

**Cyclic securitization, political parties and speech acts  
in The Netherlands**

by

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## Abstract

The thesis in front of you presents a modern framework of analysis in the field of security studies and securitization, labelled cyclic securitization. This framework, grounded in the scientific realist approach to social sciences, incorporates the criticism of the sociological school of thought of securitization into Copenhagen School securitization. Thereby, we assume that a certain status quo influences an agent's habitus in such a manner that this political agent is convinced to attempt a (de)securitizing move through a speech act. If this process is successful, it leads to political empowerment and the implementation of new policy tools, after which a new status quo emerges. The innovative components of the proposed framework include the assumption of causality, linguistic precision, chronological presumption of events and a broader methodological toolbox.

After introducing cyclic securitization, we empirically investigate two assumptions of the proposed framework. These two assumptions are the relation between the political actor and the speech acts, and the status quo and the speech acts. We do so by deploying a quantitative content analysis, thereby inspecting speech acts by political through Facebook. We conclude that there are significant differences in speech acts over time, thereby indicating strongly that the status quo affects the utterance of speech acts. We have not found any decisive evidence indicating that the type of political party impacts speech acts of cyclic securitization.

## Table of contents

<b>Chapter</b>	<b>Paragraph</b>	<b>Page number</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	Investigative inquiry	5
	Relevance of the research	6
	Read guide	8
<b>Theoretical framework</b>	Copenhagen School	9
	Sociological securitization	16
	Core assumptions of sociological securitization	18
	Comparison of the two schools of thought	25
	The framework of cyclic securitization	28
	Abstract comparison of the three frameworks	40
<b>Research design</b>	Case selection and conceptualization	43
	Research question and hypotheses	47
<b>Methodology</b>	Content analysis and data collection	49
	Codebook	55
	Roadmap of research	54
	The process of trial-and-error	56
	Theoretical and empirical validity	59
	<b>Analysis and results</b>	Analysis regarding hypothesis one
Analysis regarding hypothesis two		68
<b>Conclusion</b>	Discussion of results and research questions	79
	Limitations and reflection	80
<b>References</b>	All references	84
<b>Appendices</b>	Appendix one: linguistics	94
	Appendix two: Guzzini & causal mechanisms	98
	Appendix three: Wæver's response	103
	Appendix four: history of migration in NL	108
	Appendix five: causality and cyclic securitization	113
	Appendix six: attitude of the Dutch public toward migration.	131
	Appendix seven: the technical process of data-cleaning, analysis and visualization	135

## Speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration in the Netherlands

### Introduction

“Do we want more or fewer Moroccans?” Geert Wilders, a Dutch right-wing politician, asked a gathered crowd at an election campaign meeting the 19<sup>th</sup> of March 2014 (AD, 2014). The municipality elections were three days away and the assembled crowd responded clearly: “fewer, fewer, fewer!”. This example underlines the sentiment in Western Europe in which anti-migration parties, advocating stricter migration policies, gain popular support. The examples are aplenty, ranging from individual politicians like Boris Johnson (UK) and Marine le Penn (France) to political parties exemplified through the recent success of Italian and Polish anti-migration parties. Migration is also a controversial topic in The Netherlands. Since the rise of the political party “Lijst Pim Fortuyn” at the beginning of this millennium, who actively campaigned on stronger migration policies, migration is a central theme during elections in the Netherlands (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). This process started before Pim Fortuyn: The Netherlands had with the Centrum Partij (CP, 1982) the first anti-immigration party gaining a seat in a European parliament (Van Heerder et al, 2013). Thus, since the 1980s, migration is a controversial political topic in which parties from all ideological perspectives at one point in time expressed their uncomfortableness with migration policies.

One prominent framework of analysis of the presentation of migration as a security threat is called *securitization*, developed at the end of the last century by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998), making them the founding fathers of the school of thought called the Copenhagen School. Their framework, grounded in the poststructuralist understanding that discourse shapes the world, describes how speech acts, any form of communication, produce the world in the reality, as we know it, and thus how discourse can escalate a politicized affair, like migration, into a security affair.

The Copenhagen School is grounded in the scientific realm of poststructuralism. Consequently, causality and scientific realism are not included. As we will discuss later we view this as a shortcoming, hence we developed an analytical framework of cyclic securitization in which we conceive a central role for the speech acts while incorporating the scientific notion of empiricist realism. Thus, we do assume the possibility of causality whilst integrating the poststructuralist notion as the key towards a more or less securitized status of the affair under investigation.

## **Investigative inquiry**

Along these lines, we will analyze speech acts of political actors in the Netherlands of cyclic securitization of societal security, specifically migration. We will do so by analysing the communication of political actors in the Netherlands through Facebook between the first day of January 2010 and the last day of 2018. Thereby, we aim to identify differences in the speech acts over time, relating it to the political actors enunciating these speech acts.

Since the beginning of 2018, the Dutch organization “*Open State Foundation*” collected these Facebook posts in retrospect. Their database starts to take shape from 2010 (Open State Foundation, 2018), which explains our chosen timeframe. Through the analysis of these messages, we aspire to map two phenomena. First, we will test our framework of cyclic securitization, investigating if there is a general trend towards stronger securitization between the chosen timespan while investigating developments around the elections years of 2017 and 2012 more thoroughly. Secondly, we will inspect the, in cyclic securitization of migration assumed, relation between the ideological placements of political parties on the political spectrum and their utterance of speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration.

### Research questions

Accordingly, our main research question is as follows:

*“What impacts speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration?”*

As our research takes place in a non-experimentalist environment, it is virtually impossible to identify all factors with relevant impact on the speech acts. Hence, we had to limit the scope of our research. Thus, we decided to focus on two plausible variables of influence: party-placement on the political spectrum and transition in participation over time-based on the abovementioned investigative ambitions. We formulated two sub-questions to address these isolated variables, thereby limiting the scope of the research:

*(1) “How have the speech acts related to cyclic securitization of migration evolved between 2010 and 2018?”*

*(2) “Which type of political party is more likely to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration?”*

### Research objectives

Out of these sub-questions, we can derive the research objectives. Our first sub-research question is grounded in the framework of cyclic securitization that assumes a relation among (1) a certain status quo, (2) the political agent's habitus and (3) the speech act they utter. This research question addresses this relation by a longitudinal observatory investigation over eight years, presuming that by observing all political actors are one entity, significant changes in the relative amount of speech acts related to cyclic securitization indicate that there is validity to this assumption. We will discuss this in-depth in our methodology section.

Our second research question aims to investigate the assumed relation between the type of political party, based on ideology, and their uttered speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration. The framework of analysis of cyclic securitization assumes a relation between these two, thus we aim to investigate this specific assumed relation of the framework of cyclic securitization. Thus, both our research questions can be understood as having the objective of testing the theory, more precisely framework, we introduce in this thesis. However, this should be read with caution as we cannot test causality as there are too many plausible variables of influence. Therefore, even though the ultimate objective of the research is to test an introduced theory, we are aware that this is the first research employing this framework, thereby limiting the thoroughness of the objective.

### Research problem and scholarly relevance

Scholars researched the left-right scale of political parties with regard to their stance on (Copenhagen School) securitization and migration extensively, mostly through small-N research based on qualitative work. Examples of these are the analyses of party programs done by Van Heerden et al. (2014) and Akkerman (2015). Others researched experts' opinions (e.g. Immerzeel, Lubbers & Coffé, 2015, Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009) or longitudinal experts' - and mass-surveys (e.g. Alonso & Da Fonseca, 2011). Some scholars have focused on the behaviour of political parties with regard to (anti-migration) behaviour in parliament (e.g. Louwse & Otjes, 2015, 2018). Many more examples are can be named, sometimes even reaching conflicting conclusions (e.g. Huysmans, 2000, Baele & Sterck, 2015, Boswell, 2007, Coen, 2007, in which Huysmans concludes that the EU has securitized migration while Boswell concludes the opposite). Thus, the identified research problem locates itself in the ambiguity of scholarly work investigating migration and securitization.

This investigation hopes to take a new step in the scholarly development of securitization by introducing cyclic securitization. Moreover, by testing two components of the proposed framework we could strengthen the academic claims made and thereby provide direction for further research. Our research uses political messages from political parties themselves, namely Facebook-messages which we will analyse through computer-based quantitative content analysis. Thereby, we use two distinct methods rarely employed in securitization-studies, specifically a content analysis with a quantitative approach. As Balzacq (2010) underlines, content analysis is an underused method in the field of securitization, partly because of the poststructuralist notion underlying the Copenhagen School.

### *Societal relevance*

This research reaches to the societal benefit of increasing clarity with regard to the types of parties that articulate speech acts of securitization of migration. Migration is a controversial topic in the Netherlands, as the quote at the beginning of this thesis underlines. Moreover, the media tends to highlight controversial themes like these. Lastly, social-cultural research in the Netherlands showed that migration, and consequently cultural identification, is one of the primary concerns of the Dutch population (SCP, 2018). This research aims to provide accuracy, by showing which types of parties in the Netherlands partake in this affair. When a political message presents itself in the media, analysts, journalists and columnists frame it with many possible intentions. These goals stretch from political goals of supporting a certain ideal or party to economic goals of simply selling the newspaper, TV-channel or website. Through our analysis of direct political communication from the parties themselves, we cut out these intermediaries and assess political communication directly.

Thus, our research could contribute to future journalistic work to gauge events correctly and to put the public debate surrounding migration in past and future elections in the accurate perspective. Furthermore, our research could contribute to political parties and their leaders itself, inspiring reflection on their previous pronouncements with regard to migration and thereby their chosen discourse. Especially the component of our research focussed at the difference between the discourses based on placement on the political spectrum could be of interest.



## **Reading guide**

The index ordering this master thesis is as follows. After introducing the two dominant schools of thought in the scholarly securitization debate, we discuss the pitfalls of these frameworks. Then, we introduce a new framework of securitization dubbed cyclic securitization. Third, our research design will be considered and our methodology will be clarified. Fourth, our analyses and results will be presented, after which we will provide a consecutive conclusion. Next, we will reflect on the proposed framework of cyclic securitization and the investigation itself. The last part of this thesis is reserved for appendices, our technical coding, and a list of references used in this thesis.

## Theoretical framework

### **Classic securitization: The Copenhagen School**

In 1998, a new framework for analysis of security emerged out of the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School is a school of academic thought based on constructivism and poststructuralism that commented on the traditionalists view on security, which was dominant during the Cold War era. The Copenhagen School in the personification of Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan introduced their framework through a new concept named securitization in their book “Security, a framework for analysis”. They were part of the so-called wideners: scholars who believed that security meant more than military issues and the use of military force (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998). Buzan et al (1998) intended to introduce a new framework for analysis positioned in the widener’s agenda: through the incorporation of the traditionalists view, they aimed to introduce a more radical view on the concept of security by “exploring threats to referent object and the securitization of those threats that are non-military as well as military” (Buzan et al, 1998, pp. 4). First, they set out the level of analysis. Secondly, they explain the applicability of the framework with relation to different sectors of analysis. Thirdly, they define the concept of securitization.

First of all, the level of analysis. There are five different levels of analysis in which can be theorized. Buzan et al (1998) explicitly warn that they are not theories itself, merely frameworks in which can be theorized. The five levels of analysis are, from large to small, international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits and individuals. International systems and subsystems are groups of units on the highest playing field, namely the whole planet and as subsystems large international organizations like the state-oriented ASEAN or the organizational OPEC. Units, as the middle level, focus at “actors composed of subgroups, organizations and communities” (Buzan et al, 1998, pp. 6), like states and transnational firms. Subunits are the components that makeup or influence the units, like lobbies and bureaucracies. Individuals speaks for itself, namely the bottom line of the hierarchy of the human being itself. An important side note with regard to the use of levels of analysis is that it could strengthen a state-centred school of thought, while that is not explicitly the case.

When Buzan et al. (1998), speak about sectors, they identify them as distinct categories of interaction. From this point of view, for example, the military sector is occupied with relationships of forcible persuasion. The intention of the use of sectors is to reduce the complexity of reality to smoothen analysis since it reduces the number of involved variables. The identified sectors are military security, political security, economic security, environmental

security and lastly societal security. By singling out one sector for analysis, this leads to simplification of reality to facilitate analysis. To accomplish understanding of a phenomenon, at the end of the analysis, the sector should be put in perspective through reassembling to understand relations and interactions between sectors and variables. As Buzan et al put it, “the analytical method of sectors thus starts with disaggregation but must end with reassembly” (1998, pp. 8).

### Securitization

“Security” in the context of securitization is the act of taking political issues outside the limits of classical, established politics. Hence, “securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23). Theoretically, all public affairs can be placed within this spectrum, from politicized affairs in which governmental and/or political action is involved to depoliticized affairs in which the state is not primarily involved through policies. These issues can be securitized, meaning, “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24). As an example of the wide range of affairs that can be securitized, religion can be named in states like Iran and Saudi-Arabia, while also culture could be securitized as was the case in the former Soviet-Union. The link between politicization and securitization does not imply that the state must play an official or central role in the securitization of an affair. Therefore, Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 24) explain that they connect the affair to “a fairly demanding criterion: that the issue is presented as an existential threat”. In consequence, the authority is claimed to enact extraordinary measures in which classical political rules of the game are being disregarded. Security in this context is therefore merely the presentation of an affair as a security-issue, whether it is objectively a security threat is irrelevant. “Thus, the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 25).

The loose logic behind securitization has been laid out above, but norms with regard to their applicability in research have to be established. Since securitization is primarily studied through discourse-analysis, a speech act by a primary actor is not securitization per se. This speech act itself is a so-called securitizing move, aiming to securitize an affair. Only when the targeted audience accepts the affair as imposing an existential threat, then it is successfully securitized. Crucial here is that a move that frames, or explains, a threat as an existential one, creates the

legitimacy to advocate breaking rules or to demand exceptional measures that were undiscussable before the success of the securitizing move.

When securitization has taken place, an actor does not have to oblige to intersubjectively shared norms, values and rules but it can rely on its own capabilities and assets. Intersubjectivity in this context means commonly shared norms and values. Hence, the actor who successfully securitized a certain affair claims the right to conduct policy and governmental affairs independently, based on its own preferences (Buzan et al., 1998). In short, when securitization is successful it consists of three components, also called steps: “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 26). Crucial here is the use of distinct, disciplined rhetoric in which the affair to-be securitized is framed as an existential threat, i.e. as a case of societal or cultural survival. This rhetorical process has been named a “speech act” in the scientific field of linguistic studies, which we will adopt for the use of this master thesis. As Austin (quoted in Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 26) puts it, “by saying the words, something is done”. In the specific discourse of securitization, an agent dramatizes an affair thereby presenting it as an affair that should be dealt with quickly.

Security itself is, in the context of securitization, a generic concept with a specific essence but it depends on the context for the form it presents itself in. As discussed previously, securitization can take place in different sectors. Security, in essence, means “survival in the face of existential threats” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 27). Hence, every sector has its own spectrum of existential threats and affairs to-be threatened. Moreover, if a threat presents itself in a repetitive pattern, the presumption of necessity and its reaction become institutionalized. A primary example of this is the military, its infrastructure and bureaucracy, which exists because of the repetitive nature of military threats in the past. This institutionalization reduces the need for dramatization since the topic itself becomes a synonym for, and naturalized in the common tongue as, an area of urgency. Consequently, behind the institution(s) dealing with the institutionalized, securitized affair, one can still find the original argument of a sense of security endangered by an existential threat.

As mentioned before, securitization can be seen as the extent, or extreme variant, of politicization. Politicization means, as defined by Buzan et al (1998, pp. 29), “to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that entails responsibility instead of issues that could not, or should not, be put under political control”.

Buzan et al. (1998) also mentioned that security in this context should be seen as something negative (Taureck, 2006). In an ideal situation, the conventional political process should have the means to act sufficiently to a new situation without resorting to extraordinary threats to legitimize extreme measures. As Buzan et al. put it (1998, pp. 29), “it is always a political choice to securitize or to accept a securitization”.

Arnold Wolfers (in Buzan et al., 1998) explains the difference between objective and subjective threats, in which an objective threat means that an affair actually posed a threat while subjective threats are perceived threats by any audience. Buzan et al. (1998), in their framework of securitization, adopt the intersubjectivity of securitization that Wolfers would name the perceived threat. Buzan et al. (1998) defend this viewpoint by explaining that an objective threat assessment is not possible, at least no security theory has provided objective measures and definition of a threat. Their position of intersubjectivity, however, should not be understood as subjective as such. If an affair is a security affair, it is dependent on social constructs of intersubjectivity in which successful securitization relies on the audience of the speech act who should accept the premises of an existential threat, which legitimizes extraordinary measures. Intersubjectivity thus puts the act of successful securitization between the subjects, or audience(s), of the speech act.

The securitizer usually sprouts from a position of being a socially accepted voice of security with the power to define security. This is not an absolute position, or power, since the intersubjectivity with regard to the audience of the securitization process creates the biased structure of the field with no absolute power positions. In consequence, as Buzan et al. put it (1998, pp. 31) “no one conclusively ‘holds’ the power of securitization”. On the other hand, this is not practical for specific analyses of securitization. Hence, one should be explicit while studying securitization who the securitizer, or securitizing actor, is. In Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 32), words, “to study securitization is to study the power politics of a concept”. Therefore, security arguments have to be studied, which contain two forecasts. On one hand, a forecast should be outed with a potential scenario without taking (extraordinary) action and a forecast should be outed with a scenario in which (extraordinary) action is taken to avoid the perceived threat. Since the political process is investigated, the conceptualization of the affair to be securitized is inherently subjective.

Nevertheless, to study this subjective power political concept, Buzan et al. (1998), have developed so-called facilitating conditions. These conditions describe when a speech act by a securitizer is either successful or unsuccessful. They split this into internal and external conditions for success. The internal conditions approach the speech act itself. The speech act should follow the “rules of the act” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 32). Hence, amidst the security form, the perceived threat and solution should be present. Moreover, the identified sector out of which the to-be securitized affair originates should be mentioned. An example of this is the societal sector where “social identity” could be an affair to be securitized. This identification is crucial since it influences the form of the speech act. The external conditions of the speech act are twofold. First, the securitizer should have a certain authority, making his call to action credible. Secondly, the threat is increasingly credible if there are objects of events to be referred to. The easiest example of this is “tanks at the border” to securitize a military affair, but it could also focus on other sectors like the previously mentioned societal sector in which identity is threatened by “outsiders”, like migrants. Buzan et al. (1998, pp 33) summarize the facilitating conditions “as follows: (1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor [...] and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made [...], and (3) features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization”.

Thus, firstly the audience determines the effectiveness and determines if they believe the proposed securitization. Secondly, the analyst assesses the effectiveness of the speech act by analysing the audience’s response. Lastly, the analyst investigates the effects of the securitization act on other units. Therefore, the analyst does not judge whether something is an existential threat, he merely assesses the effect of the speech act by the securitizer with regard to its effectiveness. However, this does not mean that the analyst has to acknowledge the speech act as beneficial for society. One of the purposes of the framework is to be able to analyse if an affair should be dealt with through securitization (“panic politics”) or through conventional political means. Through this approach, one can analyse the modus operandi of the involved securitizing actors and their audience(s).

### *The speech act*

The earlier mentioned approach based on the concept of the speech act demands a division of three units of analysis, which are involved in the speech act (Buzan et al., 1998). First, the referent object(s). The referent objects are the affairs that are perceived to be threatened, at least


by the securitizer. Moreover, their existence should be bona fide to society, to legitimize its survival. Secondly, the securitizing actors. These actors announce and advocate the referent object to be threatened in its continued existence. Lastly, the functional actors. These actors are the actors that influence the dynamics within a sector. They influence decision-making without being part of the referent objects and/or securitizing actors, e.g. a commercial company involved in the to-be securitized affair.

When the securitization process starts, a securitizing actor (or actors) erects a referent object, which should survive. Hence, they legitimize security action(s), referring to the referent object, claiming these measures are in the name of a collective to ensure the previously mentioned survival. This collective ranges from a small group of individuals to international collectives, theoretically even humanity (as environmental securitizers advocate). Realistically, however, the middle-range collectives proved themselves as being the most stable securitizers (i.e. states and nations). However, returning to the implication of this framework that it widened the view of security, this does not mean that securitization is limited to these collectives. The state is still the primary actor of securitization but when concerning different sectors, like the environmental sector, particular actors come into play.

With regard to the securitizing actor: these are the ones that execute the speech act with reference to the referent object. However, the definition of an actor creates analytical complications. When one political leader exercises a speech act to securitize an affair, there are multiple levels of analysis possible. One could argue that he is an individual, part of a small collective (the political party) or part of a larger collective (the political party and their popular support). This is even more radical with governmental securitization. According to Buzan et al., the best way to tackle this is by “focusing on the organizational logic of the speech act [...] to identify who or what is the securitizing actor” (1998, pp. 41).

Lastly, there is the audience who responds to the speech act. Those are the ones that “the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept the exceptional procedures because of the specific nature of some issue” (Buzan et al, 1998, pp. 41). This group can be overlooked in an analysis but is crucial for the success or failure of securitization.

To illustrate securitization further, we have included a graphic visualization of the securitization process underneath (Figure 1, Does, 2013):





## **Modern securitization: the sociological school of thought**

Balzacq (2010) did not agree with the proposition laid out by the Copenhagen School and in his book, he introduces an alternative, namely the sociological school. He starts his work by introducing securitization in its classical form, using Wæver's definition of security in which "the act ... by saying something it's done" (Weaver in Balzacq, 2010, pp 1). Something becomes a security problem through discursive politics. Thus, as a broader definition, security is speech act. The speech act does more than explain how the use of vocabulary describes reality. These communicative statements are a dichotomy in the form that they are either true or false. Austin's theory of the speech act demonstrates how statements can lead to human action: they "do" something. Thus, they are "performatives" instead of "constatives", in which the former can be falsified (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 1). Balzacq classified this perspective as part of the philosophical view of securitization, conventionally named the Copenhagen School. Against this view, he explains, there is a sociological perspective. This view originates from the social theories underlining, among others, the importance of context and power relations that together create a certain image of a threat. "The argument here is that while discursive practices are important in explaining how some security problems originate, many develop with little if any discursive design" (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 1).

Thus, there are two main schools of thought within securitization theory: sociological and philosophical. Balzacq points out three main differences. First, we will discuss these three differences. Then, modern securitization will be introduced thoroughly. Third, we will discuss the criticism of Balzacq on the Copenhagen School comprehensively, after which we are able to summarize this chapter.

The first main differences is that, at its core, the philosophical school trims security to a conventional procedure (like marriage) in which the central theme of the speech act, based on facilitating circumstances, must triumph. The sociological school sees securitization in the context of a pragmatic process that is part of, and originates from, circumstances, context, the frame of reference of the audience and the power relations between the speakers and the listeners (Balzacq, 2010). In consequence, this sociological point of view underlines the importance of securitization as a process in which strategic discursive forces aim for persuasion whilst the speech acts underline the universal principle of communication; hence, the sender of the message is of significant importance.

Second, the sociologists view performatives as activities influenced by context, especially the agent's habitus: "a set of dispositions that informs their perceptions and behaviours" (Bourdieu in Balzacq, 2010, pp. 2). The Copenhagen School, on the other hand, does not discuss an agent's habitus, not does it pay substantial attention to the influence of context and the performatives.

Third, the audience. Both views underline the importance of the audience in securitization, but they perceive it differently. The philosophical view takes the audience as a receiver of the message without any questions asked: a formal category. The sociological view, on the other hand, underlines the establishment of understanding between the sender and receiver. Thus, the audience cannot be seen in all cases as one uniform entity.

Furthermore, Balzacq explains how these schools of thought are ideal types: utopic scholarly points of view. In practice, securitization research hardly ever fits one school perfectly. Crucial, however, is that the "magic power" of words is not overstated according to the sociological vision.

As the third main difference between the school underlined, securitization is an intersubjective process. Thus, Balzacq (2010, pp. 3) defines securitization differently than Buzan et al (1998) did, as

*"an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, polity tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development. "*

Balzacq uses the summary of Habermas, to sum up the notion of the speech act (2010, pp. 5): "to say *something*, to act *in* saying something, to bring about something *through* acting in saying something." Here, the first two concepts form the illocutionary act, while the last one contains the effects of something that is uttered, called the perlocutionary act (Balzacq, 2010). Thus, in short, the speaker's own intentions is the illocutionary act, whilst the actual effects are part of the perlocutionary act. This difference is important since speech acts consist of language while

perlocutionary acts consist of the manner in which the speech act creates reality, as we know it. In consequence, accepting perlocution in the strict sense as mentioned above, in combination with the above-mentioned threshold of the illocutionary, leads to the conclusion that “viewing security as a speech act is a restrictive theoretical position” (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 5). This is founded in the intersubjective nature of securitization, in which there is no securitization without the response of an audience. Therefore, the perlocutionary effect is crucial for securitization. In consequence, one should incorporate the perlocutionary into the notion of the speech act, thereby investigating consequential effects, therefore examining the (intended) audience.

### **Three core assumptions of sociological securitization**

Balzacq identified three core assumptions of securitization: the audience, the co-dependency of the securitizer and setting and lastly the dispositif.

*Assumption 1: The centrality of the audience (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 8-9).*

*“For an issue to be pronounced an instance of securitization, an empowering audience must agree with the claims made by the securitizing actor. The empowering audience is the audience which: a) has a direct causal connection with the issue; and b) has the ability to enable the securitizing actor to adopt measures in order to tackle the threat. In sum, securitization is satisfied by the acceptance of the empowering audience of a securitizing move.”*

This matter closely relates to the previous section in which, to achieve the perlocutionary effect that the securitizer aims for, the utterer of it has to identify with the audience. Even stronger, this is a crucial component since cognitive (and in consequence behavioural) change happens through identification. If this is successful, the securitizer gains moral support. Moral support is the notion of (public) support. However, to achieve a securitized status quo there has to be formal support. This is often institutionalized through e.g. parliaments. “The essence of this point of view is the assumption that speaking is an action, and that the question of expedient agency underlies any attempt to securitize a public issue by eliciting a suitable attitude” (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 11).

*Assumption 2: The co-dependency of agency and context (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 11)*

*“The semantic repertoire of security is a combination of textual meaning—knowledge of the concept acquired through language (written and spoken)—and cultural meaning—knowledge gained through previous interactions and current situations. Thus, the performative dimension of security rests between semantic regularity and contextual circumstances.”*

Classical securitization is perceived to be performative: when something is said, it changes the status quo, which is viewed as the internalist position (Stritzel, 2007). The ramification of this notion is that when a speech act arises and if it conforms to the rules of act, it changes the context. Hence, an affair can become (de)securitized. The illocutionary force of the speech act thereby redesigns the status quo.

This notion misses one essential concept of security: external threats. Therefore, Balzacq introduces the externalist approach complementary to the internalist, in which the latter states that a successful, illocutionary speech act changes the status quo. Balzacq (2010) argues that this speech act has to uphold to external, contextual reality to have a persuasive effect on the audience. This persuasive and thus perlocutionary effect depends on context, hence it depends on the situational awareness of the audience which originates in historical conjuncture (Balzacq, 2010). As such, it influences securitization research. Accepting securitization as being influenced by historical and contextual antecedents, leads to the conclusion that investigating one factor of influence (like the speech act) does not capture the full securitization process. Thus, the semantic repertoire of security should fit the frame of reference of the audience to influence the securitization through, which happens through the incorporation of textual and cultural meaning (Balzacq, 2010).

Balzacq himself summarizes this notion as following (2010, 14-15): “pragmatically, the basic idea is this: the performative dimension of security sits between semantic regularity and contextual circumstances. This enables us to say that security is a symbol. The symbol of security is isomorphic, that is, although it is a naturalized frame, it is also shaped by current information about the context, and the influence of the speaker’s discourse (see Balzacq 2004). Therefore, the meaning of security derives from the mutual recognition of the content of the threatening object that is symbolically referred to. The configuration of securitization evolves within a symbolic context of forces that define what a conceptual event (security) is for an

audience, and when the use of that concept resonates with the context in order to increase or win the support for the enunciator's policy."

