal context of the research participants that are influenced by their upbringing, their perception of the community and host society as well as the social position of the in-group members.

The dependent variable 'Islamic radicalization' takes into consideration the embracing of extremist beliefs, the supremacy of the in-group and the declination of inclusive and interreligious values that ultimately results into the usage of violent means (Schmidt, 2013 & Coolsaet, 2013). The term is coined by the previously discussed disciplines in Behavioral and Sociological Sciences that thematize the upbringing of individuals as well as their socio-economic status in the host society. The conditions for a radicalization process are based on the literature review of section 3. As a result, an individual shows a willingness to radicalize if (1) if there is no secure environment to form an identity throughout their adolescence, (2) if individuals have no certainty and prospects concerning their future, (3) society lacks strong and inclusive institutions and (4) the community members do not possess a social identity and exert trust among each other. In this process, radicalization is a multi-faceted phenomenon that requires an interdisciplinary approach in which family dynamics and the social position of the Turkish and Moroccan community is thematized. As a result, the research thematizes these four pushes and pull factors in the analysis and contrasts the outcomes with the ethno-religious capital on site.

3. Research Design

This research paper makes use of a localized comparative, mini ethnographic case study focusing on Turkish and Moroccan immigrant families in North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany. Since this study aims to explore the process of learning more about the community and the Muslim families engaging in in-group and respective social networks, a mixed method of mini-ethnography and semi-structured interviews can offer an observational and interactive research design to investigate neighborhoods (Weinstein and Ventres, 2000).

Ethnographic research is defined as the study of groups, behaviors, beliefs, interactions, languages requiring a long-term commitment to fieldwork (Barbour, 2010). The qualitative research design embraces an assemblage of several forms of documentation focusing on cultural themes, shared patterns of behavior and language (ibid.). According to Fields and Kafai (2009) ethnographic research focuses on the meanings of relationships between people that interact within their cultural setting. since the researcher conducts his analysis in directly in the cultural setting, the analysis benefits from the researcher's perspective and the direct input of the participants to the study (Fusch et al. 2017). The fieldwork can be divided into an (1) emic approach in which information is provided by the participants, an (2) etic approach in which the provided data is based on what the researcher perceives and (3) negotiation process in which information for the research is agreed upon between participant and researcher (Creswell, 2014). The analysis for this ethnographic research resorts to an emic approach and is based on the information that the interviewees provide. In order to understand and reconstruct the family's belief, cultural habits and traditions, "the researcher will observe or even interview the members of the culture in order to understand why they live and believe as they do" (Etic and Emic World Views in Anthropology, 2014). Furthermore, Abbas (2010) states that with respect to research on minorities and ethnicities, an ethnomethodological strategy enables the articulations of minorities meaning that individuals are capable to narrate their own stories and to give sense to their own behavior and attitudes. This embraces also their ethnicities, the Islamic jurisprudences (madhab) and cultural origins (ibid.).

Due to the current state of the COVID 2019 pandemic as well as the limitation in resources and time, this thesis takes advantage of Fusch et al's (2017) "Mini-Ethnographic Case Study Research Design guideline." The authors state a focused ethnography (mini ethnography) is used when "particularly time or monetary constraints are evident" (Fusch et

al. 2017, p. 925). In contrast to a full-scale ethnography, a focused or mini ethnographic research design operates in shorter time frames (from weeks to a year) with the intent to understand cultural norms, values and roles of participants in a certain community (White, 2009). Traditional ethnography can take years, as the researcher must be fully involved and integrated in the new cultural environment since data relating to cultural events and societies are usually complex and multifaceted. However, according to Storesund and McMurray (2009), mini ethnographies can be completed within a week by analyzing and accompanying one or two families in their everyday life. As a result, the researcher combines the mini ethnography with a case study design mitigating the limitations of the analysis and allowing the researchers to examine causal links (Fusch et al. 2017). The blended research design of ethnography and case study both depend on fieldwork. Considering the data collection method, informal and unstructured interviews within the fieldwork provide insights and understanding on concepts and gives clarification on questions that arise throughout the research (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). In contrast to traditional ethnographic research design, a mini ethnography reduces the risk of subjectivity in the interview process since the researcher has less time to integrate and project own emotions and opinions to the research (Fusch et al. 2017).

In the interview process verbal and nonverbal communication is a significant indicator of cultural or religious patterns within a group (Weinstein and Ventres, 2000). Semi-structured interviews have the advantage that imposed meanings are avoided and a comfortable environment with the interviewee is created (Barribal and While, 2013). Once having a clear structure of questions that should be answered, in contrast to the structured interviews, semi structured interviews allow to clarify and explore a respondent's answer more elaborately (ibid.). As Abolafia (2010) points out, data gathered through researcher and participant interactions depend on sensemaking in which several people might have to compromise on a common understanding of concepts and agree on the same mean of communication. In order to comprehend the information that the participant delivers, one has to capture the meaning of words, their concepts as well as the context in which they are used (ibid.). For this particular research Moroccan and Turkish families in Europe might pertain to different non-verbal communication methods or have a different understanding of concepts or words, why it is crucial to clarify the research context and possible misconception before the interviews.

The important findings that emerge from the field work are recorded in the field notes. Fusch et al (2017) argue that field notes have a methodological, theoretical and observational

function, as the researchers identify themes and patterns in the data during the actual field work. The authors stress that field notes are essential in detecting and linking concepts and observations with each other that enable a later coding of themes and ideas. Sangasubana (2011) stresses that next to field notes reflective journaling enables a better understanding and interpretation of the respective culture. Since journaling involves a reflective thinking process of the gathered data, it contains thoughts, interpretations and opinions on different observations. According to Fusch et al (2017) “It is a written representation of one’s personal lens about the study” (p. 930).

This comparative case study allows an in-depth analysis of the ethnic religious capital and its effect on Muslim communities and possible radicalization paths of young Muslims in Western Europe. Yin (2009) argues that a case study is best be utilized in case of blurred boundaries between phenomenon and context. Furthermore, the advantage of case studies is the possibility to study of a problem within a limited scale (Bell, 2014). The ethnographic case study follows a replication logic that has been advocated by Yin (2009) and Flyvberg (2006). The selected cases are assessed through the lens of theoretical replication meaning that each of the individual cases yields at different results. In contrast to the sampling logic, the replication logic does not rely on the amount of cases that are analyzed (Yin, 2009). It focuses rather on the outcome of each case study that is supposed to reflect a similar outcome (ibid.). Yin’s demonstrated procedure enables the exploration why and how each individual case study demonstrates a distinct proposition. Following a three-step-scheme in which (1) theory and research is defined and designed, (2) the analysis is prepared, data collected and analyzed and (3) results are discussed and concluded. After developing or indicating the theory to test, the selected cases are studied individually and a respective individual case report for the German and Dutch families are written. As the third step, cross-case conclusions are drawn in which policy implications for deradicalization strategies are proposed. Baxter and Jack (2008) explain that case studies allow researchers to analyze the contextual conditions that are relevant to the studied phenomenon. Comparative case studies are suitable for empirical research in which (a) comprehensive research design is not feasible and (b) to explain “how the context influences the success of program or policy initiatives” (Goodrick, 2014, p.1). Both conditions apply to this research since time and resource limitation hinder a comprehensive ethnographic research design. Furthermore, the research aims to detect how the context influences radicalization paths of individuals in Germany. The evidence generated from a comparative case study is considered to be reliable and thus, produces a more substantial theory of the findings (Baxter

and Jack, 2008). In terms of the generalizability of the case study, it should be noted that the generalizability derives from the case study itself, not from the number of cases that are analyzed (Yin, 2009).

Operationalization of Variables

The analysis is grounded on two variables: (a) ethnic religious capital and (b) radicalization process of Muslim youth in Germany. Religious capital as the independent variable refers to the available resources and social networks generated through religious institutions and faith-based gatherings in a community (Berger and Hefner, 2003). Radicalization of young migrants refers to the phenomenon of developing religious attitudes and beliefs and, where appropriate, adopt a corresponding ideology (Schmidt, 2013). In order to measure the effect of ethnic religious capital on communities, networks, and identity building of Muslim families, interviews with family members of one Turkish and one Moroccan family as well as community stakeholders are conducted. In addition, the extent to which Islam influences the Turkish and Moroccan communities will be investigated by including religious institutions such as 'Ditib'.

Case Selection: Düsseldorf, North-Rhine Westphalia

The case selection for a comparative study should be (a) representative and (b) serve within the population of interest (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Since the embedded case study method is constructed on the basis of a specific outcome or on the theory of interest, case selection is purposively- meaning it is not based on random sampling. Following Shakir's (2003) proposed types of purposeful sampling frameworks, the cases selected for this research are defined as politically important cases. The location and research field are designated based on reach, the size of the community, the available facilities on site and two comparable families of Moroccan and Turkish descent. The researcher should be acquainted with the setting and surrounding; at the same time, however, it is important to ensure objectivity and an unbiased approach to the analysis. For this very reason, the mini-ethnography and the interviews are conducted in Düsseldorf, North-Rhine Westphalia.




Figure 1: Düsseldorf Map, orange highlight: Oberbilk

Although Düsseldorf has no personal familiarity to the researcher the city is within reach in times of the pandemic; the political and legal setting are known to the researcher; and the Turkish and Moroccan community are represented equally strong.

Düsseldorf is the state capital of North Rhine-Westphalia and has one of the highest population densities in Germany (Düsseldorf Statistics, 2020). 18% of the approximately 612,000 inhabitants belong to minority groups, most of whom are of Turkish origin (Ausländeramt Düsseldorf, 2020). The Turkish community in Düsseldorf possesses a wide reach and scope supporting around 30 civil society organizations, seven mosques and ten cultural facilities in the area (Sen & Aydin, 2014).

Although, there are a wide range of Turkish shops and facilities in the Düsseldorf-center, the community also reside in suburbs and neighboring cities, including Mettmann, Ratingen and Neuss. However, the central mosque ‘DITIB’ and the affiliated civil society organizations are central meeting points for the community members connecting German-Turkish individuals from different generations. Since these biggest facilities with a range and scope are concentrated in the center, the mini ethnography focuses on the specific area of Oberbilk. The

site is also applicable for the data collection process concerning German Moroccan community life. Düsseldorf possesses one of the biggest Moroccan communities in Germany (Rafoud, 2015). Similar to the Turkish community, German Moroccan largely reside in the district of 'Oberbilk' in which different cultural and religious facilities are represented (Krebs, Westdeutsche Zeitung, 2017). Especially in the neighborhood around "Eller-street" in Oberbilk, one can detect several Moroccan shops and cultural facilities that enabled the name of "little" Morocco or "Maghreb-Town." The Federal Statistical Office (2018) estimates that around 20,000 Moroccans live in Düsseldorf. In addition, there are also German citizens with Moroccan roots who are not included in these statistics.

Data Sources and Collection Method

Interviews with family and community members as well as faith based civil society organizations give particular information about the family structures, identity-building and the perception of Islam of the respective families. Considering the ongoing debate about Jihadi radicalization, Islamic influence and integration of Muslim families in Europe, the cases of Turkish and Moroccan families provides evidence on how the two biggest Islamic minority groups in Europe may differ or resemble in their family values, the role of Islam and on their perception of Western culture in their everyday life. In accordance with Phalet and Schönflug's (2001) research on value transmission and acculturation, it is important to consider the disparities between Moroccan and Turkish families. To assess imparted values, traditions and the upbringing of individuals, families serve as an adequate information source, since several generations are represented. Semi-structured interviews are reliable sources to follow and comprehend the perspectives of the involved stakeholders with respect to conveying family values and raising children and living in a non-Islamic country. First, the interview questions focus on parents and their ways of raising children as well as the generations' identity building throughout the years. Second, the interviews with the community members give clarity about the amount of social capital and the existing networks on site. In order to create comparable cases between the Moroccan and Turkish family, both families are selected by same standards, living conditions and shared characteristics concerning family members, age, occupation. Through the involvement of so-called "gatekeepers" of the respective communities, the different families have a reference person to whom they could rely and refer to if further questions might arise. Gatekeepers are known to the families and enable a sense of

trust and confidence in the research (Singh and Wassenaar, 2016). As a mean of triangulation, next to family members, the research relies on faith-based organizations and representants of the respective communities. Since the aspect of ‘Islam’ and religiosity is an integral part of the paper, faith-based organizations are contacted that have influence on families and the community’s Islamic practice. The semi-structured interview questions for faith-based organizations, are directed to understand (a) which family structures and values prevail in the upbringing of Muslim migrants and (b) how the community and religious organizations pictures the European culture.

Prior to the interviews an interview guide is created in order to produce a list of questions regarding (a) community and social networks (b) raising Muslim children in a non-Islamic Country, (c) life of young Muslims in Europe, (d) perception of the Western culture as well as (e) demand and supply of in-group and faith-based activities. An informed consent is sent out to the interview participants in which the intent of the study, the scope, the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewees is guaranteed. It is significant that the interviews are conducted in a confidential and anonymized setting in which no personal information of the interview partners are disclosed. The interviewees are informed about background and goal of the research project and the possibility of interviews via Skype or in person are offered in advance. Time frame and location of the interviews may vary; however, content of the interviews remain the same for both families. The interview partners are provided with the contact address of the interviewer, the institution and the supervisor for further questions.

This table shows interview partners and participants of the field work:

Participants	Characteristics
Turkish Family (3 Generations)	Family’s first generation emigrated to Germany in the early 1960s 2nd and 3rd (and even 4th) generation lives in Germany now → accompanying and meeting the family several

	times in order to grasp on the family dynamic
Moroccan Family (3 Generations)	<p>Family's first generation emigrated to Germany in the early 1960s</p> <p>2nd and 3rd (and even 4th) generation lives in Germany now</p> <p>→ accompanying and meeting the family several times in order grasp on the family dynamic</p>
Religious Institution A (Turkish)	semi-structured Interview with cleric/ imam
Religious Institution B (Moroccan)	semi-structured Interview with cleric/ imam

Since the study makes use of a mixed method including a mini-ethnographic research design, the researcher accompanies the families and the community members throughout the day and week in order get a better understanding of the culture and the ties of in-group members. The data collection for the mini ethnography takes place in Düsseldorf, Oberbilk, in which a walking and observation route through the Turkish and Moroccan neighborhood is generated encompassing cultural and religious facilities on site.




Figure 2: Walking Route- Moroccan District in Düsseldorf, Oberbilk




Figure 3: Walking route- Turkish District in Düsseldorf, Oberbilk

Similar to the guideline of the mini-ethnography study by Weinstein and Ventres (2000) as well as Fusch et al (2017), the data collection is facilitated through observational field notes and ad-hoc interviews with community stakeholders operating in restaurants, shisha-bars, clothing stores or other service provisions in the neighborhoods. Conversations with in-group members are conducted in a comprehensive and understandable manner in which the research objective is disclosed. Together with the specific gatekeeper, the participants are informed about the study and data collection method in order to ensure transparency. Considering the language barriers, the observational field notes and communication logs are captured in German, Turkish and French.

The pandemic “COVID 19” exacerbate the data gathering within the field work since visits to the participants’ house or offices have been restricted. As older family members, who are in the Covid19 risk group, are also examined, the analysis relies partly on digital means of communication such as ‘Skype’ or ‘WhatsApp’ calls. Younger or non-vulnerable participants are met at a distance (1.5 m). Later, when the restrictions decrease, a more intensive contact becomes possible. The second half of the fieldwork takes place at the same time as the fasting month of Ramadan. Some of the family members invited me to help with the cooking and joint fast-breaking. This allows an intimate insight into the family structure and the common religious life of the members.

Data Analysis

This research makes use of qualitative data analysis. After transcribing the interviews, labelling relevant phrases and sections the similar and different statements of the different interview settings are put in a table. This coding indexing helps to identify the significant key points for the analysis. Before the coding, however, the research aims at conceptualizing underlying patterns. The interviews are coded accordingly to the underlying concepts. With regards to the concepts of ‘radicalization’ and ‘ethnic religious capital’, the output of the interviews is categorized according to social network and community structures, Islamic faith, and the families’ perception of the Western culture. This narrative analysis approach assists in interpreting and comparing the findings of both countries. In the chapter ‘Analysis’ the results of both- quantitative and qualitative analysis- are examined and put into context in order to answer the research question.

In order to ensure structured, reflective elaborated outcomes, the coding of the observational field notes follows Strauss and Corbin's (1990) "Basics of Qualitative Research" as well as Fusch et al (2017) "Guideline to Mini-Ethnography": First, the source of data from which codes are defined have to identified. With respect to the research field, the **source of data** are the observational field notes as well as interview data (as a mean of triangulation) of the respective communities. The written form of observations and conversations provides the researcher with information on social bonds, family dynamic and institutional propositions for the community. As a result, the wealth of information has to be coded with an **open coding method**. This method follows a scheme in which codes are identified without any constraint or stricture but solely based on the importance and meaning of statements. At the same time, the researcher makes use of **memoing** in which theoretical notes are taken during the process of coding. First observations and concepts of the different codes are noted and through memos registered. As a next step the **data has to be ordered and sorted** identifying relationships between memos and the generated word-clouds. This process helps in **labelling categories** which are crucial in the coding process. Categories are defined as groupings of central and frequently appearing statements. They display decisive notions, emotions and opinions that are detectable in the data. In the course of identifying categories, the researcher might be encountered with the detection of causal relationship between the sub-categories. In the respective field, **axial coding** assists in detecting linkages between religious capital and its possible limiting effect on radicalization through causal conditions and contextual factors. This also encompasses actions and interactions of research participants in response to certain questions or occurrences throughout the research. Once core categories and linkages between subcategories are established, a **triangulation** of the data is an essential step to confirm ideas. As a result, a third element or source from outside is integrated to validate and authenticate apparent relationships. Although the mixed method of quantitative and qualitative data is best suited for data triangulation, this research makes use of semi-structured interviews as a mean of triangulation. Since there is no quantitative data at hand, the recorded conversations might clarify unclear statements, tensions and observations of the mini ethnography.

Theory-Building

Considering the importance of the study and the lack of plausible existing theory, this academic paper builds with the gathered data its own theory. The approach is based on examining the

unexplored relationship between ethnic religious capital and encountering the radicalization of young Muslims in Germany. According to Wacker (1998) a theory must follow certain criteria including uniqueness, generalizability, consistency, empirical riskiness and abstraction. By finding similarities across many different research sectors, theory building research is considered to be significant in stimulating academic interdisciplinarity (ibid) In this process, a deductive approach is applied in which certain concepts and propositions a previous theory is modified in order to fit the variables into a new context (Kühnle and Bitsch, 2017). Since Mason et al's (2012) research on "Dimensions of Religiosity and Access to Religious Social Capital: Correlates with Substance Use Among Urban Adolescents" shows that social religiosity has been a decisive factor in decreasing the externalizing behavior of young adolescents and the participation of religious activities and the involvement of in-group members assisted in recovery and abstinence of substance use, the thesis makes use of furthering the concept of religious social capital as a mean to limit the effect of externalizing behavior. In the context of jihadi extremism, the social religiosity and exploration of ethnic religious capital is expected to have similar results in limiting the urge to radicalize, however, the data gathering, and analysis is based on qualitative research in which a mini-ethnography and semi-structured interviews are utilized. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) state when adapting theories on case studies, the researcher should limit the biases in the data sources, especially when conducting interviews. According to the authors, biases in interview data can be limited by including different stakeholders and age groups in the research as well as referring to other qualitative data. Since the research makes use of a mixed method of interviews and mini-ethnographic research design, including individuals from different generations and minority groups, the limitation of bias is fulfilled.

Reflexivity

In the mini-ethnographic study the role between researcher, research field and research participants have to be clarified prior to the analysis and the data collection method has to be selected on the basis of transparent factors (Fusch et al, 2017). Since the researcher has a Turkish-Muslim background herself, the question of objectivity, transparency, bias and interpretation arises. One might argue that the own heritage and religious affiliation intervenes in the objective research process as the research is not able to hold an objective standpoint towards the outcomes. Abbas (2010) thematizes in 'Muslim on Muslim Social Research' the

phenomenon of the role of researcher and research when both are of Muslim origin. The author argues that the biased position of the researcher and his or her researched subject are less important than the actual nature of the objective research process. As an academic researcher, regardless of Muslim or non-Muslim heritage, one has to maintain a critical, rational and balanced perspective (ibid.). Here, the principle of social research defines the interaction and also the power relation between researcher and research participant rather than the own standpoint of the scientist (Abbas, 2010). Furthermore, people of the same religious faith or ethnic identity have the advantage to grasp on intellectual, social and cultural norms that outsider might not be able to understand (ibid.). The advantage to overcome any language barrier and to gain direct access to community members as well as institutions goes hand in hand with the responsibility not to exploit social bonds in the respective research field. Significant, however, is to maintain an objective and critical standpoint to the research and the utilized method in which ethics, codes and principles define the nature of interaction in the research field.

Limitation and Threat to Validity

This research method is also prone to limitations and threat to validity. Since a traditional ethnographic study requires much more time in the field, the mini-ethnographic study might not capture all aspects of the cultural setting and the environment the participants engage (Fusch et al, 2017). However, since the current pandemic Covid19 restrains from direct contact and long participation in cultural settings and environment, the mini-ethnographic research is a suited alternative for a setting in which social distancing and limited time is on foreground. Regarding the research objective and the method, this research is prone to culture bias. As Sarniak (2015) states ethnographic studies involve the individual's beliefs and activities, researchers are prone to judge and analyze other cultures from their own perspective. In order to encounter this bias, the researcher has to adopt cultural relativism acknowledging its cultural assumption (ibid.). Considering the sensitive topic of Islam and the lives of Muslim minorities in Europe, the participants may answer to topics in socially desirable way in order to be accepted or liked (Doudou and Winter, 2014). This social desirability bias can falsify the research. Researchers can encounter and minimize this respondent bias by exuding positive consideration assuring that honesty is desired and will not turn out in a negative light (Sarniak, 2015).

As Yin (2009) points out, it is important to minimize threats to internal validity in order to establish and present accurate research results. Taking the data sources and collection method into account, the research is prone to selection and interpreter bias. Selection bias refers to errors that occur through differences between assigned groups that influence the outcome and the study's objectivity as well as generalizability (ibid.). To encounter this threat the interview partners, rely on objective criteria that pertain to both selected cases in German and in the Netherlands. The selection of interviewees does not base on personal preference or any given advantage for the researcher but on (a) entity of the organization, (B) expertise and (c) reliability of the interview partners regarding community members, families or social networks and their influence on radicalization. However, it might be argued that the interviewees may be influenced by awareness of participation in the study. In order to encounter this maturation effects, the interviews are anonymized, their confidentiality ensured, and the setting of the conducted interview is adjusted to the preference of the interviewees. By following these strict operational measures, the construct validity is strengthened. As a result, the legitimacy of the outcomes is secured (Downing and Haladyna, 2004).

