

# Press coverage of lone-actor terrorism

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Table of contents	
1. Introduction	3
2. Theory	7
2.1 Lone-actor terrorism	
2.2 Amplification of terrorist's and state's messages	
2.3 Framing of lone-actors	
2.4 Press coverage and shaping the reaction of three audiences	
3. Methodology	14
3.1 Research design	
3.2 Data collection	
3.3 Methods	
3.4 Validity, reliability and limitations	
4. Results	20
4.1 Reporting trends of lone-actor terrorism	
4.2 Amplification of terrorist's and state's messages	
4.3 Framing of lone-actors	
5. Case comparison	30
5.1 Trends of lone-actor terrorism	
5.2 Amplification of terrorist's and state's messages	
5.3 Framing of lone-actors	
6. Discussion	38
7. Conclusion	43
Annex 1.	51
Annex 2.	64
Annex 3.	65
Annex 4.	67

## 1. Introduction

Mohammed Emwazi, also known as Jihadi John, was a British Arab seen in several videos produced by the Islamic extremist group Isis showing the beheadings of a number of captives in 2014 and 2015<sup>1</sup>. Emwazi took on a celebrity status for some Isis followers. Abu Ayman, a former Isis fighter, added: “Some love him. Some joined Isis after watching and admiring him; they take him as an example”. Col Steve Warren, a spokesman for the US-led military coalition fighting Isis, said: “He was somewhat of an Isis celebrity, somewhat the face of the organisation... he was a prime recruitment tool for the organisation”<sup>2</sup>. By glamourizing its fighters, ISIS has taken the lead in producing videos to incite a global Arab audience (Prucha, 2016: 49-50). Isis promotes their agenda to act as a lone-actor terrorist<sup>3</sup>. By performing such attack, you will be glamorised because every attack is jihadistly glorified by Isis.

Lone-actor terrorism is the new main treat to the Western society (Hamm and Spaaij, 2017: 1-12). The new features of lone-actor terrorism include the potential inspiration for copycat attackers, which is caused by the glamorisation of perpetrators. Horaro (2017: 12) claims that sensationalised anti-hero “celebrity” reporting of the perpetrators may increase their appeal to others. Parker, Pearce, Lindekilde and Rogers (2018: 2-3) also recognize that media coverage leads to the potential glamorisation of the attackers. Media can act as a mouthpiece for terrorists. They acknowledge that media reporting of lone-actor terrorism has the potential to be particular problematic, because of the unique features of this form of terrorism and the range of audiences that could be influenced.

The three audiences that could be influenced by media reporting on lone-actor terrorism are the general public, affected communities and potential copycat attackers (Parker et al. 2018: 3). These audiences can be influenced by means of the amplification of state’s and/or perpetrator’s message and the framing of the perpetrator.

The press can report on lone-actor attacks and thereby can play a role in the amplification of terrorist’s or state’s messages (Parker et al., 2018: 2-3). Amplification can be achieved if the message is represented by the media. All reports about terrorism have the potential to promote terrorist agenda. Amplification may influence copycats and/or public

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<sup>1</sup> The Guardian. “Who is Mohammed Emwazi? From shy, football-loving boy to Isis killer”. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/02/who-is-mohammed-emwazi-from-lovely-boy-to-islamic-state-executioner> (visited on February 5<sup>th</sup> 2019).

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, 2015. “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Col. Warren via DVIDS from Baghdad, Iraq”, November 13 <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/628932/> (visited on February 5<sup>th</sup> 2019).

<sup>3</sup> De Telegraaf, 2012. “Regelrechte godsdienstoorlog; Jihadisten jagen op christenen in Azië en Afrika”, September 1 (visited on April 6 2019).

anxiety. According to Feldman (2013: 271) many lone-actors are self-activating, meaning that triggers for action are more individual and potential more rapid than in a coordinated attack. The glamorisation by the media of the attackers may inspire copycats, because it can potentially contribute to the decision to commit a terrorist attack (and what to target) by indirectly providing inspiration. Besides, by sensationalising these acts the media can further enhance anxiety in the public.

The third audience that can be influenced is the affected community (Parker et al. 2018: 3). The media can frame the lone-actor in their own terms by the selection what information to broadcast, while minimizing other and thereby it can affect the community of which perpetrators emerge (Thompson, 2014: 507-509). The communities from which the perpetrators emerge can be homogenised and stigmatised by media framing of the lone-actors (Horaro, 2017: 15-16). Because reporting on lone-actor terrorism has these effects, we can justifiably ask two research questions:

*How does the Dutch press cover lone-actor terrorism in the period between January 1<sup>st</sup> 2009 until February 28<sup>th</sup> 2015, with respect to the amplification of state's and/or perpetrator's message and the framing of the perpetrator?*

*What does it imply giving the media its potential role in shaping the reactions of the public, affected communities and the copycat attackers?*

In order to examine press coverage in the Netherlands about lone-actor terrorism, Dutch newspaper between January 2009 and February 2015 will be examined about the subject. This thesis analyses the newspapers to examine the trend in the Netherlands across a five-year period, understand the extent to which the media amplifies either terrorist's or state's messages and explore how the media frame lone-actors. The media can amplify the perpetrator's message, but also the state's message. To gain insight on the media amplification of the perpetrator's message, an analysis of all the newspaper articles will be executed on the frequency of articles that the media amplifies the terrorist's message. Similarly the state amplification will be examined, and thereafter a distinction will be made between how many of the state counterterrorism capabilities focus on counterterrorism strengths and how many on the weaknesses. To explore how the media frame lone-actors the newspaper articles are being examined how many Dutch newspaper articles provided a frame, and then in which context of terrorism they were framed.

The article of Parker, Pearce, Lindekilde and Rogers (2018) instructs the approach in this thesis, as they researched press coverage of lone-actor terrorism in the United Kingdom

and Denmark. The findings will be compared between the three countries in order to make up a cross case conclusion.

### Social relevance

By covering the news, the media can influence the people. According to Norris, Kern and Just (2003) the media can play an important role in shaping how people understand issues. Lone-actor terrorism means a new form of terrorism and a range of audiences that could be influenced by this form (Parker et al. 2018: 2-3). The new form of terrorism focus on a range of issues, including media coverage of terrorism. A new feature of this kind of terrorism can be the possible inspiration for copycats. Media can contribute to, or influence copycat behaviour by amplifying the message of the attacker. Bakker and de Graaf (2011: 4) warn that lone wolves deliberately inspire copycat behaviour and become role models for other alienated youngsters. Moreover, the media can by amplifying the message of the attacker influence the general public (Slone and Shoshani, 2006). By displaying the message of the attacker, it risks overemphasising these acts a further influence anxiety.

In addition media framing of the perpetrator can contribute to stigmatize the affected communities (Horaro, 2017: 15-16). The community, from which the perpetrator emerges, can be put in a negative light as a whole, while the perpetrator is only 1 person who is part of the community. This thesis is relevant, because the features of lone-actor terrorism, including the challenges of interdiction and the potential for copycat attacks mean that the media is likely to play a particularly role in shaping the reactions of the general public, affected communities and copycat attackers.

### Academic relevance

Spaaij (2010: 855) notes that “there exist a major discrepancy between the recent political, judicial and media attention for lone wolf terrorism on the one hand, and scientific investigation of this phenomenon on the other. Research into lone wolf terrorism remains extremely scarce”. The scarcity of research has a reason, and the reason for this is because terrorism often purely is viewed through a group-lens (Gill, 2015: 15). Terrorism historically has been an organized crime, consequently researchers have focused on group dynamics to explain individual pathways to terrorism (Hamm and Spaaij, 2017:14).

However, since 2010 more books and articles in journals on lone-actor terrorism have appeared because lone-actor attacks increased (Gill, 2015: 15). Researchers focus around a

number of factors including motivation, antecedent event behaviour, offence-commission, psychology, behaviour that helps underpin the lone-actor's radicalization and other aspects like plots and attacks conducted by lone-actors. Different studies offer a guideline for future research, they also vary in definitions of lone-actor terrorism and vary on units of measurement, making a comparison between the studies problematic. Yet, these obstacles do not preclude the identification of several commonalities in their findings on the lone-actors.

Hamm and Spaaij (2017: 26) also note that terrorism studies typically overlook the influence of media. Media influence can contribute to modus operandi by providing the lone wolf with a source of information for attack planning, ideology and terrorist tactics. This thesis is relevant because little research exist about lone-actor terrorism and the media. It sheds light on the impacts on lone-actor terrorism and contributes to the wider literature on media reporting about lone-actor terrorism. In this thesis the study of Parker et al. (2018) fundamental. This thesis is also relevant because it adds another case study to the study of Parker et al. (2018) which makes the research in total larger, and more conclusions can be drawn from the results.

The aim of this thesis is to shed a light on the specific impact of lone-actor terrorism in the Netherlands and contribute to the wider literature on media reporting of terrorism. In chapter 2 follows a conceptualization of lone-actor terrorism and theory on the media its role in amplification of terrorist's or state's messages, framing the perpetrators and shaping the reaction of three audiences. In the methodology chapter, the research design and operationalization will be explained that we need for the empirical data collection and analysis. After that follows chapter 4 in which the results will be presented. In this chapter an individual case report will be written about the press coverage of lone-actor terrorism in the Netherlands. Thereafter a cross case conclusion will be drawn up about the three cases in chapter 5, in which the cases will be compared. In chapter 6 the results will be discussed in order to give insight on media reports on lone-actor terrorism, which relates to one of the three audiences identified. Lastly, chapter 7 is a conclusion.

## 2. Theory

### 2.1 Conceptualization of lone-actor terrorism

In the aftermath of 9/11, the attacks on the twin towers committed by Al-Qaeda were considered the greatest threat by groups to the Western security (Bush, 2002). At the time, this perception shaped the security policies of Western countries, culminating in the coalitions' global war on terror. Presently, the post-9/11 threat landscape has shifted to the "after, after-9/11" world, which is the age of lone wolf terrorism (Hamm and Spaaij, 2017:1-12). It can be traced back to August 15<sup>th</sup> 2011, when President Barack Obama told to CNN that a lone wolf terrorist strike in the United States is more likely to happen than an attack like 9/11<sup>4</sup>. Obama stated that "the risk that we're especially concerned over right now is the lone wolf terrorist, somebody with a single weapon being able to carry out wide-scale massacres of the sort that we saw in Norway recently". Subsequently lone-actor terrorism attacks the West, such as for instance in the cities of London, Nice, Berlin, Stockholm, Manchester, Ottawa and Charleston have further enlarged the impression of a transformed security landscape now. This means a new range of issues, and unique new features of terrorism.

Originally, the term lone wolf terrorism was in reference to actors that pertained a far-right background in the United States (Parker et al., 2018: 2). However, since the mid-1990s the term has been used accompanied by different range of terrorist ideologies. Especially now with the rise of Islamic State and thereby increased concerns about the extreme far-right in Western countries. Parker et al. (2018: 2) apply the definition of Burton and Stewart<sup>5</sup> defining lone-actors as unaffiliated individuals who "acts on his or her own without orders from – or even connections to – an organization". They are stressing the absence of connections with a broader network or organization, and thereby they neglect the ideological connections individuals might have with other networks or organizations. That is why the definition of Bakker and de Roy van Zuijdewijn (2015: 9) "the threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting out of purely personal material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct support in the planning, preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others)" will be applied for this thesis.

Bakker and de Graaf (2011: 46) name numerous possible features of lone-actor

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<sup>4</sup> CNN, 2011. "B. Obama: 'Biggest Terror Fear Is the Lone Wolf'", August 16, <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/16/obama-biggest-terror-fear-is-the-lone-wolf/> (visited on January 3 2019).

<sup>5</sup> Burton, F. and S. Stewart, 2008. "The 'Lone Wolf' Disconnect", January 30, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/lone-wolf-disconnect> (visited on December 21 2018).

terrorists, which make their acts difficult to prevent. Firstly, they are idiosyncratic and their history “hardly gives away anything in the sense of patterns or recurring methods”. Secondly, it is difficult to distinguish lone-actors with a violent intent from those with radical beliefs. Thirdly, lone-actors inspire copycats. The fourth supposed feature is that some lone-actors, such as Breivik and McVeigh caused a lot of fatalities. Lastly, and maybe the biggest factor that makes them a problem is that they act alone, which makes the usual tools of tracing communications and contacts therefore not applicable.

According to Melloy and Pollard (2017: 1-3) recent cases have shown that despite the presence of targeted violence that has been researched and planned, there appears to be an element of impulsivity and emotion toward the end of the pathway to violence. In first instance we appear to be seeing terrorist intent, planning, and preparation, meant to be organized and controlled. And thereafter devolving into an emotionally-laden act of violence with an ideological touch which has been triggered by a preceding event(s), usually a loss and a humiliation. It leads to a time/action imperative wherein the person believes he must act immediately, disregarding the fact that his planned operation may only be partially fulfilled or carried out in a disorganized manner. This implies that the attacker is impulsive, which makes him/her easily influenced by, for example, other terrorist’s messages.

## 2.2 Press coverage and shaping the reaction of three audiences

It is difficult to establish causality of media influence on others by covering lone-actor terrorism (Parker et al., 2018: 2). However, it is generally accepted that the media play a significant role in shaping how people understand issues (Norris, Kern and Just, 2003). As stated earlier, media reporting of lone-actor terrorism in this era has the potential to be particularly problematic because of the unique features of this form of terrorism and the range of audiences that could be influenced (Parker et al., 2018: 3). Three audiences are key when trying to understand the impact of media reporting around lone-actor terrorism. These are general public, affected communities and copycat attackers.

General public is one of the audiences that may be affected by the media reporting (Parker et al., 2018: 3). It is a result of the press using the lone wolf terminology. By using this term, it risks sensationalising these acts and further enhances anxiety in the general public. The press can by covering lone-actor terrorism amplify the message of the perpetrator. The amplification of the message of the perpetrator can influence the general public.

The second audience is the affected communities (Parker et al., 2018: 2-3). This is the



community from which the perpetrator emerged. By looking into the background of the perpetrator, the media has the potential to stigmatise people or homogenise and securitise communities (Horaro, 2017: 15). Terrorism often leads to societal bias towards all members of the affected communities affiliated with the perpetrator (Steele et al., 2017: 2). Besides Islamist lone-actors are often framed as distinct from far-right lone-actors. Islamist lone-actors are often framed as terrorist, while far-right lone-actors are more likely to be framed as mentally ill.

The last audience is the one of the potential copycats (Parker et al., 2018: 3). Copycats may be inspired by media amplification of terrorist's or state's messages. The media reporting can contribute to commit a terrorist attack and what to target by indirectly providing inspiration by glamorising the message of a perpetrator. They may also be inspired by state's messaging about terrorism, because content that amplifies counterterrorism strength could introduce doubt in the mind and can deter the attacker. But other way around, information about the challenges of interdiction could aid attack planning of the attacker by providing them with information about possible techniques or targets.

The general public, affected communities and copycat attackers are the three audiences that can be affected by the media reporting on lone-actor terrorism. In the next part will be discussed how the media can shape the reactions of the three audiences.

### 2.3 Amplification of terrorist's and state's messages

The press can report on lone-actor attacks and thereby can play a role in the amplification of terrorist's or state's messages (Parker et al., 2018: 2-3). Amplification can be achieved if the message is represented by the media. The media amplification entails that the message of for example the perpetrator is described in the newspaper article, and by describing his/her message it can promote his/her agenda. All reports about terrorism have the potential to promote terrorist agenda. All the reports, in the same way, describing for example state counterterrorism strengths have the potential to promote state agendas.