*Assumption 3: The dispositif and the structuring force of practices (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 15)*

*"Securitization occurs in a field of struggles. It thus consists of practices, which instantiate intersubjective understandings and which are framed by tools and the habitus inherited from different social fields. The dispositif connects different practices."*

Security and securitization are no clear-cut procedures, which follows a fixed schedule. Practices, as it is used in the assumption of the dispositif, is defined as (Reckwitz in Balzacq, 2010, pp. 15) "a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 'things' and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding and know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge."

When security practices are executed, it often takes the form of policy tools. However, these processes and involved actors are blurred and ideological positions are increasingly hard to unravel. Thus, Balzacq proposes that securitization is better understood "by focusing on the nature and functions of policy tools used by agents/agencies to cope with public problems, defined as threats. In other words, the study of tools is not reducible to an analysis of their endogenous, technical functions. Instead, because operating tools activates a specific dispositif they can be regarded as basic elements contributing to the emergence of a security field and in the routinization of practices (i.e., *habitus*)" (2010, pp. 15-16).

Security tools encompass the perspective of security professionals regarding threats. Furthermore, Balzacq (2010, pp. 16) "defines the instruments of securitization as 'an identifiable social and technical "dispositif", embodying a specific threat image through which public action is configured to address a security issue"'. Thus, security tools stand for practices. Their characteristics echo something about a perceived threat, which demands a public response. It also says something about the policy preferences and different tools that embody different effects. Therefore, these traits of the instruments are not just technicalities involved in the securitization of a public affair. On the other hand, Balzacq (2010) underlines how these traits should not lead to a narrow focus since it disregards two essential components of securitization:

symbolism and politics. A decision to accept securitization, as discussed earlier through the notion of formal support, is inherently a political decision. The focus on the political and symbolic aspects of security tools will allow for an imaginative leap into a more robust conceptualization of how ‘the intention of policy could be translated into operational activities’ (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 17).

Security practices in its core manifest itself through two types of instruments: regulatory and capacity.

(1) Regulatory instruments

Regulatory tools aim to align the individual, thus to changed unwanted behaviour into preferred behaviour. This happens either through the prohibition of certain social activities or by the promotion of a certain perception of a threat. Thereby, it often creates the framework of analysis for the capacity instruments.

(2) Capacity instruments

“In simple terms, capacity tools often call for enablement skills, that is skills that allow individuals, groups and agencies to make decisions and carry out activities, which have a reasonable probability of success” (Ingram and Schneider in Balzacq, 2010, pp. 17). Thus, the regulatory instruments occupy the governmental process whilst capacity instruments are occupied with the enforcement of these regulatory instruments to achieve the policy targets.

Thus, we can now summarize the crucial points made by Balzacq so far. First, it stands out that the philosophical perspective regarding the speech act centres on the production of security affairs, not on the origins and development of security affairs. Therefore, Balzacq (2010, pp. 18) “developed the view that securitization should be understood as a pragmatic (sociological) practice, as opposed to a universal pragmatics (speech act), the aim of which is to determine the universal principles of an effective communicative action of security.” He does so by introducing three core assumptions under which securitization could take place.

However, this does not imply that causality is absent in Balzacq’s perspective. On the contrary, he advocates the introduction of causal adequacy instead of causal determinacy. He does so by the introduction of degrees of congruence. By investigating degrees of congruence the

investigator can identify the “the relative status of one of the forces within the *network of causality*. In other words, rather than clinging to set of *a priori* universal principles, the analysis of the degree of congruence among relevant concurrent forces should better guide attempts at understanding securitization, because how these various factors blend tells us a great deal about the likely outcome of the process.” (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 18). This avoids the pitfall of direct causality, which is virtually impossible to investigate in the case of securitization since there are too many (unknown) variables in play.

#### *Criticism of Philosophical securitization: the case of self-referentiality*

Balzacq identifies two core complications with the philosophical notion of the speech act: the underlying assumptions and the detachment of method and theory. “The basic idea is as follows. The focus on rules of securitization, which enables the Copenhagen School to hold that security is a *self-referential* practice (or an illocutionary act), poses a great challenge to its model of securitization as an *intersubjective* process (cf. Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008). The source of this confusion rests on the assumption that the speech act encompasses both the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary effect. In a nutshell, either we argue that security is a self-referential practice, in which case we forsake perlocution with the related acquiescence of the audience (and thereafter the idea that security is a “speech act”), or we hold fast to the creed that using the concept of security also produces a perlocutionary effect, in which case we abandon self-referentiality” (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 20). Balzacq expects that the founding fathers of the securitization theory prefer the first to the latter since their developed framework does not define the audience in-depth. He supports this by explaining that the Copenhagen School singles “out three units of analysis: (i) the *referent object*—what is the object of securitization? (ii.) The *securitizing actor*—who speaks “security”? (iii) *Functional actors*—i.e., those whose activities have significant effects on security making.” (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 20). This framework ignores largely both context and audience as well-defined units of analysis; hence, it does not provide the necessary tools to analyse their impact.

#### *Sociological securitization: argumentative processes and web of practices*

##### *Causality and habitus*

For the sociological variant, performatives are crucial (Balzacq, Léonard, & Ruzicka (2016). Hence, we need to define these first. Balzacq (2010, pp. 22) sees performatives as actions, hence “a specific ‘bringing about that *p,f* where the value of “p” indicates the new end-state to be achieved as a result of the discursive action. Communication is successful, from this point of

view at least, to the extent that the speaker and the hearer attain a mutual knowledge that prompts the receiver to do something.” Central here is the notion of intersubjectivity between the sender and receiver since it involves a dynamic situation. Therefore, the crux of discursive action is to persuade the audience (or receiver) to take a certain action or actions. This creates the concept that discourse and action are connected in two ways. Firstly, the so-called constitutive side of discursive action in which discourse leads to a shared perception of knowledge and understanding, social relations are formed and developed. Secondly, there is a causative side of discursive action in which “discourse targets and creates the instantiation of a particular communicative action” (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 23). For this process to be successful, the receiver has to link the sentences’ pure meaning with the senders original meaning. When this process ends favourable, generally a reaction takes place.

To summarize, if the notion of Balzacqs (2010, pp. 24) “analysis of discourse as action is correct, if “X” happens, for instance, because “Y” was uttered, then, in the total speech act, the resulting matrix articulates action-type (the how-question), the *problem* a securitizing claim intends to solve (the what-question), the *communication purpose* (the why-question) it serves and the *domain of relevance* it pertains to”.

Thus, to study securitization means to “elucidate how action-types are mobilized in discourse to comprehend and communicate the stakes raised by a threatening development. Second, communicative purposes mediate between the “problem” and the “domain of relevance” as laid out on the “map” they direct our attention to the results and consequences of actions” (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 24). Consequently, to analyse securitization means to identify that the illocutionary act alone is not enough; the relevance perlocutionary cannot be denied. In short, what done in saying cannot exist without what is done by saying (Balzacq, 2010).

Therefore, Balzacq (2010, pp. 24-25) concludes that “it is misleading to hold that because conventional rules do not guarantee the results will be attained *by* producing an utterance, our description of performatives must dismiss communicative or extra-linguistic elements. This is why the insistence on rule-guided security actions fails to capture some factors that may affect the outcome of discursive games.”



### Essence of sociological securitization

In conclusion, the three core assumptions are crucial. Hence, we have used Balzacq's (2010) perspective as follows. Firstly, we showed how the Copenhagen Schools' emphasis on the illocutionary part of the concept of the speech act creates complications. Secondly, the connection between poststructuralism and securitization was scrutinized and an alternative view was offered in which the purely textual approach was abandoned. Thereby, the way was paved for the universal pragmatist perspective in which Balzacq (2010, pp. 27) "amplified the idea that threat images are social facts which acquire a status of objectivity within the relationship between the securitizing actor and the audience, in contexts. To analyse security utterances discursively is to account for their capacity to bring about something desired (and sometimes unintended) by the speaker. In terms of the logic of persuasion, securitization is a meaningful procedure carried out through a strategic (argumentative) use of linguistic impulses that seek to establish a particular development and/or entity as an intersubjective focus for the organization of cognition and action."

Thirdly and lastly, the introduction of the *dispositif* leads to the desertion of the notion of the purely linguistic view. This happened through the development of an "explicitly practice-oriented *complement* which emphasizes the structuring force of the *dispositive for* understanding both the designed and the evolutionary character of securitization" (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 27).

## **Comparison of the shortcomings of Copenhagen School and Sociological securitization**

The two preceding chapters introduced two frameworks for analysis of securitization and compared them based on the foundational work of the scholars that developed them. In this section, we will introduce the developments of the scholarly debate regarding securitization since Balzacq's work of 2010. Furthermore, we will present our own thoughts regarding the shortcomings of both schools. This will lay the ground for our next chapter in which we will introduce a third framework for analysis dubbed cyclic securitization.

First, the developments regarding the scholarly debate. Balzacq and Guzzini (2015) observe how securitization theory and its scholars follow two distinct courses. One stream accepts the premises of the illocutionary act as the primary attribute of the surfacing of securitization. These are the adepts of the Copenhagen School. The others walked down the road of criticism, asking securitization scholars questions related to the notion of intersubjectivity, context and the influence of politics. This debate is closely related to the debate regarding the nature of the theorizing, in which the conflict between ontological, philosophical and naturalist/empirical theorizing became clear.

Furthermore, there is the assumption of ideal types of securitization as introduced by Balzacq (2010) which criticized the functioning of the illocutionary, hoping to increase the focus on the perlocutionary. Wæver (2011) disagrees, stating the centrality of the speech act and thus the illocutionary. Moreover, Wæver "challenges Balzacq's sociological theory on the precise ground that it is set on a wrong premise (perlocutionary), and thereby displaces the political moment, which Wæver wants to place at the centre" (Balzacq & Guzzini, 2015, pp. 100). Wæver (interpreted by and presented in Balzacq & Guzzini, 2015, pp. 100) adopts Arendt's vision on politics, creating the argument for an approach investigating "causal (explanatory) and philosophical, concept and discourse analysis".

Thus, there are broadly spoken, three main subjects of discussion.

- (1) The centrality of the illocutionary act in the speech act in securitization.
- (2) The centrality of the poststructuralist speech act in securitization.
- (3) The nature of theorizing of securitization.

The next sections we will demonstrate how these debates are artificially constructed to be mutually exclusive, or incompatible. Here, we will offer our criticism of both schools of thought. Broadly, the argument laid out is as follows. Securitization is a process which could happen virtually in every (to-be) public affair when influential, often political, actors introduce a threat based on either a referent object or subject. This will be based on contextual factors of influence, i.e. historical discourse and cultural development. This notion is pronounced through speech act(s), aimed to persuade the audience. The intersubjective understanding between the securitizer and the audience cannot be measured directly; the entity of the latter is too complex. Thus, the only unit of analysis we can have is based on the premises of formal and informal support, for which we can borrow units of measurement from our colleagues from the political science department. With regard to informal support, we can turn to methods like polling, focus groups and outings of informal support like interest groups. Formal support is expressed through security practices; hence, we can be inspired by the field of governance affairs. Here, the notion of Balzacq (2010) related to regulatory and capacity instruments which can be inventoried, among others, through governmental policy analysis. Hence, when both informal and formal support is present, policy changes arise whilst when formal support is absent there is none. Either way, the context changes into a new status quo. After this stadium, the process is back in step one in which (de)securitizing actors their habitus is influenced by the status quo.

### *Pitfalls of securitization*

As the previous section showed, there is no final securitized status quo. Recalling Buzan et al (1998), a security argument contains two core assertions. On one hand, a forecast should be outed with a potential scenario without taking (extraordinary) action and a forecast should be outed with a scenario in which (extraordinary) action is taken to avoid the perceived threat. However, following the philosophical school of thought, there is no standard for extraordinary. Different attempts have been made to operationalize this, e.g. in the form of actions that would not have been possible before the securitizing moves (for example Huysmans, 2000). However, what is extraordinary is inherently subjective and vulnerable to the wheel of time. Therefore, we suggest the proposition that the requirement of extraordinary should be excluded from securitization. The argument here is that after the execution of the extraordinary measurement the affair is not securitized. There are always more policy decrees possible to enhance the security status of the affair. Therefore, there is no use in employing the requirement of extraordinary measures to be put in place since, after the acceptance of the proposed measure, the normalization process leads to a new status quo in which there is the possibility of even

more radical measures. Thus, the previous measure integrates to become a socially accepted measure, thereby losing its status of extraordinary.

*The extreme variant of politicization*

Recalling Buzan et al (1998), “securitization can be seen as a more extreme version of politicization” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23). Theoretically, all public affairs can be placed within this spectrum, from politicized affairs in which governmental and/or political action is involved to depoliticized affairs in which the state is not primarily involved through policy. These issues can be securitized, meaning, “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24). As for the developed nations, actions outside of the normal bound of the political procedure are virtually not present since WW II. Even military affairs are institutionalized, as Buzan et al (1998) agree with, hence these affairs are dealt with through the regular, political arena. The other identified sectors underline this argument even more; the political arena is the place in which securitizing moves are translated into policies related to preventing the threat from happening, which is, in essence, the target of securitizing moves. Buzan et al already in 1998 agreed, as can be derived from their statements that it is a political choice to accept securitization (1998, pp. 29) and that the goal of securitization is to “have substantial political effects” (1998, pp. 25).

Thus, in summary, in developed nations, it is not feasible to demand that securitization should lead to actions or measures outside of the classic political arena or liberation of conventional political procedures. Therefore, the demand of breaking free of rules (Buzan et al, 1998) to impose critical measures should be dropped. This does not exclude the fact that critical measures could be put in place but this does not happen outside of the political arena. Importantly to note here is that this applies in developed nations: in weak states, political actors can evade normal political procedures (more easily), while the argument can still be made that these actors manifest themselves as political actors if they participate in such a political process.

## **Introducing cyclic securitization**

As we will elaborate further, securitization is a cyclic, social phenomenon. We advocate dropping the requirement of extraordinary measures for securitization as we believe these are sensitive to, among others, time, place, context, historical associations and cultural development. Therefore, an adequate assessment of their extraordinariness is essentially not possible. Moreover, after the measure took place, it will become a socially accepted measure. To exemplify this, one could look at one of the non-military sectors as identified by Buzan et al (1998). Societal security does not mean the same as it did at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; nor does it mean the same in the Netherlands as it does in the U.S.A. Therefore, we believe that securitization is a repetitive process of both securitizing and desecuritizing attempts.

First, we will provide oversight of the proposed framework of cyclic securitization. Second, we will discuss the detailed terms of the framework. Third, its advantages will be embedded in the scholarly debate. Lastly, limitations and points of clarification for further research will be given.

### *The cyclic model of (de)securitization*

The cyclic model explains how both securitization and desecuritization change the status quo. However, the end of the cycle means the possibility of the start of a new one. Since there is no absolute securitization, the cyclic model gives scholars the possibility to map how an affair goes from one security perception to another. Even though we accept the notion of the poststructuralists that discourse creates reality, we do not agree that this implies that causality is not present, nor do we agree with Balzacq's causal adequacy. This could have been the state in a Hobbesian state of nature but the development of language creates a cultural association with it. Here, the sociological view as Balzacq (2010) laid it out, comes into place. Thus, while we accept the premises that language shapes the world, we also agree that the world shapes language. Therefore, both need to be incorporated into the model, in which they influence each other; hence, there is some form of underlying, assumed causality. However, we also agree with Guzzini (2011) that absolute causality is absent in our field of social sciences since the ambition to come to universal laws is not possible: the number of variables of influence, both observable and unobservable, are virtually infinite. Thus, we opt for the concept of causal mechanisms, covariate relations and finally repeatedly proven causal relations. We will discuss this in-depth in the section related to the underlying philosophy of science and in appendices two, three and five.

Figure 2:  
Analytical framework of cyclic securitization



### Desecuritization

Before we will discuss the proposed framework and above figure in-depth, we would like to emphasise that the cycle of (de)securitizing attempts can end at any moment if there is no effect. Moreover, the whole process can also be applied to desecuritizing moves as the same principles can be applied. Additionally, we hypothesize that this is often the case on controversial topic in the process of securitization (e.g. environmental securitization or the securitization of migration), in which a securitizing move has such a perlocutionary effect that other political actors are inclined to attempt a desecuritizing move or to join the securitizing attempt. Therefore, when we discuss cyclic securitization, we imply that the same goes for cyclic desecuritization.

### The status quo and politics

Every securitization attempt starts somewhere: a certain status quo influences the to-be securitizing actor's habitus, which in turn prompts the actor to attempt a securitizing move. Therefore, we believe that the status quo is the first step. As Balzacq (2010) explains, Copenhagen School securitization misses one essential concept of security: external threats. Some threats are not dependent on human vocabulary to be understood as an immediate danger towards human life. "Analysing security problems [...] becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it" (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 13). We view external threats as part of the status quo: it could influence the agent's habitus and if it does not achieve this then it can be disregarded in analyses. Moreover, as Guzzini explained, cultural and historical contexts have the potential to create "some sort of an automatic mobilization bias" (2011, pp. 336). This is configured by historical developments related to the affair, personal referential frameworks, past policy choices and many other mechanisms, of which not all are observable, e.g. expected political gain. However, the status quo forms politicians' habitus, where Bourdieu defined the latter as "a set of dispositions that informs their perceptions and behaviours" (in Balzacq, 2010, pp. 2). Hence, by affecting the agent's already formed habitus, the status quo plays a significant role. Therefore, we define the status quo as "*the current state of affairs, grounded in spatiotemporal contingency and influenced by cultural-historical developments*".

We accept Bourdieu's definition of the agent's habitus. However, we extend it by claiming that the way the habitus is formed and influenced by the status quo, at any given moment, affects the point of view of the political actor. The political actor is one of the most crucial components

of our cyclic framework. As stated earlier, in developed nations the ultimate goal is to get political actors to take action; policy measures and regulations outside of the political arena hardly exist effectively in the field of security. Hence, as we will discuss in the next section, other securitizers are part of the audience in our framework; hoping to influence the status quo and therefore the political actor's habitus. Then, we arrive at the political actors themselves. The political actors are the ones that decide to attempt a securitizing move through speech act(s). To be eligible for the outing of securitizing attempt, a few requirements are in place. Echoing Buzan et al (1998), the securitizer should have a certain authority, making his call to action credible. This relates closely to Balzacq's requirement of intention and linguistic competence (2010, pp. 25): "the context and the power position of the agent that utters them". Lastly, one should keep in mind that there are contingency effects, as Guzzini (2011) explained, which could influence the power position of the political actor in the process of securitization.

### Searle and linguistics

Please see appendix one for an in-depth linguistic summary of Searle's analysis, which we summarize here shortly. "Statement-acts are illocutionary acts of stating. Statement-objects are propositions (construed as stated). The latter but not the former can be true or false. And it is the confusion between these which prevented Austin from seeing both that statements can be speech acts and that statements can be true or false, though acts cannot have truth values" (Searle, 1968, pp. 424).

The point of this exercise is to underline how the proposed differentiation of performatives and constatives do not underline a difference in the thought of the sociological and philosophical school. Furthermore, we can dismiss the differentiation made by Balzacq (2010) between the locutionary and the illocutionary as part of the speech act. Thus, we uphold two distinctions of the speech act, based on the following explanation of the speech act:

*"Speech acts are characteristically performed in the utterance of sounds or the making or marks. What is the difference between just uttering sounds or making marks and performing a speech act? One difference is that the sounds or marks one makes in the performance of a speech act are characteristically said to have meaning, and a second related difference is that one is characteristically said to mean something by those sounds or marks. Characteristically when one speaks one means something by what one*



*says, and what one says, the string of morphemes that one emits, is characteristically said to have a meaning.” (Searle, 1969, pp. 6).*

The speech act thus consists of three main classifications, which are:

- (1) The illocutionary act
- (2) The propositional act
- (3) The performative act

There are two acts we did exclude, namely the phonetic acts of uttering noises and the phatic act of outing words. However, just like translating words spoken or thought of into writing, these are irrelevant for our framework since they are a given act. However, the three acts above make up the speech act used in the analysis of securitization. Related to the speech act definition, we accept Habermas’ interpretation (in Balzacq, 2010, pp. 5): “to say *something*, to act *in* saying something, to bring about something *through* acting in saying something.”

#### *The speech act in cyclic securitization*

However, the crux here is that the analysis of speech acts, as one of the core features, if not the core feature, of securitization should require a specification depending on the scope of the research. By investigating the propositional act, one focusses on falsification of statement-objects, thus factual analysis. Even though we accept the premises by the poststructuralists that language makes our reality as we know it, we do believe that we can falsify propositional statements in security themes (e.g. the speech act “there are tanks at the border” can be falsified). By investigating the performative act, one investigates the effects of the speech act on the targeted audience. Therefore, when utilizing the cyclic framework of securitization, one should be explicit about the part of speech act will be analysed.

A last feature of the illocutionary act steams from what Buzan et al (1998) called the facilitating conditions. As we showed, the second facilitating condition is merely a requisite of the speech act: if the political actor outing the speech act does not possess the authority, the actor does not participate in securitization, hence the speech act cannot be part of the research.

Then, the internal demands to the speech act. Security arguments are forecasts: as Buzan et al. (1998) already explained, a forecast should be outed with a potential scenario without taking (extraordinary) action and a forecast should be outed with a scenario in which (extraordinary)

action is taken to avoid the perceived threat. Nowadays, as Patomäki (2015, pp. 130) explains, “[securitization theory] presupposes these twentieth-century meanings connected with the word ‘security’, constituted by the modern probability calculus and concept of risk that can be traced back to the seventeenth century”. Crucial here is that “different actors, although all perfectly reasonable and having the same evidence  $E$ , may yet have different degrees of belief in  $P$ ” (Patomäki, 2015, pp. 131). Therefore, future scenarios are prone to a lack of self-criticism, influence of geo-historical processes, cultural and economic components and so on. Moreover, predictions based on such probabilities could be self-fulfilling. “Thus what matters – apart from the framings and narratives available to an organization given the formative context – are the concrete mechanisms of choice, which select and frame issues and amalgamate stories about possible and likely futures” (Patomäki, 2015, pp. 132). This is one of the outstanding traits of the sociological perspective, which can identify these components, conventionally in securitization named internal and external conditions (Balzacq, 2010, Buzan et al, 1998).

Therefore, we do not believe that the proposition countering the perceived threat should be a requirement of the speech act in securitization. As the previous sections underscore, a threat combined with a referent subject or object is enough in both the illocutionary and the performative act. Therefore, we introduce a twofold minimum demand of speech acts in cyclic securitization, namely the perceived threat and either a referent object or a referent subject. With these two, there is a certain credibility to the claim of the securitizer: merely pointing out a threat without explaining by whom or to whom the threat exists, compromises its credibility too much to be seen as a securitizing attempt.

However, different other components could be included in securitization research into speech acts, like the preferred solution, the sector of the to-be securitized affair, the beneficiary of the referent object to legitimize their survival or the existentialism of the threat imposed by the referent subject. As we will explore after discussing the audience, endogenous effects and implementation of instruments, the choice of in- or excluding these components into analysis depends on the research question and employed method.

### *The audience*

Contrary to both Buzan et al (1998) and Balzacq (2010), we define the audience as anyone outside of the political arena that is able to receive the message. This ranges from the media, foreign actors, interests’ groups and social entrepreneurs, down towards the level of the

individual. The crux here is that there is no possible way to single out the intended audience of the speech act per se, without involving the political actor itself. Even then, there is no absolute plausibility in confirming the statement made by the actor. Therefore, we link the audience closely to the endogenous effects: the formal and informal empowerment.

Before we inspect these modes of empowerment, we return to Balzacq's perception of the audience, which we disagree with. Under the influence of the consensus in the scholarly work reviewed regarding the lack of uniformity of the audience, we drop both claims made in the core assumption laid out by Balzacq (201). First of all, the causal connection to the issue. There is an implicit impossibility in identifying the link of the audience to the speech act uttered by the political actor. Moreover, the influence of actors receiving the message and being ignited to attempt a desecuritizing move are ignored, since they do not have the theoretically explicit connection. However, it can influence the process of securitization of an affair. Secondly, the ability to enable the actor to adopt the measures, which looks specific but corresponds to our proposition, because there is no clarity who has the ability to empower the actor. One could argue that every individual eligible to vote has this power. Moreover, one could argue that any individual worldwide has this power if certain contextual and historical developments are in their favour. Therefore, implicitly, Balzacq's second requirement is integrated into ours, but for the purpose of analytics, we believe that the effects of the audience provide a better possibility of assessing the intersubjective understanding, which the securitizing attempt hopes to achieve. Thus we agree with the statement made by Balzacq (2010, pp. 13) that "the positive outcome of securitization, whether it is strong or weak, lies with the securitizing actor's choice of determining the appropriate times within which the recognition, including the integration of the "imprinting" object—a threat—by the masses is facilitated".

### Endogenous effects

Securitization is successful, according to Balzacq (2010) if the securitizer gains moral support. Moral, or informal, support is the notion of (public) support. However, to achieve a securitized status quo there has to be formal support. This is often institutionalized through e.g. parliaments. "The essence of this point of view is the assumption that speaking is an action, and that the question of expedient agency underlies any attempt to securitize a public issue by eliciting a suitable attitude" (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 11).

Thus, when a speech act has its wanted endogenous effects on the audience, this leads to a rise in informal/moral support. Hence, here is where we can identify the perlocutionary act. The possibilities for identifying this can be borrowed extensively from the field of political science, where the matter of public support has been researched extensively. Possible measurements of the change in informal support range from public polls to focus groups to election results.

After informal support, usually formal support rises. Support in parliament or in the involved institution rises. The step of informal support is not always present, which is something an analyst should keep in mind: new policies to counter a perceived threat can arise through formal, institutionalized manners without public support. However, for analytical purposes, we will assume that formal support is the successor of informal support. When formal support is there, this leads to the implementation of instruments.

#### *Implementing instruments and the new status quo*

Again, we turn to Balzacq (2010) to clarify the implementation of instruments, which we agree with. According to Balzacq (2010), security practices in its core manifests itself through two types of instruments: regulatory and capacity:

##### (1) Regulatory instruments

Regulatory tools aim to align the individual, thus to changed unwanted behaviour into preferred behaviour. This happens either through the prohibition of certain social activities or by the promotion of a certain perception of a threat. Thereby, it often creates the framework of analysis for the capacity instruments.

##### (2) Capacity instruments

“In simple terms, capacity tools often call for enablement skills, that is skills that allow individuals, groups and agencies to make decisions and carry out activities, which have a reasonable probability of success” (Ingram and Schneider in Balzacq, 2010, pp. 17). Thus, the regulatory instruments occupy the governmental process whilst capacity instruments are occupied with the enforcement of these regulatory instruments to achieve the policy targets.

Here, many methods of investigation are available which, in general, are developed by the field of governmental affairs and public policies. When either of these instruments is implemented,

the status quo changes. As we argued earlier, there is no absolute status of securitization, nor of desecuritization. Therefore, when a securitizing attempt led to the implementation of instruments, it merely changes the status quo to a *more securitized* state. To attach a certain label to it, e.g. “securitization state 4 out of 5” would do no right to the virtually infinite possibilities to enhance the securitization state of an affair, as we have not seen a case of absolute securitization so far.