4. Analysis and Discussion: Muslims in Europe: upbringing, identity and perception of the west (4500)

4.1. Three Generations: Intergenerational changes concerning family, identity, and Islam

The following analysis of the interview data and observational field notes shows how families and different generations integrate their cultural and religious life in Germany. Next to the upbringing in a Muslim household, family members convey their perspective on Western values and their life as Muslims in Germany. The analysis focuses on the integration, recognition and identity of the individual members, as these factors influence the ethno-religious capital of the community. These factors are thematized in the analysis of radicalization processes of young Muslims (see literature review). The data is categorized in four themes that reflect possible push and pull factors of Islamic radicalization: (1) the upbringing, (2) identity, (3) the role of young Muslims in the majority society and (4) the perception of the West and Islamophobia. The expression and interpretation of Islam in the representative families of the German-Turkish and German Moroccan communities shape the social connection with in-group members and influences the provided services in the Islamic religious community.

The indicated citations have not been selected randomly but reflect a general tonus of the respective study groups in the mini ethnography. They are intended to be a general resonance of the German-Turkish and German Moroccan communities of the respective study field.

Upbringing

The role of Islam in both Turkish and Moroccan households in Germany and contrasted to the different generations shows great importance in terms of upbringing and parental cultural socialization. However, the observational field notes and interviews indicate a different approach of families concerning the Islamic teaching and integration of Islam in everyday life.

For the Moroccan family, Islamic socialization has been used against the German culture, a shielding effect against the Westernization of their children's upbringing. This observation resonates with the findings of Sedgwich (2014) "Religious Socialization among Young Muslims in Scandinavia and Western Europe" in which religious socialization of the first generation is used as a clear distinction from the mainstream society, in which the preservation of religious values and also conservation of the Moroccan culture in Germany stays in the foreground. According to the first-generation research participants raising their children in a non-Islamic country was frightening since the subsequent generations were exposed to Western traditions and non-Islamic settings that were perceived as foreign and opposing to own customs and traditions. Particular attention was paid to religious education and the so-called Moudawana - Moroccan family law. Moudawana refers to the family law in Morocco, in which marriage, polygamy, divorce, inheritance, and child custody is regulated. Although the family lived no longer in Morocco, the Moudawana principle applied for the first-generation household, in which a rather patriarchal structure prevailed. According to the Centre for Public Impact (2016) Moudawana limits women's right through enforcing a patriarchal system in which women were legally obliged to obey their husbands, men were able to engage in polygamy without their wife's consent or also unilateral divorce their wives. The older generation who feels more bound to the laws and traditions of their home country adhered to the laws and defined the man as the clear head of the family. The family constellation, i.e. with regard to participation and determination in the household, also reveals a male dominance in later generations. The observational field notes indicate that Moroccan customs and traditions of the 1950s have no legal influence, but social power over family structures. Nevertheless, the younger generations show a stronger inclination towards democratic structures, in which they declare the Moudawana as a legal system to be obsolete. Especially the third generation identifies with the German legal system and considers Moroccan legislation in some respects to be undemocratic or outdated. However, they do not deny the fact that Moroccan customs have also influenced their identity and way of thinking.

"My father has the say at home, (...), in our culture the man bears the greatest responsibility and I was somehow prepared at home for the fact that I have this responsibility and that I must also obey my father and so on. But that has never bothered me (...) I want to pass this on to my children, because when I look at the youth today, I

can only say that you have to be really afraid of how they walk around or act, they are really hopeless.”

Third-Generation German-Moroccan Interview Partner (could you add age and gender here – like 29, female or 45, male etc?)

Above all, the first generation wanted to prevent a "Germanization" or "westernization", especially in terms of upbringing. Religion was seen as a kind of antidote encountering the westernization of their children preservation of Moroccan culture. Considering the second generation's style of parenting, one can detect that the children's upbringing was directed towards both: on the one hand being a Muslim, and on the other hand adapting to German society. As a result, the third generation conceives Islam as important part of identity building, however, they strive for compatibility between Islam and the western lifestyle. The attempt to reconcile both aspects also reflects the picture of the third and fourth generation's hybrid identity.

For the Turkish families, Islam plays a distinctive role as well, however, the religious practice is not embedded in everyday life. According to the first generation of research participants, the dissemination of Turkish culture, language and values counts prominently. Resonating with Phalet and Schönplflug's (2001) findings, the transmission of relatedness and in-group coherence is bigger in Turkish families than in Moroccan families in Germany. The transmitted values of close links and solidarity among the Turkish community, the parents are above all concerned to pass on collectivistic values which are not based on individualism but on group cohesion. In contrast to the Moroccan community, the German-Turkish community maintains the ethno-cultural heritage firmly and exert more social cohesion to the outside.

“First there is morality, love and respect for elders and then you might consider what you want. You always put your family first. You cannot think only for yourself- think for 5 people at the same time.”

First Generation, German Turkish, Interview Partner

Here, the national identity of Turkish families has been praised as more important than only religious identity. In this case, the “Turkishness” has been yielded as protection against a “Germanization” of the children. Overall, the Turkish research participants show a stronger in-group connectedness and ethnocultural relation which resonates with Hujink and Andriessen's research on Dutch-Turkish identity (2016). This in-group connectedness is an important component in the upbringing for future generation. According to the interviewees, it has been important to raise children in an environment with other fellow Turkish settlers since they could jointly practice and further strengthen their culture. According to Phalet and Schönplflug (2001) parents in collectivist countries such as Turkey stress the importance of obedience and respect rather than autonomy and independent thinking. In the case of the interviewed family cultural preservation does entail obedience and respect, rather than autonomous decision-making.

However, the upbringing of the third and second generation shows a different tendency: The identification with Islam plays a greater role than the identification with national consciousness. The research participants showed a greater motivation in participating in activities of religious institutions than in other activities offered by the civil society organizations. A shift in religiosity and the importance of religious institutions of the younger German-Turkish generation becomes apparent indicating that their upbringing and the parental cultural socialization differs significantly from the previous generations. The observational field notes confirm the trend for both groups: the communities' biggest social capital is not concentrated in civil society organizations but in religious organizations promoting in-group connectedness and youth engagement.

Social Identity

Considering the similar experience of immigration and upbringing of subsequent generations, Turkish and Moroccan families have established a new identity over the years. Although the first and second generation feels more affiliated to the country of origin, the third and fourth generation developed their own hybrid identity in which they combine both, the German culture and the culture of origin. This process includes a certain balancing act in which the young generation intends to reconcile both identities without discarding one or the other identity. The hybrid identity according to Wagner (2016) is influenced by various factors, such as cultural differences between the two cultures, personal skills (the capacity of negotiation,

reflection and personal decision regarding the rules, norms, targets and paths of life.) or social and time resources, including the social capital available to the minority group. However, one should acknowledge that identity is not a zero-sum game in which numbers and percentage calculations are used to quantify identity affiliation. Experiences, own estimations and socio-economic factors play a greater role (see Turner and Tajfel, 1975). Although Islam is recognized by both migrant groups as the only constant source of identification, a difference in social identity can also be seen among the migrant groups:

Turkish families have a greater attachment to the Turkish national consciousness, which is also based on Western values. The historical, political and cultural achievements of the Ottoman Empire and later the Turkish nation state are also carried on in the Turkish diaspora. According to De Guchteneire (2009) Turkish settlers of second, third or even fourth generation show a great connection to country of origin although being not native in language, customs and traditions. This phenomenon can be observed by the interaction and mindsets of the analyzed research participants. Moreover, first generation stresses the significance on the Turkish identity, which is among other things also connected with Islam, secularism and the Ottoman history. This encompasses learning the Turkish language, knowing the customs and traditions as well as the history and politics of Turkey. The observational field notes and interview data show that the third generation of German-Turkish citizens identify with a hybrid identity in which the German and Turkish culture exist in unison. According to the interview partners, identity becomes blurry, and is not clearly distinctive between solely Turkish or German identity. One has to value both countries and both societies in which intersections between two cultures becomes part of one's identity. However, when engaging in meetings with participants of the third generation, it becomes clear that the search for identity is not complete, but a continuous process. Most of the third-generation interviewees claim to have been more attached to Turkish identity in their younger years by identifying with Turkish politics, history and culture. Thus, they surrounded themselves with like-minded adolescents who grew up in a Turkish household and were also in search of a clear identity or even a clear distinction from the German culture.

“In the search for identity I rather joined together with like-minded people, also Turkish ones, you feel more like belonging to Turkey (...) We rocked ourselves up, we confirmed each other in being Turkish.”

Third-Generation, German-Turkish, Interview partner

Group dynamics play a crucial role in identity building (Wagner, 2016). As Milan (2015) states adolescents in search of a social identity do not seek for identity building individually but take part in a joint socialization process with other like-minded people. The loyalty of in-members and the mutual recognition promote certainty and confidence (Coolsaet, 2013). However, the interview data shows that with time the identity has become blurred and the more the participants engage in a broader social environment with co-workers or other students, the more they feel integrated and adopt the host country's culture.

Taking a look at the life of young German Moroccans, it becomes apparent that similar to Turkish juveniles they seek to arrange both cultures and worldviews in their life. On the one hand, they value and identify with the Moroccan culture, its tradition and Islam. On the other hand, they are born and raised in Germany being exposed to Western traditions and German culture. However, the observational field notes indicate that the Moroccan community members strive for more acceptance in society. The lacking feeling of belonging and the perceived injustice towards Muslims in Europe feed the discomfort and insecurity of the Moroccan youth.

“I would like to see a more positive image of us Moroccans and Muslims, that they accept us as a full part of society, that we are 100% German (...)”

Third-generation German-Moroccan Interview partner

At the same time, the intra-generational differences show that within the community itself there are different perspectives of what Moroccan identity is composed of. Torn between the African, Arab and Amazigh culture, the Moroccan identity has emerged to a diverse and multilayered character being contested in both, Africa and the Middle East. According to the observational field notes, even within the Arabic it is arguable whether Moroccans are considered to be more “French” than actually Arabic. In addition, Sub-Saharan Africans would consider Moroccans as Middle Eastern and not as African.

However, Islam also plays a certain role in this context, since the analyzed Moroccan groups in the mini-ethnographic study indicated that their lifestyle and identity is mainly

shaped by their Islamic faith. According to the first generation, Moroccan identity played less of a role for than being actually part of a Muslim community. Since being confronted with a non-Islamic world for the first time, the first generation had been stricter in exercising Islamic practices and in their transmission of religious values. Thus, being Muslim weighted more than being solely Moroccan. The second generation of German-Moroccans who have a stronger bond to Moroccan identity indicate that Islam played a crucial role in their identity building. This also pertains to the third and fourth generation for German-Moroccans or German-Turks. Being the “Foreigner” in Germany and the “German” in Turkey or Morocco, the religious practice is considered to be the only constant variable of identification in which people do not need to make compromises or justify themselves. Interviews with the third generation shows that the inconsistencies in defining their own social identity does not spill over into the formation of religious identity. Hence, the younger generation have a stronger affiliation with religion than with nationality. Radeljic (2014) explains that once the Muslim youth feels alienated and marginalized, they transform their Islamic faith onto their cultural identity.

The Community and Position in Host Society

In both families of German-Turkish and German Moroccan participants one can conclude a substantial improvement in education, integration and overall social position over the years. Although the first generation had no solid education or were even illiterate, the subsequent generations completed an apprenticeship or obtained a university degree raising the socio-economic position of the families. Both families agree that the emigration to Germany enabled a better life, as the financial situation and access to education was more favorable than at home.

However, the different interviews indicate that throughout the years the feeling of recognition and equal opportunities within the majority society has not been improved. Although most of the interviewees have accomplished a solid education or even completed their university studies, some of them do not feel equally recognized in their respective professional field. The third generation in particular complains of subliminal discrimination on the job market or at school stating that human resources would rather prefer traditional German candidates than people with an Islamic migration background. Furthermore, the perceived subliminal racism does not only limit itself in education but spills over in social activities with friends:

“My heritage and faith did not allow me to have the same chances as my German friends, we were the minority in the class at that time and I was often called the favorite Turk- I perceive that as a form of racism. (...) If I had been blond and German, I would have had it easier in school and my free time, be it in club visits or in my circle of friends.”

Third-generation, German-Turkish Interviewpartner

With respect to the conducted research during Ramadan, younger generations of German-Turks were much keener in organizing joint social distant fast-breaking events and in inviting each other to zoom calls for seminars concerning Islam and its practice in times of Covid19. The participation in religious organizations such as in the young peer group of the Turkish-Islamic organization DITIB is according to the participants life-enriching and helpful since religious practice gives a sense of belonging and spiritual contentment. In this regard, the younger generation in particular would like to see Islam recognized as part of Germany and Muslims as full members of the majority society rather than as part of an annual population census. However, the rise of Islamophobia and right-wing parties in Germany fuel the belief of alienation and marginalization of Muslim minorities in Germany. Finally, when asking about communities and social network, the Turkish-Islamic institution DITIB who allocates more than 800 mosques in Germany, is found to be an important stakeholder and refuge for all generations of Turkish background. Especially since the field phase took place during Ramadan, the teachings and prayers of DITIB were prevalent for most of the community members. Besides, research participants of the third generation are passive or active members of the youth organization or take part in affiliated civil society organizations that collaborate with Islamic institutions during Ramadan. Also, with respect to the Covid19 pandemic, it becomes apparent that the provided ethnic religious capital for the Turkish community is of great significance in times of uncertainty.

The Moroccan community however, intensified their own linkages abroad. The increasing number of Moroccan settlers in Germany stimulated the foundation of cultic association and cooperation between the different Moroccan groups. Since Morocco's society consists of different ethnic groups between Arabs and Amazigh the unification in a foreign country deepened the social cohesion on site. Existing structures of the home country are

transferred to the new country and social structures are either deepened or furthermore diversified (Hooghe et al, 2015). In case of the community members in the respective field, the existing structures were deepened, and the Moroccan community engaged in more cross-cultural cooperation. However, the recent times with the increasing debates on new arriving Moroccan settlers exacerbated the atmosphere on site. The increased number of sexual assaults by newly arrived North-Africans on New Year's Eve in Cologne fueled a public debate on patriarchal systems in Maghreb countries and led to major police raids in the communities. The term "Nafri" (composed of the word **N**orth **A**frican) which is used to describe the Moroccan minority is perceived by the family and community members as humiliating and demeaning. Especially the third and fourth generation of German Moroccans feels alienated by the term since they are subjected to political debates in school or at work.

"I think it is therefore terrible when I hear these contemptuous words about Moroccans or North Africans in the media, it reminds me again of my first time at school and of racism, only that it is now even represented in the media (...) 'Nafri' is pejorative, and my children and grandchildren hear it on the street, it's terrible..."

Second-generation, German Moroccan, Interview partner

Perception of the West, Islamophobia and the stance on radicalization

The picture towards the West and the social position of Muslims in Germany differs also among the Turkish and Moroccan community. Although both communities criticize unequal educational opportunities and everyday racism, their stance on identification with Western values is distinguishable. On the one hand, the Turkish family identifies to some extent with Western values in which the political past of the Turkish state and secularism has been adapted through a European model. However, the research participants recognize the increasing Islamophobia in Germany that pushes the community further away from the host society. Although the research participants condemn terrorist attacks by radical extremists and foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, most of them understand the motivation of many individuals to turn to jihadism out of anger and disappointment. It is clearly stated that terror and extremism by the so-called Islamic State or Al-Qaeda opposes Islamic principles, but that people resort to

violence in their desperation, anger and lack of prospects. Not only that many Muslims are not recognized or are given the same opportunities for money and work as their German friends, but also the constantly growing Islam hatred are reasons to "defend" themselves by joining an organization or group. This tendency has been especially noticeable after the community received several hate letters from right wing extremist during the Eid festival. While conducting the research, letters of abuse and hate mails spread through the Turkish-Islamic community which was subject to this research (see Figure 4). ¹

Figure 4: A hate letter from the Prince Eugen Group, send out Ramadan 2020

This affected not only Turkish communities, but also Muslim households throughout Germany, including in Hesse, Bavaria and Berlin². Later on, law enforcement had to increase their forces



¹ The letter states in German: “Hey, you inferior Muslim lowlives, you have something to celebrate again, f*** Ramadan again, we s** on your Allah, your Mohammed and the f*** Koran and we Christians fart towards Mecca; Turks and Arabs, the garbage of Europe”

² Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH. (May, 2020.). *Anschlagswarnung: Polizei erhöht Präsenz vor Moscheen in Hessen*. FAZ.NET. <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/rhein-main/anschlagswarnung-mehr-polizei-vor-moscheen-in-hessen-16792792.html>

in front of mosques throughout Germany. As a result, one could observe a general shift of perception and attitude towards the majority society: First the participants were more confident that the general situation towards Muslims could change positively. After the threat was received, the participants' anger and grief towards the majority of society could be observed. A more negative image was accompanied by a stronger feeling of insecurity and fluctuating mistrust of the state. However, the German-Turkish community took the incident to build stronger in-group connectedness and support each other in their shared identity of Turkishness rather than only pertaining to their Islamic faith.

In the case of Moroccan research participants, the sentiments towards the West are perceived as slightly more critical since the historical colonialism in Morocco and the current Islamophobic incidents promote the feeling of alienation and second-class citizen of the community members. This was strongly perceivable for the third generation of German Moroccans justifying the inequality between the white and Moroccan population in Europe by emphasizing the historical past of Morocco and its occupation. In both communities, the third generation shows a more insurgent attitude compared to the first and second generation. Although recognizing their hybrid identity and the influence on German culture and values on personality traits, the safeguarding of Islamic belief and in-group members gain utmost significance. An assault on Islam or in-group members is equated with a personal assault. This goes alongside with Murshed and Pavan's (2010) theory on identity and radicalization in which the Islamic belief is integrated in the third generation's social identity. A so-called 'relative deprivation' occurs in which a perceived disadvantage or attack on group members transforms to a direct attack on the individual. As a result, a group experience becomes part of personal identification accompanied with anger and resentment (ibid.) The political debates and media coverage of the current situation of Moroccan migrants also influences the perception of German Moroccans towards the West. Not only does Islamophobia and the increasing bad picture towards Muslims from North Africa upset the research participants, but also the influence of the West in the Middle East and North Africa, which has existed since colonial times, is a particularly sensitive issue for the research participants. One can conclude an anti-Western sentiment that is certainly evident when talking about political events in Morocco. While the first generation is concerned about the economic situation in Morocco, the second and third generations show a negative attitude towards politics and the influence of the French and Spanish rule in their parents' home country. The second-generation interviewees state that Islamic expression was the only way to develop independently from European influence at that

time, because in all other areas a European elite ruled and governed Morocco's political system. The observational field notes indicate a prevailing rebellious attitude of younger generations towards long-established structures in Morocco due to colonialism. A blame-game emerges in which for example France's use of the assimilation model for integration is seen as one of the many root causes for difficulties in (Northern-)Africa identity building (Dillender, 2011).

(...) but I have a certain mistrust of the elites in Europe; I am also a proud Moroccan and a lot of injustice has happened to us (...) especially regarding the colonization by the French or Spaniards - I mean France and Spain had a lot of political influence back then but religion was something they didn't touch. That was the only domain that we could determine (...)

Second-generation Interview partner, German Moroccan

Since the Moroccan families are exposed to a different image towards the West due to colonialism and the French and Spanish occupation in Morocco, a firm national identity has not been developed as strongly as in the case for most Turkish individuals. Pott et al (2014) attribute the disparity between the two groups to the different position of religion in the two countries of origin, which is characterized by an Islamic understanding of the state in Morocco and a secular understanding of the state in Turkey. At the same time, the difference of religious observation of the Turkish and Moroccan family is also based on the political background of the two different countries: On the one hand the first generation of Turkish guest workers originate from a democratic country that possessed a strictly secular structure. Although deriving from rural areas in which socio- economic factors have not been as strong as in bigger cities, the Turkish immigrants hold an understanding of differentiating everyday life from the private religious life.

It is arguable whether the perception of the West and country of origin influences the hybrid identity of the younger generations. In the research field, one can detect that the young German-Moroccans have a greater resentment towards the West than German-Turkish research participants. It becomes also apparent that Islam plays a much greater role in identity formation among Moroccans. The younger generation does not flee into the Moroccan national

consciousness of the previous generations, but recognizes Islam as part of their social identity, since faith is not delimited by ethnicity or nationality. Similarly, the third generation of German-Turks identifies more and more with Islam and is more active in youth organizations and groups of Turkish Islamic religious institutions compared to the second generation of research participants. The Turkish community, however, generally possess greater social capital, since they do not only live in a larger community, but their financial and social resources are regulated by umbrella organizations of the Turkish Islamic institution ‘Diyamet’.

4.2. Response of Faith-based actors on the four factors

Throughout the years, the communities gained more social capital in the communities and broadened their intercultural networks. However, there have been differences in access and amount of religious capital since the Moroccan and Turkish communities vary in size of members and in the management of religious services and in related propositions for their members. In general, the mosques and religious institutions for the community members are significant stakeholders and integral component in society. This resonates also with the offerings and propositions of the mosque that go beyond religious or spiritual teachings of the clerics. The previously discussed factors (Chapter 4.1.) including social identity, unequal educational opportunities, picture of Islam and Islamophobia are discussed with respect to how religious stakeholders respond to the push-factors that might lead to radicalization of young Muslims in the respective area.

Role in the community and the ethnic religious capital

The religious institutions in both communities are considerably important organizations that influence the dynamic and the social capital on site. Not only do they offer religious ceremonies and Friday sermons, but also pastoral care, integration courses, youth or cultural clubs for their members. Possessing a great range of propositions and influence for community members the importance of religious leaders should be further acknowledged. However, the quality and number of offerings in the mosque vary between the Turkish and Moroccan community in Germany. First, the Turkish religious institutions are regulated through a bigger

umbrella organization and possess more resources due to greater financial resources and range within Germany. Second, the Moroccan religious institution is still in its beginnings and has recently joined an umbrella organization in which the resources within the Moroccan community are being re-regulated. According to Chbib (2011) in contrast to Turkish or Bosnian Islamic umbrella organizations, Muslims of Moroccan origin began quite late in networking their communities that had existed since the 1970s. In their current umbrella organization ‘Central Council of Moroccans in Germany (ZMaD)’ there are only a small number of the mosque associations that have merged. Thus, the social capital of the Moroccan community is re-forming, but shows potential. According to the imam, more and more men and women from North African countries are using the religious services, and the expansion of the mosque shows that more space is being created for a larger community.

