Thesis

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On Unintended Consequences;

When Defensive Realism Leads to a Tragic Reality

Abstract

In this research I set out to test Shiping Tang's formulation of the security dilemma after its founding fathers; Herz, Butterfield and Jervis. This is important because the practical implications of the security dilemma can be severe and therefore need to be understood well by scholars and researchers alike. In this research I examined two critical cases; the Cold War and the Tensions between Japan and China. I have found that the model has great explanatory power, but is still lacking because it cannot adequately assess contemporary conflict, as some of the input necessary is simply unknowable. It does however provide a useful research framework in order to inform and assess a situation from multiple angles, allowing for a broad contextual review.

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Introduction

As old as society itself is the concept of power. It has been wielded by Kings and Queens, Presidents and Generals. It has been studied by scholars like Aristoteles, Hobbes and Machiavelli, and yet to some it still an elusive and opaque concept. In the theoretical family of international relations, there have always been two main concepts concerning the projection of power. This dichotomy was divided along the same lines most classical international relations theories were divided; those of realism and liberalism. Corresponding to those lines of thinking are hard power for the former, and soft power for the latter (Nye 2004). However, as in broader IR theory, instead of theoretical convergence and domination of one line of thinking, new theories sprung up trying to better explains changes in realm of contemporary global politics in this fast-paced world.

Stemming from power is a problem which is practically also as old as society itself; the security dilemma. This dilemma has often directed tribes, city states and superpowers spanning the globe into unnecessary conflict, often resulting in tragedy. Traditionally, this dilemma has mostly been analysed through the differing conceptualisations made by the thinkers who founded and coined out the concept; Butterfield, Herz and Jervis. However, in 2009 Shiping Tang sought a synthesis between these three differing theoretical frameworks, which he coined the BHJ-formulation, after its origins. However, this conceptual analysis is still highly theoretical, and no practical tests have been run in the research. In this thesis I will conduct two critical case studies examining Tang's conceptual analysis of the security dilemma. After first having outlined a first look at the theoretical framework to be used, largely drawing on IR scholars with the status of giants such as Dahl, Nye, Herz, Butterfield and Jervis, I will present the research methods necessary to address my main research question; "To what extent does Tang's conceptual analysis adequately capture the security dilemma?".

it is important to explore a theoretical framework which aims to capture a broad notion of what power is, how power can be projected, and how these projections fit within the literature on the security dilemma. The main aim of this research is to test the veracity, validity and fidelity of Tang's conceptual analysis, in order to provide a clear scientific theoretical framework through which one can adequately analyse whether or not there is in fact a security dilemma playing out between actors. The societal relevance of the research is also rather large, as one of the cases is currently ongoing and potentially developing into a security dilemma, which in time could lead to unnecessary and unwanted conflict, as security dilemmas tend to do. In order to ameliorate these ongoing simmering tensions and to prevent such events from happening in the future, this research is of great value. Firstly, for defensive realists the security dilemma is the one situational concept that may lead to genuine cooperation between states, while for offensive realists the security dilemma is viewed as one of the major causes of tragic wars. Secondly, it is important to clearly and presently understand the security dilemma as it has historically been used to guide and prescribe policies in some of the most important issues in global politics; arms

races, ethnic conflict and hegemonic struggles, among others (Tang 2009: 588-589). Barry Posen captured the importance of knowing the inner workings of the security dilemma as follows:

> Often statesmen do not recognise that [the security dilemma] exists: they do not empathise with their neighbours; they are unaware that their own actions can seem threatening. Often it does not matter if they know of this problem. The nature of their situation compels them to take the steps they do. (Posen 1993: 28)

Hence, it is vital to explore the security dilemma in the pursuit of conflict mitigation, peace and prosperity among nations. I will address the case selection in the methodology section of this research.

Theoretical Framework

Before setting out different conceptualisations of the security dilemma, it is vital to define what power in and of itself is, and how projections of it may lead to a security dilemma. The accumulation of both defensive and offensive power is the main catalyst of the security dilemma. Power finds itself at the core of many classical political theories dating hundreds and even thousands of years back. A more meta study on the subject of power has become increasingly popular in the previous century. One of the best-known conceptualisations of power, is that from Robert Dahl, who asserted that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl 1957: 202-203). In this conceptualisation, power became a relation between actors – the objects in the relationship of power. With this definition of power in mind, it is easy to disseminate what a power projection theoretically is; it is a means through which actor A asserts itself, so that he can get actor B to behave differently than B otherwise would have done. Although, there are many kinds of power projections, on which I will elaborate later.

However, first it is important to outline the importance of the concept of power in international relations in both academic and practical frameworks. The aforementioned conceptualisation of power is confirmed by several other notable scholars. For example, Barnett and Duvall build upon Dahl's definition of power as a social relationship with six clarifications; (1) how power is expressed, (2) the specificity of social power relations, (3) compulsory power, (4) institutional power, (5) structural power and (6) productive power (Barnett & Duvall 2005: 45, 46, 49, 51, 52, 55). I will shortly cover each of these six clarifications to see how they deepen the concept of power.

Firstly, the discussion focusses on the expression of power; is there interaction or constitution? This question means as much as that power can be expressed through interaction – i.e. 'power over' – or through mere presence and constitution – i.e. 'power to' (idem: 45-47). Secondly, the authors elaborate on whether social relations of power are specifically direct or diffuse. This second core analytical dimension of power makes a division between power directly exercised over another actor through traceable means, or if power relationships can be exercised if connections are detached or operate at some level of distance (idem: 47-49). The third dimension – compulsory power – is slightly at odds with Dahl's first conceptualisation of power, as he supposes there must be intentionality on the

part of A for B to change its behaviour. However, as has been argued by Bachrach and Baratz; A can still unintentionally influence B's behaviour, because the mere existence of A's power may lead B to pursue other interests or different means (Idem: 49-51; Bachrach & Baratz 1962: 952). Fourthly, the dimension of institutional power, strides even farther away from Dahl's original presuppositions, as it aims to take on indirect power relationships through formal and informal institutions. A prime example is US power in institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation, which in turn exert power over many developing states in different ways. This furthermore supports the claim that power can be exercised at spatial or temporal distance (Barnett & Duvall 2005: 51-52). Fifthly, structural power supposes that the kind of social being an actor is, is shaped by these structures. The main difference with institutional power is that that focuses on different constraints of action, whereas 'structural power concerns the determination of social capacities and interests' (idem: 53). Lastly, there is the dimension of productive power, which takes aim at the production of subjects through diffuse social relations. This dimension somewhat overlaps with the previous, but the main difference concern a critical aspect;

> "structural power is […] the production and reproduction of internally related positions of super- and subordination, or domination, that actors occupy. Productive power, by contrast, is the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope" (idem: 55).

I will apply the lenses of all of these analytical dimensions, as some simply do not serve a useful purpose in this research. Right before the paragraph on the security dilemma itself, I will outline which concepts are useful to keep in mind and apply when reading through Tang's conceptualisation of the security dilemma.

Taking into consideration this minor literature review of the concept of power, I can now confidently set out the theoretical framework and literature review regarding power projections, in which it is obviously of great necessity to often draw from the aforementioned power literature. In most classical literature, power projections are associated with military capabilities, strategies and presence. This, mostly because of the dominance of hard power in classical realist international relations theories (Shambaugh 1996: 265).

While the concept of hard power has been used irregularly throughout writings in articles with a neorealist approach, it became most widely known after Joseph Nye introduced its liberal counterpart; soft power. Neorealist writings are mostly concerned with the state as actor exercising its sovereign power in order to guard national interests. This can be done through military means, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions (Wilson 2008: 114). It can be distilled to influencing an actor to behave in ways it explicitly does not want to behave, but has to due to a power discrepancy. It reminds one of the well-known and age-old adage by – who some consider the arch-realist – Thucydides: "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Lebow 2001: 550). Examples of pure hard power can be

found in the allied invasion of Hitler's empire, but also in US trade policy under the Trump administration, as it follows a highly coercive line. Hard power is the most evident reminder of Dahl's conceptualisation of power as a means in which A influences B so B behaves differently than it would otherwise have done.

After this brief but comprehensive literature review on power and power projections, there is one other grand theory to be explored in this research; the security dilemma. But in order to do this, it is important to unpack some basic assumptions of the realist paradigm of international relations theories. Realist theories often incorporate thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, but originate mainly from after World War II. A main object of analysis in the realist paradigm is the balance of power, as some realists argue that actors will always unilaterally seek advantage over others because of the anarchic structure of the world inhabited by all political life – mostly states though (Lebow 2013: 60). A state which aims to alter this balance of power is called a revisionist state. A state which does not desire to force a change is dubbed a status quo state. To a realist, anarchy means the absence of an effective central authority higher than states; an overarching supranational authority, if you will. They claim that international arena remains a self-help system where "states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other" (Mearsheimer 1994: 5; 2013: 79). States will seek to survive and depend therefore on their own material capabilities as well as its alliances with others (Lebow 2013: 61; Waltz 1979: 103-104).

But why do states seek power, and how much power is enough to guarantee a state's security and therefore its survival? Once again, we need to look at core realist assumptions; five to be exact. It is important to note that while none of these assumptions alone makes the claim that striving for power is the best possible option, but when taken together this becomes the most prudent course of action, according to realist thinkers. Those five assumptions are; (1) the main actors in world politics are great powers, and they operate in an anarchic system; (2) all states possess military – and therefore offensive – capabilities; (3) there can never be certainty about the intentions and capabilities of other states; (4) the main goal of states is survival; and (5) states are rational actors (Mearsheimer 2013: 79). I have already briefly touched upon the anarchic system, which does not mean our international system is inherently chaotic, but merely that there is no overarching authority above the state level. The second assumption, that states possess military capabilities, mainly implies that states always have the means and power to inflict some kind of harm upon another if it desires to do so. The third main realist assumption – which is also one of the main drivers of the security dilemma – is the uncertainty about other states' intentions, as they are nearly impossible to be empirically assessed, while military capabilities can be. Moreover, even if it were possible to easily and adequately assess one's intentions today, it is impossible to know one's future intentions, especially as political figures or policymakers may conceal their true intentions in speeches and statements. The fourth assumptions – the striving for survival – implies that the main goal of a state will always be to maintain its political order, territorial integrity and its interests. Other pursuits such as human rights or democracy will never come before

state survival. Lastly, the fifth assumption, that states are rational actors, has the practical implication that states will try to devise sound strategies in order to maximise the prospect of survival. When all of these are taken together, realists argue, states are forced to pay close attention to the balance of power and their place within it (ibid). The logic herein seems sound; fearful states inhabiting a self-help world, seeking to ensure their own survival, quickly reason that the more powerful they are compared to potential adversaries, the risk of being attacked reduces significantly due to deterrence; the cost of attacking will greatly outweigh the gains (idem: 80; Buzan 2009a: 147-148).

