Managing negotiated flight

The United Nations Trusteeship Council and the decolonization of West Africa, 1945-1960

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Date: 19 February 2021
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Content

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[1] Cover image: Petitioners from Togoland under British administration at the Trusteeship Council. Left to right: J.K. Mensah; Joseph H. Allassani; S. Togbe Fleku. Source: UN Audiovisual Library, '505th Meeting of Trusteeship Council: 13th Session' (1954), <https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/2144/2144309/>, visited 19 February 2021.

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Figure 2 – Map of the UN Trust Territories

Australia
Belgium
United kingdom
France
United states
South Africa
New Zeland
Aus, NZ, UK

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
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
Source: Maxwell Suuk, Cai Nebe and Delali Sakpa, 'Ghana's Western Togoland region declares sovereignty', *DW*, 25 September 2020, Visited 17 February 2021.

Note: the image above depicts Western Togoland as part of contemporary Ghana. Western Togoland corresponds with the former Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration. In recent years, Western Togoland has seen renewed attempts to secede from Ghana.

Figure 5 – Map of British Togoland, recommended plebiscite units, 1956

Source: UN Digital Library, 'United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories of Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French Administration, 1955: special report on the Togoland unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration, together with related documents' (T/1218), 60.

Introduction

> The year 1960 was a year of competition for independence, in the context of African nationalism, freedom was indivisible and urgent. No Trust Territories or dependent territory would or could afford to become a stumbling-block to progress and freedom […] – *U Tin Maung, Burmese representative to the Trusteeship Council*[2]

The year 1960 was a watershed moment in the efforts of the United Nations to manage Sub-Saharan decolonization. December 1960 saw the formulation of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which declared that self-determination was a right for all and urged that "immediate steps should be taken in Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing Territories to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories."[3] This declaration was preceded by the emergence of independent African states, including four trust territories. Between 1957 and 1962, all African trust territories gained independence.[4] These trust territories were dependent entities that had been administered under international supervision through the International Trusteeship System of the United Nations. The practical operation of this system was in the hands of the UN Trusteeship Council.[5]

The role of the Trusteeship Council in the decolonization of sub-Saharan Africa is still debated. While some scholars see the Council as a product of imperial traditions, others describe it as a great facilitator of decolonization.[6] This thesis questions how the United Nations Trusteeship Council managed developments of decolonization in West African trust territories between 1945 and 1960. This timeframe covers the period from the establishment of the Trusteeship System, the Trusteeship Council, and the individual trusteeship agreements to the independence of the trust territory of Togoland under French administration in April 1960.

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[2] United Nations Digital Library, 'Trusteeship Council 26th session official records 1052nd meeting Monday, 18 April 1960, at 2.40 p.m. New York' (T/SR.1052), 5. *Note: all sources from the United Nations Digital Library (UNDL) shall be referred to by their code. These sources can be accessed through the website of the UNDL* (<https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en>) *by entering the corresponding code in the search bar.*

[3] A/Res/1514(XV).

[4] United Nations, 'International Trusteeship System', <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/international-trusteeship-system-and-trust-territories>, visited 4 October 2020.

[5] Cherifa Belhabib, *The United Nations Trusteeship System, 1945-1961*, (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1991), 3-4.

[6] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: the League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, (Oxford and New York, 2015); George Thullen, *Problems of the Trusteeship System: a Study of Political Behavior in the United Nations*, (Geneva, 1964); Belhabib, 'Trusteeship'.

The Trusteeship System has a somewhat awkward place in the historiography of post-war imperialism and decolonization. Not exactly a part of the colonial project, it has sometimes been overlooked by scholars of Sub-Saharan African decolonization. The Trusteeship System does not exactly fit into the general narrative of Sub-Saharan decolonization, as the supervising role of the United Nations gave a different dimension to developments of decolonization. The small scope of the Trusteeship System, additionally, has not been an incentive for further academic research. Similarly, the Trusteeship Council has not been paid adequate attention in the historiography of the United Nations. Questions of the United Nations' role in developments of decolonization have been largely centred on the General Assembly rather than the Trusteeship Council, which was a subsidiary organ.[7] However, the Trusteeship Council was heavily influenced by developments and the way colonial powers and the United Nations responded to these developments. In turn, it had a central role in the debates within the United Nations regarding decolonization. Additionally, the Trusteeship Council can be imagined as a political organization, in which geopolitical affiliations and power dynamics came to the fore. These dynamics heavily influenced the way the Council operated and therefore determined their position within the debates of decolonization. The Trusteeship Council can therefore be positioned both as an organizational and supervisory institute, and as a sphere of colonial and global politics. As such, it is deserving of additional attention.