“In Morocco, too, there is now a turnaround in Islam. A moderate, Moroccan Islam is preached. Before, the religious landscape had become very fragmented, which was a solid ground for extremist groups, now everything is more strongly regulated and also guidelines are given to the Imams, regarding teaching and practice. Women are now trained as imams and are an important part of our religious landscape.”

Cleric, Moroccan Islamic-center, Interview

The examined Moroccan Islamic Centre in the research field belongs to one of the few mosques that is supported by the Hassan II. Foundation in Morocco. The creation of this mosque is not only a cultural center and but also functions as a place of emotional and spiritual refuge. Furthermore, the mosque has become an educational institution, especially with regard to the religious schooling of children, youth and adults. In addition, integration and Arabic language courses are offered. The mosque also has its own library as well as premises for the preparation of funerals or weddings. According to community stakeholders and the cleric on site, the Islamic center is a core pillar in the community and belongs to the first founded organizations by the community. Since the Moroccan diaspora policy has been further developed by Moroccan King Hassan, the mosque is subject to funding from Morocco and donations by community members. Before the funding, professionally trained religious leaders were only filled by acquaintances or scholars from well-known villages of the community members.

Furthermore, the Islamic center is one of the few mosques that belong to the umbrella organization of the Central Council of Moroccans in Germany. The membership provides the imams of the mosque with an adapted public education, which is regulated and accredited by the Moroccan government.

“We are upgrading again; we are now receiving more funds for spatial expansion and integration offers. It is important to the Moroccan state how we present Islam in Morocco to the outside world.”

Cleric, Moroccan Islamic-center, Interview

The interview with the faith leader indicates a shift in Islamic expression: Since Morocco initiated a rethinking of Islam and its practice in the West, extremism is tackled not only in the country of origin but also in the Western host societies. After the terror attacks in Belgium and France executed by young Europeans with Moroccan background as well as the increasing crime rates by young North African migrants, the Moroccan government proclaimed to further accelerate a moderate Islam in which female religious leaders and an inclusive approach of different thoughts of schools are discussed and implemented in practice (see Bruce, 2019). The available religious capital that is provided by the Moroccan government is oriented towards the advocacy of a “Moroccan Islam” in which a more moderate Islam should prevail in country of origin and host society. Since Morocco does not only want to distinguish itself politically but also religiously from the other Arab states, the association of Moroccan Islam organizations is of enormous importance according to the religious stakeholders of this research. Religious leaders attempt to include as many young stakeholders as possible, however, due to limited financial and human resources pastoral care for youth is not yet firmly integrated and needs more training and education for imams. Thus, imams are caught between two challenges: on the one hand, German-Moroccans who are exposed to a hybrid identity and need acceptance and stronger integration into the host society, and on the other hand recently immigrated young Moroccans who have to find themselves in a completely new world view and need orientation and integration assistance.

In contrast to the Moroccan religious capital, German Turkish civil society organizations and religious institutions have been active in accumulating and concentrating the available capital for more than 40 years. With its establishment in 1982, DITIB has become an important stakeholder throughout the community. The mosque does not only provide spiritual support but is also a bridge between everyday life in Germany and the Islamic faith, which until then was only known from home. Community stakeholders perceive DITIB as an important bridge between the older generations and host society since the institution provides assistance for members in times of struggle and uncertainty. This does not only relate to religious questions but also daily or family problems.

“You could say it is a kind of catch basin for the people who have an internal struggle. Since the older generations do not speak good German and generally have no connection to Germans, DITIB replaces family council or psychological care.”

Community stakeholder, German-Turkish, interview partner

The trust into DITIB as a community leader and religious institution is therefore unassailable for the younger generations of German-Turks. Being aware of the trust they gain; the institutions tailored their teaching according to the growing Muslim population in Germany and the demand of the younger generation. Friday sermons are therefore not only held in Turkish as in the past but are now also translated into German. In addition, intercultural imams who grew up in Germany but completed their training in Turkey are employed since they are considered “bridge building” entities. The reason for this is not only to overcome the language barrier, but also to develop a sensitivity for the younger generation and the non-Turkish affiliated members.

“It is important for us to connect with the new generation - that is why we are training imams who grew up here and completed their education in Turkey. So, they are now ombudsmen/women between the Turkish and German society. We already use them

when we hold Friday prayers, because we now also wanted to hold our religious program in German.”

Cleric Interview, Turkish-Islamic organization, Interview

Furthermore, the mosque tailors its services according to the needs of the community. Not only religious ceremonies for weddings or funerals, but also cultural and integration programs as well as pastoral care are provided. Next to music or art classes, the mosque offers German and Turkish classes as well as integration classes for new arriving Turks from Turkey. According to the interviewees, the Imams have to obtain not only a basic academic training in Islamic Studies but also in pastoral care, which they completed in Turkey. It was recognized early on that the Islamic scholars needed not only a solid education in teaching, but also had to provide social work as community stakeholders. Harr and Yancey (2014) concludes that the collaboration of faith leaders and social workers in small towns or marginalized communities build trust and understanding which results in collaborative service provisions benefiting families.

Response to Identity Struggle

DITIB recognized early on that young people who are exposed to a hybrid identity are not only confronted with advantages but also with challenges. A new generation of imams is being trained who can identify with the third and fourth generation: German-Turks of the same age are trained at ‘Diyanet’ facilities and later on employed as bridge-builders mediating between German host society and the Turkish community on site. The dialogue-oriented exchange addresses the issue of integration but does not claim to allow assimilation. Accordingly, DITIB focuses on an ‘acculturation’ approach: They acknowledge that the in-group members slowly adopt practices and values of the German culture, however, the objective is to retain the own distinct Turkish culture within the community. The music, art and social services are strongly based on Turkish culture, and are influenced by Old Turk, Ottoman and Sufism. The difference between integration and assimilation plays a crucial role for the Turkish-Islamic organization. The interviewee and the representation of the civil society organization both stresses the importance to rather integrate than being assimilated: On the one hand it is significant to

actively participate in society, to work and pursue a career in Germany, however, the Turkish population is encouraged not to forget their roots and affiliation to the country of origin. In conjunction with the statements of the third-generation participants, the religious stakeholders in the community acknowledge the hybrid identity of the new generations born and raised in Germany. However, they advocate to not push the Turkish family identity to the back but to maintain strong bonds with their heritage. According to the cleric, the lack of acceptance of the host society would be the reason for the torn generation that feels more bound to Turkish culture. Considering the ethnic religious offerings in the mosque, a stronger inclination towards Turkish culture is detectable that also includes integration, art and music lessons. Since the institution is mainly financed by the Turkish state, it is evident that a fundamentally stronger influence of Turkish customs and traditions are reflected in the propositions. This also includes old-Turkic customs such as Ottoman language and calligraphy courses since the younger generation shows great interest in the historical past of Turkic customs and traditions.

The Moroccan stakeholders are aware of the cultural differences between German-Moroccans and those who immigrated recently to Germany. One might offer propositions for young German-Moroccans who are troubled in their identity finding. On the other hand, one has to offer counseling for recently immigrated young Moroccan men who have no experience in interculturality or living in a different setting. The imam of the research field wants to embrace the new arriving youth and hopes to offer them different perspectives. He is aware of the psycho-social care that young men need since they originate from a patriarchal system in which supervision and guidance through male family members are provided. However, due to limited funds and lacking human resources, the imam fears to lose the grasp on the young generation of German-Moroccans. If the necessary resources of pastoral education care for young people and integration courses for young Moroccan men would be available, the cleric is certain of their integration success since their obedience towards Islamic scholars is a given fact. According to the religious stakeholders, it is significant to function as a catch basin for marginalized groups and offer them new perspectives and recognition. Otherwise, the probability to get caught up in the maelstrom of extremist groups is higher and a radicalization process could start. Torn between assimilation and the religion in their home country, young North Africans would find a niche in extremism and radicalization in which they can form their identity based on extremist doctrines. Coolsaet (2013) indicates an Islamization of radicalism in which faith is exploited as a mean to become violent. As a result, religion becomes an

instrument for an extremist misleading many individuals who suffered a transgenerational trauma of suppression.

Response to Radicalization

Although there are no known cases of Islamic radicalization in their community or mosques, the clerics are in contact with the city with respect to possible extremists. The Turkish religious stakeholders point out that they have no understanding for extremism of any form, but they can estimate where the willingness to join DAESH would come from. Extremist groups take advantage of the uncertainty about identity and lack of prospects of the young people.

"If you look at the young people who join DAESH, you quickly realize that they are actually socially weak and even very disappointed and marginalized people. They do not know where to go. That's when the extremist groups intervene and lead them to "salvation" and suggest an Islam that has nothing to do with my religion."

Cleric Interview, Turkish-Islamic organization, Interview

This also resonates with Schmidt's (2013) and Coolsaet's (2013) assessments of young Muslims in Europe joining radical groups due to lack of prospect and a general sense of disappointment and alienation. However, the cleric stresses that within the Turkish community the very few numbers of foreign fighters are attributable to a strong feeling of membership and also in the interpretation of Islam. According to this, there are differences between the Turkish and Arab expression of Islam, which is caused by the Madhab and the historical-cultural past of the respective country of origin. the Cleric cites the political and cultural history in the respective countries of origin as a reason for the possible radicalization of young people. Since Turkey was not subject to any foreign or colonial power, the culture and expression of Islam could evolve independently. However, considering the historical past of North African countries, one can detect the effect of French colonization on the countries' own identity and the interpretation of religion. The fact that the madhab also plays a role is also evident from the interpretation and rituals in the mosque: The Hanafi- jurisprudence plays a historically

important role in Turkish culture since it was adopted by the Ottomans in the 16th century and allows a more liberal and moderate interpretation and execution of Islamic law (Warren, 2013). Besides the four jurisdictions in Sunni Islam (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali), Turkish Islam is also influenced by Sufism, which is rejected by many strictly religious-conservative Arabic scholars. Accordingly, Sufism would be apostatic and pagan according to conservative and extremist clerics (Yavuz, 2014). The interviewee states that Sufism is based on the so-called Tariqat, a spiritual methodology adopted by Sufism, which is considered the precursor of a liberal interpretation of Islam.

“The difference between the Arab and Turkish associations and communities lies on the one hand in the denomination and culture. There are different denominations in Islam, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, Hanbali etc. We Turks are Hanafi, whereas the Arabs are predominantly Shafi or Hanbali. (...) Furthermore, we are also influenced by Sufism, (...) and Sufism embodies humanism, compassion and philanthropy. This meets with rejection from many Arabs because they cannot identify with Tasawwuf.”

Cleric Interview, Turkish-Islamic organization, Interview

Based on the Ashaari doctrine and the Maliki jurisprudence, Morocco claims to preach a more liberal and open Islam than the one proclaimed in the Hanbali jurisprudence by Saudi Arabian funding (Davis, 2020). According to this, the state wants to shape the practice of Islam in such a way that it can also be applied in the West and can be easily implemented. According to the imam, future clerics acquire skills in dispute resolution and psychology, specializing in intercultural and interreligious understanding and mediation. In the course of time the Moroccan mosques in the West will be guided by these certified Imams. The Imam in the research field also maintains contacts with the Institute and the European Council of Moroccan scholars who work closely with the Hassan 2 Foundation. Ultimately, a uniform nationalization and guidance through government are intended to ban extremism in Africa completely (Zuidema, 2017).

Response to marginalization

Regarding the effect ethnic religious capital has on the younger generations of German-Turks, one can detect a great role of mosques being a catch basin for struggled youth. Not only are educational and cultural opportunities provided for young people, but also active measures are taken against the externalizing behavior of young people who have drug problems, for example. Because the youth are not exposed to legal consequences in the mosques, they are more likely to confide in religious leaders. Here, youth pastoral care is actively pursued, in which the imams are also trained. The significance of this pastoral care is particularly evident in the decrease in criminal cases in the area: Through the active involvement of youth pastoral care, young people who have been criminalized at an early age are caught by imams and supported in their rehabilitation by in-group members.

“(...) For example, we are approached by members when their children or acquaintances are involved in drug or other matters. Then we help the parents, take care of the young people and offer our help in pastoral care or advise them to go into rehab. This has always been helpful until now. Because the young people know that we do not judge them, they can let themselves go with us and we catch them - without any consequences.”

Cleric Interview, Turkish-Islamic organization, Interview

This procedure resonates with Mason et al.’s (2012) “Dimension of Religiosity and Access to Religious Social Capital” in which the usage of religious social capital is related to reduced drug abuses under minors. The affinity of religious institutions and the support of the broad in-group members functions also in the case of the researched institution as safe harbor for struggled individuals who had reportedly drug or crime problems. Since the faith group members and respectively the religious leaders do not judge or launch an investigate against the individuals. The mutual trust within the community and with stakeholders also stimulates social cohesion. The Turkish community in the respective area has a strong support system against rising criminality among juveniles. Since being confronted with gang brutality and criminal activities of café owners in the area, civil society organizations are keen to protect

young people and prevent gangs from recruiting young people. In this process, religious leaders in particular play a role, as they publicly condemn the criminal machinations in their sermons and offer young people alternatives in their youth groups and courses. Accordingly, a "Buddy" program has been launched, in which students work together with pupils of different age groups to tackle everyday problems and promote their education at school. Through the active engagement of educated university students, the religious organization hopes to encounter the lacking educational opportunities for young German-Turks in the community.

Assessing the data on the Moroccan research participants a torn identity becomes apparent. However, the mosque leader draws attention to the problem of lack of recognition and resources on state and local level. Unable to provide decent programs that are tailored to the multifaceted problem, the Moroccan imams touch on marginalization in their Friday sermons. Through the involvement of institutions and foundations in Morocco that grant funds for diaspora Moroccans, the mosque has been able to increase their propositions and offers for the community. A consistent strategy among the mosques, however, is still lacking since not every Moroccan religious institution is member of the umbrella organization and could not benefit from the new strategy of Islamic practice and teaching in Morocco. With regards to the transitioning of Islam in Morocco, one can detect a parallel shift in the Moroccan Islamic teaching in Germany as well. This trend is also increasingly oriented towards the German-Turkish model: Academic training for imams, outsourcing of religious scholars, and social propositions in mosques that enforces acculturation in the community.

Response to Islamophobia and perception of the West

Since religion and identification of Islam has been more important for the third generation, the Islamic institutions gain importance in role and scope. This also influences the participants' perception on the West, exerting more trust into the ethnic Islamic organizations. Especially the third generation is skeptical about the true intention behind a planned nationalization of religious services through the German state.

"I also don't believe that a nationalization of Islam by the German state would be of any use, they wouldn't even know what the Muslim community needs, they wouldn't

have the sensitivity, they wouldn't know how to create something. Muslims wouldn't take advantage of the offer.”

Third-generation, German-Turkish, interview partner

Since the German state wants to curb the long arm of the Turkish state in Germany, the relationship between the Turkish-Islamic communities and German politics is rather tensed (Breyton and Schindler, 2020). This tension is also perceivable among the research participants that observe a general bad picture towards Turks and the politics on site. In addition, the cleric sees the rising Islamophobia and the anti-Muslim sentiment as a reason for the ever more strained relationship:

“We have seen what triggered the statement of the then Federal President Wulff: He said, “Islam belongs to Germany” and in short time almost everyone went to the barricades. Many said: “How can you make such a statement?!” And that was the majority at that time. (...) We [Muslims] then think to ourselves: Okay, so if Islam does not belong to Germany, then we Muslims don't belong to Germany either. If our faith is not accepted as part of society, how can we be accepted? That is not possible.”

Cleric Interview, Turkish-Islamic organization

Racism, the sense of alienation and rejection fuels the marginalization of young German-Turks and Muslims in general. The misconception of Islam and the extremists in the Middle East exacerbate the dialogue between Islamic faith leaders and political parties. The wish of more collaboration between state actors and catering politics to the community's needs is lacking according to the Turkish-religious stakeholders. It is apparent that prejudices and a mutual distrust could be reason for this missing partnership. Nevertheless, there is a stronger identification with Western values than compared to Moroccan research participants. However, the Turkish family sees their Turkish heritage as part of Western culture since in their opinion Turkey has a bigger affiliation to Europe than to other Arab countries in the Middle East. The history of secularism and democratic process since 1923 shaped the Turkish identity on basis

of Western values. According to Göcek (2011) the transformation of Turkey led to an identity crisis of its people torn between European secularism and cultural Islam. The interviewed Turkish community stakeholders sees themselves as part of European history and acknowledge the mutual influence in the past. Nevertheless, the interviewed family agree that although possessing a European identity most Western countries do not acknowledge the Turkish population's relation to Western values:

The case of the Moroccan community shows a similar disposition: The religious leader identity the media portrayals of North-Africans as burdensome since recent police raids directed at the Moroccan community led to a damaging picture of North-African culture and the community's expression of Islam in Germany. This would accelerate the Islamophobic tensions in Germany in which Muslims feel alienated and marginalized. However, the religious leaders in the community want politicians to take action rather than being involved directly in anti-Islamophobia campaigns since hate mails and threats are increasing infuriating especially young German-Moroccans.

“Islamophobia is something that politicians have to fight; it doesn't help that if we Muslims convince people that Islam has nothing to do with terror. (...) Politicians must take this into their own hands.”

Cleric, Moroccan Islamic-center, Interview

This would be one of the reasons why also young German-Moroccans feel marginalized or misunderstood. The imam regards radicalization of young Muslims in Germany as a factor that is largely influenced by frustration, marginalization and misconception towards Islam and the West. In this process, the history of colonialism and the perceived injustice and the picture of oppressed Muslims through the West feed an anti-Western sentiment of young Muslims in Europe. Brown et al. (2017) points a vicarious nature of trauma in which young Muslims in Europe identify with the past or present suffering of fellow Muslims in different countries. In order to encounter this tension, the cleric offers enlightenment in the Friday sermons in which politicized topics are slightly discussed. However, the imam also refrains from any political statements concerning the Moroccan government or the history of colonialization. He

advocates for a new approach in which the hybrid identity of German-Moroccans are addressed and thematized also with regards to religious practice. The imam proposes: On the one hand, the Islamic mosque can help to ensure that Muslim identity is not confined to ethnic or state affiliation, and on the other hand politics should recognize the social identity of young German-Moroccans and not equate them with a false or bad image of ‘Nafri culture’.

“Once we accept that the young Moroccans here feel German and Moroccan and the politicians recognize that Islam is part of their identity, then the youth can let go from the grief of the past. The young generation feels currently unaccepted and looks for historical explanations reasoning that the West was always prejudiced against Muslims.”

Cleric, Moroccan Islamic-center, Interview

The transnational relationship between host-country and country of origin is becoming increasingly important. The fact that Islam is being outsourced, and various countries from the MENA region influence the expression of Islam in Germany results also in a partly fragmented religious landscape. To regulate Islam with different jurisprudences, interpretations and inclusion of various doctrines reveal challenges for a unison regulation. Besides, the reluctance on side of the younger generation to nationalize Islam through the German state shows also the tied links between the country of heritage and their own identity. The ethnic religious capital of the two communities are geared towards the new generation of Germans possessing a migration background and facing new challenges of social identity, acceptance, recognition and inclusion into the majority society. Push and pull factors that might influence the radicalization path of young Muslims in Europe are encountered through propositions, programs and sermons, however, without the fitting approach and lack of resources the clerics are not able to address and reach struggled youths in their community.

4.3. Building the theory and linking the pieces together

To answer the research question “To what extent does ethnic religious capital counteract the radicalization process of young Muslims in Germany” it is important to connect the findings of the conducted research. Since the thesis examined a previously unexplored relationship and process, different sets of predictors relevant to the phenomenon of radicalization have been analyzed under the lens of ethnic religious capital.

The findings indicate that religious social capital has the potential to counter radicalization if employed efficiently and with the collaboration of multiple stakeholders. Similar to the approach of Mason et al.’s (2012) “Dimension of Religiosity and Access to Religious Social Capital” indicating that social religiosity is protective against substance use among urban adolescents, it becomes apparent that the proximity of religious institutions and the involvement of various mosque activities encounter push and pull factors of radicalization, including social identity problems, externalizing behavior and unequal educational opportunities. As a result, if social resources are available, easily accessible and also funded sufficiently local institutions can function as pivotal counter-radicalization actors. Throughout the research, it becomes apparent that the involvement of young Muslims in activities channels the overall dissatisfaction with the majority society since the feeling of interconnectedness with in-group members and a feeling of belonging is ensured. However, the research indicates as well that parental cultural socialization plays a distinct role since family dynamics and conveyed values determine to what extent young Muslims want to be involved in activities of their respective religious institutions. The more collectivistic values are imparted, the more families and especially younger generations are willing to invest in and profit from a community’s social capital. As a result, for ethnic capital to be complete, there must be sufficient resources available beforehand, which are also carried by the community members. This, in turn, only happens when in-group members agree on common values and collectivistic values, which also have to be borne in the first social relationships, i.e. in the families.




Figure 5: Effect of Families on Community's Capital

This becomes particularly apparent in a direct comparison between the Turkish and Moroccan communities in Germany. Not only does the Turkish community show greater effort about uniform regulations and structure of their ethnic religious capital from the very beginning, it also becomes apparent that collectivistic values tend to be more strongly represented and passed on in Turkish families (see Phalet and Schönplflug, 2001). Thus, the Turkish community has a more solid basis to provide more financial and human capital to counteract push and pull factors in the radicalization process. The ethnic religious capital of the Moroccan community is still in its infancy; however, greater social cohesion is emerging since the religious and financial capital is being unified and regulated through an umbrella organization that allocates human and social resources for the communities.




Figure 6: Effect of Ethnic Religious Capital on willingness to radicalize

5. Conclusion

Considering the gathered data, the analysis and discussion of the findings, it becomes apparent that ethno-religious capital interferes in the radicalization process of young Muslims in Germany. The generated push and pull-factors are adapted to the socio-economic circumstances of young Germans with an Islamic migration background and reveal the psychological, sociological and pedagogical dynamics in the individual radicalization process. The literature indicates that the radicalization process of young Muslims in Europe is conditioned by the (1) absence of a secure environment to form an identity, (2) the uncertainty of educational prospects and future jobs, (3) the lack of resilient and inclusive institutions that serve as a catch basin and (4) the absence of a social identity and trust among community members. This thesis does not only draw on these findings, but also relates the four push and pull factors to social religiosity and ethnic capital in order to investigate a possible preventative relationship. The findings on Turkish and Moroccan individuals in Germany indicate that the consolidation of ethnic and religious social capital is to a large extent applicable to counteracting push and pull factors of jihadi radicalization, which ultimately leads to a prevention of further extremism on site. It becomes clear that communities from an Islamic cultural area in Germany not only build relationships on ethnic and cultural ties, but that social religiosity and the associated in-group connectedness and trust are of great importance for all generations. A direct comparison between German-Turks and German-Moroccans indicates: since German-Turkish associations concentrated their capital under one umbrella organization at an early stage, the Turkish-Islamic umbrella organization succeeded in building up a strong and inclusive institution that not only became the center of the religious community, but also established itself as a safe haven for struggled youth. Thus, the stakeholders took early initiatives to pick up the hybrid identity of the third and fourth generation and to train imams who would be able to cope with the intercultural and special environment. In contrast, Moroccan organizations have only concentrated their capital in recent years. It was only through the umbrella organization created in 2006 that the ethnic capital of the Moroccan community came together in one unit. As a result, links were also forged with the Hassan 2 Foundation and religious capital in Morocco. Nonetheless, the dynamics in the German-Moroccan community are not as pronounced as in the Turkish community, neither in ethnic nor in the religious capital. This also leads to a shortage of financial as well as human resources, which cannot be individually adapted to young people or newly immigrated Moroccans. The

analysis not only shows that ethnic-religious capital is significant for community members in terms of successful integration and a sense of belonging, but also serves as a safe haven for struggled youth. On the one hand, this trust is also due to the imparted values in the parental household, but also to the in-group connectedness of ethnically and religiously similar people.