This leads to the last strands of realist thinking we must examine; offensive realists, defensive realists and how much power would be enough power. Kenneth Waltz, one of the most prominent realist thinkers of the twentieth century, was a staunch defender of defensive realism. He maintained that if states were to maximise their power, the system would punish them for it. Therefore, to strive for hegemony or too much power in general is ultimately self-defeating, hence states should strive for 'appropriate amounts of power' (Waltz 1979: 40, 73-74, 186-187).

Defensive realists believe that if any single state would gain too much power, a process of balancing would occur in which other powers would expand their capabilities, and band together in order to squash the aspiring hegemon. They cite historical examples such as Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany, as each of those would-be conquerors of Europe was ultimately brought down by coalitions and alliances of – almost – all other great powers. This was in part why Bismarck was so successful, they argue, he did not push his luck and stopped at an appropriate amount of power. Moreover, defensive realists argue there is an offence-defence balance, which indicates the costs and benefits to defeat a defender in battle. Usually this balance is heavily tipped in favour of the defender, ergo defensive realists will always be hesitant to take an aggressive posture and will mostly be conflict averse (Mearsheimer 2013: 81).

Offensive realists on the other hand posit the stance that status quo powers rarely populate the international system of states, because there are too many incentives to increase one's power at the expense of its rivals; ultimately one must strive for hegemony in order to survive and to endure. They further argue that balancing is often inefficient and ineffective, and that a clever aggressor could exploit these vacuums of power. For example, buck passing often occurs. This means that when threatened, states attempt to let others take up the burden to balance the aggressor. Moreover, offensive realists also reject the claim of the tipped balance, and point to the fact that history is filled with wars won by the initial aggressor (Mearsheimer 2001: 99-100; 2013: 78, 80-81).

Clearly there is difference of opinion here on how much power is enough. Defensive realists argue that striving for hegemony will be self-defeating, as the system will eventually punish you, while offensive realists argue that the accumulation of power and striving for hegemony is the best way to guarantee survival. However, what all of this does show, is that military capabilities as well as alliances are still considered by past and present realist thinkers as the foundations of security, although they do concede the main premise of the security dilemma; that military power and alliances are a double-edged

swords; they may provoke conflict just as well as they may prevent it. Morgenthau observed that power balancing might deter war, as it would pose a credible threat and uncertainty regarding a victory, while balancing can intensify tensions and provoke war as motives, capabilities and resolve of the perceived enemy are nearly unknowable (Lebow 61-64).

With this brief introduction of realist theories of international relations, we can now safely and dutifully examine the of the concept of the security dilemma. While reading this, it is important to keep in mind the following analytical dimensions of power as outlined by Barnett & Duvall, as they largely shape the framework of the exact kind of power and power projections I will be looking for. This will however be further operationalised below. In summary; the power projections I will be assessing will mostly pertain to power projected through mere presence or constitution; 'power to' (Barnett & Duvall 2005: 45-46), rather than power over, as we are assessing independent states' behaviour reacting to one another, rather than direct exertion of power of one another. From this flows logically that I will look at diffuse power projections which are exerted at a level of distance, rather than direct power, which is exerted through a direct and traceable power relationship (ibid.). The same argument applies for compulsory power and institutional power, as they both assume clear-cut power relationships (idem: 51-52). We can however look at structural power projections and productive power projections, as they strive to capture the social nature of the state as embedded within the broader system of states, which allows for an assessment of social powers and discursive practices such as national identities, narratives and frames (idem: 53, 55).

The concept of the security dilemma – without being coined as such at first – arose in 1951 when Herbert Butterfield posited six propositions which could lead to war, even when actors have no desire for war with one another. These propositions are as follows: (1) the ultimate source is fear, as derived from 'the universal sin of humanity' (Butterfield 1951: 19), this ultimate sin of humanity may "reasonably be linked to Machiavelli's *ambizione*, Niebuhr's 'will to power' and Morgenthau's 'lust for power'" (Tang 2009: 590), thereby encompassing some of the greatest scholars of political science in history. (2) Uncertainty over others' intentions is required for a security dilemma, as it in tandem with fear makes for a highly toxic decision-making environment. (3) A security dilemma's origin is unintentional, (4) results produced by it are tragic, (5) psychological factors may exacerbate it and (6) all human conflict may have this as its underlying cause (Butterfield 1951: 19-22; Tang 2009: 590).

John Herz build upon this and coined the term "security dilemma". He encompassed the abovementioned propositions in stating that:

> "Groups and individuals who live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity […] must be […] concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attacks, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the effects of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure

> and compels them to prepare for the worst. Because no state can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on" (Herz 1951: 157).

Herz too posited six propositions from which a security dilemma should logically follow; (1) anarchy and the lack of higher unity as the main source, (2) uncertainty and fear about intentions under anarchy may be an immediate cause, (3) states trying to escape the security dilemma by acquiring more power are actually generating a cycle of competition, (4) this may in turn become self-defeating and with tragic consequences, (5) war can be caused by the security dilemma, although it is not the cause of all wars, as shown by World War II, Herz posited, and (6) "the dynamic of the security dilemma is a self-reinforcing vicious cycle" (Tang 2009: 591).

Last of the "founders" of the security dilemma is Robert Jervis, who did most to bring the theory into the mainstream of structural international relations theories. Instead of providing one clear-cut definition as provided by Butterfield and Herz, Jervis' mentions of the security dilemma seem rather scatter-shot, as it is mentioned inconsistently in different publications, describing it as; "unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive" (Jervis: 1976: 66), "one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others" (Jervis 1978: 170) and that this occurs because:

> "Even if they can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful" (Jervis 1976: 76).

From several of these assertions, Tang has discerned seven key propositions posited by Jervis underlying the security dilemma:

> "(1) the security dilemma is structural in origin; (2) states' uncertainty and fears about each other's present and future intentions is crucial for forming and maintaining the security dilemma; (3) it is caused by defensive actions, thus unintentional;29 (4) it tends to produce unintended and self-defeating results—that is, decreases in one's own security; (5) it tends to produce unintended and tragic results—that is, war; (6) the security dilemma can cause war, but is not the cause of all wars; and (7) the dynamic of the security dilemma is self-reinforcing and resembles a spiral" (Tang 2009: 592).

From these three "founders" of the security dilemma outlined above, Shipping Tang sought to derive a more rigorous definition the security dilemma; under the anarchic conditions underlying the system of states as posited by structural realists, two states perceive themselves as defensive realists. This means that they maintain it is unwise to maximise their share of power in the system, as they will face punishment for these actions (Mearsheimer 2013: 78). However, these two states cannot know the intentions of one another. This results in the rational fear towards one another that they may become a predator. Both states also hold the believe that power is a means towards security, and because of that

both may seek to gain more power. The crux herein is that gains of even primarily defensible capabilities yield some base offensive capabilities, which may in turn lead to perceived threats of one's own security, warranting countermeasures. This interaction of measures and countermeasures reinforces and exacerbates the already existing fears and uncertainties about intentions, leading to the vicious cycle we call the security dilemma. It is a positive feedback mechanism, which may have tragic outcomes (Tang 2009: 594). From this formulation – dubbed the BHJ-formulation after Butterfield, Herz and Jervis – follow these eight major aspects;

1. The anarchic nature of international politics is the ultimate source of the security dilemma,
2. Due to this anarchic nature, states cannot be certain of one another's intentions and as a result fear one another or entertain the possibility they may fall prey to the other,
3. Because of the aforementioned uncertainties and fears, states resort to power accumulation or the build-up of defensive capabilities, which inherently possesses offensive capabilities as well,
4. A security dilemma occurs unintentionally between two defensive realists,
5. The dynamics of the security dilemma are self-reinforcing, which may lead to arms races and the worsening of ties,
6. These dynamics may make measures and countermeasures self-defeating; more power but less security, due to an increase in weaponry, and consequentially uncertainty, fear and mistrust
7. The vicious cycle may lead to unnecessary and unavoidable wars,
8. The severity of the security dilemma may be tempered by material factors as well as psychological factors (Idem: 594-595).

The next step is to operationalise the abovementioned eight points. Firstly, the anarchic nature of international politics. Although this is regarded more as a realist base assumption rather than an empirically measurable criterium, it is still possible to assess to a certain extent. As anarchy infers that there is no overarching supranational authority which can credibly and legitimately exercise power over states, it needs to be determined if actors deem international bodies and/or international law as legitimate. The concept of legitimacy means as much that an actor beliefs that rules or institutions should be obeyed; a highly normative and subjective notion. Were a nation to belief that a rule or institution is indeed legitimate, compliance would not merely be motivated by fear of punishment or by the pursuit of self-interest, but by "an internal sense of rightness and obligation" (Hurd 2008: 30). Therefore, one might argue that if a state flat-out ignores, frustrates or contradicts a ruling, or otherwise tries to bend the rules its way, or tries to influence supposedly independent decision-making, said state does not regard the rule or institution as fully legitimate, otherwise it would accept its independent ruling. So, whether or not states regard that there is such an entity – or indeed anarchy – can in part be assessed through examining how the actor perceives the legitimacy of international organisations through

analysing the actor's compliance with decisions from international bodies, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and United Nations Security Council, or – if applicable – how the actor behaves in the United Nations Security Council with regards to said conflict. Although it does obviously need to be kept in mind that anarchy ultimately is a baseline assumption, which would not have to be assessed in this research or any further application of the security dilemma. It does however provide a broad context, which is the main reason why I have chosen to incorporate it.

The second aspect as identified by Jervis, is the lack of certainty of other states' intentions and therefore a fear of one another. This is one of the most important and hardest to assess aspects of the security dilemma, as it is important to firstly lay out what uncertainty actually is, which in and of itself is a challenging task, as different theoretical frameworks assess fear and uncertainty differently. Realists will view uncertainty as anarchy-induced fear, whereas rationalists opt to derive it from ignorance and constructivists as indeterminacy (Rathbun 2007: 533). As the security dilemma is a realist theory and one of the formulation's main determinants is the state trait of defensive realism, I will operationalise uncertainty as fear stemming from anarchy. In realism uncertainty and fear are thought be objectively perceived through a lack of information which leads states into preparing for possible conflict (idem: 536). This is perfectly characterised by the defensive realist Grieco in saying that:

> "States engage in self-help, manifested in the accumulation of power against potential adversaries, real or presumed, through military build-ups and alliance formation. Spirals of conflict, even when states might not have incompatible interests, are the result" (Grieco 1993: 315).