There are two types of media amplification, which are the amplification of state's messages or the amplification of terrorist's messages (Parker et al., 2018: 2-3). The first type that we discuss is amplifying the fame and the message of the terrorist. According to Borum, Fein and Vossekuil (2012: 390) a small number of studies specifically warn against using the term "lone wolf" because "it carries the potential to glorify or to imbue an image of power to attackers who are otherwise powerless and often ineffectual". Continuing on this, Jenkins

(2011: 21-22) similarly argues that it is a “romanticizing term that suggests a cunning and deadly predator”. Schuurman et al. (2017) agree with these views as they argue that the terminology and its increased use are problematic for several reasons, including potential glamorisation of attackers and inaccuracies about attacker’s independence.

As many policy makers have stopped using the term lone wolf, using the term remains common in media reporting about terrorism (Parker et al., 2018: 2). Applying the term is a consequence of the increase of lone-actor attacks in the West. Some lone attackers (like Breivik) have intentionally sought media attention (Hamm and Spaaij, 2017: 153-154). Also, terrorist groups (e.g. Isis) have used sophisticated propaganda to promote and glorify lone-actor attacks (Hamm and Spaaij, 2017: 3-4). According to Horaro (2017: 12-13) fixating on perpetrators, showing their name and image combined with sensationalised stories about the attack, risk creating anti-hero celebrity narratives. The risk of creating fame of the perpetrator must be avoided. For the reason that sensationalised anti-hero celebrity reporting of perpetrators may increase the appeal to other people.

The Hamm and Spaaij (2017: 45-48) study showed that there is evidence of a copycat phenomenon in one third of the cases. Potential copycats read about other lone-actor perpetrators, become inspired by their attack, and carry out and refer to the previous attack. According to Parker (et al. 2018: 3) “this is especially concerning if reporting inadvertently glamorises the attacker or amplifies his/her grievance or message”. Media reporting on lone-actor terrorism could thus potentially contribute to the decision to commit a terrorist attack (and what to target) by indirectly providing inspiration.

In addition, when the press uses lone wolf terminology and thereby risks sensationalising these acts it can also further enhancing anxiety in the public (Slone and Shoshani, 2006: 535-542). Slone and Shoshani (2006: 540) examined effects of television broadcasts of terrorism on viewer’s anxiety and concluded “that media exposure to events that are associated with relevant personal threat during a period of terrorism produces anxiety reactions”. The aim of terrorism is to instil fear within a wide target audience (Hoffman, 2006: 40-41). Lone-actor terrorism is more concerning for the public, because of the low sophistication and seemingly random nature of many home-grown attacks, compared to external attacks by foreign groups. The home-grown aspect can be alarming because of the 51 Islamist attacks that took place in Europe and North America between June 2014 and June 2017, 73% were committed by citizens of the country in which the attack took place (Vidino, Marone and Entenmann, 2017: 17).

The second type of media amplification is amplification of state’s messages. Parker et

al. (2018: 2-3) identify state's messages as messages from state officials, security officers and intelligence services. According to them media amplification of state's messaging about terrorism may contribute to prevention, but also inspire copycats. It is a consequence of the fact that, as discussed earlier, lone-actors are impulsive and emotionally driven (Melloy and Pollard, 2017: 3). Feldman (2013: 271) explains that many lone-actors are "self-activating" which means that the trigger for action is more individual and potentially rapid than in a coordinated attack. Study of Perry, Hasisi and Perry (2017: 909) showed that lone-actors respond to specific political or security-related events, because lone-actors often act due to a feeling of deprivation of things they believe they are entitled to. This implies that the immediate aftermath of specific political or security related events are more vulnerable to lone-actor attacks carried out by copycats, and efforts should be made to prevent event triggered motivation.

Prevention can be achieved amplifying counterterrorism strength (e.g. reassuring the public). Content containing these strengths could introduce doubt into the mind of an attacker. The media can send a message to the potential copycat in which they are likely to fail, which thus can introduce doubt in the mind of an attacker.

On the other hand, amplification of state's messaging can provide inspiration (Parker et al. 2018: 4). Attack planning could be aided by information designs to increase public vigilance or explain challenges of interdiction. This information can provide attackers with information about attack techniques or possible targets. Horaro (2017: 15) acknowledges the same saying that the ability of security agencies to do their jobs is hampered by irresponsible media reporting during active operations (such as revealing operational details during ongoing investigations). Media reporting potentially helps to make our enemies look more capable and competent than they really are. Horaro suggests for the media to "be respectful and responsible during active operations but governments must be held to account for their rhetoric and actions, especially when democratic freedoms and protections are under threat or when lives have been lost".

In short, the media amplification of terrorist's messages may inspire potential copycats, but also can enhance anxiety in the public. In addition, the media amplification of state's messages may inspire copycats by revealing state weaknesses or deter copycats by revealing state strengths.

### 2.3 Framing of lone-actors

According to Chong and Druckman (2007: 104-106) the major premise of framing is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and can have implications for multiple values or considerations. Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue. It is any attempt to highlight or emphasize certain parts of a message, while minimizing others and with the underlying assumption that the framing of a message can meaningfully influence audiences (Thompson, 2014: 507-509). Corresponding Entmans' (1993: 52) definition of framing includes the selection of some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.

Classic illustrations of framing research often point toward the media as an example of a framing actor (Thompson, 2014: 507-509). Through the selection of what information to broadcast, what information to highlight or omit, and what information to elaborate on, the news media frame the public knowledge and discourse.

The framing of a perpetrator is also important in terrorism studies. Over the space of 40 years of research on terrorist motivation, the literature has jumped from one extreme position stating that terrorists are all mentally ill, to the exact opposite that a terrorist cannot be mentally ill (Corner and Gill, 2015: 23). The media can report on the background of lone-actors. The media can focus on the mental health of perpetrators, and frame them as mentally ill. However focussing on mental health has the potential to stigmatise people who are mentally ill and exaggerate the prevalence and role of mental illness as a driver for terrorism (Corner and Gill, 2017: 3).

Thus the media can frame the lone-actor in combination with their ideology, religion or political motivation and thereby it can affect the community of which perpetrators emerge. If we look at the increase of Islamist attacks, Muslim communities may be at risk from media reports that portray Islam in terms of difference, risk and violence and terrorism (Ahmed and Matthes, 2017: 221-222). Findings of Steele et al. (2017: 2) suggest that terrorism often leads to societal bias towards all members of religious or ethnic groups affiliated with the perpetrator. As Horaro (2017:15-16) points out that media reporting on terrorism issues has a tendency to homogenise and securitise Muslim communities living in the West (and beyond). The media reports and homogenise Muslim communities as one, which are in fact complex and diverse (often with far less in common than shared). Moreover, the securitisation of these communities, for example the tendency to perceive every issue in Muslim communities

through a security lens of counterterrorism or counter violent extremism, fuels perceptions of crisis both within Muslim communities and about them too. Framing lone-actor attackers therefore affect affected communities, which are the communities from which the perpetrator emerges.

## 2.5 Wrap up in relation to research question

This thesis looks into how the media plays a role in the Netherlands in amplifying state's messages and/ or terrorist's messages with respect to the lone-actor terrorist attacks of the period between January 2009 and February 2015. Besides this research focusses on how the Dutch media reports on lone-actor terrorist attacks and how the attackers are framed.

Newspaper articles are used to analyse the media coverage. This study follows the approach by Parker et al. (2018). This allows for comparison of the Dutch findings and the findings of Denmark and the United Kingdom. By doing so, we can find out the role the media plays in amplifying state's messages and/ or terrorist's message and to relate these findings to implications for the three audiences (identified in 2.2).

### 3. Methodology

#### 3.1 Research design

For this thesis the chosen research strategy is a case study (Yin, 2009: 8-14). The case study is suitable because the main question posed is a 'how' question and case studies are able to answer a 'how' research question. Besides, it does not require control of behavioural events as in experiments. Another reason is that the focus is on contemporary events, namely lone-actor terrorism. The unit of analysis in this thesis are newspaper articles (Yin, 2009: 29-33).

Multiple newspapers are selected and the cases are non-random selected based on their ability to answer the research question. Non-random selection enables researchers to choose the most appropriate cases to answer the research question (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 295-296).

Which cases are selected, will be explained in the next part.

#### 3.2 Data collection

Data is collected from Dutch national newspapers covering lone-actor terrorism between January 1<sup>st</sup> 2009 and February 28<sup>th</sup> 2015. This period is chosen, because it is the same period as the conducted analysis of the United Kingdom and Denmark. Choosing the same period makes it able to compare this study to the study of Parker, Pearce, Lindekilde and Rogers (2018) (Gerring, 2004: 347). In order to compare this study to the study of Parker et al. (2018), the applied data collection and methods will correspond as much as possible, however we will be critical and will not implement the aspects that would not fit our study.

The chosen documents selected for analysis are national daily newspapers as they are the most widely read print media, and they set the tone for public debate and shape the selection of stories for television news coverage and regional and local newspapers coverage (Greenslade, 2005; Lewis, 2005: 20-26). The United Kingdom and Denmark both used tabloids and broadsheet newspapers. However, for this examination we only use newspapers. This difference is negligible because previous research in Denmark and the United Kingdom shows that there is no significant statistical difference in lone-actor framing between the two types of newspapers in the both countries (Parker et al. 2018: 6). Besides no tabloids exist in the Netherlands.

Parker et al. (2018) selected Denmark and the United Kingdom, because framing can differ considerably across Western contexts, and to identify these different trends in framing across the countries (Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira, 2008). The UK and Denmark both have a history of terrorism and have a sizeable minority population (Parker et al. 2018: 4).

Some aspects/features are similar cross-nationally, but others differ. The United Kingdom dealt with multiple terrorist attacks over the years executed by groups or lone-actors. Examples are those carried out by the IRA, the Lockerbie bombing, and the attacks in London (2005 and 2017) and Manchester (2017). Denmark had fewer incidents historically, which differs from the United Kingdom. However, Denmark has been on high alert since the 2005 Danish cartoon crisis and experienced two shooting incidents in Copenhagen in 2015. Corresponding is that immigration is an important policy issue in the UK and Denmark in de recent years, but the countries have different experiences in terms of scale and integration. Muslims make up a sizeable percentage of the population in both countries, namely: 6.3% in the UK and 5.3% in Denmark (Hackett et al. 2017: 8). Thus, the UK experienced more terrorist attacks than Denmark, but they both have a comparable minority population.

In this thesis, we focus on the Netherlands and compare it to the results of Denmark and the United Kingdom. The Netherlands is chosen, because it also has a minority population and a history of terrorism, but it differs because it is much smaller comparing to the United Kingdom (NCTV, 2018: 3-6). Since 2000 the Netherlands dealt with the murder of Theo van Gogh (2004), an attack with molotov cocktails on a mosque full of visitors in the city of Enschede (2016) and the stabbing incident at Amsterdam central station (2018). Like Denmark, the Netherlands is on high alert. The high alert can be emphasized by the terrorist attack on Zaventem, which was potential initially intended on the Dutch airport Schiphol<sup>6</sup>. And also by the statement of the stabbing perpetrator in Amsterdam in which he declared that he is intending to plan worse things, if the Dutch government does not intervene against Geert Wilders<sup>7</sup>. Besides, the Netherlands matches the UK and Denmark having minority populations. Muslims make up 7.1% percentage of the population in the Netherlands (Hackett et al. 2017: 8). Considering the similarities and differences between the Netherlands, UK and Denmark, all three countries make interesting cases for comparing media reporting of lone-actor terrorism.

Selected are the publications with the highest circulation figures as the public is most likely to have been exposed to this content, and in order to execute the same research as Parker et al. (2018). The data set is drawn from the top five national newspapers in the Netherlands: NRC (Handelsblad), Trouw, de Volkskrant, AD and de Telegraaf. Articles are

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<sup>6</sup> DH.BE, 2016. "Zaventem et Maelbeek ne devaient pas être touchés par les attentats!", April 24 <https://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/zaventem-et-maelbeek-ne-devaient-pas-etre-touche-par-les-attentats-57bda34535709a310566973c#.V72ttgX2Gxd.twitter> (visited on February 5 2019).

<sup>7</sup> Nu.nl, 2019. "Aanslagpleger Amsterdam Centraal: 'Ben van plan ergere dingen te doen'", February 22 <https://www.nu.nl/binnenland/5752959/aanslagpleger-amsterdam-centraal-ben-van-plan-ergere-dingen-te-doen.html> (visited on February 22 2019).

sourced using the expert search function NexisUni and the following search terms are selected: [“lone wolf” OR “eenzame wolf” OR “eenling”] AND [“terror\*” OR “extremisme” OR “radicaal\*” OR “aanslag”].

The search string was developed by applying the most common terms identified in the academic literature and then including additional search terms identified in the initial pilot search. The most common term is “lone wolf” and provides, at first, multiple newspaper articles in the period. The following search “eenzame wolf\*” also provides plenty of newspaper articles, based on scanning these articles. Lastly, “eenling” provides sufficient newspaper articles of the selected national newspapers. “Alleen werkende” and “lone-actor” were used in the preliminary searches but were rejected because the terms were hardly used in media reporting during the period under focus. “Eenman” was also used in in the preliminary searches, but rejected because the term was not named in relevant newspaper articles. Also rejected because of few or no hits are: “eenzame terrorist” (only 2 hits), “solo terrorist” (only 2 hits), “solo actor” (no hits). The second search group, having sufficient newspaper articles are the searches: “terror\*”, “extremisme”, “radicaal\*” and “aanslag”. NexisUni is chosen because it has a leading position among online databases for academics in North America and Europe, and is one of the most widely used news archives by social scientist (Tamul and Martínez- Carillo, 2018: 97-98).

To be in line with Parker et al. (2018), articles that on closer inspection do not pertain to lone-actor terrorism are excluded from the analysis. Articles under 200 words are excluded as the study analyses the framing of lone-actors, rather than simply the number of mentions or articles. Longer articles provide space for this framing to be developed and are suitable for analysis. Weekend and regional editions are excluded because newsworthy stories, such as terrorism are covered in the national press. Coverage of the same events in regional editions is likely to mirror the national press, whilst weekend editions often repeat stories and analysis. This process produced a data set of 98 Dutch newspaper articles.

The articles are analysed through mixed-methods content analysis. The technique makes it possible to code the text systematically using pre-established categories and allows different coders to examine the same texts with the same categories (Silverman, 2001). A coding frame enables a systematic coding of the articles using pre-established categories to identify their focus, content and framings. A coding frame has already been developed in the previous examination of Great Britain and Denmark, and the same coding frame will be applied in this study. Articles that provided a framing are coded for the following frames: mentally ill, criminal, violent, indoctrinated or isolated. An “other” category is included to



identify frames that are not anticipated in advance. One article may contain multiple framings and be coded for more than one category.

### 3.3 Methods

For this research a quantitative and qualitative content analysis will be applied. The aims of the analysis is to examine the trend in the Netherlands across a five-year period, understand the extent to which the media amplifies either terrorist's or state's messages and explore how the media frame lone-actors and to compare the finding to studies of the United Kingdom and Denmark.