### Encapsulating cyclic securitization

Now, we can summarize the framework of analysis as we laid it out thus far. We define cyclic securitization as follows:

*A reoccurring process grounded in a societal status quo that prompts a political actor, by influencing the actor's habitus, to utter a speech act of which the illocutionary act contains at least a threat and a referent object/subject, with the objective of having such perlocutionary effects on an audience that will enable informal and/or formal support to facilitate the implementation of new instruments related to the threat and/or referent object/subject, thereby creating a new status quo.*

The core of the argument of cyclic securitization is that there is no absolute state of securitization, nor of desecuritization. Therefore, different actors are able to participate in both securitizing and desecuritizing attempts, with a wide range of different motives. Securitization firstly starts by a certain status quo regarding an affair, developed over time and influenced by, amongst others, historical developments and cultural associations. This affair shapes a political actor's habitus and if the impact is strong enough, the actor decides to attempt a securitizing move through a speech act. It is of importance that the political actor is the only securitizing actor in our framework since the absolute aim of every securitizing attempt is to implement new instruments. Moreover, the political actor should have a certain authority and power relations. Then, the political actor articulates his speech act, thus committing an illocutionary act. The speech act needs to contain at least two elements to make it credible, namely the threat itself and the referent object or subject. This does not limit the speech act: other relevant components could be included in the speech act, e.g. the proposed solution. The intention of the outing of the illocutionary act is to achieve a perlocutionary effect, through a performative act, on the audience. The audience cannot be seen as a uniform entity; therefore, we view them as everyone able to receive the message, except for the political actors themselves. If the perlocutionary

effects take place it leads to informal and/or formal support. If both are in place, the political window of opportunity is there to implement instruments, which could take the shape of regulatory and/or capacity instruments. The implementation leads to a new status quo in which other political actors' habitus can be influenced in such a way that they decide to attempt a securitizing move.

Now, we need to attend to one final aspect: the assumed relationship between the stages of our framework and in extension, method and methodology.

### *Philosophy of science, causality and covariational relations*

*Please see appendix seven for an elaborate discussion of this subject. We merely present the conclusion here.*

Primarily, we need to elaborate on our adoption of the philosophy of science. Even though we believe that the poststructuralist vision contains valuable building blocks, Hedström & Ylikoski (2010) illustrated that there are inconsistencies. For example, there are infinite possible explanations to discourse. As we did not want to discard the poststructuralists vision altogether (please see appendix three for Wæver's argumentation), we incorporated it in our model through the prominent place of discourse in the form of the speech act. However, we combined this with the underlying foundation of scientific realism. Therefore, we believe that the relations between the components of the framework of cyclic securitization are grounded in assumed causal relations. This vision encompasses the idea of Guzzini (2011), but as the next section shows, we extended this vision since Guzzini's vision proved to be inconsistent with the basis of causal mechanisms laid out in the previous sections (please see appendix two for an in-depth discussion of Guzzini's vision). Primarily, if we were to adopt his suggestion then we decent to mechanistic storytelling. As Guzzini "proposes to use the idea of 'securitization' as a causal mechanism in a type of interpretivist process-tracing to allow for more coherence in the use of securitization in empirical explanations, because 'explanations' they are" (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 338). In short, he cherry-picks some of the rationalist approaches to support his advocacy for causal mechanisms. Even though the general idea is endorsed here, we echo Gerring (2010) and Hedström & Ylikoski (2010) and therefore we utilize a more rigorous adaption of scientific rationalism to prevent lazy, mechanistic storytelling.

Thus, we believe that the ultimate scientific aim should be to erect causal, generalizable relations. However, as discussed, this proves to be arduous and often even impossible. As the second best option, we believe scholars should aim for covariational relations since the

reliability and testability of such results provide the building blocks for different scholars to engage in falsification. Nonetheless, we also identified that such relations cannot be applied to every non-experimental setting. Therefore, we open the door for causal mechanisms under the strict demands laid out by, amongst others, Gerring (2010) and Hedström & Ylikoski (2010). These methodological demands encompass upholding the five guidelines of Gerring (2010).

Gerring summarizes our ultimate philosophy underlying cyclic securitization: “it is a normal feature of academic life for tractable “mechanisms” to be transformed into “covariations,” and intractable covariations into causal mechanisms” (2010, pp. 1517-18).

To summarize, the framework of cyclic securitization is grounded in scientific realism with a central place for the discourse, without accepting the epistemological and ontological assumptions of poststructuralism in full. Our framework provides eight components that, in theory, are theoretically assumed to be causally linked together. Ideally, in time these theoretical relations will be investigated and transformed into covariational relations. Moreover, there are many components not included in our framework, since these depend on the setting and employment of the framework. An example of this would be the employment of the framework on the subject of environmental securitization, where a possible status quo influences the agent’s habitus and the political actor’s decision to out a speech act could be different from when the framework is applied to military affairs. These plausible causal mechanisms could be identified and further investigated after which consecutive investigations could strengthen the assumption until rectifiable proof is found that it is a causal, or covariational, relation.

This proposition changes the methodology applied to securitization. Where previous research, as we showed, in majority employed process-tracing, discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis, our proposal opens the door for the plenty of other methods used in the social sciences. As this thesis underscores, we utilize a quantitative content analysis since we test hypotheses based on assumed relations between the status quo, the political actor and the speech acts. Moreover, the comparative case-study design and longitudinal investigations are designs and methods that could provide tremendous insight into the functioning of cyclic securitization processes. Especially, but arguably, the largest shortcoming of securitization in both the philosophical and the sociological variant is the lack of external validity. This is in line with the ontological basis of the poststructuralists since the lack of assumption of causality inherently prevents comparative research. With our incorporation of scientific realism into cyclic

securitization, we hope that this inspires future comparative, longitudinal research to contravene this classical deficiency of securitization.

We have compared the three different frameworks of analysis of securitization in figures 3 to 5, based on crucial components such as definitions and the underlying philosophy of science. We will present these comparisons first and then in the next section, we will introduce the research design deployed in this research. Next, we will discuss our applied methodology, after which we will present our analysis. Lastly, we will display our results and evaluate the framework of cyclic securitization based on progressive insight.



**Figure 3: definitions of securitization**

Copenhagen School securitization.	“[An] issue [that] is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24).
Sociological securitization.	“An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, polity tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development” (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 3).
Cyclic securitization.	A reoccurring process grounded in a societal status quo that prompts a political actor, by influencing the actor’s habitus, to utter a speech act of which the illocutionary act contains at least a threat and a referent object/subject, with the objective of having such perlocutionary effects on an audience that will enable informal and/or formal support to facilitate the implementation of new instruments related to the threat and/or referent object/subject, thereby creating a new status quo.

**Figure 4: Abstract comparison of the discussed securitization frameworks**

<b>Theoretical assumption</b>	<b>Copenhagen school securitization</b>	<b>Sociological securitization</b>	<b>Cyclic securitization</b>
Underlying philosophy of science.	Poststructuralism.	Sociological pragmatism.	Pragmatist empirical realism.
Theoretical assumed presence of causality.	No.	Implicit and viewed as not feasible to analyse independently: “the analysis of the degree of congruence among relevant concurrent forces should better guide attempts at understanding securitization, because how these various factors blend tells us a great deal about the likely outcome of the process.” (Balzacq, 2010, pp. 18).	Yes.
Existence of a securitized state.	Yes.	Yes.	No.
Existence of objective threats.	No.	Yes.	Yes.
Role of the audience.	Minimal role, but central for success of securitization through the notion of intersubjective understanding.	Central role in the notion of success of both the speech act and securitizing move.	Crucial for having securitizing effects, irrelevant for speech acts.

**Figure 5: Abstract comparison of the speech acts of the discussed securitization frameworks**

<b>Theoretical assumption</b>	<b>Copenhagen school securitization</b>	<b>Sociological securitization</b>	<b>Cyclic securitization</b>
Linguistic focus of speech act	Illocutionary act.	Illocutionary and performative acts.	Illocutionary, propositional and performative acts.
Minimum requirements to a (successful) securitizing speech act.	(1) The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor [...] and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made [...], and (3) features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp 33).	Needs to uphold not just the internal conditions set out by the Copenhagen School, but also the external conditions (see page 19 for the details).	At minimum, the perceived threat and the referent subject and/or object. Requirements from the other schools of thought can be employed, depending on the research design and objective. Measurement of success is discussed on page 32.
Units of analysis.	(1) The referent object(s), (2) the securitizing actors and (3) the functional actors.	(1) The referent object(s), (2) the securitizing actors, (3) the functional actors, (4) context, (5) audience and (6) policy instruments.	Visualized on page 29.

## Research design

In this section, we will first introduce our general research design. This includes the further conceptualization of concepts deployed in our research and the case selection. Next, we will discuss our methodology and then we will address the validity of the investigation. Lastly, we will embed our investigation into the proposed framework of cyclic securitization, addressing the underlying assumptions of the framework that we aspire to test through our analysis.

First, a broad introduction to the manner in which we hope to answer our research questions. We will analyse speech acts of political parties, uttered through Facebook, with a sole focus on the illocutionary act as we do not investigate the effects of the speech acts nor aim to falsify them. We will analyse these speech acts through quantitative (social media) content analyses. “Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the context of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 18). Holsti (in Stemler, 2001) defined content analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”. This type of research can identify patterns and trends in a document, or over multiple documents. Content analysis is an effective scholarly method because of its reliability of results. Reliability of results is grounded in the notion of replicability, seen by Krippendorff (2004) as the most important form of reliability. Replicability means that when research is replicated, based on the same explicitly stated rules of the previous research, the outcome presents the same results. We will use computer analysis as the tool for our content analysis: the amount of data to be analysed is simply too much to analyse manually.

### Case selection and identified actors for investigative purposes

First, we need to embed our research into the context and securitizing sector. Therefore, we need to conceptualize and operationalize both the referent subject and the threat. Moreover, we need to conceptualize the concept of political parties based on our framework of analysis.

We execute our analysis in the Netherlands. We chose this non-experimental setting under the influx of feasibility: as the section related to data collection will underscore, there is a unique dataset available for analyses of political Facebook messages in the Netherlands. As we did not identify this possibility in related countries, the possibilities for comparative research were limited and we chose to single out the Netherlands for our research.

Next, the political system, parties and spectrum of the Netherlands. As there are many different political systems worldwide, even more including the 20<sup>th</sup> century, we will not discuss all variants in-depth but focus solemnly on the Netherlands. The political system of the Netherlands is based on a constitutional monarchy. However, even though the monarch is the official head of the state, representatives govern the country and they are chosen through a representative, parliamentary democratic process (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). Citizens vote for an individual politician, who is almost without exception part of a political party. Since the Netherlands has a system based on proportional representation, with a low electoral threshold, this leads to a political structure in which many political parties are present (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). Every four years, elections take place. There are elections for every level of the government, ranging from municipalities to the national government. This is of importance for our investigation, as national elections lead to increased political campaigning, hence these eras are likely to indicate an increase in political activity through Facebook.

Then, the political parties and the political spectrum. There are many different ways to address the ideological spectrum of political parties. The most traditional one is the one based on Downs (1957). This theory states that parties can be divided in a one-dimensional space based on their socio-economic policy proposals, in which the extreme right-wing correlates with libertarianism and the extreme left wing with communism. Since we aim to address which type of parties participate in the securitization of migration, we uphold this classical one-dimensional left-right scale. Van der Burg, Van Heerden and De Lange (2009) have investigated the Dutch political spectrum in relation to the classical left-right division combined with a new variant, indicating the cultural dimension of integration and migration. Their conclusion was that the division on the cultural dimension goes along the classical political spectrum. Hence, a classical right-wing party is stricter on migration than a classical left-wing party. Louwense & Otjes (2015) investigated this in the Netherlands and concluded the same, based on parliamentarian voting behaviour. However, Veul et al (2016) investigated the support for the radical parties and concluded that it correlates with the number of migrants living in the area. Boonstoppel, Dekker & Den Ridder (2018) show how this influx of migration correlates to the support of radical, more populist parties. Thus, the latter two indicate that it correlates with radicalism, while the former two indicate that it does uphold the classical left-right division. As for the purpose of our analysis, we accept and assume the proposition that the left-right division corresponds on the cultural dimension. However, as the next section will show, we will be testing the other results of these studies in our analysis.

Please see figure 6 for the identified political parties in the order of Dutch name, abbreviation and lastly the English name. We excluded smaller parties in this summary to maintain consistency through the chosen timespan of analysis. The excluded parties have had, at their height in the timespan we investigate, five out the 150 seats in parliament and only one has participated in government, functioning as the smallest party. In addition, we were forced to exclude the radical parties *Party for Freedom* and the *Socialist Party*, as the dataset did not contain a representative number of messages from these actors.

<b>Figure 6: ideological identification of Dutch political parties</b>	
<b>Political party</b>	<b>Ideological identification</b>
Partij voor de vrijheid (PVV) <i>Party for Freedom</i>	Radical right wing
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) <i>People's Party for Freedom and Democracy</i>	Right wing
Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA) <i>Christian Democratic Appeal</i>	Right wing
Democraten 66 (D66) <i>Democrats 66</i>	Centre
Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) <i>Labour party</i>	Left wing
GroenLinks (GL) <i>GreenLeft</i>	Left wing
Socialistische Partij (SP) <i>Socialist party</i>	Radical left wing

We conceptualize political actors therefore, based on the scholarly work and utilization in this research, as follows.

*An assembly of collectives participating in the municipality and national elections in the Netherlands with the aim of gaining seats and influencing policy identified to be part of the five most influential political parties in the Netherlands.*

Next, we will turn to the referent subject and the threat. Just as with the conceptualization of the previous section, there is no benefit in discussing the history or the variants of migration. Thus, we will shortly discuss the types of migration in the Netherlands since the Second World War and conceptualize both the referent subject they form and the perceived threat they impose.

Please see appendix four for a more detailed description of migration in the Netherlands. The Netherlands experienced four waves of migration since the Netherlands. In chronological order these were:

- (1) Migration from the former colonies shortly after the Second World War.
- (2) Migration mostly from Morocco and Turkey as guest workers during the 60s and 70s.
- (3) Family unification migration related to (2) during the 70s and 80s.
- (4) Migration from Eastern Europe since the 90s and humanitarian and economic refugees from African and Middle-Eastern countries.

However, the most attention, both in the media and political arena, was paid to the migration and integration of Muslims, newcomers and the scions of the guest workers who migrated during the 60s and 70s (Pellikaan et al, 2007). This led to an “us versus them” discourse (Bonjour & De Hart, 2013). Therefore, we isolate this group for the purpose of analysis. Thus, we conceptualize this group as follows.

*The collective of immigrants migrated since the 90s from non-Western countries and Islamic descendants of former guest workers migrated in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.*

Even though this definition is a broad one, we believe it captures the concerned group altogether, as specifying this group any further would reduce the possibilities for content analysis. Lastly, we need to attend to the perceived threat this referent subject imposes. Again, please see appendix four for a more detailed history and overview of this perceived threat related to the referent subject. Appendix six provides further support by presenting a number of public opinion polls.

The perceived threat relates closely to the notion of cultural identification. There is the fear that the Netherlands will become an Islamic country, controversially dubbed as the Islamization of the Netherlands (Van Reekum in Duyvendak et al, 2016). Furthermore, economically we can identify that there is the threat that they will take jobs away from Dutch labourers and the economic threat that they will provide a burden on the system of social security (Van Kersbergen & Krouwel, 2008). Third, there is the threat of terrorism since 9/11 happened. Lastly, there is a fear of lack of integration from the descendants of guest workers, grounded in the conviction that this group does not uphold the same moral values as native Dutchmen would (Van Reekum, 2016). Thus, we conceptualize and summarize the threat as follows.

*The perceived lack of cultural integration into Dutch society, the possibility of economic misbehaviour, either through participation in the labour market or through abstinence of this market, the fear of increasing influx of the Islam and lastly the fear of Islamic terrorism.*

### **Research questions and hypotheses**

As we have introduced at the beginning of this thesis, our primary research question is the following:

*“What impacts speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration?”*

We aspire to test assumed causal mechanisms of our introduced model of cyclic securitization. We aim to do this by investigating two sub-research questions, namely:

*(1) “How have the speech acts related to cyclic securitization of migration evolved between 2010 and 2018?”*

*(2) “Which type of political party is more likely to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration?”*

Therefore, we need to modify these questions into testable hypotheses. Our first hypothesis is as follows:

*“Speech acts related to cyclic securitization of migration increase during the election years of 2012 and 2017.”*

Our model predicts that political participation in cyclic securitization is recurrent but not constant. This assumption needs to be bolstered, hence this hypothesis. We further, based on previous scholarly work discussed in this thesis, speculate that looming national elections trigger political parties to harden their stance on migration. However, it is not the scope of this research to test this any further, since such questions aim to identify further mechanisms between a status quo and a political actor’s speech acts. If, nonetheless, there are significant differences while we consider all political actors in the Netherlands as one entity, that a certain status quo does influence the consideration of political actors, to either participate or absentee from uttering speech acts of cycling securitization of migration.



Then, our second hypothesis:

*“Right-wing parties are more likely to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration than centre and left-wing parties.”*

This hypothesis is derived from the literature underlying the role of right-wing parties that are supposedly jumping the bandwagon of the message of radical parties addressing migration as a threat to society. Even though, ideally, we would include these radical parties, this was not feasible. Thus, we identified three types of political parties in the Netherlands, ranging from (centre) right-wing to (centre) left-wing.

#### Essence of the research design thus far

To summarize the previous paragraphs, we identified the following actors to investigate. First of all, the securitizing actors. We consider the individual parties as one uniform entity while testing our first hypothesis. We do so since we will merely observe if, and how, the political utterance of speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration change over time. While answering our second hypothesis, on the other hand, we differentiate between political parties based on a threefold distinction. This will allow us to discuss differences in parties over time.

Then, the definition and operationalization of the two components that will form the coding categories, namely the threat and the referent subject. We choose to analyse the referent subject instead of the referent object since in societal securitization of migration the Dutch identity would be the referent object. It is unfeasible for large-N content analysis to employ such an undefined concept as identity, hence the selection of the referent subject. Based on the literature and framework of cyclic securitization, we identified migration and perceived failed integration of Islamic migrants and their descendants as the referent subject. The second component of the speech acts under scrutiny here is the perceived threat. To return to the field of linguistics, these encompass negative adverbs and adjectives related to the referent subject of migration. It would not be feasible to operationalize the threat independently since it has to relate to the referent subject to be coherent. Moreover, as the framework of cyclic securitization explained, the referent object/subject are related to the threat since the threat is the negative action or impact that the referent object would be the victim of, and/or the referent subject would be the alleged wrongdoers of. Logically, therefore, the threat can range from adjectives like “criminal” to adverbs like “unlawfully”.

## Methodology

### Introduction to content analysis

Since others produce text to-be analysed, there is no inherent objective meaning to them. Content analysis can, besides to analyse texts, be used for the analyses of e.g. images, but since that goes beyond the scope of this master thesis we will not discuss these options. Krappendorff (2004) has identified six features of texts that underline this idea, which we will discuss shortly.

First, texts do not have an unbiased nature. At least, no nature that is independent of the reader. Without an audience, of at least one individual, a text does not exist. Therefore, the content analyst aims to use an explicit systematic methodology to characterize textual features and interpret these later on. Secondly, texts do not have a unique meaning. A text can be interpreted from different points of view, leading to different interpretations. An illustrative example is a political speech, in which an economist would have a different interpretation than a sociologist would have. That does not mean that one of them is wrong; it merely means that their points of references and analytical interests differentiate. Thirdly, there is no need to find common ground, or consensus, among researchers who analyse texts. As this point is related to the third one, it also underlines the purpose of content analysis. If consensus would be the primary aim, different analyses from different points of view would be meaningless. Fourthly, “meanings (contents) speak to something other than the given texts, even where convention suggests that messages “contain” them of texts “have” them. Since one of the most crucial characteristics of texts, it that they evoke human response, e.g. emotions, these features are hard to capture since it requires human interpretation. Hence, this feature also explains one the limitations of computer text analysis since this type of analysis cannot, with absolute accuracy; interpret emotional responses to texts (Coffey, 2005). Fifthly, the meaning of a text depends on the specific context(s), discourse(s) and purpose(s). This is linked to the first feature of the unbiased nature. This puts the analyst in the driver’s seat since his scholarly objective guides the context in which he aims to analyse the text(s). This reduces the number of interpretations. Even though the analyst has some freedom in this process, his choices have to be accounted for. Moreover, he has to develop explicit guidelines, often but not exclusively through a codebook as we will discuss later on, which he bases his research on. This is crucial since replicability, and thus reliability of results is compromised if this process is not done correctly. Sixthly, “the nature of the text demands that content analysts draw specific inferences from a body of texts to their chosen context” (Krappendorff, 2004, pp. 24). Content analysis can have predictive and informative results. In addition, they can “help to conceptualize the realities of certain

individuals or groups” (Krappendorff, 2004, pp. 24). Therefore, an objective meaning of a text can never be achieved but validity is crucial in the process. Therefore, the context has to be made explicit, just like the aim of the research.

In short, content analysis goes along the lines of the following steps (Downe-Wambolt, 1992, pp. 315):

- 1: “Selecting the unit of analysis.
- 2: Creating and defining the categories.
- 3: Pretesting the category definitions and rules.
- 4: Revising the coding rules if necessary.
- 6: Pretesting the revised category scheme.
- 7: Reassessing reliability and validity.”

#### Data collection and sampling

As we have demonstrated during the introductory paragraph of this master’s thesis, scholars researched migration, securitization and politics extensively. The universe of possible data sources is large: from the analysis of verbal speeches by political leaders to analyses of the framing in the media. From this universe, we chose to analyse speech acts by political parties through their own Facebook-page(s). We chose this based on three arguments.

Firstly, feasibility. It is not feasible to analyse every source, so we had to choose. Moreover, the Dutch foundation called the “Open State Foundation” started to collect Facebook posts of political parties in 2017. They used non-intrusive cookies and web scrapers to collect this data (Open State Foundation, 2018). This collection included posts that had been posted earlier. Therefore, while writing this master thesis, their database takes shape starting in 2010. Their collection of this data has been published as part of the so-called “Poliflw-project”, with the aim of making local political news comprehensible (*in Dutch: Lokaal politiek nieuws inzichtelijk*, Poliflw, 2018). Their initiative made our research feasible since the collection this large amount of data was impossible to do in the timespan of a master’s thesis.

Secondly, we aimed to use quantitative content analysis to limit the influx of subjectivity of the research. The amount of Facebook posts collected by the Poliflw-project between the first day of January 2010 and the last day of December 2018 is a little over 310.000 posts. To our knowledge, no other database contains such an amount of Facebook posts. This database has a distinctive feature in the form that it also collects posts from local political parties’ Facebook pages. National political parties have their own Facebook page, but the local

departments per municipality also have their own Facebook page. This database collected posts from both of them, thereby creating the possibility to investigate the parties nationwide instead of just their national party pages.

Thirdly, communication through social media can be seen as one of the most direct types of political communication. There is no “middleman” in the form of the media or a TV-debate director choosing their frame (Vergeer, 2015). Parties usually discuss their party programs in depth, reflecting every topic and word that is in it. This also happens when political parties communicate through Facebook, but the nature of the medium in which parties post short messages on a frequent basis prevents in-depth discussions.

The next step of this research is to select the subparts to analyse. During the last paragraph, we specified our source. Secondly, we need to determine the authors.

Even though the Facebook-posts are made by a variety of authors, from a local volunteer managing the local Facebook-page to professionals at the national level, we exclude this variety from our analysis. Therefore, we see the posts per political party as coming from one unit: the party itself.

Since we aim to analyse the participation of political parties in the process of securitization, we have to select an arbitrary timeframe to analyse. Our timeframe ranges from the first day of January 2010 to the last day of December of 2018, as we explained earlier in this thesis. We will analyse these in terms of whole years, therefore we have eight ordinal variables ranging from 2010 to 2018. We made this decision under the influx of feasibility: the distribution of the data in the dataset changes heavily per month. Therefore, if we were to address the data based on months, this would lead to spurious results. Luckily, this imbalance is not present when analysing the data based on years.

### Coding preparation

The first step is to inspect the format of the data to-be analysed. Our data is stored in an online Representational State Transfer (REST) web service (ful) application-programming interface (API). We will refer to this further as the RESTful API. Such a database is developed to store, alter and collect data online. Hence, the database is updated in real-time with new information. As the interaction with the RESTful API is a technologically sophisticated process, we decided to contact the Open State Foundation to receive a so-called data dump: a data file containing all the information stored in the RESTful API that can be loaded directly into our data-analysis program. The Open State Foundation was happy to provide this information, thereby arranging

that I received the data dump, containing all the data up until the end of January 2019. I received this in the coding language JSON. As we employed the statistical program for analysis R, and the integrated development environment Rstudio, I parsed this language into the language employed by R, conveniently also called R. This technological process will be discussed comprehensively in the next chapters.

The Facebook posts that are part of this dataset range from being very small, just a few sentences, to a whole essay of multiple thousands of words. Since it is arbitrary to select posts based on their length, we included all posts regardless of their length. Therefore, the unit of analysis is one Facebook post in its totality. Usually, during content analysis, paragraphs are the starting point of coding. This is not feasible for us because of the amount of data and large differences between the sizes of the posts.

Furthermore, we will apply a random sampling ( $n = 50$ ) to manually verify the accuracy of our keyword-based coding.

### *The codebook*

A codebook is the content analyst variant of operationalization. “Operationalization is the process of developing measures”, as Neuendorf (2016) puts it. Since we will analyse texts, we will construct a codebook, also called a coding scheme. This is done through the development of categories: names that represent the idea or concept that we aim to investigate. Alternatively, as Weber (quoted in Stemler, 2001, pp. 3) defined them: “a category is a group of words with similar meaning or connotations”.

We will firstly elaborate on our identified categories. We have included four original categories, based on our theoretical framework. This is called “a priori coding” since we already established our categories before the analysis is performed (Stemler, 2001). The first category is the threat: adjectives and adverbs with negative connotation related to the referent subject. The second category is the referent subject of migration and perceived failed integration. The subcategories are (im)migration, integration and Islam. We included Islam here since our literature review of the Dutch migration debate (see appendix four) shows that it is often used for the securitization of migration in The Netherlands. Thirdly, the category of placement on the political spectrum. We have identified previously that the political parties to-be analysed are split into three types, which are the ones we will uphold in our coding. Lastly, all political

actors are seen as one entity to observe the longitudinal changes in the speech acts of the actors in its entirety.

Generally, categories are supposed to be mutually exclusive; indicating that it will not happen that one unit of analysis is categorized in multiple categories. However, as Downe-Wamboldt (1992) explained, this depends on the context of the research. In our case, to analyse the illocutionary speech act in full, both the threat and the referent subject should be present. Thus, this demand is not feasible for our research. To address this issue, we created two different categories, one containing the referent subject and the other one containing the threat. Only when a message is marked by both categories, it will be included in our research as a plausible speech act.

In addition, the categories per codebook are intended to be mutually exhaustive; meaning in our specific case that there will not be any posts faulty marked as “not part of any category”.

Next, we need to identify the indicators. These indicate how we will assign the content to-be analysed into the chosen categories and thus will it guide the analysis.

### Codebook

A Dutch variant of this codebook will be developed since we analyse Dutch Facebook posts. This translation is in development and will be added to this thesis as an appendix.

<b>Figure 7: Abstract codebook</b>			
<b>Code</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Categorical definition</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
A	Threat.	Adjectives and adverbs related to the referent subject in which the adjective / adverb refers to the referent subject to have a perceived negative impact on some affair. <i>There will be no specification of the affair that the threat refers to</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aggressive</li> <li>- Threatening</li> <li>- Destructive</li> <li>- Harmful</li> <li>- Deceitful</li> <li>- Unsafe</li> <li>- Abuse</li> <li>- Narrow-minded</li> <li>- Lousy</li> <li>- Dishonest</li> </ul>

		<i>since it is not relevant in the scope of this research.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Untrustworthy</li> <li>- Selfish</li> <li>- Failed</li> </ul>
B	Referent subject.	The lack of integration into Dutch society, the possibility of economic misbehaviour, either through participation in the labour market or through abstinence of this market, the fear of increasing influx of the Islam and lastly the fear of Islamic terrorism.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Migrants</li> <li>- Islam</li> <li>- Islamization</li> <li>- Multicultural drama</li> <li>- Integration</li> <li>- Cultural threat</li> <li>- Refugees</li> <li>- Cultural dominance</li> <li>- Economic migrants</li> </ul>
C	Placement on the political spectrum.	The placement of political parties in the five identified categories of the Dutch political spectrum.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Right-wing: all posts posted from Facebook pages connected to the VVD and the CDA.</li> <li>- Centre: all posts posted from Facebook pages connected to D66.</li> <li>- Left-wing: all posts posted from Facebook pages connected to GL and the PvdA.</li> </ul>
E	Other.	Facebook posts irrelevant to our research.	The number of Facebook posts that are not categorized in other categories.
<i>Please see appendix seven for the detailed, Dutch codebook employed in the analysis.</i>			

### *The proposed steps to answer our research questions*

First, we need to investigate the data dump we received from the Open State Foundation. As mentioned earlier, the first step is to parse it from JSON into R (Nagler, 1995). Secondly, we need to clean the data we received. Thus, we need to extract the following information:

- (1) Content of the Facebook post
- (2) Sender of the post, thus the political party
- (3) Date of the message
- (4) Polarity score addressed by the Open State Foundation's algorithm.