This fear and uncertainty can only be assessed by looking at how a state perceives threats. The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology suggests that:

> "scholars can draw on archives, documents, diaries, leaked cables, interviews, and polls to assess what leaders and publics feel, what they perceive, and what they think" (Gross Stein 2013: 387).

Hence, I will search for declarations of fear and uncertainty in public government statements and publications, academic articles, diplomatic cables and archives, as well as leaks through journalistic sources in which such uncertainty and fear are expressed and threat assessments are made.

The third posited aspect is the accumulation of defensive capabilities which inherently possess offensive capabilities as well. Traditionally military capabilities by both scholars and governments "count the number of military personnel or major weapons systems such as tanks, warships and combat aircraft that a country possess" (Cliff 2015: 4). Yet, it is important to note that academics often argue that this is not enough to adequately assess a state's complete military capabilities, and to successfully and with fidelity model battle simulations and war games after that data. Historical analyses regarding World War II, the Gulf War and Special Operations have shown that non-material factors were often much more decisive in actual battle than material factors such as weaponry and personnel size. One

could think of training, skill, doctrine, organisation, leadership, logistics, etc. (idem: 4-6). However, this research does not serve to determine who would theoretically win if respectively the United States and the Soviet Union, or China and Japan would be embroiled in an open war. This research serves to determine whether states' capabilities are more defensive or more offensive in their nature; in the sense that they disturb the balance of power as such that another state may feel threatened in its survival through the relative loss of deterrent capabilities, or in any way doubts the intentions of the other. Hence, I will emphasise the traditional military capability research indicators such as weaponry and personnel, but I will also focus on military doctrine, as it serves as a guide throughout militaries and understanding their main tasks and aims. Within these three concepts, I will try to distinguish the defensive and offensive angles and capabilities of objects, people, movements and doctrines in order to establish that states indeed do not solely acquire offensive capabilities, but mainly defensive capabilities with the inherent potential to be used in an offensive manner. Like the previous aspect I will be looking at archives, documents, statements, reports, etc. in order to try to determine a state's intention on whether it is more offensive or defensive. In order to assess the state's capabilities on whether they are indeed reflective of those suspected and proclaimed intentions, I will mostly use analyses by historians, academics, think tanks and governmental bodies; such as ministries of defence and foreign affairs, as well as intelligence agencies.

Fourthly – and closely intertwined with the previous point – Tang insists that a security dilemma can solely occur between defensive realists. To briefly summarise; defensive realists are acceptant of a status quo in which the balance of power is maintained, as they believe that acquiring too much power will lead to punishment from the broader system of states. Thus, defensive realists will tread carefully and with restraint (Mearsheimer 2013: 78, 81). Therefore, I will have to establish that each actor in the conflicts at hand is merely a security-seeker, which does not intend to actively threaten other parties, but only to increase one's own security, although it may appear offensive to others. This can be tested by assessing a state's capabilities and its intentions (Gross Stein 2013: 373). How to assess one's capabilities has been closely described in the previous point, so in this part of the analysis, I will largely reference findings categorised under military defensive capabilities with inherent offensive potential. Which leaves intentions to be analysed in this part. Jervis conceptualises intentions as "the collection of actions the state will or would take" (Jervis 1979: 48). This dual look at both intentions and capabilities through the assessments mentioned is derived again from Gross Stein in the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Gross Stein 2013: 387). And In turn I will again use the sources she has recommended; diaries, archives, reports, cables, interviews, etc. It may be hard to truly gain an insight in the intensions of China and Japan, as those tensions are ongoing and – unlike the Cold War – not relegated to the history books with entire libraries of existing research, which may prove to be the largest obstacle in Tang's BHJ-formulation, were anyone desiring to use it as an early-warning mechanism for contemporary or ongoing conflicts.

Fifthly, it is important to show that the spiral model is in effect. This model emphasises how the

anarchic nature of the system of states compels statesmen to ensure their own security and survival. In a poignant quote Jervis lays out how the spiral model is the core of the security dilemma:

> "When states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little — too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little because others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state's security" (Jervis 1976: 64)

The premise of the spiral model is crucial to the security dilemma, as it is the causal mechanism in which state A acquires weapon Y for defensive purposes. However, due to inherent offensive capabilities of weapon Y, state B feels a decrease in its security, propelling it to acquire weapon Z, in turn frightening state A and spiralling out of control, opening up a vicious cycle of arms acquisitions. Neither A nor B have any intend to harm one another, but have created an environment in which both are less secure due to the mutual perception of insecurity, which induces fear, uncertainty and mistrust (Collins 2004: 31). The model itself has two spiral equilibria; an upward spiral and a downward spiral:

- "A spiral (or upward spiral) takes place when a security-seeking state i takes an action that causes another state j to raise its belief p_j, that i is greedy.
- In a downward spiral, a security seeker (i) takes an action that causes another state (j) to decrease its fear (p_j) (in this case correctly)" (Kydd 1997: 384).

I will for the purpose of this research only examine the upward spiral. This shows that I will have to establish that when in case II China takes an action, this raises fears in Japan and prompts them to conduct a similar balancing action (idem: 389-399). This will be done through assessing the data on the build-up of capabilities, a state's intentions and a state's fears and uncertainties as acquired in the abovementioned aspects.

The last three points, outcomes and regulators of the security dilemma are more given notions than testable hypotheses or criteria. Therefore, I will not research these three points as thoroughly as the previous five, but I will address them in passing when relevant. The sixth point – that such an arms race is self-defeating – can be established through deepening point five, that there is such an arms race at hand in which there is an increase in power, but a decrease in security through an increase capabilities and consequentially uncertainties, fear and mistrust. This can be easily observed if such an arms race has not merely a nature of reciprocity, but one of escalation. The penultimate seventh point is more of a prediction than a precondition, as it states that a security dilemma *can* lead to unnecessary or avoidable wars, but not that it is necessarily so. Therefore, I will not actively seek out whether or not there is

Figure 1) Aspects of Tang's BHJ-formulation



war in the cases which are to be analysed. Lastly, the security dilemma at hand should be able to be regulated by both material and psychological factors; for example technology, geography, geography, and misperceptions (Tang 2009: 594-597; Taliaferro 2001: 137).

All of these eight aspects, with the two consequential options grouped together, are included in figure 1. These are the aspects of the security dilemma as derived from Tang, who in turn derived these from the base premises by Butterfield, Herz and Jervis, and which I will test. However, before we begin with the analysis, it is very important to note that to Tang anarchy, a lack of malign intentions, and power accumulation are the most important aspects, as the others are mostly consequences or regulators of those aspects (Tang: 2009: 595). This can be explored in the appendices, where I have placed the figure Tang shows to illustrate the causal link from anarchy to the security dilemma and war, which includes all of these aspects. I must stress however, that that it becomes apparent from the descriptions above that all of these aspects have a high interconnectedness. I have chosen to assess each aspect in and of its own, but that does cause some overlap in some of the assessments throughout the analysis.

This new model concerning the security dilemma is worth examining and to that end I have selected two critical cases which we will use to test the security dilemma; the Cold War and the current developments between in East Asia between China and Japan. I will elaborate on the case selection in the next section.

Methodology and case selection

In order to test Tang's theoretical framework, I will conduct a comparative case study of two 'critical cases' a most likely design and a least likely design. This, because I wish to assert beyond reasonable doubt that if proven to be true, Tang's framework provides to be useful in determining so. The idea behind crucial cases is that some cases are more important than others, moreover, critical cases are often defined as "having a strategic importance in relation to general problem" (Flyvbjerg 2006: 233; Levy 2008: 12). This is especially useful when testing new theories such as this, because it immediately lends a broad research lens to assess the theory in a myriad of ways. I strongly believe that the dual use of both a most likely case and least likely case lend this research a great validity, as a least likely case evidently asserts a strong scientific claim, whereas a most likely case follows the "inverse Sinatra inference – if I cannot make it there, I cannot make it anywhere" (Levy 2008: 12).

The cases I have chosen are the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the current tensions playing out in East Asia between China on one side and Japan – together with a heap of allies – on the other side. Both of these conflicts will be thoroughly assessed on whether or not they can be classified as a security dilemma according to Tang's BHJ-formulation. This assessment is based on the eight aspects of the formulation as laid out in the theoretical framework. I will search for these aspects through an extensive research of the conflicts in academic literature, government statements and publications, think tank publications and journalistic publications through an elaborate content analysis. Each of the found aspects will be thoroughly described and crossed off in case-related

figures such as figure 1. If in both cases all aspects of the BHJ-formulation are found, it is a sound theoretical framework which may aid researchers as well as policymakers greatly in understanding the security dilemma and mitigating consequences stemming therefrom. What is important to note before elaborating on the details of case selection, in order to qualify for the broadest possible definition of the security dilemma we will have to assess states with tensions between them as such that both are accumulating more power in hard power terms; e.g. military expenditure (Tang 2009: 594). Preliminary research shows both cases do fit these base criteria, as I will show in the analysis. It is important to mention this, as the spectrum of conflict is rather broad – e.g. trade wars, border disputes, espionage among others – but there must be an active spiral in arms acquisitions and/or defence expenditure in order to even fit the research criteria. These criteria have been assessed beforehand, but do also appear in the analysis. The remainder of the analysis is mainly gaging the belief of anarchy in the international system of states, fear and uncertainty towards one another, and whether or not both states can be considered as defensive realists.

The former case, the Cold War is obviously the most likely case and therefore serves as a litmus test. This is the mostly likely case because it has often been cited as a prime example of the security dilemma by several high-profile academics on the subject (Herz 2003: 413; Jervis 2001: 53; Wohlforth 2012: 94-95). Therefore, if Tang's framework does not apply to this case, it can evidently be discarded. However, it is highly likely that it will be applicable. If that happens to occur, I will conduct the least likely case study, chosen for its actuality and therefore especially interesting and poignant. What is important to note, is that the Cold War is of course a historical event which has been studied extensively. Therefore, I will use mainly academic articles in order to study Case I.

The second case; the least likely case of tensions between China and Japan is currently playing out, which will put the theory severely to the test as "early" detection mechanism, which may in turn be very helpful in identifying security dilemma's and conflicts of the future. While it is obvious why the Cold War is to be considered as the most likely case, some may find it hard understand why tensions between China and Japan rightfully qualify as a least likely case. In a large part this hinges on the constructivist notion that ideas and discourse have material consequences in the real world. I will later elaborate on the use of such constructivist ideas. Since the end of World War II Japan has posited itself as a staunch peaceful internationalist through the Yoshida Doctrine which emphasised "economic growth, avoiding contentious international issues and relying on the United States for Security" (Droubie 2011: 2309). Most poignant in the Yoshida Doctrine was Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which states to this day:

> "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained" (Sun 1997: 396).