In order to examine the trends in the Netherlands of lone-actor terrorism, all the newspaper articles will be analysed how many references to lone-actor appeared in articles discussing lone-actor terrorism generally, or in reports covering attacks or attempted attacks by lone-actors. Also an overview of articles for each year of data analysed that focus on lone-actors and the frequency of articles by month will be made. This overview enables to examine if there is an increase or decline in newspaper articles. By examining the frequency of articles by month, it is possible to examine if the peaks (months with the most articles) are event driven. Content-wise the newspapers will be analysed if the reporting primarily focused on Islamist terrorism, far-right or more than one type of terrorism. Then the reporting will be analysed if lone-actor terrorism is presented as a significant security threat, an increasing problem or that the likelihood is rare.

In order to examine the amplification of the message of the perpetrator all the newspaper articles will be analysed on the frequency of articles that amplify the terrorist's message. To execute, the newspapers will be examined of how many quoted directly lone-actor's messages. And how many indirectly quoted lone-actor's messages (e.g. reporting lone-actors' claim regarding motivation).

To analyse the amplification of the state's message the frequency of articles that amplify the state's message will be examined. To execute, the newspapers will be analysed on how many included statements from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services. And how many of that discussed state counterterrorism capabilities.

Counterterrorism capabilities are all statement that include counterterrorism strengths, weaknesses or both made by the previous mentioned persons. Then, will be examined how many of the state counterterrorism capabilities focus on counterterrorism strengths, counterterrorism vulnerabilities, and both including counterterrorism weaknesses and

strengths. Looking into heightened security, effectiveness of counterterrorism in the run-up to large events (e.g. London Olympics or abdication of the throne), allocation of extra resources (e.g. following Breivik's attacks in Norway), the scale of terrorism plots foiled by security services.

To explore how the media frame lone-actors the newspaper articles are being examined how many Dutch newspaper articles provided a frame. Then of that newspapers will be examined how many were in combination with a perpetrator pertaining an Islamist background, a far-right background, articles specified more than one background and in or another religion/ideology. It will give an overview of how the media frames lone-actors of what background they emerge.

Lastly the findings will be compared the finding to the similar case studies of the United Kingdom and Denmark. The differences and similarities will be compared in order to make up a cross case conclusion.

### 3.4 Validity, reliability and limitations

In order to enlarge the quality of the research, a number of requirements must be met (Yin, 2009: 40-45). Validity means whether an actual answer is given to the research question (Yin, 2009: 40-44). The validity is enlarged because of the use of multiple sources of evidence. The top five national newspapers in the Netherlands reporting on lone-actor terrorism between January 1<sup>st</sup> 2009 and February 28<sup>th</sup> 2015 are chosen, and resulted in a 98 sources. The use of multiple sources benefits the generalisability of the research. Using more resources makes the result more robust and deviations decrease. More results will make it more generalisable to other Western countries.

Reliability means whether repetition of the research produces the same results (Yin, 2008: 45). The reliability is enlarged if the research followed uses the same procedures as described and applied in earlier research. By applying the same methods as Parker et al. (2018), the reliability will be enlarged and makes it also comparative to the case studies of the United Kingdom and Denmark.

A pitfall of this research is that bias can be caused, because this thesis also applies qualitative research methods. This means that the results are interpreted by the research, which can cause a lower validity. The validity of this research is higher applying the quantitative content analysis and lower when applying the qualitative content analysis,

because the writers' interpretation of the results can be biased.

## 4. Results

### 4.1 Reporting trends of lone-actor terrorism

This section contains an overview of the press coverage of the trends of lone-actor terrorism in the Netherlands between 2009 and 2015. Containing the frequency of articles for each year that focus on lone-actor terrorism, the frequency of articles per month that focus on lone-actors and content-wise if it is event driven, the category of religion/ideology of the perpetrator and whether lone-actor terrorism is presented as security threat.

Table 1. Shows the frequency and percentage of articles for each full year of data analysed that focus on lone-actor terrorism in the Netherlands. In total 98 Dutch articles focussed on lone-actor terrorism. It is comparable to the 97 Danish articles. The number of articles started with 8 in 2009 and increased to 30 in 2011. After that the number of articles decreased, except in 2013 with a number of 20 articles. The results suggest that media coverage increased until 2011 and after that the media coverage declined. References to lone-actor terrorism appeared in articles discussing lone-actor terrorism generally (21.4%) and most references appeared in reports covering attacks or attempted attacks by lone-actors (43.8%).


**Table 1.** Frequency and percentage of articles for each full year of data analysed that focus on lone-actors.

Dutch data		
Year	Frequency	Percentage
2009	8	8.2%
2010	12	12.2%
2011	30	30.6%
2012	12	12.2%
2013	20	20.0%
2014	10	10.0%
2015	6	6.0%
Total	98	100%

Figure 1. shows the frequency of articles per month that focus on lone-actors. The results suggest that media coverage of lone-actor terrorism is event driven. Notable are the 3 peaks. The media coverage appears to be higher in July/August 2011, April/May 2013 and end of 2014/January 2015. The articles covering lone-actor terrorism in July/August of 2011

focused mostly on the attack in Norway caused by Breivik or were inspired by the attack discussing far-right terrorism. Multiple articles also express their concern for lone-actor attacks since this attack. The articles covering lone-actor terrorism in April/May 2013 are not caused by one event, but by multiple events and their concerns that arise from it. The events are the tensions in the run up to the abdication of the throne in the Netherlands (caused by lone-actors), the Boston bombings, the attack of a British soldier in London and the Attack of a France soldier in Paris. The articles covering lone-actor terrorism in the end of 2014/January 2015 focussed mostly on the attack on the satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo, the Canadian parliament attack in Ottawa, and the hostage taking crisis in a café in Sydney. This shows that the media coverage of lone-actor terrorism is event driven. Noticeable it that events the Dutch publications focus on mostly, are on attacks outside of the Netherlands.

**Figure 1.** Frequency of Dutch articles that include lone-actor content by month.



Further, content-wise reporting of the lone-actor terrorism in the Netherlands focussed primarily on Islamist terrorism 50.0% of the newspaper articles discussed Islamist terrorism and 34.2% focussed on far-right terrorism. 9% focussed on more than one category of religion/ideology and 2% discussed other forms of lone-actor terrorism.

In the reporting, lone-actor terrorism was presented as an important security threat. 63 articles discussed the likelihood or scale of the threat posed by lone-actors. In total 77.8% of the articles characterised lone-actor terrorism as a frequent or large problem and 15.9% characterised lone-actor terrorism as an increasing problem. Only 4 articles (6.4%) frame lone-actor terrorism as rare.

## 4.2 Amplification of terrorist's and state's messages

This section contains the results of the press coverage of the amplification of lone-actor terrorism in the Netherlands. All reports about terrorism have the potential to promote terrorist's agendas. Only a few articles amplified a lone-actor grievance or goal in detail. In the Netherlands four articles (4.1%) directly quoted lone-actor's messages, and fourteen articles (14.3%) indirectly acted as a conduit for the message. For example, the attack on a British soldier, Trouw reported the video of the perpetrators wherein they warn the British while holding two butchers knives in his bloody hands, quoting:

“We swear by almighty Allah that we will not stop fighting until you leave us alone. You will never be safe. The only reason we do this is because British soldiers kill Muslims every day”<sup>8</sup>.

Noticeable is the article by the Volkskrant about the Attacks in Toulouse by Merah<sup>9</sup>. The TV channel Al-Jazeera received a letter with his video images, but did not broadcast the video. However, the Volkskrant described in detail the content of the video. The video was recorded from a mini camera tied to his body during his murders. Eventually, Merah edited religious songs, music and Koran texts on the recordings. Another noticeable example is the multiple analysis of Breiviks' manifest in detail. Trouw analysed three times three different parts of Breiviks' manifest<sup>10112</sup>. The analysis included his grievance in detail with quotes as:

“These days, young Europeans get a systematic brainwash that makes them pacifist eunuchs” and his disapproval of the Islamic religion.

In 2011 the amplification of the perpetrator's message was the highest with ten articles. After that the number of articles declined from five articles in 2012, three in 2013, one in 2014 and zero in 2015.

In comparison, in the Netherlands thirty-one articles (31.6%) included statements from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services. In total of all the articles twenty-two (22.4%) articles discussed state's counterterrorism capabilities. State's capabilities are all the articles that included the statements and focused on the

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<sup>8</sup> Horst, van der A. 2013. “Eenzame wolven of toch een georganiseerde terreurgroep?”, Trouw, 24 May <https://www.trouw.nl/home/eenzame-wolven-of-toch-een-georganiseerde-terreurgroep~aa7451a0/> (visited on March 23 2019).

<sup>9</sup> Korteweg, A. 2012. “Frankrijk twijfelt of moordenaar 'eenzame wolf' is Radicale Merah kreeg hulp bij aanslag”, de Volkskrant, 28 March (visited on 26 March 2019).

<sup>10</sup> Mulder, E. 2011. “Breivik klinkt bedrieglijk vertrouwd”, Trouw, 14 August <https://www.trouw.nl/home/breivik-klinkt-bedrieglijk-vertrouwd~a9c79a85/> (visited on March 26 2019).

<sup>11</sup> Mulder, E. 2011. “Moslimmoeders saboteren djihad”, Trouw, 8 October <https://www.trouw.nl/home/moslimmoeders-saboteren-djihad~a69c7cf0/> (visited on March 26 2019).

<sup>12</sup> Mulder, E. 2011. “Zieleleven van een terrorist”, Trouw, 11 November <https://www.trouw.nl/home/zieleleven-van-een-terrorist~a64ba0a1/> (visited on March 26 2019).

counterterrorism vulnerabilities, strengths or both. Twenty-two articles are almost the same amount of articles (18) that amplified the perpetrator's message.

The amount of articles that included statements of Dutch officials, security officers, or intelligence services and discuss state's counterterrorism capabilities is high in the Netherlands. 22 of the 31 Dutch articles (71%) included statements of Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services and discussed state counterterrorism capabilities. Eleven (50.0%) of the all articles that amplified the state's message included counterterrorism strengths, four (18.2%) included counterterrorism vulnerabilities and seven (31.8%) of which included both weaknesses and strengths. The 18 articles amplifying counterterrorism strengths (solely or in combination with vulnerability) focussed on more security measures/allocation of extra resources in run-up to large events (e.g. liberation day; abdication of the throne or other royal family related events), highlighted new approaches and research in the Netherlands (e.g. new collaboration team including police, AIVD (Dutch intelligence and security service), MIVD (Dutch military intelligence and security service) and psychologists (mental healthcare); database for lone-actors), heightened security (e.g. following Breiviks' attacks in Norway), and a plot foiled by the Dutch security service. For example, Telegraaf amplified messaging about a success of a foiled plot by the Dutch security service:

“The secret service AIVD claims late last year to have foiled an Al Qaeda terror plot in Europe. The AIVD provided 'important information' to foreign counterparts on the basis of whom three Al-Qaeda terrorists were arrested”<sup>13</sup>.

Most statements about counterterrorism strength tended to be issued prior to major public events or post event for example after the attacks of Breivik. To give an illustration of an article issued prior to a major public event is of the heightened security in the run-up to the abdication of the throne in the NRC, discussing:

“On 30 April, the first 'safety ring' will be erected a few hundred meters around Dam square: freely accessible to the public, but prohibited for cars and with increased police supervision. On the Dam, where according to the police a maximum of 25.000 people can stand, uniformed agents will engage to visitors to report to them if they observe something suspicious. A practice that has been copied from the wedding of the English crown prince William and his wife Kate in 2011. In addition, agents will scan attendees based on a prepared visitor profile. Whoever deviates is called to account. "Making contact is essential for gathering the information needed to make the risk assessment," says an insider. "For example,

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<sup>13</sup> De Telegraaf, 2013. “Gisteren Boston, morgen hier; AIVD heeft handen vol aan terreurdreiging”, 17 April.

how does someone respond if he is approached by two agents?"<sup>14</sup>.

In addition, most of the Dutch newspaper articles amplified messaging by discussing a new approach to fight lone-actor terrorism. For example quoting Akerboom working at the Dutch counterterrorism and security coordinator (NCTV) in the newspaper Telegraaf:

"“You cannot keep a threat locked in for days. And you cannot protect a threatened person forever," says Akerboom. That is why it makes more sense to encircle the perpetrator with social workers and isolate the threat using that, instead of a series of radical, costly security measures..... In concrete terms: a 'small and effective team' will focus its attention at the headquarters of the national police service KLPD over the next two years on dozens of notorious threats in the Netherlands. The team consists not only of policemen, but also of analysts from the secret services AIVD and MIVD and psychologists”<sup>15</sup>.

The eleven articles that described difficulties in interdicting lone-actor attacks focussed on the weakened information position of the intelligence services due to living in an open democratic society that respects people’s private domain, resource deficit in the AIVD, and the challenges lone-actor pose due to online self-radicalisation or because they are invisible which makes it hard to detect. For example NRC Handelsblad quoted Uri Rosenthal<sup>16</sup>:

“But if the plans or sudden intentions of the lone-actor are separate from a terrorist or activist goal, the intelligence and security services have no information position whatsoever. Only in a totalitarian regime, where one keeps a constant eye on the other and passes on any suspicious deviations to the authorities, can intelligence and security services be able to obtain such information. In an open democratic society that respects peoples’ private domain, that is not the case”<sup>17</sup>.

Some of the post-event reporting only discusses the state vulnerabilities. Take for instance the news article of the AD Handelsblad. The AD reported after an attack on a soldier in the London Woolwich district:

“The public massacre of a soldier in London seems to be the work of two dangerous

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<sup>14</sup> Logtenberg, H. 2013. “Vrijgezel, gefrustreerd en gevaarlijk; Politie houdt tientallen ‘potentieel gewelddadige eenlingen’ in de gaten voor 30 april, <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/04/23/vrijgezel-gefrustreerd-en-gevaarlijk-12647378-a881789> (visited on March 30 2019).

<sup>15</sup> De Telegraaf, 2013. “Gevaarlijke gekken 'Zachte jacht' op; Nieuwe aanpak moet bedreigers in vroeg stadium onschadelijk maken Psychiater goedkoper en effectiever dan kordon bewakers "Even wijkagent langs zo'n manisch- depressieve gast sturen", 17 July.

<sup>16</sup> Uri Rosenthal was at that time the chairman of the COT Institute for Security and Crisis Management and chairman of the VVD in the Senate.

<sup>17</sup> NRC Handelsblad, 2009. “Gefrustreerde daders steken elkaar aan; En het arsenaal aan geweldsmiddelen is, met dank aan internet, almaar gegroeid”, 6 May.



lone-actors, the so-called lone wolves. Intelligence services in our country know how difficult it is to combat them. Even in the Netherlands lurks the danger, although it is hard to estimate how great that is. They are the nightmare of any intelligence service. So-called lone wolves, dangerous loners, operating under the radar of investigative services. Because whether it is the Dutch AIVD or the British MI5: a solitary terrorist is hard to come by. Where terrorist groups move, buy raw materials for bombs or recruit fellow fighters, lone wolves works in a way that is hardly to be discovered. They work alone or in small groups and mainly radicalize behind the screen of their PC. More than a knife and a symbolic target are not necessary, as demonstrated by the attack in Woolwich on Wednesday afternoon. The Netherlands also recognises the threat, says the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)”<sup>18</sup>.