Consequently, we can discard other columns of information in the data, as it is merely surface noise distracting from the core.

Third, we need to extract the correct source and parties. As the database also contains messages from the websites of the political parties, instead of their Facebook pages, we need to identify this part and exclude it. In addition, the database contains messages from political parties that are not included in our research and thus can be discarded.

### *Data cleaning*

To ensure replicability, we will describe our process of data cleaning shortly, as it heavily increases the reproducibility of our research. Reproducibility is crucial for replicability (Gandrud, 2016). First, we will elaborate on the web scraping by the Open State Foundation. They collected the data from the website of political parties and their Facebook page through a so-called web scraper. "Web scraping involves downloading a file from the internet, parsing it and extracting the data you are interested in then putting it into a data frame object" (Gandrud, 2016, pp. 125). The Open State Foundation used this tool to create a JSON-datafile, which we parsed. This involved discarding unnecessary information and merging the relevant variables into a single data frame (Gandrud, 2016). "Most data go through many manipulations from raw form to the form we use in our analysis" (Nagler, 1995, pp. 489). These tasks are logged at the end of our research in appendix seven. Following the standard in data cleaning, every step is accompanied by a short description of the task to be fulfilled (Nagler, 1995, Gandrud, 2016). When we completed this process, we were able to test our keyword filters and polarity scores through the process of trial-and-error.

After this step of data cleaning, we move to data-analysis. Thus, following Downe-Wambolt's (1992) steps, we will pre-test our coding scheme. Most likely, based on our broad categories,



we will have to revise our indicators supporting the categories to increase the accuracy. As the Facebook messages are already coded with relation to the sender of the message, this phase will be characterized by a focus on the analysis of the content of the messages. Thus, we will create the pattern of keywords used to filter our messages, apply it and address the accuracy. Then we will test our revised coding scheme again based on the same demands until further changes do not lead to improved accuracy. Moreover, we need to address the polarity scores that provide every message with a score ranging from minus one to plus one. Positive scores indicate that the message has a positive tone whilst negative scores indicate a negative tone (Mohammad and Turney, 2013). When messages are marked as containing both a keyword related to the referent subject and the threat, the polarity scores indicate if they are indeed part of the messages we aspire to map. However, if the random sampling of the polarity scores indicate that they are not conclusive, we will turn to alternatives like the *Pattern.NLP* or *Syuzhet* from the R-network CRAN (R-project, 2019). CRAN means “a network of ftp and web servers around the world that store identical, up-to-date, versions of code and documentation for R” (R-project, 2019). Then, we will apply their algorithms and lexica to create new polarity scores, which we will then evaluate based on their accuracy.

#### *The process of trial-and-error*

To recall, we had two main affairs related to our analyses that needed to be tested. First, the keywords we applied. We started with a small selection of keywords, in which the threat contained fifteen keywords and the referent subject eleven words. These keywords often contain only parts of the keywords, as the pattern analysis will include every word containing this part. To exemplify this, we included the term “*immigration*” in the form of “*immigra*”, as this choice ensures the inclusion of variants on the term immigration. This process of transforming words into their uniform, base format is called stemming (Welbers, Van Attenveldt & Benoit, 2017). The primary benefit of stemming for our analytical purposes is that “a base word might have different morphological variations, such as the suffixes from conjugating a verb or making it plural. For purposes of analysis, we might wish to consider these variations as equivalent because of their close semantic relation, and because reducing the feature space is generally desirable when multiple features are in fact closely related. A technique for achieving this is stemming, which is essentially a rule-based algorithm that converts inflected forms of words into their base forms (stems).” (Welbers et al, 2017, pp. 251). We also employed an algorithm to stem our keywords, namely the Quanteda CRAN. “Quanteda makes it easy to manage texts in the form of a corpus, defined as a collection of texts that

includes document-level variables specific to each text, as well as meta-data for documents and for the collection as a whole. Quanteda includes tools to make it easy and fast to manipulate the texts in a corpus, by performing the most common natural language processing tasks simply and quickly, such as tokenizing, stemming, or forming n grams” (Benoit, Watanabe, Wang, Nulty, Obeng, Müller & Matsuo, 2018, pp. 5).

Our first group of keywords did not capture the groups correctly, as our random sample showed. Our random sample showed an accuracy of 46%, while we aimed for a threshold of at least 60%. Thus, we revisited and expanded our group of keywords, after which it showed an accuracy of 67%, thus passing the threshold of 60%. Please see appendix seven for the (Dutch) keywords we settled on.

Then, the polarity scores. Unfortunately, we found out that the algorithm put in place by the Open State Foundation was not sufficient. Out of the over 6.000 messages that were marked by our keyword filters, less than 500 received a polarity score. This forced us to employ other methods to derive the polarity scores from the Facebook posts, which we did base on the so-called dictionary method. “Dictionary methods use a list of words with attached tone scores and the relative rate words occur to measure a document’s tone. A dictionary to measure tone is a list of words that are either dichotomously classified as positive or negative or contain more continuous measures of their content” (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013, pp. 13-14). Thus, the CRAN we employed used the dictionary method to classify each post based on their tone. Therefore, it assigns a score per post ranging from -1 to 1, in which posts with a negative tone receive a low number and vice-versa.

First, we used the Pattern.NLP package developed by the University of Antwerp, with the so-called *pattern.nl module*, mounted from Python into R. “The pattern.nl module contains a fast part-of-speech tagger for Dutch [...] sentiment analysis” (University of Antwerp, 2019). Second, we used the Syuzhet package, developed by Matthew Jockers, to be able to compare these two methods. The accuracy of the Pattern.NLP package was 61% and the Syuzhet was 57%. Our random sampling indicated that the average score of these two packages provided the most accurate polarity scores, namely 83%. This is most likely due to the balancing of extreme values. Grimmer & Steward (2013) underscore that it is crucial to investigate these scores in such a manner since their effectiveness depends on the context of the texts. Thus, we decided

to take the mean of both scores and apply those to the messages after they passed our keyword filters as this proved to be the most accurate one.

After this process of analysis, we get to the final part of descriptive statistics and data visualisation. As our research does not investigate two, plausibly correlative, variables, there is no use for employing advanced statistical analyses like generalized linear inference models. Thus, we aim to answer our research questions with the use of descriptive statistics of the following kind:

- (1) Frequency tables.
- (2) Boxplots based on quartiles of polarity scores.
- (3) Density plots, weighted and not weighted.

This way, we can address the inter-party differences in the absolute amount of posts before and after applying the keyword filter and we can investigate the inter-party distribution of polarity scores. In addition, this enables us to investigate developments over time in the absolute and relative amount of posts and it lays the ground for the data visualization (Monogan III, 2013). We will use data visualization in four forms, derived from our choices of the abovementioned descriptive statistics. We will use histograms, boxplots, density plots and linear models to support our analysis.

Lastly, we will reassess the reliability and validity of this research since the used methods and code revisiting can influence our reliability and validity. It is a standard procedure to reinvestigate the accuracy of our analysis again in the final stage (Downe-Wambolt, 1992).

From these descriptive statistical analyses and visualizations, we aim to answer our research questions. We will start with our first hypothesis, thus when we view all political parties as one entity. Through the development over time in both absolute and relative numbers, we can address changes over time. Moreover, the inclusion of polarity scores lay the ground for an accurate assessment of this development. When addressing our second hypothesis, we differentiate between political parties and repeat the process we used to answer our first hypothesis. Furthermore, we will employ density plots to investigate if there are types of political parties that are more prone to utter illocutionary speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration.

## **Theoretical and empirical validity**

### *Empirical validity*

Validity, internal validity in essence, means if one measures what one aims to measure. It consists of criteria of reliability, accuracy and precision (Neuendorf, 2016). Since we will use digital means to code the identified units of analysis, in theory, a “perfect reliability” could be achieved (Downe-Wambolt, 1992, pp. 319). We will code the analysis ourselves, except for the polarity analysis. Our coding will be applied on a consistent, systematically basis to the Facebook posts. As we will publish our whole coding as an appendix, we believe that our research will be reliable in the form of replicability.

We agree with Holsti (1969), hence, we will use his trial and error method to investigate the reliability of our research. Revising the reliability of content analysis research is an accepted method. In this light, we cannot provide a correct assessment of the reliability of this research yet. The accuracy of our research, meaning an unbiased approach and research without non-random errors can be addressed shortly. First, the unbiased approach. As discussed previously, content analysis cannot be completely unbiased. The analyst reduces complex theories to testable hypotheses in which nuance can be lost. Moreover, as is the case here, an analyst can develop his own coding scheme. This coding scheme is based on categories derived from the research question, existing literature and developed hypotheses. Hence, it will never be completely unbiased. However, since we have accounted for our decisions this creates the possibilities for other scholars to criticise or improve our coding. We do prevent the confirmation bias that plagues securitization research: our a priori coding combined with the lack of certainty regarding the outcome provide a solid ground for unbiased research (Alexandrova et al, 2014).

Lastly, precision. This is a less strict measurement and should be understood as “as precise as possible” (Holsti, 1969, pp. 104). However, common sense explains that the identified categories heavily compromise our precision. It is infeasible to demand an inclusive coding scheme related to these affairs under investigation because they symbolize complex social structures. Thus, we aim to achieve the highest precision possible while inviting other scholars to continue building the codebook to become more inclusive. At the current moment, therefore, it is not possible to assess our precision correctly. Holsti (1969, pp. 104) has summarized this issue as such: “In the absence of standard schemes of classification, the analyst is usually faced with the task of constructing appropriate categories by trial and error methods. This process

consists of moving back and forth from theory to data, testing the usefulness of tentative categories, and then modifying them in light of the data.” Lastly, there is the concern related to the polarity analysis. Through our proposed trial-and-error method, involving three different possibilities for polarity analysis, we believe we provide polarity scores that are as precise as possible for digital text mining.

### Empirical generalization

Generalization, also called external validity, is not the aim of our research. Generalization “relates to whether the results of a measure can be extrapolated to other settings, times and so on” (Neuendorf, 2016, pp. 115). Our aspiration of testing theoretical assumptions of our framework inherently compromises the possibilities of generalization. We test assumed relations of our introduced framework in a specific, non-experimental setting. Therefore, the generalization of our analysis is modest: virtually, it could be extrapolated to countries with a similar socio-cultural history and political structure: e.g. Scandinavian countries. However, this has to be tested thoroughly before such claims can be made. Moreover, we test a framework of analysis developed as part of this thesis. Therefore, this can be regarded as the first time that the assumptions underlying the framework are tested. This inherently compromises the generalizability even further, as the underlying assumptions of the framework are merely investigated through descriptive statistics, in consequence providing an insight in the phenotype expressed in the Netherlands. Consequently, we assess the generalizability of our analysis as paltry.

### Theoretical validity

We have to weigh the validity of our research in relation to the framework. We mentioned earlier that the investigation of our hypotheses theoretically could bolster the assumed relation of the framework of cyclic securitization. Since we developed two hypotheses, we will discuss both in relation to our proposed framework. We refer to figure two and the elaboration in our theoretical framework for the underlying rationale.

### Hypothesis one: the assumption that the status quo influences speech acts

The basic assumption underlying this hypothesis is discussed in the previous chapter, namely that the status quo influences an agent’s habitus, consequently influencing political parties decision to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization.

When we cluster the political actors into one entity, the point of gravity of the research shifts from the political actors to the status quo. As we merely observe the variability of the number of speech acts related to cyclic securitization of migration, originating from the Dutch political actors grouped into one entity, changes in both the absolute and the relative amount of speech acts indicates an influence of the status quo on the agent's habitus. The agent's habitus itself can be considered as the translation from the status quo into the political actor's decision to out a speech act and thus cannot be of independent influence. Theoretically, this could be possible when for example an influential political actor has previous, personal experience related to an affair. However, this concept is hard, if not impossible, to empirically test and falsify. Therefore, we theoretically dismiss it for the purpose of analysis.

Since our chosen timeframe spans over eight years, we created the possibility to identify patterns in both the absolute amount of posts related to the cyclic securitization of migration and the relative amount of post in relation to the total environment of isolated posts indexed by the polarity analysis. The absolute amount of posts potentially relate to triggering events. We could, for example, hypothesize that the Paris Attacks of 2015 triggered an increase. The relative amount of posts contains more value in relation the changes of political parties' stances over time since an increase in the percentage of posts related to cyclic securitization of migration shows how a certain status quo over time influences the political spectrum to increase their participation. Moreover, we could identify differences in the distribution of polarity scores per year to assess general trends of negativity. Van Kersbergen & Krouwel (2008) investigated this phenomenon. They concluded that parties would show bandwagon-behaviour and follow the radical, right-wing parties in their attempts to securitize migration.

However, there are large limitations here. Even if we discover a potential relation, it merely indicates that "*something*" in the status quo influenced the habitus of the Dutch political spectrum. It is not part of the scope of this research to investigate that "*something*". Moreover, we cannot claim that there is a plausible causal mechanism. There could be an untraceable causal relation between the development over time and the participation through Facebook posts speech acts in the cyclic securitization of migration, but we cannot falsify if this relation is flawed. Therefore, this component of our research solely investigates in an exploratory fashion if there is any validity to the assumption under investigation, potentially providing credibility to this component of the proposed framework and rendering for researchers aiming to analyse this proposition further.

*Hypothesis two: the political actor's influence on the utterance of speech acts*

The assumption of cyclic securitization, in this case, is that the type of political actor influences the way in which they participate through speech acts in cyclic securitization (while the political actor, in turn, is influenced by its habitus and status quo). Our research design regarding the testing of this hypothesis could be labelled as a comparative case study the most similar case design. George and Bennet (2005, pp. 74) explain this as a design in which “the researcher attempts to select cases that are similar in all of their independent variables except one and differ in their dependent variable.” Here, the independent variable is the political actor in which the only difference between them is the type of political party. The dependent variable, the speech acts, differ between the different actors, or cases. Therefore, through executing this research, we could verify if the dependent variable of the speech act indeed differs between the cases, in this setting thus the political actors. This could inspire further, more rigor, research into this assumed relation as this exploratory investigation could provide credibility to this assumption.

This case also has large limitations. Among those are the fact that political parties are not one uniform entity and that there is the statistical possibility of outliers influencing the outcome (for example, one local Facebook page heavily posting about the topic of migration, thereby biasing the outcomes). Even if our results indicate that the type of political party influences the speech acts uttered, it does not mean that we claim to have found a causal mechanism. It could merely indicate that there is some credibility to the underlying assumption, which should be researched more thoroughly to come close to a plausible mechanism or relation.

## Analysis and results

In this section, we will present our findings and analysis. We will start by presenting the results of our analyses and provide an interpretation of these results. Subsequently, we can address our hypotheses. Next, we will turn to our conclusion to answer our research questions, provide further discussion of the findings, address the limitations of the research and lastly specify directions for further scholarly work related to securitization, speech acts and migration.

### Our first hypothesis and results

As discussed, our first hypothesis is as follows:

*“Speech acts related to cyclic securitization of migration increase during the election years of 2012 and 2017.”*

Following the proposed steps, we cleaned our data to a data frame after which it contained the following information:

- (1) Sender of the message, in political parties.
- (2) Date, in years.
- (3) Content of the message, in characters.
- (4) Messages marked to contain both a keyword related to the referent subject and related to the threat.
- (5) Polarity scores, stored in a separate column, accompany all the messages of variable (4).

This enabled us to derive the differences between the number of messages before and after applying the keywords, both in absolute and relative amount. Please see figure 8 for the statistics. This frequency table is the standard primary step of summarizing ordinal variables, as is the case here since it “shows the frequency of each value” (Monogan III, 2015, pp. 57).




<b>Figure 8: General overview without splitting into parties</b>			
	<b>Before keywordfilter</b>	<b>After keywordfilter</b>	<b>Average</b>
<b>2010</b>	1.528	20	1,31%
<b>2011</b>	3.021	66	2,18%
<b>2012</b>	8.786	267	3,04%
<b>2013</b>	15.265	503	3,30%
<b>2014</b>	34.138	1.476	4,32%
<b>2015</b>	29.348	2.112	7,20%
<b>2016</b>	28.687	2.056	7,17%
<b>2017</b>	48.645	2.912	5,99%
<b>2018</b>	47.069	2.748	5,84%
<b>Total</b>	216.487	12.160	5,62%

The average amount of posts containing the keywords are visualized in figure 9. This visualization through a histogram is to “give a quick sense of the spread of the other values” (Monogan III, 2015, pp. 59). We used ggplot2 to visualize all figures derived from our data, which is a great expansion to “the aesthetic and substantive tools R has for displaying quantitative information” (Gandrud, 2016, pp. 200).

These preliminary results indicate that national elections do not have an effect on the utterance of speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration by political parties, as the average of posts containing our keywords in the years 2012 and 2017 are not among the highest seen in the chosen timeframe. However, we still need to inspect the distribution of polarity scores. A standard step would now be to address the variance and standard deviation of the spread of the observations of the polarity scores. However, “extreme values can really run-up variances and standard deviations, just as they can distort a mean” (Monogan III, 2015, pp. 61). As the distribution of our polarity scores includes extreme values, we decided to focus on quartiles, percentiles and the median. “Quantiles are the relative placement of data values in a sorted list, scaled [0, 1]. For a value  $q$  the quantile for that value would be the order statistic  $x_{(q*n)}$ . Percentiles are the same thing, scaled [0, 100], so for a value  $p$  the  $p$ th percentile would be  $x_{((p*n)/100)}$ . Hence, the median is the 0.5 quantile and the 50th percentile. Special cases of quantiles include the previously introduced quartiles (dividing the data into four groups), quintiles (dividing into five groups), and deciles (dividing into ten groups)” (Monogan III, 2015, pp. 61).

**Figure 9**

Average percentage of Facebook posts per year containing the keywords



Then, we turned to the polarity scores that we plotted in a boxplot based on their quartiles. As the polarity scores are normally distributed and range from -1 to 1, Rstudio calculates the respected quartiles, thus the minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile and lastly the maximum. However, this would create a spurious plot, since we include messages with a positive polarity score. Therefore, we excluded messages with a positive polarity score in this plot. Please see figure 10 to inspect the boxplots, plotted per year.


In figure 10, “the bottom of the box represents the first quartile value (25th percentile), the large solid line inside the box represents the median value (second quartile, 50th percentile), and the top of the box represents the third quartile value (75th percentile). The whiskers, by default, extend to the lowest and highest values of the variable that are no more than 1.5 times the interquartile range (or difference between third and first quartiles) away from the box. The purpose of the whiskers is to convey the range over which the bulk of the data fall. Data falling outside of this range are portrayed as dots at their respective values” (Monogan III, 2015, pp. 36).

When we inspect the boxplot more thoroughly, we cannot conclude that there are significant differences in-between the years in polarity scores. Especially since the only significantly more negative year, 2011, is not a reliable source since the number of messages in 2011 that are marked by our keyword filters is lower than 75, the lowest after the year 2010.

Thus, we can reject our hypothesis, as there are no significant increases in speech acts of cyclic securitization by political parties during the national election years of 2012 and 2017. However, there are some general trends visible. Most interestingly, there was a rise in the attention paid to the topics of migration, Islam, terrorism and integration in the years 2015 and 2016. This is notable since it corresponds to the Paris attacks of 2015 and the height of the fear of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. It would be unwise to pinpoint these events as the cause of the increase in speech acts by political parties, but the relation is conspicuous. Furthermore, the dots in the boxplot, visualizing data falling outside of the 1.5 times the interquartile parameter, increase during the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. This corresponds to the observation in means as we saw in the histogram of figure 10.

Figure 10

Distribution of negative polarity scores between 2010 and 2018



Then, our second hypothesis:

*“Right-wing parties are more likely to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration than centre and left-wing parties.”*

Again, we first turned to the absolute amount of posts per political party. Please see the figures 12 to 16 to inspect this data. We were confronted with a data frame that was heavily influenced by the fact that over 38% of the total dataset contained messages from the political party *GroenLinks*. The smallest section, of the *CDA*, contained only 2.3 percent of the total dataset. Thus, absolute numbers did not provide the insight we aimed for. However, we can draw preliminary conclusions from the average of the percentage of messages that passed our keyword filters.

Interestingly, there is a rise in the average of posts passing our keyword filter in the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. This corresponds with the preliminary conclusion of the previous section. Thus, we will compare years focussed in this timespan, visualized in figure 11. There year of the Paris attacks, 2015, we saw that the left-wing *GroenLinks* revealed a large increase (+3,55 %) with as the second-highest the left-wing *PvdA* (+2,81%). However, when comparing the average of 2014 with 2017, the right-wing *CDA* take the lead with as primary runner-up *D66* with + 2,51%. Even though this data is not precise enough to enable us to draw conclusions, it does indicate that the left-wing parties of *PvdA* and *GroenLinks* are the on average the parties that direct the most attention to migration and integration as a threat, closely followed by the right-wing *CDA*. A last potentially interesting result is that left-wing parties seem to take the lead in the securitization of migration. *PvdA* and *GroenLinks* increase their utterance of speech acts in 2015 and 2016 and these decrease in 2017. The right-wing party *CDA*, however, strongly increased their utterances related to migration since 2017.

Figure 11

Average percentage of Facebook posts per year per party containing the keywords



<b>Figure 12: Number of posts per party per year before applying keywordfilter</b>										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
<b>CDA</b>	0	19	222	296	744	586	894	1.455	935	5.151
<b>D66</b>	233	441	1.828	2.499	5.950	4.967	4.684	8.955	9.270	38.827
<b>GroenLinks</b>	988	1.540	3.556	5.084	12.226	12.473	11.715	18.204	16.563	82.349
<b>PvdA</b>	216	819	2.070	3.988	8.006	6.357	6.321	11.093	10.119	48.989
<b>VVD</b>	91	202	1.110	3.398	7.212	4.965	5.073	8.938	10.182	41.171
<b>Total</b>	1.528	3.021	8.786	15.265	34.138	29.348	28.687	48.645	47.069	216.487

<b>Figure 13: Number of posts per party per year after applying keywordfilter</b>										
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
<b>CDA</b>	0	0	6	3	17	21	66	125	30	268
<b>D66</b>	6	8	29	61	154	219	226	457	366	1.526
<b>GroenLinks</b>	11	33	129	184	626	1.082	962	1.119	1.115	5.261
<b>PvdA</b>	3	19	78	158	458	542	455	812	802	3.327
<b>VVD</b>	0	6	25	97	221	248	347	399	435	1.778
<b>Total</b>	20	66	267	503	1.476	2.112	2.056	2.912	2.748	12.160

<b>Figure 14: Average number of posts per party per year that contain our keywords</b>									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>CDA</b>	NA	0,00%	2,70%	1,01%	2,28%	3,58%	7,38%	8,59%	3,21%
<b>D66</b>	2,58%	1,81%	1,59%	2,44%	2,59%	4,41%	4,82%	5,10%	3,95%
<b>GroenLinks</b>	1,11%	2,14%	3,63%	3,62%	5,12%	8,67%	8,21%	6,15%	6,73%
<b>PvdA</b>	1,39%	2,32%	3,77%	3,96%	5,72%	8,53%	7,20%	7,32%	7,93%
<b>VVD</b>	0,00%	2,97%	2,25%	2,85%	3,06%	4,99%	6,84%	4,46%	4,27%

Figure 15

Absolute amount of Facebook posts before and after keywordfilter







Figure 16

Average percentage of Facebook posts per year per party containing the keywords



Again, however, we need to evaluate the polarity scores, by plotting their distributions by party, as displayed in figures 17 and 18. When we consider all polarity scores, including the positive ones, we cannot conclude that there are major differences in this differentiation between parties. The only exception here is D66, as their median scores are on average higher than the others are. This would indicate that both the left-wing and the right-wing parties are uttering more negative messages regarding migration than the centre-party is. We inspect this suspicion when disregarding the positive scores, which changes the painted picture. Here, D66 fits the general pattern of a distribution around the median of a polarity score of -0.05. There are small differences between both the parties and the years, but these differences cannot be considered significant in any way. This fits the preliminary conclusion draws earlier when we saw the second largest increase in the average amount of messages after the keyword filter by the *CDA*.

Besides boxplots, we can also visualize the distribution of polarity scores per party per year through density plots. This “computes and draws kernel density estimate, which is a smoothed version of the histogram. This is a useful alternative to the histogram for continuous data that comes from an underlying smooth distribution.” (Rdocumentation, 2019). We employed the density plot function of *ggplot2*, based on the Gaussian kernel. As R takes care of the underlying statistical functions, we will merely present a short introduction into kernel density estimation. The formula for determining the Gaussian kernel estimate is as follows (Sheather, 2004, pp. 588):

$$K(y) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{y^2}{2}\right).$$

Here, *K* is the Kernel estimate of variable *y*. This leads to a certain number of data points, depending on the size of the sample. “Centred at each data point is each point's contribution to the overall density estimate, namely,  $(1/(nh)) K((x - Y_i) / h)$  (i.e.,  $1/n$  times a normal density with mean  $X_i$  and standard deviation  $h$ ). The density estimate is the sum of these scaled normal densities.” (Sheather, 2004, pp. 588-589). We used the default of R to calculate the bin width, also called the smoothing parameters: “if numeric, the standard deviation of the smoothing kernel” (Rdocumentation, 2019).

Through this method, we estimate the underlying, real distribution of the polarity scores based on the sample we received from the Open State Foundation.

Moreover, we applied the function twice in which figure 19 has not been weighted and figure 20 is. By applying the unweighted density plot function, “the density plots are calculated separate for each variable” (Datacamp, 2019). The Datacamp instruction later explains the difference with the weighted function: “when you compare several variables it's useful to see the density of each subset in relation to the whole data set. This holds true for multiple density plots as well as for violin plots. For this, we need to weight the density plots so that they are relative to each other. Each density plot is adjusted according to what proportion of the total data set each sub-group represents” (Datacamp, 2019).

Density plots also have an advantage of histograms. “The bias of a histogram estimator with bin width  $h$  is of order  $h$ , whereas centering the kernel at each data point and using a symmetric kernel zeroes this term and as such produces a leading bias term for the kernel estimate of order  $h$ ” (Sheather, 2004, pp. 589).

The density estimations plotted in figure 20 indicate that the most negative tendency per party can be found with the *CDA*. However, the height of the density plots of all parties are located at the positive side of the  $x$ -axis, thus larger than zero. This provides an even stronger indication than the boxplots already gave, that when political parties communication regarding migration and integration, their tone is generally positive.

The weighted density plot of figure 21 does not provide as much insight, unfortunately. As each curve is adjusted based on their proportion of the dataset, the large amount of messages of *GroenLinks* creates a spurious relationship amongst the ordinal substance of parties existing within the variable “political parties”. We decided to include the plot to further underline the tendency of positive polarity scores, which survived this weighting of kernel estimates.