The most practical discursive consequence of this article is that the standing armed forces of Japan are officially known as the Self-Defence Forces (SDF), which may not engage in offensive actions. Moreover, there is a general consensus in Japanese policy elites as well as the population at large that Article 9 effectively states that "offensive weapons or any projection of armed forces outside of Japanese territory" are disallowed (Idem: 398). This is illustrated by Japan's 1992 participation in UN Peacekeeping operations, which was only allowed by parliament under the condition that the SDF would not carry or indeed bring arms (ibid.). Were we to accept the newly acquired Japanese identity as a dove rather than a hawk, and thereby to acknowledge constructivist premises that discourse has real material consequences in the world, it seems that uncertainty on China's behalf considering Japanese intentions on potential war would be limited, if not erased, which would make this case effectively a least likely case, for China would have no rational fear of Japan. This argument gains even more traction when we consider that China itself has for decades emphasised its own narrative of peaceful rise/development, aimed at assuring the international community that China will not pose a threat to peace, especially while in the Cold War the Reagan administration talked up the possibilities of using nuclear weapons in order to 'win' the Cold War (Meghan et al. 1990: 134).

It may seem strange to apply a constructivist notion to this paper which is solidly grounded in realist theories, but even the arch-realist Mearsheimer contends that constructivism – which he categorises as 'critical theories' – makes a sophisticated argument in which structure and discourse are inextricably linked and interact with one another (Mearsheimer 1995: 37-39). Something which is exemplified in how elite discourse from the Japanese government has shaped both the state's self-perception and identity, as well as its actual policies in the material world. Moreover, it is argued that constructivist thinking may even complement classical realist thinking in capturing "the relationship between normative structures, the carriers of political morality, and the uses of power" (Barkin 2003: 338). Because of the actuality of this case, I cannot contain my research to academic articles, but will have to make extensive use of think tank publication, journalistic publications and government publications. If Tang's BHJ-formulation also identifies a security dilemma in this case, it will lend the formulation a great validity and credibility as a means to study the security dilemma.

Analyses

Case I: The Cold War between The Soviet Union and The United States

As mentioned before, due to the Cold war being a historical conflict, analysis of this case can be conducted mostly through academic articles which capture all of the necessary context. The Cold War is the name usually given to the post-war period in which there were severe tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. After World War II, both emerged as the two leading global superpowers. Germany was split up in a western-controlled part and Soviet-controlled part, causing the East-West divisions to deepen. The conflict intensified as both sides accused each other of trying to destroy their

respective ideologies and associated forms of government, while supporting opposing forces around the world in a myriad of armed conflicts. Both states also drove nuclear armament and developed missiles capable of reaching each other's homeland in the vein of deterrence. The world tiptoed on the edge of a global Armageddon during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when open conflict seemed almost inevitable. Gradually tensions simmered and flared up again until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Byrd 2009a: 87-89).

Firstly, I will try to examine on the presence of anarchy on part of the actors. However, I will stress again that anarchy is presumed in the international system of states, and that its analysis is therefore not of the utmost importance. But seeing how it shapes the context of the conflict, it is still useful to at least examine whether or not the US and Soviet Union behaved in ways which would signal that they do not – fully consider – international organisations as legitimate. This signalling can be done through either flat-out ignoring or going against resolutions, or if they use their powers to influence decision-making – or the prevention thereof – by wielding power out of self-interest. Both actors occupied seats in United Nations Security Council, and therefore I will examine their behaviour within that institution. As the two parties to this conflict – the United States and the Soviet Union – were at that point in time the two single most powerful entities on the stage of global politics, no single third state could be seen as a viable contender to constrain either the US or the Soviet Union, or to exercise any power over them. However, in the aftermath of World War II – which of course gave rise to these two powers – the United Nations was founded. The Security Council, the UN's forum in which the most pressing security questions are discussed, is tasked with enforcing, building and keeping peace through binding Chapter VII resolutions which govern threats to peace globally. So, if there ever would be an overarching supranational authority over the United States and the Soviet Union, it would have to be the Security Council.

However, the veto power the five permanent members possessed – which included the United States and the Soviet Union – eliminated all possibilities for the Security Council to exercise such overarching authority (Byrd 2009b: 477-478). This is illustrated by the fact that 193 vetoes concerning conflict management were cast since the UN's founding and January 1990, while between 1990 and 2004, this number dropped to a mere seventeen. From an average of 4.3 vetoes per year, to an average of 1.2 vetoes per year. This becomes especially remarkable when we factor in that since 1989 the amount of United Nations Security Council resolutions – involving enforcement mechanisms as granted in Chapter VII – increased with 25%, which shows that while there is a significant increase in Chapter VII resolutions filed, the steep decline of veto-usage is even more spectacular (Weiss & Young 2005: 144). Of these 193 vetoes issued, a staggering 90 were cast by the Soviet Union between 1946 and 1991, while the US followed closely with 65 in the same period of time (Dag Hammerskjöld Library Research guide 2019).

These vetoes had a broad effect as they dealt with nuclear reports, membership applications, regulations and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and acts of aggression on a plethora of

different theatres; such as air bombings in China, the invasion of Taiwan, bacterial warfare in Korea, the Palestine question, the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, atomic hydrogen bomb flights, a shot down US fighter plane over the Barents Sea, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet-Afghan War and Iran-Contra, among others (idem). The utter disregard of Article 27 paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter which states that "a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting" (United Nations 1945: 7) infers the lack of Hurd's propelled "sense of rightness and obligation" (Hurd 2008: 3), which would otherwise signal that the actors regard the institution as legitimate. This illustrates the powerlessness of the United Nations Security Council as the only imaginable supranational overarching authority which theoretically may have been able to exercise any power in order to remedy the dilemma; or anarchy, if you will, which allows me to check the first box of the BHJ-formulation.

The second aspect of said formulation was that of uncertainty and fear, which exists and persists because of the anarchy in the international system, as states cannot be certain about present and future intensions of one another, while the anarchical nature of the international system of states leaves them open to be attacked and therefore threatened in their survival (Tang 2009: 594). In order to establish whether or not such uncertainty and fear played a part in this conflict, I will look at historical analyses, released documents and other sources of such inside government information as recommended by the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology.

It was known that Stalin was dissatisfied with the borders of the Soviet Union after World War II, which raised fears in the West that he would strive for the restoration of historical Tsarist borders and to keep the fruits it had gained under the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi-Germany; Poland, the Baltics and parts of Romania and Finland. Moreover, at the start of the Cold War the United States viewed the Soviet Union as inherently hostile, which mixed with the instability in war-torn Europe made for a dangerous and toxic cocktail of fear and uncertainty (Mark, 1981: 314-315; Jervis 2001: 45, 52). In the power vacuum of war-torn Europe, the United States worried that a Soviet sphere of dominance over Europe could be the catalyst of another war if Europe chose to remilitarise, and subsequently a grand security loss for the US if that war would be lost and the Soviet Union would be the primary European power (Mark 1981: 317-318).

However, these fears partly subsided for concerns that the Soviet Union would take advantage of the collapsed economies and social systems in the west, rather than a military invasion. This fear later shifted to the Third World, as revolutionary change was welcomed by Moscow, and seemed to coerce such change under the guise of Brezhnev Doctrine. However, this was later proven false as it became clear that the Soviet Union was merely taking advantage of inexpensive and riskless opportunities, instead of forcing them themselves. One can easily understand that the United States felt scared and uncertain as the Soviet Union seemingly masterminded every plot from the Vietnam War to several African adventures and the war in Afghanistan. Though, all of these were initiated by local actors (Westad 1997: 21; Wohlforth 2012: 98; Jervis 2001: 48, 50).

Despite this realisation, the fearful belief that the Soviet Union was bent on dominating the European continent – and further expanding its influence – persisted ever since the US' first official statement on its objectives in the cold war;

> "to reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world's family of nations" (idem: 53)

Exactly how fearful and uncertain the US was with regard to Moscow became clear in the early stages of the Cold War. After Stalin died, the new Soviet leadership brought the Korean war to a close, came to a peace treaty with Austria, improved its relations with Israel, Yugoslavia and Greece among others, pursued a summit with Western leaders and emphasised peaceful coexistence. However, President Eisenhower mistook those intentions as a ploy of psychological warfare, designed to win over hearts and minds in the US in order to decrease support for the Cold War effort. He feared allies would acquiesce to lower defence expenditures while the Soviet Union would continue its military build-up (Osgood 2000: 419-420). This line of thinking kept a devout following as the successive Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations all discarded Soviet offers of cooperative conflict resolution resembling a great power concert (Wohlforth 2012: 100). Moreover, there was an unshakable belief in Eisenhower's Domino Theory. This theory described that if the US would allow communism to take hold in one country, it would allow it to take hold wherever it festered, which would in turn embolden communist adversaries in their own efforts to prevail and coerce such change. Hence every single challenge had to be combatted ferociously, which diminished any prospect of cooperation with the Soviet Union (Jervis 2001: 54).

The Soviet Union on the other hand feared they were losing control of events in the region in the aftermath of World War II as Communist parties throughout all of Europe were barred from government (Pons 2001: 14). Moreover, Stalin deeply shared the communist view that capitalist states were inherently and irredeemably hostile, ruthless, expansionist and aggressive, uncoincidentally the same way the Soviet Union was viewed by the United States. This showed especially in Stalin's communications to his General Molotov;

> "The Anglo-Saxons are hostile, duplicitous, and anti-Soviet at heart, they understand only the language of firmness at strength. At worst they are hidden enemies, at best rivals" (Pechatnov 1999: 8; Taliaferro 2001: 151).

After all, as far as Stalin was concerned the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had shown the true colours, as well as the true capabilities, of the United States, and how could Stalin – a man notoriously living with paranoia – ever feel secure in a world in which not the communists, but only the capitalists, had the knowledge to develop nuclear bombs?" (Jervis 2001: 46-47). This belief in the inherent hostility of capitalist states, led Stalin to adopt a posture which was sure to frighten the western states even more – which he intended:

> "It is obvious that in dealing with such partners as the US and Britain we cannot achieve anything serious if we begin to give in to intimidation or betray uncertainty. To get anything from this kind of partner, we must arm ourselves with the policy of tenacity and steadfastness" (Pechatnov: 1999: 14).