However, most of the post-event reporting that included details of vulnerability, also included articles discussing counterterrorism strengths. For example the AD wrote after the attack of Breivik:

“According to experts, the invisibility of individuals who want to commit an attack is a major problem for intelligence services. The National Police Services Agency (KLPD) is already working on a database of loners who have radical ideas and who have shown themselves earlier. But that project is still in an experimental phase”<sup>19</sup>.

And NRC wrote after the Breivik attack:

“In the Netherlands, the security services have also been aware for some time of the fact that political violence or expressive terror can come from all over and that loner-actors can strike deadly. The murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh were the reason for the creation of teams within the police who had to map the threat of 'systematic hatred' and radicalizing lone-actors. The previous mentioned attacks also led to the Security Surveillance System (Stelsel Bewaken Beveiligen), which regulates how a threatened person or object is protected. For the first time in Dutch history, the NCTV has ensured that GGZ, police and AIVD regularly cooperate and consult. In addition, consultancy firms and universities, often commissioned by the government, carry out research into lone-actors and so-called solo threats”<sup>20</sup>.

Summing up, 18.4% of the articles amplified a lone-actor’s grievance or goal in detail. After 2011 the number of these articles declined. In total 22.5% of the articles discussed state’s counterterrorism capabilities. Elven (50%) of these articles mentioned counterterrorism

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<sup>18</sup> AD, 2013. “Solitaire terrorist is moeilijk te stuiten”, 24 May, <https://www.ad.nl/buitenland/solitaire-terrorist-is-moeilijk-te-stuiten~a5ff53bf/> (visited on April 2 2019).

<sup>19</sup> AD, 2011. “Ontspoorde eenlingen opsporen is bijna onmogelijk”, 25 July.

<sup>20</sup> Graaf, de B. and E. Bakker, 2011, “De eenzame wolf wordt door vrienden gepakt”, 27 July, NRC Handelsblad <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/07/27/de-eenzame-wolf-wordt-door-vrienden-gepakt-12027534-a1255128> (visited on April 2 2019).

strengths. These articles discussed mostly a new approach of cooperation between various institutions to prevent lone-actor terrorism. Four (8.2%) of these articles mentioned counterterrorism weaknesses, mostly focussing on why lone-actors are hard to detect. Most of the seven (31.8%) articles contained post-event reporting that included details of vulnerability also included articles discussing counterterrorism strengths.

### 4.3 Framing of lone-actors

This section contains the results of how the press frames lone-actor terrorism in the Netherlands. 50 (51.0%) of the Dutch newspaper articles provided a frame for understanding lone-actor terrorism. Of the 50 articles that provided a frame, 41 (82.0%) of articles entailed a perpetrator pertained to Islamist background or to a far-right background and 9 (18.0%) articles provided a frame but not in combination with a background. In 20 (38.5%) articles the perpetrators were related to an Islamist background, an in 20 (38.5%) articles the perpetrators were related to a far-right background and one (1.9%) article specified more than one background.

Considering the nature of the data set, the findings cannot be considered generalisable to all right-wing and Islamist cases. It is not generalisable by the cause of having relatively few cases for each ideologically motivated lone-actor attack and the event-driven nature of the reporting. Nevertheless, the differences in coverage are interesting to look into because the results show clear differences in framing between Islamist and far-right actors. Table 2 shows the number of Dutch articles coded in order of frequency and by background of the perpetrator.

**Table 2.** Frequency of Dutch articles that provided an actor framing for each frame coded by background of the perpetrator.

	Background of perpetrator			
	Islamist (N=21*)	Far-right (N=21*)	Non-ideological (N=9)	Total (N=51)
Mentally ill	2 (9.5%)	15 (71.4%)	7 (77.8%)	24 (47.0%)
Violent	6 (28.7%)	6 (28.7%)	3 (33.3%)	15 (29.4%)
Isolated	2 (9.5%)	8 (38.1%)	2 (22.2%)	12 (23.5%)
Criminal	4 (19.0%)	0 (0%)	1 (11.11%)	5 (9.8%)
Indoctrinated	4 (19.0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (7.9%)

\*The figures include the articles that were originally code for more than one category. The article contained framings for the perpetrator pertaining an Islamist background and far-right background.

Table 2 shows that the most frequent provided frame is mental illness. For example, quoting the article from Volkskrant, which applies for all the categories:

“Mental condition regularly plays a role: around 30 percent have a history of psychological problems”<sup>21</sup>.

The most frequent provided frame after mental illness, are violence and isolation. Criminality and indoctrination are the frames that are least used in the Dutch newspaper articles. Table 2 shows that lone-actors pertaining an Islamist background are just as often framed as violent as the lone-actors pertaining a far-right background.

Table 2 also shows that only perpetrators related to an Islamist background were characterised as criminal and indoctrinated. In relation to crime the lone-actor is explicitly named in criminal terms, or indirectly features criminal aspects of the perpetrator in their background information. For example from the Volkskrant:

“Merah, a young delinquent who was often spotted in the nightlife scene in Toulouse, allegedly converted into a Muslim fundamentalist in prison”<sup>22</sup>.

An example wherein the lone-actor is characterised as indoctrinated and by which aids in Trouw:

“The radical lone-actor, who is inspired from the solitude of his bedroom by internet videos of foreign hate preachers or the digital edition of 'Inspire' (the English-language magazine of Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula), is less easy to capture”<sup>23</sup>.

In contrast, far-right actors were more than seven times as likely to be described in relation to mental health issues than Islamist actors in the Dutch newspaper articles. For example, a Trouw article stated:

“In their comments, newspapers take a stand on the psychiatric side of the killer. The Telegraaf is the first to state that Breivik is mentally disturbed, an analysis that is later shared by his lawyer. The Telegraaf calls him a "mentally ill devil" and a "unscrupulous madman,

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<sup>21</sup> Wierenga, P. 2015. “De lone wolf bestaat niet”, de Volkskrant, 31 January (visited on April 2 2019).

<sup>22</sup> Korteweg, A. 2013. “Franse scootermoorden jaar later nog mysterie”, de Volkskrant, 19 March <https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/franse-scootermoorden-jaar-later-nog-mysterie~b90027a3/> (visited on April 2 2019).

<sup>23</sup> Horst, van der A. 2013. “Eenzame wolven of toch een georganiseerde terreurgroep?”, Trouw, 24 May <https://www.trouw.nl/home/eenzame-wolven-of-toch-een-georganiseerde-terreurgroep-~aa7451a0/> (visited on March 23 2019).

who has let his head spin wild with delusions”<sup>24</sup>.

Also noticeable, table 2 shows that lone-actors pertaining a far-right background tend to be framed four times as often as isolated than lone-actors pertaining an Islamist background. An example from the Volkskrant shows (about Breivik):

“A lonely wolf with a short circuit in the head, yet another case of an isolated actor a round shooting schizophrenic that the West faces from time to time”<sup>25</sup>.

While the dominant framings were mentally ill, violent and isolated a number of “other” framings in the Dutch data are interesting to look into. Table 3 shows the additional frames identified within the Dutch newspaper subset. These framing are the same as the UK data set. They correspond as no other striking frames occurred in the Dutch dataset, because other framings that only occurred once are excluded because they are irrelevant to mention in this thesis and are not generalisable.

**Table 3.** Frequency of articles for each “other” frame identified in the sample by category of terrorism.

	Category of Terrorism			
	Islamist (N=21*)	Far-right (N=21*)	Non-ideological (N=9)	Total (N=51)
Disaffected	1 (4.8%)	6 (28.6%)	4 (44.4%)	11 (21.6%)
Young	7 (33.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (13.7%)
Educated	2 (9.5%)	3 (14.3%)	0 (0%)	5 (9.8%)
Normal	2 (9.5%)	1 (4.8%)	0 (0%)	3 (5.9%)
Fanatic	2 (9.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (3.9%)

In total 28 Dutch articles coded for an “other” framing. Of these articles, 11 characterised lone-actors as disaffected, making this the fourth most common framing of the Dutch newspapers. Disaffected implies lone-actors whom are dissatisfied or angry mostly on the government. As the following from Trouw illustrates:

“Timothy McVeigh also hated the government. Anders Behring Breivik is not the first extreme right-wing, native-born lone-actor who kills a large number of his countrymen in

<sup>24</sup> Houten, van M. 2011. “Geert Wilder is niet verantwoordelijk, maar ...”, Trouw, 4 August <https://www.trouw.nl/home/geert-wilders-is-niet-verantwoordelijk-maar~a9657ad6/> (visited on April 2 2019).

<sup>25</sup> Schnitzler, H. 2012. “Column Hans Schnitzler Breivik is onze eigen Bin Laden”, de Volkskrant, 27 June <https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/breivik-is-onze-eigen-bin-laden~b8f2d7e5/> (visited on April 2 2019).

opposition to the government”<sup>26</sup>.

Table 3. Shows that mostly lone-actor pertaining a far-right background are framed as disaffected. A contrast between framing of the perpetrators with an Islamist and far-right background is the tendency to characterise Islamist lone-actors as young, as the following example from the Telegraaf highlights:

“British security forces raise the alarm for Waltham Forest, one of the districts in east London that are home to this Summers’ Olympic Games. A report surfaced by the British newspaper The Guardian refers to a high threat of extremist inspired by Al-Qaeda men between 20 and 38”<sup>27</sup>.

Table 3. shows no important difference between the education of a perpetrator in relation to an Islamist and far-right background. Although most newspapers highlight lone-actors as different from the general population, a small proportion (5.9%) framed lone-actors as normal prior to their attack.

Summing up the most common framing applied in the Dutch newspaper articles is mental illness. Then the most applied framing is violence and then isolation. Discussing the difference between framing and ideology we see that far-right actors were more than seven times as likely to be described in relation to mental health issues than Islamist actors. Besides, lone-actors pertaining a far-right background tend to be framed four times as often as isolated than lone-actor pertaining a far-right background. The results also showed that only perpetrators pertaining an Islamist background were characterised as criminal and indoctrinated.

The other framing that occurred most was disaffected. Mostly far-right lone-actors are framed as disaffected. Another contrast between framing of Islamist and far-right actors is the tendency to characterise Islamist lone-actors as young. Overall it can be said that there is a noticeable difference in the results when it comes to framing of the lone-actors and looking into their background. The above were the Dutch results, now we move on to the case comparison between the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark.

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<sup>26</sup>Sudhölter, J. 2011. “Parallelen met dader Oklahoma”, Trouw, 26 July, <https://www.trouw.nl/home/parallelen-met-dader-oklahoma~a3c7971b/> (visited on April 4 2019).

<sup>27</sup> De Telegraaf, 2012. “Al-Qaeda aast op Olympische Spelen”, 13 February.

## 5. Case comparison

In this section the results of the Netherlands will be compared next to the similar case studies of the United Kingdom and Denmark. These cases will be compared in order to draw up a cross case conclusion. First we compare the trends, then the amplification of the perpetrator's and state's message of the three countries and then the framing of the lone-actors in all the three countries.

### 5.1 Trends of lone-actor terrorism

In total 98 Dutch articles focussed on lone-actor terrorism. It is comparable to the 97 Danish articles, although it is two times less than the 219 British newspaper articles. The number of Dutch articles suggests that media coverage increased until 2011 and after that the media coverage declined, however there was a small peak in 2013. This trend corresponds to the newspaper coverage of Denmark. The Danish number of newspaper articles first increased, and later declined from 2012 to 2015. On the other hand, the trend differs from the coverage of the United Kingdom, because the media coverage in the UK increased from 2009 until 2015. Thus results shows us that the media coverage of lone-actor terrorism in the United Kingdom is twice as much as in the Netherlands and Denmark, and moreover the media coverage is only increasing instead of decreasing in the period between 2012 and 2015 as showed in the Netherlands and Denmark.

In the Netherlands the media coverage of lone-actor terrorism is event driven, which corresponds to the cases of the United Kingdom and Denmark. Difference between the countries is caused by the focus on events which took place close to home in the UK and Denmark. The Netherlands has not dealt with terrorism in that period on their soil. The UK and DK coverage is highly event driven, although not all caused by the same events. For example the peak in 2012 in Denmark concerned Mohammedaed Geeles' axe-attack on cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. The events that caused identical peaks in media coverage were the attacks in Norway caused by Breivik in 2011; the attack of a British soldier in London in 2013; the Canadian parliament attack in Ottawa in the end of 2014 and also the hostage taking crisis in a café in Sydney; and in the beginning of 2015 the attack on the satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo.

Content-wise, reporting of lone-actor terrorism in the all three countries primarily focused on Islamist terrorism. 73.5% of the UK articles focussed on Islamist terrorism, 60% of the Danish articles and 50.0% of the Dutch articles. After that the focus is on far-right

terrorism in the articles. Noticeable, is it that the discussion of far-right terrorism is the highest in the Netherlands (34.2% compared to 10.5% (UK) and 6.1% (DK)). A possible explanation for the higher percentage of the discussion of lone-actor terrorism with a perpetrator pertaining a far-right background in the Netherlands may be due to (as mentioned above) that the media coverage of lone-actor terrorism is event driven. The difference between the countries is caused by the focus on events which took place close to home. These events that took place close to home were lone-actor terrorist attacks of perpetrators pertaining mostly an Islamist background. Which could cause a higher focus on Islamist terrorism than on far-right terrorism.

Finally, lone-actor terrorism was presented as a serious security threat in all three countries. Of the articles that discussed the likelihood or scale of the threat posed by lone-actors, most of the articles characterised lone-actor terrorism as a frequent or large problem, and after that described it as an increasing problem. In total 94.6% of the Danish articles, 93.7% of the Dutch articles and 91.5% of the British articles that discussed the likelihood or scale of the threat posed by lone-actors presented the threat as frequent or large or increasing. Only four Dutch articles, five British articles and one Danish article framed lone-actor terrorism as rare.

## 5.2 Amplification of terrorist's and state's messages

All reports about terrorism have the potential to promote terrorist's agendas, but only a few articles in all three the countries amplified a lone-actor's grievance or goal in detail. However, the Netherlands amplified the lone-actor's message the most by publishing more articles containing the perpetrator's message. In the Netherlands four articles (4.1%) directly quoted lone-actor's messages, and fourteen articles (14.3%) indirectly acted as a conduit for the message. The extensive analysis of the Breiviks' manifesto was particularly striking. Secondly, the United Kingdom directly quoted nineteen times (8.9%) the lone-actor's message and indirectly acted thirteen times (5.9%) as a conduit for message. Denmark amplified the perpetrators message least. In Denmark only two articles (2.0%) directly quoted attackers, and four (4.1%) indirectly conveyed lone-actor's messages by describing their claims. The result suggests that there is a considerable difference between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and Denmark considering the amplification of the perpetrator's message.

The results showed, as looking closer into the amplification of the state's message,

that the amount of statements was high in all the three countries. The Danish articles included the highest percentage of statements from elected Danish officials, security officers or intelligence services. In Denmark, 53 articles (54.7%) included statements. In the United Kingdom 104 articles (47.5%) included statements and in the Netherlands 31 articles (31.6%) included statements. The percentage of Danish articles that discussed state's counterterrorism capabilities was the highest with a total of amount of 27 articles (27.8%). 22 Dutch articles (22.4%) included state's counterterrorism capabilities and 33 British articles (15.1%) discussed state's counterterrorism capabilities in the articles.