The existing historiography on the Trusteeship Council has concentrated on the question of its influence on developments of decolonization, imagining it as either a facilitator of decolonization or as an obstructer to decolonization.[8] Additionally, some studies have included an analysis of the Trusteeship Council as a comparison with its predecessor, the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) or as part of a broader study into the United Nations' role in decolonization.[9] Rather than discussing the Council in terms of decolonization in a broad sense, this research focuses specifically on decolonization policies by the administering authorities of trust territories during the late-1950s. These policies are defined as "negotiated flight," a term coined by the British historian Martin Thomas. I use this term to analyse the policies of colonial authorities to further developments of decolonization along their interests, in context of the increasing realization amongst these authorities that the colonial

[7] Yassin El-Ayouty, *The United Nations and Decolonization: the Role of Afro-Asia*, (The Hague, 1971).
[8] Ullrich Lohrmann, *Voices from Tanganyika: Great Britain, the United Nations and the Decolonization of a Trust Territory, 1946-1961,* (Münster, 2007); Belhabib, 'Trusteeship'; Thullen, *Problems.*
[9] Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations. Volume 2: The Age of Decolonization, 1955-1965*, (London, 1989); Pedersen, *Guardians.*

project was untenable.[10] As we will see, policies of negotiated flight affected the trust territories just as it did colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the supervision of the Trusteeship Council changed the way these policies were discussed and implemented. The context of the Trusteeship System also gave rise to different questions regarding the effects of these policies on decolonization and the political development of the trust territories.

This thesis therefore researches the question of decolonization developments in the Council on multiple levels: a) the internal level, the ways in which the members of the Council operated within the organization; b) the institutional level, meaning the Council's relations with other organs of the United Nations, notably the General Assembly; c) the trusteeship level, or the Council's relations with the trust territories and the administering authorities; and d) the international level, focusing on the way geopolitics affected the positions of the Council's members vis-à-vis decolonization. These levels will not be separated explicitly in the analysis, as they often overlapped. Rather, I show how these levels affected each other and the operation of the Council in different ways. As an actor in developments of negotiated flight, I reinterpret the role of the Trusteeship Council as both a facilitator and obstructer. I do so through case studies of the trust territories of Togoland under British and French administration. In these case studies, I analyse how policies of negotiated flight were discussed and regulated by the Council. The two Togoland territories, which were neighbouring each other and had a shared past, were nevertheless administered in different ways. Policies of negotiated flight also differed between the two territories, and were regulated very differently by the Council. These case studies are therefore useful to study the different approaches of the Council to negotiated flight.

Using sources from the archives of the United Nations, I analyse the operations of the Council and the ways it was involved in developments of decolonization and negotiated flight. The Trusteeship Council archive forms the bulk of my sources. This archive includes, amongst other things, meeting records of the Council's sessions, resolutions and decisions made by the Council and annual reports to the General Assembly on the Council's operations and on developments in the trust territories. The archive also contains reports on visiting missions to the Trust Territories. These sources are accompanied by sources from the General Assembly, mostly resolutions and reports. Both the sources on the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly can be found in the UN Digital Library.

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[10] Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Decolonization: A Short History,* (Princeton, 2017); Wm. Roger Louis, and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonisation', in: Wm. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization*, (New York, 2006), 451-502, 451-458; Martin Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and their Roads from Empire*, (Oxford, 2014).