Figure 17

Distribution of polarity scores per party per year




Figure 18

Distribution of negative polarity scores per party per year




Figure 19

Comparison of density of messages per party, therefore not weighted with other parties





Figure 20

Weighted comparison of density of messages per party in relation to other parties



Legend CDA D66 GroenLinks PvdA WD

## Conclusion

This section will provide answers to the research questions we introduced earlier. We will start by discussing our two sub-research questions, after which we will turn to our main research question. Then, we will consider the limitations of the investigation presented here. Third, we will evaluate the presented framework of cyclic securitization, based on the findings of this research. Lastly, we will present avenues for future research in the field of securitization, cyclic securitization and speech act analyses.

### Results and discussion

To recall, our first research question was:

*(1) “How have the speech acts related to cyclic securitization of migration evolved between 2010 and 2018?”*

This became the following hypothesis:

*“Speech acts related to cyclic securitization of migration increase during the election years of 2012 and 2017.”*

We have found no evidence that this hypothesis can be accepted. However, there were significant changes in the development of the average of speech acts related to cyclic securitization of migration, in comparison to speech acts that were not related to cyclic securitization of migration. We found a peak in the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. It is not part of this research to indicate the cause of this peak. Thus, since this question was an exploratory one, we refer to our analysis for the detailed changes over time and the comparison with speech acts that were not part of cyclic securitization of migration, while rejecting the proposed hypothesis.

Then, our second research question:

*(2) “Which type of political party is more likely to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration?”*

Here, we tested the following hypothesis to answer the question:

*“Right-wing parties are more likely to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration than centre and left-wing parties.”*

We are not confident that we found evidence supporting this hypothesis. There are indications that parties from the centre are the most hesitant to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration, based on average polarity scores and the average amount of speech acts related to cyclic securitization in comparison with the ones that are not. However, these differences cannot be marked as significant, or definitive. Thus, we cannot confirm this hypothesis since



we have not found conclusive evidence indicating that one out of the three types of parties is uttering speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration significantly more than the other types. Especially since the two parties uttering the most speech acts of cyclic securitization, on average, are both left-wing parties (*PvdA* and *GroenLink*) and a right-wing party (*CDA*). Thus, we also have to reject this hypothesis, concluding that we have not found any evidence for the hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the type of political party and the speech acts they articulate.

Lastly, our main research question:

*“What impacts speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration?”*

The framework of cyclic securitization, as introduced in this thesis, was investigated based on underlying two assumptions. Firstly, the assumption that a certain status quo inspires political actors to utter more speech acts of cyclic securitization. We assess this assumption as correct, supported by the evidence cited in the analysis regarding the first hypothesis. We did not find any evidence supporting that the phenomenon of elections, as part of the status quo, impact speech acts of cyclic securitization. The only exception here is the right-wing *CDA*, whose utterance of speech acts increased in 2017. However, we did find significant differences between the years, indicating that this assumption has validity.

Then, the cyclic model of securitization assumes that the status quo influences different types of political parties. Consequently, the assumption is that these parties, based on their habitus, make different deliberations to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration. However, this research does not find evidence supporting this assumption as a factor of impact. There were differences in the boxplot analysis of polarity scores and in the density plots, but these were too marginal to support any conclusive statements.

Thus, we conclude that a certain status quo does affect the decision of political parties to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization, thereby indirectly affecting these speech acts. We have found no conclusive evidence supporting the assumption that the type of political party influences the utterance of speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration by political parties. The discovered indications are not strong enough to support any decisive conclusions.

### Limitations of this research

There are a number of limitations to this research. Primarily, we were confronted with a dataset that was flawed. The main concern here was the overrepresentation of *GroenLinks* and underrepresentation of *CDA*. This became the most obvious during the analysis of the distribution of polarity scores per party per year since for a minority of years the number of messages was too small to be able to support reliable comparison. Hence, we coped with this disadvantage by focussing on descriptive statistics based on means, median and distribution of posts per party. This enabled comparison of parties per year, with some exceptions like those that were mentioned.

Secondly, the design we opted for inherently limits the research. As we turned to content analysis for determining the keyword filters and to the dictionary method for the polarity scores, there are messages flagged incorrectly. We have provided accuracy scores, based on a random sample ( $n = 50$ ) to be transparent about this limitation. We believe that the accuracy of the keyword filters of 67% is substantive, thereby enabling us to draw preliminary conclusions. However, this limitation abates our already meagre possibilities for generalization.

Generalization as a whole is the last limitation of this thesis worth discussing. As discussed in our research design, we expected the generalizability to be paltry. This preliminary estimation proved to be correct, especially since the credibility of the lack of generalizability was increased by the flawed distribution of the data set among the parties.

### Reflection on the introduced framework of cyclic securitization

We introduced the framework of cyclic securitization to challenge the assumptions of both the Copenhagen School and Sociological school of securitization. Primarily, we aimed to incorporate scientific realism and the notion of assumed causality into securitization theory, without waning the central role of the speech act. Moreover, as figures 3 to 5 indicate, we reduced the demands to this speech act to increase the configurability in relation to the proposed research objective and direction. Lastly, our framework differentiated between the interrelated configurations of sociological securitization, thereby explicitly putting a chronological order in place. We expanded this to include the effects of speech acts, as our foundation of scientific realism presumes.

This research investigated the introduced framework on the underlying assumptions of two of those components, namely the influence of the status quo and of the type of political party on the decision to utter speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration. We did find evidence that the status quo influences the decision of political parties to utter these types of speech acts. As this is an exploratory research, this conclusion was to-be-expected. However, we believe the presented conclusion here bolsters this assumption.

Then, the more precarious conclusion that we did not find conclusive evidence supporting the assumption that political parties are not uniform in their utterances of speech acts of cyclic securitization of migration. However, this does not mean that the assumption is incorrect per se. If this would be the case, we could dismiss both the Copenhagen School and the Sociological school of securitization, as these assume that political actors are the primary securitizers. Even though the Copenhagen School reserved room for other types of securitizers, they still consider political actors to be the primary securitizer. Therefore, we do not assess this assumption as to be incorrect, merely as to be unsubstantiated in this specific investigation. However, we do believe that the deployed method here, of content analysis through pattern recognition and the automatic allocation of polarity scores, did not prove to be the ideal manner to investigate this specific assumption. The next section will delve into plausible alternative methods.

To conclude, we believe our introduced framework of analysis can provide scholars with new tools to analyse securitization. Especially the newly introduced threshold for categorizing speech acts, the adoption of scientific realism and the chronological differentiation between the components of securitization and their assumed linkage, create a new toolbox to perform analysis. Moreover, this facilitates new research designs and methods. We demonstrated this by using quantitative content analysis through text mining based on keyword patterns, which is a method hardly adopted by scholars of securitization. Furthermore, this new approach embraces falsification of scholarly work while other schools of securitization, especially the Copenhagen School, narrow down to qualitative investigations mainly supported by interviews. We emphasize that we do not dismiss these methods to be applied to investigations based on the framework of cyclic securitization. We merely indicate that the broadening of scientific methods to-be applied to securitization research fits the pattern of scientific realism.

Therefore, we hope that the assumed covariation, of the impact of the status quo on speech acts, follows the steps articulated by Gerring (2010, pp. 1517-18):

*“It is a normal feature of academic life for tractable “mechanisms” to be transformed into “covariations,” and intractable covariations into causal mechanisms”.*

### Directions for further research

We will shortly discuss two plausible avenues for new scholarly work related to the framework of cyclic securitization in the sector of migration, namely a differentiation in methodology and an expansion into the field of comparative research.

First, continuing our discussion of the second research question, we believe that our method of programmatically assigning polarity scores did not prove to have the substance we hoped. Therefore, we suggest the appliance of content analysis, even on large-N data sets, with a manual assignment of polarity scores. Our choice to implement the most accurate variant of sentiment analysis, namely the mean score of two methods, did prove to be the most meticulous but it reduces the distribution of the polarity scores since it balanced extreme values. When applying polarity scores manually, this concern is reduced. Thus, we would recommend a similar type of research as we performed but then with manual assignment of polarity scores. Such a method was infeasible for us to do, under the influx of the pressure of time.

Secondly, databases like the ones we used are being established throughout Europe in recent months. In combination with the possibilities for artificial translation of these databases into one language (e.g. English), creates the opportunity for comparative, quantitative content analysis research. Moreover, this research design would address the most distinct weakness of our research design, namely generalizability. Furthermore, it would invite increased falsification of investigations, as the methodology is clear-cut and can be repeated, thereby plausibly bolstering the general scholarly validity of securitization.

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### Appendix one: The linguistic status of the speech act

If the status quo influences the habitus in such a way that the political actor is convinced to attempt a securitizing move, the speech act(s) enter the stage. Recalling Austin (in Balzacq, 2010, pp. 4-5) the speech act consists of:

- “Locutionary: the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference (Austin 1962: 95, 107);
- Illocutionary: the act performed in articulating a locution.
- Perlocutionary: the “consequential effects” or “sequels” that are aimed to evoke the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience.”

However, surprisingly, the large body of securitization theorizing is grounded in Austin’s conceptualization of the speech act, whilst Austin, unfortunately, passed away in 1960, before the age of 50. Speech act theory developed since then, notably by John Searle who improved parts of Austin’s original Speech Act theory. Interestingly, Searle (1968) does not agree with the locutionary / illocutionary distinction, nor does he believe in a dichotomist division between constatives and performatives. Thus, to be able to define our perspective on the speech act, we first need to take a trip into the field of linguistics.

First of all, the distinction between the constatives and performatives. Searle explains how this distinction does not uphold: constatives according to Balzacq (2010, and Austin in Balzacq, 2010) are either true or false whilst performatives are neither true nor false but felicitous or infelicitous, relying on their performance based on conventions (Searle, 1968). However, some classes of performatives can be falsified (Searle names warnings as an example, just like promises, etc) and constatives can be judged based on felicitousness or infelicitousness. To exemplify the latter point, the sentence “Peter’s car is moving” is infelicitous when Peter has no car. “Eventually the conclusion becomes obvious: making a statement or giving a description is just as much performing an act as making a promise or giving a warning. What was originally supposed to be a special case of utterances (performatives) swallows the general case (constatives), which now turn out to be only certain kinds of speech acts, among others. Statements, descriptions, and so forth are only other classes of illocutionary acts on all fours, as illocutionary acts, with promises, commands, apologies, bets, and warnings” (Searle, 1968, pp. 406). Therefore, we cannot support the proposition by Balzacq (2010) that the constative / performative distinction underlines the distinction between the philosophical and sociological school of thought.

Searle also scrutinized the locutionary / illocutionary distinction. This is a linguistic-technical analysis but crucial in the understanding of the speech act itself. Originally, the difference between the locutionary and illocutionary according to Austin (in Searle, 1968, pp. 406) was that within the message of a sentence, the locutionary referred to and defined as “sense and reference” and the illocutionary referred to and defined as “uttering a sentence with a certain force”. However, these are not mutually exclusive. As Searle puts it (1968, pp. 406), “the class of illocutionary acts will contain members of the class of locutionary acts”. This difference is important since “the original locutionary-illocutionary distinction is best designed to account for those cases where the meaning of the sentence is, so to speak, force-neutral-that is, where its literal utterance did not serve to distinguish a particular illocutionary force. But now further consideration will force us to the following conclusion: no sentence is completely force-neutral” (Searle, 1968, pp. 412). Only rhetic acts, which are part of the locutionary and defined as “the act of using those vocables with a more or less definite sense and reference” (Searle, 1968, pp. 410). However, to extract a rhetic act from the illocutionary act is impossible without abstracting the illocutionary act, simply because a rhetic act in definition is an illocutionary act. “It now emerges that all the members of the class of locutionary acts (performed in the utterance of complete sentences) are members of the class of illocutionary acts, because every rhetic act, and hence every locutionary act, is an illocutionary act” (Searle, 1968, pp. 413). Then, Searle turns to some linguistic principles:

- (1) “Whatever can be meant can be said. I call this the Principle of Expressibility.
- (2) The meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of all its meaningful components.
- (3) The illocutionary forces of utterances may be more or less specific; and there are several different principles of distinction for distinguishing different types of illocutionary act” (Searle, 1968, pp. 415).

The principle of Expressibility (from here on “the Principle”) underlines how the intentions of the utterer can be expressed in the utterance. Therefore, a mutually exclusive division between the locutionary and the illocutionary is not feasible, since the intended force of a sentence can be brought in detail to words if the speaker wishes to. The second point describes how deep syntactic structure, stress and intonation contour in the articulation influence the meaning of an utterance. In written speech, this also included punctuation. These are often essential indicators of meaning, therefore determinates of the illocutionary force (Searle, 1968). Thus, not only



words and the order in which they are expressed is relevant for the meaning. The last point is threefold: “One is that descriptions of illocutionary acts may be more or less determinate. The second and more important, which I now wish to emphasize, is that the acts themselves may be more or less definite and precise as to their illocutionary force” (Searle, 1968, pp. 416). Third, “the distinction between the content or, as some philosophers call it, the proposition, in an illocutionary act and the force or illocutionary type of the act” (Searle, 1968, pp. 420).

The propositional act is “the act of expressing a proposition (a phrase which is neutral as to illocutionary force)” (Searle, 1968, pp. 420), which needs distinction from the illocutionary. The crux here is the different identity conditions related to both acts, as the identical propositional act can appear in diverse types of illocutionary acts. Searle (1968) visualizes this by using the  $F(p)$  representation in which  $F$  stands for the possible values of the illocutionary force and  $p$  represents a variable of an inherently indeterminable possibility of propositions. Thus, the propositional act only represents those fragments of the utterance that are no indicators of the illocutionary force (Searle, 1968). Therefore, “the propositional act is a genuine abstraction from the total illocutionary act, and so construed no propositional act is by itself an illocutionary act” (Searle, 1968, pp. 421). This distinction leads to the notion that statements are speech acts. However, *statement* should be differentiated. The word *statement* consists of *state* and *-ment* in which *state* represents a regular illocutionary verb. However, “its nominalized forms share features with nominalized forms of illocutionary verbs; in particular in the “-ment” form “state” shares the act-object ambiguity” (Searle, 1968, pp. 422). This leads to the distinction between statement-objects and statement-acts, in which the former is a proposition that can be falsified whilst the latter as an illocutionary force forms the speech act (Searle, 1968).

Thus, to wrap-up Searle’s analysis, “statement-acts are illocutionary acts of stating. Statement-objects are propositions (construed as stated). The latter but not the former can be true or false. And it is the confusion between these which prevented Austin from seeing both that statements can be speech acts and that statements can be true or false, though acts cannot have truth values” (Searle, 1968, pp. 424).

The point of this exercise is to underline how the proposed differentiation of performatives and constatives do not underline a difference in thought of the sociological and philosophical school. Furthermore, we can dismiss the differentiation made by Balzacq (2010) between the

locutionary and the illocutionary as part of the speech act. Thus, we uphold two distinctions of the speech act, based on the following explanation of the speech act:

*“Speech acts are characteristically performed in the utterance of sounds or the making or marks. What is the difference between just uttering sounds or making marks and performing a speech act? One difference is that the sounds or marks one makes in the performance of a speech act are characteristically said to have meaning, and a second related difference is that one is characteristically said to mean something by those sounds or marks. Characteristically when one speaks one means something by what one says, and what one says, the string of morphemes that one emits, is characteristically said to have a meaning.” (Searle, 1969, pp. 6).*

The speech act thus consists of three main classifications, which are:

- (4) The illocutionary act
- (5) The propositional act
- (6) The performative act

There are two acts we missed, the phonetic acts of uttering noises and the phatic act of outing words. However, just like translating words spoken or thought of into writing, these are irrelevant for our framework since they are a given act. However, the three acts above make up the speech act used in the analysis of securitization. Related to the speech act definition, we accept Habermas’ interpretation (in Balzacq, 2010, pp. 5): “to say *something*, to act *in* saying something, to bring about something *through* acting in saying something.”

## **Appendix two: Guzzini's introduction of causal mechanisms into securitization**

Guzzini starts off by reflecting on the status quo of securitization, explaining how securitization in its original form took the shape of a broad conceptual move (Guzzini, 2011). It did not accept the objectivist vision anymore, in which threats are factually constructed; neither did it fit the subjectivist vision that security is anything the involved individual actors claim is it. Thus, securitization offered an array of conceptual moves which built on the idea that “perceptions may not be subjective to start with, but only made possible by intersubjective understandings embedded in the dominant discourses among foreign policy elites” (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 330). Guzzini names this the sociologization of security in which the central place of the meaning of the concept security is replaced by the investigation into social constructions of security. Hence, it emphasized what security undertakes instead of its connotation. Therefore, Guzzini (2011, pp. 330) recaps the following definition of securitization, based on Buzan et al (2003) re-evaluated variant: “securitization is a successful speech act through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat”.

However, the implications behind the speech act nature of securitization are inadequate to trigger securitization. To address this issue, securitization theory evolved by marking speech acts as attempt or moves. Besides this notion, the implications derived from the approach that securitization is the aggravation of regular political debate instead of replacing it create difficulties. The common detonator of these complications is that they view securitization as a process instead of a dichotomy in which securitization is either successful or not (Guzzini, 2011). Thus, it is part of a framework of analysis instead of pure empirical theory. However, Guzzini claims that the framework could, and should, be included in “an empirical theory of security” (2011, pp. 331). In this format, the framework should function as the internal rationale behind the mechanisms of securitization, in consequence providing the circumstances for its possibility. However, the externalist position as Balzacq (2010) described it is ignored. The geopolitical reality is what the involved actors decide that it is, based on intersubjective understanding and historical precedence instead of a given phenomenon.

This perception led to the introduction of empirical theorizing. As Guzzini (2011, pp. 331) puts it, “Knowing different security discourses and analysing how ‘the other’ is constructed within each allows the observer to see potential policy fault-lines and securitization processes. In turn,

this makes it possible to state that (regional) security crises appear when such discourses simultaneously start securitizing ‘the other’, or that regional détente is possible when such discourses simultaneously desecuritize.” Hence, causality can be present, even though it takes an implicit form.

Lastly, the political component of securitization, thus how security among others forms political structures. Hence, it is relevant to examine “political theories that more generally relate to the role of identity (both personal and collective) and, or so I think, to processes of recognition in the reproduction of a social order” (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 332).

### Causal mechanisms

With this reflection, Guzzini moves to introduce his concept of causal mechanisms in securitization. Therefore, these mechanisms have to be defined, which Elster (in Guzzini, 2011, pp. 332) did as “frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences”. To contextualize this definition, the notion of universal laws and correlation is crucial. Correlation does not provide an explanation; it merely describes an interpretation of a possible explanation. Universal laws, however are virtually absent in the social sciences as it is impossible to generate universal laws which uphold in every circumstance. Because of these components, there is a grey area between correlative descriptions and universal laws in which the latter is not present and the former is too explicit.

Causal mechanisms can fill this gap by, in hindsight, by providing clarifications about the rationale behind certain occurred affairs. One important limitation, however, is the lack of predictive generalizability since the trigger that activated the identified causal mechanism(s) could change depending on the context, just like the source of the effects of the mechanism(s). Moreover, mechanisms should not be perceived as intervening variables, since this would mark mechanisms as sequential correlative explanations, supported by micro-correlations (Guzzini, 2011).

Thus, a specification of causal mechanisms is needed to differentiate it from variables. Guzzini identifies three main differences. “First, and in contrast to mechanisms, an intervening variable ‘is added to increase the total variance explained in a multivariate analysis’, but that is different from providing the links in a process” (Mayntz in Guzzini, 2011, pp. 333).

Secondly, variables hint towards actual observation, whilst mechanisms do not have to be observed. Lastly, “mechanisms describe the relationships or the actions among the units of analysis or in the cases of study” (Falleti & Lynch in Guzzini, 2011, pp. 333), hence they do not have to be ascribed to the unit of analysis. In short, viewing mechanisms as variables prevents combinatorial reasoning. This is a different manner of interpreting causality, moving away from both forced regularities and the positivist perception of explanation, while moving into the sphere of interpretivism and scientific rationalism.

Scientific rationalism can be interpreted the narrow and the broad way in relation to mechanisms. In its origin, sociologists used this method in social science, as part of the idea that all affairs are linked to each other, either intentionally or unintentionally. Therefore, micro-actions can lead to micro-actions and vice versa. Consequently, the standard is to double-check it, which leads to the scheme of macro-micro-macro behaviour in which there are three mechanisms connecting them to each other (Guzzini, 2011). This is seen as the narrow view since it is “all reduced to a narrowly mechanistic ‘through-put’ “ (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 333). The broader vision, however, defines mechanism analysis in a pure rationalist action theory manner. This includes *wertrationalität* as a crucial component besides instrumental rationality. Consequently, the line of reasoning is arranged according to so-called reasons, schematically ordered in the desire – believe – (opportunities) – behaviour triangle as one of the classical rationalist notions (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 333). At its core, the rationalist point of view thus underlines the importance of rationality and cognitive processes.

Institutionalists criticized this individual rationalist view, claiming that structural components are at the core of mechanisms. Hence, “the main cognitive challenge is therefore to identify the structural and institutional features, that organize ... the actions of different actors so as to produce their macro effect” (Mayntz in Guzzini, 20121, p.. 333). From this perspective, the notion of materialism can be abandoned and replaced by the notion of social ontologies. Applying this conceptualization of mechanisms to the broader field of social sciences, Colin Wright (in Guzzini, 2011, pp. 334) explains mechanisms as follows: “All social activity presupposes the prior existence of social forms. Speech requires language; making, materials; actions, conditions; agency, resources; activity, rules. Equally, these prior social forms are concept dependent ... the concepts possessed by agents ‘matter’; they make a difference. And in complex social settings they are part of the causal complex and, hence, may be mechanisms”.

### Causal mechanisms and securitization

Using the perspective of mechanisms to mark securitization as a mechanism exposes some of the flaws in previous research. Empirical studies often disregard or ignore the notion of intersubjectivity. Hence, they fall prey to analysing successful propaganda. Alternatively, as Balzaq (2010) explained, their investigative topic becomes part of the self-referential apparatus that appears and stunningly influences the ruling political agenda. Thus, taking the concept of mechanisms can increase the explanatory power of securitization theory. Guzzini (2011, pp. 335) interprets mechanisms therefore as “contingent or indeterminate, and applicable to many different contexts, yet not as a universal or regular cause”.

For the application of mechanisms to securitization to work, some aspects of securitization have to be highlighted. First, securitization is no clear-cut act; it is a process that happens through speech acts. Secondly, without cultural context securitization cannot be applied since the concept of intersubjectivity does not uphold in all contexts, hence it is not a universal theory in which speech acts lead to the same outcome. Then the facilitating conditions: consisting of endogenous and contingency effects. We already explained the endogenous effect in the form of formal and informal empowerment but contingency effects need to be included since they influence the empowerment of the involved actors, hence they affect the facilitating conditions. Lastly, closely related to this point is the role of history with relation to the authority of the securitization actors. Guzzini (2011, pp. 336) defines this together as “a process in which (de)securitization can only be understood against the background of existing foreign policy discourses, their embedded collective memory of past lessons, defining metaphors and the significant ‘circles of recognition’ for the collective identities of a country; and whose success does obviously depend on, but cannot be reduced to, the distribution of authority and the different forms of capital in the relevant field. Its effectiveness (just as with a law) is historically constituted and evolving.”

Interpreting mechanisms can be done based on the dichotomy in which one explains how the trigger is a given, but the effects are unknown, or the other way around in which the effect is known but the triggered mechanisms are undefined. Lastly, “if automaticity would apply to both, the event concerned would be a positivist causal regularity” (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 336). Guzzini, nevertheless, introduces a third manner in which the outcome is contingent instead of the incitement of the trigger. “Here, a certain event triggers securitizing moves in which actors lay claim to the actualization of a pre-existing action-complex” (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 336). This

mechanism fits the last part of the facilitating condition in which securitizing moves are the offspring of historical complexes related to a certain threat. Therefore, the specific context leads to “some sort of an automatic mobilization bias” (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 336). Moreover, these securitizing moves on a regular basis provide the means that inspire a countermovement against the securitizing attempt(s). This provides the foundation for the observation that “both securitizing and desecuritizing moves can be part of self-fulfilling prophecies by becoming shared beliefs – and then affecting pre-existing routine action-complexes related to them (say: deterrence or reassurance strategies)” (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 336). Thus, both securitization and desecuritization are routine moves grounded in historical contexts. It also underlines the uncertainty of the definition of both mechanisms and securitization. In applying mechanisms to securitization it becomes clear that they can be interpreted as *explanandum* and *explanans*. The former refers to the notion that securitization is provoked by some entity and the latter refers to the visa versa notion in which securitization triggers a response (Guzzini, 2011). Guzzini points out that there is no inherently better method or vision but he misses the explicit configuration of securitization research with regard to these components of securitization employed in research. “The choice of a specific understanding is partly driven by the empirical question. If the research is directed towards individual events, trying to find out whether they contribute to (de)securitization, then analysis of the possible triggering moments seems appropriate. [...] if the question turns on a comparison of different processes, as in comparative historical sociology – then it makes more sense to define the sequence of moves in their particular context as the relevant understanding of ‘securitization’. ” (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 337). Therefore, by applying the notion of causal mechanisms in combination with explicitly defining the manner in which research is set-up, a researcher has the means to employ securitization as an empirical theory of securitization.

### Appendix three: Wæver's response to Balzacq and Guzzini

Wæver used the same 2011 edition of *Security dialogue* to respond to, among others, Balzacq and Guzzini, providing insight in his perspective with regard to the theoretical status of securitization and providing new insights for future research and the foundation it should be built on.

#### Politics and securitization

The political component of securitization relates closely to the research question employed by the scholar. Therefore, Wæver claims that there are three variants. “First, it might be used to refer to empirical studies of *political processes* of securitization and desecuritization (knowledge about politics). Second, it can headline research that explores the *concept of politics* implied in securitization theory (how to define politics). Finally, it might refer to the *political moves invested in the theory*, i.e. the political act involved in designing and/or employing securitization theory (how to theorize politically). Briefly: ‘political securitization practices’, ‘the political in securitization analysis’ and ‘the politics of securitization theory’” (Wæver, 2011, pp. 466). Wæver centres his article around the second variant, as it is one of the most debated features of securitization

The core question, therefore, he tries to answer is to “know how features of the theory systematically shape the political effects of using this theory.” (Wæver, 2011, pp. 468). To do this, he uses Hannah Arendt her vision on politics as one of the most realistic presentations of politics in the current context. In short, affairs and actions taken cannot be judged as morally good or bad; it can only be judged in hindsight. The same goes for the meaning of a political act since these acts are the product of actions and reactions of involved actors that lead to the notion that there is no “capturing power” that generates an outcome according to a pre-set procedure. Securitization incorporated this conceptual vision on politics by placing a focal point on the concept of intersubjectivity and the role of the audience. “Therefore, the theory is constructed so that a user can never reduce away politics by deriving it from objective threats or causal explanations at the particular point of securitization” (Wæver, 2011, pp. 468). This leads to the notion that part of securitization investigation involved moral questions; strongly connected to the “why” component of research questions.

Besides the influence of the incorporation of Arendt's vision, there is a prejudice in the theory of securitization that inclines to investigate the counterpart called desecuritization. Wæver does



not claim that either one of these is the best for investigation; according to him one should use desecuritization as an abstract concept whilst using securitization when investigating more concrete, empirical circumstances. Here, causal mechanisms come into place. These mechanisms inspire in its broad sense two kinds of questions; based on the idea of explanandum and explanans. Interestingly, Wæver notes, these are not mutually exclusive. Consequently, when applying causal mechanisms to securitization enhances the theory by including systematic political effects to the theory. “Thus [by] programming a suggestion of desecuritization into every usage, the theory makes a political investment; like all action, it runs a risk due to the unpredictability of outcomes – and in this case a particularly big one because the political input is chosen, so to say, at a distance as a general input to numerous concrete situations” (Wæver, 2011, pp. 469).