The highest percentage of articles that included statements and discussed state's counterterrorism capabilities appeared in the Netherlands. 22 of the 31 Dutch articles (71%) included statements of Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services and discussed state's counterterrorism capabilities. In Denmark 27 of the 53 Danish articles (53%) and in the United Kingdom 33 of the 104 British articles (31.7%) included statements and discussed state's counterterrorism capabilities.

Focussing on the state's counterterrorism capabilities, 17 (63%) of the Danish articles communicated Danish counterterrorism strengths, and 10 (37%) communicated the interdiction challenges posed by lone-actors. 13 (39.5%) of the British articles included counterterrorism strengths, 12 (36.3%) included counterterrorism vulnerabilities and 8 (24.2%) included both weaknesses and strengths. In the Netherlands 11 of the articles (50%) that amplified the state's message included counterterrorism strengths, 4 articles (18.2%) included counterterrorism vulnerabilities and 7 (31.8%) of which included both weaknesses and strengths.

An example of a comparison of state's counterterrorism strengths in all the three countries was the focus on more security measures/allocation of extra resources in run-up to large events. For the United Kingdom this was in the run-up of the London Olympics, and for the Netherlands it was in the run-up to the abdication of the throne. Another example is the post event statements of the heightened security following Breiviks' attacks in Norway that occurred in all the three countries.

Another corresponding example of the state's counterterrorism vulnerability in all the three countries is the interdiction challenges posed by lone-actors. The key theme of all of the three countries was the challenges the lone-actor pose due to online self-radicalisation or because they are invisible which makes them hard to detect. Most of the articles that reported details of vulnerability also reported on counterterrorism strengths.

Wrapping up about the amplification of terrorist's and state's messaging. Only a few



articles in all three the countries amplified a lone-actor's grievance or goal in detail. The Netherlands had the most articles, with a total of 18 articles (18.4%), amplifying the perpetrator's message of the three countries. The amount of articles (8.9%) in the United Kingdom that directly quoted the lone-actor's message was the highest. The result suggests that there is a considerable difference between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and Denmark considering the amplification of the perpetrator's message.

Noticeable is almost the same amount of articles amplified the perpetrator's message as the state's message in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands 22 articles amplified the perpetrator's message and 18 articles amplified the state's message. In the UK 33 articles amplified the perpetrator's message and 22 articles amplified the state's message. These results differ extremely from the results of the Denmark whereby 6 articles amplified the perpetrator's message and 27 amplified the state's message.

Moreover, more articles combined amplified terrorist's narratives or state's counterterrorism weakness than state's counterterrorism strengths in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands. In total 52 (23.8%) British articles amplified terrorist's narratives or state's counterterrorism weaknesses and 21 (9.6%) amplified state's strengths. In total 29 (29.6%) Dutch articles amplified terrorist's narratives or state's counterterrorism weaknesses and 18 (18.4%) amplified state's strengths. In contrast to the Danish articles, whereby 16 (16.5%) articles amplified terrorist's narratives or state's counterterrorism weaknesses and 17 (17.5%) amplify state's strengths. Combining all the data sets showed that 97 articles (23.4%) amplified terrorist narratives or state counterterrorism weakness than the 56 articles (13.5%) that amplify state counterterrorism strengths.

Looking closer into state's counterterrorism capabilities. In the Netherlands the amount of articles amplifying the counterterrorism strengths is the highest, followed by Denmark. In the United Kingdom the amount of articles that discussed counterterrorism strengths or weaknesses are almost equal.

### 5.3 Framing

In total 50 (51.0%) of the Dutch newspaper articles, 98 (44.7%) of the British articles and 30 (30.9%) of the Danish articles provided a frame for understanding lone-actor terrorism. Of the 98 British articles that provided a frame, 70 (71.4%) of the articles entailed a perpetrator pertained to an Islamist background, in 18 (18.4%) articles the perpetrators were related to a far-right background and 1 (1.0%) article pertained to anarchism and nine (9.8%) articles

included multiple backgrounds of the multiple perpetrators. Of the 30 Danish articles that provided a frame for the lone-actor, 13 (43.4%) of the articles entailed a perpetrator pertained to an Islamist background, in 4 (13.3%) the perpetrators were related to a far-right background, and 13 (43.3%) articles included multiple backgrounds of the multiple perpetrators. Of the 50 Dutch articles that provided a frame, 20 (38.5%) of the articles entailed a perpetrator pertained to Islamist background, in 20 (38.5%) articles the perpetrators were related to a far-right background, and one (1.9%) included multiple backgrounds of the multiple perpetrator.

Table 2 of this thesis is displayed again to make it easier to compare it with table 4 and 5. Table 4 and 5 are copies of the research of Parker et al. (2018: 11-12). Table 2 shows that in the Netherlands the most dominant framing is mental illness, then violence and then isolation. Table 4 shows that the most dominant framing in the United Kingdom is first crime, then violence and thirdly mental illness. Table 5 shows that mental illness and violence are the most dominant framing in Denmark, however crime is also featured heavily. These results suggest that the lone-actors are most likely to be framed as mentally ill, violent, criminal and isolated in the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark.

**Table 2.** Frequency of Dutch articles that provided an actor framing for each frame coded by background of the perpetrator.

	Background Of perpetrator			Total (N=51)
	Islamist (N=21*)	Far-right (N=21*)	Non-ideological (N=9)	
Mentally ill	2 (9.5%)	15 (71.4%)	7 (77.8%)	24 (47.0%)
Violent	6 (28.7%)	6 (28.7%)	3 (33.3%)	15 (29.4%)
Isolated	2 (9.5%)	8 (38.1%)	2 (22.2%)	12 (23.5%)
Criminal	4 (19.0%)	0 (0%)	1 (11.11%)	5 (9.8%)
Indoctrinated	4 (19.0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (7.9%)

\*The figures include the articles that were originally code for more than one category. The article contained framings for the perpetrator pertaining an Islamist background and far-right background.

**Table 4.** Frequency of British articles that provided an actor framing for each frame coded by background of the perpetrator.

	Background of perpetrator			Total (N=98)
	Islamist (N=77*)	Far-right (N=19*)	Other (N=2**)	

Criminal	34 (44.2%)	1 (5.3%)	1 (50%)	36 (36.7%)
Violent	25 (32.5%)	3 (15.8%)	1 (50%)	29 (29.6%)
Mentally ill	19 (24.7%)	8 (53.3%)	1 (50%)	28 (28.6%)
Indoctrinated	11 (14.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	11 (11.2%)
Isolated	10 (13.0%)	1 (5.3%)	0 (0%)	11 (11.2%)

\* These figures include nine articles that were originally coded for >1 background, 7 of which contained framings for Islamist actors and 1 of which contained framings for far-right actors.

\*\* This figure refers to the article originally coded for >1 background and the article that was coded as “other” which referred to an “anarchist” lone-actor.

**Table 5.** Frequency of Danish articles that provided an actor framing for each frame coded by background of the perpetrator.

Total (N=30)	
Mentally ill	11 (36.7%)
Violent	11 (36.7%)
Criminal	9 (30.0%)
Isolated	7 (23.4%)
Indoctrinated	0 (0%)

\*Parker et al. did not displayed the difference in the background of the perpetrator.

Table 3, 4 and 5 show a difference in framing of Islamist and far-right lone-actors. In the Netherlands the lone-actor pertaining an Islamist background tends to be framed as violent. This framing is in line with the framing of British articles, because in the United Kingdom lone-actors tend to be framed as violent or criminal in relation with a lone-actor of an Islamist background. The dominant framing for lone-actors pertaining an Islamist background is thus violence.

In contrast, far-right actors in the British data were more than twice as likely to be described in relation to mental illness. This frame of mental illness corresponds for the Dutch articles. Far-right actors were seven times more likely to be described in relation to mental health issues than Islamist actors in the Dutch newspaper articles.

Also noticeable, table 2 shows that perpetrators pertaining a far-right background tend to be framed four times as often as isolated than perpetrators pertaining a far-right background in the Netherlands. However, this does not apply to the articles of the United Kingdom and Denmark.

The dominant frameworks in all the three countries were mentally ill, violent, criminal and isolated, but there is a difference between framing in context of Islamist and far-

right terrorism. It is also interesting to look into the framing of “other” category. Table 3 of this thesis is displayed again to make it easier to compare with table 6. Table 6 is copied from the research of Parker et al. (2018: 13).

**Table 3.** Frequency of articles (percentage of all Dutch articles that provide a frame) for each “other” frame identified in the sample by coded by background of the perpetrator.

	Background of perpetrator			
	Islamist (N=21*)	Far-right (N=21*)	Non-ideological (N=9)	Total (N=51)
Disaffected	1 (4.8%)	6 (28.6%)	4 (44.4%)	11 (21.6%)
Young	7 (33.3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	7 (13.7%)
Educated	2 (9.5%)	3 (14.3%)	0 (0%)	5 (9.8%)
Normal	2 (9.5%)	1 (4.8%)	0 (0%)	3 (5.9%)
Fanatic	2 (9.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (3.9%)

**Table 6.** Frequency of articles (percentage of all British articles that provide a frame) for each “other” frame identified in the sample by coded by background of the perpetrator.

	Background of perpetrator			
	Islamist (N=77)	Far-right (N=19)	Non-ideological (N=2)	Total (N=98)
Fanatic	20 (26%)	3 (15.8%)	0 (0%)	23 (23.5%)
Young	7 (9.1%)	1 (5.3%)	0 (0%)	8 (8.2%)
Normal	6 (7.8%)	2 (10.5%)	0 (0%)	8 (8.2%)
Educated	2 (2.6%)	2 (10.5%)	1 (50%)	5 (5.1%)
Evil	0 (0%)	4 (2.1%)	0 (0%)	4 (4.1%)
Disaffected	4 (5.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	4 (4.1%)

Table 3 shows that the fourth most common framework used to label lone-actors in the Netherlands is disaffected (21.6%). However, looking at table 6, disaffected is not a common framework used in the United Kingdom. Notably table 6 shows that disaffected is one of the least used framework in the UK. In the UK the frame of disaffected is only used 4 times which is in total 4.1% of all the articles.

Another distinction is that in the British articles, the fourth most common framework is fanatic. The frame fanatic was 23 times (23.5%) applied as frame. Table 3, on the other

hand, shows that in the Netherlands lone-actors are not often framed as fanatic. The Dutch newspapers only used the frame 2 times (3.9%). Although what is a small similarity for both countries is that the frame fanatic is used to describe a perpetrator pertained mostly to an Islamist background. In the UK the frame fanatic was used in 20 articles (26%) describing a perpetrator with an Islamist background, and 3 times (15.8%) describing a perpetrator with a far-right background. In the Netherlands the frame occurred in 2 articles (9.5%) portraying a perpetrator with an Islamist background, and zero times portraying a perpetrator with a far-right background.

A similarity between the Dutch and the British framing and the background of the perpetrator is the tendency to frame lone-actors as young in combination with an Islamist background. 7 (9.1%) of the British articles and 7 (33.3%) of the Dutch articles framed lone-actors as young and the perpetrator emerged from an Islamist background. The last corresponding aspect between the countries is that a small proportion (8.2% in the UK and 5.9% in NL) framed lone-actor as normal prior to their attacks.

The newspaper articles provided a frame for understanding lone-actor terrorism. The results showed that the lone-actors in the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark are most likely to be framed as mentally ill, violent, criminal and isolated. The results also showed that there is a distinction in framing when it comes down to the Islamist and far-right background that the perpetrator pertained. Perpetrators pertaining an Islamist background are more likely to be characterised as violent, fanatic and young, and perpetrators with a far-right background are more likely to be framed as mentally ill. The above were the results, now we move on to the discussion.

## 6. Discussion

This section contributes insight into debates on media reports on lone-actor terrorism. All of the debates relate to at least one of three audiences identified earlier. These audiences are general public, affected communities and potential copycat attackers.

The first discussion entails the amplification of the perpetrator's message and the influence on copycat attackers and the general public. The media has the potential by amplifying the perpetrator's message to inspire potential copycats and influence the general public (Parker et al., 2011: 3). Only a few articles in all three the countries amplified a lone-actor's grievance or goal in detail. Nevertheless, the Dutch data set contained the highest amount of articles amplifying the perpetrator's message. In total 18.4% of the articles promoted a lone-actor's grievance or goal in detail, which is in total only few. However, it is always one too much as the coverage of lone-actor terrorism may act as a "force multiplier for terrorist campaigns" (Hamm and Spaaij 2017:177). There is no explanation why the Dutch data set contained the highest amount of articles amplifying the perpetrator's message. On the other hand, after 2011 the amount of articles amplifying the perpetrator's message declined. This can possibly be explained by scientific research that shows that not spending time focussing on the perpetrator's message, which glorifies the attackers, it makes the attacker powerless and ineffectual (Borum, Fein and Voskuil, 2012: 390). And by research recommendations about counterterrorism approaches of Bakker and de Graaf (2011: 48) that entail that it is important to refrain from handing the perpetrators the public theatre they strive for. Lone wolves should be handled without giving them any positive public status.

Thus, the amount of articles promoting the perpetrator's message declined in the Netherland since 2011. As the result of this reduction in our findings and the fewer articles in the other data sets, the results support studies which conclude that only a minority of reports actively and in detail convey terrorist's grievances (Abrahams, 2014:8). Which is positive, because glamorisation of the perpetrator may increase the appeal to other people (Horaro, 2017: 12-13) or install fear within the general public (Slone and Shoshani, 2006). A contemporary example of not glamorising a perpetrator is the attack in Christchurch. The Prime Minister said: "But if I speak, he will remain nameless..... We must do what we can to prevent him from getting the fame he is looking for"<sup>28</sup>. It is especially important because it looks like that the attacks now a day are inspired by previous attacks.

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<sup>28</sup> AD (2018), "Premier Nieuw-Zeeland: Nooit meer naam van schutter Christchurch noemen, 19 april <https://www.ad.nl/buitenland/premier-nieuw-zeeland-nooit-meer-naam-van-schutter-christchurch-noemen~a40e7dc1/> (visited on April 20 2018).

The second discussion entails the amplifications of state's messages and the influence on copycat attackers. The amplification of state's messaging could influence copycat attackers. State's messaging that could indirectly inspire copycats and the perpetrator's message combined in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is higher than state's messaging that could indirectly deter copycats. This increases the potential for reporting to contribute to copycat attacks and enemies look more capable and competent than they really are (Horaro, 2017: 15). They look more capable and competent if their message is glamorised. There is no possible explanation found why the media amplifies the messages of the perpetrator and state's weaknesses more than the state's strengths.

Nevertheless, looking closer into state's counterterrorism capabilities. State's messaging that could indirectly deter copycats is higher in the Netherlands than messages that could inspire copycats by reporting state weaknesses. The amount of Dutch articles amplifying the counterterrorism strengths is the highest of all the three countries. The high amount of articles can possibly be explained because the Netherlands is looking for a new cooperation between the AIVD, Police and mental health institutes in order to detect lone-actor terrorist. As Bakker and Zuijdewijn (2016: 3) recommend: "The other one is sharing (sensitive) information between relevant actors, in particular between mental health practitioners and law enforcement. Of course it is important to be aware and respect legal and ethical boundaries".