The mini-ethnography gives an insightful impression of the dynamics and the general atmosphere in the respective communities. It becomes clear that there is an increasing need to empower and increase resilience of Islamic communities in Europe by establishing resilient and inclusive institutions. Although the Covid19 regulations did not allow a more intensive research, the thesis has been able to pick upon the most relevant evidences throughout the analysis contributing to generalizable findings in exploring the motivations of young Western European Muslims to become Jihadi fighters and delivering possible policy implication on local initiatives against extremism. However, future research is encouraged to further elaborate on the findings and examine the question of Islamist extremism within particular Western European settings with a focus on sociological and anthropological dynamics in ethnic minority communities. To this end, academia feeds into policy development in which religious institutions, civil society organizations and local stakeholders become an integral support and first responders against radicalisation of young Western European Muslims.

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Annex I: Observational Field Notes Mini-Ethnography

1. Mini Ethnography: German-Turkish Neighborhood

Time-frame: 20.05- 24.05.

Location: Düsseldorf, NRW

Observations, Field notes	Own interpretations
Street full of different local shops, snack bars, betting offices, restaurants	a variety of shops with mainly Turkish/Middle Eastern owners, mainly Turkish/Middle Eastern customers → community strong present, good location to conduct short interviews with stakeholders and members
Smells and tastes of grill, hard coal and spices, music, busy street	Tukish culture influence detectable with all senses, when closing eyes, it appears to be in a different country in the Middle East, not Germany
majority of people of Middle Eastern descent (from the appearance), some women wearing hijabs, younger generation in groupings, men playing backgammon on terraces of the local cafés	Not many “white” people on the street, mainly Turkish community members present. Parallel society? However, people seem open and relaxed- loud indication of well-being?
Turkish music and conversations sounding from shops and snack bars, people approaching each other	people are talking with each other a lot, shop owners with each other, customers with each other, groups with each other, it seems everyone knows everybody
talking with shop owner: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - predominantly Turkish but now also Arabic and Albanian shop owners - “everyone knows everybody” - sometimes criminal activity but way less than before - people help out each other, especially shop owners - more and more Germans approaching - feeling of Gentrification - “Hipster taking over” 	shop owner is very open and friendly, worried about his future due to COVI; lives in Germany now for more than 30 years, came when he was 10 years old. He feels not German, but Turkish also because he never felt like the Germans accepted him as one feeling of disappointment comes up when he talks about life adjustment in Germany, but still grateful to be here shows also inner torn of second generation

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - important locality: mosque - DITIB fundamental institution, meet other shop owners at friday sermon 	
<p>talking with young group (16-18 y/o, men, high-school students)</p> <p>About Neighborhood:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - coming here after school, but since corona less busy - meet up with friends and dates - feels like “Home”, familiarity with Turkish culture - feeling of belongness - feeling of acquaintance <p>About living in Düsseldorf/ Culture Turkish-German:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - nice area to live in - however, sometimes problems with prejudices against Turks and Muslims - predominantly Turkish or non-German friends - hanging out in shisha cafés after school, snack bars or at friend’s place - feeling of Turkishness and being Muslim stronger with time - area resonates with feeling of belongness and cultural feeling - no judgement of other shop owners or local stakeholders - in other areas one might feel alienated 	<p>young Turkish men have a different attitude/ trying to fit into the role of an “urban” lifestyle, different style and use of language than their “white German peers”</p> <p>→ i feel like they want to portray themselves as different, and want to be perceived as not typical German</p> <p>Their group dynamic is engaging, it becomes apparent that they have a strong bond with each other</p> <p>→ the use of language very interesting, when talking about heritage and identity, they switch automatically to Turkish</p> <p>→ indication of a strong feeling of belongness to Turkish-ness?</p> <p>→ it appears they feel more comfortable with each other than being alone</p> <p>→ in their opinion: feeling of alienation becomes stronger when talk about Islam, Islamophobia strong indication for them as not being welcomed in Germany</p> <p>→ however, in their opinion, they do not act as proper Muslims (go to bet offices, or drink)</p> <p>→ nevertheless, strong identification with islam also due to their heritage</p>
<p>Visit of Turkish CSO on site: (OT, Offene Tür, Jugendhilfe)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - area got better with time - strong work with DITIB on site - young people are included in cultural and social activities - more and more gentrification - strong connection with Mosque since catch basin for younger generation - also work on less criminal activities, young people are integrated in social programs 	<p>CSO really endeavours to include as many young people as possible</p> <p>hard to offer more courses because of lack of financial assets show the strong need for funds</p> <p>seems like a very important stakeholder in the area since flyers indicate also help for women and illiterate people (of Turkish descent) to help with administrative questions.</p> <p>counterpart for legal questions in the area shows importance for households</p>

<p>Activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - home work assistance, now remotely since COVID - before COVID: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - social programs on integration and family support - music and sports clubs - dance groups - art clubs - during COVID: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - homework assistance remotely - art club remotely <p>talk with social worker:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - people of different origin seek for assistance - Youth struggles with identity and marginalization a lot - perceived injustice - perceived discrimination - also unequal job and education opportunities hamper integration - in the area, it gets better with time but 10 years ago, it was declared a “no-go” area. 	<p>however, the lack of facilities and more human and financial resources is alarming</p> <p>→ need for more grassroot organizations and civil society engagement since they work closer with families and individuals</p> <p>→ first counterparts for problems so need more attention from local politicians</p>
<p>talk with family, customers at local shop:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - area delivers a lot of possibilities to shop “Turkish supplies” - feeling of belongingness, familiarity with origin and heritage - security aspect - “We know, we would get immediately assistance if I would scream now for help” - familiarity since also previous generations came here to do groceries - “little Istanbul” 	<p>Families feel very comfortable in this area, reminding them of their old neighborhoods in Turkey</p> <p>→ feeling of familiarity and wellbeing in the setting facilities to openly speak about life in Germany etc.</p> <p>→ family members shop mostly in Turkish shops since food and housing supplies that they are used to are mostly in these kind of shops</p> <p>→ feeling of Turkishness stronger than German</p>
<p>Talk with people at betting office</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - no place for women actually - bets between people on soccer matches, car races, horse riding - a lot of young people gather around - it’s a business in which fast money happens - accusation of money laundering but 	<p>Feeling awkward, because I am the only woman</p> <p>→ exacerbate speaking openly with them about identity, family and upbringing</p> <p>talk with shop owner better: he speaks open about misconceptions and the youth that comes here often to bet but are not allowed</p>

<p>it is “clean business” for the shop owner</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - predominantly people of Turkish and Arabic heritage - 	<p>in → he is more pessimistic about the young Turkish men but hopeful for young Turkish women coming in Germany</p>
<p>Talk with snack bar “Döner kebab shop” owner</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - in Germany since 1970s - a lot people come and go - not only Turkish but German or international customers - picture towards Turkey and Turkish people in Germany changed since political turmoil in Turkey - however, overall situation of German-Turks got better, socio-economic status - younger Generation more German than Turkish (in the eyes of the snack bar owner) 	<p>Döner kebab shop also frequently visited by community outsiders</p> <p>shows a lot of more understanding towards Muslim youth on the one side and German skepticism towards migrants and Islam on the other side</p> <p>he sees an overall improvement of the situation but nowadays political agenda in Turkey exacerbates coexistence between Turkish and German citizens → meta level: how political turmoil in one country influences the local level</p>
<p>Before Covid:</p> <p>Very lively, also at night A lot of more cafes open, a lot of more people on the street Business is striving</p>	<p>→ people describe the area as a place of gathering → important place for community members</p>
<p>After Covid:</p> <p>less crowded shops closed people more distant Shop owners feel consequences</p>	<p>→ restrictions and regulations do not allow/permit large groupings and some shops have to close for an indefinite period</p>
<p>Mosque attendances (women)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - local institution for Turkish settlers - not only religious sermons but also cultural and social activities - bridge between Turkey and Germany - social programs to help youth and women in Germany - talks about religion and Islam/ Feminism in Germany - Misconception and Prejudices towards Islam pushes us away - Not feeling included in society; pushes them towards Turkey, Turkey 	<p>mosque has been closed until restrictions loosened</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - women very engaging in talking about religion and life in Germany - very different opinions about living in Germany: some feel accepted, others dont - however, overall grateful to live in Germany - devoted Muslims but also strong feminists, want more female leaders in Islamic context - happy about DITIB and their

<p>offers a home for Muslims</p>	<p>sermons and religious propositions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - especially in times of uncertainty great counterpart for many individuals - feeling of belonging stronger in religious context than in ethnic context (according to younger generation)
<p>Talk with German-Turkish youth outside of the mosque:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mainly girls, age range: 14-17 - Feeling of German and Turkish at the same time - They know they are „different“ - Being Muslim and German not in reconciliation always, sometimes Paradoxon - Feeling more comfortable with other Turkish peers —> „because we understand each other“ - „We know, what we need“ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Islam teaches patience and love so „we have to see what will happen to us; we have to give the Germans time“ - Some however, do not see a future in Germany, want to move to Turkey when older <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There they accept us as one of them - Being Muslim is no problem there 	<p>young girls perception on Islam: strong and determined, would “do anything for my religion” mind-set</p> <p>They recognize difference in interpretation of Islamic texts when comparing with their other Muslim friends (Arabs)</p> <p>very grateful for DITIB, wouldn’t want to have a nationalization by German state → “They dont know what we Muslims want and need”</p> <p>→ strong advocate Ditib’s youth organization since variety of programs introduced also for struggled teens</p> <p>→ highlight: visits to Istanbul and Umrah for younger generation, excited about travel possibilities next year</p> <p>→ overall youth seems very enthusiastic about the work in mosque, and introduced programs, feeling of connectedness among the group very strong perceivable</p>
<p>tour with Imam showing me around the mosque:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DITIB acquires most of its funds from Turkey - Building has been renovated and has been a facility for many prestigious projects (religious- related) - biggest mosque in Düsseldorf - Mosque does not necessarily resemble to other place of prayers in Turkey→ old industrial sight has been reused - Feeling of being in Turkey when inside of the mosque - typical smell of mosques 	<p>Feeling of imam’s pride perceivable, since the mosque was one of the first ones in Germany to be built and established as one with minarets</p> <p>overall very calm atmosphere and relaxing talks, no fear of contact or reserved</p> <p>mosque appears to be a very important institutions for community members, in times of covid: online sessions, awareness-raising sessions on also domestic violence in times of covid → trying to adapt to changing environments and contexts</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - very quiet surrounding and environment - tesserae, carpets, different rooms terraces, well preserved, 	<p>→ “going with time” → feeling of calmness</p> <p>empathy with Muslims and youth rising</p>
<p>Before receiving racist letter</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - talk with youth group of DITIB - talk with Imam 	<p>Overall environment in the mosque friendly and relaxed, during ramadam no sermons but online sessions, however, joint fast breaking with 1.5 distance</p> <p>Very friendly and relaxed environment in which also politicians were involved</p> <p>Youth group of DITIB excited about the EID celebrations; Imam very friendly and forthcoming</p>
<p>After receiving racist letter</p>	<p>Shift of environment; police and security regulations increasing, people seemingly tensed, no Eid celebrations inside the mosque</p> <p>Hostile environment towards right-wing politicians and tensed relations with local politicians -→ youth feels misunderstood, anxious and disappointed “Why does this always have to happen”?</p> <p>→ shift in mood and environment, dynamic changing, a bit more tensed,</p>

2. Mini Ethnography: German-Moroccan neighborhood

Time-Frame: 25.05-30.05.

Location: Düsseldorf, NRW

Observations	Own interpretations
lot of people on the street (despite covid), Friday seems to be very busy	in contrast to other neighborhoods in the area, very busy and loud since center point of Moroccan community
very colorful clothing, traditional Moroccan clothing on streets (during Eid)	Community members express themselves in all facets, also “little Morocco” becomes evermore prevalent
on street Arabic language prevalent, a lot of small and local shops with Arabic/ Middle Eastern products.	similar to Turkish neighborhood, central point for authentic Arabic food and supplies, a lot of families are here to shop groceries, resort to well-known patterns and shops → feeling of belonging and security in a different country → people strive for their own heritage
kebab smell in the air, a lot of noises, when closing eyes feels like different country/ feels like Morocco	the community really established their own neighborhood resonating with Moroccan lifestyle → it is like travelling to another country
Shop owners friendly and welcoming, speaking German well <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - talk about life in Germany - talk about life in Morocco - resonating with interview data, that they are grateful to be here but still miss Morocco and the life back then since they don't feel very welcomed here - however, they managed to establish a better life here than in Morocco - stress the difference between Moroccans who just recently immigrated from Morocco and those who live here more than 40-50 years 	it becomes apparent that there is a big difference between Moroccans who recently immigrated from Morocco and those who live here now for several years and decades → most of the shop owners feel like they have to justify themselves or their peers in order to encounter misconceptions or prejudices → feeling of alienation is confirmed
a lot of youth groupings, mainly male	→ similar to the Turkish neighborhood again more gathering of younger male individuals → group behavior more distinct

	→ feeling of belonging?
youth reside in shisha bars and in bet offices; however, before covid they were closed	shisha bars appear to be new meeting spots for youth, however, shisha bars are closed due to COVID regulations
bistro owners first hesitant to talk about rally's and allegations against Moroccans in mainstream media → „Who is watching?“, sarcastic about current situation of Muslims in Germany but also protective of the community → difference between Moroccans from Morocco and those who grew up here	some owners of small bistros and restaurants struggle with the misconception of Moroccans and Muslims since also less Germans are visiting now the area after policy rallies against suspected gang members → overall a feeling of hostility not really detectable but disappointment and anger → no understanding of prejudices
youth talks about misconception of Moroccans and Islam → feeling of alienation and marginalization, use of words of „Islam hate“ and „Discrimination“ occurs often Talk in a group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - they use NAFRI now to describe themselves - “owning” now the word/ expression once introduced by police - feeling like being Muslim is almost a crime, being a Moroccan is worse - however, they engage more with non-German friends who have no prejudices - residing in community since fellow Moroccans “get us” 	→ youth feels pilloried; feeling of marginalization prevalent, however, still perceives themselves as Germans, rather than Moroccans → group dynamic engaging and also shows importance of groupings in culture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - feeling of belonging within the group against majority society - discrimination and racism is actively discussed in the group - individual experience becomes group experience
Short talk shop owner „Argan Oils“ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - misconception about Moroccan culture and Islam exacerbates the picture that many German-Moroccans try to convey - Also hampers business, especially in times of „Nafri“ sayings - Trying to encounter misconception and prejudice but media portrays a „dangerous picture of us Moroccans“ Short talk with restaurant owner: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - When Islam and culture gets mixed together it brings up a mess - After the incidents of New Year's 	overall, same reaction like other shop owners, people will pilloried and feel like they have to justify themselves and the group members → feel like the justify of their current situation because they are Muslims → feeling of disappointment prevalent → but overall hopeful of younger generation New Year's events turn point in integration talks ---> further digging needed The feeling of having to justify oneself struggles with stakeholders

<p>eve: people are suspicious of North Africans and Moroccans, we feel alienated</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If they think here it is bad, they have never seen the French or Belgian Banlieus; we successfully integrated into this society. - I encounter the prejudices through talking to the customers by showing my friendly and open face but still, it becomes hard 	
<p>In the mosque:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - predominantly male, a lot of Northern Africans (not only Moroccans but also Algerians, Tunisians) - Very friendly and forthcoming - Open to speak about Islam and Morocco - The area around the mosque should reflect designs and environment of Morocco - Female imam and male imam talk to me and show newly renovated buildings and interior - Programs have been restructured and adapted to new guidelines - A more open Islam is being preached, however, limited access to intercultural and Interreligious propositions since no financial assets - „Anchor“ of religious community, especially for the first generation, still close ties to Morocco and Islam, trying to connect Youth with religion 	<p>perception of Islam different than in other Arabic countries, emphasis on Maliki madhab; women are also on the foreground, sheikha seems very open and friendly</p> <p>Mosque is an important meeting point for community members, especially for older men of Northern African heritage</p> <p>Next to prayings, most important factor seems to be the after-talking and discussions, it seems like the socializing part is a bigger event than the prayer</p>
<p>Talks with civil society organization „German-Moroccan intercultural dialogue“</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - New generation of Moroccans very well integrated; better educational opportunities than the first generation - However, hybrid identity hard struggle —> who am I? - Trying to show: you are both and that is okay! - Also aims to offer integration courses for newly arrived 	<p>it becomes apparent that the hybrid identity, Islamophobia, and the misconception towards Moroccans, and diffamation through “NAFRI” causes a lot of struggle for the community;</p> <p>the civil society organization is of great importance since encountering prejudices and misconceptions towards Muslims and Moroccans</p> <p>also support for families and youth in terms of education and social aspects</p>

<p>Moroccans, limited access to financial assets though</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- More collaboration with local agencies and politicians desired- Also more work towards an interreligious dialogue, since misconception about Islam still prevalent- However, politic doesn't show a lot of effort to reconcile with „us“ German-Moroccans	<p>however, no cooperation with Mosque; maybe helpful to have a better grasp on families and religious individuals (?)</p>
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Annex II: Interview with Faith Based Actors

Interview: Cleric (Imam), Diyanet, Düsseldorf

Interview language: Turkish and German (transcribing in German)

Participants: Imam and Researcher

Wie schaut die Arbeit von Diyanet aus? Inwieweit ist sie in der türkischen community integriert?

- Diyanet gibt es seit 1984 in Deutschland als anerkannter religiöser Verein, ja gar Institution
- davor sah die religiöse Landschaft in der Türkei sehr fragmentiert aus, es gab individuelle Vereinigungen, in denen selbsternannte Imame Freitagsgebete aufhielten
- Mit der Gründung Diyanets gab es erstmals eine Vereinheitlichung der religiösen Landschaft in Deutschland
- erst einmal haben wir uns nur auf die Religiöse Lehre fokussiert aber mit der Zeit wurde klar, dass wir viel mehr Programme anbieten müssten, da die community schnell auf uns mit vielen Anfragen ankamen
- So haben wir uns über die Jahre nicht nur zu einer religiösen Institution etabliert, sondern sind auch in Sachen Integration, Kultur und Seelsorge ein wichtiger Bestandteil der community
- Wir bieten beispielsweise Deutsch und Türkischkurse an, damit wir einen kulturellen Dialog mit unseren deutschen Mitmenschen aufrechterhalten, viele Deutsche wollen unbedingt türkisch lernen, damit sie die türkische community besser verstehen beispielsweise
- Wir geben Deutschunterricht, die gerade für die erste und zweite Generation gerichtet ist, damit sie sich auch besser in ihrem Umfeld integrieren können, viele kommen da auf uns zu, da wir auch Ansprechpartner für andere Angelegenheiten sind
- so geben wir auch Kunst- und Musikunterricht für jeden Interessenten, natürlich handelt es sich hier um überwiegend türkische Musik und türkischer kunst so wie Saz und Ebru bzw Kalligraphie
- Meiner Meinung nach ist aber die wichtigste Angelegenheit die Seelsorge, gerade für die jüngere Generation, wenn diese sich in kriminellen Machenschaften verwickeln, so werden wir bspw von mitgliedern angesprochen, wenn ihre Kinder oder Bekannte in Drogen- oder anderen Angelegenheiten verwickelt sind. Dann greifen wir den Eltern unter den Armen, nehmen uns den Jugendlichen an und bieten unsere Hilfe in Richtung Seelsorge oder Entzug an. Das war bis jetzt immer hilfreich. Denn die Jugendlichen wissen, wir urteilen nicht über sie, sie können sich bei uns frei fallen lassen und wir fangen sie auf- ohne jegliche Konsequenzen.
- Wir haben beispielsweise auch ein Buddy Programm zwischen Studierenden und Schülern, damit sie denen auch den richtigen Weg aufzeigen können und in der

Schule helfen können. Die Studierenden wohnen auch hier über der Moschee. Die Kinder wissen, wo sie sie erreichen können.

- Wir stehen natürlich auch im Dialog mit der Stadt, wir sind Mitglied des Interreligiösen Rates und Teil der Dialoggruppe mit christlichen Organisationen aber auch anderen Islamischen Verbänden
- Es ist uns wichtig mit der neuen Generation anzuknüpfen- deswegen bilden wir gerade Imame aus, die auch hier aufgewachsen sind und ihre Ausbildung in der Türkei abgeschlossen haben. Damit sind sie nun Ombudsmänner bzw -Frauen zwischen der türkischen und deutschen Gesellschaft. Wir setzen schon diese ein, wenn wir Freitagsgebete halten, da wir nun auch unser religiöses Programm auf Deutsch halten wollten
- Es kommen immer mehr nicht-türkische Muslime zu uns

Der Unterschied zwischen Türken und Marokkanern:

- Der Unterschied zwischen den arabischen und türkischen Verbänden bzw auch den communities liegt zum einen in der Konfession und Kultur. Es gibt verschiedene Konfessionen im Islam, Hanafi, Maliki, Schafi, Hanbali etc. Wir Türken sind Hanafi, wobei die Araber überwiegend Schafi oder Hanbali sind
- (Darüber hinaus sind wir stark vom sufismus geprägt, Yunus Emre war ein Sufi. und Sufismus verkörpert den Humanismus, die Mitmenschlichkeit und Philanthropie
- Das stößt bei vielen Arabern auf Ablehnung, weil sie Tasawwuf nicht wirklich verstehen.
- Es stimmt, wir Türken bleiben gerne unter uns, man sagt uns nach, wir sollten uns mehr öffnen. Das stimmt. Andererseits gibt es aber
- Dann gibt es dann auch noch die kulturellen Unterschiede, die hier sehr zutreffend sind, da diese auch von politisch und historischen Faktoren abhängig sind
 - Die Nordafrikanischen Länder sind überwiegend unter Einfluss der Franzosen gewesen, erst waren sie Teil des Osmanischen Reiches, dann aber Kolonien der Franzosen
 - Sie konnten sich nicht ihre eigene Identität bilden, keine eigene soziale Identität formen, man merkt es auch gerade an der heutigen Jugend
 - die jungen Marokkaner, die hier hinkommen, sind her- und hergerissen zwischen der hier Assimilation und der Religion, und da sie sich ferner ab nicht mit der Kolonialisierung identifizieren wollen, finden sie im Extremismus und in der Radikalisierung eine Nische, in der sie sich ganz und gar "frei" formen können- das denken sie jedenfalls
- Religion wird hier instrumentalisiert und die damalige Ausübung wird in die heutige Welt übersetzt- das kann man nicht- Das sage ich sogar als Imam. Du kannst nicht einfach das damalige Leben auf das heutige übertragen, du musst ein Verständnis ja eine Brücke zwischen der Religion und der Gesellschaft finden
- Auf jeden fall gibt es Unterschiede zwischen den Türken und den Arabern, der Unterschied der religiösen Interpretation ist durch die Kultur bedingt.