Lastly, securitization in its core targets a specific vision on the security rationality, closely linked to the normative dilemma as developed by Huysmans (2002), explaining how “all security studies risks strengthening security, even when intentionally anti-security” (in Wæver, 2011, pp. 470). Before securitization was introduced, security studies could be interpreted as split into two camps: the strict vision on security in which military affairs were central and the broad vision in which the entirety of affairs could be interpreted as security affairs. Securitization broke this impasse by providing a ‘fishing net’ based on a fixed standard, with the speech act at its core, which scholars could apply to filter the security status of an affair. Unfortunately, this fixed standard of security became the blind eye of the theory, as many theories have blind spots (Wæver, 2011). Some scholars deceive securitization in this way, by adopting the theory’s premises to identify new patterns of security whilst neglecting the conceptual moves that brought them there.

However, the blind spot of fixed security does provide possibilities for identifying new practices. One provision here is that it should follow the clearly defined operations since these limited concepts do provide more structural insight than the identification of new patterns without the limit of concepts. Nevertheless, this does not deal with the issue of the security rationale and the dilemma put forward by Huysmans. Wæver deals with this controversy by explaining that “a theory of the exceptionalist dimension of politics – even a theory that challenges exceptionalism from another core meaning of politics – can fortify a conceptual universe where exceptionalism is central to the political field, and thereby limit our political imagination” (Wæver, 2011, pp. 470). He links this notion to a third effect: “On the one hand, highlighting a

particular security rationality serves the critical purpose of showing what security speak does rather than what it claims to innocently mirror. On the other hand, however, it can strengthen the exceptionalist end of politics” (Wæver, 2011, pp. 470).

### Securitization as theory

This brings us to the concept of theorizing with regard to securitization. This is often captured through an unprofitable dichotomy in which mainstream scholars emphasise how theories consist of a number of hypotheses, which in their turn either ratified or falsified based on correlations and consistencies. Social constructivist, as the other side of the spectrum, disregard theories with more specification than broad perspectives. Therefore, Wæver uses the model-theory view originating from the school of scientific philosophy. “Here, a theory is basically a model that can be held against empirical instances to assess structural similarity. We gain insights through bridge building from this abstraction to specific analytical usages. A theory is not basically a proposition about reality (true or false): it is a model from which one might produce empirical statements” (Wæver, 2011, pp. 470). This is the light in which securitization should be upheld and applied as long as its objective can be met. Thus, one might call securitization an “idea theory”, with one explicit idea at its core. Key concepts function as a jointly unified pattern in which only the essential concepts are included. This view leads to these injunctions of theory:


- “Focus on the core idea that defines a theory.
- Distinguish clearly between the theory itself and its cumulated insights from empirical studies.
- Discuss empirical cases less in terms of vindicating or falsifying theory, and more as exploring whether a specific case is an instance of ... and thus what the extension of the model is and through which additional models.
- Invest in theoretical work when doing empirical analysis. Theories are quite minimalistic and therefore any case study demands a specific set-up – possibly with several theories and constructs for the occasion. ‘Theories don’t predict, people do’ (Waltz, 1996: 56).” (Wæver, 2011, pp. 471).

When applying this approach, two things become clear. Firstly, it provides clarification on how the theory should manifest itself in distinct investigations. Secondly, it provides the possibility

of applying multiple theories provided an explicit specification in the research design. Wæver (2011, pp. 471) names this the hardening of the core of the theory, which “can also clarify its limits and enable a more focused analysis of the spatiotemporal contingency of the particular securitization format, as well as subtle changes in the codifications of contemporary societies”.

Causal mechanisms in securitization

Wæver acknowledges that many securitization studies fall prey to the confirmation bias in which they investigate a development leading up to a successful securitization. Other scholars call for an increase in causality in the theory, making predictions and standards for successful securitization possible. However, Wæver (2011) does not agree with the latter, claiming that this would reduce the political component of the theory. Thus, he introduces the following visualisation of securitization based on action, events and effects of the theory:



Grounded here, he views the first arrow, “doing security”, as related to actors, acts and politics in a non-causal fashion. Then, as the core of securitization, the speech act, doubted by Wæver

(2011, pp. 476) as “the moment of securitization”. The arrow to the right creates the space for the introduction of causal mechanisms, which determine if something is securitized.

“The intersecting arrow is powerful. The theory rests on ‘fixing’ a particular figure as the center of investigation: securitization. Fixation on *form* was the move that freed the theory from a need to privilege particular actors (e.g. states) or means (e.g. military) prior to empirical analysis. The spatiotemporal contingency of securitization is checked by, for example, risk-management practices; changing relations between risk, uncertainty and danger; and non-Western understandings of security” (Wæver, 2011, pp. 477).

## **Appendix four: a history of migration and integration in the Netherlands**

### *Migration and the politics of the Netherlands*

After the Second World War, the Netherlands was being rebuilt after the infrastructure of the Netherlands was severely damaged. This decade, starting around 1950, marked the first influx of migrant in the Netherlands. Under the influence of the decolonization, migrants from the former colonies moved to the Netherlands. Around 300.000 migrants were accepted from the former Dutch East Indies (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015). On the other hand, around half a million Dutchmen migrated away from the Netherlands in this era.

When the Netherlands was reconstructed and the economy boomed, the government developed schemes to recruit guest workers. These workers came from the south of Europe and Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. These workers did not return to their home countries but, under the influence of Dutch unions, were given the same rights as native Dutchmen to prevent unequal competition. This became complicated when the Netherlands encountered its first economic crisis since the Second World War in the form of the oil crisis of 1973. Immigration had to be stopped, that was clear to all parties including the socialist who were in power. Guest workers were given the opportunity to register themselves, which around 15.00 successfully did (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015). Moreover, this led to pressure from religious groups and politicians (still influential under the pillarization) to facilitate family unification for the former guest labourers. In consequence, immigration could not be stopped even when the economic crisis hit and the rate of migrant moving into the Netherlands rose (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015). The concept of humanitarian, fair treatment of the former labour workers manifested itself under pressure of the feeling of collective guilt after the Second World War. The survival rate of Jews in the Netherlands during the Nazi occupation was much lower than the ones of neighbouring countries. Moreover, civil rights movements in South Africa and the U.S.A. influenced public opinion. Lastly, in 1969 there were publications about war crimes committed by the Dutch army during the Indonesian war of independence after the Second World War. This together led to a common feeling of guilt; therefore, the policies to treat the guest workers were benevolent.

Multiculturalism became a dominant term, implicating that “it was morally wrong to expect from migrants to give up their cultural heritage” (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, pp. 84). Different cultures were supposed to live peacefully together. An often-used synonym was that the

multicultural society should not be seen as a melting pot, but as a salad in which different identities and cultures together formed the whole salad.

After the first wave of migrants from the former colonies in the Dutch Indies, the second wave of migrant workers, a third wave of migration happened when Suriname became independent and the families of the migrant workers of the second wave of migration arrived. This increase in migration led to a sharp increase in unemployment under migrants, especially since the Dutch economy was still recovering from the 1973 oil crisis. Therefore, the Dutch government adopted policies, presented as a multicultural packaging. These policies were aimed to soften the blow of an economic recession by putting emphasis on housing, education and income assistance (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015). Besides humanitarian reasons, these policies were fed by the perceived threat of the rise of the extreme right to exploit this situation. This happened starting the 1980s when the anti-migration party “Centrum Party” (“*Centrum partij*”) gained a seat in the parliament. The response of the established political parties was to isolate the Centrum Party, hoping to keep migration depoliticized. The common belief was that it would lead to widespread racism and discrimination if the topic of migration were to be politicized. The Socialist Party (*SP*) published a critical piece in 1983 about the immigration, stating their inability to adjust and integrate successfully in the Netherlands. This led to an immense reaction, calling the paper among other things racist.

Even though unemployment among migrants rose, the public debate surrounding migration was prevented. As Lucassen & Lucassen (2015, pp. 89) put it: “politicians, the media and a considerable part of the Dutch population refused to engage in open discussions of sociocultural tensions between migrants and the native population”.

However, this two-faced situation would shift quickly, with the so-called “Rushdie-affair”. In 1989, the Dutch translation of “The Satanic Verses” by Salman Rushdie was published. Worldwide, Muslims demonstrated against the publication, sometimes violently. Demonstrations also happened in Rotterdam and The Hague, even though many Muslims in the Netherlands disagreed with them. However, these demonstrations demonstrated to some Dutchmen what they already believed: “immigrants who, after having been accepted in Europe, finally showed their real (intolerant) face” (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, pp. 90). Remarkably, these notions were mostly outed by left-wing public figures. Jan Blokker, an influential journalist working for the left-wing newspaper the *Volkskrant*, acted in religion in general

through his published articles. In 1990, a Dutch right-wing politician of the liberal party “The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy” (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD*) moved into the vacuum to act against the multicultural society. In consequence, he broke the longstanding political consensus to abstain from such criticism. This politician, Frits Bolkenstein, outed statements in which he claimed the Western cultural heritage of the enlightenment to be superior to Islamic culture. This started the nowadays common Dutch belief that the political left wing was naïve with regard to migration and its complications. Notably, the Rushdie-affair had an interesting side effect. Migrants from the former colonies were progressively perceived as natively Dutch. The alienation of Muslim immigrants led to the acceptance of migrants from the former colonies since, on average, they shared the Dutch language, Christian religion and they self-identified with the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015).

The political right continued to agitate against migrants during the 1990s, abandoning the shared responsibility they had with the political left wing during the era of first-generation migration. In consequence, the political left was forced to defend itself against these untrue accusations. It did so through skeptic party members. Most prominent during the 1990s in this context was Paul Scheffer, a staff member of the scientific bureau of the Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA*) published an article in 1995. This article expressed his concerns that the Dutch identity was under threat by (Islamic) mass immigration and the process of European integration (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015). Thus, he advocated an increase in attention paid to Dutch history and the national identity. The Socialist Party supported his call to action.

#### 9/11, Pim Fortuyn and the public cultural-identity debate

In January of 2000, Scheffer published another article in one of the most prominent Dutch newspapers, the *NRC Handelsblad*. This piece, named “The multicultural drama” blamed the political left for overlooking the social-cultural problems that the mass migration of the previous decades had caused. He named the Muslim immigrants especially, calling the multicultural society a drama and ending his piece with the exclamation that this drama is “the greatest threat to societal peace” (NRC, 2000). In retrospect, this article is seen as “the keystone of the fierce criticism of political correctness that had started with the Rushdie affair in 1989” (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, pp. 94).

At the same time, Pim Fortuyn entered the Dutch political stage. Pim Fortuyn was a conference speaker, columnist and writer who published a “book-length argument “Against the Islamization of our culture” (Duyvendak & Uitermark, 2006, pp. 1490). Over the 1990s, his attitude radicalized and he argued explicitly “that there should be ‘one people, one nation, one society’” (Duyvendak & Uitermark, 2006, pp. 1490). He saw Islam and Muslim migrants as a threat to the Dutch culture and identity, claiming that “our” norms and values should be reestablished. Fortuyn also agitated against the political left, claiming that they had created the failed multicultural society. In this, he followed the discourse starting already with Frits Bolkenstein (and Scheffer later on). It should be mentioned that Pim Fortuyn was not a one-issue writer and soon-to-be a politician. He had a broad vision on societal policy, which could be characterized as neo-liberal.

In 2002, he started his own political party, the “List Pim Fortuyn” (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF*). Moreover, he led the local political party “Livable Rotterdam” (*Leefbaar Rotterdam, LR*) with which he participated in the municipality elections of one city: Rotterdam. This city was a labor stronghold as they had been the biggest party there every election since the Second World War. LR won the elections on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March 2002 overwhelmingly and captured 35% of the votes. Irwin and Van Holsteyn (2003) identified that the voters who voted for him correlated in a survey research with questions confirming harder stances against immigrants. A few months later, the 6<sup>th</sup> of May, he was assassinated by a radical left-wing animal rights activist. This happened nine days before the national elections of 2002. His LPF still participated in the election and they captured 26 out of 150 seats. Pellikaan et al. (2007), have identified Fortuyn as a political game changer. Under the influence of the rise of Pim Fortuyn, other political parties adjusted their party programs. Some scholars have named this the “bandwagon effect”, based on the electoral success of Fortuyn. They took harder stances on migration, especially parties right of the center of the political spectrum. We will discuss this more thoroughly the next chapter.

After Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders emerged. Geert Wilders was a politician part of the VVD and became known for his criticism on Islam. In 2004, he formed his own party, the Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de vrijheid, PVV*). He became one the most well known Dutch politicians internationally, based on his comments regarding the Islam and the failure of the multicultural society. Another influential event happened in this era as another Dutch celebrity was assassinated. Theo van Gogh, a movie and documentary director produced a film about Islam



called “Submission”. He did so together with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Dutch politician (VVD). They both received death threats from around the world because the film was seen as offensive in the eyes of Islamic groups. The 2<sup>nd</sup> of November 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim, assassinated Theo van Gogh. His death, the second political murder in less than three years, shocked the Netherlands again and further accelerated the already flammable public debate regarding migration in the Netherlands.

The government formed after the 2002 elections, was a coalition of liberal / Christian Democrats. They reshaped integration policies focusing on individual responsibility to emancipate. Moreover, they criticized the previous coalitions with regard to their immigration policies (Roggebrand & Verloo, 2007). The minister of migration, Rita Verdonk, created harder migration policies. “The cultural heritage and religion (Islam) of migrants are increasingly mentioned as an essential part of the problem” (Roggebrand & Verloo, 2007, pp. 280). Right-wing parties strongly supported these policies, even though left-wing parties already pleaded for a shift in migration policies. The right-wing politicians, however, were the ones that were in the position to shape these policies.

The last decade has seen the same tenure: an increasingly critical standpoint of politicians towards integration and migration. This problem became a European Union (EU) one when the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged in 2014. As an aftermath of the Arabian spring and the escalation of the civil war in Syria, the EU saw a sharp increase in migration from the Middle-East to the EU. These war refugees, together with economic migrants from i.e. Africa, created a governmental crisis at the EU level. This also influenced Dutch politics, in which the fear of (Islamic) migrants increased. Moreover, ISIL staged terror attacks in the EU, increasing fear of terrorism by Muslims. At the moment of writing of this master thesis, it is too soon to address the political influences of these developments in depth. On the other hand, it is important to mention since the chosen timeframe of this research (2012-2018) is influenced by these phenomena.

## **Appendix five: causal mechanisms, covariate relations and cyclic securitization**

Throughout this section, we will argue for implementation of causality in the form of analysis of covariate relations where possible and the application of causal mechanisms when an analysis of covariate relation is not possible. First, we will introduce the foundations of methodology and the underlying philosophy of science. Secondly, we will introduce mechanisms. Third, there will be an elaboration of mechanisms as causal mechanisms. Then, we will discuss the limitations and pitfalls of causal mechanisms. Lastly, we will shortly touch upon the idea of middle range theories in relation to causal mechanisms, after which we will conclude with the utilization in cyclic securitization.

### *Methodology and philosophy of science*

“A methodology is an open-ended set of strategies through which the investigator defines research questions, formulates hypotheses and explanations, gathers and analyses data, and assesses the credibility of the hypotheses and explanations that are put forward.” (Little, 2015, pp. 463). The structure of research creates new questions to the scholar, depending on the viewpoint he is using, i.e. about the phenomenon to be studied, hypotheses, ontology and much more. To this date, there is no consensus in the social sciences regarding the many methodologies. There are many styles, ranging from a qualitative single-case study to quantitative, large-N comparative case studies. Moreover, the possibility of triangulation enlarges the possibilities for research design.

However, a methodology is grounded in assumptions to comprehend an empirical truth. These assumptions provide the building blocks for the manner of executing the analysis. Here, scientific realism is crucial. “Realism asserts that there are real underlying causes, structures, processes, and entities that give rise to the observations we make of the world, both natural and social. And it postulates that these structures can be studied empirically and that it is scientifically appropriate to form theories and hypotheses about these underlying causes to arrive at explanations of what we observe” (Little, 2015, pp. 468). The causal mechanisms theory (CMT) is grounded in this vision of critical realism, as Little (2015) later explains. He states (2015, pp. 468) that it: “rests on the idea that events and outcomes are caused by specific happenings and powers, and it proposes that a good approach to a scientific explanation of an outcome or pattern is to discover the real causal mechanisms that typically bring it about.”

To address the supposed linkage between the stages of our proposed framework, we first need to take a step back and address the philosophy of science underlying one of the main differences between the different variants of interpretation of securitization. Originating in the field of physical sciences, the philosophy of science of social sciences has a fundamental difference in the form that the social sciences deal with an inherently reflective agent in the form of humans (George & Bennet, 2005). These agents are reflective: “they contemplate, anticipate, and can work to change their social and material environments and they have long-term intentions as well as immediate desires or wants” (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 157). This notion provided the foundation for the school of thought called constructivism. This school explains how both material and social structures socialize, and constrain both individuals and collectives but also facilitate social interaction including actions that purposely alter social norms and materialistic state of affairs (George & Bennet, 2005). This ontological point of view incorporates the basis of structural ontologies since it includes both social and materialistic structures. Moreover, it includes the effects of social interplay, either on purpose or on accidental.

The other school of thought of importance here is the postmodern, or poststructuralist, one, which “emphasize that language—a key medium of human interaction—is open to multiple interpretations, thus hampering any aspiration toward definitive explanatory theories. Hermeneuticists argue that the study of social phenomena cannot be independent of these phenomena because researchers are socialized into certain conceptions of science and society. Moreover, the results of research can change the behaviour being studied” (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 157). Therefore, absolute truth can never be discovered, since generalizable truths are influenced by the wheel of time, just like their underlying ideas.

Nevertheless, we cannot accept the postmodern thought in full. “Observation is theory-laden, not theory-determined” (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 158). There are, indeed, many possible interpretations of texts. However, as our analysis of Searle (1968) already slightly indicated through the Principle of Expressibility and propositional acts in the form of statement-objects, often language is obvious and clear with regard to its meaning. Even if it is not, the claim that there are inexhaustible interpretations is not true. Thus, “it is inconsistent to argue that relations of social power exist and persist and also to maintain that it is not useful to theorize about these relations or the continuity of language and meaning that they embody” (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 158).

Notwithstanding, the social interaction and reflectiveness do complicate social sciences. Therefore, there is a dichotomist distinction to be made in which some theories are able to explain and predict processes and outcomes (most often seen in the field of physics) and theories that can explain but not predict, regularly seen in the social sciences. Even though the social scientist should strive for prediction (usually through generalizations), it is not always possible and explanations do have a scientific value. Moreover, the two are linked, in which good explanations provide the building blocks for generalizations and generalizations provide argumentation for explanations. Therefore, George and Bennet (2005, pp. 159) “concur with the scientific realist view that social facts exist independently of the observer and can be the subject of defensible causal inferences.” This is the view we uphold for the framework of cyclic securitization.

### *Mechanisms in general*

Here, mechanisms come into play. Hedström & Ylikoski (2010, pp. 2) explain how in its core, causal mechanisms “imply that proper explanations should detail the ‘cogs and wheels’ of the causal process through which the outcome to be explained was brought about”. However, this is not the final definition, as we will show later. To begin with, some components underlying the idea of the mechanism should be elaborated. Hedström & Ylikoski (2010, pp. 3-5) point out five general ideas:

- (1) “A mechanism is identified by the kind of effect or phenomenon it produces. A mechanism is always a mechanism for something.
- (2) A mechanism is an irreducibly causal notion. It refers to the entities of a causal process that produces the effect of interest.
- (3) The mechanism has a structure. The focus on mechanisms breaks up the original explanation-seeking why-question into a series of smaller questions about the causal process.
- (4) Mechanisms form a hierarchy. While a mechanism at one level presupposes or takes for granted the existence of certain entities with characteristic properties and activities, it is expected that there are lower level mechanisms that explain them.
- (5) Mechanisms can be combined into a more complicated mechanism.”

The fourth point needs further elaboration. We do not claim that the hierarchy is unending, based on two arguments. In the first place, the explanatory power of a mechanism does not demand an explanation of the underlying mechanisms, entities or activities. They should exist, but to explain them is a different research (question). Second, the hierarchy ends at the level of five, which do not have any underlying mechanisms to be explored. A last point of clarification is needed with regard to the vagueness of the concept of mechanisms. “Sometimes it is used to refer to a causal process that produces the effect of interest and sometimes to a representation of the crucial elements of such a process. This should not be a cause of concern, however, since the latter presupposes the former” Hedström & Ylikoski (2010, pp. 5).

By accepting the assumption that an explanation is an answer to a question, Hedström & Ylikoski (2010, pp. 6) state that mechanisms have to classes of *explananda*: “they might address particular empirical facts of they might address stylized facts”.

Of crucial importance with regard to mechanisms is that they answer through the assemblage of empirical evidence regarding entities, activities and others, leads to a probable mechanism. With the collection of more empirical evidence, it may become a plausible mechanism. Finally, at a certain moment, this could become an actual mechanism. “What separates proper mechanistic explanations from mere mechanistic storytelling is this kind of rigorous checking of the assumptions upon which the mechanism schemes rest” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 7).

### Social mechanisms

Since the introduction of mechanisms, already many centuries ago, a lot of different definitions of social mechanisms have been developed. Hedström & Ylikoski (2010, pp. 104-15):

<i>Author</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>References</i>
Bechtel & Abrahamsen	A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena	Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Bechtel 2006, 2008

Bunge	A mechanism is a process in a concrete system which is capable of bringing about or preventing some change in the system.	Bunge 1997, 2004
Glennan	A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations.	Glennan 2002
Machamer, Darden & Craver	Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start to finish.	Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000, Darden 2006, Craver 2007
Elster I	Mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions.	Elster 1989
Elster II	Mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions.	Elster 1999
Hedström	Mechanisms consist of entities (with their properties) and the activities that these entities engage in, either by themselves or in concert with other entities. These activities bring about change, and the type of change brought about depends upon the properties of the entities and the way in which the entities are organized spatially and temporally.	Hedström 2005
Little	A causal mechanism is a series of events governed by law-like regularities that lead from the <i>explanans</i> to the <i>explanandum</i> .	Little 1991

Woodward	A model of a mechanism (i) describes an organized or structured set of parts or components, where (ii) the behavior of each component is described by a generalization that is invariant under interventions, and where (iii) the generalizations governing each component are also independently changeable, and where (iv) the representation allows us to see how, in virtue of (i), (ii) and (iii), the overall output of the mechanism will vary under manipulation of the input to each component and changes in the components themselves.	Woodward 2002
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However, there is no definite definition until this moment. George & Bennet (2005) have another definition of causal mechanisms, not included in the one laid out by Hedström & Ylikoski (2010). George & Bennet (2005) base their definition in the scientific rationalist view, thus at the ontological rank. Consequently, they “define causal mechanisms as ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities. In so doing, the causal agent changes the affected entity’s characteristics, capacities, or propensities in ways that persist until subsequent causal mechanisms act upon it.” (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 163). In other words: *“If we are able to measure changes in the entity being acted upon after the intervention of the causal mechanism and in temporal or spatial isolation from other mechanisms, then the causal mechanism may be said to have generated the observed change in this entity. The inferential challenge, of course, is to isolate one causal mechanism from another, and more generally, to identify the conditions under which a particular mechanism becomes activated.”*

We are not in the position to select one definition as the most accurate one. We believe it is the responsibility of the scholar to identify which causal mechanism will be the subject of investigation, in consequence being able to assess which definition should be employed.

Causation in itself is still a strongly debated notion in social sciences. The concept of mechanisms is compatible with multiple interpretations, but it introduces some limitations. First, there is a commitment to the locality of a causal process. *A* could be the cause of *B* in a certain spatiotemporally status quo but there is no guarantee it an identical process happens again. Thus, the definition of causality as a regularity creates complications for mechanisms, Hedström & Ylikoski (2010) even state that they are incompatible.

Besides providing an explanation, mechanisms can be employed in two ways to identify causal relations from spurious correlations. First, when it is known that a mechanism by which *A* affects *B*, it leads to the notion that *A* generates *B*. Without such credible mechanism providing this linkage, one should be sceptical about the causal relation between *A* and *B*. Mechanisms play “an important role in extrapolation of causal findings from one setting to another. As Steel (2008) discusses, the assumption about the similarity of causal mechanisms is crucial for making inferences from one setting or population to another” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 10).

### Causal mechanisms

First, causal effects have to be defined. “The definition of causal effect is an ontological one that invokes an unobservable counter-factual outcome: the causal effect is the expected value of the change in outcome if we could run a perfect experiment in which only one independent variable changes” (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 165). The issue that pure experimental settings are hard to construct plagues social sciences. Therefore, we have to cope with non-experimental settings in which one can merely try to approach the logic of pure experimental settings. Causal mechanisms are the predecessors of causal effects since there are no causal effects without causal mechanisms underlying them. This does not mean that one is more important than the other is; in causal explanatory theories, both are of equal importance to complete the picture. Here, microfoundations enter the stage. When causal mechanisms are employed to explain a phenomenon, they should be consistent with known mechanisms and observed process related to the micro level of analysis (George & Bennet, 2005). Furthermore, spatial contiguity and temporal succession are of importance: “in particular, explanation via causal mechanisms involves a commitment in principle to making our explanations and models consistent with the most continuous spatial-temporal sequences we can describe at the finest level of detail that we can observe” (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 164). Therefore, hypotheses should indicate how the causal process underlines the observable correlation.



Accordingly, causal mechanisms are grounded in realism, continuousness and contingency related to the causal process to-be explained. Theoretically, they should even align with everything we know about the humankind, ranging from the field of biology to the field of chemistry. “Thus, causal mechanisms provide more detailed and in a sense more fundamental explanations than general laws do. The difference between a law and a mechanism is that between a static correlation (“if X, then Y”) and a “process” (“X leads to Y through steps A, B, C”) (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 165). This is illustrated by the notion that aim to explain a deeper level than merely the *explanandum*. This firstly facilitates a pathway from larger to smaller: from the societal level to the individual. Second, it reduces the interval between the *explanandum* and the *explanans* (Elster in George & Bennet, 2005).

The above linkage of theories and the minimum micro-level does not exclude theory testing at the macro-level. It merely “entails that individuals must have been capable of behaving, and motivated to behave as the macro-level theory states, and that they did in fact behave the way they did because of the explicit or implicit micro-level assumptions embedded in the macro-level theory” (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 166). Here, causal mechanisms diverge from “as if” assumptions. As if assumptions aim to be falsified at higher levels of analysis while causal mechanisms do not only that but also aim to expand the boundaries of the observable. Even though new investigate methods are more regular in psychical sciences, social science is developing with regard to observational possibilities. This can be exemplified by the possibilities of the analysis of large datasets, increasingly accurate public polling and increasingly accurate GNP measures and comparisons (George & Bennet, 2005).

There is no set-standard related to the level of analysis, either micro or macro, in social science. It relates to the formulation of hypotheses and theory, which will be reformulated when new knowledge regarding the causal process is gained, i.e. through new tools of analysis and the indexation of lower microlevel(s). Thus, when these standards are followed, the scholar can design its research autonomously.

Ideally, this new knowledge is translated into plan, generalizable models and theories. However, this is even in psychical sciences a rarity and in the social sciences even more. Thus, “models built on detailed observations often take the form of complex and contingent generalizations (or middle-range theories) that describe a smaller subset of a phenomenon with a higher degree

of precision or probability” (George & Bennet, 2005, pp. 168). Therefore, the direction of the research, research question and research objective plays a large role in the scope of generalizability of causal mechanisms.

As a valuable side note, however, mechanisms are no panacea for causal inferences. On a regular basis, the issue is that there are too many probable mechanisms instead of a lack of them. “To avoid lazy mechanistic storytelling, the mechanism scheme must be made both explicit and detailed, and its assumptions must be supported by relevant empirical evidence” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 10).

Echoing the many definitions of mechanisms, pointed out by Hedström & Ylikoski (2010), Gerring (2010) asks if this diversification of definitions and employment does not lead to a blurred notion of causality. Thus, he points out some ground rules, again in the same line as Hedström & Ylikoski (2010) to prevent lazy storytelling explanations and to preserve the concept of mechanisms as tools of understanding.