The results also showed that most state amplification is event driven. A possible explanation is that research showed that counterterrorism communication is a crucial aspect of overall strategy, and post attack messaging is important for deterrence (Fischhoff, 2011: 2). Post-attack messaging is important because it can affect copycats, which makes post event communication important to protect against further attacks (Reed and Ingram, 2017: 13). The results showed that most state amplification is event driven, which can be explained because the immediate period after security related events is more vulnerable to lone-actor attacks and efforts should be taken to prevent this event triggered motivation (Perry, Hasisi and Perry 2017: 909). Especially as Hamm and Spaaij (2017: 45) found evidence that the copycat phenomenon is present in a third of the cases. Thus post event media amplification of state's message in the period shortly thereafter, is relevant because it could indirectly inspire or deter copycats.

The results showed thus that the amplification of state's message is event driven. It could possibly explain why the counterterrorism weaknesses (12 articles) and strengths (13 articles) are even in the United Kingdom. After an attack, statements mostly are made about

state vulnerabilities but also strengths to conquer these vulnerabilities. The United Kingdom has dealt with more attacks closer to home, leading up to more statements including counterterrorism capabilities. Denmark and the Netherlands has dealt with none/less attacks on their own soil, therefore it would make sense that less statement about vulnerabilities will be made.

The third discussion involves the distinct framing and possible implications for the community the perpetrator emerges from. The data sets revealed that lone-actors pertaining an Islamist background are framed differently than lone-actors pertaining a far-right background. Lone-actors related to an Islamist background are more likely to be characterised as violent and young, and lone-actors related to a far-right background are more likely to be framed as mentally ill. That the results showed that lone-actors pertaining an Islamist background are more often framed as violent is actually strange. Research showed that far-right lone-actor terrorist attacks were more lethal than religiously inspired attacks (Ellis et al. 2016: 7-8). If causing more casualties it would be logical that the lone-actor would be framed as violent? In spite of framing lone-actors pertaining a far-right background as violent, lone-actors pertaining an Islamist background are more likely to be framed as violent, which is strange and unexplainable.

The different framing of lone-actors supports that framing lone-actor terrorism can affect affected communities, which are the communities from which the perpetrator emerges. It supports the research that terrorism often leads to societal bias towards all members of religious or ethnic groups affiliated with the perpetrator (Steele et al., 2017:2). As Horaro (2017: 15-16) points out that media reporting on terrorism issues has its tendency to homogenise and securitise Muslim communities living in the West and beyond. The problem occurs that this difference in framing of lone-actor attackers contributes to radicalisation influence by fuelling existing perceptions that Muslims are treated as an out group (Parker et al. 2017: 276-277). The results of all the three cases support that Muslim communities may be at risk that the media portrays Islam in terms of difference, risk and violence and terrorism (Ahmed and Metthes, 2017: 221-222).

The fourth discussion also discusses the distinct framing and possible implications for the community the perpetrator emerges from. The results showed that lone-actors pertaining a far-right background are more often framed as mentally ill. A possible explanation is that in the court case of Breivik, it was often speculated if Breivik was mentally ill. This could bias our results. However looking into annex 4 showed that only two articles discussed the court



case against Breivik, as a result of which this possible explanation can be rejected.

Looking closer into the frame mental illness and its implications. Framings in media coverage are not always reflective of the characteristics of lone attackers and has the potential to stigmatise affected communities. A study of lone-actor terrorists in the European Union between 2000 and 2015 found that 35 percent of the perpetrators suffered from some kind of mental disorder (Bakker and de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2016: 7). While this is a genuine characteristic of some lone attackers, we must always remember that this characteristic does not apply to everyone. Mostly because framing of lone attackers as mentally ill could influence public perceptions of mental illness. Studies have found that reporting on terrorist acts by perpetrators with suspected mental illness increased public perceptions of mental illness as dangerous and unpredictable (Schomerus et al. 2017)

The results of the datasets supports Borums' (2013: 107) statement: "If the subject... been given some diagnostic label, then there is a common tendency to regard that label as master explanation of the subjects' thinking, motives and behaviour". It can be forgotten that mental illness does not cause lone wolf terrorism by framing lone-actor as mentally ill, because there is a difference between cause and effect terrorism (Hamm and Spaaij, 2017:53-55).

The last discussion entails the increase of anxiety in the general public caused by framing. The findings in all the countries showed that lone-actor terrorism is seen as an increasing and/or significant problem. It is almost never framed in the countries as rare. By framing lone-actor terrorism as an increasing and/or significant problem, it can enhance anxiety in the general public. This framing of lone-actor terrorism differs from reality. Research showed that across thirty European countries (European Union and Norway and Switzerland) between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2014, 72 lone-actor attacks were successful (Ellis et al., 2016: 5-6). Ellis et al. frame lone-actor terrorism in Europe as rare, because in ten of the thirty countries studied, no lone-actor terrorist plot could be identified across fifteen years (2016: 7). Logical would be if the amount of anxiety in the United Kingdom is higher than in the other countries, because more lone-actor attacks took place there. Focussing on the Netherlands, lone-actors are mentioned in the annual reports of the AIVD and NCTV, however not as a threat on their own<sup>2930</sup>. These findings show that the reality differs from how the media frames lone-actor terrorism.

This section gave insight into debates on media reports on lone-actor terrorism. The

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<sup>29</sup> AIVD, 2019. "Jaarverslag 2018", Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties: Den Haag.

<sup>30</sup> NCTV, 2019. "Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 49", Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid: Den Haag.

first discussion gave insight to amplification of the perpetrator's message and copycats. Amplifying the perpetrator's message could inspire possible copycats, and there is no possible explanation found why the Dutch data set contained the highest amount of articles amplifying the perpetrator's message. On the other hand, after 2011 the amount of articles amplifying the perpetrator's message declined. This descent can be explained by scientific recommendation to not convey terrorist's grievances. By doing so copycat will be less inspired and fear will be less spread within in the general public.

The second discussion entailed the amplification of state's message and copycats. The amplification of state's messaging could influence copycat attackers. There is no possible explanation found why the media amplifies the messages of the perpetrator's and state's weaknesses more than the state's strengths in the UK and NL. However, the amount of Dutch articles amplifying the counterterrorism strengths is the highest of all the three countries. The high amount could possibly be explained by the reason that the Netherlands is looking for a new cooperation between various public and private organisations. The results also showed that state amplification is event driven, which is important for the deterrence of copycats because post event communication can protect against further lone-actor attacks.

The third and fourth discussion involves the distinct framing and possible implications for the community the perpetrator emerges from. The data sets revealed that lone-actors pertaining an Islamist background are framed differently than lone-actors pertaining a far-right background. However, it is strange that perpetrators pertaining an Islamist background are more likely to be framed as violent, while they cause less fatalities. This distinction in framing can affect affected communities caused by societal bias. Muslim communities can be homogenised and securitised, and mental illness could be seen as characteristic of lone-actors.

The last discussion entails the increase of anxiety in the general public caused by framing. The findings in all the countries showed that lone-actor terrorism is seen as an increasing and/or significant problem. These findings show that the reality differs from how the media frames lone-actor terrorism, as lone-actor terrorism in Europe is actually rare.

## 7. Conclusion

This study aimed to examine how the Dutch press covered lone-actor terrorism in the period between January 1<sup>st</sup> 2009 until February 28<sup>th</sup> 2015, with respect to the amplification of state's and/or perpetrator's message and the framing of the perpetrator, and what it implied giving the media its potential role in shaping the reactions of the public, affected communities and the copycat attackers.

The media plays a role in shaping the reactions of the public, affected communities and copycat attackers when it comes to the subject of lone-actor terrorism. They can shape the reactions of the three audiences through the amplification of state's and perpetrator's message and by the framing of the perpetrator. Considering the perpetrator's message the results showed that the Netherlands amplified the lone-actor's message the most by publishing more articles containing the perpetrator's message. However, the amount of articles promoting the perpetrator's message declined in the Netherlands since 2011. As the result of this reduction in our findings and the fewer articles in the other data sets, the results support studies which conclude that only a minority of reports actively and in detail convey terrorist grievances. A decrease in articles is positive, because glamorisation of the perpetrator may increase the appeal copycats or install fear within the general public.

Examining the state's message showed that state's messaging that could indirectly deter copycats is higher in the Netherlands than messages that inspire copycats by reporting state weaknesses. However, combining all the data sets, more articles amplify terrorist narratives or state counterterrorism weakness (23.4%) than state counterterrorism strengths (13.5%). This increases the potential for reporting to contribute to copycat attacks. However, the results showed that most state amplification is event driven, which is important for deterrence, because post event media amplification of state's or terrorist's message in the period shortly thereafter is relevant because it could indirectly inspire or deter copycats. Besides, the amount Dutch articles amplifying the counterterrorism strengths is the highest of all the three countries. The high amount could possibly be explained by the reason that the Netherlands is looking for a new cooperation between various public and private organisations.

Lastly looking into framing of lone-actor terrorism. Most applied frameworks are mentally ill, violent, criminal and isolated in the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark. Muslims are more likely to be characterised as violent and young, and far-right actors are more likely to be framed as mentally ill. This distinct in findings supports that framing lone-actor terrorism affect affected communities, which are the communities from which the

perpetrator emerges. It supports the research that terrorism often leads to societal bias towards all members of religious or ethnic groups affiliated with the perpetrator. The results of all the three cases support that Muslim communities may be at risk that the media frame Islam in terms of difference, risk and violence and terrorism. It is strange that perpetrators pertaining an Islamist background are more likely to be framed as violent, while they cause less fatalities. Looking into the framework of mentally ill, and while this is a genuine characteristic of some lone attackers, we must always remember that this characteristic does not apply to everyone. Mostly because framing of lone attackers as mentally ill could influence public perceptions of mental illness. Studies have found that reporting on terrorist acts by perpetrators with suspected mental illness increased public perceptions of mental illness as dangerous and unpredictable. Lastly, lone-actor terrorism is seen as an increasing and/or significant problem. The results showed that the reality differs from how the media frames lone-actor terrorism, as lone-actor terrorism in Europe is actually rare.

Hence, the media has a positive and negative influence covering lone-actor terrorism in shaping the reactions of the public, affected communities and copycat attackers with respect to the amplification of state's and/or perpetrator's message and the framing of the perpetrator. Examining and adding the Dutch case gave insight into the trend in the Netherlands across a five-year period, understanding the extent to which the media amplifies either terrorist's or state's messages and exploring how the media frame lone-actors and to compare the finding to studies of the United Kingdom and Denmark. The results implied that the amount of media amplification of the perpetrator's messages and state's weaknesses could provide inspiration for copycats is decreasing. This decrease takes on a possible positive effect, namely less lone-actor attacks because lone-actors are less inspired. In addition, less negative media can decrease the fear installed into the public.

The results also suggested that the amplification of state's strengths in the Netherlands is the highest. Focus on these strengths is positive for the deterrence of copycats, and also leaves behind a clear message that the Netherlands is looking for new cooperations between organisations to detect lone-actors. Lastly looking closer into framing, showed that framing is mostly similar in all the three countries. We noticed a difference in framing of perpetrators pertaining to an Islamist background and to a far-right background. The difference can involve negative effects that can be worrisome because perpetrators pertaining to an Islamist background can be homogenised, and mental illness could be seen as a characteristic of far-right lone-actor terrorism.

This research was limited because it is only focussing on newspaper articles. It might

be interesting to broaden the media coverage by for instance including news broadcastings. Another restriction is the fact that the beginning of 2015 is already a while ago. The broadening of the time frame is interesting to look at, because new lone-actor attacks took place, even in the Netherlands.

The last suggestion for further research is that we have seen that the amount of articles focussing on articles discussing a lone-actor attack carried out by an Islamist perpetrator is higher than one carried out by a far-right perpetrators. Especially in the United Kingdom the amount was higher, and then in Denmark. The reason that the focus on lone-actor terrorism is higher on their own soil, is that almost mostly only Islamist lone-actor attacks took place on their soil. It is interesting for further research to examine an event equally far away from all the three countries, and see what kind of result it will unravel.

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Annex 1. Chosen Dutch newspaper articles – General findings

<b>Number</b>	<b>Headline</b>	<b>Publication</b>	<b>Summary</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Category of terrorism</b>	<b>General discussion of lone-actor terrorism</b>
1.	<b>TERREURDREIGING Waarschuwingbelletje uit Brussel met politie Amsterdam - 'Ze streven naar heel veel slachtoffers'</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Bombthreat IKEA, Mediamarkt en Decathlon	13-3-2009	No	No
2.	<b>Gefrustreerde ouders steken elkaar aan;En het arsenaal aan geweldsmiddelen is, met dank aan internet, almaar gegroeid</b>	NRC Handelsblad	General discussion of lone-actor terrorism	6-5-2009	No	Yes
3.	<b>We vieren de vrijheid';Eensgezindheid kenmerkt 5 meiviering Festivals in het hele land druk bezocht</b>	De Telegraaf	Concerning about 5th of may celebration	6-5-2009	No	No
4.	<b>We willen herdenken én vieren'</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Concerning about 5th of may celebration	6-5-2009	No	No
5.	<b>Angst voor nieuwe terreurgolf Rusland laait op;Aanslag op drukke forenzentrein Moskou-Sint-Petersburg lijkt sterk op terreuractie in 2007</b>	NRC Handelsblad,	Attack train Moskou-Sint Petersburg	30-11-2009	No	No

6.	<b>VS: aanslag was actie van eenling;Nigeriaan claimt banden met Al Qaida</b>	de Volkskrant	Attack attempt details on Airplane above Detroit	28-12-2009	Islamist	No
7.	<b>ISLAMITISCH LAND IN TREK BIJ RADICALISERENDE WESTERLING, ZEGGEN EXPERTS - 'Jemen broeinst terrorisme'</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Yemen as the new hotbed for terrorism	30-12-2009	Islamist	Yes
8.	<b>De grenzen van Obama's handreikingenbeleid;Column Terreur en de VS</b>	de Volkskrant	Overview of a year with Obama in power focussed on attacks on US soil	30-12-2009	Islamist	No
9.	<b>Obama valt inlichtingendiensten aan</b>	de Volkskrant	Obama attacks intelligence services due to having sufficient information in hand to have discovered the plan	7-1-2010	Islamist	No
10.	<b>ONDERBROEK-AANSLAGPLEGER - VOORBEELD VAN NIEUWE WERKWIJZE VAN AL-QAEDA</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Underpants bomber - example of new method of Al Qaeda	4-2-2010	Islamist	Yes
11.	<b>Web van camera's na 'bom' New York</b>	de Volkskrant	Attack attempt Times Square	4-5-2010	No	No
12.	<b>Terrorismedreiging komt van eenlingen</b>	de Volkskrant	Terrorism threat comes from	6-5-	Islamist	Yes

			individuals	2010		
13.	<b>Faisal Shahzad nieuwe terrorist</b>	De Telegraaf	New pattern in international Islamic terrorism.	7-5-2010	Islamist	Yes
14.	<b>Dreiging vaak het werk van gefrustreerde eenling; Politie hield potentiële bedreigers bezig tijdens laatste Koninginnedag</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Background lone-actors	2-7-2010	No	Yes
15.	<b>Bedreiger vaak verwarde eenling</b>	de Volkskrant	Research: perpetrator often confused loner	2-7-2010	No	Yes
16.	<b>Justitie op zoek naar ongekende dreiger; Publieke personen moeilijk te beschermen tegen stille eenling Karst T. bekendste voorbeeld</b>	Trouw	Research: extra attention for people who express threats on their own	2-7-2010	No	Yes
17.	<b>GEVAARLIJKE GEKKEN 'Zachte jacht' op; NIEUWE AANPAK MOET BEDREIGERS IN VROEG STADIUM ONSCHADELIJK MAKEN Psychiater goedkoper en effectiever dan kordon bewakers "Even wijkagent langs zo'n manisch- depressieve gast sturen"</b>	De Telegraaf	Lone wolf should not be behind bars, but in therapy.	17-7-2010	No	Yes
18.	<b>Les in terreur is in Pakistan zo te krijgen; Dreiging aanslag Europa blijft</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Warning new trend: the lone wolf, and terrorist	20-10-2010	Islamist	Yes

			training in Pakistan			
19.	<b>Zieke, boze eenling gijzelde New York;Sporen 16 november 1940</b>	de Volkskrant	In the forties and fifties, New York also had to deal with the threat of attacks	15-11-2010	Far left, far right, Islamist	No
20.	<b>Op zoek naar massa slachtoffers;Aanhouding van 19-jarige Amerikaanse moslim resultaat van grote infiltratie-operatie FBIInfiltratie onderdeel van strategie</b>	de Volkskrant	Foiled attack by American teenager Mohamed Osman Mohamud	29-11-2010	Islamist	No
21.	<b>Schietpartij schokt VS;Politiek klimaat in VS tot op het bot verziekt</b>	De Telegraaf	The attack on the Democratic congressman, Gabrielle Giffords	10-1-2011	No	No
22.	<b>VS-soldaten dood bij aanslag</b>	De Telegraaf	Attack on German airport Frankfurt	3-3-2011	Islamist	No
23.	<b>Bom schrikt Jeruzalem op</b>	de Volkskrant	Bomattack Jeruzalem	24-3-2011	Palestine	No
24.	<b>De jacht op de gestoorde eenling;reportage Voorbereidingen voor Koninginnedag in Thorn</b>	de Volkskrant	Preparations Queensday	29-4-2011	No	No
25.	<b>EENLING IN WAANZIN;Massamoordenaar gaf</b>	De Telegraaf	Attack Norway by Breivik and	25-7-2011	Far right	No