This thesis consists of four parts. Chapter 1 comprises an examination of the academic theoretical and historiographical approaches to the issue of decolonization and trusteeship. The chapter questions the ways in which these issues became integrated into the United Nations and the Trusteeship Council. Chapter 2 further examines how questions of decolonization were managed by the Council. In this chapter, the Council is reimagined as a political organization, susceptible to geopolitical power dynamics and alliances. Additionally, the chapter deals with the question of how policies of negotiated flight were debated and regaled by the Council. The last two chapters cover the case studies of British and French Togoland. Both chapters deal with issues of integration policies of trust territories into larger colonial frameworks. But while Chapter 3 – on British Togoland – sees the Council as a facilitator of negotiated flight, Chapter 4 – on French Togoland – finds the Council to have an obstructing role.

Chapter 1: Theoretical and historiographical approaches

Issues of decolonization and the role of the United Nations have been widely debated amongst historians and social scientists, although topics of trust territories and the UN Trusteeship Council have remained inadequately researched. This chapter deals provides an overview of the existing historiography on issues of decolonization in the UN and the Trusteeship Council.

a. Post-war imperialism and decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Second World War has often been described as the breaking point for traditional colonial powers. Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, historians of the British Empire, explain that the European colonial powers became financially dependent on the US due to the economic and financial effects of the Second World War.[11] The continuation of empire in the decades following the war has sometimes been explained in context of the Cold War. Louis and Robinson argue that "the intensification of the Cold War […] came to the rescue of the Empire."[12] They argued that the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the prioritization by the US of the anti-communist agenda over the anti-colonial one. The European colonial powers became vital allies in the American fight against communism, especially in the European colonies in Africa and Asia. The US thus provided financial and political support to these European colonial powers so that they could retain control over their empires.[13]

From the mid-1950s onwards, however, the colonial project was increasingly criticized on the international political stage. In this context of increasing pressure on the colonial system by the international community, as well as African nationalist movements and internal financial and political pressures, the decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa is sometimes explained as a deliberate move by European colonial powers. Scholars such as Louis and Robinson, as well as Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, have argued that, from the late 1950s onwards, European colonial powers actively pursued decolonization policies in order to control the move towards independence and establish political elites loyal to the former metropole, thus securing continuing influence.[14] This process of deliberate decolonization policies by colonial powers is defined by Martin Thomas as "negotiated flight."[15] According to Thomas, decolonization in

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[11] Louis and Robinson, 'Imperialism', 451-458.

[12] Ibidem, 459.

[13] Ibidem, 454-467.

[14] Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization,* 100-101; Louis and Robinson, 'Imperialism', 487-488.

[15] Thomas, *Fight,* 275.

West Africa was defined by attempts of negotiated flight by colonial authorities.[16] The idea of orderly flight has been questioned by scholars who point out that – in practice – the process of decolonization was far from a smooth process. As Jansen and Osterhammel point out, "decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa was strongly shaped by […] by the acceleration and then collapse of planned schedules […]."[17] Thomas also explains that this form of "managed" decolonization was not as smooth as implied, due to tensions between rival African parties and between African political demands and European colonial interests.[18] Still, this concept of negotiated flight can be useful as a starting point for thinking about the politics of decolonization in context of the Trusteeship System. I argue that negotiated flight was behind the policies of British and French authorities regarding the trust territories of Togoland.

b. Decolonization and the United Nations

With the internationalization of issues of colonialism and anti-imperialism, the United Nations got increasingly involved with such questions from the mid-1950s onwards. Scholars have debated about the reasons for this development. One school of thought focuses on the "advent of many African and Asian nations to the world stage as they gained independence from colonial rule."[19] According to these scholars, the entrance of these newly independent states into the UN led to more vocal criticism within the organization of issues of colonialism, human rights and inequality.[20] Most scholars agree that the UN thus became an "anti-colonial forum."[21] Some scholars have emphasized the role of Afro-Asian solidarity in promoting anti-colonialism in the UN. Yassin El-Ayouty, a political scientist and jurist, argues that the Afro-Asian bloc was able to use bloc pressure to contest the colonialist interpretations of the UN Charter.[22] Jessica Lynne Pearson adds that the anti-colonial bloc in the UN was able to "exploit the ambiguous wording of the Charter in favour of expanding [a] system of international colonial oversight."[23]

