

Pick
(An International Mission)
&
Choose
(A Type of Peacebuilding)

The consequences of implementing different forms of Dutch Peacebuilding operations in the international missions in Afghanistan and Mali

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List of Abbreviations

EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
CPAU	Cooperation for Peace And Unity
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISAF I	International Security Assistance Force (Dutch in Uruzgan)
ISAF II	International Security Assistance Force (Dutch in Kunduz)
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PBO	Peacebuilding Operation
PolRep	Police Representative
UN	United Nations

1. Introduction

1.1. Setting the scene

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government, (Fukuyama, 1989, p.3).

These famous words written by Francis Fukuyama date from a period in which, according to some, a lasting peace became a worldwide possibility. Fukuyama sums up the main drive for international peacebuilding initiatives. After the Cold War, the idea that liberal democracy was the final form of ideology, formed a driving engine behind several international operations that all had the main goal to create a stable situation within countries that were experiencing some form of civil war or conflict (Paris, 2002). International peace operations have transformed and developed over the years and include many different forms and actors. These operations vary in mandates depending on the insinuating country and chosen strategies. However, the main goal always remains the same: stabilizing the peace in countries that are seemingly unable to establish a lasting peace themselves. Nonetheless, even though we see an ever growing amount of *peacebuilding operations, humanitarian interventions, counterinsurgency operations and reconstruction missions*, it seems like the final format for successful peacebuilding has yet to become universal. Fukuyama's peaceful 'End of History' is still absent.

Motivations and strategic narratives for countries participating in peacebuilding operations are divergent. The peacebuilding activities operated by the Netherlands offer an interesting case study as their *Integrated Approach* is internationally recognized and referred to as the "Dutch Approach" (Travers & Owen, 2008; 2). The Integrated Approach aligns with the *3D Strategy*. In this approach, the focus of the peacebuilding operation evolves around three aspects: Defence, Diplomacy and Development. The 3D approach has risen in popularity since the beginning of the 21st century and was adopted by the Dutch for the first time in 2007 during their participation in the NATO mandated peacebuilding operation ISAF (*the International Security Assistance Force*). In 2014, the Dutch interpretation of the 3D approach was officially documented in the 'Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering' (Guideline Integrated Approach, hereafter referred to as Guidelines). This formalized the cooperation between the ministry departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Justice & Security. This document presents the motivational and strategic narrative on Dutch participation in international mission. Currently,

the Netherlands are participating in sixteen peacebuilding operations worldwide, all incorporating the Integrated Approach to some extent.

Historically, participation in international operations has been exposed to abundant criticism and discussion among Dutch politicians and media. It is a sensitive topic because of the highly controversial debate on the responsibility-taking of *Dutchbat* during the international UN mandated mission in Bosnia (1992-1995). A second dispute formed around the military mission in Uruzgan (ISAF I). The political contentious topic resulted in the collapse of the Dutch government which led to widespread media attention concerning the participation in international operations (Frerks & Terpstra, 2017). The construction of a new mission in Afghanistan came with a new wave of criticism but eventually resulted in the so-called 'Integrated Policing Mission' (ISAF II), in the province of Kunduz, Northern Afghanistan. However, when lead country Germany announced their military exit from Afghanistan in 2013 –one year earlier than planned- the Dutch mission also abruptly ended. This evoked a new discussion on the efficiency and effectiveness of international interventions (Klep, 2011). In June 2018 the ongoing discussion heated up again when the Dutch government officially released an announcement concerning the withdrawal of Dutch troops in Mali. This ended Dutch participation in the *Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali* (MINUSMA). The same criticism rose from different (inter)national media outlets, mainly emphasizing how the current conflict and humanitarian situation in Mali has deteriorated since the arrival of the Dutch army, and to a larger extent since the start of the international mission MINUSMA.¹

The discussion concerning legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness of participation in peacebuilding operation is not only relevant in the Netherlands. The same questions have arisen in other countries that participate in peacebuilding (Travers & Owen, 2008; Greener, 2017; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2007).² Scholars of peacebuilding studies are entangled in a complex debate on the meaning of successful peacebuilding. More specifically, it is argued that at times, third-party interventions designed to bring peace in fact make the situation worse (see: Autesserre, 2017 for a thorough and recent overview of this discussion). In the contemporary debate, scholars and politicians appear to have come to the agreement that there is need for more coherence in peacebuilding operations. Coherence is defined as the integration of different

¹ For example: (van der AA, 2018); (Sommers, 2018); (Vermeulen; 2016).

² To name a few: Travers and Owen (2008) ask the question for Canadian peacebuilding operations. B. Greener (2011) analyses the efficiency of Australian peacebuilding strategies and Gilligan & Sergenti (2007) offer an extensive work on UN interventions and their use.

dimensions of peacebuilding in one unified strategy and believed to realize more successful outcomes to peacebuilding operations (de Coning & Friis, 2011).

The inclusion of coherence in the Dutch peacebuilding operations can be traced back to the implementation of the Integrated Approach. This approach essentially leads to a solid strategic framework for Dutch future peacebuilding interventions. Both the Integrated Policing mission in Kunduz (ISAF II) and the military mission in Mali (MINUSMA) are designed using the strategy. However, it is questionable whether this one framework is able to adequately cover the complicated reality of conflict and peace and if it indeed serves as a solid framework. In the cases of ISAF II –a strictly non-armed policing mission focusing on training police officers- and MINUSMA –a military mission, sending out armed soldiers and defence materials-, the missions differ widely in their origins. The question arises to what extent it is possible to use the same strategic approach for two very different missions. Both missions are influenced by different conditions and are part of bigger –by different institutions mandated- peacebuilding operations.

1.2. Research Question

The relation between the Integrated Approach and Dutch participation in different peacebuilding operations is a compelling realm of research as it forms a starting point for analysing Dutch peacebuilding initiatives in general. Both MINUSMA and ISAF II are formulated through this approach whilst fundamentally differing in their objectives and activities, which leads to the following explorative research question:

To what extent does the type of peacebuilding mission affect the implementation of the Integrated Approach?

The case analysis of the Dutch participation in ISAF II and MINUSMA serve as a starting point in answering this question. Official documents released by the Dutch government on design, progress and evaluation of the missions, function as data analysed for this thesis. The choice to analyse these two Dutch missions stems from the fact that both missions claim to follow the Integrated Approach in their designs, whilst simultaneously differing widely.

1.3. Relevance of the research

Amongst the five priorities for 2019 from the Dutch Ministry of Defence the following two underline the relevance of this research: 1. Restoring the confidence amongst employees and 2. A secure organisation that learns from mistakes. Both priorities ask for deep understanding of Dutch participation in peacebuilding operations and the approach the Dutch follow in their mission design. This research provides a wider understanding of the approach in analysing both operations and appointing strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of the approach.

For the strategic level this research will add to the knowledge on how the Integrated Approach can be traced back in ISAF II and MINUSMA and how the different dimensions within the operation interact and sometimes contradict. As future Dutch operations are already under construction implementing the Integrated Approach in the designs, this research could help in understanding the tension field between designing a mission in line with the approach and how this works out in the course of the mission.

Including police officers in peacebuilding activities is relatively new. Most of the current operations are still focused on deploying militaries (Caparini and Osland, 2017). However, following the critical discourse on liberal peacebuilding, inviting police officers in peacebuilding operations to train police officers of the country of intervention aiming for a self-sustainable peace and a working security apparatus, seems to provide a new type of peacebuilding. The tension between a military and a policing operation becomes more visible when studying through a singular strategy, which is why the Dutch cases and the Integrated Strategy lend themselves perfectly for further analysis. The findings of this analysis could add to the peacebuilding debate as the theoretical framework shows through a combination of different theoretical fields how peacebuilding enters a new domain. Chapter 2 will elaborate on this further.

1.4. Thesis Outline

Through an explorative in-depth comparative case study, this thesis aims to provide an answer to the research question. First, chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework on the existing literature concerning peacebuilding operations. The chapter elaborates on the Integrated Approach and its components (i.e. the 3D strategy). There is a vast array of literature on this approach and its fallacies which offer the starting point for this research. Additionally, this chapter discusses the phenomenon of missions that deploy police officers rather than soldiers.

Considering the current stand of the debate, a general expectation on the research question is formulated.

Before the methodology is introduced, chapter 3 briefly discusses several historical moments that have had a significant impact on Dutch peacebuilding and the current strategies that are implemented within these missions.

Chapter 4 describes the methodology used to conduct this research. This includes the key features of the Integrated Approach. These features are distributed among the three dimensions of Defence, Diplomacy and Development as discussed in chapter 2. The chapter validates the selection of the two cases used for this research and breaks down how data was collected and which indicators were used to analyse the data.

Chapter 5 analyses both cases individually. The mission context and design will be discussed first. Subsequently, the key characteristics of Defence, Diplomacy and Development within both cases will be highlighted.

Chapter 6 will compare the cases and summarize the findings of the analysis. The case comparison provides a conclusion answering the research question. Lastly, a discussion will be awakened concerning the broader peacebuilding discourse, pointing to limitations in this analysis and posing questions for future research.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to construct a theoretical framework that offers an insight into the field the case-studies and the research questions are embedded. Major academic debates are introduced and gaps in current literature identified. In order to understand why integrated approaches are currently the central concept in designing a peacebuilding operation, this chapter first briefly introduces the emergence of the peacebuilding debate. This offers a broader perception of its history and common assumptions and explains how these have shaped the debate and its predominant perspectives (2.2). Shifting from the broad debate, paragraph 2.3 will elaborate on vertical and horizontal issues limiting the integrated approach. Paragraph 2.4 discusses the rising popularity of policing in peacebuilding, how this differs as well as overlaps with the ‘original’ military intervention, arguing that it is a result of the intensification of coherent peacebuilding operations. The chapter will conclude with a short summary of the theoretical framework, appoint existing gaps in the literature and formulate a general expectation for the analysis based on the literature.

2.2. The emergence of the peacebuilding debate

There is no commonly agreed, shared and understood concept used to describe the activity of building, restoring and keeping peace.³ In 1969, Galtung was the first to make a theoretical distinction between conventional military missions and peacebuilding operations. He argued that an effective peace operation does not only strive to reach a *negative peace*, meaning the absence of war and violence, but aims to develop a *positive peace* which entails a form of sustainable peace emphasizing development (Galtung, 1969, p.170). The UN definition of peacebuilding stems from the beginning of the 1990s when the organisation started to get involved in large-scale multidimensional peacebuilding operations. It has offered the foundations of the current formula for peacebuilding missions to the extent that securing peace beyond national borders became a separate activity next to protecting national security (van der Lijn, 2011). Additionally, the Brahimi report which was issued by the UN in 2000, emphasized

³ *Peacekeeping operations, Peacebuilding operations and Peaceful intervention are used interchangeably. To avoid confusion the UN definition of a Peacebuilding Operation will be applied throughout this thesis: ‘A broader policy framework that strengthens the synergy among the related efforts or conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, recover and development, as part of a collective and sustained effort to build lasting peace,’* (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2018).

a more robust mandate compared to that of the first UN peacebuilding activities. Concepts such as *statebuilding*, *human rights*, and *civil expertise on good governance* were now defined and included in the UN strategy (Brahimi, 2000).

What triggered this intensification of peacebuilding activities on the international level? For western countries and institutions the concept of *enemy* changed during the post- Cold War period as the presence of a specified enemy, namely the Soviet Union, disappeared (Duffield, 2007, p.3). This resulted in blurred lines between the realms of security and development in the international discourse. New issues such as endemic poverty, terrorism, environmental issues and civil wars gained attention as threats to the international security (Duffield, 2007, p.3). Non-western countries that dealt with high levels of insecurity, were portrayed as so-called fragile or failing states and the solutions to battle this insecurity were searched for on an international level (Duffield, 2007).