Radikalisierung von jungen Muslimen

- Die Extremisten finden schnell den Schwachpunkt der jungen Generation
- Wenn du dir die Jugendlichen anschaust, die sich dem IS anschließen, erkennst du schnell, dass sie eigentlich sozial schwache ja gar von sehr enttäuschten und marginalisierten Menschen sind. Sie wissen nicht wohin mit sich. Da greifen die extremistischen Gruppen ein und führen sie zur "Erlösung" und legen ihnen einen Islam nahe, der nichts mit meiner Religion zu tun hat.
- Ich sage mal so, wenn der ISIS Recht hat, dann müsste ich doch als vorsitzender Imam mich als erstes denen anschließen. Als jemand der mehr als 20-30 Jahre mit der Lehre zu tun hat diese studiert hat, müsste ich doch genau die Kernaussagen des Islams kennen. Aber ich kann dir versichern, der Islam ist eine friedliche Religion, in der alle Menschen einen Platz finden.
- **Iman güvende olmak demektir, Allah seni yasatmak için dünyaya getirdi, ölmek için degil. Allah diyor ki sen dinine kendini teslim et ama canini verme, bunun DAESH ile hic bir alakasi yok.**

Wie gehen sie mit der neuen Generation um?

- wir sind nicht hier, um die Leute zum beten zu schicken, wir sind hier als Seelsorge und sie in die spirituelle Wegweisung zu geben
- das verstehen viele nicht. Von Außen denkt man, dass religiöse Institutionen nur da sind einem das Beten beizubringen, aber nein, wir bringen vielen das friedliche Leben bei. Das gemeinsame Beten entsteht demnach nur als Nebenprodukt.
- Wir wissen, dass wir mit unserer neuen Generation noch einmal ganz anders umgehen müssen
- Die 1. Generation kam nur zu arbeiten
- Die 2. Generation steht zwischen den Stühlen, in denen sie der ersten Generation unter den Armen griffen und zum ersten Mal Brückenbauer zwischen der eigenen und der deutschen Kultur wurden.
- Die 3. Generation bilden sich eine eigene hybride Kultur
 - Diese schaut jedoch folgendermaßen aus: Sie interessiert sich weder für die eine, noch für die andere Kultur, sie wollen schnell Geld verdienen, reich werden, freiheit genießen ohne über die Konsequenzen oder Opfer nachzudenken, sie sind hinter der Sinnesfreude her, da sie gerade in der heutigen Gesellschaft nicht die volle Akzeptanz erfahren, die sie brauchen.
- Diese Generation ist auch hin- und hergerissen, weil diese hier auch nicht völlig akzeptiert werden, weil sie sich hier als Menschen 2.Klasse fühlen, sie erfahren diese auch in jeglicher Art und deswegen führt diese diese nicht-Akzeptanz zur mehr Orientierung zur türkischen Kultur
- Man sagt zwar, wir Türken seien nur unter uns, aber öffnet euch damit wir auch euch entgegenkommen können
- Wir fangen die jungen, rastlosen Menschen auf, bieten ihnen eine Alternative an: Wir sagen integriert euch, aber assimiliert euch nicht. Vergesst nicht, wo eure Wurzeln liegen, aber seid dankbar für das, was ihr hier kriegt. Das ist wichtig

- Wir leiten sie und geben einen Weg vor, in denen sie ihre hybride Kultur ohne jegliches Urteil ausleben können
- Die negative Lobbyarbeit, die aber in den letzten Jahren von jeglichen anti-türkischen Organisationen geführt wurde, machen unsere Arbeit aber echt schwer. Ich kann nur sagen, wir heißen alle Menschen willkommen.

Wie sehen Sie die Islamophobie in Deutschland?

- nach dem 11. September hat sich die Grundstimmung natürlich verändert,
- Aber die Dynamiken in Europa sind nochmal anders, ich finde die Rechtsextremen hier sind stärker geworden, die Sympathisanten lauter und Rassismus zum Teil salonfähig.
- Noch gestern haben wir Schmähbriefe, Drohungen und Schweinsköpfe anlässlich unseres Zuckefestes gefunden.
- Gerade wir Imame werden ständig bedroht, unsere Moscheen angegriffen, aber nach einer Zeit beeindruckt dich das nicht mehr, es wird traurigerweise zur Routine.
- Wenn große Feierlichkeiten oder islamische Feste anstehen, wissen wir schon was kommt, so ist das halt.
- Der Rassismus, die steigende Macht der AFD zeigt übrigen auch unserer jungen Generation, dass sie wohl hier nicht wirklich willkommen sind
- “Deutsch und Muslim sein? Das passt hier wohl gar nicht zusammen” sagen die Rechten.
- Natürlich drängt das unsere Jugendlichen mehr in die eine als in die andere Ecke. Sie fühlen sich wieder nicht Teil der Gesellschaft
- Wir haben ja gesehen, was die Aussage des damaligen Bundespräsidenten Wulff ausgelöst hat: Er sagte der Islam gehöre zu Deutschland und dann sind alle auf die Barrikaden gegangen. Wie könne man nur so eine Behauptung aufstellen, sagten viele Konservative in Deutschland. und das waren zur damaligen Zeit die Mehrheit.
- Wir denken uns dann: Okay, wenn also der Islam nicht zu Deutschland gehört, dann gehören wir Muslime auch nicht dazu. Wenn man unseren Glauben nicht als Teil der Gesellschaft akzeptiert, wie soll man dann uns akzeptieren? Das geht nicht.

Interview: Cleric (Imam), Masjid Omar, Düsseldorf

Interview language: French and German (transcribing in German)

Participants: Imam and Researcher

Könnten Sie sich kurz vorstellen?

- Ich bin Imam seit mehr als 15 Jahren, komme ursprünglich aus Marokko, habe dort auch meine Imamausbildung abgeschlossen und nun lehre ich in NRW in der marokkanischen Moscheegemeinde

- Wir haben die Moschee erst kürzlich renoviert, da die community immer größer wurde und der marokkanische Staat seinen Bürgern hier etwas bieten wollte, sonst waren diese immer auf die anderen arabischen Moscheegemeinden angewiesen
- seit 1978 gibt es unsere Moschee, wobei die bis letztes Jahr sehr klein war, jetzt wurde sie vergrößert
- Wir rüsten wieder neu auf, wir erhalten jetzt mehr Gelder für räumliche Erweiterungen und Integrationsangebote. Es ist dem marokkanischen Staat wichtig, wie wir den Islam in Marokko nach außen austragen
- das besondere ist: dass wir auch wirklich auf die marokkanische community angepasst sind und auch Arabisch Kurse anbieten
- Wir sind ein Verein bzw eine religiöse institution. Wir predigen auch einen moderaten Islam meiner Meinung nach, einer der auch in Marokko gepredigt wird.
- Wir haben eine Imamausbildung in Marokko abgeschlossen, der auch bspw von anderen Afrikanischen Imame in Anspruch genommen wird.
- Das regelt zum einen die Hassan 2 Stiftung und das Religionsministerium in Marokko
- Ja, es ist schon wichtig einen engeren Kontakt mit der marokkanischen community zu etablieren, vorher war das ein bisschen anders. Der König will nun einen engeren Kontakt zu den Aussiedlern haben
- Auch in Marokko gibt es nun einen Umschwung im Islam. Ein moderater, marokkanischer Islam wird gepredigt. Vorher hatte sich die religiöse Landschaft sehr fragmentiert, das war ein solider Boden für extremistische Gruppierungen, jetzt wird alles stärker reguliert und auch Vorgaben angegeben für die Imame, hinsichtlich der Lehre und Ausübung. Frauen werden nun als Imame ausgebildet und sind ein wichtiger Bestandteil in unseren religiösen Landschaft.

Wie schaut die Arbeit von ihrer Moschee aus? Inwieweit ist sie in der marokkanischen community integriert?

- wir lehren den Islam und bieten darüber hinaus Hilfe und Sprachassistenz an. Auch Seelsorge ist auf gewisser Art und Weise dabei
- Wir sind immerhin Ansprechpartner bei spirituellen Fragen und stützen unsere Mitglieder in ihren Glauben und geben Ihnen Anweisungen
- Dann bieten wir auch Sprachunterricht für die jungen Marokkanischen Kinder an, die Arabisch lernen wollen
- Die Unterrichtseinheiten sind auch für Deutsche, die vielleicht arabisch lernen wollen, darüber denken wir in der Zukunft nach
- Seit Corona bieten wir unsere Predigten via Facebook im Livestream an.
- Wir sind nun auch ein integraler Bestandteil und bieten Jugendarbeit durch unseren Sportverein
- Da wir nun auch aktiver in der Stadt werden wollen, suchen wir Kooperationspartner.
- Wir sind schon im interreligiösen Rat vertreten, wollen aber auch mehr Veranstaltungen planen, die interkulturell und interreligiösen Feierlichkeiten zu Gute kommt

- Wir gehören dem ZMaD an, das heißt, dass wir auch Funding vom marokkansichen Staat erhalten, und Ressourcen bekommen, die vom marokkansichen Staat anerkannt sind. Vorher, waren wir auf ausländische Finanzierungen in anderen arabischen Staaten angewiese- wie z.B. Saudi Arabien. Unsere Imame kamen aber meistens aus den hier bekannten Dörfern der marokkanischen Aussiedler. Das heißt, dass diese ihre Lehren bis dahin auch nur in diesen Dörfern gelernt haben- und in Marokko hatte damals auch Extremisten einen großen Einfluss auf die Lehrtexte
- Und heutzutage nehmen wir dies selbst in die Hand.

Der Unterschied zwischen Türken und Marokkanern:

- Ich denke der größte Unterschied liegt in der Kultur und auch im Madhab
- Wir Marokkaner sind Maliki, die Türken Hanafi. Wir haben da unterschiedliche Sichtweisen auf Dinge, wobei es gibt nur einen Islam
- Unsere Predigten finden auch vorwiegend auf Arabisch statt, ihre aber auf Türkisch denke ich
- Wir stehen jedoch im Kontakt, gerade auch im interreligiösen Stadtrad oder wenn es gemeinsame islamische Feierlichkeiten gibt
- Die marokkanische Kultur ist schon distinktiv, so ist auch der Islam und die Auslegung nicht mehr vergleichbar mit dem der Saudis oder im Nahen Osten- dort sind viele Hanbali oder Schafi
- Die jungen Marokkaner, die hierherkommen sind auch unterschiedlich aufgewachsen als die jungen Deutsch-Marokkaner, die hier aufgewachsen sind- es gibt starke kulturelle Unterschiede
 - Marokkaner in Marokko: erleben nicht die Freizügigkeit, die ist hier im Westen gibt, sie sind angewiesen auf das Sagen ihrer Väter, dort ist ein stark verwurzelte Autorität
 - Die hier lebenden Marokkaner müssen sich anpassen, sich an den Westen anpassen
 - Wenn wir die Ressourcen hätten, wüsste man genau, wie man da angehen müsste, denen die Perspektiven bieten könnte
 - Aber auch hier sieht man Unterschiede im Gegensatz zu Frankreich wie z.b in Paris Berbés. Die Marokkaner hier sind besser integriert als in Frankreich
 - Ich denke das liegt zum einen an der Politik aber auch an der französisch-marokkanischen Geschichte
 - Die Jugend dort fühlt sich durch die damalige französische Herrschaft in Marokko angegriffen, sie fühlen als habe Frankreich ihren Großeltern damals das Recht auf eine eigene Zukunft genommen
 - Es entsteht schon eine Art anti-sentiment gegenüber den Franzosen
 - Mit Deutschland verbinden die Großeltern oder die erste Generation in erster Linie Arbeit bzw Gastarbeit, um aus ihrer damaligen schwierigen finanziellen Situation rauszukommen

- Türken haben hier schon viel mehr Institutionen, viel mehr Moscheen, wir Marokkaner stehen noch am Anfang, versuchen uns erst jetzt von saudi arabischen Institutionen frei zu gelangen, abhängig zu sein von fremd-finanzierten Moscheen
- Das Bild, das man nun aber gegenüber Nordafrikanern hat, ist schon schwierig, man hat nun mehr Vorurteile, die Polizei beobachtet dich, vielleicht auch uns- man sollte nur erkennen, dass die damaligen Angriffe durch Nordafrikaner nicht die Kultur oder auch den Islam repräsentiert
- Der Islam schützt und respektiert jegliche Menschen und auch Geschlechter, das was da passiert ist die Folge davon, dass junge Männer, die keine interkulturellen Erfahrungen gemacht haben, in den Westen gelangen ohne jegliche Aufsicht und dann abdrehen
- Sie haben keine Anleitung, keine Führung in ihrem neuen Leben hier
- Natürlich wollen wir diese jetzt aufgreifen und sie mir in unsere spirituelle Arbeit einbinden

Radikalisierung von jungen Muslimen

- Andererseits gibt es viele marginalisierte junge Menschen hier, die weder auf dem Arbeitsmarkt noch im sozialen Umfeld eine Chance erhalten
- die Marokkaner hier helfen sich gegenseitig, aber so eine community Struktur gibt es nicht überall
- Die jungen Menschen, die radikalisiert werden, werden in extremistischen Gruppierungen radikalisiert, die nicht vom marokkanischen Staat unterstützt werden
- Die haben auch nichts mit dem Islam zu tun, glaub mir, ich müsste es doch wissen, ich habe mein ganzes Leben dem Islam gegenüber gewidmet- wenn DAESH Recht hätte, wäre ich doch einer der ersten Ansprechpartner- aber sie haben kein Recht, sie benutzt und beschmutzen die Religion
- Man muss den jungen Menschen die wahre Spiritualität aufzeigen, den wahren Glauben nahelegen, nicht diese Gerede vom bewaffneten jihad. Jihan ist der innere Kampf, kein Kampf gegenüber Ungläubigen
- Ich finde auch, dass der deutsche Staat sich mit uns in Verbindung stellen sollte- mit uns Moscheen, islamischen Institutionen; wir stehen der Community nahe, wir wissen was ihnen fehlt, was sie brauchen und wie diese Menschen den Glauben ausleben
- Akzeptanz ist wichtig, den Menschen zu erklären, dass anders sein okay ist, und dass der Islam geschätzt wird
- Der Westen schätzt den Islam nicht, obwohl der Islam auch historisch einen Einfluss auf Europa hatte- damals herrschten die Mauren über die iberischen Halbinsel jahrhundertlang- auch wir haben einen Teil in der europäischen Kultur
- Es ist kein schwarz-weiß denken
- Natürlich ist es klar, dass wir das marokkanische politische System nicht hier hin übertragen können, das ist auch nicht unser Ziel- wir sind eine religiöse Institution. Wir bringen den Menschen den Glauben nahe und wollen einen religiösen Service anbieten, dass in ihrem Heimatland ausgelebt wird- das ist in gewisser Weise ein kultureller Austausch

- In Marokko gab es ein großes Umdenken, was auch den Kampf gegenüber Extremismus angeht, bspw ist Marokko auch an der Bildung an einem moderaten Islam in Frankreich mitbeteiligt
- Warum sollte Frankreich, ein so laizistischer Staat Marokko zuwenden, wenn wir extremistische Ansichten hätten?
- Radikalismus in Marokko ist bedingt durch ökonomische Faktoren und Perspektivlosigkeit, sie sind frustriert. Hier ist der Radikalismus bedingt durch nicht-Akzeptanz und Frustration, bei der junge Muslime ihren Platz in der Gesellschaft nicht finden.

Wie gehen sie mit der neuen Generation um?

- Die neue Generation ist sehr zwiegespalten und das jetzige politische Klima macht es ihnen auch nicht leicht. Das Gerede vom Nafri, von den frauenverachtenden Arabern oder Nordafrikanern drängt sie in eine Ecke, in die sie nicht gehören.
- Sie sind genauso Teil von Deutschland, wie sie Teil von Marokko sind
- Wir bieten ihnen einfach eine Anlaufstelle an, haben aber momentan nicht die Kapazitäten für eine gerechte Seelsorge für die junge Generation- da machen wir eher gebrauch von anderen Institutionen, interkulturellen Vereinen
- Wir sind momentan eher in der Beobachtungsstellen, in denen wir andere darauf aufmerksam machen können
- Wir bauen aber auch gerade unser Kapital aus- wir wollen schon den jungen Marokkanern, die sich hier nicht aufgefangen oder gut aufgehoben fühlen, eine neue Perspektive bieten
- Der Glaube kann dir da Hilfe geben, weil du dich als Muslim nicht in deinem Glauben rechtfertigen muss, du musst niemandem weiß machen, dass du Muslim bist, das ist etwas zwischen dir und Gott
- Für unsere Jungs haben wir aber einen Fußballverein gegründet, sie spielen dort Fußball und einen Trainer haben wir auch
- Wir wollen auch zeigen, dass Moscheen nicht alleine für das Beten geeignet sind, sondern unsere Gläubigen Jungs zusammenbringen
- Wenn wir dann das Kapital haben, können wir auch unseren Mädchen Kurse anbieten, oder andere Angebote aufbereiten
- Wir stehen aber immer noch am Anfang
- Zum einen kann die Moschee dabei beitragen, die muslimische Identität nicht auf eine ethnische oder staatliche Zugehörigkeit abzugrenzen
- und zum anderen sollte die Politik die soziale Identität der jungen Deutsch-Marokkaner anerkennen und sie nicht durch ein falsches oder schlechtes Bild der "nafri-kultur" gleichsetzen.
- Wenn wir akzeptieren, dass sich die jungen Marokkaner hier deutsch und marokkanisch fühlen und die Politiker erkennen, dass der Islam Teil ihrer Identität ist, dann können die Jugendlichen den Hass in der Historie loslassen.

- Die junge Generation fühlt sich derzeit nicht akzeptiert und sucht nach historischen Erklärungen, die begründen, dass der Westen immer Vorurteile gegenüber Muslimen hatte.

Wie sehen Sie die Islamophobie in Deutschland

- Islamophobie ist ein großes Problem, ich denke, das treibt auch die meisten Menschen in die Radikalisierung
- Hass zeugt mehr Hass, gerade im Westen ist der Anstieg rechtsextremistischer Parteien groß, der Anstieg von Gewalt gegenüber Muslimen gewachsen
- Wir wissen von dem Schreien, das dieses Jahr umherging
- Wir bekommen auch Drohungen, und genau das macht uns mehr zu schaffen
- Islamophobie ist etwas, was die Politik bekämpfen muss, es bringt nicht, dass wenn wir Muslime den Menschen weiß machen, dass der Islam nichts mit Terror zu tun hat
- Das muss die Politik in die Hand nehmen

Annex III: Interview Families

1. German-Turkish Family

Interview 1st and 2nd Generation

Interview Participants: Researcher and Interviewees of the first and second generation

Location: Düsseldorf, NRW

- 1972 nach Deutschland (12 Jahre alt)
- nachgeholt vom Vater, mit 2 weiteren Geschwistern
- 1984 geheiratet (24 Jahre alt)

Einfindung

- schwierige erste Zeit, niemand wollte mit mir spielen, ich konnte die Sprache nicht, ich war eine Türkin, war fremd für die anderen
- Durch die Förderung meines Vaters musste ich die deutsche Sprache schnell lernen
- Vorbereitungsklasse (3. Klasse)
- In Berlin waren die Lehrer nicht so nett, die wussten nicht wie sie mich fördern sollten
- In Aachen hat mich mein Vater gefördert, er hat sogar den deutschen Kindern Kleingeld gegeben, damit sie mit mir spielen. Er hat mir auch die neuesten Spielzeuge gekauft, damit ich beliebt war
- Nach einem halben Jahr konnte ich dolmetschen
- Die Ausgrenzung hat mich geprägt, weil ich nie das Gefühl hatte, dass ich Teil der Gesellschaft war

Religion:

- wir wussten nur, wir sind Muslime die anderen sind keine Muslime, sondern Christens
- Meine Eltern haben mir beigebracht, dass Jesus auch ein Prophet ist und demnach Christen uns sehr nah sind, wir sollen keine Angst haben
- Die Religion fand ausschließlich zu Hause statt, es gab damals noch keine Vereine oder Moscheen wo wir hingehen konnten
- Geistliche kamen erst nach Jahren privat angereist zu Haushalten, und dann wurden ein paar Gäste nach Hause eingeladen und so entstand dann kleine Predigten im Wohnzimmer
- Das interessante ist, dass die Leute jetzt viel konservativer sind, meine Großeltern waren viel liberaler
- Die Leute hier, mit denen ich dann groß geworden bin, sind viel konservativer sogar mehr als damals was im Dorf ausgelebt wurde

- Radikalere Ausrichtungen, wie es halt viel früher ausgelebt wurde
- Islam hat eine Wanderung angenommen, eine Wanderung die radikaler und konservativer geworden ist. Ideologisch wollten sie über den Islam ihre Macht zeigen
- $\frac{2}{3}$ der Kinder werden jetzt sogar noch konservativer erzogen, als wir früher
- Heutzutage: Muslime sind viel selbstbewusster geworden, sie wollen es viel offener ausleben, früher war es eher verdeckt, man wollte nicht mehr auffallen, als man schon sowieso ist
- Naja die rutschen grad mehr in den Iran, die Schiiten

Community

- zwei Gruppierungen: einen sehr frei und liberal und die anderen sind nationalistisch
- Die sind entstanden wegen der türkischen Politik, die Politik bringt mehr alles an die Leute und dann spalten sich in ihren Meinungen
- Die Türkei wird technologisch fortschrittlicher, die gewinnen an Selbstbewusstsein, d.h. Das Selbstbewusstsein hier wird gestärkt, früher haben die türkischen Politiker nicht wirklich für uns interessiert. Seit Erdogan haben die deutsch-Türken hier auch eine Stimme, man nimmt uns ernst, man erkennt uns an
- Leute, die früher nicht so religiös waren, beten und zeigen sich religiöser damit sie ins bessere Licht gerückt wird. Religion für ein Zweck ausgenutzt
- Im Zuge der 60 Jahre:
 - Ältere Generation sind bisschen religiöser geworden nach dem Arbeitsleben
 - Zweite Generation: liberal gewesen aber religiöser geworden
 - Dritte Generation: gesellschaftlich ausgegrenzte sind türkisch- nationalistisch geworden, die anderen sind deutsch-türkisch
- Mit 50 Jahren habe ich erst meine kulturelle Adoleszenz abgeschlossen, ich habe mit befreit von all den Vorurteilen und Erwartungen
- Die neue Generation: müssen sich auch entscheiden zwischen den zwei Kulturen und das ist schwer, weil die nicht wissen für welche sie sich entscheiden sollen
- Die Vielzahl an Vereinen und Moscheen hetzt bringen die Menschen mehr zusammen, die Leute machen auch Gebrauch von den Angeboten, die sie hier erhalten, wobei ich glaube, dass es schon mehr geben sollte
- Es sollte mehr gesellschaftliche Vereine geben, nicht religiöse, hier gibt es mehr religiöse Verein
- Ich finde es gut, dass ein Förderverein von Ditib gibt, die geben dann Frühstücke und andere Sachen
- Ditib: Vertiefung des Glaubens, aber auch Menschen sind näher an sich
- Aber es sollte mehr Integrationskurse oder dayanisma Kurse geben
- Ditib hätte locker die Kapazitäten dazu, e.g. Mieterschutzvereine gründen
- Es fehlen hier so an kreativen Sachen: Nähkurse, Malkurse, Sprachkurse, Essenskurse,
- Sportkurse gibt es ja schon

Leben in Deutschland:

- sehr umständlich, sehr kämpferisch, ich musste viele Niederlagen einstecken, immer mich rechtfertigen
 - „Wenn es Ihnen hier nicht gefällt, dann können Sie zurück in die Türkei“
- Ich kann jetzt nicht per se sagen, dass es mir hier besser ergangen ist, als in der Türkei- ich war schon immer eine fleißige Schülerin, ich glaube ich wäre in Kappadokien glücklich geworden
- Meine Kinder haben hier eine bessere Chance als in der Türkei, beruflich und schulisch bessere Qualität
- Ich könnte aber auch nicht jetzt in der Türkei leben, ich bin aus der Kultur da herausgewachsen, ich bin nicht Teil der typisch türkischen Gesellschaft
- Ich hätte mehr aus meiner Situation machen sollen- schulisch meine ich
- Die Zukunft von Deutsch-Türken hier: $\frac{1}{3}$ wird es noch schwer haben wegen ihrem Bildungsgrad und ihrer Integrationsfähigkeit, der Rest wird es guthaben.