Another prime example of how the states misunderstood one another is Afghanistan. The spring after the communist coup of 1978, Moscow's new client state appeared to be faltering. The US viewed such an Afghan collapse as a potential resurgence of the pre-1978 status with a leftist Afghan government which would respect Soviet geopolitical power, while the Soviet Union feared the US would take control of Afghanistan, prompting them to invade, signalling a sharp revisionist intent in the eyes of US leadership (Wohlforth 2012: 100-101). We know from soviet archives that the USSR Politburo feared greatly for war and had no desire to be drawn into such a conflict which they knew they could not win (Lebow & Gross Stein 1995: 164).

There was a diffuse but strong fear surrounding the Kremlin in the later 1970s as well. Mostly Moscow was afraid that a minor incident such as an accident at sea could spark all-out war. This is important, as not only nuclear war was a fearful perspective for Soviet leadership, but really any kind of Soviet-American war (idem: 168).

Both sides initially believed the other was striving for superiority and global domination. However, evidence shows that already halfway the 1960s, leadership in both the United States as well as the in Soviet Union was not seeking superiority, but ironically driven by spectres of inferiority, not strategic gain. Nuclear war – or any kind of actual war for that matter – would herald an unprecedented destruction which neither side could afford (Jervis 2001: 56).

If we try to analyse the third aspect – the accumulation of defensive capabilities containing offensive capabilities – we must look at things such as troop movements, arms acquisitions and development, and other strategic and tactical decisions as well as military doctrine to contextualise these findings.

What springs to mind immediately is the arms race which was 'fought' with missiles and yielded concepts such as "second strike capacity", "deterrence" and history's most beautifully macabre acronym MAD; "Mutually Assured Destruction". Eventually both sides possessed second strike capacity, which meant that both states could retaliate if the other initiated a first strike (Buzan 2009b: 477). That both sides possessed nuclear weapons and second-strike capacity is agreed upon by both defensive and offensive realists to be defensive. They argue that nuclear weapons only have offensive utility when only one party has them, as neither gains an advantage for striking first. Moreover, due to the risk of escalation to an undesired nuclear conflict, paradoxically conventional war between two nuclear-armed states becomes less likely (Mearsheimer 2013: 82). So, this equilibrium of deterrence should have led to a more relaxed foreign policy, as no one truly desired mutually assured destruction. However, the aforementioned core beliefs on the both the Soviet Union-side as well as the US-side led to the problematic situation that policies from either side had highly competitive and even offensive notions.

This was largely due to deterrence theory and the role of resolve therein, which suggests that there must remain a plausible and credible threat to indeed trigger all-out war, which is especially trying when war means complete annihilation. Therefore, both sides – especially the US – decided it was best to behave unpredictably and to commit to barely tenable positions (Jervis 2001: 54).

Another trigger of these irrational behaviours was the aforementioned Eisenhower's domino theory which led to an unnecessarily strong US reaction everywhere communism as much as appeared as a blip on the radar (ibid). We see the spectres of this already forming in the direct aftermath of World War II as the United States had reached the status of being the sole proprietor of specific knowledge on the workings of nuclear weaponry. In the following section we can clearly see the spiral model at work, as after the US had dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, the Soviet Union sought to create its own bombs. The Soviets succeeded in exploding their first atomic bomb in August 1949. The US was the first to raise the stakes when it exploded a bomb 500 times more powerful than the Nagasaki bomb in 1952. Three years later Moscow tested its own first thermonuclear device. A mere two years after that, the Soviet Union launched its first ICBM, a major threat to the US, as the Soviets could now strike farther than the Americans. In 1959 the US also developed their ICBM capabilities, levelling the playing field. Tests like these continued for a while until the Soviet Union spectacularly exploded the largest bomb in human history; the 58-megaton Tsar Bomba over Nova Zembla. The following year the first period of the arms race culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the world balanced on the brink of war. In 1968 the US succeeded developing MIRV systems, which added great accuracy to missiles. The Soviet Union sought to counter this and alter the balance of power by developing defensive ABM systems, designed to pick ballistic missiles off mid-flight. In 1983 the US sought to top this through the launching of the Strategic Defence Initiative, a Reagan-era plan which could theoretically be the end of mutually assured destruction and forever tipping the balance of power due to the elimination of second strike capacity (ICAN 2019; PRECEDEN 2019; Council on Foreign Relations 2019). It is important to note that while many of the missiles had an offensive character, they were deployed mostly to counter one another, in order to even the offence defence balance, hence these weapons were used defensively as a deterrent through second strike capacity and mutually assured destruction (Caljé & Den Hollander 2013: 397-399).

But especially the deployment of conventional arms put both superpowers to the test. The Soviets deployed an excessively large force, which was equipped to secure offensive objectives, as well as defensive objectives, while there is not a single credible reason as to why the Soviet Union would willingly instigate an unprovoked attack after the 1950s. However, this military build-up as well as perceived soviet military and ideological doctrine made western leaders assume the worst. The United States started to develop larger and more diverse strategic forces, as well as nuclear options to be positioned in Europe, bound to agitate the Soviet Union and strike fear in their leadership. However, due to the strong military grip on Soviet politics, barely any knowledgeable civilians were involved, and the Soviet military retained its offensive posture, initiating the grand US response (Jervis 2001: 56).

As described in the above section, there are many instances of acquired weaponry for defensive purposes, but which do possess inherent offensive capabilities, as the BHJ-formulation predicts. Therefore, it is also important that beyond the already described intentions, military doctrines will be examined briefly. What is especially salient, is that US military doctrine in 1976 was criticised for lacking an offensive spirit and the loss of tactics even before its publication (Jablonski 1994: 21-22). Meanwhile, the Soviet starting point has always been strategic defence. As they have been taught in two world wars, it is unwise to prepare for mobilisation at the expense of homeland defence. Therefore their focus is "strategic defence, survivable command and control, and military and industrial mobilisation", Moreover, at one point the Kremlin directed the army to at all cost avoid the possibility of war (Odom 1988: 121; Gray 1991: 34; Atkeson 1991: 81-83).

Some maintain that calling the US or Soviet Union defensive in the Cold War is doing an injustice to the many invasions and meddling in third countries such as Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. However, were we to assess both the Truman doctrine and the Brezhnev doctrine and assess their compatibility with what defensive realists argue is the core of defensive realism, it does make for a convincing case of establishing that both were indeed defensive realists. This is because both the Truman doctrine and the Brezhnev doctrine aimed not contest communism and capitalism respectively in states where it was the norm to be challenged, but rather to protect their own system where it had gained a foothold (Spalding 2017: 562-564; Kramer 1990: 25). As the Truman doctrine states that:

> "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way" (Kaine 2017: 38).

While the Brezhnev doctrine seems to mimic the same style of reasoning, albeit a lot less liberal:

> "Without question, the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine their own countries' paths of development. Any decision they make, however, must not be inimical either to socialism in their own countries or to the fundamental interests of other socialist countries. . . . The sovereignty of individual socialist countries cannot be set against the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement. . . . Each Communist party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism in its own country, but it is not free to deviate from these principles. . . . The weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, and they cannot look indifferently upon this" (Kramer 1990: 25).

When assessing the fourth aspect of the BHJ-formulation, whether or not the actors in the specified conflict are defensive realists, we need to assess both policy and intentions. We have already seen broad consensus on this topic in the previous paragraph. That Stalin did not desire the dilemma to occur, became clear from archival research when this was possible. One scholar concluded: "The Cold War

was both unintended and unexpected, it was predetermined all the same" (Naimark: 2002: 5). While World War II was still raging in 1944, a US state department policy committee even concluded that:

> 'Soviets seemed to lack a compelling ideological reason for expansionism, [as] their strivings for predominance in Eastern Europe were ascribed to fears of "further attacks from the west" and "certain reservations" about the practicability of collective security' (Mark 1981: 322).

The United States was at most points during the Cold War – with exception of the final years, when it became clear the US would emerge victorious – open to negotiations in order to freeze the status quo. State department officials had hedged their bets and concluded that it would be in the best interest to discount potential gains in order to obtain a certain degree of security (Jervis 2001: 52). A prime example of this willingness is the fact that already in the 1950s plans were drawn up which outlined a mutually acceptable solution for Europe. However, it took almost 25 years before these agreements were finalised in the Quadripartite Agreements and the Helsinki Accords. Both would have settled much earlier for these conditions, were they not preoccupied with their own fears and uncertainties about one another (idem: 55).

There are some indications that the Soviet Union pursued a competitive and not a defensive strategy. It seems true that the USSR did indeed seek relative gains, but it did so from an inferior position as it tried to keep up with and mirror the US as an equal on the world stage, which can be argued to be defensive in and of itself, as defensive realists argue that a certain amount of power must be pursued in order to ensure one's survival, just not too much (Wohlforth 2012: 97-98). Moreover, archival research has shown that the politburo had no appetite for war – it was feared even – as they knew it could not be won. A prime example of this fear was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both leaders greatly feared an escalation and did not want war. The Soviets merely wanted a bargaining chip after US missile deployment in Europe in order to even the offence-defence balance. Ultimately, both leaders were deterred from making the fatal decision to go on the offence, as both sides decided to withdraw certain weaponry. Similarly, in the Korean War, Stalin authorised the North to attack when Washington had shown that it would not intervene. However, as soon as they did intervene, Stalin showed interest in a cease-fire in order to prevent Soviet-American war. What is remarkable is that at a certain point, the Soviet Union even exercised self-deterrence toward Egypt before the US practiced deterrence, as Brezhnev ruled out Soviet commitment (lebow & Gross Stein 1995: 164-168).

Fifthly, we reach the core of the security dilemma; the spiral model. This is when states start reacting to one another leading to a deterioration of relations, arms races and increasing tensions. I have partly explored these mechanics in the third aspect on the accumulation of defensive capabilities with inherent offensive potential, where besides reactionary policies in third countries such as Afghanistan, I showed a clear time path of the actors reacting to one another in the research and development of different ICBM's, nuclear bombs and missile defence systems. Arch-realist Kenneth Waltz himself described the

Cold War as a security dilemma between two defensive great powers locked in spiral conflict, in which both could be ascribed to be a fearful warrior (Waltz 1979: 170-176), but there is still something to add.

Ideology also played a big part in this. As the Cold War was also a clash of ideologies and systems, each side vehemently believed that the future of global prosperity and security rested upon its own conception of how the world order ought to be. This resulted in both sides relentlessly pursuing their own deeply held beliefs and principles, which only confirmed "the fear of the other that it was bent on aggression" (Schlesinger 1967: 46; Jervis 2001: 58). There is of course always this deep spiralling irony in the security dilemma which also took hold of the Cold War. As the United States sought to diminish what they perceived as a Soviet expansion of influence, they pursued policies which themselves were indistinguishable from expansionism, leading the cold war into a deep security dilemma (idem: 53). Kissinger wrote: "A principal purpose of our Mideast policy was to reduce the role and influence of the Soviet Union, just as the Soviets sought to reduce ours" (Kissinger 1982: 600). This once again is a testament to the spiralling nature of the security dilemma as the unintended effects of these policies was that mutually agreeable possibilities were struck down one after another, while the acquiring of arms on both sides led the conflict to spiral out of control and generated rather than mitigated it (Jervis 2001: 54, 56).