Contemporary peacebuilding operations find their roots in the shift of focus from protecting national security towards international security. This change is interwoven with the growing interest amongst academics in the topic of efficient peacebuilding (van der Lijn, 2011). Paul Collier, one of the leading scholars in the peacebuilding discourse - most famous for his book *The Conflict Trap* – acknowledges and analyses the merging of security and development.⁴ Collier argues that the themes of security and development are interrelated in fragile states, as underdevelopment creates insecurity and vice versa, resulting in a recurring pattern of conflict. It is estimated that only fifty percent of the countries in which the peace is restored after conflict, manage to keep the peace for more than a decade. This reinforcing pattern explains why Collier considers conflict a trap (Collier, 2003). Collier argues that in order to successfully defeat the conflict trap, international intervention is necessary. Intervening parties are motivated by the conviction that national insecurity in ‘fragile or failed states’ is a threat to the international security because this can -for example- slow down economic growth. This is where the fields of security and development become intertwined, as there is a causal relation between the two. Battling insecurity means consideration for development in fragile states, thus a ‘peaceful’ integrated approach is necessary in order to defeat the ‘trap’ (Collier, 2003). In short, the benefits of intervening in a country in conflict weigh out the costs which creates legitimacy for intervention on the international level (Collier, 2003).

⁴ Leading in academic discourse but also often referred to by policy makers and advisory reports. Colliers views were also included in the creation of the Dutch Integrated Approach (see Middelkoop, 2008).

In addition to Collier's *Conflict Trap*, the work of Amitai Etzioni, *The Primacy of Life*, is the second work which highly influences the current peacebuilding debate. Etzioni's argument folds around the theory of 'Security First' which argues that security is the priority in international intervention, needed to create an opening for future development to slowly follow, this idea is also known as the *Security/Development nexus* (Etzioni, 2007, p.7). The works of Collier and Etzioni are not only influential in the academic realm but also used as a theoretical foundation for peacebuilding operations worldwide. Both works can thus be considered as the current *mainstream* peacebuilding narrative used to legitimize intervention.

With the turn of the century, the act of peacebuilding became a profession, a subject to be taught, shifting away from the customized version of conventional military intervention. At the same time the academic debate took a critical turn. The main criticism was addressed towards the 'distressingly inept' industry of peacebuilding and the arbitrary choices made by leading peacebuilding institutions (Millar, 2014, p.1). Critics of the mainstream peacebuilding discourse argued whether a possible threats to the international security posed by fragile states and conflicts in the Global South, instantly ask for intervention (see: Duffield 2001; Bellamy, 2004; Richmond, 2005 etc. elaborated on in §2.3).

At the basis of this debate lays the question Diehl, Druckman & Wall pose in their early work on the efficiency of peacebuilding: 'What roles do managers assume in the conflict and what is their bargaining orientation?' (Diehl, Druckman, Wall, 1996, p. 33-34). In other words: are the designers of peacebuilding operations taking up their role as a third party or do they position themselves as leading actors in managing their efforts to build peace? Furthermore, how do they relate to each other on both internal and external levels? Duffield questions the interests of intervening parties as these are, according to him, motivated by external interests and only emphasize specific parts of peacebuilding (Duffield, 2001). The position of the third party towards the country of intervention and the local population implies the character of the peacebuilding operation. Simultaneously, the 'third party' is composed by different conflict managers and the growing inclusion of national governments, NGOs, police officers and militaries all increase the importance of the question Diehl et al. already posed in 1996 (Diehl, et al. 1996).

This question has been the major theme in the current debate concerning peacebuilding operations. A solution to efficiently and successfully build peace, was – and still is – searched for on different levels (Millar, 2014). Amongst policy makers and peacebuilding designers the general assumption dominates that an isolated approach is no longer adequate. Therefore, the

demand for an integrated approach aiming for coherence within operations grows (Collier, 2003; Martin et al. 2018). At the same time, the resilience of the local population and local peacebuilding organisations is heavily undermined according to more critical discourses of peacebuilding discussed in §2.3. The new paradigm of peacebuilding is at risk of reshaping neutral humanitarian aid and local peacebuilding initiatives towards the desired goals of the liberal agenda (Bellamy, 2004, p. 42). Before discussing the liberal peacebuilding theories, which is one of the prevailing academic discussions in the field of peacebuilding, it is first necessary to understand this widespread aim for coherence.

2.3. A critical approach to peacebuilding

2.3.1. Coherence

A peacebuilding operation consists of different activities, all aimed towards creating (more) security. In their effort to gather all these activities under one set strategy, policymakers and designers aim for coherence (de Coning, 2007). Coherence is not an end state, but rather a factor that can increase or decrease in its degree, depending on the relationship between the different peacebuilding dimensions. ‘Doing successful peacebuilding’ has become the core incentive in designing and decision-making regarding peacebuilding operations and coherence between the different dimensions seems to be the solution (Martin et al., 2018). What is problematic in striving towards successful peacebuilding, is the fact that the conception of ‘success’ is different for each of the dimensions, people and institutions participating in and influenced by peacebuilding activities (de Coning & Friis, 2011).

On the executive level, the growing quest for coherence within peacebuilding initiatives can be identified through the naming of strategies by international organisations and countries. The UN speaks of an *Integrated Approach* similar to the Netherlands. At the EU- and NATO-level the term *Comprehensive Approach* is officially adapted. The *whole-of-government approach* is used by certain national strategies in peacebuilding operations⁵, and the *3D Approach* is the strategy referred to by Canada. The Netherlands use the 3D-strategy to define the Integrated Approach (van der Gaar-Halbertsma et al., 2008). Although utilizing different terminologies, all strategies boil down to the same principle: in order to address global threats and security issues, states and institutions need to mobilise their entire panoply of policy

⁵ The whole-of-government term was firstly used in the UK and currently adapted in multiple countries to name the national strategy in peacebuilding operations.

instruments to support the level of coherence between different dimensions of peacebuilding (Patrick & Brown, 2007). ‘Pursuing coherence is now accepted as a core objective in all international peace and stability operations’ (de Coning and Friis, 2011, p. 244). The ambition to strive for coherence stems from the logic that the greater the amount of coherence between different organisations and levels of a peacebuilding operation, the more effective and sustainable the impact is likely to be (de Coning & Friis, 2011). A first large-scale study on integrated approaches was performed by Patrick & Brown, who analysed different interventions which all claimed to adhere to some sort of integration. They conclude that the concept of these approaches mostly exist in theory, rather than in practise (Patrick & Brown 2007, p. 130-132).⁶

Peacebuilders seek to strengthen the intensity of coherence vertically (between different societal levels e.g. local and international organisations) as well as horizontally (between different legs of peacebuilding e.g. defence and developmental activities). Whilst acknowledging the fact that coherence is necessary for a mission’s success, de Coning and Friis argue that the limits of coherence are too often forgotten, and scholars as well as policy makers take the terminology for granted. Dismissing the limits of coherence result in rivalry, conflicting purposes and funding competition which contribute to the failure of an operation (de Coning & Friis, 2011). Peacebuilding embodies a broad dimension of activities which more often than not have objectives which are opposed to each other. However, through the integrated approach these dimensions become intertwined.

2.3.2. The vertical limits of coherence

Having established the definition of coherence and the importance in the international field concerning the growing demand for an Integrated Approach, the most neglected challenge of the approach is the imbalance between internal and external actors – or third party actors (de Coning and Friis, 2011). This is the point where the literature on coherences collides with the current stand of the peacebuilding debate. Criticizing the liberal peace discourse Alex Bellamy warns for the desire to prioritize a third-party agenda as it is generally recognized that locally owned peace agreements and consolidation processes are much more sustainable than those led by international organisations (Bellamy, 2004; Paris, 2003). Even though stronger cooperation between third parties seems beneficial, it also risks downplaying the local needs. The danger of external actors becoming beneficiaries, implementing their own values and culture in peace

⁶ United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, France, Germany and Sweden.

processes, results into neglecting or diminishing the needs and possibilities for internal actors. Thus creates a vertical imbalance which offers ground for a critical discussion on so-called *liberal peacebuilding* (Paris, 2003).

At the basis of this debate lay Roland Paris's *At War's End* (2003) and *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (2009) in which he claims it is problematic that the process of designing and executing a peacebuilding operation is being influenced by liberalist incentives, rejecting Colliers' *Conflict Trap* (Paris, 2003;2009). The concept of a *Liberal Peace* is generally understood as the ultimate ideological form of peace, combining free market and democracy (Richmond, 2005). Major international organizations such as the UN, African Union, World Bank and NATO, acknowledge the Liberal Peace Agenda as 'the surest foundation of peace,' (Paris, 1997, p. 56). The main indicators of peace (statebuilding, rule-of-law and democracy) are highly ranked on this agenda, however Paris argues that economic and political liberalization in fact increase the likelihood of renewed conflict (Paris, 2009). High levels of economic competition do not enhance a fragile peace. Nonetheless, liberal values and institutions are the main securer of peace in the home countries of the interventionists and thus incorporated in the operations (Paris, 2009). Oliver Richmond, part of the critical school, accurately recaps the problem as follows: 'How does one emancipate without dominating, without ignoring difference, without knowing the mind of the other? How can those who 'know' peace, talk to those who do not?' (Richmond, 2005, p. 294). Richmond here introduces the main shortcoming of coherence. On an international level coherence appears to be the ultimate solution to successfully manage peacebuilding operations. However, on a local level the values of successful peacebuilding can differ, opposing the liberal agenda.

What should a peacebuilding operation look like in order to gap the vertical limits of peacebuilding? A more recent discussion within the peacebuilding debate, descending from the liberal peace discourse, is the *Hybrid Peace discourse*. Richmond can be seen as a pioneer in opting the idea that norms, institutions and actors from liberal and illiberal nature coexist, interact and sometimes clash (Richmond, 2014). Liberal actors in peacebuilding operations should acknowledge these facts rather than trying to battle all that is not liberal. Hybrid peace can be conceptualized as a form of peace that is constantly reshaping its capacities and narrative, subject to the circumstances and actors involved (Mac Ginty, 2010). Hybrid peacebuilding should be seen as an alternative for the current liberalist structures that often characterize international peacebuilding operations (Richmond, 2014). Hybridity, to a certain extent, tackles the risk of an external actor taking the role of first actor instead of being a third party actor

supporting the peace process. An integrated or comprehensive approach, such as the 3D approach discussed in the following paragraph, often aims to involve all stakeholders in a peacebuilding operation including internal actors.

2.3.3. The horizontal limits of coherence

The working field of a soldier is completely different compared to that of a policymaker or a humanitarian aid worker. Nonetheless, stemming from a liberal agenda, an integrated approach aims to place all three fields under the same wing. To merge the dimensions of Defence, Diplomacy and Development successfully, the 3D approach is a useful format to clarify different aspects within an integrated approach. A 3D approach is not just another theoretical concept explaining the characteristics of peacebuilding operations. Instead, it functions as an instrument which serves as the foundation of the strategy for a mission in all phases (Mathijssen, 2014). Chapter 4 and 5 will elaborate on the implementation of the Dutch Integrated Approach, whereas this paragraph focuses on the theoretical implications of an approach that combines different fields of peacebuilding under the same strategy.

An integrated approach assumes that all actors participating in the operation aim towards the same goal (Jansen, 2008). Different timeframes pose a problem to a strategy that spreads over multiple phases of peacebuilding operations and to the final objective of the operation (de Coning, 2007). The 3Ds can be considered as ways to horizontally strive for the same destination, yet at different speeds, using different vehicles.