Einfindung

- gewollt gekommen, wegen politischen Unruhen, jeden Tag sind 5-10 Menschen getötet wurden
- Bochum Universität: da gab es Sprachkurse, danach an der RWTH studiert
- Mit der Zeit habe ich verstanden: Ich bin fremd, nicht wirklich willkommen
- Ich wollt nicht wirklich zurück, weil ich mich hier sicher gefühlt habe und hier die Lebensbedingungen besser waren, als wäre ich in die Zukunft gekommen
- Gewohnheit; du du hinterfragst nach einer Zeit die Sachen nicht, natürlich erfährst du trotzdem Diskriminierung aber aus Trotz bleibst du hier
- Es gab keinen Grund sich zu verstellen
- Die Türken haben sich in ihre eigenen Viertel verzogen, in ihre eigene Distrikte
- Die damaligen Türken wollten ja eigentlich zurück, die kamen als Gastarbeiter, man hat ja nicht gedacht die bleiben hier deswegen war alles okay dass es diese Parallelgesellschaften gab
- Ich als Student wollte aber natürlich länger bleiben, deswegen habe ich die Sprache schnell gelernt
- Ich lebte in einem Studentenwohnheim mit verschiedenen Menschen
- Da ich mein Studium selbst finanzieren musste wegen der inflation in der Türkei, deswegen hab ich selbst gearbeitet (Kellner, etc.)
- Später hab ich meine Frau kennengelernt

Religion und Erziehung

- In der Türkei leben sie den Islam lockerer finde ich
- Hier sind sie strenger, religiöser weil sie sich die Türken hier abgrenzen, das ist aber beidseitig, nicht einseitig, die Deutschen befürworten die Abgrenzung
- Die Religion hier fügt die Türken zusammen, sie fühlen sich mehr einbezogen und es entsteht auch eine kleine community

- Im Vergleich zu den Türken in der Türkei sind die Menschen hier viel religiöser und nationalistischer
 - Abgrenzung, Fremdengefühl, sie sind Bürger zweiter Klasse deswegen Identität mehr türkisch
- Du kannst dich integrieren wie du willst, trotzdem bist du nicht deutsch meiner Ansicht nach, deswegen nehmen auch viele junge Menschen eher sich der türkischen Kultur an
- Und nach dem 11. September sind die Muslime sowieso Feinde geworden, deswegen Muslime hier als Feinde abgestempelt, zumindest haben sie sich so gefühlt
- Es entstand ein Wir vs. Ihr Gefühl, und natürlich gibst du nicht deine Religion oder Identität dafür auf, dass dich andere akzeptieren. Du willst für das akzeptiert werden, das du bist
- Zu meiner Zeit in 1978 gab es noch keine Moscheen, es gab nur Kulturvereine aber keine streng islamischen
- Da ich in der Türkei aufgewachsen bin, hab ich den Islam in dem Sinne nicht vermisst weil ich in der Gesellschaft groß geworden bin und nichts hinterfragt habe
- Erst als in Deutschland angekommen bin, und mich Leute nach meinem Glauben ausgefragt haben, habe ich mich nach dem Islam und der Lehre gesehnt
- Durch diese Kulturvereine gab es dann die Idee eine Moschee zu errichten, wir haben uns an den türkischen Staat dafür gerichtet und durch Spenden konnten wir in den Jahrzehnten eine Moschee aufbauen
- Je älter du wirst, desto religiöser wirst du, weil du erkennst dass du dem Tod nahe bist, deswegen sehnst du dich mehr nach der Religion
- Jetzt ist es gut, dass es DITIB gibt, da sich Menschen hier auch nach religiösen Fragen oder aber auch bei der Todesmesse an jemanden wenden können
- Die Türken sind viel selbstbewusster geworden, durch die Generationen sie beherrschen die Sprache, haben einen guten Bildungsgrad, sie können sich verteidigen
- Ich finde es sollte aber verstaatlicht werden, der deutsche Staat sollte der Fragmentierung entgegen wirken demnach würde auch diese Feindbild Darstellung wegfallen und es gäbe auch weniger Extremisten
- Islam sollte als eine der Staatsreligion anerkannt werden
- Andere islamische Vereine haben einen viel größeren Einfluss auf die türkische Community, Milli Görüş, Süleymanî, Gülen —> they impose their own thinking onto the community, DITIB doesn't do that
- DITIB trägt auch zum kulturellen und interreligiösen Dialog bei, da sie den Menschen hier auch behilflich sind bei Bestattungen (Beerdigungen), religiösen Angelegenheiten, oder auch bei Ehelichung
- für Jugendliche und Frauen gibt es dann auch Sportvereine, Frauenvereine von DITIB, Studentenbeihilfe. Das alles trägt zur Integration bei, weil sie sich politisch da raushalten, und nur kreativ Menschen fördern wollen

Community

- Unterschied zwischen den Generationen ist enorm hoch, die dritte Generation ist viel selbstbewusster und gebildeter

- Bildungsniveau ist höher, die Menschen sind hier nun als Deutsche akzeptiert
- Der Lebensstandard hat sich auch gebessert, die Community ist stärker geworden auch bei politischen Fragen, weil sie mehr Entscheidungsmacht haben
- Es fehlt trotzdem an Anerkennung und es gibt hier viel zu viel Vorurteile
- Man müsste denen nicht mehr an social capital anbieten, sondern mehr Anerkennung, man sollte sie nicht als Fremde sehen
- Sie haben hier die Vereine die sie brauchen, die politische Macht
- Der türkische Staat hat sogar mehr Einfluss auf die Deutsch Türken hier weil sie ihnen mehr Beachtung schenken, sahiplenyor, Almanlar‘dan bekleidiklerini türkler veriyorlar

Leben in Deutschland

- angenehmes Leben, in der Türkei wäre es anders verlaufen nicht besser, sondern schlechter (Chancen, Bildungschancen)
- Meine Kinder haben hier viel bessere Chancen als in der Türkei, ich weiß nicht ob ich ihnen das Leben hier geben könnte, dass ich ihnen hier geben kann
 - Die haben hier viel bessere Bildungschancen
 - Die haben hier ein viel sicheres Leben
- Kismet inaniyorum, ich bin zufrieden wie man Leben hier verlaufen
- Ich hätte mir nur gerne von Anfang mehr die Anerkennung, die Chancengleichheit gewünscht, nicht Bürger zweiter Klasse
- Mein Migrationshintergrund sagt nicht viel über mein Können und Wissen aus, sondern nur was über meine Haar- und Hautfarbe.

Interview 3rd generation

Interview participant: two male, 27 and 33 years old

Location: Düsseldorf

1) 33 years old, Manager:

Identifizierung, Herkunft und Religion

- identifiziere mich als weder noch, neue hybrid Spezies
- in allen Belangen besser
- du kannst nicht zu beiden gehören, du erfindest du dich komplett neu, bringst dir deine eigene Identität bei, von beiden Kulturen und von beiden Gesellschaften, die Werte und Eigenschaften sowie Schnittmengen
- Sinus kurve auf und ab, zu einer Seite warst du mal türkisch mal deutsch, natürlich war am Anfang das türkische stärker wegen der Familie, aber Freunde und Bekannte ziehen dich auch auf die deutsche Seite

- es ist etwas Neues, es ist auch kein Zwischending, sonst sitzt du ja zwischen zwei Stühlen, ich möchte nicht zwischen zwei Stühlen sei, es ist eher so eine Hybride Werteform
- du wachst kulturell und traditionell mit dem Islam auf, was die Eltern vorleben, nicht konservativ bedingt mit Vorerfahrung von Tanten, die sich losgerissen haben
- es ist ein größter Faktor
- Standard, öffentlich dass der Islam dazu gehört, weil du das als offenstichtlich hinnimmst, es kommt zu einem Punkt wo dich hinterfragst und Sachen nicht verstehst, aber dann musst du entscheiden zwischen dem kulturellen Glauben und der Glaube an sich
- hin- und hergerissen zwischen Islam und Christentum
- wenn es ein politischer Glaube: liberal, bei vielen Gläubigen ist der Glaube der Mittelpunkt und bei mir ist der Glaube einfach mitintegriert aber nicht der Mittelpunkt, sondern eher ein Bestandteil
- Nationalität kann man ablegen, nicht als eher mit jemand mit nationalität betrachte, aber Glaube ist eher prägnanter es bleibt, es ist ein bestandteil
 - Aber was beeinflusst mich mehr? da müsste ich mir die Wertennorm betrachten, teils- teils
 - Pluspunkt der deutschen Gesellschaft: Bildungssystem, Hinterfragen und Normen hat mich geprägt
 - Konsens wird geschaffen mit Religion und der Identität
- was die türken unterscheidet ist der politische und kulturelle Islam, keine Muslime leben den reinen Islam
- Gemeinschaftsgefühl ist gleich, man identifiziert sich miteinander aber die Auslebung und Auserlegung ist anders

Einstellung gegenüber dem Westen:

- kommt auf die verschiedenen Regionen
- in der westlich- demokratischen Gesellschaft fühlt man sich in der ähnlichen Umgebung wohler, weil man damit groß geworden ist und man damit groß geworden ist, dann spielen da aber gesellschaftliche aspekte wieder (kultureller Aspekt)
- dieses Wir vs. Die nimmt ab, da es auch diese Völkerwanderung gibt und die Muslime auch sich vermischen; das kann man nicht pauschalisieren, da trotzdem Islamophobie da ist und gesellschaftlich gibt es verschieden Gruppierung
- Islamophobie oder Rassismus: teil-teils, kommt auf den Umstand an, manchmal ärgert es mich extrem, manchmal interessiert es mich kaum
- es kommt eher darauf an, wie die Mehrheit auf Rassismus und Islamophobie reagiert, weil wenn die AFD bspw mehr Stimmen gewinnt, macht mich das schon unsicher und ich frage mich hallo?! denkt ihr alle so?
- Was uns bspw von Italienern und Griechen unterscheidet ist der Religionsfaktor, wir haben ähnliche Kulturen, Temperamente aber die werden eher akzeptiert, weil es Christen sind und dann fragt man sich warum wird man aufgrund seiner Religion diskriminiert

Erziehung

- die gleichen Zugangschancen wie bei meinen deutschen Freunden entstand auf keinen Fall
- ich denke meine Eltern haben aus ihrer Situation das beste gemacht, das betrifft auch die Erziehung mit uns, mein Vater war sehr aggressiv am Anfang, der mich auch geschlagen hat, aufgrund seiner Krankheit nehme ich ihm das nicht übel
- sie waren sehr liebevoll und haben versucht das beste für ihre Kinder rauszuholen, sie haben sich für uns eingesetzt, die hatten natürlich nicht die gleichen Chancen wie Akademiker, aber das war ganz in Ordnung wie sie es gemacht haben
- Ich hatte aufgrund meiner Herkunft und Religion nicht die gleichen Chancen wie meine Deutschen Freunde, wir waren damals die Minderheit in der Klasse und ich wurde öfters mal als der Lieblingstürke genannt (positiver Rassismus),
- Wäre ich blond und deutsch gewesen, hätte ich es auch leichter in meiner Freizeit sei es in Clubsbesuchen oder auch im Freundeskreis
- als ich den Wehrdienst abgeleistet habe: hieß es warum bist du hier? Du bist doch kein Deutscher! Du kannst doch einfach gehen... Da habe ich mich wirklich als Türke gefühlt, ich habe mich als Teil nicht wahrgenommen. Hätte ich sie darauf konfrontiert, wäre sie ausgewichen, es war ein impulsives handeln von meinem Vorgesetzten, es zeigt schon was sie darüber denken

Community und social networks

- aus meinen direkten Erfahrungen wird es schon besser als vorher
- meine Generation wächst ja mit den Ausländern in der Schule auf, deswegen ist es für sie nicht so schwer
- es sind schon 50 Jahre her, aber man wird auch nicht wirklich akzeptiert, hat natürlich auch mit dem Islamischen Terror zu tun nach 11. september oder auch in den medien
- Vorurteilen kommt von Eltern, nicht von Kindern, Kinder wachsen mit dem Gedankengut der Eltern auf, es prägt sie
- Medien spielen eine große Rolle
- Es wird in der türkischen community zwei Gruppierungen geben: die eine, die so wie ich so eine hybride soziale Identität haben und die andere Gruppe, die sich mehr der Türkei zuwenden, wenn sie nicht akzeptiert wird
- Die türken haben hier keine Lobby, die konnten keine gemeinsame Stimme finden, das hängt aber auch damit zusammen dass es auch hier sehr viele Strömungen gibt, so kulturelle, politische und religiöse strömungen, es gibt hier keine richtige Haltung und keine kohäsion untereinander, aber wir konnten keine vernünftig große Lobby einrichten, die die Interesse der Deutsch-Türken hier in Deutschland vertreten.
- Ich glaube deswegen hadert es auch mit der Akzeptanz der Türken hier, weil wir keine gemeinsame Stimme haben
- Die meisten identifizieren sich dann durchs Türkisch-sein eher und sagen okay, wir sind Türken, wir müssen einen Standpunkt gegen XYZ haben, aber das ist eher selten

Radikalisierung von jungen Muslimen

- Radikale fühlen sich hier nicht akzeptiert und das fängt von der zweiten Generation an,
- natürlich wird man beeinflusst vom Freundeskreis und von extremistischen Gruppen, die dich auffangen, aber Ausgangspunkt ist, dass man sich hier nicht angekommen fühlt und die Transformationsprozesse der Eltern spielen hier eine große Rolle
- in der türkischen community ist es mehr nationalistisch geprägt, also man wird eher nationalistisch radikalisiert
- Heimatland der Eltern spielen eine große Rolle denke ich, in der Türkei herrscht ja Säkularismus und es wird dort viel mehr auf den Nationalstolz aus als eher Religion
- unsere Eltern, die auch hergekommen sind, waren eher politisch aktiv (rechts vs. links) da war nichts mit Religion
- Es heißt ja nichts umsonst “Ne mutlu Türk’üm diyene” , der Nationalstolz herrscht dabei so eine große rolle, dass die Religion in den Hintergrund rückt
- bei Arabern ist das anders

DITIB

- Ditib geht gar nicht auf nationalstolz ein, es wird mehr auf Religion eingegangen, die Hocas waren sehr moderat und humanistisch, ich habe nie diese Radikalisierung über DITIB wahrgenommen, auch keine politische aktivitäten
- es gab keine nationalistische predigten
- DITIB bekommt ja die Gebete und die Lehrtexte aus der Türkei, aber es wurde nie wirklich sichtbar und spürbar inwieweit die Türkei da Einfluss hat
- Die Predigten passen sich jetzt auch mehr der Generationen an, die älteren Generation waren sehr Türkei gebunden jetzt ändert sich das ja alles deswegen passen sich die Predigten dann an

Zukunft:

- interkulturelle Veranstaltungen sollten das mindeste sein
- ich wünschte mir, dass die Medien mehr Lobbyarbeit für uns machen, aber es sollte mehr eine Lobby machen
- es sollte einen türkischen oder muslimischen Landespräsidenten bzw Ministerpräsidenten geben und auch wenn er sich als Muslim identifiziert es kein großer Aufruhr gibt
- ich wünschte mir mehr bildung in Schulen, Chancengleichheit und Themen wie Religion und Islam viel intensiver und weltoffener behandelt wird
 - auch dass die Lehrer da geschult und besser unterrichtet werden
- Auch eine europäische einheitspolitik gegenüber Islam und die Statistik zu Religionszugehörigkeit verschwindet, und die Statistiken werden total aus dem Kontext gerissen und für ihre eigenen Zwecke genutzt
- die Teilung zwischen Muslimen, Christen, Juden etc pp. ist total überholt und nicht mehr up to date
- Religion sollte einfach keine Rolle mehr spielen

2) Interview, 27 years old, logistics manager

- wohnhaft in Nürnberg
- Arbeitest als Logistiker
- Verheiratet und keine Kinder

Identifizierung

- Deutsch-Türke wahrgenommen, weil ich zwischen zwei Kulturen aufgewachsen bin, ich sehe mich mehr Deutsch, aber die Gesellschaft sieht mich als Türken
- In meiner Jugend wusste ich wofür ich mich identifizieren soll und jetzt aber kein Verlangen mich unter zu ordnen
- Wenn ich mich auf etwas fokussiere, dann würde ich sagen ich bin Muslim
- Ich würde sagen, das Türkischsein geht irgendwie auch mit dem Muslimsein hin her, aber ich identifiziere mich mehr dem Islam
- Ich kann mich nicht so geben, wie ich mich fühle der druck vom Westen ist sah stark und nicht so gern angesehen ist
- Das hat mich auch in meiner Jugend geprägt, ich bin distanzierter von den Menschen und ich muss aufpassen was ich sage, und gebe ungern viel von mir preis, manche verstehen es aber andere tun es eher weniger
- Ich habe mich sehr verändert in den letzten 15 Jahren, weil ich echt nach Identität gesucht habe, und jetzt ist es mir wichtiger in Einklang leben, es muss harmonisch sein
- Auf der Suche nach Identität schloss ich mich eher mit gleichgesinnten zusammen, auch türkische, fühlst dich mehr der Türkei zugehörig, ich wurde nicht wirklich streng religiöser, aber nationalistischer in dem Sinne, das wuchs auf jeden Fall
 - Wir schaukelten uns hoch, wir haben. uns gegenseitig bestätigt im Türkischsein
- Es hat sich aber mit der Zeit verändert- ab den 20ern als du mehr mit Arbeit, sozialen Umgang gepflegt hast und dann auch mehr in der Gesellschaft integriert bist und du auch per se keine Zeit mehr für dein altes Umfeld hattest

Erziehung, Religion,

- Nationalstolz wurde in meiner Erziehung nicht bestärkt, der Islam wurde ausgelebt zum Freitagsgebet, an Bayram etc. aber es wurde jetzt nicht 5 mal am Tag vorgebetet
- Frühe Wahrnehmung der Erziehungsstil war jetzt auch nicht da, es stand nie wirklich zur Debatte zwischen meinen Freunden, ich habe jetzt auch nicht Schweinefleisch gegessen, aber so aktiv unterschiede habe ich nicht wahrgenommen
- Meine Eltern haben meine Einstellung zum Türkisch Sein und dem Nationalstolz wahrgenommen, die haben es nicht eingeschränkt aber die haben schon ein scharfes Auge drauf geworfen, weil sie Angst hatten, dass ich nationalistisch wurde
- Erziehungsstil war zwar strengere, aber nicht wirklich auf die Nationalität und Religion

Perception of the West

- Ich hatte nicht die gleichen Bildungschancen wie meine deutschen Freunde, auf gar keinen Fall
- Verhalten der Leute dir gegenüber sind distanzierter, sind vorsichtiger in ihrer Wortwahl, das kommt mir dann gezwungen vor und auch auf der schule die Notengebung hat man sich benachteiligt gefühlt
- Das spiegelt sich auch in der Gesellschaft wider
- Ich fühle mich schon westlich, weil ich wohne und arbeite, aber sobald ich aus dem Westen wegziehen würde habe ich keine Probleme haben mich woanders auch, ich fühle mich halt in Deutschland wohl, weil es meine Heimat ist,
- Ich fühle mich dennoch als Bürger zweiter Klasse wegen meiner Herkunft und wegen meiner Religion, für die Deutschen macht es keinen Unterschied ob du jetzt Türke oder Muslim bist, für die Deutschen bist du das gleiche
- Wenn ein Türke ein Schweinewurstchen essen würde, wäre er glatt mehr akzeptiert als jemand der es nicht tut
- Auf der Arbeit: es gibt Leute, mit denen ich echt gut verstehe, aber andere, mit denen ich mich nicht gut verstehe, ich weiß aber nicht ob es an meiner Herkunft liegt bzw. an meiner Religion
- Alltagsrassismus und diskriminierung prägen mich schon, ich denke auch, dass der Großteil der Deutschen rassistisch sind, und es gab auf jeden fall rassistische Kommentare und es gab auf jeden fall Leute die sich dann abfällig äußern Auch gegenüber meiner Frau bspw.
- Würde ich die gleichen wirtschaftlichen und gesundheitlichen Bedingungen in einem anderen Land haben, würde ich sofort wegziehen
- Ich fühle mich also schon teil der Gesellschaft aber eher als der teil der Bürger 2. Klasse