	<b>troetelnamen aan z n geweren</b>		background			
<b>26.</b>	<b>Ontspoorde eenlingen opsporen is bijna onmogelijk</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Lone actor is hard to detect - attack Breivik and McVeigh	25-7-2011	Far right	Yes
<b>27.</b>	<b>Noorse terrorist heeft kenmerken 'lone wolf'</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Is Breivik a lone wolf?	25-7-2011	Far right	No
<b>28.</b>	<b>Extremisme en waanzin bieden geen verklaring;Opinie</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Perpetrators in the public space who randomly kill people are a characteristic form of violence of the present time	25-7-2011	Far right, Islamist, other	Yes
<b>29.</b>	<b>Extreem-rechts organiseert zich nu op internet</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Lessons from the Norwegian tragedy for other countries	25-7-2011	Far right	No
<b>30.</b>	<b>Terrorisme-experts zeggen maar wat</b>	Trouw	Speculations about perpetrators (attacks)	25-7-2011	Far right, Islamist	No
<b>31.</b>	<b>De buurjongen als terrorist;Profiel Timothy McVeigh, Oklahoma 1995, 168 doden</b>	de Volkskrant	Background Timothy McVeigh	25-7-2011	Far right	No

32.	<b>Iedereen in Noorwegen heeft wel iets verloren op 22/7;Reportage Het hart van de Noorse democratie werd twee maal geraakt</b>	de Volkskrant	Attack Breivik	25-7-2011	Far right	No
33.	<b>Parallellen met dader Oklahoma</b>	Trouw	Attack Breivik in comparison with Timothy McVeigh	26-7-2011	Far right	No
34.	<b>Is dit 'vechten voor onze cultuur'?</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Attack Breivik	26-7-2011	Far right	No
35.	<b>Na vrijdag is wereld voor PVV een andere</b>	de Volkskrant	Attack Breivik implications for the Netherlands	26-7-2011	Far right	No
36.	<b>De eenzame wolf wordt door vrienden gepakt</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Preventing an lone actor attack is almost impossible	27-7-2011	Islamist, far right	Yes
37.	<b>AIVD: overheid is niet blind voor het type 'solistische dreiger'</b>	de Volkskrant	Approach to extreme right in the Netherlands	27-7-2011	Far right	No
38.	<b>Noren schrikken van barsten in hun homogene paradijs;reportage een week na de aanslagen van anders breivik</b>	de Volkskrant	Aftermath attack Breivik	30-7-2011	Far right	No
39.	<b>Moeilijk in de omgang, weinig tot geen behoefte aan contact</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Background Breivik	30-7-2011	Far right	No
40.	<b>Geert Wilders is niet verantwoordelijk,</b>	Trouw	Aftermath attack Breivik/	4-8-	Far right	No



	<b>maar ...</b>		implications for the Netherlands	2011		
41.	<b>Zwagerman leest;2083 voor zijn sociale isolement was breivik ein kind unserer welt</b>	de Volkskrant	Background and manifest discussion Breivik	10-8-2011	Far right	No
42.	<b>Breivik klinkt bedrieglijk vertrouwd</b>	Trouw	Analysis Breivik manifest	13-8-2011	Far right	No
43.	<b>Noorse moslims maken zich geen illusies</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Beforehand affraid that attack Norway was carried out by Islamist	17-8-2011	No	No
44.	<b>Obama: Eenling-terrorist is grootste gevaar</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Obama: biggest threat is lone actor	18-8-2011	No	Yes
45.	<b>De angel uit de angst</b>	de Volkskrant	Balance of the last decade in the Netherlands in terms of attacks	10-9-2011	Islamist	No
46.	<b>Breivik was radicale eenling'</b>	Trouw	Letter from Minister Donner to the parliament, concerning Attack Breivik	14-9-2011	Far right	No
47.	<b>Moslimmoeders saboteren djihad</b>	Trouw	Manifest Breivik	8-10-2011	Far right	No

48.	<b>Zieleven van een terrorist</b>	Trouw	Manifest Breivik	19-11-2011	Far right	No
49.	<b>Aanslag op postkantoren New York verijdeld' Burgemeester Bloomberg: stad is tien jaar na 9/11 nog altijd een doelwit</b>	de Volkskrant	Attack attempt postoffice New York	22-11-2011	Islamist	No
50.	<b>tofik;tekstGreta RiemersmafotografieRobin de PuyVolkskrant magazineInterviewinterviewTofik DibiTofik Dibiinterview</b>	de Volkskrant	Interview member of parliament Tofik Dibi	3-12-2011	Far right	No
51.	<b>Liberaal Bosnië schrikt van zijn radicale islamieten</b>	Trouw	Bosnia and its radical Muslims (attack)	10-2-2012	Islamist	No
52.	<b>Al-Qaeda aast op Olympische Spelen</b>	De Telegraaf	British security forces afraid of attack during the Olympic Games	14-2-2012	Islamist	No
53.	<b>De doe-het-zelf radicalisering</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Attack Toulouse	24-3-2012	Islamist	No
54.	<b>Frankrijk twijfelt of moordenaar 'eenzame wolf' is Radicale Merah kreeg hulp bij aanslag</b>	de Volkskrant	Attack Toulouse	28-3-2012	Islamist	No
55.	<b>Hoe eenzaam de eenzame wolf ook is, zelfs hij heeft zo zijn contacten</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Start court case against Breivik - How lonely is a	16-4-2012	Islamist, far right	Yes

			lone actor			
<b>56.</b>	<b>Breivik-retoriek;In Nederland</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Start court case against Breivik	18-4-2012	Far right	No
<b>57.</b>	<b>Breivik haalt ridderhelden uit games en van Wikipedia</b>	de Volkskrant	Start court case against Breivik - background	19-4-2012	Far right	No
<b>58.</b>	<b>AIVD ziet toename van het aantal jihadreizen</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	AIVD annual report on terrorist violence in the Netherlands	20-4-2012	Islamist, far right	No
<b>59.</b>	<b>Column Hans Schnitzler Breivik is onze eigen Bin Laden</b>	de Volkskrant	Start court case against Breivik - background	27-6-2012	Far right	No
<b>60.</b>	<b>Sikhs voelen zich onveilig;Honderden incidenten sinds aanslag op de Twin Towers</b>	De Telegraaf	Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting	7-8-2012	Far right	No
<b>61.</b>	<b>Amsterdam vreest radicale eenlingen</b>	De Telegraaf	Amsterdam fears attacks	28-8-2012	No	No
<b>62.</b>	<b>Regelrechte godsdienstoorlog;Jihadisten jagen op christenen in Azië en Afrika</b>	De Telegraaf	Jihadists hunt Christians in Asia and Africa	1-9-2012	Islamist	No
<b>63.</b>	<b>Franse scootermoorden jaar later nog mysterie</b>	de Volkskrant	Year after attack Toulouse	19-3-2013	Islamist	No

64.	<b>Spanning is te snijden in aanloop naar de inhuldiging</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Tension in the run up to abdication of the throne in the Netherlands	16-4-2013	No	No
65.	<b>`Terroristen willen hiermee laten zien dat ze er nog zijn'</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Boston bombing - who's behind the attack?	17-4-2013	No	No
66.	<b>Gisteren Boston, morgen hier ;AIVD heeft handen vol aan terreurdreiging</b>	De Telegraaf	Warning by terrorism expert about possible attack in the Netherlands	17-4-2013	No	No
67.	<b>Snelkookpan</b>	de Volkskrant	Boston bombing - who's behind the attack?	17-4-2013	No	No
68.	<b>Was het een crimineel of toch een djihadist?</b>	Trouw	Boston bombing - who's behind the attack?	18-4-2013	Islamist	No
69.	<b>Maak `lone wolf' niet nog eenzamer</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Warning: don't make lone wolf even lonely	19-4-2013	No	Yes
70.	<b>Gevaarlijke eenling in vizier</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Report about possible Dutch lone wolfs	19-4-2013	No	No

71.	<b>Aanslag Boston was in uitvoering Breivikiaans';Interview John Berger, expert terrorisme</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Analysis domestic terrorism in the US	22-4-2013	Far right, Islamist	No
72.	<b>Vrijgezel, gefrustreerd en gevaarlijk;Politie houdt tientallen 'potentieel gewelddadige eenlingen' in de gaten voor 30 april</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Tension in the run up to throne change	23-4-2013	No	No
73.	<b>Experts</b>	de Volkskrant	Experts about lone-actors	24-4-2013	No	Yes
74.	<b>Isolement van eenling kan gevaarlijk zijn</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Isolation of a loner can be dangerous	25-4-2013	Far right	Yes
75.	<b>Natuurlijk kan het vandaag misgaan</b>	de Volkskrant	Tension in the run up to throne change	30-4-2013	No	No
76.	<b>Eenzame wolven of toch een georganiseerde terreurgroep?</b>	Trouw	Attack British soldier in London	24-5-2013	Islamist	No
77.	<b>Daders waren al bekend bij autoriteiten</b>	de Volkskrant	Attack British soldier in London - background perpetrators	24-5-2013	Islamist	No
78.	<b>De terreur van Al Qaida heeft een nieuw gezicht</b>	de Volkskrant	Attack British soldier in London	24-5-2013	Islamist	No
79.	<b>Solitaire terrorist is moeilijk te stuiten</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Problems with advance of lone actor	24-5-2013	Islamist	Yes

80.	<b>Ik weet waarom jullie komen, zegt de Parijse messensteker;m/v in het nieuws 'Eenzame wolf' Alexandre D.</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Attack France soldier in Paris - background perpetrator	30-5-2013	Islamist	No
81.	<b>De NSA kon Boston niet voorkomen'</b>	de Volkskrant	Interview Boston police chief about Bosting bombing and how the NSA could not have prevented the attack	14-6-2013	No	No
82.	<b>Ophef over proefverlof Van der G.</b>	de Volkskrant	Request for parole Volkert van der G.	3-10-2013	Environmentalist	No
83.	<b>Koekhappen is zó 2014, maar wat moeten ze straks?</b>	Trouw	Tension in the run up to Kings' day	25-4-2014	No	No
84.	<b>'Ze willen Volkertpakken'</b>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Parole granted for Volkert van der G. - scare for revenge	2-5-2014	Environmentalist, far right	No
85.	<b>Broer Pim Fortuyn hangt vlag halfstok</b>	De Telegraaf	Parole granted for Volkert van der G. - scare for revenge	2-5-2014	Environmentalist, far right	No
86.	<b>Wat zijn de nieuwe djihadisten van plan?</b>	Trouw	Plan of returning Jihadi	4-6-2014	Islamist	No
87.	<b>Gezocht: anti-gif tegen jihadisten</b>	NRC Handelsblad	Returning Jihadi	6-6-2014	Islamist	No

88.	Acties tegen terroristen hielden VS tot nu toe veilig'	Trouw	Not one large attack since 13 years in the US, only lone wolves	27-9-2014	Islamist	No
89.	Alom paniek na aanslag in Ottawa	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	Attack Ottawa	23-10-2014	Islamist	No
90.	Canada herdenkt vermoorde militair Nathan Cirillo	Trouw	Attack Ottawa	24-10-2014	Islamist	No
91.	Vluchten kan niet meer;Analyse: Ook Australië niet immuun voor terreur	De Telegraaf	Hostage action in Sydney	16-12-2014	Islamist	No
92.	Lone wolf is vaak psychisch ziek'	de Volkskrant	Discussion of lone wolf	17-12-2014	No	Yes
93.	Wat is ons antwoord op de aanslag in Parijs?	de Volkskrant	Attack Paris - inspiration	9-1-2015	Islamist	No
94.	Satire is geen vrijbrief	NRC Handelsblad	Attack Paris	9-1-2015	Islamist	No
95.	<a href="#">10 jaar na 'Van Gogh' gaan ook moslims mee de straat op</a>	AD/Algemeen Dagblad	More than 10 years after the murder of Theo van Gogh, the Netherlands reacts horrified to the attack in Paris	10-1-2015	Islamist	No
96.	<a href="#">Parijs' was mogelijk poging van Al</a>	de Volkskrant	Attack Paris -	10-1-	Islamist	No

	<a href="#">Oaida om IS te overtroeven</a>		background	2015		
97.	<a href="#">Terrorist was niet alleen</a>	De Telegraaf, Buitenland	Brussels Jewish Museum attack	24-1- 2015	Islamist	No
98.	<a href="#">De lone wolf bestaat niet</a>	de Volkskrant,	Lone wolf does not exist	31-1- 2015	No	Yes

Annex 2. Chosen Dutch newspaper articles – Amplification of perpetrator message

Number	Headline	Date	Amplification of perpetrators message?
1.	<a href="#">Faisal Shahzad nieuwe terrorist</a>	7-5-2010	Indirectly
2.	<a href="#">Op zoek naar massa slachtoffers;Aanhouding van 19-jarige Amerikaanse moslim resultaat van grote infiltratie-operatie FBIInfiltratie onderdeel van strategie</a>	29-11-2010	Directly
3.	<a href="#">EENLING IN WAANZIN;Massamoordenaar gaf troetelnamen aan z n geweren</a>	25-7-2011	Directly
4.	<a href="#">De buurjongen als terrorist;Profiel Timothy McVeigh, Oklahoma 1995, 168 doden</a>	25-7-2011	Indirectly
5.	<a href="#">Parallellen met dader Oklahoma</a>	26-7-2011	Indirectly
6.	<a href="#">Is dit 'vechten voor onze cultuur'?</a>	26-7-2011	Indirectly
7.	<a href="#">Brevik klinkt bedrieglijk vertrouwd</a>	13-8-2011	Indirectly