Defence is first and foremost concerned with the protection of national security and international security, often including the deployment of military forces. However, what should be pointed out here, is that the military is not exclusively tasked with the conventional military activity of offering protection, but is increasingly stationed to assist humanitarian interventions and offer support to other statebuilding activities (Jansen, 2008). The merging realms of security and development mentioned before, are reflected in the changing roles of military personnel during peacebuilding operations. For instance, there is a rising amount of policing operations, in which the military only assists police officers protecting them, whilst they execute mission tasks (§2.4 will elaborate on this matter). Considering the duration of a peacebuilding operation, political support is an important aspect of the defence dimension. Political and financial support lay at the basis of the continuity of a mission and short term results of an operation are necessary to receive support in the home country. This is why

governments rarely commit to supporting a peacebuilding operation on the long term (longer than five years) (van der Lijn, 2011). The defence dimension mostly plays in the field whilst results in this dimension influence the amount of support a mission receives which can decide the continuation of an operation.

Diplomacy relates to the political field and concerns the interrelationship between policymakers on national and international levels. So do leadership and hierarchy as these structures should be clearly formulated in order to create transparency in the structure of the operation. Diplomacy stretches over all peacebuilding levels including ‘the field’, the headquarters in the country of intervention, the national government of the sending home country and last but not least the initiating international organization (van der Lijn, 2011). The question as to what successful peacebuilding is in relation to diplomacy often aligns the liberal agenda. The diplomacy realm offers a needed foundation for coherence between the other two D’s, as it mostly focuses on communication, dialogue and debate.

Development, the third dimension in the approach, is engaged with the well-being and the safety of local populations, who are often victims of the conflict. Additionally, statebuilding activities and intensified cooperation with NGOs in order to create a sustainable peace, are strongly encouraged in the activities executed within this dimension. Contrary to defence, from a development perspective, long-term objectives are often incorporated and pursued. The evaluation and monitoring of a peacebuilding operation also covers an important element to measure developments, successes and lessons learned. Coherence between the local and the third party actor is most visible within this realm. The transition of authority to the national authorities striving towards a durable peace can be seen as the ultimate goal of the 3D strategy, strongest returning in this dimension.

All three D’s have different time horizons that allow different goals, which make it impossible to create full coherence. Moreover, in their aim for peace the dimensions contradict on certain levels, which makes it questionable if this approach can be successful in peacebuilding (van der Lijn, 2011). In discussing the three D’s within the broader debate of peacebuilding, the development and defence seem to logically result from the growing overlap between the fields of security and development, mentioned earlier (Collier, 2003) Following Jansen’s argument, the overlap of the two results in a mix-up of main and additional objectives. In a nutshell: a soldiers’ main objective is offering security, and development deals as an instrument to be successful in protecting the national and international security. Seen through a development lens: security contributes to the final goal: the well-being of the population and

a durable peace. The ends and means of the two differ, which leads to contradicting interpretations and role distribution within peacebuilding operations. When participants in a peacebuilding operation have different main objectives, it becomes impossible to apply coherence or integration of strategies (Jansen, 192). The challenge of integrated approaches is thus to go beyond the defined dimensions and search for a way they can enhance each other rather than contradict. One of the possibilities in battling this problem is the inclusion of police officers in peacebuilding operations hence creating a new direction for peacebuilding.

2.4. The military/policing tension

In conventional warfare the role of a soldier is straightforward, whereas in peacebuilding it is not. However, the presence of a soldier, in war- as well as in peacetimes, evokes a certain response by a population. A soldier stands outside of society bearing a certain amount of authority due to the legal possession of a weapon and the ability to use it. This is problematic in integrated peacebuilding operations as the soldier enters the realms of development and diplomacy which plays in the societal realm (Klep, 2011). Through multiple researches based on interviews with soldiers in integrated peacebuilding operations, it becomes clear that soldiers themselves also struggle with their renewed position (Klep, 2011; Mathijssen 2014; Westerterp, 2015). The soldiers traditional duty, that of solely offering security and protection, is to disappear and the fear exists that the role of the military will transform in developmental assistance activities (Travers & Owen, 2014).

The question remains if this fear is legitimate, and moreover if this should be feared at all? Mathijssen argues that the realm of defence has become a blur of contradicting activities and objectives since peacebuilding operations have become more integrated. There is often not just one defined enemy and as the role of authorities becomes questioned sometimes, it is vague who should protect the local population, and from what. As it becomes difficult to define the role of a soldier it is even harder to prepare the military to what they can expect during a peacebuilding operation. With the blurring definition of the enemy the traditional role of a soldier disappears and its substitute role is still being modified (Mathijssen, 2014).

During the first decade of this millennium, policing has become a growing component in peacebuilding operations with an increasing number of police officers operating outside of their national border. Not only the number of deployed police officers has grown, but their participative role has shifted from a focus on monitoring the local police, towards a focus on

community policing. This intensification of the role of police officers in peacebuilding operations aligns with the rising emphasis on coherence. The broadening of the aims and goals of an operation results in a growing array of tasks for police officers, extending from the reformation of local police to the (re)structuring of law institutions (Caparini and Osland, 2017).

The phenomenon also receives more academic interest (e.g. Greener, 2009; Caparini and Osland 2017). Both within the academic and political realm, a discussion is ongoing on the benefits of the deployment of police officers. Police officers are educated conform to the nation context and lack the knowledge on policing in a conflict area, which asks for training and re-schooling. A second limitation is that of quantity. Countries often cannot miss their higher educated police officers as they need them to help deal with crime and disorder in their own countries. Lastly, statistics show that the top ten of police contributing countries in 2014 existed out of all non-western countries the (UNPOL Mag 2014, 86).⁷ Policing in these countries often does not amplify with the standards of the objectives in peacebuilding operation on an international level. The specific formulation of what the role is of a police officer, in liberal terms, is unknown to them from a socio-cultural perspectives. This makes it harder to adjust a general framework within peacebuilding operations in which all police officers have the same values and understandings of their job (Greener, 2011).

The decision to deploy a police-led mission instead of a military mission can signal a different incentive of the sending country towards the country in which it is intervening (Greener, 2011). The presence of police is not hostile in its nature whereas that of an army is. Military forces are often more isolated from the political realm and tend to be more responsive and defensive instead of preventive. There is, however, a difficult aspect to international policing in peacebuilding which stems from the fact that in many non-western countries, citizens' lack trust in the police because their own national police are often corrupt or violent institutions (Greener, 2017). In their research after the police system in Afghanistan, Frerks and Terpstra concluded that sending police officers there to train and change the system was problematic due to the long history of corruption. They argue that in the design of policing operations in Afghanistan it was not included that changing such a system takes more than a small peacebuilding operation (Frerks and Terpstra, 2018).

⁷ Bangladesh, Jordan, Senegal, Nepal, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Egypt and Toga (in order of participation number)

The merging of different peacebuilding activities and the development of a 3D strategy has led to an irreversible trajectory towards modernization of intervention strategies. Traditional roles within interventions disappear and are replaced with new possibilities, liberalizing certain aspects of fragile societies. The merging field of development and security is best recognized in the inclusion of police officers in peacebuilding operations. Police officers participating in peacebuilding activities, aiming to train police in the conflict states represent on one hand the field of security and on the other that of development.

2.5. Summary and General expectation

The previous paragraphs have included the main theories that form the foundation of the current peacebuilding discourse. Collier, founder of the *mainstream* peacebuilding theory, argues that intervention is necessary in order to break the conflict trap (Collier 2003). This line of thinking is subject to a critical school of authors arguing against the implicit aim to build a liberal peace. Duffield criticizes the liberal drives behind these peacebuilding initiatives as western institutions fear their own security is threatened by fragile states (Duffield, 2003). Additionally, Paris emphasizes the actual liberalization of political and economic institutions in these countries, fearing that a fragile peace is not strong enough to face the hard competitions that accompany such developments (Paris, 2003; 2009). All three arguments mostly focus on the position of external actors, whereas the discourse of hybridity aims to emphasize the role of internal parties against a backdrop of third party intervention (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond, 2014). However, no convincing international examples of hybrid peacebuilding exist, as the search for coherence is primarily done on the level of designing policy, rather than on the level of policy implementation. In their search for successful and effective peacebuilding, all scholars emphasize coherence between whichever stakeholders in peacebuilding operations.

As this chapter has illustrated, the current stand of the debate concerning peacebuilding spreads on many different levels and goes beyond an easy solution to effectively build peace. Searching a strong level of coherence seems to be most appealing in deciding for a peacebuilding strategy amongst policymakers. However, in choosing a strategy different options for the main objectives of the operation are available. Missions become a pick and choose game and the menu consists of suiting possibilities for every different dimension of peacebuilding. According to the critical discourse on peacebuilding, in their search to coherence peacebuilders are ignorant to the limits of this concept and fail to go beyond the liberal agenda.

This leads to ignoring local needs or conflicting and contradicting goals within and between different peacebuilding dimensions.

Recently added to the peacebuilding menu is the deployment of police officers. Within the current literature little attention has been paid to the differences between military and policing operations in their broader peacebuilding context. There is a gap in measuring the impact of a mission type in relation to the implemented strategy. As the Netherlands have a clearly defined approach and have executed both military and policing mission types, they are a perfect case example to explore this undefined realm of research. Before the methodology and the analysis of this research are provided, chapter 3 first elaborates on the origin of the Dutch strategy (i.e. Integrated Approach) which is necessary to get a deep understanding of the Dutch mission design as well as which historical events that have influenced this process. From this it will become clear that Dutch policymakers follow the *mainstream* peacebuilding discourse. Which will be analysed through a critical lens.

3. The emergence of the Integrated Approach

3.1. The Dutch approach in historical context

When discussing different international intervention strategies in Afghanistan, Barack Obama expressed his admiration for the 3D approach as it was: ‘...pursued effectively by the Netherlands in Afghanistan,’ (President Obama, 14 July 2008). Minister President Rutte was in 2018 invited to the UN Security Council to discuss the wider scope of international peacebuilding operations and the Dutch approach towards certain returning difficulties. This approach receives attention from multiple angles in the international playfield. The Netherlands were, together with the Canadians, the first to officially implement a 3D strategy into their foreign politics (Travers and Owen, 2014). Several historical moments have led to the current formula for Dutch international intervention.

The first one being the end of the Cold War which changed the general opinion on conventional military intervention and created space for modern peacebuilding operations (Autesserre, 2017). Secondly, the failure of the Dutch *Blue Helmets* to protect thousands of young men from mass murder in the Bosnian city Srebrenica during the mission in former Yugoslavia. As one of the darkest pages in modern Dutch history this led to gigantic political and public debate. After the fall of Srebrenica, a common understanding reigned that future military failure, to this extent, was to be avoided at all costs (Klep, 2011). Lessons that were learned from this are still included in mission designs of new operations (e.g. see Parliamentary Papers 29 521, nr. 349). After Srebrenica the Dutch government focused mostly on non-UN mandated operations, i.e. *green interventions*, which often bare a more explicit mandate. A set end date and obligation to report to the government also followed hereafter (Klep, 2011).

A third influential moment were the 9/11 attacks which made an appeal on *Article Five* of the North Atlantic Treaty, invoking the obligation to offer collective defence as a Member State (Bevans(1968). "North Atlantic Treaty") *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF) resulted from these attacks aimed at ‘Fighting terrorism from the inside,’ (NATO Fact Sheet, 2002). The Netherlands mainly participated in delivering materials and medical support as they were hesitant towards the use of force and deployment of militaries –still resulting from Srebrenica– but forced to obey article five (Klep, 2011). The fourth historical moment follows from this as the government decided to engage in ISAF, a NATO led peacebuilding operation, focused on statebuilding rather than fighting terrorism. A Task Force was send to Uruzgan. ISAF I became the deadliest peacebuilding operation the Netherlands ever participated in (Klep, 2011).