Türkische Community

- Unsere Generation hat es schon besser als die zweite Generation, auch wenn wir nicht die gleichen Bildungschancen wie die Deutschen haben wir es aktuell besser als die Deutschen
- Die türkische community ist schon selbstbewusster geworden, die wissen auch was sie wollen und stehen auch für ihre Rechte ein
- Die sehen sich als Teil der Gesellschaft und wollen akzeptiert werden, werden aber nicht voll akzeptiert
- Die türkische community dem Westen gegenüber offener, als bspw die arabische, weil wir auch historisch oder politisch uns irgendwie damit identifizieren können, wir sind anpassungsfähiger
- Community stakeholder sind schon wichtig und die tragen auch schon viel dazu bei, dass die türkische community auch interkulturell und interreligiös arbeiten sollen
- Ich glaube auch nicht dass eine Verstaatlichung des Islams durch den deutschen Staat was bringen würde, die wüssten gar nicht was die muslimische community braucht, die hätten nicht das Fingerspitzengefühl, die wüssten auch nicht wie man was etabliert, Muslime würden es auch nicht wahrnehmen

- Ditib hat schon einen großen Einfluss auf die türkische community auch wegen den Kulturvereinen (glaube ich nur)
- Die Türken hier identifizieren sich mehr mit dem Islam, weniger mit dem Nationalstolz

Religion und Radikalisierung

- Menschen fühlen sich nicht akzeptiert und die suchen ja nach zugehörig, deswegen radikalieren sie sich
 - Verstehen kann ich es nur zu einem bestimmten Grad bzw bedingt, ich würde nie Extremisten oder Radikalen zusprechen
- Die Religion spielt dann eine übergeordnete Rolle, die Religion bestimmt für sie die den Alltag
- Das Angebot an religiösen Vereinen steht ja aktuell. Ich wünsche mir jetzt nicht mehr

Zukunft in Deutschland:

- Ich wünsche mir mehr Akzeptanz, Chancengleichheit, Bildungsungleichheit
- Ich wünsche mir die Stärkung von türkischen Vereinen und mehr Programme
- Wenn ich mich zugehörig fühle, zu Hause fühle was will ich denn woanders und ich weiß auch nicht wie
- Meine Kindern sollen sich nicht nur auf Deutschland beschränken, die sollten hier auf jeden Fall ihre Schulbildung absolvieren, die sollen sich ein Land oder ein Leben aussuchen, wo sie gleich sind

2. German-Moroccan Families

Interview: First and Second Generation

Interview participant: family members and Researcher

Location: Düsseldorf, NRW

Interview Language: German, French, Arabic

Transcribing in German

- Familie kommt aus Nordmarokko, Provinz Nador
 - ländliche Gegend im Landkreis Rif
 - leben jetzt in NRW
 - erste, zweite, dritte und vierte Generation verteilt in NRW und Hessen
 - Interview mit 3 Generationen
- Vater kam 1968 nach Deutschland, um im Bergbau zu arbeiten, davor auch schon in Algerien im Bergbau tätig

- wenige Marokkaner noch damals, und es gab Schwierigkeiten die deutsche Sprache zu erlernen, da Vater nur eine Grundschulausbildung hatte
- jeden Tag eine 12- stunden Schicht mit anderen Arbeitern aus der Türkei, Griechenland, Italien etc.
- haben mit 8 in einem Zimmer in einem Wohnheim gewohnt, ähnlich wie in Jugendherbergen
- schwierige Zeit, da Heimweh sehr groß war und die Fremde sehr kühl, außer den anderen ausländischen Mitarbeitern war es sehr schwer mit Einheimischen sich zu verknüpfen
- Es fehlte einfach mal zu sprechen, mal einander sein Leid klagen, mal mit mehreren zusammensitzen und ohne Problem sich zu verständigen
- 1972 kam Familie dann hinzu im Rahmen der Familienzusammenführung
- insgesamt 3 Kinder kamen von Marokko hinzu, danach noch, die in DE geboren wurden
- ab den 1970ern mehr Marokkanische Familien, deswegen wurden Kulturvereine gegründet, die diese Familien zusammenbrachte, diese Vereine haben danach auch Moscheen mitintegriert, haben lokale Imams eingeladen, die bspw. vorgebetet haben
- Interview wird zum Teil vom Sohn übersetzt

1) Wie in Deutschland eingefunden?

- erste Zeit war sehr schwer, aber meine Kollegen waren nett
- wir haben uns halt mit Händen und Füßen unterhalten, ich konnte Französisch bzw verstand es, das half mir mit den Italienern zu sprechen
- bei islamischen Feiertagen dann, habe ich mich mit meinen türkischen Kollegen bspw ausgetauscht, es half dass es auch dort muslimische Brüder gab, die verstanden dass ich kein Alkohol trinke oder kein Schweinefleisch esse- es gab mir schon Sicherheit
- ich ging alle 2 Jahre nach Marokko zurück, natürlich schickte ich meiner Familie auch Geld jeden Monat; da mein Vater krank war, waren wir auf meine Verdienste angewiesen
- ich rekrutierte dann auch viele meiner Cousins und Freunde für die Arbeit in Deutschland, wir machten echt gutes Geld und in Marokko hatten wir nicht sonderlich große Arbeitsmöglichkeiten, am Ende war ich nicht ganz alleine, da mein jüngerer Bruder und paar andere männliche Familienmitglieder dazu kamen, das war echt gut
- 1966 heiratete ich dann, und wurde kurze Zeit später zum ersten Mal Vater, natürlich besuchte ich dann meine Familie jedes Jahr, ich vermisste sie sehr- meine Frau und meine zwei Kinder
- Ich war sehr froh, als ich sie nach Deutschland holen durfte, das gab mir ein Gefühl von Heimat
- aber als Mann fällst du mit deinen schwarzen Haaren halt nicht unbedingt stark auf, aber als meine Frau dann mit ihrer traditionellen kleidung in unserer Straße herum lief,

waren alle Augen auf sie- sie sah halt sehr anders aus mit ihrem Gewand und dem Kopftuch

- Ich fand es eher witzig, weil alle Augen auf uns gerichtet waren und die Deutschen sehr neugierig waren aber auch nicht sofort fragen wollten

Frau: - ich habe eher gelitten, in Nador war ich eine von ihnen und hier war ich auf einmal eine Außerirdische, eine von den Ausländern; das Gefühl mochte ich gar nicht. Die Menschen waren nicht jetzt sonderlich unhöflich, aber diese Blicke waren schon unangenehm.

- ja ja, das verstehe ich. Aber zum Glück war meine Frau nicht die einzige, da immer mehr Marokkaner dazu kamen
- und dann haben wir gemeinsam mit anderen einen ersten kleinen Verein gegründet. Ich würde jetzt nicht sagen, dass es ein offizieller Verein war, aber schon so eine Art Zusammenkunft,
- ich denke, dass hat vielen geholfen, vor allem unseren Kindern, weil sie dann ein Stück Heimat hier hatten; ich wollte auf keinen Fall, dass die hier deutsch werden
- Warum? Weil sie Muslime sind! Das war mir sehr wichtig. Natürlich sollten sie sich integrieren bzw arbeiten, aber bitte nicht ihre Identität aufgeben.
- Sie sollten ja auch die Möglichkeit haben, irgendwann dann nach Marokko zurück zu gehen, als gebildete, die in Europa gearbeitet haben.

Erziehung, Islam zu Hause

- ich muss zugeben, am Anfang war ich nicht sonderlich streng religiös, ich habe sogar Alkohol ab und zu getrunken, aber als ich geheiratet habe ich das abgelegt diesen lebensstil- aber ich war jetzt auch nicht sehr streng religiös danach- so bin ich auch nicht groß geworden, ich habe aber Pflichten als Mann und als Oberhaupt der Familie
- Mudawana ist sehr wichtig. Familienrecht, und ich war nun das oberste Haupt einer eigenen Familie, das heißt, ich musste meine Familie regeln, meine Söhne, meine Tochter, meine Ehe. Das was ich sage, war Gesetz... aber natürlich war nicht alles von mir bestimmt, meine Frau hat da auch viel Mitsprache

FRAU: ja, und ich hatte auch die Aufgabe, dass meine Kinder hier ihre Muttersprache nicht verlernen und unsere Traditionen respektieren und diese auch kennen. Man, war ich streng am Anfang- ich wollte ja nicht dass sie zu deutsch wären

- irgendwann wollten wir schon zurück nach Marokko aber wir wussten nicht wann, und wenn wir dann zurück gingen sollten die anderen nicht denken dass wir eingedeutscht sind, weißt du? oder noch schlimmer: den Christentum angenommen haben, weißt du es gibt diese Angst seit dem auch die Franzosen und Spanier bei uns einmarschiert sind- dass wir uns zu deren Werten bekennen
- Wichtig war aber dennoch, dass sie zur Schule gingen, lesen und schreiben lernen und Deutsch sprechen

- Mein ältester Sohn hatte das etwas schwieriger, er war schon älter und hat mitbekommen, dass andere Kinder nicht mit ihm spielen wollten, weil er anders war
- er war gekränkt und zog sich zurück- das war aber nur am Anfang so...

FRAU: -ich hatte so Angst, dass er gar nicht mehr glücklich ist und spielt aber zum Glück gab es dann diesen Verein und er hat sich dann mit anderen marokkanischen Kindern angefreundet, das gab ihm Selbstvertrauen- und dann als er auch noch besser Deutsch konnte, ging es auch in der Schule besser

- ja danach kam es dann auch dazu, dass andere Kinder mit ihm spielen wollten, vor allem Mädels (Gelächter), die fanden ihn halt süß mit seiner braunen Haut und seinen schwarzen Locken
- Islam war mir in dem Sinne wichtig, damit meine Kinder auch trotzdem Muslim sein lernen, und wissen was man von ihnen erwartet, wir haben den Islam vorgelebt vor allem damit sie auch den Ursprung zu ihrer Heimat nicht verlieren
- wir haben gefastet oder haben zu den festlichkeiten Feiern organisiert, wir haben auch gebetet und ich wollte, dass die Kinder das lernen
- wir haben aber auch viel Musik gehört und haben uns gefreut als wir dann in den 1980, 1990ern arabischen Fernsehen empfangen haben- das war toll.

Frau: Ja zu Hause war es dann wie in Nador, wenn du deine Augen geschlossen hast

- Fehlte nur noch die Sonne und die Mandelbäume...
- Ich muss sagen, dass ich Widerworte nicht duldet, das wussten meine Kinder auch, die haben das gespürt. Das was ich sagte und machte, war auch Gesetz

Frau: das ist in Marokko nun mal so gewesen, aber jetzt ist schon anders, wenn ich so meine Tochter sehe...

Bild gegenüber dem Westen:

- ich bin sehr dankbar, dass ich hier arbeiten und leben darf, weil es meiner finanziellen und sozialen Situation sehr zum Besseren kam
- in Nador, wäre ich ein einfacher Hirte oder Bauer gewesen, das hätte nicht viel an mir geändert, aber ich weiß nicht, ob ich meinen Kindern das hätte anbieten können, wie es in Deutschland getan habe. Meine Söhne haben eine Ausbildung abgeschlossen, meine Tochter ist sogar Krankenschwester geworden.
- Ich mag die Deutschen, aber am Anfang hatte es unsere familie sehr schwer, das vergisst man nicht so einfach
- und natürlich kann ich sie nicht mit den Franzosen oder so gleichstellen, aber ich habe so ein gewisses Misstrauen gegenüber den Eliten in Europa; ich bin auch stolzer Marokkaner und uns ist viel Unrechtes widerfahren
- Aber natürlich, ich will nicht pauschalisieren

Frau: Mich stört es, wie der Westen über Islam und jetzt Nordafrikaner denkt; sie haben sogar diesen abwertenden Begriff: Nafri, das ist nicht schön

- ja das stimmt. Nicht alle Nordafrikaner sind gleich, diejenigen, die böses tun werden immer in den Medien groß dargestellt, das ist unfair
- Was ist mit denjenigen, die dieses Land aufgebaut haben? an die denkt man dann nicht...

Frau: Manchmal will ich zurück nach Marokko aber meine Kinder und Enkel sind hier, wir haben jetzt sogar einen Urenkel... das ist das auch noch miterlebe. Dann können wir nicht alles aufgeben

- Ja Deutschland ist für uns ein Stück weit Heimat geworden, aber ich würde nichts auf der Welt für Marokko eintauschen- ich vermisse es sehr... wäre ich nicht krank, dann würde ich gut dort leben, aber es ist dort nicht so weiterentwickelt wie in hier in Deutschland... wer weiß... vielleicht hätte ich auch meine fast 75 Jahre dort nicht erlebt.
-

Interview: 2nd Generation

Interview participant: male and female, 55 and 50

Language: German

- Papa schwärmt immer, wenn er von Marokko spricht... Dann kommen meinen Eltern immer Tränen
- naja, mir geht es ähnlich, aber ich habe jetzt auch einen großen Bezug nach Deutschland, wer weiß... vielleicht kommen mir mit 80 Jahren die Tränen, wenn ich über Düsseldorf reden (Gelächter)

Mann Einfindung:

- Ich bin in Marokko geboren und habe dort bis zu meinem 7. Lebensjahr gelebt
- danach sind wir mit Mama und meinen zwei jüngeren Geschwistern nach Deutschland ausgewandert
- ich wollte das gar nicht, vor allem, weil ich mich in Marokko super wohl gefühlt habe und eine Freundesbande hatte
- Ich war jeden Tag draußen, hab gespielt. ich wollte meine Freunde nicht verlassen
- Aber natürlich musste ich mit... und in Deutschland erging es mir auch die erste Zeit nicht gut. ich fand nicht so viele Freunde, die einzigen mit denen ich gespielt habe, waren Türken oder andere Marokkaner, so habe ich dann auch die erste Zeit kein Deutsch gelernt. wollte ich auch nicht- aber mein Papa hat mich gezwungen haha, er wollte nicht dass ich analphabet werde, was auch Sinn macht

- Es brauchte seine Zeit bis ich mich eingefunden habe, aber als es mit der Schule bergauf ging und ich Freunde bzw Freundinnen machte gefiel es mir immer besser
- Aber Deutsch habe ich mich nie gefühlt, ich fühle mich in erster Linie als Marokkaner oder Amazighs (Berber) wenn man mich ganz genau fragt. und Muslim sein gehört da genau so dazu
- Deutschland ist irgendwo eine Art Heimat, aber ich glaube das beruht nicht auf Gegenseitigkeit- in ihren Augen bin ich der Nafri von nebenan.
- Ich bekomme das schon auf der Arbeit gelegentlich zu hören: dann fragen mich meine Kollegen über die Kölner Silvesternacht aus und wollen wissen, ob wir alle so groß geworden sind?! Ich bin doch nicht der Kummerkasten von den ganzen Deutschen, die sich über Marokkaner oder so aufregen- die sollen mich in Ruhe lassen
- Ich will aber schon, dass meine Kinder hier erfolgreich sind, ich wünschte mir nur dass die Deutschen diese auch anerkennen aber das wird nie so sein. Ich habe meiner Tochter schon gesagt, sie soll, wenn sie ihr Medizinstudium beendet nach Marokko, da wird sie behandelt wie eine Königin... Außerdem,
- auf jeden fall, am Anfang war es schwer, später wurde es immer besser- ich wurde dann auch der Dolmetscher meine Familie- gerade für meine Mutter; so Arztbesuche, Behördengänge oder aber auch Einkäufe übernahmen wir dann immer gemeinsam, ich habe schon früh Aufgaben und eine gewisse Verantwortung auferlegt bekommen, was normal ist, immer hin bin ich der stellvertretende Mann im Haus gewesen
- Ist ja auch normal, ich bin der erstgeborene und dann auch noch Vater der erste männliche Stellvertreter- mein Vater machte mir schon früh klar, dass wenn er nicht mehr da ist, ich die nächste Entscheidungsperson bin- da war ich gerade mal 8 haha
- Ich glaub das gefiel meiner Schwester nicht so gut, die war schon immer ein bisschen rebellisch haha, aber es war ja nicht so, als hätten wir sie erdrückt oder zu Sachen gezwungen, meine Eltern haben uns religiös aber auch in gewissen Maßen moderner erzogen, als andere Marokkaner oder Muslime hier denke ich

Islam im Haushalt

- ich ging dann auch früh zum arabisch unterricht und zu den Koranschulen, die waren dann von den marokkanischen Vereinen organisiert und die Imame kamen aus Marokko, die waren zum Teil auch sehr streng und man hat gemerkt, die haben ein anderes mindset als wir
- es wurde schon einiges politisiert, aber ich denke das hängt mit Marokkos Geschichte zusammen, gerade bezüglich der Kolonialisierung durch die Franzosen oder Spanier- ich mein Frankreich und Spanien hatten großen politischen Einfluss damals aber Religion war etwas, was sie nicht angefasst haben. Das war die einzige Domäne, die wir bestimmen konnten-

Frau: Naja, der Sultan hat ja immer noch Bestimmungsrecht auf alles gehabt, ist ja nicht so als wären wir Marokkaner eine Kolonie gewesen

- ja Strippenzieher waren trotzdem die Franzosen und die Spanier. Ich vertraue da auch nicht dem Sultan, der wurde auch noch vom Westen ausgewählt.
- Es gibt auch Eliten in Marokko oder in Nordafrika allgemein, die sich als Franzosen bezeichnen... ich kann da nur mit dem Kopf schütteln. Die haben wohl vergessen, wie "freiwillig" ihre Eltern oder Großeltern französisch wurden
- schau dir doch an, was sie in Algerien angerichtet haben- ein Massaker! Das gleiche hätten sie bestimmt auch in Marokko getan, haben sie auch zum Teil- bis heute kann sich unser Land nicht erholen
- Weißt du was mich stört? Der Westen macht so viel Schlimmes, so viel Menschenverachtendes aber niemand zeigt mit dem Finger dorthin, nein, viel mehr heißt es sie leben in der Moderne, der Rest der Welt soll sich an uns richten, dann pfeif' ich ja eher drauf und bleibe der Hinterwälder, der ich bin!

Frau: Es sind aber nicht alle so. Immerhin kannst du hier für deine Rechte kämpfen, in Marokko kannst du das nicht! Was der Sultan sagt, ist Gesetz! Ich ziehe es dann vor in der Demokratie zu leben

- auf jeden Fall, Muslim sein und der Islam haben einen hohen Stellenwert in unserer Kultur und im Haushalt
- ich bin selbst nicht streng religiös, will aber trotzdem, dass meine Kinder als Muslime groß werden und es ist mir wichtig, alle möglichen Informationen weiter zu geben
- deswegen schicken wir sie auch zum Islamunterricht- wir haben hier eine arabische Moschee, da sind sie auch hingegangen

Frau: Es gibt auch marokkanische Moscheen, aber die sind bisschen weiter weg, deswegen schicken wir sie zur arabischen community moschee- der Imam kommt auch aus dem Irak glaube ich oder Libanon- ich erinnere mich nicht mehr. Er ist aber sehr nett

- zu türkischen Moscheen können wir sie ja nicht schicken, weil die Religionslehre auf türkisch stattfindet und wir Maliki sind. wäre aber interessant mal zu sehen, wie die Türken den Islam lehren- ich glaube die haben einen anderen Ansatz als wir, immer hin sind wir Maliki und die Hanifi

Frau: Im Prinzip gibt es aber nur den einen Islam, aber verschiedene Strömungen,

- ja der Imam hier ist aber nicht streng oder radikal, der ist moderat- natürlich konservativ aber ganz gut drauf.
- Unsere Kinder sind ja auch schon etwas älter (um die 20-30 Jahre alt), mein Enkel wird dann auch hoffentlich dorthin gehen- das ist mir wichtig.

Was ist Moudawana?