#### Employment of causal mechanisms

“Two intertwined methodological arguments are especially widespread among the protagonists of a mechanism-centred social science. The first is a concern that the causal path connecting a causal factor and outcome of interest be carefully specified, and the second is a desire to test that connection empirically” (Gerring, 2010, pp. 1501-2). The underlying assumption here is that the general intention of social sciences is to be as generalizable as possible. Therefore, the concept of mechanism already implies that, even if the investigation regards one single case, the theoretical value derived through the identification of mechanisms is larger than the one single case.

One of the ground rules is that we want to know if *A* causes *B* and in what manner *A* causes *B*. As Mayntz puts it, “the specification of causal chains is what distinguishes propositions about mechanisms from propositions about correlations” (in Gerring, 2010, pp. 1502).

“A mechanism-centred social science would seem to take more seriously the specification of discrete causal pathways than is common, for example, in many economic models. But this by itself does not provide a sharp point of contrast between “mechanismic” and “covariational” social science. Both propound theories, and those theories delve—more or less—into causal

mechanisms. It is hard to see how it could be otherwise” (Gerring, 2010, pp. 1505). Gerring further supports the remark Little (2015) that we can know that *A* causes *B* but that we do not know why. However, the better tested the causal mechanism is, the more credibility it has. In consequence, he adopts the assumption that the goal is to test these causal mechanisms but that it is not a condition of causal analysis.

Then, Gerring (2010) turns to the question of infinite causal regress, also pointed out by Hedström & Ylikoski (2010). As Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) explained, this can end based on certain psychic mechanism or causal mechanisms which have been tested. “This means that in the analysis of very proximate covariational relationships—where little causal distance separates *X* and *Y*—there may be no point in testing causal mechanisms at all because the pathway is already more or less self-evident. The very notion of a causal mechanism presumes that a distinction can be drawn between the covariational and mechanistic properties of a causal argument; if the covariation is mechanistic (i.e., if the mechanism at work is obvious), then the problem of specifying a mechanism does not arise. It is already accomplished” (Gerring, 2010, pp. 1506). Thus, the key-consideration relates to structural (distal) causes. In this case, *A* resides far from *B*, while there are multiple intervening variables located in between. Thus, this needs to be tested in an empirical matter but unfortunately; this proves to be very hard. Moreover, there are so many potential causal mechanisms (to be discovered) that scholarly attention is paid more to identifying causal mechanisms than testing them. If there are tested, there is usually no hard conclusion to be drawn regarding their validity (Gerring, 2010). This uncertainty is an inherent effect of social sciences. However, the point here is that the covariational arguments are seen as more reliable and there is a more scholarly consensus regarding them, in comparison to their causal mechanistic counterpart, which faces the problem laid out in this section.

Hedström & Ylikoski (2010) underscore the importance of the manner in which causal mechanisms are employed. First, new causal mechanisms are often grounded in others. These underlying mechanisms should be specified clearly to ensure their validity. Moreover, it is prone to overestimation from the researcher’s side. “Social theory is probably a primary example of this failure of metacognition. One of the key ways to fight this illusion is by making explanations explicit: clearly and precisely articulated accounts of mechanisms can be subjected to a piecemeal scrutiny and their implications can be assessed more accurately” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 21).

### Microfoundations


Mechanisms are already widespread in the social sciences. To exemplify this, examine theories like the democratic peace theory or the prisoner's dilemma. We believe that there is a mechanism to explain that democratic nations do not go to war with each other, but there is no certainty until now about the mechanism underlying this theory. The key point we derive from this is that there is evidence that there are certain social regularities, even though we do not know (yet) why. "If we want to understand revolution or economic crisis, we need to understand the multiple social mechanisms that contribute to these large social outcomes. CMT is a superior ontological foundation for conducting social science research" (Little, 2015, pp. 470).

### The sociological *explananda*

The crucial *explananda* in social theories are social phenomena. However, one crucial challenge is to investigate a collective of phenomena that are not reducible to an individual. Among these are (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 22):

- (1) "Typical actions, beliefs, or desires among the members of society or a collectivity.
- (2) Distributions and aggregate patterns such as spatial distributions and inequalities.
- (3) Topologies of networks that describe relationships between members of a collectivity.
- (4) Informal rules or social norms that constrain the actions of the members of a collectivity."

Crucial here are, thus, human actors, their relations and intentionality. This is visualized through Coleman's boat (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 23):



(1): Situational mechanisms

(2): Action-formation mechanisms

(3): Transformational mechanisms

This view is grounded in the assumption that macro-observations cannot be linked directly to each other since they do not explain in which manner they are related. Therefore, the “black box” in between have to be opened and examined. “Rather than analyzing relationships between phenomena exclusively on the macro level, one should identify the situational mechanisms by which social structures constrain individuals’ action and cultural environments shape their desires and beliefs (arrow1), describe the action-formation mechanisms according to which individuals choose how to act (arrow2), and single out transformational mechanisms by which individuals, through their actions and interactions, generate various intended and unintended social outcomes (arrow3). Only by understanding the whole chain of situational, action-formation and transformational mechanisms, have we made sense of the observed macro-level relationship” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 23-24).

Although this could indicate a focus on independent individualistic action, this is not the case. Even though individuals and their motives/desire are the driving force behind the social system, they direct their actions towards each other. Consequently, to explain why an individual does what he does, one has to account for these relations. “Explanatory understanding is only achieved by recognizing that actions take place in relational structures that in this case channel mobility opportunities and thereby explain why we observe what we observe” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 24). This hints towards an engagement to methodological individualism. However, this is not the case since it places too much emphasis on the individual itself: the

doctrine of structural individualism fits the perspective mentioned above better. “Structural individualism is a doctrine according to which all social facts, their structure and change, are in principle explicable in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 25). Thus, it emphasizes the influence of social relations and structures to come to explanatory mechanisms. It is important to note that this doctrine is irreconcilable with doctrines like structuralism and holism since the focus on social relations through interactions of individual actors is contrary to their underlying philosophic ground.

### Theories of action

Intentional action is crucial in the case of (causal) mechanisms, thus a short introduction into the theories of action is necessary. Since the human actor is crucial in mechanisms, discoveries made by the field of psychology and cognitivism provide essential building blocks. On the other hand, a detailed focus blurs the purpose of explanatory mechanisms in the abstract form. Therefore, “only those aspects of cognition that are relevant for the explanatory task at hand should be included in the explanation, and the explanatory task thus determines how rich the psychological assumptions must be” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 26). There is no *one size fits all* theory of action for the purpose of mechanisms. Hedström & Ylikoski (2010) explain how the ‘desire-belief-opportunity model’ (DBO-theory) could be sufficient, just like the pragmatist theory of action, all depending on the phenomena to be explained. However, Hedström & Ylikoski (2010) do not agree with the notion that causal mechanisms are grounded in the rational choice theory. “Rather than accepting the instrumentalist ‘as if’ attitude displayed by many economists [rational choice], the mechanistic approach requires that one should strive for theoretical assumptions that are both empirically valid and compatible with the results of other disciplines (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 27). Thus, the assumptions underlying rational choice theory are often implausible and therefore not compatible with the concept of (causal) mechanisms.

### Pitfalls of causal mechanisms

The problems here are plenty. First, to test a causal mechanism empirically, all other possible mechanisms should be enunciated. Secondly, as a consequence of the first, there is the risk of omitted factors. As it is impossible to create an index of all the possible causal mechanisms explaining an A-B relationship, then no empirical test is exhaustive. “The situation is worse still, for these omitted factors may serve as confounders for the causal factors that one has

thought to confirm. In this respect, the contrast between covariational and mechanistic research designs is akin to the contrast between “effects of causes” and “causes of effects” (the search for all causes of a particular outcome). The latter objective is, in some basic philosophic sense, indeterminate (Gerring, 2010, pp. 1510)”. Thirdly, since causal mechanisms often employ unambiguous concepts, the operationalization of these concepts could prove to be challenging. Fourthly, with relation to distal A-B relationships, there are often multiple probable mechanisms connecting A to B. These mechanisms often cannot be split and if the possibility is there, there is the hazard of multicollinearity (Gerring, 2010). Fifth, “the variety of possible interrelationships that may be found among various causal mechanisms that help to explain X’s relationship to Y. Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4 may be independent and additive (each contributing some portion of causal force that together explains variance on Y), they may be substitutes (each providing a sufficient cause for Y), or they may work interaction with one another” (Gerring, 2010, pp. 1510). Sixth, and last, the context of the situation could influence the functioning of the mechanism, therefore complicating the generalizability.

Even though these problems are general traits of social sciences, it affects the causal mechanisms more than it does covariational studies. However, Gerring (2010) does acknowledge that the standards should be lower for causal mechanisms than covariational research. However, these hazards should be addressed explicitly.

On a regular basis, research into causal mechanisms is employed in a setting to support analysis into covariational relationship(s) (Gerring, 2010). “It is there to help confirm or disconfirm—or to further clarify—an observed relationship between X and Y. However, it is also argued that the investigation of causal mechanisms (aka process tracing, colligation, etc.) can sometimes effectively replace the (covariational) analysis of X and Y” (Gerring, 2010, pp. 1515). Gerring (2010) does not agree, however. This would only be possible under the following circumstances: “(a) all causal mechanisms (Z) connecting X to Y are measurable, (b) Z serves as the exclusive and exhaustive pathway between X and Y, (c) if Z consists of multiple pathways these are isolated from one another (they do not have any reciprocal causal impact) and independently measurable, and (d) Z is caused by X and not by any other factor (except some factor that lies antecedent to X)” (Gerring, 2010, pp. 1515).

This leads to the conclusion that causal mechanistic research splits covariational research into two:  $A \rightarrow Z$  and  $Z \rightarrow B$ . In combination with the above notion about the usual ambiguity of (at

least) *Z* as the domain between *A* and *B*, it complicates causal mechanistic research. If *Z* would not have been uncertain, it would have been researched. Gerring (2010, pp. 1517-18) summarizes this as follows: “it is a normal feature of academic life for tractable “mechanisms” to be transformed into “covariations,” and intractable covariations into causal mechanisms”.

### Mechanisms and middle-range theories

Causal mechanisms defy the classical empiricist view that view scientific knowledge as an accumulation of empirical observations, empirical generalizations, deduced from abstract theoretical principles (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010). The mechanistic scheme as discussed above does not fit this model. Moreover, it is unrealistic to demand that a grand theory could be formed based on causal mechanisms. There are scientific demands, however, to mechanisms in the form of mutual compatibility and consistency through micro-macro relations. This also implies that occasionally, mechanisms can be used across different fields of social sciences.

As discussed previously, this fits the notion of the middle-range theory the best, since mechanisms do more than explain an empirical observation and are less generalizable than universal laws and grand theories. Merton (in Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 29) defines a middle-range theory as follows:

*“Theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization and social change. (Merton 1968, p.39).”*

Thus, a middle range theory does not focus on detailed descriptions but lays out a broader pathway towards an outcome, backed by some crucial explanatory factors. “A theory of the middle range can be used for partially explaining a range of different phenomena, but it makes no pretence of being able to explain all social phenomena, and it is not founded upon any form of extreme reductionism” (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, pp. 29).

### Conclusion

In conclusion, we agree with Hedström & Ylikoski (2010), who are cautious of social mechanisms because of the looming threat of lazy mechanistic storytelling. However, they do believe that the correct application of social mechanisms does have broad value for social sciences. It is not an ad hoc enhancement to be applied at a random set of empirical observations.



Through the responsibility of upholding the standards set by realism, mechanistic explanation should manifest the causality underlying the observation correctly and conform to other accepted identified causal mechanisms.

Gerring (2010) also values causal mechanisms. He advocates for testing them under a stature of the feasibility of their testing. Causal mechanisms won't solve the problems laid out but can shed a light on them. Lastly, he (Gerring, 2010, pp. 1519) shows four causal issues:

- (a) *“The definition of causality (what is a causal relationship?)*,
- (b) *The causal effect (what is the effect of a given change in X on Y?)*,
- (c) *Causal explanation (what does it mean to explain a causal relationship?)*, and
- (d) *Causal assessment (how do we know when a causal relationship is present?).”*

When employing a causal mechanism, the most relevant category is (c). Sometimes they can also be used in answering (a) and (d) as complementary investigative tools. However, in (b) the use is very limited, if not absent. Therefore, causal mechanisms are part of the scheme of causality, not the whole entity.

#### *Causal mechanisms and covariate relations in cyclic securitization*

Primarily, we need to elaborate on our adoption of the philosophy of science. Even though we believe that the poststructuralist vision contains valuable building blocks, Hedström & Ylikoski (2010) already illustrated that there are inconsistencies. For example, there are infinite possible explanations to discourse. As we did not want to discard the poststructuralist's vision altogether, we incorporated it into our model through the prominent place of discourse in the form of the speech act. However, we combined this with the underlying foundation of scientific realism. Therefore, we believe that the relations between the components of the framework of cyclic securitization are grounded in a causal relation. This vision encompasses the idea of Guzzini (2011), but as the next section shows, we extended this vision since Guzzini's vision proved to be inconsistent with the basis of causal mechanisms laid out in the previous sections. Primarily, if we were to adopt his suggestion then we decent to mechanistic storytelling. As Guzzini “proposes to use the idea of ‘securitization’ as a causal mechanism in a type of interpretivist process-tracing to allow for more coherence in the use of securitization in empirical explanations, because ‘explanations’ they are. (Guzzini, 2011, pp. 338). In short, he cherry-picks some of the rationalist approach to support his advocacy for causal mechanisms. Even though the general idea is endorsed here, we echo Gerring (2010) and Hedström &

Ylikoski (2010) and therefore we utilize a more rigorous adaption of scientific rationalism to prevent lazy, mechanistic storytelling.

Therefore, we believe that the ultimate aim should be to erect causal, generalizable relations. However, as discussed, this proves to be arduous and often this is not possible. As the next-best option, we believe scholars should aim for covariational relations since the reliability and testability of such results provide the building blocks for different scholars to engage in falsification. Nonetheless, we also identified that such relations cannot be applied to every non-experimental setting. Therefore, we open the door for causal mechanisms under the strict demands laid out in the previous sections. These methodological demands encompass, among others, upholding the five guidelines of Gerring (2010). Gerring summarizes our vision (2010, pp. 1517-18): “it is a normal feature of academic life for tractable “mechanisms” to be transformed into “covariations,” and intractable covariations into causal mechanisms”.

To summarize, the framework of cyclic securitization is grounded in scientific realism with a central place for the discourse, without accepting the epistemological and ontological assumptions of poststructuralism in full. Our framework provides eight components that, in theory, are causally linked together. This notion needs to be tested, which we did for two components in this thesis. Ideally, in time these theoretical relations will be investigated and transformed into covariational relations. Moreover, there are many components not included in our framework, since these depend on the setting and employment of the framework. An example of this would be the employment of the framework on the subject of environmental securitization, where a possible status quo influences the agent’s habitus and the political actor’s decision to out a speech act could be different from when the framework is applied to military affairs. These plausible causal mechanisms could be identified and further investigated after which consecutive investigations could strengthen the assumption until rectifiable proof is found that it is a causal, or covariational, relation.

This proposition changes the methodology applied to securitization. Where previous research, as we showed, in majority employed process-tracing, discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis, our proposal opens the door for the plenty other methods used in the social sciences. As this thesis underscores, we utilize a quantitative content analysis since we test a hypothesis based on an assumed relation between the political actor and the speech acts. Moreover, the comparative case-study design and longitudinal investigations are designs and methods that


could provide tremendous insight into the functioning of cyclic securitization processes. Especially, but arguably, the largest shortcoming of securitization in both the philosophical and the sociological variant is the lack of external validity. This is in line with the ontological basis of the poststructuralists since the lack of assumption of causality inherently prevents comparative research. With our incorporation of scientific realism into cyclic securitization, we hope that this inspires future comparative, longitudinal research to strengthen this classical deficiency of securitization.

Appendix six: attitude of the Dutch public toward migration.

Source: Wike, R., Bruce, S., Katie, S. (2016). *Pew research centre. Page 1-9.*

**Sharing customs and traditions is very important to being considered truly Hungarian or Greek**

*Sharing our national customs and traditions is \_\_\_ for being truly (survey country nationality)*



Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q85d.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

## Many Europeans rate Roma, Muslims unfavorably

*Unfavorable view of \_\_\_ in our country*

	Roma*	Muslims	Jews
	%	%	%
Italy	82	69	24
Greece	67	65	55
Hungary	64	72	32
France	61	29	10
Spain	49	50	21
Poland	47	66	24
UK	45	28	7
Sweden	42	35	5
Germany	40	29	5
Netherlands	37	35	4
<b>MEDIAN</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>16</b>


\*In UK, asked as "Gypsies or Roma."

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q36a-c.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

## Most Europeans say Muslims in their country want to be distinct

*Do you think most Muslims in our country today want to adopt our country's customs and way of life or do you think they want to be distinct from the larger society?*



Note: Volunteered category "Both" not shown.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q71.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

**Source:** Boonstoppel, E., Dekker, P., Den Ridder, J., (27 September 2018). *Sociaal en cultureel planbureau.*

*Public polls in relation of the benefit of migrants and different cultures for Dutch society (pp. 22):*

Tabel 1.6 Opvattingen over immigratie en vluchtelingen, bevolking van 18+, 2008-2018/3 (in procenten)<sup>a</sup>


		2008- 2010	2011- 2013	2014- 2016	2017- 2018/1	2018/2	2018/3
Nederland zou een prettiger land zijn als er minder immigranten zouden wonen.	oneens	32	34	31	31	35	34
	eens	40	37	40	39	35	33
De aanwezigheid van verschillende culturen is winst voor onze samenleving.	oneens	28	25	26	26	23	23
	eens	40	43	43	43	46	44
Nederland moet meer vluchtelingen opnemen dan het nu doet.	oneens	.	.	57	57	59	56
	eens	.	.	13	14	11	14

a De percentages eens en oneens tellen samen met neutraal / ik weet het niet op tot 100%. De stellingen zijn niet altijd in alle kwartalen voorgelegd.

Bron: COB 2008/1-2018/3


*The three societal problems the panel mostly worries about (pp. 3):*

### Drie meest genoemde maatschappelijke problemen




**Source:** Van der Meer, T., Van der Kolk, H., Rekker, R. (2017). *Stichting nationaal kiezersonderzoek Nederland*.

*Relation of populism and the right of migrants to be able to maintain their own culture (pp. 71):*



Opvattingen over het behoud van de eigen cultuur door allochtonen naar populisme

*Linkage of populism and support of Dutch political parties (pp. 74):*



Populisme onder de aanhang van Nederlandse politieke partijen

## Appendix seven: the technical process of data- cleaning, analysis and visualization

June the 4<sup>th</sup> 2019

This document contains the coding I used to create the graphics and calculations used in this thesis. This document contains all coding, therefore increasing the possibilities for replicability. I used a data dump which I received from the Open State Foundation. More information regarding this organisation can be found [here](#). To receive an identical data dump, I can be contacted on [Max\\_Dijkstra@hotmail.com](mailto:Max_Dijkstra@hotmail.com).

### Step one: cleaning the in JSON format supplied data

First of all, the needed CRAN-packages should be mounted.

```
library(httr)
library(jsonlite)
library(dplyr)
library(stringi)
library(tidyverse)
library(reshape2)
library(purrr)
library(tidyr)
library(reshape)
library(data.table)
library(stringr)
library(rebus)
library(readr)
library(pattern.nlp)
library(syuzhet)
library(ggplot2)
library(rmarkdown)
library(knitr)
library(quanteda)
```

Then, we import the data from my harddisk.

```
Location.data <- "~/\\Datadump - Poliflw\\complete-dump.json"
```

As I received the data in JSON format, it needs to be parsed into R.

```
All.data <- fromJSON(Location.data)
```

The datadump contained all JSON meta-data, which was not needed for my investigation. Thus, we can discard these elements.

```
Core.data <- (All.data$'_source')
```

Obsolete elements, like the AI-based identification of tagged politicians, can also be discarded.

```
Core.data$meta <- NULL
Core.data$location <- NULL
```



```
Core.data$topics <- NULL
Core.data$politicians <- NULL
Core.data$id <- NULL
Core.data$all_text <- NULL
Core.data$hidden <- NULL
Core.data$type <- NULL
Core.data$enrichments <- NULL
Core.data$title <- NULL
```

After this surface cleaning, our dataset looks as follows:

**Observations: 611,253**

**Variables: 7**

- (1) \$ description <
- (2) \$ date\_granularity
- (3) \$ source
- (4) \$ parties
- (5) \$ date
- (6) \$ title
- (7) \$ sentiment

As the size of the dataset slows down my computer, the original file can be deleted.

```
remove(All.data)
```

The dataset contained both website and Facebook posts, of which we can discard the website-based data-entries.

```
Core.filtered.source <- Core.data %>% filter(source == "Facebook")
```

Variable \$source can be deleted

```
Core.filtered.source$source <- NULL
```

We need to identify the accuracy of the variable \$date\_granularity, addressing the accuracy of the dates per message.

```
mean(Core.filtered.source$date_granularity)
```

```
## [1] 12
```

```
max(Core.filtered.source$date_granularity)
```

```
## [1] 12
```

```
min(Core.filtered.source$date_granularity)
```

```
## [1] 12
```

As both the minimum, mean and maximums return 12, we know the year, month, date and time of the Facebook posts in format YEAR-MONTH-DAY“T”HOUR:MINUTE:SECOND (POSIXct).

Thus, `$date_granularity` can be removed

```
Core.filtered.source$date_granularity <- NULL
```

The data becomes clearer in this stage, therefore we start our analysis from this point

Time is irrelevant in my research, so this information can be deleted.

```
Core.filtered.source$date <- as.Date(Core.filtered.source$date)
```

As my research focusses on the timeframe starting from the first of January 2010 until the last day of 2018, we can delete posts not originating from this era.

```
Filter.2 <- Core.filtered.source %>% filter(date > "2010-01-01" & date < "2018-12-31")
```

Some posts from the database are empty, which need to be filtered out of my dataset.

```
Filter.3 <- Filter.2 %>% filter(description != "NULL")
```

The variable `$parties` is nested and needs to be unnested.

```
Filter.4 <- Filter.3 %>% unnest(parties, .drop = FALSE, .sep = ',')
```

Sometimes, the same Facebookpost is put only by multiple local subsidiaries of the national party. We need to ensure that these duplicated posts are not employed in our analysis.

```
Check <- duplicated(Filter.4$description)
df.2 <- cbind(Check, Filter.4)
df.3 <- df.2 %>% filter(Check != TRUE)
```

As we focus on five major political parties, we need to ensure that other parties are not included in our analysis.

```
Filter.parties <- or("VVD", "CDA", "D66", "PvdA", "GroenLinks")
Dummy.party <- str_extract(df.3$parties, pattern = Filter.parties)
df.4 <- cbind(Dummy.party, df.3)
df.5 <- df.4 %>% filter(Dummy.party != FALSE)
```

Again, we remove obsolete elements from our R environment.

```
rm(Check)
rm(Core.filtered.source)
rm(df.2)
rm(df.3)
rm(df.4)
rm(Dummy.party)
rm(Filter.2)
rm(Filter.3)
rm(Filter.4)
rm(Filter.parties)
rm(Location.data)
df.5$Check <- NULL
```

```
df.5$sentiment <- NULL
df.5$Dummy.party <- NULL
```

To ensure correct identification during the analysis, we insert an ID-column.

```
library(dplyr)
df.5 <- df.5 %>% mutate(id = row_number())
df.5$id <- as.numeric(df.5$id)
```

Next, we create the pattern for the referent subject to ensure textmining.

```
Pattern.ref.subject.raw <- c("Islam",
  "Migrant",
  "Marokkaan",
  "Moskee",
  "Vluchteling",
  "Turk",
  "Boerka",
  "Asiel",
  "Syrier",
  "Moslim",
  "Afrikaan",
  "Jihad",
  "Bijstand",
  "Aanslag",
  "Terrorisme",
  "Allochtoon",
  "Dreiging",
  "Immigratie",
  "Integratie",
  "Mensensmokkelaar",
  "Multiculturalisme",
  "Koran",
  "Salafisme",
  "Fundamentalisme",
  "Moslimfundamentalisme",
  "Migratie",

  "islam",
  "migrant",
  "marokkaan",
  "moskee",
  "vluchteling",
  "turk",
  "boerka",
  "asiel",
  "syrier",
  "moslim",
  "afrikaan",
  "jihad",
  "bijstand",
  "aanslag",
```

```
"sociale zekerheid",
"terrorisme",
"allochtoon",
"dreiging",
"immigratie",
"integratie",
"mensensmokkelaar",
"multiculturalisme",
"koran",
"salafisme",
"fundamentalisme",
"moslimfundamentalisme",
"migratie")
```

Next, we transform this string of characters into tokens

```
Token.pattern.ref.sub <- tokens(Pattern.ref.subject.raw)
```

These tokens need to be stemmed

```
Stemmed.pattern.ref.sub <- tokens_wordstem(Token.pattern.ref.sub, language = "nl")
```

Lastly, we need to transform the tokens back to characters

```
Pattern.ref.subject.char <- as.character(Stemmed.pattern.ref.sub)
```

Lastly, we convert these from the characterf vector into a character regex

```
Pattern.ref.subject <- or1(Pattern.ref.subject.char)
```

Then we print it to ensure correct stemming

```
print(Pattern.ref.subject)
```

```
## <regex> (?:(?:islam|Migrant|Marokkan|Moskee|Vluchtel|Turk|Boerka|Asiel|Syrier|Moslim|Afrikan|Jihad|Bijstand|Aanslag|Terrorism|Allochton|Dreiging|immigratie|integratie|Mensensmokkelar|Multiculturalism|Koran|Salafism|Fundamentalism|Moslimfundamentalism|Migratie|islam|migrant|marokkan|moskee|vluchtel|turk|boerka|asiel|syrier|moslim|afrikan|jihad|bijstand|aanslag|social|zeker|terrorism|allochton|dreiging|immigratie|integratie|mensensmokkelar|multiculturalism|koran|salafism|fundamentalism|moslimfundamentalism|migratie)
```

Then we mark posts containing Pattern.ref.subject

```
Logical.dummy <- str_detect(df.5$description, pattern = Pattern.ref.subject)
```

```
df.6 <- cbind(Logical.dummy, df.5)
```

```
df.7 <- df.6 %>% filter(Logical.dummy != FALSE)
```

Again, we remove obsolete elements from environment

```
rm(df.6)
rm(Logical.dummy)
rm(Pattern.ref.subject)
rm(Pattern.ref.subject.raw)
rm(Token.pattern.ref.sub)
```

```
rm(Stemmed.pattern.ref.sub)
rm(Pattern.ref.subject.char)
```