Whereas Obama spoke his admiration for the Dutch strategy, nationally the mission was criticized on its complex and broad set of objectives, and Dutch soldiers in Uruzgan felt unsupported by their own nation (Klep, 2011). Towards its ending in 2009, the mission caused a great deal of criticism in the media as well as between Dutch political parties. This eventually led to the collapse of the Dutch coalition ensuring the second painful failure in Dutch peacebuilding history (see Task Force Uruzgan, van Bommel 2009).

3.2. Integration of the Integrated Approach

The 3D strategy expresses the multidisciplinary and inter-ministerial approach. The government pursues multiple objectives and different tools in such a way that they reinforce each other (Parliamentary Papers 27 925, 315, p. 25).

How did the defined 3D strategy come into existence? During ISAF I the former ministers of Development Co-operation (Bert Koenders), Foreign Affairs (Maxime Verhagen) and Defence (Eimert van Middelkoop) joined efforts in designing an approach that embraces all three ministries but also aligns with the developments on the international level in striving for coherence within peacebuilding operations. In their speeches and official notes concerning the Integrated Approach the ministers repeatedly refer to scholars such as Paul Collier and Amitai Etzioni (van Middelkoop, 2008) elaborated on in chapter 2 (Collier 2003, 2007; Etzioni). Arguments in line with the scholars are for example that international security should continuously be protected and fragile states do pose a threat to this. Additionally, terrorism is framed as a big threat to the international security and seen as legitimate motivation to participate in peacebuilding operations (Parliamentary Papers 27 926, 315, 2008).

What does the implementation of the integrated strategy mean practically? First, the changing of the role of the Dutch military as their priorities shift to facilitating security through civil reconstruction and development. Secondly, police officers become part of the international field and start to be included in mission designs. There is more interaction between the military and civil actors such as NGOs and local organisations. In an extensive research on the civil-military cooperation of NGOs and the Dutch military, two conclusions were made: first that in general the Dutch soldiers and the Ministry of Defence feel positive about working together with civil actors. Second, that NGOs are often keeping their distance in working together with an army as they are afraid this will jeopardize their neutrality. Different NGOs have supported the argument that soldiers miss local knowledge and expertise within the cultural context (Frerks, Klem, van Laar, van Klingereren 2006).

In his speech on diplomacy and defence, Verhagen argues that the Integrated Approach needs multi-disciplinary and interdepartmental cooperation aiming for multiple objectives in order to do a successful peacebuilding. (Verhagen, 2008). Interventions and conflicts should be approached from this integrative perspective (Verhagen, 2008). As Verhagen argues, the format of the Integrated Approach depends heavily on the circumstances in the peacebuilding operation.

The concept of the Integrated Approach is designed through constant negotiation between the three different fields. From a Defence perspective the strategy implies closer cooperation with civil actors. From a diplomatic perspective the strategy aligns with the developments within the international community of more coherence within the peacebuilding operation, focusing on the political dialogue with the country in conflict, aimed at rebuilding the state. From a developmental perspective the strategy means more back up from the military. However, for an NGO working with soldiers means losing some impartiality. Only if all three dimensions are engaged in transforming some of their conventional characteristics, an Integrated Approach will do justice.

4. Methodology

The theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 serves as the foundation of this research. This chapter elaborates on the case selection, the methodological tools needed to bridge the body of knowledge with the research and the operationalization of the analysis.

4.1. Comparative case study

This research is designed as an explorative (in-depth) case study accounting validity through its comparative outline. A contemporary phenomenon within real-life context is favourable when conducting a case study as it allows to deconstruct the phenomenon and explore it through different lenses (Yin 2003, p. 1). The rising popularity of peacebuilding strategies equivalent to the Dutch Integrated Approach appear to be a suitable contemporary phenomenon. The case study method explores through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information and reports a case description and case themes (Creswell, 2013, p.92). The process of the case is central in most case studies and the analysed data selection needs to be as transparent as possible (Yin, 2004).

Case studies can have a double function as they are being studied as their own unit but can be placed in a larger group of units as well (Gerring, 2004). Using multiple case studies offers a broader conclusion and a defined understanding of the cases in their context (Yin, 2003). Whilst defining the criteria for case selection, the identification of the cases should take place within the boundaries of the Dutch Integrated Approach to avoid inconsistency and external factors that could influence the outcomes. The Integrated Approach, understood as the Dutch leading strategy in peacebuilding operations, offers a defined list of potential cases.

As the Netherlands have been intervening in multiple countries following the same approach, a multiple case study can be applied to identify the differences and similarities in the implementation of the Integrated Approach between operations. However, in this study the format of a comparative case study has been selected and only two operations will be included in an in-depth comparative case study. In this case study the Integrated Approach as the central phenomena unfolds in two different peacebuilding operations.

4.2. Limitations and challenges

The choice of comparing two different missions operated by the Netherlands asks for careful analysis as the missions differ in objectives, personnel and time-frame. During the analysis the fallacy of inconsistency is lurking as false equivalences in comparing the cases is a common trap (Creswell, 2013). Two peacebuilding operations are different because of case specific internal and external factors and conclusions should not be drawn on differences that result from this. However, this research analyses the causal mechanism of a certain type of mission to an implemented strategy rather than to compare the missions in their progress or development. This limitation could harm the internal validity of the research and should thus be carefully considered during the analysis.

Challenged by time and size, another limitation is the lack of empirical data which could offer a reflection of how missions evolve in the field. Journalist Fara Karimi states: ‘The differences between what we discussed in the conference room in The Hague compared to what actually happened in Afghanistan were sometimes completely incoherent,’ (Karimi, 2006, p. 23). This research lays the foundation on what was discussed in The Hague through analysing official documents. Potential further research and data collecting in the field could offer a different perspective and possibly verify Karimi’s argument.

The extent to which the outcomes of this research can be generalized is relatively low as the comparison that is made is very specifically build around these two cases. However, through the comparison certain outcomes can provide useful and valid findings for future Dutch operations that are designed through the Integrated Approach.

4.3. Case selection

The main criteria of the case selection was that the mission implements the Integrated Approach. The approach was incorporated during the first operation in Afghanistan (ISAF I) in 2006 but only officially included in the article-100 letter of ISAF II in 2011.⁸ The cases can be chosen from Dutch missions designed after 2010.

The Netherlands are currently participating in 16 international missions, however, missions that are formulated by the European Union are excluded from the list as these are not

⁸ Article 100 in the Dutch constitution entails the following: The government shall inform the States General in advance if armed forces are to be deployed or made available to maintain or promote the international legal order. This shall include the provision of humanitarian aid in the event of armed conflict.

designed from a Dutch perspective. Table 1 shows all peacebuilding operations that meet the requirements. Seven missions have started or are continuing after the Integrated Approach became the leading strategy for Dutch international intervention.

Table 1: Mission details (Dutch Ministry of Defence)

Mission	Contribution	Scale	Costs on yearly basis
Atalanta/EU and Ocean Shield/NATO	Marines and navy ship	3 ships and crew	€ 10 million
ISAF II	Police training forces	225 policing trainings officers	€50-100 million
EUBAM	Border protection	A dozen militaries at different European borders	€1-5 million
UNMISS	Providing staff office at headquarters of the mission	6 officers	<€1 million
MINUSMA	Military protection	368 soldiers	€50-100 million
International battle against ISIS (Iraq & Syria)	F16s and military trainers	4 f16s, 20 soldiers and civil experts	>€155 million
Resolute Support	Rebuild Afghan national army and police	Advisors (10) Medical personnel(10) Transport officers (30) Logistics (20) Officers (15)	€50 million

In table 2 the numerical details of all seven missions allow to choose for the most-similar cases to compare. The overlap between the missions can already be perceived as rather low because external factors, conflict situations and motivation to participate are diverse. However, the scope of the missions in Mali and Afghanistan are distinctively larger compared to other missions (looking at the number of individuals included and the costs of the missions on a yearly basis). Both missions focus on peacebuilding. ISAF II being the integrated *policing* mission and MINUSMA the *military* mission also builds two interesting cases as they vary in mission types whilst both implementing the same approach.

4.4. The guidelines of the Integrated Approach

The guidelines of the integrated approach formulate the main goal of the Dutch strategy in international intervention. Creating cohesion between different actors and dimensions in

peacebuilding is formulated as the main goal in these guidelines (Guidelines, p. 11). This aspiration is in line with multiple (inter)national strategies.⁹

'The Dutch vision on a coherent commitment to security and stability to fragile states and conflict areas' (Guidelines, p. 1). This sentence functions as the subtitle of the document created in 2014, through a partnership between the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Foreign Trade and Development cooperation and Security and Justice with its purpose to share the experiences and ambitions of the Dutch government in international operations. This document parallels with the international intensification of integration in peacebuilding operations. Furthermore, it offers a broad definition of how to compose the right mix of actors in a peacebuilding operation. The main purpose of this document is twofold: on one hand it deals as the Dutch policy vision on international peacebuilding, whilst it functions as a practical guide for Dutch policy makers and implementation of peacebuilding activities on the other hand (Guidelines, p. 4).

In the road towards designing and executing a peacebuilding operation, the general starting point for the Dutch government is the focus on one similar end goal in all different peacebuilding dimensions. Namely the country of intervention being able to protect and keep the stability independently, through generating national ownership (Guidelines, p.1). A big challenge is to remain self-critical and effective in the execution of a peacebuilding operation (Guidelines, 2011, p. 4).

4.5. Operationalization

4.5.1. Data collection

In order to remain concise, the official data used to formulate an answer to the research question will strictly remain with official government documents in the form of article 100 letters, progress reports and final evaluations. All documents refer back to *Guidelines of the Integrated Approach*.

Table 3 includes all official documents that have been analysed. The collected data will be coded through systematically marking the three different fields of Defence, Diplomacy and Development of the Integrated Approach in the documents, linking them to the guidelines. The

⁹ See: European Announcement Comprehensive Approach, 2013; Integrated Assessment and planning handbook of the UN, 2013; Action plan for a comprehensive approach NATO, 2010.

quotes are translated carefully and without loss or change of meaning to this research. All documents are in Dutch and the original statements are included in the annex.

Table 1: Analysed documents

Title	Mission
Guidelines to the Integrated Approach (Guidelines)	-
'Article-100 letter, 7 January 2011.' (Parliamentary Papers 27925, nr. 415.)	ISAF II
Final evaluation policing trainings mission, 29 January 2014 (Final Evaluation ISAF II)	ISAF II
'Article-100 letter, 1 November 2013.' (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 213)	MINUSMA
'Progress Report 11 May 2017.' (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 292)	MINUSMA
'Article-100 letter, 11 September 2017.' (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr.349).	MINUSMA

The choice for these documents is legitimized through its time frame during the preparing, execution and –in the case of ISAF II- evaluation of the missions. The analysis will revolve around the incorporation of the Integrated Approach in the documents. Questions that are kept in mind whilst collecting the data are: How is the approach mentioned in the designs and reports? How are the fields of defence, diplomacy and development included in the objectives of both missions? Are there bottlenecks with the approach and the mission? And lastly: which aspects are missing in the documents related to the approach?

Table 4 shows the specific characteristics per dimension that are used in appointing to which certain peacebuilding activities belong. Table 5 marks the characteristics of the military opposed to those of police officers send in peacebuilding operations. In order to enhance the credibility of this research the principle of triangulation has been applied in identifying the characteristics of the different dimensions. Triangulation means that a researcher should seek for more than one way to verify the collected data (Yin, 2003). The characteristics in table 4 and 5 are derived from the literature and also in line with the Guidelines of the Integrated Approach.

Table 2: Characteristics of the Integrated Approach

The Integrated Approach	Characteristics/focus
Defence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection - Stabilization - Position in society - Rules of Engagement
Diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Peace talks - Statebuilding - Regional focus
Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local needs - Long term projects - Cooperation with NGOs.