- Moudawana bestimmt eigentlich sozusagen das Familienrecht in Marokko
- Hier hat es natürlich nicht viel Anwendung, wenn, dann nur symbolisch

- ich glaube, es kommt vom islamischen Recht und wurde auf die jetzige Zeit angepasst- also alles was mit Erbrecht oder Scheidung oder aber auch Erziehung und Ehe
- Das kannst du hier im deutschen Recht nicht anwenden, wenn, dann hat das alles nur eine symbolische Bedeutung aber auch nur bei streng konservativen Menschen

Community

- Ja unsere Marokkanische community hat sich echt gemacht, also der Unterschied zwischen der ersten und dritten Generation ist enorm, auch so die zweite Generation, die zum Teil in Marokko geboren ist... Wir haben uns gesteigert.
- Natürlich haben wir auch Integrationsprobleme, aber ich denke das liegt eher daran, dass unsere Jugend rebelliert- die wollen dann dem Rassismus oder der Islamophobie entgegen kommen- die sind enttäuscht von den Medien und der Politik
- Wir gründen aber immer mehr Vereine und immer mehr Moscheen, unser Einfluss wird auch immer stärker und wir sehen auch, dass wir in der politik mitmischen können
- Aber auch: es wird viel vom Sultan in Marokko gesteuert und ich glaube das ist so manchen ein Dorn im Auge, weil politisch Marokko genau so verstreut ist wie religiös...
- Wenn du dir die jetzige situation in Marokko anschaust, sieht es schlimm aus, weil der IS auch da sehr viel Macht ausübt auf Jüngere und der Sultan kommt da nicht mehr mit.
- ich finde, man sollte auch Unterscheiden zwischen den Marokkanern machen, die als Flüchtlinge herkommen und denen, die seit Jahren hier leben oder hier geboren sind. Da gibt es essentielle Unterschiede im Auftreten und auch in der Integration, denn die einen sind ja schon Deutsch, wobei die anderen aus einem Land kommen, das gerade sehr zerrüttet ist
- Stell dir vor in Marokko kannst du nicht einfach andere Frauen ansprechen, dich auf Daten verabreden, oder dich austoben- das gibt es da nicht. Die Jungs, die dann dort aufgewachsen sind und hier hinkommen, drehen dann natürlich am Rad. Niemand erzieht sie bzw bereitet sie auf das Leben hier vor...
- Ich wünschte unsere Jugend würde mehr in Bildung gefördert werden, aber auch mehr Akzeptanz erfahren, gerade was den Islam angeht... Das würde unsere Community auch bestärken

Frau, 50 Jahre alt, Krankenschwester, verheiratet, 2 Kinder

Einfindung:

- Ich bin in Nador geboren und kann mich an meine Zeit da kaum erinnern, weil ich noch ein Kleinkind war, als wir nach Deutschland kamen, bin also hier in NRW groß geworden
- ich habe als erste die deutsche Sprache akzentfrei aufgenommen, weil ich sie von Kind auf gelernt habe
- Klar, ich wusste schon von Anfang an, dass ich nicht Deutsch bin, da wir aus Marokko kommen, aber ich war auch die Brücke zwischen meinen Eltern und ihrer Heimat und Deutschland
- meine Brüder sind generell "marokkanischer" als ich, weil sie auch ein Stück weit in Marokko groß geworden sind. Wir sind eigentlich auch halb Imaziyen, meine Mutter ist Imazirin, für die Deutschen sind wir aber die Nafris oder Araber- ganz einfach... Heutzutage versuche ich denen auch wirklich zu erklären, dass Marokkaner ganz vielfältig sind und dass die berberische Kultur sehr vielfältig und tausende Jahre alt ist... Man merkt auch, dass die Deutschen heutzutage gebildeter sind, was andere Kulturen angeht...
- Aber damals, naja damals war ich froh, wenn ich einfach nur akzeptiert wurde. Ich wollte am Anfang auch so sein wie meine deutschen Freundinnen, die hatten so schönes blondes Haar. Meine schwarzen Locken mochte ich damals gar nicht, ich war halt dunkler und fremder- ich weiß noch in der Schule hieß es dann: Du Äffchen, du kommst ja aus Afrika, oder? Ich habe schon darunter gelitten aber zum Glück hörte das dann auf, weil ich schnell gelernt habe mich zu verteidigen. Meine Brüder halfen mir da (Gelächter)... ja, die erste Zeit war es schon hart
- Mit der Zeit gewöhnst du dich aber daran, es heißt nicht, dass der Hass oder die Diskriminierungen okay sind, aber du merkst auch, dass die Deutschen dann später toleranter wurden, weil es mehr und mehr durchmischte Gruppen gab, Menschen mit anderen Hautfarben, deswegen hörte dieser oberflächliche Rassismus auf, aber natürlich gibt es den immer noch in der Gesellschaft
- Heute würde ich nicht unbedingt sagen, dass ich Deutsch bin, oder typisch Deutsch bin- klar, ich bin schon eingedeutscht, aber 100% fühle ich mich auch nicht dazugehörig, gerade auch wegen meiner Religion oder meiner Hautfarbe

Erziehung, Haushalt

- ich hatte es nicht leicht als Mädchen, gerade als die jüngste im Haushalt. Nach meinem Vater, hatten meine Brüder das sagen und ich wurde mit vielen Verboten auferlegt...
- meine Mutter vor allem hatte so Angst, dass ich auf die schiefe Bahn gerate, dass sie mir viel Druck gemacht hat, sie war sehr streng,
- Ich musste dann auch später einen aus dem gleichen Dorf heiraten, und verstehe mich nicht falsch, ich liebe meinen Ehemann und der ist toll, aber niemand sollte unter Druck gesetzt werden mit 17 zu heiraten. Das war schwer für mich, gerade auch weil meine deutschen Freundinnen das nicht verstanden bzw es deren Vorurteil bestätigt hat, dass wir früh heiraten müssen, Kinder kriegen etc. Keine Selbstbestimmung halt.
- Ich musste meinen Vater dazu überreden, mir bei der Ausbildung beizustehen. Er wollte dann auch dass ich eine Lehre wenigstens zu Ende mache und auch

selbstständig bin. Ich habe ihm gesagt, dass ich mich nicht auf einen Mann verlassen kann, der gerade erst einmal nach Deutschland gekommen ist, und sich hier nicht auskennt.

- Ich glaube er hat dann mit der Zeit gesehen, wie wichtig es ist, dass eine Frau auch selbstständig ist, da meine Mutter hier in der Fremde total auf uns bzw auf meinen Vater angewiesen war
- trotzdem hatte ich weniger Freiheiten als meine Brüder und das hat mich schon immer genervt- ich bin dann auch wie meine Oma, ich sag sofort wenn es mir nicht passt. Dankbar bin ich trotzdem, dass mein Vater mir erlaubt hat eine Lehre zu machen, das war zu meiner Zeit nicht selbstverständlich, bspw. meine Cousinen, die auch hierher kamen, haben gar keine Ausbildung, die haben geheiratet und das war's.
- Mit der Heirat habe ich mich schwer getan, ganz ehrlich, aber ich wusste, es würde nichts bringen mich dagegen aufzulehnen, weil am Ende wollte ich auch keinen Stress mit meinen Eltern. Es tut mir aber irgendwie immer noch weh... vielleicht hätte ich ja studieren können, aber wer weiß, das hätten sie mir dann nicht erlaubt... naja, zum Glück hat sich mein Ehemann gebildet und versteht mich und wir haben uns viel Zeit genommen um uns kennenzulernen aber ja, ich hatte Glück in der Hinsicht--Glück im Unglück... Ich bin so froh, dass es diese Zeiten nicht mehr gibt, ganz ehrlich, das würde ich meinen Kindern niemals zumuten.
- Also, streng erzogen wurden wir, gerade auch deshalb weil meine Eltern Angst hatten, wir würden total in die Schiefe bahn geraten, unsere Haare blond färben, Minirock tragen und mit einem Deutschen durchbrennen (Gelächter). Die wollte auf keinen Fall dass wir uns zu stark einbringen in der deutschen Gesellschaft, wir sollten marokkanisch bzw muslimisch bleiben. Sie hatte glaube ich mehr Angst, was die Leute in Marokko zu uns sagen werden, als was die Leute hier in Deutschland von uns halten...
- die Werte und Traditionen waren wichtig, und ich habe mich auch wirklich nicht getraut auch nur anzumerken, dass ich bspw. gerne auf Konzerte mit meinen deutschen Freunden gehen will oder dass ich gar ins Kino möchte- ich hatte das Gefühl, das wäre genau so zu fragen, ob ich denn jetzt einen deutschen Freund haben könnte- einfach undenkbar. Ich wünschte meine Eltern hätten was anderes ausgestrahlt, was Tolerantes, aber ich kann sie verstehen, sie wussten es ja auch nicht besser... Sie kamen aus einem Dorf, als einfache Bauern und mussten sich im Ausland zurechtfinden ohne ihre eigene Identität aufzugeben- dann kommt man auch an seine Grenzen...
- Es war halt immer ein Spektakel, wenn wir Marokko besucht haben- weil wir "Neureichen" dann kamen, und reich waren wir auf keinen Fall aber so sahen sie uns- weil du vom Dorf auf einmal im Ausland in einer Stadt lebst.
- Wir hatten einen gewissen Ruf zu verteidigen und zu verlieren, deswegen glaube ich, dass, wenn ich in Marokko aufgewachsen wäre, ich es ein wenig leichter hätte als hier.
- der Islam spielte da auch eine Rolle, da wir als Muslime halt anders waren als die "Christlichen" Deutschen und deswegen wir unseren Glauben zu Hause intensiver ausgelebt haben- das gehörte ja auch mit zu unserer Kultur, das Fasten, das Beten, die

Feierlichkeiten... zum Beispiel sollte ich bei meinen Freunden nichts essen, weil meine Mutter sich nicht sicher war, ob sie heimlich Schwein da reinmischen würden haha, sie war echt paranoid.

- Ich bin aber jetzt als Mutter anders als meine Mutter damals; ich bin schon offener und verständnisvoller und will auch, dass meine Töchter vor allem studieren und ihr eigenes Geld verdienen. Ich will auch, dass sie das machen, was sie wollen, dass sie auch ein selbstbestimmtes Leben führen können
- Das geht auch als Muslima, und der Islam verbietet dir ja nicht selbstbestimmt zu sein, aber ich denke die Tradition und Kultur eines Landes kann dir dann zuwider werden

Bild Westen

- Der Westen ist halt in meinen Augen schon modern und ich bin froh hier zu sein
- Marokko zähle ich trotzdem zu meiner Heimat, gerade auch weil hier meine Wurzeln sind
- Ich finde es deswegen schrecklich, wenn ich in den Medien diese verachtende Worte zu Marokkanern oder Nordafrikanern höre, das erinnert mich wieder an meine erste Zeit in der Schule und an den Rassismus, nur dass er jetzt sogar in den Medien vertreten wird
- "Nafri" ist abwertend und meine Kinder und Enkel bekommen dass schon auf Straße zu hören, das ist schrecklich...
- nur weil ein paar junge, männliche Marokkaner hierhin kommen, die keine Ahnung haben, wie sie auf westliche Frauen oder Regeln antworten bzw sich benehmen sollen, heißt es nicht dass wir Deutsch-Marokkaner gleich genauso sind bzw. auf einmal hinterwäldlerisch sind, das geht nicht. Wir haben hier 50 Jahre lang was aufgebaut, wir gehören zu Deutschland und man sollte nicht die wenigen 1% als schlechte Referenz nehmen, das ist unfair...
- Ich finde auch der Westen hat den Nahen Osten so zur Nichte gemacht, die haben einfach Syrien, Irak, Iran, Libyen, Tunesien, Ägypten einfach zerstört politisch, da ist es normal dass der Glaube den Menschen das einzige ist, was ihnen bleibt
- aber für Terrorismus gibt es keine Rechtfertigung, die nutzen unseren schönen Glauben für ihre Zwecke aus und verbreiten Angst und richten mehr Unheil an
- aber ich glaube auch, dass der Westen davon profitiert... Von den ganzen Kriegen und den ganzen Waffenkäufen, schau an wie die Europäer damals Afrika ausgebeutet haben, sogar Marokko, Algerien und Tunesien. Wir wurden genauso ausgebeutet und noch heute leiden wir...
- Ich traue da dem Westen nicht, politisch also. Aber trotzdem bin ich dankbar irgendwo hier aufgewachsen zu sein, weil ich auch die Missstände in Marokko sehen kann und jetzt beurteilen kann, was dem Land fehlt und was dem Land gut tun würde
- Ich hoffe, dass meine Kinder dann vielleicht Marokko positiv beeinflussen kann

Community

- Wir haben uns enorm gebessert, wenn du die erste Generation betrachtest, die kaum lesen und schreiben konnte, und uns die normale Mittelschicht, dann siehst du auch dass die neue Generation studiert, Akademiker werden, das macht mich Stolz
- Bildung ist so wichtig, gerade für junge Menschen, die noch so viel vor sich haben
- Ich wünschte aber, es gebe mehr marokkanische Vereine die stärker in der Politik vertreten sind, die auch lokal mehr mitwirken können das sehe ich oft nicht
- und ich würde mir auch wünschen, dass die Politik auf bundesebene uns "Otto-Normalverbraucher" Ernst nimmt, also auch lokale Kräfte berücksichtigt, das tun sie auch nicht
- Ich sage nicht, dass es uns hier schlecht geht, aber wirklich akzeptiert werden wir nicht, wir sind ja immer hin nur "Nafris"
- Es freut mich nur, dass es jetzt mehr marokkanische und sogar berberische Vereine gibt, die sich um interkulturalität bemühen, ein differenzierteres und schöneres Bild von Marokko nach Außen übermitteln möchten
- Für meine Kinder wünsche ich mir dann aber, dass die Deutschen sie als Deutsche akzeptieren, immerhin sind sie hier geboren und sprechen weit aus besser Deutsch als Arabisch...
- Trotzdem, sollten sie nicht vergessen, dass sie auch Marokkaner sind bzw Imaziren Ich weiß nicht, ich hoffe halt die haben eine bessere Zukunft als wir

Interview: 3rd Generation

Interview participant: female and male

Location: Düsseldorf

23 Jahre alt, Mann, Lehre abgeschlossen als Elektriker

25 Jahre alt, Frau, studiert Medizin

in Deutschland geboren und aufgewachsen

1) Mann

Identity

- Ich bin hier in NRW geboren und aufgewachsen, beider meiner Eltern kommen aus Marokko, Nador
- ich bin Deutsch-Marokkaner, wobei mich diese Frage "Woher kommst du" schon immer aufregt, ich meine ich komme aus NRW aber ich weiß dass die Leute halt wissen wollen, woher ich wirklich komme
- Okay, es regt mich nicht auf, aber ich kann sagen manchmal hinterlässt es einen bitteren Nachgeschmack, gerade wenn ich auf der Arbeit bin, die Kunden bspw da habe ich das Gefühl sind dann manchmal misstrauisch

- aber halb so schlimm, ich gebe dann an, dass ich Deutsch-Marokkaner bin und dann hat sich auch die Sache...
- Ich fühle mich zwar Deutschland zugehörig, weil ich hier geboren und aufgewachsen bin, und Marokko halt nur von Urlauben kenne, weiß aber, dass ich eine tiefere Verbundenheit zu Marokko habe. So eine Art Heimweh...
- Ich weiß aber nicht, ob ich da leben könnte, ist alles etwas kompliziert, um ehrlich zu sein
- Irgendwie ist man Deutsch, aber auch nicht ganz Deutsch und in Marokko bist du der Ausländer
- ich bin einfach Muslim. Deutsche können ja auch Muslime sein. Da muss man sich ja nicht nach Land richten, sondern jeder- ob weiß, schwarz, gelb, braun- kann ja Moslem sein

Erziehung

- Zu Hause haben wir halt krass marokkanisch gelebt. Es wurde bei uns Arabisch und Tamazigh gesprochen, meine Mama ist nämlich Imazighin. Aber sagen wir mal zu Hause wird Marokkanisch gesprochen
- Bei uns ist es halt auch wie in Marokko eingerichtet haha. Orientalische Sessel, Böden, Teppiche, das Geschirr, sogar das Fernsehen
- der Islam hat einen hohen Stellenwert, da wir auch praktizierende Muslime sind Alhamdulillah. Fasten, beten, der Koran das gehört einfach dazu. So wurde uns das auch von Anfang an beigebracht. Ich bin auch zur arabischen Moschee gegangen, gerade auch weil meine Eltern wollten, dass ich von Anfang an die Religion mittrage
- Meine Schwester zum Beispiel trägt auch das Kopftuch und wir sollten wissen, warum und weswegen. War auch gut so.
- Klar, mir ist schon früh aufgefallen, dass das, was wir zu Hause leben und lernen nicht das ist, was mein deutsches Freunden hier erleben und mitbekommen, aber ehrlich gesagt, bin ich größtenteils mit Muslimen aufgewachsen, also mit anderen Arabern oder Türken halt. Und das war nicht so eine große Sache, weil wir alle das gleiche zu Hause erlebt haben- ich meine das war eher so eine Bestätigung für uns
- Zu Hause war ich dann halt Teil vom marokkanischen Lebensstil und draußen der "Maghreb" oder Kanake halt. Das ist auch kein großes Ding weißt du... Meine deutschen Freunde haben das auch zu akzeptieren und respektieren, an das was ich glaube. Ich musste mich vor denen nie erklären.
- Mein Vater hat halt das Sagen zu Hause, meine Mutter hat natürlich auch ein großes Stimmrecht ist jetzt nicht so dass die nichts zu sagen hat, aber, bei uns kulturell trägt die größte Verantwortung der Mann und ich wurde auch irgendwie zu Hause darauf vorbereitet- dass ist diese Verantwortung habe und dass ich auch meinem Vater gehorchen muss und so. Aber das hat mich nie gestört.
- Ich will dann meinen Kindern das auch so weitergeben, weil, wenn ich mir die Jugend heutzutage anschau, kann ich nur sagen, man muss echt Angst haben, wie die zum Teil herumlaufen oder sich geben, die sind echt verloren
- Der Islam ist halt ein Lebensstil der dich leitet und dich durch Krisen bringt und dir den richtigen Weg zeigt

- Ja, ich denke schon, dass ich eine Muslima heiraten werde, muss nicht unbedingt Marokkanerin sein, aber Religion ist mir schon wichtig in der Hinsicht.

Community and Social Networks

- Was ich sehr gut finde ist, dass die jungen „Marocs“ heutzutage viel gebildeter und finanziell stärker dastehen, als die früheren Generationen wie die meines Großvaters.
- Wir haben uns halt all die Jahre hochgearbeitet, haben uns gebessert und weitergebildet
- Meine Großeltern können kaum lesen und schreiben, und jetzt wird meine Schwester Ärztin- ich glaube wären die damals in Marokko geblieben, hätte sich meine Familie niemals so stark entwickelt
- Ich überlege mich sogar selbstständig zu machen, um mein eigener Boss zu sein
- ich bin dankbar hier zu leben, wirklich, gerade auch weil es in Marokko gerade keine Perspektiven gibt... aber, ich sag mal, wenn die AFD hier siegt, bin ich weg und ziehe nach Marokko- die suchen bestimmt auch Elektriker
- Ich wünsche mir ein positiveres Bild von uns Marokkanern und Muslime, dass sie uns als vollwertigen Teil der Gesellschaft akzeptieren, dass wir 100% Deutsche sind dann...

Perception of the west and Islam

- das krasse ist, vorher hat sich niemand über Marokkaner oder Nordafrikaner aufgeregt, wenn die sich aufgeregt haben, dann war es über Muslime oder Türken halt. Aber meistens ging es um Muslime und dass die Terroristen sind etc.
- Seit dieser Silvesternacht in Köln, sind die Marokkaner bzw Nordafrikaner so in Verruf geraten, also so als wäre wir alle Grabscher und Frauenverachtende Monster
- Das waren nicht mal Nordafrikaner, die hier aufgewachsen sind, sondern die, die sich als Flüchtlinge ausgeben und dann seit ein paar Monaten hier in DE leben
- Die gehören nicht mal wirklich zu uns... Die sind in irgendeinem Dorf in Marokko aufgewachsen, wo die nicht mal mit Frauen sprechen dürfen gar anschauen dürfen, die haben keine Ahnung vom Westen und kommen dann hierher und sind total umgehauen von den Sachen, die sie hier erleben, die rasten halt aus
- Ihre Väter sind dann auch in Marokko, niemand bestimmt über sie und dann wollen die ihre Freiheit so ausleben... ich sage dir, wenn die Familien hier wären, die würden es nicht mal wagen, Frauen nur von der Seite anzuschauen, weil die auch wissen, wie respektlos das ist- die repräsentieren auf keinen Fall Marokkaner oder Muslime... Ich meine, nicht jeder Asi-Deutsche, der trinkt und Frauen grabscht, ist gleich Repräsentant von 80 Mio. Deutschen...
- Aber jetzt sind wir halt alle Nafris, wir alle sind die bösen...
- Weißt du, wenn mich ein Hans oder Peter auf der Straße sieht, denkst du die sehen in mir den Deutschen? nein, die sehen in mir den Ausländer!
- Naja, unsere Generation sieht das schon anders als die ältere, deswegen hoffe ich mal dass meine Kinder keine Probleme haben werden

- Aber ich kann dir auch eins sagen, der Westen wird immer mehr Probleme bekommen, gerade auch, weil die Geschichte sie einholen wird
- all der Mist, den sie in den letzten Jahren gebaut haben mit Kolonialisierung und Waffenverkauf, geht jetzt nach hinten los... deswegen ist es auch eine gewisse Mitschuld des Westens, dass es so viele Kriege im Nahen Osten gibt.

2) Frau

- Identifikation
- Erziehung und Islam
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Identifikation

- hättest du mich vor ein paar Jahren gefragt hätte ich durch und durch Deutsch gesagt, aber die letzte Zeit ist es echt schwer geworden sich wirklich 100% mit der deutschen Gesellschaft zu identifizieren
- Ich trage zwar Kopftuch, aber das war nie wirklich die Ursache, sondern eher die Razzien in Düsseldorf gegen die marokkanische Community, diese „Nafri“ Sprüche und im Großen und Ganzen das Bild, das man gegen den Islam hegt
- Jetzt habe ich sozusagen eine eigene Identität, in Marokko bin ich nämlich nur die „Deutsche“
- Ich bin hier geboren und aufgewachsen, habe aber zu Hause die marokkanische Kultur erlebt, bin also zwischen zwei Stühlen...
- Auf der Arbeit, im Krankenhaus interessiert es mich nicht ob mein Patient Muslim oder Christ oder sonst noch was ist... Auch meine Patienten interessiert es nicht wirklich an was ich glaube, klar, es kommen schon Fragen bezgl meines Kopftuches und Herkunft aber mehr nicht.

Erziehung, Islam, zu Hause

- der Islam ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil meines Lebens, das wurde uns auch schon so mitgegeben zu Hause
- Wir haben gemeinsam gebetet, gefastet, ich bin auch aktiv gewesen in der arabischen Moschee- im Frauenverein. Da gab es dann gemeinsame Treffen und Sprechstunden mit anderen Gläubigen Frauen
- Es war mir wichtig den richtigen Weg, der durch den Islam vorgegeben ist, zu gehen, das wurde auch von mir erwartet
- Meine Eltern legen da großen Wert drauf, genau so wie meine Familie in Marokko, aber zu etwas gezwungen wurde ich nicht. Alles meine eigene Entscheidung.
- In unserer Kultur ist der Islam fest verankert meiner Meinung nach... gewisse Gebräuche, Traditionen und Sitten werden durch den Glauben beeinflusst, deswegen denke ich schon, dass es wichtig ist diese mitzugeben

- Mein Vater hat das Sagen zu Hause, ob ich immer damit einverstanden bin, kann ich so nicht sagen... Aber ich füge mich dem zum Teil, was mir gesagt wird- aber sage trotzdem meine eigene Meinung...
- Mein Bruder, obwohl er jünger ist als ich, hatte es in manchen Sachen leichter und wurde weniger streng erzogen- man wolle mich schützen
- Wovor? Vor dem deutschen Lebensstil (Gelächter) nein, ich denke vor Männern aber auch dem Gerede der anderen, als Frau hat man es in unserer Gesellschaft generell nicht leicht wegen des Gelabers der anderen

Community and Connections

- die Community ist schon wichtig für mich, da sie auch in meiner Kindheit sehr präsent waren
- sie geben schon eine Art Gefühl von Marokko und Heimat denke ich
- aber, die community ist auch nicht so mega groß, es gibt schon Unterschiede zwischen den einen und den anderen Marokkanern
- im Großen und Ganzen haben sich aber alle schon angepasst und gebessert

Islam and the West

- Da die unterschiedlichen Rechtsprechungen, Sitten und Gebräuche sowie Interpretationen des Islam nicht einheitlich sind, wäre eine Nationalisierung durch den deutschen Staat nicht sinnvoll, da er nicht weiß, was den verschiedenen Gemeinschaften an spiritueller und kultureller Führung fehlt. Da Moscheen nicht nur Orte des Gebets sind, sondern auch Seelsorge und Hilfe im Alltag bieten, treffen die Gemeindemitglieder eher auf Gleichgesinnte und Imame mit ähnlichem kulturellen Hintergrund.

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