However, these reckless US policies were in response to some Soviet movements; namely its adventures in Africa, Europe, Southeast Asia and Central Asia – even though these adventures were largely low-cost riskless opportunistic endeavours (Wohlforth 2012: 98-99). This apparent upward spiral of competitive movements led the Carter administration to adopt a hawkish view in 1980:

> "my concern is that the combination of increasing Soviet military power and political short-sightedness fed by big-power ambition, might tempt the Soviet Union [to] both exploit local turbulence and to intimidate our friends in order to seek political advantage and eventually even political preponderance" (ibid.).

Here we arrive at the sixth point, either an unnecessary war with tragic consequences, or a self-defeating stalemate as there is more power, but less security. It is important to note that the article by Jervis – which I have often cited – in the end concludes that the Cold War was more a clash of systems than a security dilemma. This, mainly because the uncertainty and fear of the arms did not result in a tragic war, but in extreme caution in times of crisis, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, one needs to take into account that for Jervis the only end to a security dilemma is a tragic and unnecessary war, while Tang's BHJ-formulation explicitly distinguishes between a tragic war or the self-defeating process Jervis clearly indicates; more power, but less security, which allows the Cold War to be labelled a security dilemma in accordance with the BHJ-formulation and all the points I have previously stipulated on how both states behaved in their arms development and acquisition as well as strategies and troop movements (Jervis 2001: 57; Lebow & Gross Stein 1995: 167; Tang 2009: 595). As all of this did inflame tensions, increase fear and uncertainty, and brought the world to the brink war between the two

nuclear-armed superpowers and therefore were in a less secure position than they were before the 'start' of the Cold War; more power, but less security.

Tangs last aspect of the BHJ-formulation of the security dilemma is that regulation would be possible through material and psychological factors such as technology, geography, misperceptions and communication (Tang 2009: 594). The clearest example of material factors we can see in the geographical factor of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which mainly revolved around the placement of Soviet ICBM's on Cuba and American missiles in Turkey (Hayek 1974: 5-7).

A clear-cut example of the psychological factor can be found in the several misperceptions I have highlighted earlier regarding Soviet adventurism in Africa and Asia, the mistrust of one another when it came to spheres of influence and the differing views on the faltering of Afghanistan as a Soviet client state. An example working the other way, is how the Soviet Union and the United States entered a détente and brokered multiple important treaties on arms reduction such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I & II, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I & II, the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Non-proliferation Treaty and ABM Treaty, which all served to bring the Soviet Union and the United States closer together while jointly agreeing to ensure safety and phase out some weapons (Caljé & Den Hollander 2013: 399-400; Council on Foreign Relations 2019).



Figure 2) Aspects of Tang's BHJ-formulation applied to the Cold War

As shown in figure 2, I have systematically shown that all aspects of Tang's BHJ-formulation occur in the Cold War and can therefore be judged as a proper security dilemma, in accordance with my expectations. This was of course the most likely case, so this finding can be considered as more of confirmation than a real discovery.

Case II: The simmering tensions between China and Japan

After World War II United States General Douglas MacArthur directed the defeated Japanese empire to incorporate a unique article in its constitution; the famed article 9 which states that Japan "forever renounced war as a sovereign right" (Girard 2019), while the country also stated that:

> "land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential will never be maintained and overseas operations are expressly forbidden, with some humanitarian exceptions" (ibid; Mao & Vreeland 2013: 39).

This striking promise remains untouched ever since it was enshrined into law. However, that was the case until in September 2018 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared to ponder to constitutionally

acknowledge Japan's Self-Defence Forces as the Japanese de facto military forces. It is theorised that many in the region – especially China – may see this as the opening salvo of a very slippery slope towards eventual conflict (Girard 2019). But why is Japan considering this change and are we indeed seeing a new security dilemma emerge in East Asia as China rises?

Firstly, I will once again examine anarchy on part of the main actors in this case; China and Japan. Once again, I emphasise that anarchy is a realist assumption, and therefore does not have to be examined, but is useful to do so anyway, because it clearly delineates the context in which both actors operate. Signalling to disregard the legitimacy of international organisations and rules – or otherwise undermining them – are considered as indicators of a perceived lack of legitimacy for the international institution at hand, as it shows a state does not have the "sense of rightness and obligation" it should have in order to indeed view such an institution as legitimate (Hurd 2008: 30).

First and foremost, it is important to note that due to Japan's peaceful nature after World War II, it has presented itself as a staunch international institutionalist. This is expressed by Japanese vows that it would want to be regarded as one of the most prominent UN member states and would seek election to the Security Council as often as possible, as well as the arguments that the Japanese military should be able to operate on foreign soil solely if mandated by the United Nations Security Council. Since its admission to the UN, Japan has represented Asia more than any other state (Mao & Vreeland 2013: 40). This fits in with the Yoshida doctrine which Japan has followed since the 1950s, which dictates a relaxed approach to international affairs, focus on domestic economic gains, and defence reliance on the United States (idem: 41; Droubie 2011: 2309). However, under the Trump administration in the United States, defence reliance has become quite the dirty word, spurring calls for defence reform from outside as well as from within Japan.

But there is more to Japan's attitude with regards to the United Nations Security Council. It uses its prominent position in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to finance aid loans to states serving on the Security Council in order to influence them. It does so because this obfuscates the fact that Japan effectively violates the Yoshida doctrine as the money gets "laundered". In return Japan expects favourable Security Council votes, agenda-setting powers and gaining intelligence about closed-door meetings (Mao & Vreeland 2013: 47). Japan does so not through an obvious "pay-to-play" scheme, but by structurally funding projects in prospective UNSC member states in order to curry favour with its leadership, coupled with the implication that voting behaviour which would harm Japanese interests will likely get the loan rescinded. As the minimum time for an ADB loan to be dispensed is eighteen months, UNSC members remain indebted to the ADB and Japan for their entire Security Council tenure (idem: 48). To immediately equate this with realist anarchy is perhaps a bit too extreme, but it does show a simmering disregard for the Security Council's legitimacy and is a testament to Japan's hard power wielding through soft power means, as well as a repudiation of Hurd's sense of rightness and obligation, were Japan to consider those institutions to be truly legitimate.

China has been a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for several decades. In those decades it has not had to vote on anything with regard to this case. However, the United Nations Security Council has in the past already been used as a theatre for Sino-Japanese tensions. While China asserts that white and rich nations are overrepresented in the UNSC, it has repeatedly refused to endorse bids by Japan and India in order to remain the sole permanent Asian voice, which of course is a position of power, but diametrically opposes its own calls for an increased diversity in UNSC representation for its own interests. Moreover, China fears that a Japanese accession to the Permanent 5 of the UNSC, might enable Washington to circumvent Russian intransigence and Chinese opposition in core decisions (Malik 2005: 20). This is not per se an assault on the rules-based order which would signal China's disregard for the UN or even that China regards itself as operating in an anarchical sphere in which it is not beholden to any higher authority. However, there are several other pointers which indicate how Chinese compliance would fare.

The most prominent example regards how in 2016 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in a case brought by the Philippines against China over their assertiveness in the South China Sea, including the legality of the infamous nine-dash line; a vast area in the South China Sea over which China claims sovereignty, but which cuts straight through territorial waters of multiple other states. The court ruled against China in affirming that China has no historical right to the claimed territory according to the nine-dash line, and that no exclusive economic zone could be established, among other rulings. China flat-out rejected the court's award as it claims to not recognise the court, which they announced they would do prior to the award. China's non-compliance with the award is illustrated by its threat to other claimants of the contested area not to extract any resources, otherwise this might lead to war. This can be seen as China deploying military force – or at least the threat thereof – in order to "overturn the legal rights given to other countries" (Hayton: 2018; Dingli et al. 2019).

Moreover, since the Ruling Beijing has sought to construct even more military installations on artificial islands it has created in disputed waters, which thereafter have been populated with surface-to-air missiles, air bases capable of hosting bomber planes and other military installations. China tries to spin international law even further by claiming that international law technically would allow any continental state to claim offshore archipelagos. This is even more problematic when taking into consideration that a third of global shipping passes through the disputed area, giving China a strong hand to play if necessary, and indeed, China has suggested it may seek to bring freedom of navigation in the region under the order of coastal China (Nakayama 2019). The non-compliance with an ICJ-ruling which underpins maritime safety, security and peace is a grave assault on the global rules-based order and a clear indicator that China does indeed regard itself as not beholden to at least that overarching authority, while further chipping away at the legitimacy of international institutions and international law and therefore operating in the anarchy for the purpose of this research.

Lastly, Deng Xiaoping himself reiterated that the Chinese People's Republic regarded sovereignty as an inalienable right, defining the core of sovereignty as:

> "a notion of political authority as lying exclusively in the hands of spatially differentiated states," they constitute the basis for "an anarchy of mutual recognition," and, therefore, tend to "promote egoistic over collective conceptions of interest" (Deng 1998: 311).

Which of course reaffirms and defends the Westphalian notion of the anarchic nations within the international system of states, placing the state above any entity which tries to exert its supposed power over it.

Secondly, I will discuss the aspect of fear and uncertainty as described in the BHJ-formulation with regards to the China-Japan case. I will start with examining the historical context which reverberates and impacts political attitudes until today, before moving on to the more present dangers. China is a state with a remarkable longevity, as well as a rich and proud history, and as such, the atrocities Imperial Japan committed there in the twentieth century have neither been forgiven nor forgotten, and always haunt Sino-Japanese relations as a spectre. Moreover, Japan's unwillingness to acknowledge their crimes and atone for them, has contributed to the preservation of the visceral mistrust of Japan, because – China argues – as long as it maintains these attitudes, Japan could easily slide back into militarism. Hence, the slightest sign of any military assertiveness by Japan will always be viewed with severe suspicion through Chinese eyes (Christensen 2003: 26-28).