Table 3: Police versus military indicators of the Integrated Approach

Police characteristics	Military characteristics
Part of society	Outside society
Only use violence to defend	Monopoly of the legitimate use of violence
Trained in homebound situation	Trained to be in conflict situations
Not hostile in nature	Hostile in nature

4.5.1. Data analysis

Chapter 5 analyses both cases first discussing the mission context, briefly mapping the conflict and country situation followed by an oversight of the mission design and how the Integrated Approach is embedded in the mission. Followed by an analysis of each specific dimension (defence, diplomacy and development) within the operation. For each dimension certain aspects that either do align, contradict or only to a certain extent link with the Integrated Approach will be discussed. The relation to the Integrated Approach is divided in the following scale:

- *Integrated*
The aspect is fully integrated both in the mission design as well as in the mission activities described in progress reports/evaluations.
- *Not Integrated*
The aspect is not integrated in the mission design and also not executed in the field.
- *Partly Integrated*

Only specific parts of the aspect are integrated.

- *Integrated only in mission design*

The aspect is integrated in the design, however in the progress reports and/or evaluation the aspect appears not to be integrated.

The guidelines advocates to equally emphasize all three areas in the mission design and execution, implement them side-by-side whilst intersecting and supporting each other. The analysis will focus on the linkages and interplay between the different dimensions and appoint the (in) equalities of the representation of the three different levels of peacebuilding and how these relate. The collected data will be indicated through the theories on the Integrated Approach (table 5). This leads to a conclusion considering the implementation of the approach per mission.

After both cases have been analysed independently the research proceeds with the comparison of the results between both operations. Chapter 6 compares the outcomes of both analysis and offers grounds for the conclusion. Chapter 6 will provide an answer to the research question, followed by a conclusion that embeds the findings of the analysis in the theoretical framework.

5. Analysis

Certain similarities between the geopolitical contexts of Mali and Afghanistan can underpin the validity of the case comparison. The context analyses of both operations as described in the article-100 letter show certain resemblances.¹⁰ First, both interventions take place in a predominantly Islamic country, are haunted by criminality, terrorism, poverty and collective discrimination and exclusion of minorities (Ruttig, 2013). Second, governance structures in both countries are asymmetrical, meaning that within the countries the division of power between regions is unequal. Even though Mali and Afghanistan both have a national constitutional status, the autonomy between regions can differ considerably. This results in the fact that the conflict cannot be solved on a national level as the unofficial authorities are spread throughout regional and local level (Pezard & Shulking, 2017). Both governments are dealing with high levels of corruption and a malfunctioning judicial system (Parliamentary papers 27925, nr. 415 & 29521, nr. 213). Lastly, within international context both countries are referred to and framed as failed states, a breeding place for terrorists and they create a high numbers of migrants. These latter aspects form important incentives for both operations as they pose a threat to the (inter)national security (Parliamentary Papers, 27 92, n. 415 & 29521, nr. 213).

5.1. ISAF II

5.1.1. *Mission context*

Today's international intervention in Afghanistan originates from the 9/11 attacks and the War on Terror that followed afterwards. Multiple attempts to build peace and establish a non-corrupt democratic government have been initiated, without any great success. The last year has seen tremendous outbreaks of violence again. Currently there is not much peace to keep in Afghanistan. Based on Afghans rich history of conflict and anticipating the many different ethnic, religious and tribal rivalries the country houses, it is safe to say that the roots of the conflict stretch far beyond the War on Terror. However, experts on the Afghan conflict all agree that the conflict has intensified due to western interference, no matter how good or bad their intentions are (Klep, 2011; van Bommel 2011; Westerterp, 2015).

The Dutch have an ongoing presence in Afghanistan since 2005. ISAF is the overarching operation supported by different national militaries all contributing to build a new Afghan

¹⁰ Phase 1 of the guidelines of the integrated approach.

government and guarantee the security and stability in the country (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Dutch Ministry of Defence 2008:1). The Dutch motivations to support ISAF, first military and later with police officers, follows from the title of both article-100 letters: *Battling International Terrorism* (Parliamentary Papers 27 92, n. 415, p. 6). ISAF II resulted from a request by the new Dutch coalition after ISAF I led to the collapse of the old government (Parliamentary Papers 29 925, nr. 392 Peters/Pechtold, 2009). The discussion preceding the decision to interfere in Afghanistan again, was profound. From different politicians and media it was argued that the international community were blaming the Dutch government for withdrawing from Uruzgan, resulting in a pressure to participate again (Westerterp, 2015). Finally, under strict national conditions ISAF II was endorsed in 2010 (Parliamentary Papers Parliamentary Papers 27925, nr. 415).

ISAF II aligned with *The City and Justice Project*. A bilateral initiative by Germany and Afghanistan within the mandate of the international ISAF operation and aimed at capacity building of the judicial system in the Kunduz region. Kunduz was framed as being a relatively safe area, however ambiguous articulated in the context analysis of the Dutch government: *The safety incidents in the North are only 4% of the whole country. The increase of incidents has halved in 2010* (Parliamentary Paper 27 925, n. 415, p. 12). The quote uses indistinct wording covering the fact that there is still an increase of violence. The presence of a safe environment was an important motivation of the approval of the operation as unarmed police officers needed to be deployed to a safe area.

Safety was also important for the Dutch public and media as the casualties fallen in of Uruzgan had led to nationwide uproar. As soon as the first conversations on a new operation in Afghanistan started, the media took a critical stand (Klep 2011, Westerterp 2015). According to Dutch journalists who were active in Kunduz, the context analysis of Kunduz was unrealistic: *'I got the idea that the article-100 letter was produced the following: we want to go to Kunduz and we will write this letter in such a way that possible objectives by the opposition are minimized to the least'* (Journalist interviewed in Westerterp 2015, p. 414). There was a lack of support from a national level which made the operation even more politically sensitive.

5.1.2. Mission design

Table 6 broadly portrays the construction of ISAF II, providing important mission details as was decided during the mission design phase.

ISAF II	
<i>Goal</i>	Capacity building within the Afghan civil policing system and judicial institutions.
<i>Objectives</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Reinforcement of the Afghan civil police ➔ The improvement of cooperation between the Afghan civil police and the judicial system ➔ The improvement of the quality of the Afghan judicial system ➔ The improvement of awareness and acceptance of the Afghan civil police and judicial systems by the Afghan people.
<i>Number of police officers</i>	225 training officers on a yearly basis
<i>Location</i>	Kunduz, Afghanistan
<i>Budget</i>	€ 69.2 million (2011) € 98.8 million (2012) € 47.1 million (2013 till 1 July)
<i>Start date</i>	Mid 2010
<i>Initial end date</i>	Mid-2014
<i>Actual end date</i>	1 July 2013

Table 4: ISAF II

The Integrated Approach in the mission design can be traced back to the objectives that from different angles aim for the same mission goal. The article-100 letter includes a paragraph on coherence introducing the different stakeholders in the operation that all have their own part in adding to the objectives and thus the main goal: the Afghan government, the Afghan police, civilians of Kunduz, the Dutch government (i.e. ministry of foreign affairs, justice and security and defence), NATO and other participating countries in ISAF, in particular Germany. Another aspect aligning with the Integrated Approach is the execution of a baseline study and a context analysis by the Dutch government and the strict rules for a final evaluation.

The objectives of ISAF II represent the Integrated Approach and the merging realms of security and development. On one hand the reinforcement of the Afghan civil police aiming for a stronger security system and on the other hand the improvement of the judicial system striving towards developments. The mission goal aligns with the assumption that development will lead to a self-sustaining security in Afghanistan:

From the start the attention should be on generating the national ownership and the transmission of all activities to local and national partners, resulting that acute stability will flow into a durable stability (Parliamentary Papers 27 925, nr. 415, p. 7).

Acknowledging that the fields of Defence, Diplomacy and Development overlap, there are certain aspects that can be detected which fall under each specific dimension.

5.1.3. *The Integrated Approach in ISAF II*

All three dimensions include certain aspects that are in some way related to the Integrated Approach. The aspects are scored with the extent to how integrated the aspect was in the operation: *Integrated, Partly Integrated, Only integrated in design, Not Integrated.*

Defence

The dimension of defence in this operation is atypical because ISAF II deploys police officers instead of soldiers. The article-100 letter recognizes the irregularity of a policing operation underlining the fact that the range of instruments police officers have at their disposal differ significantly compared to the military (Parliamentary Papers 27 925, nr. 414, p. 1). The following aspects and the level of integration (discussed in §3.5) affect the implementation of the Integrated Approach.

1. Formulation of national Rules of Engagement – *Not Integrated*

Usually the Rules of Engagement are copied from the international mission mandate. However, to clarify what defence meant for the policing officers sent to Afghanistan, the Dutch government formulated a so-called *National Caveat* stating Rules of Engagement that were only applicable for the Dutch mission:

Seen the current safety situation, it cannot be excluded that police units and their trainers are confronted with violence. The Dutch police officers cannot participate in violence. If the Afghan police officers trained by the Dutch receive orders from Afghan authorities to participate in offensive military activity then the Dutch will not participate (Parliamentary Papers 27 925, nr. 415, p. 15).

The use of arms is strictly abandoned in this operation. However, the German/Afghan partnership which the Dutch joined, included training armed police officers and soldiers, which was not mentioned in the article-100 letter. This meant that Dutch officers were unable to assist and cooperate with these trainings due to the national Rules of Engagement (Parliamentary Papers 27 925, nr. 415; Final Evaluation ISAF II). Therefore, the Dutch officers were placed in a safer area, training only a small Afghan police entity. This worked incoherent for the broader mission being in contrast with the approach as well as it led to a lower number of trained officers (Guidelines; Final Evaluation ISAF II). The final evaluation underlines the following lesson learned: *National caveats hamper the execution of the main goals and objectives of the mission* (Final Evaluation ISAF II, p. 34).

2. Closer cooperation with the local authorities – *Integrated*

Partnering with the local police, raising awareness amongst local population and including local authorities is heavily emphasized in the Guidelines. ISAF II has strongly integrated this aspect. Unarmed police officers lack the monopoly of legitimate violence which made them more approachable (Parliamentary Papers 27 925, nr. 415).

3. Lack of knowledge on Afghan culture and society – *Not Integrated*

Through the interaction Dutch police officers had with the local authorities and population another problem rose. Partnering with the Afghans asked for knowledge on its culture and the general perception on policing. Even though Dutch police officers were trained beforehand, it appeared from the evaluation that they still lacked knowledge (Final Evaluation ISAF II, p. 28-29). For example, officers were unaware of the high level of illiteracy and language barriers they encountered. Additionally, the Afghan public perception of the police in Kunduz was negative and the security system judged as corrupt and unreliable. Moreover, this perception also appeared to be true as stated in the final evaluation on the corrupt system of authority in Kunduz (Final evaluation ISAF II, p. 30).

4. Duration – *Not Integrated*

There is a need for short term results in the dimension of defence as this leads to political and financial support. Protecting and securing an area offers short-term results, however, training police officers with the aim to achieve systemic change asks for more time. The ending date for ISAF II –Medio 2014- was secured in the article-100 letter and the operation could only stretch over three years (Parliamentary Papers 27925, nr. 415). Due to the dependency on Germany the mission ended even earlier. The evaluation states: *Since this mission has ended, it is up to the Afghans to continue the trainings and the cooperation between different judicial institutions* (Final Evaluation ISAF II, p. 40). However, stated earlier in the evaluation it is acknowledged that the situation in Kunduz was still fragile and the peace process slow which hindered the efficiency of international peacebuilding activities (Final Evaluation ISAF II, p. 12). Considering long-term results whilst designing the mission appeared to have been more realistic.