8.	<a href="#">Moslimmoeders saboteren djihad</a>	8-10-2011	Indirectly
9.	<a href="#">Zieleleven van een terrorist</a>	19-11-2011	Indirectly
10.	<a href="#">Aanslag op postkantoren New York verijdeld' Burgemeester Bloomberg: stad is tien jaar na 9/11 nog altijd een doelwit</a>	22-11-2011	Indirectly
11.	<a href="#">De doe-het-zelf radicalisering</a>	24-3-2012	Indirectly
12.	<a href="#">Frankrijk twijfelt of moordenaar 'eenzame wolf' is Radicale Merah kreeg hulp bij aanslag</a>	28-3-2012	Indirectly
13.	<a href="#">Breivik haalt ridderhelden uit games en van Wikipedia</a>	19-4-2012	Indirectly
14.	<a href="#">Sikhs voelen zich onveilig;Honderden incidenten sinds aanslag op de Twin Towers</a>	7-8-2012	Indirectly
15.	<a href="#">Regelrechte godsdienstoorlog;Jihadisten jagen op christenen in Azië en Afrika</a>	1-9-2012	Indirectly
16.	<a href="#">Eenzame wolven of toch een georganiseerde terreurgroep?</a>	24-5-2013	Directly
17.	<a href="#">De terreur van Al Oaida heeft een nieuw gezicht</a>	24-5-2013	Directly
18.	<a href="#">Ik weet waarom jullie komen, zegt de Parijse messensteker;m/v in het nieuws 'Eenzame wolf' Alexandre D.</a>	30-5-2013	Indirectly

Annex 3. Chosen Dutch newspaper articles – Amplification of state message

Number	Headline	Date	State counterterrorism capabilities? State
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			strengths/weakness?
1.	<a href="#"><u>TERREURDREIGING Waarschuwingsbelletje uit Brussel met politie Amsterdam - 'Ze streven naar heel veel slachtoffers'</u></a>	13-3-2009	Only statement from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services
2.	<a href="#"><u>Gefrustreerde daders steken elkaar aan;En het arsenaal aan geweldsmiddelen is, met dank aan internet, almaar gegroeid</u></a>	6-5-2009	State weakness
3.	<a href="#"><u>We vieren de vrijheid';Eensgezindheid kenmerkt 5 meiviering Festivals in het hele land druk bezocht</u></a>	6-5-2009	Only statement from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services
4.	<a href="#"><u>We willen herdenken én vieren'</u></a>	6-5-2009	State strength
5.	<a href="#"><u>ISLAMITISCH LAND IN TREK BIJ RADICALISERENDE WESTERLING, ZEGGEN EXPERTS - 'Jemen broeinst terrorisme'</u></a>	30-12-2009	Only statement from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services
6.	<a href="#"><u>Dreiging vaak het werk van gefrustreerde eenling;Politie hield potentiële bedreigers bezig tijdens laatste Koninginnedag</u></a>	2-7-2010	State strength
7.	<a href="#"><u>Bedreiger vaak verwarde eenling</u></a>	2-7-2010	State strength
8.	<a href="#"><u>Justitie op zoek naar ongekende dreiger;Publieke personen moeilijk te beschermen tegen stille eenling Karst T. bekendste voorbeeld</u></a>	2-7-2010	State strength and weakness

9.	<a href="#"><u>GEVAARLIJKE GEKKEN 'Zachte jacht' op:NIEUWE AANPAK MOET BEDREIGERS IN VROEG STADIUM ONSCHADELIJK MAKEN Psychiater goedkoper en effectiever dan kordon bewakers "Even wijkagent langs zo'n manisch- depressieve gast sturen"</u></a>	17-7-2010	State strength
10.	<a href="#"><u>Les in terreur is in Pakistan zo te krijgen;Dreiging aanslag Europa blijft</u></a>	20-10-2010	Only statement from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services
11.	<a href="#"><u>De jacht op de gestoorde eenling;reportage Voorbereidingen voor Koninginnedag in Thorn</u></a>	29-4-2011	State strength
12.	<a href="#"><u>Geert Wilders is niet verantwoordelijk, maar ...</u></a>	4-8-2011	Only statement from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services
13.	<a href="#"><u>Ontspoorde eenlingen opsporen is bijna onmogelijk</u></a>	25-7-2011	State strength and weakness
14.	<a href="#"><u>Is dit 'vechten voor onze cultuur'?</u></a>	26-7-2011	Only statement from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services
15.	<a href="#"><u>De eenzame wolf wordt door vrienden gepakt</u></a>	27-7-2011	State strength and weakness
16.	<a href="#"><u>AIVD: overheid is niet blind voor het type 'solistische dreiger'</u></a>	27-7-2011	State strength and weakness

17.	<a href="#"><u>Breivik was radicale eenling'</u></a>	14-9-2011	State strength and weakness
18.	<a href="#"><u>tofik;tekstGreta RiemersmafotografieRobin de PuyVolkskrant magazineInterviewinterviewTofik DibiTofik Dibiinterview</u></a>	3-12-2011	State weakness
19.	<a href="#"><u>AIVD ziet toename van het aantal jihadreizen</u></a>	20-4-2012	State strength
20.	<a href="#"><u>Amsterdam vreest radicale eenlingen</u></a>	28-8-2012	State strength and weakness
21.	<a href="#"><u>Spanning is te snijden in aanloop naar de inhuldiging</u></a>	16-4-2013	State strength
22.	<a href="#"><u>Gisteren Boston, morgen hier ;AIVD heeft handen vol aan terreurdreiging</u></a>	17-4-2013	State strength
23.	<a href="#"><u>Gevaarlijke eenling in vizier</u></a>	19-4-2013	State strength
24.	<a href="#"><u>Vrijgezel, gefrustreerd en gevaarlijk;Politie houdt tientallen 'potentieel gewelddadige eenlingen' in de gaten voor 30 april</u></a>	23-4-2013	State strength
25.	<a href="#"><u>Natuurlijk kan het vandaag misgaan</u></a>	30-4-2013	State weakness and strength
26.	<a href="#"><u>Solitaire terrorist is moeilijk te stuiten</u></a>	24-5-2013	State weakness
27.	<a href="#"><u>Ophef over proefverlof Van der G.</u></a>	3-10-2013	Only statement from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services
28.	<a href="#"><u>`Ze willenVolkertpakken'</u></a>	2-5-2014	Only statement from elected Dutch officials, security officers or

			intelligence services
29.	<a href="#">Gezocht: anti-gif tegen jihadisten</a>	6-6-2014	State strength
30.	<a href="#">Alom paniek na aanslag in Ottawa</a>	23-10-2014	Sate weakness
31.	<a href="#">10 jaar na 'Van Gogh' gaan ook moslims mee de straat op</a>	10-1-2015	Only statement from elected Dutch officials, security officers or intelligence services

#### Annex 4. Chosen Dutch newspaper articles – Framing

Number	Headline	Date	Frame	Category of terrorism
1.	<a href="#">De grenzen van Obama's handreikingenbeleid;Column Terreur en de VS</a>	30-12-2009	Educated, violent	Islamist
2.	<a href="#">ONDERBROEK-AANSLAGPLEGER - VOORBEELD VAN NIEUWE WERKWIJZE VAN AL-QAEDA</a>	4-2-2010	Isolated, anonymous	Islamist
3.	<a href="#">Terrorismdreiging komt van eenlingen</a>	6-5-2010	Isolated, young	Islamist
4.	<a href="#">Faisal Shahzad nieuwe terrorist</a>	7-5-2010	Discrete, indoctrinated	Islamist
5.	<a href="#">Dreiging vaak het werk van gefrustreerde eenling;Politie hield potentiële bedreigers bezig tijdens laatste Koninginnedag</a>	2-7-2010	Mentally ill, violent, untied, disaffected, criminal,	No

			addicted, isolated	
6.	<a href="#"><u>Bedreiger vaak verwarde eenling</u></a>	2-7-2010	Violent, disaffected, mentally ill	No
7.	<a href="#"><u>Justitie op zoek naar ongekende dreiger;Publieke personen moeilijk te beschermen tegen stille eenling Karst T. bekendste voorbeeld</u></a>	2-7-2010	Disaffected, mentally ill	No
8.	<a href="#"><u>GEVAARLIJKE GEKKEN 'Zachte jacht' op;NIEUWE AANPAK MOET BEDREIGERS IN VROEG STADIUM ONSCHADELIJK MAKEN Psychiater goedkoper en effectiever dan kordon bewakers "Even wijkagent langs zo'n manisch-depressieve gast sturen"</u></a>	17-7-2010	Mentally ill	No
9.	<a href="#"><u>Les in terreur is in Pakistan zo te krijgen;Dreiging aanslag Europa blijft</u></a>	20-10-2010	Violent	Islamist
10.	<a href="#"><u>Zieke, boze eenling gijzelde New York;Sporen 16 november 1940</u></a>	15-11-2010	Mentally ill, disaffected, isolated	Far right
11.	<a href="#"><u>Op zoek naar massa slachtoffers;Aanhouding van 19-jarige Amerikaanse moslim resultaat van grote infiltratie-operatie FBIinfiltratie onderdeel van strategie</u></a>	29-11-2010	Normal, young	Islamist
12.	<a href="#"><u>VS-soldaten dood bij aanslag</u></a>	3-3-2011	Young	Islamist
13.	<a href="#"><u>De jacht op de gestoorde eenling;reportage Voorbereidingen voor Koninginnedag in Thorn</u></a>	29-4-2011	Mentally ill, isolated, low educated	No
14.	<a href="#"><u>EENLING IN WAANZIN;Massamoordenaar gaf troetelnamen</u></a>	25-7-	Mentally ill, violent	Far right

	<a href="#"><u>aan z n geweren</u></a>	2011		
15.	<a href="#"><u>Ontspoorde eenlingen opsporen is bijna onmogelijk</u></a>	25-7-2011	Isolated, mentally ill	Far right
16.	<a href="#"><u>Noorse terrorist heeft kenmerken 'lone wolf'</u></a>	25-7-2011	Mentally ill, isolated, disaffected	Far right
17.	<a href="#"><u>Terrorisme-experts zeggen maar wat</u></a>	25-7-2011	Normal, educated, disaffected	Far right
18.	<a href="#"><u>De buurjongen als terrorist;Profiel Timothy McVeigh, Oklahoma 1995, 168 doden</u></a>	25-7-2011	Violent	Far right
19.	<a href="#"><u>Parallellen met dader Oklahoma</u></a>	26-7-2011	Disaffected, violent	Far right
20.	<a href="#"><u>Is dit 'vechten voor onze cultuur'?</u></a>	26-7-2011	Mentally ill	Far right
21.	<a href="#"><u>Na vrijdag is wereld voor PVV een andere</u></a>	26-7-2011	Mentally ill, educated	Far right
22.	<a href="#"><u>Moeilijk in de omgang, weinig tot geen behoefte aan contact</u></a>	30-7-2011	Isolated	Far right
23.	<a href="#"><u>Geert Wilders is niet verantwoordelijk, maar ...</u></a>	4-8-2011	Mentally ill	Far right
24.	<a href="#"><u>Zwagerman leest;2083 voor zijn sociale isolement was breivik ein kind unserer welt</u></a>	10-8-2011	Isolated, violent, educated, disaffected	Far right
25.	<a href="#"><u>Breivik klinkt bedrieglijk vertrouwd</u></a>	13-8-2011	Mentally ill	Far right

26.	<a href="#"><u>De angel uit de angst</u></a>	10-9-2011	Normal, disaffected, criminal	Islamist
27.	<a href="#"><u>Breivik was radicale eenling'</u></a>	14-9-2011	Mentally ill, violent	Far right
28.	<a href="#"><u>Moslimmoeders saboteren djihad</u></a>	8-10-2011	Mentally ill	Far right
29.	<a href="#"><u>Aanslag op postkantoren New York verijdeld' Burgemeester Bloomberg: stad is tien jaar na 9/11 nog altijd een doelwit</u></a>	22-11-2011	Mentally ill	Islamist
30.	<a href="#"><u>Al-Qaeda aast op Olympische Spelen</u></a>	14-2-2012	Young, fanatic	Islamist
31.	<a href="#"><u>De doe-het-zelf radicalisering</u></a>	24-3-2012	Indoctrinated	Islamist
32.	<a href="#"><u>Frankrijk twijfelt of moordenaar 'eenzame wolf' is Radicale Merah kreeg hulp bij aanslag</u></a>	28-3-2012	Fanatic	Islamist
33.	<a href="#"><u>Hoe eenzaam de eenzame wolf ook is, zelfs hij heeft zo zijn contacten</u></a>	16-4-2012	Mentally ill	Far right
34.	<a href="#"><u>Breivik haalt ridderhelden uit games en van Wikipedia</u></a>	19-4-2012	Mentally ill	Far right
35.	<a href="#"><u>Column Hans Schnitzler Breivik is onze eigen Bin Laden</u></a>	27-6-2012	Mentally ill, isolated	Far right
36.	<a href="#"><u>Sikhs voelen zich onveilig;Honderden incidenten sinds aanslag op de Twin Towers</u></a>	7-8-2012	Violent, disaffected, isolated	Far right
37.	<a href="#"><u>Franse scootermoorden jaar later nog mysterie</u></a>	19-3-	Young, criminal	Islamist



		2013		
38.	<a href="#"><u>Maak 'lone wolf' niet nog eenzamer</u></a>	19-4-2013	Mentally ill	No
39.	<a href="#"><u>Gevaarlijke eenling in vizier</u></a>	19-4-2013	Mentally ill, isolated	No
40.	<a href="#"><u>Vrijgezel, gefrustreerd en gevaarlijk; Politie houdt tientallen 'potentieel gewelddadige eenlingen' in de gaten voor 30 april</u></a>	23-4-2013	Disaffected, violent	No
41.	<a href="#"><u>Isolement van eenling kan gevaarlijk zijn</u></a>	25-4-2013	Isolated, mentally ill	Far right
42.	<a href="#"><u>Eenzame wolven of toch een georganiseerde terreurgroep?</u></a>	24-5-2013	Indoctrinated, violent	Islamist
43.	<a href="#"><u>De terreur van Al Qaida heeft een nieuw gezicht</u></a>	24-5-2013	Violent	Islamist
44.	<a href="#"><u>Solitaire terrorist is moeilijk te stuiten</u></a>	24-5-2013	Young	Islamist
45.	<a href="#"><u>Ik weet waarom jullie komen, zegt de Parijse messensteker; m/v in het nieuws 'Eenzame wolf' Alexandre D.</u></a>	30-5-2013	Criminal	Islamist
46.	<a href="#"><u>Gezocht: anti-gif tegen jihadisten</u></a>	6-6-2014	Violent, indoctrinated	Islamist
47.	<a href="#"><u>Canada herdenkt vermoorde militair Nathan Cirillo</u></a>	24-10-2014	Criminal	Islamist
48.	<a href="#"><u>Lone wolf is vaak psychisch ziek'</u></a>	17-12-2014	Mentally ill	No

49.	Wat is ons antwoord op de aanslag in Parijs?	9-1-2015	Violent	Islamist
50.	<a href="#"><u>De lone wolf bestaat niet</u></a>	31-1-2015	Young, educated, online active Unemployed, less online active Mentally ill	Islamist Far-right Both