As per the Yoshida doctrine Japan and the United States have a fruitful military partnership in which – amongst others – they codevelop theatre missile defences. This seems innocuous enough, but this kind of partnership stokes the fear in China that a newly-invigorated and more defensive role for Japan in the bilateral alliance could upend decades of old role patterns in which Japan exercised restraint, which could subsequently lead to more offensive military build-ups in the near future. In a remarkable and seemingly paradoxical scenario, China fears both a breakdown of the US-Japan alliance – as this would most certainly lead to a new military build-up – as well as a significant upgrade of Japan's role within the alliance, because it invites more cooperation with the Americans and might upend traditional regional roles (Idem: 26). This alliance is despised as it allowed for Japan to develop the most technically advanced defensive capabilities in the region. Chinese analysts cite examples such as antisubmarine capabilities, advanced fighters, advanced warning aircrafts, Patriot air defence batteries and Aegis radar technology on ships (idem: 29).

All of these fears stem from the fact that China knows Japan could easily become a military superpower in the next 25 years if it desired and aspired to be. This, coupled with the absence of knowing future Japanese intentions, makes China perceive Japan as one of its greatest existential threats. If Japan wished to build up its military and successfully repealed article 9 of the constitution and the "non-constitutional norms of self-restraint (e.g., 1,000-nautical-mile limit on power-projection capability, prohibitions on the military use of space, and tight arms export controls)" (idem: 30; Goh 2011: 897)

China would surely take more than notice, as a stand-off over the aforementioned tensions over the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea could be the spark to ignite an immense war, as these islands are home to rich fishing grounds, trade routes and oil reserves. Chinese ships regularly pass by these islands, raising tensions each time, especially because the mutual defence agreement between the US and Japan includes the islands and could therefore be the opening salvo of a global superpower war (Allison 2017: 161; 176-177).

What complicated matters is that despite former President Clinton's best efforts, during his administration a belief became more widely held which stipulated that in order to not weaken the alliance, Japan must eventually broaden its roles and integrate itself more with the US military, leading China to feel increasingly cornered. Especially when this integration occurred and the alliance stated that it would operate in situations in the areas surrounding Japan, and that those areas would be defined on a situational basis, feeding uncertainty. Then in 1998 the alliance started codeveloping theatre defence missiles to counter the North Korean threat, but which China believes are also designed to counter their missile capabilities (Christensen 2003: 32-35; Goldstein 2003: 68-69), which once again illustrates how fear and uncertainty play key parts in China's view of Japan.

However, China does not appear all that friendly to Japan either. The country is very weary of China as the latter further expands its military as well as its operational areas, encroaching upon Japan, and the Senkaku Islands. In 2017 there was the joint Sino-Russian exercise *Joint Sea 2017*, as well Chinese fighter incursions into the Sea of Japan, bomber advancements close to the Kii Peninsula, frequent advancements by ships and aircraft, and underwater intrusions (Japanese Ministry of Defence 2018: 3) which all appeared to Japan as China testing Japanese responses to incoming threats. Apart from an increase in these kinds of incidents, Japan is mainly frightened by several long-term trends. One prominent example is China's defence budget which has been growing exponentially over the last 20 years with double digits every year until 2015 with exclusion of 2010. Another is the strengthening of its defensive Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities which encompass the entire east and south China Sea, making counteroperations in case of a Sino-Japanese conflict nearly impossible. And lastly the development of new techniques such as electronic warfare, and more than anything else how China appears to attempt to change the regional status quo through coercion. Examples of this include assertive behaviour in maritime disputes, the land-reclamation and subsequent annexing of features on the Spratley and Paracel Islands, which in turn are converted into military outposts, and the potential involvement of the People's Liberation Army (PLA, the Chinese military) in China's Belt and Road Initiative which currently spans across the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Idem: 9; Liff & Ikenberry 2014: 66). Japan also takes issue to China's increasing lack of transparency, the enormous size of its defence budget and the rapid pace with which it appears to modernise. China remains asserting the narrative that it is all for defensive purposes, but Japan evidently sees it as directly threatening its own security and survival (idem: 76; Samuels 2006: 114).

As to the third point of accumulation of defensive capabilities with inherent offensive capacities. I have already delved into some technical parts of this aspect under the two previous aspects and will do so as well in the following aspect. But what is important to note is that China is very afraid of US influence in the region, as that might tip the balance in favour of Japan and other potential regional contenders. An especially thorny point is Taiwan. As China still strives to reunification – with or without force. Even defensive weapons in the hands of Taiwan or of its supporters are highly provocative to Beijing (Christensen 2003: 26). A clear example of where Japanese strategic defensive choices were interpreted as offensive can be found in the spring of 2019, when Japan in a show of force deployed 400 troops to the tiny island of Miyakojima, a mere 100 miles from the Senkaku Archipelago which belongs to Japan but is claimed by China. Even more troops and missile units will follow in the near future, according to government officials (Craft 2019; Fravel 2010: 145). 400 troops and some missiles of course are far too inconsequential to make a dent in Chinese military capabilities and therefore serve just as defensive capabilities and to signal that Japan means business. However, they do of course yield offensive capabilities, if need be.

As Discussed in aspect two and to be elaborated on in aspect four, Japan's defence cooperation does not sit easy with Beijing, as they fear new defensive roles for Tokyo could eventually lead to a more aggressive posture due to an erosion of the Japanese norm of self-restraint (Christensen 2003: 26, 31). In response to a perceived increased security posture of China, Japan bands together with not only the US, but also with Australia, which joined the bilateral alliance to establish the Trilateral Security Dialogue (Liff & Ikenberry 2014: 71). This clearly fuels the uncertainty of China which may feel their own security diminishing, as Japan's increases through these defensive agreements.

What remains the hardest to square in this aspect is China's de facto colonisation of artificial pieces of land or features of the Paracel and Spratley Archipelagos. This, because while it theoretically could be true that China does this as a purely defensive mechanism because it believes it has a legitimate claim to all islands within the nine-dash line and does enhance Chinese control of the region and therefore is coasts, it is factually an act of expansion against other claimants or international territories. To elaborate on that, over the past couple years China has successfully expanded into the sea with 1.35 million square miles in artificial land. Through these land reclamation activities China has gained valuable defence assets as it has fitted these islands with a myriad of defence facilities such runways, ports, defence systems, radars and more (Neill & Nouwens 2018). Many of these facilities allow China to assert power through better interactivity between the mainland and its newly founded archipelago. But it has given China more; a host of new signals intelligence capabilities, space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, early warning detection mechanisms and further enforcement of aerial and maritime defences, which could be used to hinder free navigation by states such as Japan, the US or Australia (ibid.). Granted that all of this could be used solely for defensive purposes, but it is quite hard to believe. This makes painfully clear the shortcomings of Tang's BHJ-formulation; that it is mainly to be used in order to study historical events and not ongoing events, because the researcher can simply

not possess all the facts on whether or not a state's intentions are/were purely defensive and is therefore forced to make his or her own educated guesses based on policy output and statements by government officials.

However, what may guide us a bit is examining the doctrines of both Japan and China, to see how these elaborate on such policies. Since May 1999 – when the defence pact between Japan and the United States was intensified – Japan's security posture certainly has changed from a pure perspective of self-defence. While two of the three new main guidelines pertain to an intensified cooperation under normal circumstances or in the case of an attack on Japan, the third guideline states that joint US-Japanese operations could take place in the area surrounding Japan (Mulgan 2000: 225), as I touched on before. One can see why that has China worried. However, it is argued that it is just a rewording of the status quo, as article 9 of the constitution is still the guiding principle for military action, and the aforementioned 'area surrounding Japan' is understood to not be outside of Japan's previous area of operations (Idem 226-227). In Japan's most recent military doctrine, they appear to emphasise efficiency and interoperability above all else. This could indicate that Japan (1) will continue to rely mainly on the United States in the near future, and (2) does not aim to significantly expand the Self-Defence Forces. (Le 2018: 184). Moreover, in this doctrine the focus on self-defence has not shifted and remains contained to defending the homeland. The most major shifts stem from technological advancements which have allowed Japan to create a dynamic defence force which "emphasises readiness, mobility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology […] and intelligence capabilities" (idem: 184-185).

China on the other hand has had a guerrilla-based doctrine from the early 1970s until the mid-1980s, in which doctrine shifted towards fighting smaller local wars, as Chinese leadership did not envisage large conflicts in the coming decades. This doctrine emphasised conflict over limited objectives such as "enhancing diplomatic strength, intimidating an adversary, or acquiring economic resources" (Cliffe 2015: 20). This doctrine dictated the importance of seizing initiative and seeking to end a conflict early by decisive and offensive battles. After Operation Desert Storm, China revised its doctrine in 1999 to an elaborate and integrated doctrine between politics and the military aimed at:

> "[maintaining] protect the sovereignty of its territorial waters and its oceanic interests, protect the territorial sovereignty of its border areas, protect critical coastal areas, and ensure the security of China's airspace over critical strategic areas" (idem: 21-22).

In this doctrine five types of joint campaigns were laid out; "island blockade, island offensive, border region counterattack, joint air defence, and counter landing" (ibid). The first two are suggested to be aimed at Taiwan, the third against a bordering county in case of hostilities, and the last two to counter an air campaign or amphibious landing by an invading force, which is often presumed to be the US. It is critical to mention that all Chinese military doctrines – including those active today – subjugate military goals to political goals, implying that Chinese involvement in any war would be mostly limited

and defensive, while politics and economics would do a lot of heavy lifting in trying to constrain hostilities (ibid.).

in the period 2003-2009 the Chinese doctrine was again updated. This time to focus on consolidating the power of the ruling party, providing security against the backdrop of national economic development, the safeguarding of the national interest, and maintaining world peace and promoting common development (idem: 30). Moreover, the emphasis on joint operations between different branches of the military and political spheres was increased. Secondly, China paved the way for modern warfare such as computer network warfare and psychological warfare. Thirdly, the scope of operations was broadened and now included domains such as counterterrorism, mountain offensives and campaigns against coral islands and reefs. Scrapped pieces of doctrine included: border region counterattack, counter landing, urban offensive, urban defence, sea blockade, coastal raid, air blockade, and nuclear counterattack (idem: 31). It is likely that many of these plans were ditched in favour of more integrated joint operations which still encompass all of these niches.

All in all, it is hard to assess from doctrine whether China focusses more on a defensive or offensive approach, although they do champion pre-emptive action. However, the stakes for China, a rising global superpower, are of course different from Japan's, "merely" a strong regional power. Therefore, it would be more defendable for China to pursue a doctrine which allows for a military which is deployable all over the world in different kinds of scenarios, both offensive and defensive. What we do know from earlier aspects is that China does not desire war with Japan, as it will inevitably draw in the US and the broader international community.

Fourthly, the aspect that both actors should be defensive realists comes into focus. In this section it is especially important to make a distinction between China's hegemonic ambitions on the global economy and an increased defence spending which is not per se challenging the US military hegemony.