Diplomacy

The characteristics in the diplomacy dimension of ISAF II are twofold divided between the local and international level. This dimension shows how the aim for coherence approach is incorporated in ISAF II:

1. Decentralization of leadership – *Integrated*

The civil/military management team resulted directly from the lessons learned in ISAF I (Final evaluation ISAF I-Uruzgan). The team dealt with the communication infrastructure of the operation supporting the regional and local aspects of the operation whilst reporting to the Dutch government and the ISAF headquarters (Parliamentary Papers 27 925, nr. 415). The team testified and advised on the progress of the operation aiming for an Integrated Approach working together with the Afghan authorities and the German troops. According to the evaluation this management team led to a highly integrated form of mission leadership using the dimension of diplomacy to link the objectives with the mission execution (Final evaluation ISAF II). The management team has improved the cooperation between different actors on different mission levels which positively added to the integrated design and the coherence on the strategic level of the operation (Final evaluation ISAF II, p. 6).

2. Lack of vertical mission communication - *not integrated*

Dutch police officers were cooperating with the Afghan authorities meaning certain diplomatic responsibility also fell on their shoulders, most importantly the transmission of authority in the training centres to the Afghan police. The police officers in the field were the ones executing important mission tasks in the local level, taking up diplomatic roles as well (Final evaluation ISAF II). It only appeared at mission end that there were communication problems with the field. Even though the evaluation only underlines positive results from the civil/military management team, in the field this structure resulted in confusion amongst police officers (Final Evaluation). As this is an important element left out of the official document Westerterps interviewees prove the inconsistency in what was reported by the government and how the police officers in the field have felt. One of the interviewees' states:

'If there would have been visionary leadership we would have reached much more (...) this was a big deception. Someone who only slightly knows Afghanistan would laugh about this mission. It is a Mickey Mouse mission.' (Deployed police officer interviewed by Westerterp, 2015, p. 418).

3. German influence - *not integrated*

'We go together, we leave together' (Ivo Opstelten, Minister of Security and Justice during his visit in Kunduz, January 2013). Minister Opstelten visited Kunduz right before the Germans announced their early leave from Afghanistan. Even though this quote here indicates the existing of a partnership, the decision was made without consulting the Dutch government and

the civil/military management team (Final Evaluation ISAF II). The Dutch police officers needed the protection of lead country Germany as the Rules of Engagement of the operation disabled the Netherlands from sending armed militaries for protection (Final Evaluation ISAF II, p. 7).

Development

Before analysing the development aspect in ISAF II it needs to be mentioned that NGOs are excluded from the list of stakeholders in the article-100 letter, even though the Guidelines state that these should be integrated in the design, especially local parties (Guidelines, p. 23, Parliamentary Papers). However, the dimension of development stretches a broad part of the operation:

1. Development forms the starting point of the operation - *Integrated*

The overall objectives of the operation all focus on systematically change and develop the current weak judicial and security system (parliamentary papers 27925, nr. 415). The broader intentions of the ISAF international operation are also focused on development.

2. Monitoring and evaluation – *Integrated*

Working towards the transition of authority, a context analysis and baseline study were done before the mission was designed in order to decide the needs of the local population. The final evaluation presents results from the independent report by the Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU; Final evaluation). As these findings are based on a baseline study, a fair evaluation can be made on the changes including lessons learned for future operations. This strongly aligns with the Integrated Approach.

3. Deployment of police officers – *Integrated*

The hierarchy between the Dutch and Afghan police officers locally is built upon a flexible approach of change as it is focused on transitioning the governing power to the Afghan authorities. A system of equality was constructed in the mission design, aimed to rely on a balance of power with the centre of gravity transferring from Dutch authority (in the training centres) towards Afghan authority (Parliamentary Papers 29 521, nr. 213).

4. Duration – *Not Integrated*

The set ending date of mid-2014 came too soon for the transition mentioned earlier. The finalization of the Dutch operation went hand in hand with the argument that the area was ready for self-government and the police officers -trained through the Dutch mission- were able to pursue the trainings themselves (Final Evaluation ISAF II, p. 12). The evaluation states the following:

This mission emphasized capacity building from an Afghan perspective, in order to transfer the responsibilities from the international community to the Afghans themselves. Since this mission has ended, it is up to the Afghans to continue the cooperation between the different judicial institutions (Final Evaluation ISAF II, p. 41).

In terms of development the evaluation also states that long-term results are impossible to measure after a short-term mission like this due to external factors that will have their influence over time and make it impossible to make any tangible conclusions.

In summary: Policing activities in ISAF II shift away from the typical defence dimension towards an Integrated Approach. This also brings new problems as a lack of knowledge concerning the cultural and societal differences as well as the perception of police officers and the corrupt system in Afghanistan. Tackling these problems is more developmental work, however, the aim for short-term results still weighs heavy in deciding the course of the operation, which has negatively influenced the mission results.

A discrepancy can be noted in the diplomacy dimension as on an international level the Civil/Military management team was positively assessed whereas locally it led to confusion. A top-down formulation of leadership would have been more evident considering the high responsibility the police officers had in the field.

ISAF II shows clear aspects of the Integrated Approach but due to the lack of coherence in the broader international operation this approach does not work successfully. Because of the atypical character of police officers in the field compared to soldiers it becomes easier to merge the realms of development and security.

5.2. MINUSMA

5.2.1. Mission context

Mali also knows a long history of ongoing conflicts and rivalries between different ethnical and religious groups. Additionally, centralized in the Sahel desert, Mali is conveniently located for weapons, drugs and human trafficking. The extreme poverty, high levels of food insecurity and major differences between the rural north and economical dominant South result in tension between and within regions (Sabrow, 2017). The independency of Mali in 1960 was framed by

the international community as a success story for the model of democracy after the decolonization process (Pringle, 2006). However, the fragility of the democracy was proven in 2012 when a military coup exposed the superficiality of Mali's democracy. A civil war rose and former colonizer France was brought into the country to restore the peace. MINUSMA's predecessor *Operation Serval* led by the France army, was born (Sabrow, 2017). Peace talks between insurgent parties, the Malian government and the UN Security Council led to the formal authorization of MINUSMA to lead the country towards a peaceful democracy and offer necessary protection against ongoing rebellion activity (UN Security Council, resolution 2100). The main objective of MINUSMA was to support Mali in the road towards security and social services for the whole country (Parliamentary Papers 29 521, nr. 213 p. 2).

The main incentive for Dutch participation in MINUSMA in 2013 stemmed from the bilateral relation between the Dutch and the Malian government in the form of humanitarian and financial support (Parliamentary Papers 29 521, nr. 213). The opening sentence of the article-100 letter: *Following the request of the UN, the coalition has decided to participate in MINUSMA* also indicates that participation is an answer to the demand of the UN. Noteworthy is that there was no set end date in the mission design and in the context of the conflict the Netherlands changed their motivation in the prolonging of Dutch support to MINUSMA in 2017 (Parliamentary Papers 2017). The motivation shifted from supporting humanitarian aid and securing Mali towards emphasizing the insecurity which the Malian conflict brings to Europe's borders (Parliamentary Papers 2017). The different forms of illegal traffic are framed to be a threat to the European security (van Willigen 2016, 705). The EU becomes an important stakeholder in this article-100 letter as well and migration is mentioned as a specific threat.

Dutch support to MINUSMA was portrayed as controversial in the Dutch media (Vermeulen, 2013). It was speculated that the government aspired a seat in the UN Security Council and ingratiate themselves in the international community. Another accusation was that the support was led by the motivation that the Netherlands had not delivered substantial commitment to a UN operation since Srebrenica which was rather overdue for Dutch reputation internationally (Vermeulen, 2013, Righton 2017). The ambiguity towards the operation strengthened when four Dutch soldiers fell victim to material failures during the operation as questions were raised if the Dutch military was prepared to be deployed in MINUSMA. The last aspect that rose questions among the public was the continuous prolonging of the operation since 2013 and kept on receiving financial support without delivering clear results (Righton, 2017; van der AA, 2018). Now that the end of the mission has been pronounced the discussion

heats up again. With the lack of a final evaluation the mission is often framed as useless and even worsening the situation in Mali (van der Aa, 2018; Sommers, 2018).

5.2.2. Mission design

Table 7 broadly portrays the construction of MINUSMA, providing important mission details as was decided during the mission design phase.

<i>Mission Name</i>	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
<i>Goal</i>	To guide Mali in the road to a functioning government that can provide security and other social services to its civilians nationwide.
<i>Objectives</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ The stabilization of important civilian hubs ➔ Recovery of the authority of the state ➔ Mediation in political dialogue and reconciliation ➔ Support in organizing democratic elections ➔ Protection of civilians ➔ Support of humanitarian aid
<i>Number of troops</i>	450 (2014) 375 (2017) 290 (2017) 250 (2018)
<i>Location</i>	Bamako and Gao
<i>Budget</i>	€ 87.67 million (2014) €90.85 million (2015) € 70 million (2017) €50 million (2018)
<i>Start date</i>	1 November 2013
<i>Initial end date</i>	End of 2015
<i>Actual end date</i>	Prolonged till 2018, planned end date mid 2019

Table 5: MINUSMA

The different stakeholders included in the article-100 letter are: the Malian government and army, the local population, the UN, the EU, neighbouring governments in the Sahel, the Dutch government and humanitarian agencies (Parliamentary Papers 29521. nr. 213). The mission design of MINUSMA hangs closely with the design of the broader international operation. There are no national caveats. In contrary with the lessons learned from Uruzgan, Kunduz and the guidelines no context analysis or baseline study was executed before the Dutch joined MINUSMA. Remarkably, there is no clear explanation from the Dutch government why it was decided to dismiss this aspect.

The goal of MINUSMA presented in table 5 aligns with the Integrated Approach aiming for Mali to be able to independently secure its peace through the development of governmental institutions. The dimensions of defence, diplomacy and development return in the objectives. In the prolonging of MINUSMA the mission shifts from guiding Mali in their road to peace to: *Securing international stability; focus on restoring stability in regions close to Europe; the North of Mali has become a breeding ground for terrorism; threat to instable situation in the South of Europe* (Parliamentary Papers 29 521 nr. 213, p. 2-3). Which will be included in the analysis that follows.

5.2.3. The Integrated Approach in MINUSMA

Similar to the analysis of ISAF II, specific aspects per dimension that indicate a certain extent of the Integrated Approach are present in MINUSMA as well.

Defence

Defence is the main dimension in which Dutch activity in MINUSMA is executed. The military was sent to Mali to offer protection and stabilization in Bamako and Gao, protecting the population and assisting the headquarters of MINUSMA by mapping the conflict and risk areas (Parliamentary Papers 29 512, nr. 213). Aside from these activities the dimension became integrated as there is also space for humanitarian and diplomatic tasks. Several aspects are defining in the defence dimension:

2. No national caveats and Rules of Engagement – *Integrated*

Even though the strategic framework of the UN had not yet been finalised when the Dutch operation received green light the article-100 letter states: *The mandate and the Rules of Engagement give the mission sufficient space to fulfil its tasks* (Parliamentary Papers 29 521, nr. 213, p. 15). This letter refers to earlier operations –i.e. ISAF II- from which lessons learned were to remain with the broader set mandate and avoid national caveats. This aligns with the Integrated Approach as a common understanding of the strategy enhances the level of coherence (Guidelines).

3. Win intelligence by speaking to the local population – *Partly integrated*

Another, more unconventional, aspect of the defence dimension is the gathering of necessary information through interacting and speaking with the local population. The article-100 letter defines this as civil/military cooperation (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 213). Through this cooperation military activity becomes more integrated. Gathering information at the local level,

rather than follow information streams from the strategic level, can be seen as a bottom-up approach of mapping the conflict. However, the progress report acknowledges that the presence of a military provokes a certain response and civil/military cooperation as a western concept makes communicating with the local population difficult leading to ambiguous outcomes (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 292 p. 29). This mission activity is integrated in its core but appears to be unfruitful at the empirical level.