Then, we create the pattern for the threat

```
Pattern.threat.raw <- c("Anders", "Dood", "Hinderlijk", "Kapot", "Lastig", "Minder", "Onduidelijk", "Rot", "Smerig", "Apart", "Duur", "Financieel", "Hopeloos", "Kostbaar", "Lelijk", "Minimaal", "Onmogelijk", "Scheef", "Traditioneel", "Bitter", "Economisch", "Fout", "Illegaal", "Kritisch", "Lui", "Misselijk", "Pikant", "Schuin", "Triest", "Brutaal", "Egoïstisch", "Gevaarlijk", "Individueel", "Kwaad", "Lullig", "Moeilijk", "Pittig", "Slap", "Urgent", "Buitenlands", "Ernstig", "Goedkoop", "Irritant", "Kwalijk", "Maatschappelijk", "Nationaal", "Raar", "Slecht", "Verboden", "Verkeerd", "Wild", "Onbehoorlijk", "Incorrect", "Ongunstig", "Onmogelijk", "Onredelijk", "Verschillend", "Zenuwachtig", "Onbekwaam", "Onduidelijk", "Onhandig", "Onnatuurlijk", "Onrustig", "Vervelend", "Ziek", "Onbeleefd", "Ongeschikt", "On-Hollands", "Onnodig", "Onterecht", "Vies", "Zogenaamd", "Onbevoegd", "Ongevoelig", "Onlogisch", "Abnormaal", "Ontevreden", "Werkloos", "Zwak", "Onchristelijk", "Ongezellig", "Merkwaardig", "Onpersoonlijk", "Onveilig", "anders", "dood", "hinderlijk", "kapot", "lastig", "minder", "onduidelijk", "rot", "smerig", "apart", "duur", "financieel", "hopeloos", "kostbaar", "lelijk", "minimaal", "onmogelijk", "scheef", "traditioneel", "bitter", "economisch", "fout", "illegaal", "kritisch", "lui", "misselijk", "pikant", "schuin", "triest", "brutaal", "egoïstisch", "gevaarlijk", "individueel", "kwaad", "lullig", "moeilijk", "pittig", "slap", "urgent", "buitenlands", "ernstig", "goedkoop", "irritant", "kwalijk", "maatschappelijk", "nationaal", "raar", "slecht", "verboden", "verkeerd", "wild", "onbehoorlijk", "incorrect", "ongunstig", "onmogelijk", "onredelijk", "verschillend", "zenuwachtig", "onbekwaam", "onduidelijk", "onhandig", "onnatuurlijk", "onrustig", "vervelend", "ziek", "onbeleefd", "ongeschikt", "on-Hollands", "onnodig", "onterecht", "vies", "zogenaamd", "onbevoegd", "ongevoelig", "onlogisch", "abnormaal", "ontevreden", "werkloos", "zwak", "onchristelijk", "ongezellig", "merkwaardig", "onpersoonlijk", "onveilig")
```

Again, we transform these into tokens.

```
Token.pattern.threat <- tokens(Pattern.threat.raw)
```

And start the process of stemming

```
Stemmed.pattern.threat <- tokens_wordstem(Token.pattern.threat, language = "nl")
```

Convert the tokens back to characters

```
Pattern.threat.char <- as.character(Stemmed.pattern.threat)
```

Then, we transform them into a character regex

```
Pattern.threat <- or1(Pattern.threat.char)
```

Next, we print it to ensure correct stemming

```
print(Pattern.threat)
```

```
## <regex> (? :Ander|Dod|Hinder|Kapot|Lastig|Minder|Onduidelijk|Rot|Smerig|Apart|Dur|Financieel|Hopelos|Kostbar|Lelijk|Minimal|Onmogelijk|Schef|Traditioneel|Bitter|Economisch|Fout|illegal|Kritisch|Lui|Misselijk|Pikant|Schuin|Triest|Brutaal|Egoïstisch|Gevaar|individueel|Kwad|Lullig|Moeilijk|Pittig|Slap|Urgent|Buitenland|Ernstig|Goedkoop|irritant|Kwalijk|Maatschapp|National|Rar|Slecht|Verbod|Verkeerd|Wild|Onbehor|incorrect|Ongunstig|Onmogelijk|Onredelijk|Ve
```

rschill|Zenuwacht|Onbekwam|Onduidelijk|Onhandig|Onnatuur|Onrustig|Vervel|Ziek|Onbeleefd|Ongeschikt|On-Holland|Onnodig|Onterecht|Vies|Zogenaamd|Onbevoegd|Ongevoel|Onlogisch|Abnormal|Ontevred|Werklos|Zwak|Onchristelijk|Ongezell|Merkwaard|Onperson|Onveilig|ander|dod|hinder|kapot|lastig|minder|onduid|rot|smerig|apart|dur|financieel|hopelos|kostbaar|lelijk|minimal|onmog|schef|traditionel|bitter|economisch|fout|illegaal|kritisch|lui|misselijk|pikant|schuin|triest|brutaal|egoïstisch|gevar|individueel|kwad|lullig|moeilijk|pittig|slap|urgent|buitenland|ernstig|goedkop|irritant|kwaliijk|maatschapp|national|rar|slecht|verbod|verkeerd|wild|onbehoor|incorrect|ongunst|onmog|onred|verschill|zenuwacht|onbekwam|onduid|onhand|onnatuur|onrust|vervel|ziek|onbeleefd|ongeschikt|on-Holland|onnod|onterecht|vies|zogenaamd|onbevoegd|ongeevoel|onlogisch|abnormal|ontevred|werklos|zwak|onchrist|ongezell|merkwaard|onperson|onveil)

And we apply it to the dataframe

```
Logical.dummy.1 <- str_detect(df.7$description, pattern = Pattern.threat)
df.8 <- cbind(Logical.dummy.1, df.7)
df.9 <- df.8 %>% filter(Logical.dummy.1 != FALSE)
```

Then, we remove the obsolete elements from the R environment

```
rm(df.7)
rm(df.8)
rm(Pattern.threat)
rm(Logical.dummy.1)
df.9$Logical.dummy.1 <- NULL
df.9$Logical.dummy <- NULL
rm(Stemmed.pattern.threat)
rm(Token.pattern.threat)
rm(Pattern.threat.raw)
```

After inspecting the dataframe, we identified some observations in \$parties that need to be removed. (1) D66/GROENLINKS (2) Democraten 66 (D66)/GROENLINKS (3) Groen Drimmelen (VP/D66) (4) GroenLinksaf (5) Hart voor Langedijk-D66 (6) Lokale Realisten & D66 (7) P.v.d.A. D66 GROENLINKS Samen Verder Beesel (8) Partij Voor Oud en Jong-GroenLinks (9) PvdA-GroenLinks (10) PvdA-GROENLINKS (11) PvdA / GROENLINKS (12) PvdA/GROENLINKS (13) VVD-Leefbaar Uden (14) Wij Zijn Someren / VVD

Thus, we create a pattern to identify these outliers from df.5

```
Pattern.outliers.df5 <- or("D66/GROENLINKS", "Democraten 66", "Groen Drimmelen", "GroenLinksaf", "Hart voor Langedijk-D66", "Lokale Realisten & D66", "P.v.d.A. D66 GROENLINKS Samen Verder Beesel", "Partij Voor Oud en Jong-GroenLinks", "PvdA-GroenLinks", "PvdA-GROENLINKS", "PvdA / GROENLINKS", "PvdA/GROENLINKS", "VVD-Leefbaar Uden", "Wij Zijn Someren / VVD")
```

And we remove them

```
Logical.dummy <- str_detect(df.5$parties, pattern = Pattern.outliers.df5)
df.6 <- cbind(Logical.dummy, df.5)
df.final.pre.keywords <- df.6 %>% filter(Logical.dummy != TRUE)
```

Remove obsolete elements from environment

```
rm(df.5)
rm(df.6)
```

```
rm(Logical.dummy)
rm(Pattern.outliers.df5)
df.final.pre.keywords$Logical.dummy <- NULL
```

Then, we create table to address amount of posts per party

```
Table.parties.pre.keywords <- table(df.final.pre.keywords$parties)
print(Table.parties.pre.keywords)
```

```
##
##      CDA      D66 GroenLinks      PvdA      VVD
##      5151     38827     82349     48989     41171
```

There were still some unwanted observations within \$parties of df.9

So, we create another pattern to remove these

```
Pattern.outliers.df9 <- or("D66/GROENLINKS", "/", "Partij Voor Oud en Jong-GroenLinks",
  "PvdA-GroenLinks", "D66/GROENLINKS", "Democraten 66", "Groen Drimmelen", "Groen
  Linksaf", "Hart voor Langedijk-D66", "Lokale Realisten & D66", "P.v.d.A. D66 GROENLIN
  KS Samen Verder Beesel", "Partij Voor Oud en Jong-GroenLinks", "PvdA-GroenLinks", "Pv
  dA-GROENLINKS", "PvdA / GROENLINKS", "PvdA/GROENLINKS", "VVD-Leefbaar U
  den", "Wij Zijn Someren / VVD")
Logical.dummy.3 <- str_detect(df.9$parties, pattern = Pattern.outliers.df9)
df.10 <- cbind(Logical.dummy.3, df.9)
df.final.incl.keywords <- df.10 %>% filter(Logical.dummy.3 != TRUE)
```

Thus, we recreate the table

```
table.parties.incl.keywords <- table(df.final.incl.keywords$parties)
print(table.parties.incl.keywords)
```

```
##
##      CDA      D66 GroenLinks      PvdA      VVD
##      268     1530     5271     3328     1779
```

Remove obsolete elements

```
rm(df.10)
rm(df.9)
rm(Logical.dummy.3)
rm(Pattern.outliers.df9)
df.final.incl.keywords$Logical.dummy.3 <- NULL
```

Next, we will provide df.final.incl.keywords with polarity score from the Pattern.NLP package

```
Isol.Des <- as.matrix(df.final.incl.keywords$description)
Des.Pol <- apply(Isol.Des, 1, pattern_sentiment, language = "dutch")
df.des.pol <- as.data.frame(Des.Pol)
Transpose.pol <- transpose(df.des.pol)
Unnested.pol <- Transpose.pol %>% unnest(V1, .drop = FALSE, .sep = "")
Nth.filter <- function(dataframe, n){dataframe[-(seq(n,to=nrow(dataframe),by=n)),]}
```

## Structure of Unnested.pol:

Every 2st row is polarity Every 2nd row is subjectivity Every 3rd row is id

Thus, first to filter every 3th row:

```
Unnest.minus.3 <- as.data.frame(Nth.filter(Unnested.pol, 3))
```

Then, to remove the second row

```
Pol.score <- as.data.frame(Nth.filter(Unnest.minus.3, 2))
```

Next, we create a new df with the polarity scores

```
df.incl.pol.score <- cbind(df.final.incl.keywords, Pol.score)
```

Lastly, we need to rename the header

```
names(df.incl.pol.score)[names(df.incl.pol.score) == 'Nth.filter(Unnest.minus.3, 2)'] <- 'Polarity'
```

Remove obsolete elements from environment

```
rm(Des.Pol)
rm(df.des.pol)
rm(Isol.Des)
rm(Nth.filter)
rm(Pol.score)
rm(Transpose.pol)
rm(Unnest.minus.3)
rm(Unnested.pol)
```

Transform \$polarity into a numeric class

```
df.incl.pol.score$Polarity <- as.numeric(levels(df.incl.pol.score$Polarity)[df.incl.pol.score$Polarity])
```

Then, we apply the Syuzhet polarity analysis

```
Raw.Syuzhet <- get_sentiment(df.incl.pol.score$description, language = "dutch")
df.incl.raw.syuzhet <- cbind(Raw.Syuzhet, df.incl.pol.score)
Syuzhet.filter <- subset(df.incl.raw.syuzhet, Raw.Syuzhet < 10 & Raw.Syuzhet > -10)
```

Test min and max from Syuzhet.filter\$Raw.Syuzhet

```
max(Syuzhet.filter$Raw.Syuzhet)
## [1] 9.7
min(Syuzhet.filter$Raw.Syuzhet)
## [1] -8.65
```

Transform Syuzhet.filter\$Raw.Syuzhet to the same format as Syuzhet.filter\$Polarity, thus to divide it by 9.9

```
Syuzhet.filter$Raw.Syuzhet <- (Syuzhet.filter$Raw.Syuzhet / 9.9)
```



To get a representative polarity score, we take the mean from both the analyses.

```
Sent.Polarity <- (Syuzhet.filter$Raw.Syuzhet + Syuzhet.filter$Polarity)
df.final <- cbind(Sent.Polarity, Syuzhet.filter)
df.final$Sent.Polarity <- (df.final$Sent.Polarity / 2)
```

To identify which polarity analysis is the most accurate, we use a random sample (n = 50)

```
Random.Sample <- df.final[sample(nrow(df.final), 50), ]
Random.Sample$date <- NULL
Random.Sample$parties <- NULL
write_excel_csv(Random.Sample, path = "~\\Scriptie 1.0.csv")
```

Remove obsolete elements

```
rm(Raw.Syuzhet)
rm(Sent.Polarity)
rm(Syuzhet.filter)
rm(df.incl.raw.syuzhet)
```

We used the Syuzhet package to extract keywords classified within emotions

```
Raw.emotions <- get_nrc_sentiment(df.final$description, language = "dutch")
Raw.emotions$anticipation <- NULL
Raw.emotions$joy <- NULL
Raw.emotions$sadness <- NULL
Raw.emotions$surprise <- NULL
Raw.emotions$trust <- NULL
Raw.emotions$positive <- NULL
df.incl.emotions <- cbind(Raw.emotions, df.final)
```

Remove obsolete elements

```
rm(df.final)
rm(df.incl.pol.score)
rm(Raw.emotions)
df.incl.emotions$Raw.Syuzhet <- NULL
df.incl.emotions$Polarity <- NULL
```

As we will analyse according to year, we transform the date format.

```
Year <- format(df.incl.emotions$date, format = "%Y")
df.final <- cbind(df.incl.emotions, Year)
df.final$Year <- as.factor(df.final$Year)
```

Create year columns df.pre.keywords

```
Year.1 <- format(df.final.pre.keywords$date, format = "%Y")
df.pre.incl.year <- cbind(df.final.pre.keywords, Year.1)
df.pre.incl.year$Year.1 <- as.factor(df.pre.incl.year$Year.1)
```

Remove obsolete elements

```
rm(df.incl.emotions)
rm(df.final.pre.keywords)
```

```
rm(Year)
rm(Year.1)
```

Then, we create a table to compare years

```
Table.year.post <- table(df.final$Year)
Table.year.ante <- table(df.pre.incl.year$Year.1)
Table.year.mean <- ((Table.year.post * 100) / Table.year.ante)
Table.year.total <- as.data.frame(cbind(Table.year.ante, Table.year.mean, Table.year.post))
rm(Table.year.post)
rm(Table.year.ante)
rm(Table.year.mean)
rm(df.final.incl.keywords)
Year <- c("2010", "2011", "2012", "2013", "2014", "2015", "2016", "2017", "2018")
df.uniform.year <- cbind(Table.year.total, Year)
print(df.uniform.year)
```

```
##   Table.year.ante Table.year.mean Table.year.post Year
## 2010           1528      1.308901           20 2010
## 2011           3021      2.184707           66 2011
## 2012           8786      3.038926          267 2012
## 2013          15265      3.295120           503 2013
## 2014          34138      4.323628          1476 2014
## 2015          29348      7.196402          2112 2015
## 2016          28687      7.167009          2056 2016
## 2017          48645      5.986227          2912 2017
## 2018          47069      5.838237          2748 2018
```

Create common df

```
df.mix <- merge.data.frame(df.pre.incl.year, df.final, by = "id", all.y = TRUE, all.x = TRUE
)
df.mix$description.y <- NULL
df.mix$Year <- NULL
df.mix$date.y <- NULL
```

## We have analyzed our data, thus we can start the process of visualization

Create theme for plotting

```
Theme <- theme(plot.title = element_text(hjust = 0.5),
               plot.background = element_blank(),
               panel.background = element_rect(fill = "#FFDEE7"),
               legend.position = "bottom",
               legend.direction = "horizontal",
               panel.grid = element_line(colour = "white"))
```

Create histogram showing the average post per year containing the keywords

```
ggplot(df.uniform.year, aes(x = Year, y = Table.year.mean)) +
  geom_histogram(stat = "identity", position = position_dodge(width = 1), fill = "#3C90FF")
```

```
) +
  geom_text(data = df.uniform.year, aes(y = Table.year.mean, label = round(Table.year.mean, digits = 3)),
    size = 3.5, vjust = -0.5) +
  labs(x = "Year", y = "Percentage", title = "Average percentage of Facebook posts per year containing the keywords") +
  scale_y_continuous(labels = scales::number_format(accuracy = 0.001)) +
  Theme

## Warning: Ignoring unknown parameters: binwidth, bins, pad
```

Create df containing only the negative Sent.Polarity scores

```
df.only.negatives <- df.mix %>% subset(Sent.Polarity < 0)
```

Calculate median of negative polarity scores

```
library(plyr)
```

```
polarity.total_meds <- ddply(df.only.negatives, .(Year.1), summarise, med = median(Sent.Polarity))
```

Plot boxplot containing distribution of negative polarity scores per year

```
ggplot(df.only.negatives, aes(x = Year.1, y = Sent.Polarity)) +
  geom_boxplot(color = "black", fill = "white") +
  coord_cartesian(ylim = c(-0.4, 0)) +
  geom_text(data = polarity.total_meds, aes(x = Year.1, y = med, label = round(med, digits = 3)),
    size = 3.1, vjust = -0.8) +
  labs(y = "Negative polarity scores, excluding outliers", x = "Year", title = "Distribution of negative polarity scores between 2010 and 2018") +
  Theme
```

Create tabel displaying messages with negative polarity score per year

```
Table.year.post <- table(df.only.negatives$Year.1)
Table.year.ante <- table(df.pre.incl.year$Year.1)
Table.year.mean <- ((Table.year.post * 100) / Table.year.ante)
Table.year.negatives.total <- as.data.frame(cbind(Table.year.ante, Table.year.mean, Table.year.post))
rm(Table.year.post)
rm(Table.year.ante)
rm(Table.year.mean)
```

Create df connecting date and amount of posts per party

```
df.combo.party.year <- as.data.frame(table(df.mix$parties.x, df.mix$Year.1))
```

Lineair plot df.combo.party.year

```
ggplot(df.combo.party.year, aes(x = Var2, y = Freq, group = Var1, color = Var1)) +
  geom_line(size = 0.5) +
```

```

geom_point(aes(shape = Var1), size = 3) +
labs(y = "Absolute count", x = "Year", title = "Post per year per political party", color = "Color per party") +
scale_color_manual(name = "Legend", labels = c("CDA", "D66", "GroenLinks", "PvdA", "VVD"), values = c("orange", "black", "blue", "red", "green")) +
scale_shape_manual(name = "Legend", labels = c("CDA", "D66", "GroenLinks", "PvdA", "VVD"), values = c(1, 16, 0, 2, 18)) +
Theme

```

Create table to print to compare amount of posts per year per party

```

Table.parties.year.ante <- table(df.mix$parties.x, df.mix$Year.1)
Table.parties.year.post <- table(df.mix$parties.y, df.mix$Year.1)
Table.combo <- cbind(Table.parties.year.ante, Table.parties.year.post)
rm(Table.parties.year.ante)
rm(Table.parties.year.post)
print(Table.combo)

##      2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2010 2011
## CDA      0  19  22  296  744  586  894 1455  935  0  0
## D66     233 441 1828 2499 5950 4967 4684 8955 9270  6  8
## GroenLinks 988 1540 3556 5084 12226 12473 11715 18204 16563 11 33
## PvdA     216 819 2070 3988 8006 6357 6321 11093 10119  3 19
## VVD      91 202 1110 3398 7212 4965 5073 8938 10182  0  6
##      2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
## CDA      6  3  17  21  66 125  30
## D66     29  61  154  219  226 457 366
## GroenLinks 129 184 626 1082 962 1119 1115
## PvdA     78 158 458 542 455 812 802
## VVD     25  97  221  248  347 399 435

```

Transform into dataframe

```

df.ante <- as.data.frame(table(df.mix$parties.x, df.mix$Year.1))
names(df.ante)[names(df.ante) == 'Var1'] <- 'Parties'
names(df.ante)[names(df.ante) == 'Var2'] <- 'Year'
names(df.ante)[names(df.ante) == 'Freq'] <- 'Frequency.per.year'
df.post <- as.data.frame(table(df.mix$parties.y, df.mix$Year.1))
df.combo <- cbind(df.ante, df.post)
rm(df.post)
rm(df.ante)
df.combo$Var1 <- NULL
df.combo$Var2 <- NULL

```

Melt table.combo

```
Melted.year.party <- melt(df.combo, measure.vars = c("Frequency.per.year", "Freq"))
```

Plot melted.year.party

```

ggplot(Melted.year.party, aes(x = Year, y = value, fill = variable)) +
geom_histogram(stat = "identity", position = position_dodge(width = 0.5)) +

```

```

geom_text(aes(label = value, hjust = 0.5, vjust = -0.5), color = "black", size = 3.2) +
labs(x = "Year", y = "Absolute count", title = "Absolute amount of Facebook posts before and after keywordfilter") +
scale_fill_manual("Histogram legend", labels = c("before filter", "after filter"), values = c("#FFFF41", "#3C90FF")) +
facet_grid(. ~ Parties) +
Theme

```

```
## Warning: Ignoring unknown parameters: binwidth, bins, pad
```

Calculate percentage of posts containing the keywords per party

```

df.mean <- ((df.combo$Freq * 100) / df.combo$Frequency.per.year)
df.combo.mean <- cbind(df.combo, df.mean)
rm(df.combo)
rm(df.mean)
print(df.combo.mean)

```

```

##   Parties Year Frequency.per.year Freq df.mean
## 1   CDA 2010           0 0      NaN
## 2   D66 2010          233  6 2.575107
## 3 GroenLinks 2010          988 11 1.113360
## 4   PvdA 2010          216  3 1.388889
## 5   VVD 2010           91  0 0.000000
## 6   CDA 2011           19  0 0.000000
## 7   D66 2011          441  8 1.814059
## 8 GroenLinks 2011         1540 33 2.142857
## 9   PvdA 2011          819 19 2.319902
## 10  VVD 2011          202  6 2.970297
## 11  CDA 2012          222  6 2.702703
## 12  D66 2012         1828 29 1.586433
## 13 GroenLinks 2012        3556 129 3.627672
## 14  PvdA 2012         2070 78 3.768116
## 15  VVD 2012         1110 25 2.252252
## 16  CDA 2013          296  3 1.013514
## 17  D66 2013         2499 61 2.440976
## 18 GroenLinks 2013        5084 184 3.619197
## 19  PvdA 2013         3988 158 3.961886
## 20  VVD 2013         3398 97 2.854620
## 21  CDA 2014          744 17 2.284946
## 22  D66 2014         5950 154 2.588235
## 23 GroenLinks 2014       12226 626 5.120236
## 24  PvdA 2014         8006 458 5.720709
## 25  VVD 2014         7212 221 3.064337
## 26  CDA 2015          586 21 3.583618
## 27  D66 2015         4967 219 4.409100
## 28 GroenLinks 2015       12473 1082 8.674737
## 29  PvdA 2015         6357 542 8.526034
## 30  VVD 2015         4965 248 4.994965
## 31  CDA 2016          894 66 7.382550
## 32  D66 2016         4684 226 4.824936

```

```
## 33 GroenLinks 2016      11715 962 8.211694
## 34 PvdA 2016           6321 455 7.198228
## 35 VVD 2016            5073 347 6.840134
## 36 CDA 2017            1455 125 8.591065
## 37 D66 2017            8955 457 5.103294
## 38 GroenLinks 2017     18204 1119 6.147001
## 39 PvdA 2017           11093 812 7.319931
## 40 VVD 2017            8938 399 4.464086
## 41 CDA 2018             935  30 3.208556
## 42 D66 2018            9270 366 3.948220
## 43 GroenLinks 2018     16563 1115 6.731872
## 44 PvdA 2018           10119 802 7.925684
## 45 VVD 2018            10182 435 4.272245
```

Plot df.combo.mean\$df.mean

```
ggplot(df.combo.mean, aes(Year, df.mean, fill = Parties)) +
  geom_histogram(stat = "identity") +
  geom_text(data = df.combo.mean, aes(x = Year, y = df.mean, label = round(df.mean, digits = 3)),
    size = 3, vjust = -1.25) +
  labs(x = "Year", y = "Percentage", title = "Average percentage of Facebook posts per year
per party containing the keywords") +
  facet_grid(. ~ Parties) +
  scale_fill_manual(values = c("orange", "black", "blue", "red", "green")) +
  Theme
```

## Warning: Ignoring unknown parameters: binwidth, bins, pad

## Warning: Removed 1 rows containing missing values (position\_stack).

## Warning: Removed 1 rows containing missing values (geom\_text).

Plot mean frequencies per party

```
ggplot(df.combo.mean, aes(x = Year, y = df.mean, group = Parties, color = Parties)) +
  geom_line(size = 0.5) +
  geom_point(aes(shape = Parties), size = 3) +
  labs(y = "Percentage", x = "Year", title = "Average percentage of Facebook posts per year
containing the keywords ", color = "Color per party") +
  scale_color_manual(name = "Legend", labels = c("CDA", "D66", "GroenLinks", "PvdA",
"VVD"), values = c("orange", "black", "blue", "red",
"green")) +
  scale_shape_manual(name = "Legend", labels = c("CDA", "D66", "GroenLinks", "PvdA",
"VVD"), values = c(1, 16, 0, 2, 18)) +
  Theme
```

Calculate median of df.final\$Sent.Polarity

```
polarity.party_meds <- ddply(df.final, .(parties, Year), summarise, med = median(Sent.Polarity))
```

Create boxplot displaying polarity distribution per party per year

```

ggplot(df.final, aes(x = Year, y = Sent.Polarity)) +
  geom_boxplot(color = "black") +
  coord_cartesian(ylim = c(-0.5, 0.5)) +
  geom_text(data = polarity.party_meds, aes(y = med, label = round(med, digits = 3)),
    size = 2.5, vjust = -0.5, color = "black") +
  labs(y = "Polarity scores, excluding outliers", x = "Year", title = "Distribution of polarity scores per party per year") +
  facet_grid(. ~ parties) +
  Theme

```

Calculate median of negative polarity distributions per party per year

```

polarity.party.negative_meds <- ddply(df.only.negatives, .(parties.x, Year.1), summarise, med = median(Sent.Polarity))

```

Create boxplot displaying negative polarity distribution per party per year

```

ggplot(df.only.negatives, aes(x = Year, y = Sent.Polarity)) +
  geom_boxplot(color = "black") +
  coord_cartesian(ylim = c(-0.45, 0)) +
  geom_text(data = polarity.party.negative_meds, aes(y = med, label = round(med, digits = 3)), size = 2.5, vjust = -0.5, color = "black") +
  labs(y = "Polarity scores", x = "Year", title = "Distribution of negative polarity scores per party per year") +
  facet_grid(. ~ parties) +
  Theme

```

Densityplot Sent.Polarity

```

ggplot(df.final, aes(x = Sent.Polarity, fill = parties)) +
  coord_cartesian(xlim = c(-0.4, 0.4)) +
  geom_density(col = NA, alpha = 0.4) +
  labs(x = "Polarity", y = "Density per party", title = "Comparison of density of messages per party, therefore not weighted with other parties") +
  scale_fill_manual("Legend", values = c("orange", "black", "blue", "red", "green")) +
  Theme

```

Calculate weighted Sent.Polarity score per party

```

detach(package:plyr, unload = TRUE)

## Warning: 'plyr' namespace cannot be unloaded:
## namespace 'plyr' is imported by 'reshape2', 'reshape', 'ggplot2' so cannot be unloaded

library(dplyr)
Pol.weighted <- df.final %>%
  group_by(Sent.Polarity) %>%
  mutate(n = n() / nrow(df.final)) -> df.final

```

Weighted densityplot of Sent.Polarity

```

ggplot(Pol.weighted, aes(x = Sent.Polarity, fill = parties)) +
  geom_density(aes(weight = n), alpha = 0.4) +

```

```

coord_cartesian(ylim = c(0, 10), xlim = c(-0.4, 0.4)) +
labs(x = "Polarity", y = "Weighted density", title = "Weighted comparison of density of me
ssages per party in relation to other parties") +
scale_fill_manual("Legend", values = c("orange", "black", "blue", "red", "green")) +
  Theme

## Warning in density.default(x, weights = w, bw = bw, adjust = adjust, kernel
## = kernel, : sum(weights) != 1 -- will not get true density

## Warning in density.default(x, weights = w, bw = bw, adjust = adjust, kernel
## = kernel, : sum(weights) != 1 -- will not get true density

## Warning in density.default(x, weights = w, bw = bw, adjust = adjust, kernel
## = kernel, : sum(weights) != 1 -- will not get true density

## Warning in density.default(x, weights = w, bw = bw, adjust = adjust, kernel
## = kernel, : sum(weights) != 1 -- will not get true density

## Warning in density.default(x, weights = w, bw = bw, adjust = adjust, kernel
## = kernel, : sum(weights) != 1 -- will not get true density

```