Japan, even though it is seeing staggering increases in defence spending, is not rearming according to Professor Stephen Nagy, international relations scholar. He states Japan is merely striving for a defensive armed forces, which makes more demographic sense than an offensive posture (Craft 2019). This confirmed by how Japan spends large parts of its defence expenditure as laid out in previous aspects. While a significant portion to be spend over the next couple years will pay for the acquisition of F-35 fighter planes, a large part is designated to pay for two Aegis ballistic missile defence radars (Reuters 2018). As I described earlier, Japan has a valuable military partnership with the United States in which they develop certain military hardware together. It needs to be noted though, that this includes mainly hardware such as missile defences (Christensen 2003: 26). While Japan sees its alliance with the US as a purely defensive arrangement, it is precisely this alliance which may in some way fuel Beijing's desire to increase defence spending, as they view US military presence as an encroachment upon and diminishment of their own security (Liff & Ikenberry 2014: 59).

China views Japan's repeated comments about China's rapidly advancing military capabilities

as psychological warfare ploy, used to garner support for its own "resurgent militarism" (Liff & Ikenberry 2014: 68), which is of course ironically reminiscent of how Eisenhower thought of Soviet calls for cooperation right after World War II. As I touched upon in the previous aspects, it is hard to assess from military doctrine and the military build-up if China really is a defensive realist, or more of an offensive realist. As mentioned before, China has heavily invested in A2AD-capabilities and interception systems against missiles, but also in more offensive capabilities such as missile systems and the dubious militarisation of the South China sea, while frequently nearing or entering on Japanese territory during 'exercises'.

If we are dealing with a security dilemma in accordance with the BHJ-formulation, both parties should be defensive realists or at least have not revisionist stance, but rather a status quo stance. While Japan has often derided China for its lack of transparency on its defence expenditure, military capabilities and intentions, China has stressed repeatedly it desires an increase in strategic trust and to reduce suspicion and misunderstanding (idem: 87). Examining all previous aspects, I think it is certainly safe to assume that Japan is indeed a defensive realist. However, China remains opaque and ambiguous, leaving too much room for doubt in both their discourse and their actions.

Fifthly, there is the spiral model; worsening relations and arms races, which for a large part tie into the previously discussed aspects. Hence, I will elaborate more on that aspect in this paragraph. The relationship between China and Japan has always been frail due to the imperialist occupation of parts of China by Japan and has further been strained by Chinese opposition of a permanent United Nations Security Council seat. Moreover, as China has been asserting itself increasingly actively in and around Japanese territorial waters, suspicion has risen on the Japanese side (Malik 2005: 24-25).

Both states have seen staggering raises of their defence expenditures over the past couple of years and have also signalled that this will increase even more over the coming years. Japan is planning to spend a record of $47 billion on defence as it tries to respond to naval incursions by China and threats from North Korea.

China on the other hand aims to increase its defence spending with 7.6% in 2019. This growth is smaller than last year's 8.1%, but it is still a remarkable jump, as it is expected to outpace general economic growth. The 2019 budget entails a staggering $177.61 billion in defence spending. However, this number may even be higher, as china omits multiple major spending categories such as research and development, as well as foreign weapons procurement (Johnson 2019; Office of the Secretary of Defence 2019: 94). Then there are also the remarkable acquisitions both states are making. Japan has sought to modernise their already state of the art defence capabilities even further by expanding the fleet with two Aegis destroyers, the biggest increase in submarines since World War II, the launching of two more new aircraft, as well as the construction of facilities for intelligence gathering and monitoring the outer border regions. However, they have even more ambitious plans for the near future in which they place priority on gaining air and maritime superiority through the acquisition of seven more destroyers,

and 28 F-35 fighter jets. Moreover, they are aiming to create a joint special operations force with the United States Marines. It is suggested that all of these points have come to fruition as a means to gain and maintain – defensive – superiority over China, which in response is continuing to ratchet up its own defence spending, while lambasting Japan for doing the same (Liff & Ikenberry 2014: 73-74).

What proves beyond a doubt that Japan has fallen for the tragic nature of the security dilemma – and is consistent with this aspect of the BHJ-formulation – is an unearthed 2011 policy document which states that Japan and its allies hope that by investing in their own security and thereby intensifying their security posture, they could convince China to back down. However, China has responded by rapid military modernisation, ever increasing defence expenditures, less transparency and an expansion of its capabilities for "matters of concern for the region and the international community" (Idem: 76). The two nations are attacking one another verbally in defence white papers and other government publications and calling on one another to decrease its security posture, while both keep enhancing their own. China maintains these increases are purely defensive, while Japan clearly regards them as highly problematic. This "perceptual disconnect" became evidently clear when Japan's minister of Defence commented on China's newly presented aircraft carrier, which China once again labelled as defensive, dismissing any and all concerns as unreasonable (idem: 76-77).

This trend of direct verbal confrontation and mudslinging has coincided with the territorial disputes in the East China Sea and China's broader rise. Japan even went as far as to state that China's dangerous behaviour could cause a "contingency situation" (ibid.). It has been firmly researched and established that Japan, together with the US, Singapore and Australia, have significantly invested in enhancing defence capabilities as a direct response to China's growing military capabilities, uncertainty about its strategic intentions, and it's more provocative behaviour concerning border and territorial disputes (Idem: 86). Although there is significant action-reaction between China and Japan, it must be noted that there has not yet been a traditional full-scale arms race. Increases to defence budgets have mostly been in line with economic growth and leaders have – instead of traditional reciprocal arms races – targeted very specific sectors in which to invest. This is evident in how states such as Japan have invested in "likely trouble spots, strengthen[ing] alliance coordination and military interoperability, prepositioning military assets, expanding joint exercises and force rotations, and so forth" (idem: 88).

The penultimate aspect once again is concerned with the ultimate consequences of the security dilemma; an unnecessary and tragic war effort, or self-defeating defence spending. As this conflict is still ongoing and not yet a part of history as the Cold War clearly is, it is impossible to give a definitive answer to this point. However, what we can clearly establish, is that while there has not been a war yet, the increase in power has most certainly been self-defeating, as it has created new areas of contention, and inflamed rhetoric between Japan and China. While this does not have to mean that there is factually a decline in security, the perception of this decline is enough to feed fear and uncertainty, which makes the acquirement of more power indeed self-defeating. This is in accordance with the BHJ-formulation, for

an increase in firepower can be self-defeating due to the mechanics fear and uncertainty play in propelling the spiral model which worsens the security dilemma.

Lastly, there are certainly and easily both material and psychological factors to discern. The most clear-cut straightforward example can be found in the territorial aspect; the creation and annexation of artificial islands and the claiming of existing islands belonging to other states, as I have thoroughly laid out with regards to the Senkaku archipelago, and the Spratley and Paracel archipelagos.

Psychological factors which contribute to the security dilemma are mostly historical mistrust within the region and the – informal – relations some states in the region maintain with Taiwan. Although this latter aspect is both material and psychological (Christensen 2003: 26) A psychological factor which partly mitigates the security dilemma is the creation of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defence Authorities of Japan-China, which aims to coordinate movements in order reduce the risk of unnecessary incursions, provocations and escalations (Japanese Ministry of Defence: 8).



Figure 3) Aspects of Tang's BHJ-formulation applied to the Cold War

In conclusion; this conflict was much harder to pin down than the Cold War. This is in part because it is still ongoing, and some things are simply unknowable; such as true intentions and capabilities. If these things will ever become public knowledge it can only be many years from now. If we look at figure three, you can see I once again ticked all the boxes, but left the third – regarding defensive realist actors – slightly open. This point is built upon the unknowability of contemporary true intentions. We cannot yet read memoirs or correspondence from Chinese and Japanese officials which truly show what their actual intentions are. We can merely judge what they say in public and contextualise it with policy, and knowable capabilities which leave much facts to be desired, exposing the main risk if one wished to use the BHJ-formulation to assess and test contemporary conflicts.

Conclusion

In this thesis I have set out to test Shiping Tang's conceptual analysis of the security dilemma. I felt this was of great importance as arms and technological races around the world seem to be intensifying and a great understanding of such a concept as the security dilemma may very well help researchers and policymakers in understanding and mitigating future conflict.

Tang formulated his eight aspects of the security dilemma based on the work of security dilemma giants Herbert Butterfield, John Herz and Richard Jervis. After a broad theoretical exploration of the political science research on realism, power, power projections and the security dilemma I set out

to answer the following question; “to what extent does Tang’s conceptual analysis adequately capture the security dilemma?”. I analysed this through two critical case studies. This research design was chosen for its broad validity lending purposes, as it is perfect for establishing a base line through a most likely case design, and thoroughly tests and shapes the theory through a least likely case design. The case representing the former the design was the Cold War, as it is traditionally viewed as the epitome of the security dilemma. The case representing the latter was the conflict between China and Japan. As this case is still ongoing and would truly put the theory to the test, as there could be no mere reliance on decades of academic research.

The analysis of the Cold War showed overwhelmingly that the theory works on its most base levels, as all aspects as noted in Tang’s BHJ formulation were met; it was established the actors resided in an anarchical sphere, both actors dealt with great fears and uncertainties about one another, war was not intended by either side as they mostly sought to increase security towards one another, there was an accumulation of defensive capabilities with inherent offensive capacities, the spiral model and its arms races and the worsening of ties were acutely present, there was more power but less security, and several material and psychological factors served as regulators of tensions.

The analysis of the conflict between China and Japan came far, and truly tested the BHJ-formulation, but also showed me that it is rather hard to apply the model to an ongoing conflict, as you simply cannot have all the facts. What we could establish with absolute certainty were the fact that both actors live with a lot of fear and uncertainty with one another. We can conclude there were regulation material and psychological factors, as well as the accumulation of defensive capabilities with inherent offensive capabilities of both actors. Moreover, it is clear that there is an action-reaction between both when it comes to defence acquisitions, expenditures and statements. What was harder to really discern was whether or not both states truly pursue merely a defensive realist strategy, instead of an offensive realist strategy, what China often seems to do, even though they will never explicitly say so.

To answer the research question: “To what extent does Tang conceptual analysis adequately capture the security dilemma?”, the answer is clear. Tang’s BHJ-formulation does a wonderful job in establishing whether or not a historical event was indeed a security dilemma. However, there are still significant troubles with assessing current events, as not all the facts one needs to make such a determination are readily available at hand.

Future research should strive to devise a theory of the security dilemma which is also applicable in the ongoing conflict, as it would both policymakers and researchers to readily deal with it and diminish the chances of it turning into an unnecessary war with tragic consequences.

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Appendix I: The Causal Link From Anarchy to the Security Dilemma and War (Tang 2009: 596)