4. Lack of clear mission structure and manner of command – *Integrated*

In alignment with the international strategy, the existing organizational structure and manner of command were adopted in the Dutch mission as well. However, it became clear that the Dutch troops had difficulties concerning the lack of a clear definition of the organizational structure (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 292p. 28). Working together with many countries led to different ideas on peacebuilding and the bureaucracy of the United Nations in MINUSMA appeared to be problematic for the Dutch. The Netherlands aimed to tackle this problem through rooting for higher positions in the mission command, which is strongly integrated as it combines defence and diplomacy.

5. Humanitarian aid support – *Only Integrated in design*

The last objective of the article-100 appears to be strongly integrated merging defence and development, namely offering humanitarian aid support. The letter mentions that Dutch militaries are allowed to be deployed to support humanitarian aid in offering NGOs protection whilst they execute their activities (Parliamentary Papers 29 521, nr. 213). From the progress report it becomes clear that, even though the possibility is there, *not any use has been made of this, as neutrality is at the core of humanitarian aid* (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 292, p. 18). Therefore, although this is a perfect example of an integrated objective, in reality the merging of defence and development remain difficult.

6. Duration - *Not integrated*

MINUSMA had no set ending date indicated in the article-100 letter which is in conflict with the lessons learned from previous Dutch operations (Guidelines). MINUSMA kept on being prolonged with a year until summer 2018 when the ending date was decided for mid-2019. The main reason for the decision to end Dutch participation was that MINUSMA weighted too heavy on the Dutch armed forces (Parliamentary Papers 29 521, nr. 368, p. 3). Neglecting the Integrated Approach there are no plans for a final evaluation as there is also no baseline or

context analysis made beforehand. This is problematic as results and lessons learned are an important component for future participation in the operation. Moreover, the current security situation in Mali is similar to the situation outlined in the first article-100 letter (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 368 and Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 213). The mission thus ended as a result of national shortcomings in the defence dimension.

Diplomacy

The dimension of diplomacy stretches between the Dutch part of MINUSMA and the wider UN mandated operation.

1. High level of commitment at a strategical level- *Integrated*

During the first year of the operation, militaries reported their problems with the manners of command. Resulting from this the Dutch government, more specifically the Ministry of Defence, send a number of staff officers to the MINUSMA headquarters in New York. From the progress report it becomes clear: *Partly because the Netherlands have not participated substantially in UN missions, the knowledge and experience with the specific procedure and the Dutch preparation was not optimal* (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 292 p. 32). The struggles with the strategy and manner of command in the field were tried to be addressed at a higher level of the operation which was successful to a certain extent. The Dutch received a pioneering role in the design and implementation of an intelligence chain within MINUSMA, due to successful diplomatic consultation (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 292, p. 32). The dimensions of defence and diplomacy reinforced each other, identifying and tackling problems from different levels which shows a high level of integration.

2. Campaigning for more involvement in the operation - *Partly Integrated*

The Dutch have been campaigning for more international involvement in MINUSMA and with success. Czech and Denmark decided to participate in Mali directly resulting from Dutch diplomacy (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 309, p. 14). Through their participation the size in number of the Dutch is significantly reduced. This helps in shifting from big numbers of militaries towards more diplomatic and developing aspects in close cooperation with Mali itself. Problematic is the absence of civilian perspectives and initiatives in the diplomatic realm. The focus is put on campaigning on an international level.

3. European interest - *Not integrated*

The last aspect of the diplomatic dimension is that of the European perspective, which appears to have gained importance in the prolonging of the operation. The prolonging article-100 letter changes the incentive of the Dutch MINUSMA from developing and securing Mali towards securing European borders. This aligns with the changing political climate in Europe and the Netherlands but not with the mandate of MINUSMA. The progress letter states: *The Netherlands asked to broaden the mandate of the mission in order to fight human traffic and irregular migration. These requests appeared to be unachievable* (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 292, p. 32). It is questionable if these changes in motivation still align with the Integrated Approach as it appears that incentivizing Europe's fear and problems could lead to diminishing the actual needs in Mali (Guidelines).

Development

The dimension of development in MINUSMA coheres strongly with the realms of defence and diplomacy.

1. NGOs are a stakeholder in MINUSMA - *Integrated only in mission design*

Before the Netherlands participated in MINUSMA there was already a bilateral development program with Mali focusing on financial support to humanitarian programs. This program was one of the motivations of the article-100 letter for the Netherlands to participate in MINUSMA to also support the peacebuilding process from another area. As already mentioned under *Defence*, the neutral character of NGOs does not allow the organisations to work together with the military. Another problem that holds cooperation back is fear that an NGO can become a target when accepting military support (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 292). Even though the objectives of the operation show inclusion of the NGO, there does not appear to be much activity in this field.

2. Emphasizing migration - *Not integrated*

The development aspect in MINUSMA shows the clearest in emphasizing the migration aspect in the prolonging of the operation. *The Dutch security efforts primarily focused on the instability surrounding Europe. The vast majority of irregular migrants from West Africa travels through the Sahel* (Parliamentary Papers 27 925, nr. 213, p. 3). Migration has become the incentive for the Netherlands to continue operating in Mali, whereas previous documents have no mention of this. In the first article-100 letter the word *migrants* is mentioned twice in

the general context analysis, in the prolonging letter *migration* is mentioned 25 times. As migration was no main objective of MINUSMA whereas it became highly important for the Netherlands, the withdrawal of the military also did not come as a surprise to this aspect.

3. Duration - *Not integrated*

The uncertainty concerning an ending date for MINUSMA is problematic when working towards a final goal as there is no clear exit strategy and thus no clarity on how the situation should be changed by then. Moreover, the main motivation for the Netherlands to participate in MINUSMA shifted for developing Mali towards securing Europe. This is problematic for result measurement and also shows a certain downgrade from the aim to develop a country and build peace here, which is the main indication of the guidelines, towards securing Europe's border by intervening outside of Europe.

The progress evaluation based on feedback from the operation summarizes: *The peacemaking process is too slow* and further on: *Mali cannot do without MINUSMA* (Parliamentary Papers 29521, nr. 292). However, it cannot be analysed what time path the Dutch part of MINUSMA has meant for the peace process which makes participation questionable in general even though the objectives described in under aspect 1 do ask for long term evaluation.

In Summary, The Integrated Approach in MINUSMA is best traced back in the diplomacy and development realm. The coherence within the wider international operation has been strongly influenced by Dutch diplomacy resulted from the problems faced in the defence dimension. In regard to the development realm the aim for development in Mali was mainly based on the fear for more migration towards Europe. However, within the mission activities local development disappeared to the background. The mission mainly focused on developing the mission itself, gathering intelligence services. The field of development and defence became integrated when the local population was included in the intelligence gathering. However, the military position outside of society remained a problem to really merge these fields.

6. Conclusions & discussion

6.1. Comparing the cases

General comparison

The Integrated Approach pursued in MINUSMA and ISAF II is the glue that holds the widespread objectives of both missions together. Whilst aligning both missions with the main indicators of the Approach, certain parallels and differences exist between the cases when it comes to the implementation. First an overarching comparison between the operations is presented, followed by the individual comparison of the three discussed dimensions in ISAF II and MINUSMA.

1. *The Integrated Approach aims to generate national ownership* (Guidelines, p. 7)

Concerning the main goals of both missions a difference in level of alignment with the Integrated Approach is visible. ISAF II aimed to successfully transit all mission activities to local authorities hence creating national ownership. MINUSMA, on the other hand, emphasized security and protection through mapping the conflict in order to achieve data on Mali's situation. Moreover, MINUSMA first claimed that a durable peace in Mali was the main goal of the operation but this became questionable in the course of the operation when the Dutch motivation changed towards emphasizing Europe's security. On this matter it can be concluded that ISAF II had a more obvious integrated goal, whereas MINUSMA lacked to provide clarity on this.

2. *Intervention is only effective when different parts of the whole are melted together and activities coherently executed* (Guidelines, p. 11)

In terms of mission coherence, the structure of MINUSMA shows more commitment to the Integrated Approach compared to ISAF II. The Dutch mission design of MINUSMA copied the mandate of the UN which resulted in a coherent understanding of the mission strategy. ISAF II included national caveats that resulted in limitations for the Dutch operation which prevented them to efficiently join the main mission strategy and activities.

From a field level in both operations militaries and police officers were struggling with the mission structure. However, in MINUSMA this inconvenience was communicated to the Dutch strategic level which allowed them to try and tackle this problem. In ISAF II it appeared to be problematic to address the confusion. It can be concluded that the coherence within

MINUSMA was less dense compared to ISAF II which made the communication flow more successful and thus more integrated.

Defence

Executive tasks of police officers and soldiers differ significantly. However, certain overlaps concerning the Integrated Approach are present. Both missions have included humanitarian and development aspects in their objectives which is new in the job descriptions of a soldier and a police officer. Considering the overlap between defence and development as a result of these objectives, ISAF II successfully integrated both fields in their activities. This appeared to be problematic in MINUSMA, which was lacking the ability to merge the development realm with military activities. However, the defence dimension in MINUSMA is stronger embedded in the wider international operation. Defence in ISAF II played more in the defined area of the national operation, whilst being strongly depending on the course of the international operation, more specifically Germany as the lead country.

At last, both missions are influenced by the need for short term results which has affected the continuation and results of both missions. This offers the biggest contradiction with the Integrated Approach for both operations and should be a matter of discussion in the mission design of future operations, if the Netherlands really aim to successfully implement the Integrated Approach.

Diplomacy

The level of influence the Dutch were able to execute on the international strategic level was much bigger in MINUSMA compared to ISAF II. Paradoxical, due to the independency police officers had at the local level –as a result of the national caveat- the Dutch troops were forced to strongly integrate with the local Afghan authority. Local level diplomatic engagement is absent in MINUSMA as this was not part of the Dutch set objectives.

Vertically, the Integrated Approach is most apparent in MINUSMA. This mission strives for coherence by tackling difficulties from the defence dimension through diplomacy on a higher strategic level. MINUSMA was also successful in encouraging other countries to participate in MINUSMA through the diplomatic path, relieving the Dutch defence dimension to a certain extent. Horizontally, ISAF II aligns more strongly with the approach. This mission has mobilised successfully a Civil/Military management team on a strategic level whilst simultaneously focused on the partnership between Dutch and Afghan police officers.

However, Germany had the deciding position on mission continuation and the Netherlands were excluded from this decision, which is not in line with the Integrated Approach.

In the dimension of Diplomacy, MINUSMA stands out sharply concerning as the operation focused on creating mission coherence. ISAF II, on the other hand lacked to have any influence in the broader operation.

Development

Both operations focus on objectives that strive for durable stability which can only be measured through long term results. However, both operations lack a long-term evaluation plan. The final evaluation of ISAF II claimed that the trained Afghans were able to continue the activities implemented by the mission themselves. However, it was also stated that the situation in Afghanistan was still very fragile. For MINUSMA there will not be a final evaluation because there is no baseline that can be used to normalise the measured results. Even though NGOs were included in MINUSMA, due to their neutral position in society they did not actively cooperate. ISAF II did not mention any cooperation with NGOs in their list of stakeholders.

In terms of different mission types the development dimension demonstrates best how the differences between militaries and police officers influence an Integrated Approach. The role of the soldier is changing but its perception still remains hostile amongst local populations. This is problematic when aiming for development activities. Police officers, on the other hand, take on a more equal position which allows them to cooperate with local authorities and thus takes on a more Integrated Approach. However, development activities with corrupt systems appear to be very difficult, which again leads to the problem of short-term results as a system does not change in a time-period of three years.

Before answering the research question a clear connection with the literature is detected from the comparison between ISAF II and MINUSMA. Chapter 2 argued that national police systems in non-western countries are often corrupt or undermined by violent institutions (Greener, 2017). Frerks and Terpstra highlight this in their research after the Afghan police system as well. They conclude that a changing perception of this system is only possible when the military situation is controlled by the government, which is in both Afghanistan and Mali not always the case (Frerks and Terpstra, 2010). From this research it became clear in both the dimensions of Defence and Development, how important the timeframe is to a country in conflict. When designing a peacebuilding operation and deciding between a policing or military operation this is extremely important to realise. However, as Frerks and Terpstra conclude their

research: ‘There is a general fact that change in perception, or a lesson in human rights, may not actually change behaviour and most certainly not transform a corrupt system.’ (Frerks and Terpstra, 2018, p. 28). This *general fact* should be included in the execution of an Integrated Approach. Both operations appeared to have missed this, seen their problematic time paths.

6.2. Conclusion

September 2015, two years after the ending of ISAF II, Kunduz had officially fallen into the hands of the Taliban. Since then, an ongoing outbreak of violence reigns the area. Deadly attacks are daily reality.¹¹ After five years of international intervention in Mali there exists no hopeful scenario for the installation of an effective democratic system. Additionally, MINUSMA has become the deadliest UN operation in UN peacebuilding history (Righton, 2017). In general, what can be concluded for both international operations is that they have (not yet) fulfilled their mandates.

Considering the Dutch participation in the operations, both missions aimed to implement an Integrated Approach. The main question of this research was how a different type of peacebuilding mission affects the implementation of the Integrated Approach. The findings of this comparative case analysis displayed in §6.1 provide a concise answer:

Both MINUSMA and ISAF II are designed in line with the Guidelines of the Integrated Approach reflecting interaction and overlap between the three dimensions. Analysis of the official documents on the operation reveal how within all dimensions the Integrated Approach can be traced back which suggests a fruitful implementation. Certain aspects –positive and negative- unfolded during the designing and implementation of the Integrated Approach. These aspects resulted –to a certain extent- from the type of the mission (policing versus military)

Both operations bring different challenges and benefits concerning the implementation of the Integrated Approach. The tension between a policing and a military mission is most visible in relation to the Security/Development nexus (Etzioni, 2007). Policing makes it possible to merge the fields of development and defence in the mission objectives, striving towards a transition of national ownership and authority. MINUSMA on the other hand, proves how the military is still struggling in entering the development domain which leads to an imbalance between the

¹¹ On May 7th 107 people were killed in an air strike, amongst which over 30 children, being the deadliest attack in Kunduz since 2015 executed by the Afghan air force (Jaeger, 2018). In August 2018 almost 190 people were taken hostage in the area (van Unen, 2018).

fields of defence and development. However, MINUSMA appears to be more successful in the merging of defence and diplomacy which leads to more strategic influence in the broader international operation.

Considering the main goals of both operations in summary, the policing mission aims for development through improving the security system whilst the military operation emphasizes security in the wider region through development in Mali.

This research should be received as a ground for further analysing the general Dutch strategy in peacebuilding operations. The research does not so much aim to state which mission type is better or does a better job in implementing the approach as it rather tries to offer an in-depth understanding of the way the Integrated Approach is characterized in both operations. Shortcomings to the research are the lack of empirical evidence that underpin the information found in the official government documents. Having empirical information on the implementation of the Integrated Approach is necessary to come with effective recommendations for future operations. Future research should also zoom in on the motivations of the Dutch government to participate in peacebuilding operations. Both ISAF II and MINUSMA did not end because there was a durable peace. This places questions by the commitment of the Dutch government to their peacebuilding activities.

The Integrated Approach is still a work-in-progress. Because both missions were part of a broader international operation instigating change is a tough challenge. However, the Integrated Approach is a good framework to propagate within the international community, if successfully implemented.

6.3. Discussion

Despite (or because of) all international commitment to build peace, the current situation in Mali and Afghanistan underline the importance of research after how to successfully execute a peacebuilding operation. How can we give meaning to this research whilst embedding it in the wider peacebuilding discourse? The outcomes of this analysis emphasize again how strong the motivations and design of a peacebuilding operation are influenced by the liberal agenda. Both operations are constructed with liberal motives in line with Colliers *Conflict Trap*, either battling terrorism (ISAF II) or emphasizing Europe's security (MINUSMA), arguing that building peace overseas is necessary to protect the international security (Collier, 2003).

However, the main goal of the Integrated Approach –generating national ownership– shares values with the upcoming hybrid peace discourse, as it aims to create more equality and balance of power in peacebuilding operations. Working towards the transition of authority aiming for a durable peace that the country of intervention is able to maintain themselves, acknowledges the national needs of the country of intervention, rather than liberal interest (Richmond, 2015).

The Dutch Integrated Approach aligns with the trend of aiming for coherence and in both missions coherence plays an important role on all peacebuilding levels. As de Coning and Friis warned for ‘too much coherence’ which can distract the mission from the main goal, this recurs in MINUSMA as the Dutch focused on improving the mission structure at a UN level to retrieve more clarity on the strategy of MINUSMA. This worked for the coherence within third parties but the local level and the goal of restoring a durable peace in Mali appear to have been lost out of sight. In ISAF II the limits of coherence appeared between the international and the Dutch mission.

As this analysis has shown, the Integrated Approach does not offer the ultimate effective peacebuilding template peacebuilders search for. It does prove that mission design should be handled with extreme care, leaning towards a hybrid peace as the aim is to create a durable peace that can survive without the need for international intervention. The cases of ISAF II and MINUSMA show how liberal driven decisions problematize conflicts rather than building peace. It is time to stop playing a pick and choose game choosing which design fits best in liberal interest as this will not lead to the recipe for success. The ingredients of the Integrated Approach offer a step in the right direction and the Dutch government should aim for improving its implementation.

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ANNEX I. Original quotes

3.2.

De 3D strategie is een uitdrukking van de gedachte van een multidisciplinaire en interministeriële aanpak, waarbij een regering op geïntegreerde wijze meerdere doelstellingen nastreeft en verschillende instrumenten op dusdanige wijze worden ingezet dat zij elkaar effect versterken. (Kamerstuk 27 925, nr. 31, p.25).

5.1.1.

Het aantal veiligheidsincidenten in het noorden als geheel bedraagt de laatste jaren ongeveer 4% van alle incidenten in Afghanistan. De stijging in het aantal incidenten is in 2010 gehalveerd. (Kamerstuk 27 925, nr. 415, p. 12).

‘Ik had het idee dat die brief zo opgesteld was: we willen nu eenmaal naar Kunduz en we gaan het op een dergelijk manier opschrijven dat de mogelijke bezwaren van de Kamer zo minimaal mogelijk zijn,’ (Westerterp 2015, p. 414).

5.1.2.

Vanaf het begin zal er aandacht moeten zijn voor het genereren van nationaal eigenaarschap en de overdracht van activiteiten aan lokale of internationale partners, zodat “acute stabilisatie” kan overgaan in duurzame stabiliteit (Leidraad 7).

5.1.3.

Gezien de veiligheidssituatie is het niet uitgesloten dat politie-eenheden en hun begeleiders met geweldgebruik worden geconfronteerd. De Nederlandse multidisciplinaire trainingsteams zullen geen zelfstandige executieve taken uitvoeren. Mocht de Afghaanse politie-eenheid waarbij Nederlandse begeleiders/trainers aanwezig zijn, van de Afghaanse autoriteiten de opdracht krijgen tot enigerlei offensieve militaire activiteiten, dan zullen de Nederlanders hieraan niet deelnemen.

De robuuste Rules of Engagement (ROE) voor ISAF waren vastgesteld door de NAVO. Nederland heeft voor de Nederlandse militairen voorbehouden (caveats) gemaakt bij de ROE.

De ervaring in Kunduz onderstreept dat landen terughoudend moeten zijn met het formuleren van nationale caveats. Deze leidden af van de kerntaken. (Eindevaluatie, p. 40).

De nadruk in de gehele missie lag op capaciteitsopbouw aan Afghaanse zijde en de uiteindelijke overdracht van verantwoordelijkheden van de internationale gemeenschap naar de Afghanen. Nu de missie is beëindigd, is het aan de Afghanen de samenwerking tussen de schakels in de justitiële keten voort te zetten (Eindevaluatie 41).

‘Als er visionair leiderschap was geweest hadden we meer kunnen bereiken (...) Dat vond ik een grote deceptie. Iemand die een beetje Afghanistan kent gaat hard lachen bij deze missie. Dit is een Mickey Mouse missie,’ (Westerterp, 2015, p. 418).

‘Samen uit, Samen thuis’ (Ivo Opstelten, minister van Veiligheid en Justitie tijdens zijn bezoek aan Kunduz in januari 2013).

De nadruk in de gehele missie lag op capaciteitsopbouw aan Afghaanse zijde en de uiteindelijke overdracht van verantwoordelijkheden van de internationale gemeenschap naar de Afghanen. Nu de missie is beëindigd, is het aan de Afghanen de samenwerking tussen de schakels in de justitiële keten voort te zetten (Eindevaluatie 41).

5.2.1

Het kabinet heeft naar aanleiding van een verzoek van de VN besloten een bijdrage te leveren aan MINUSMA (Kamerstuk 29 521, nr. 213 p. 1).

5.2.2.

De problematiek in Mali kent een sterke regionale dimensie. Het internationale terrorisme en de criminele netwerken gaan landsgrenzen ver te buiten. De combinatie van het ontbreken van effectief en legitiem staatsgezag, grensoverschrijdende criminaliteit en terrorisme dreigt niet alleen in Mali, maar ook de toch al fragiele regio aan de zuidgrens van Europa verder te destabiliseren (Kamerstuk 29 521, nr. 213, p. 2-3).

5.2.3.

Het mandaat en de Rules of Engagement (ROE) geven de missie voldoende armslag om haar taken te kunnen uitvoeren (Kamerstuk 29 521, nr. 213, p. 15).

Hier wordt in de praktijk weinig gebruik van gemaakt vanwege het beginsel van humanitaire neutraliteit waaraan veel van deze organisaties zich gebonden achten. (Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 292, p. 8).

Mede omdat Nederland een langere periode niet op substantiële wijze in VN-missies had geopereerd was de kennis van en ervaring met de specifieke aard en werkwijzen van de VN-missies bij de voorbereiding van de Nederlandse deelname aan MINUSMA niet optimaal (Tussentijdse Evaluatie, 2015, p. 32).

Evenals voorgaande jaren heeft Nederland verzocht het mandaat op dit punt ambitieuzer te maken, maar dit bleek niet haalbaar (Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 292, p. 12).

Het internationale terrorisme en de criminele netwerken gaan landsgrenzen ver te buiten. De combinatie van het ontbreken van effectief en legitiem staatsgezag, grensoverschrijdende criminaliteit en terrorisme dreigt niet alleen in Mali, maar ook de toch al fragiele regio aan de zuidgrens van Europa verder te destabiliseren (Kamerstuk 29 521, nr. 213, p. 2-3).

Samenvattend verloopt de voortgang in het vredesproces te traag (Kamerstuk 29 521, nr. 349, p. 5).

Mali kan vooralsnog niet zonder MINUSMA (Kamerstuk 29 521, nr. 346, 1).

Vanaf het begin zal er aandacht moeten zijn voor het genereren van nationaal eigenaarschap en de overdracht van activiteiten aan lokale of internationale partners, zodat “acute stabilisatie” kan overgaan in duurzame stabiliteit (Leidraad 7).

Echter, zowel nationaal als internationaal is men het erover eens dat een inzet pas effectief is wanneer de delen van het geheel zijn afgestemd en deze in samenhang worden voorbereiden en uitgevoerd. (Leidraad, p. 11).