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[16] Thomas, *Fight,* 236-237.
[17] Louis and Robinson, 'Imperialism', 487-488; Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization,* 100-101.
[18] Thomas, *Fight,* 237.
[19] Alanna O'Malley, *Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations during the Congo Crisis, 1960-1964*, (Manchester, 2018), 2.
[20] Jessica Lynne Pearson, 'Defending Empire at the United Nations: The Politics of International Colonial Oversight in the Era of Decolonisation', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 45:3 (2017), 525–549, 542; O'Malley, *Diplomacy,* 2.
[21] Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, (Princeton, 2009), 25.
[22] Ayouty, *Afro-Asia*, xvii-xix; 34.
[23] Pearson, 'Defending Empire', 541-542.

These studies on the UN's role as an anti-colonial forum, however, have focused mainly on the General Assembly. This thesis will instead focus on the Trusteeship Council, although it will still consider the relationship between the two organs. Still, an understanding of anti-colonialism in the General Assembly is important for interpreting the role of the Trusteeship Council in developments of decolonization. It is important to realize that, as an organ subsidiary to the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council often relied on instructions from the General Assembly and the Special Political and Decolonization Committee. This committee – more commonly known as the Fourth Committee – was the branch of the General Assembly which dealt with issues of the Trusteeship System.[24]

This thesis is an attempt to reposition the UN in the historiography of African decolonization. To understand how the Council played a role in these developments, it will be important to keep in mind the processes of anti-colonialism in the General Assembly. I argue that the emergence of anti-imperial sentiments in the General Assembly affected the Trusteeship Council in their work and approach. As the supervising organ of the Council, the General Assembly was able to push the Council more towards the goals of decolonization. I will also argue that – due to the subsidiary position of the Council in relation to the General Assembly – the Council did not always control the management of decolonization developments with respect to trust territories. This thesis will analyze how this organizational reality affected the ability of the Trusteeship Council to facilitate or obstruct decolonization developments.

c. The role of the Trusteeship Council

The historiography of the UN's involvement in developments of decolonization has paid little attention to the Trusteeship Council. However, as developments as well as discussions of trusteeship and colonialism were often integrated in the UN, the role of the Trusteeship Council in decolonization is a vital part of the UN's history of decolonization.

The influence of the Trusteeship Council on decolonization developments in Sub-Saharan Africa has been analysed by some scholars, seeing the Council either as a facilitator of an obstructor of decolonization. Cherifa Belhabib's dissertation on the Trusteeship Council presents the major arguments in support of the 'facilitator' approach. Belhabib argues that "the Trusteeship System was a tool for decolonization […]."[25] She judges the performance of the Council based on the fact that, by 1961, most colonies had either achieved independence or

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[24] Belhabib, 'Trusteeship', 92.
[25] Ibidem, 9.

were well under way.[26] According to Belhabib, the source of the Council's success lay in the changes from the League of Nations Mandates System, implemented at the establishment of the UN. Changes, such as replacing Council membership based on individual expertise with state-based membership and the implementation of a right of enforcement, gave the Trusteeship Council an advantage over the PMC.[27]

Ullrich Lohrmann's study on the British trust territory of Tanganyika argues that the Trusteeship Council unintentionally became a tool for national independence movements to advance developments towards independence. Because of the status of trust territories, colonial authorities were obligated to administer these territories in context of their special status. The mechanisms of the Trusteeship Council thus helped to accelerate their progress towards independence, according to Lohrmann. Additionally, nationalist movements in the trust territories used these mechanisms to their advantage, promoting their political goals.[28]

Other scholars view the Council as an 'obstructer' to decolonization. Countering Belhabib's argument that the Trusteeship Council was an improvement on the PMC, Evan Luard argues that the Trusteeship System remained restrictive in its scope and influence over colonial administration. Luard maintains that "colonial powers continued to administer [Trust Territories] in their own way, according to their own traditions of colonial administration […]."[29] The supervising role of the Trusteeship Council did very little to adjust that. However, he does point out that the formulation of the goal of independence with regard to Trust Territories in the charter made it more difficult for colonial authorities to reject this.[30]

Susan Pedersen argues that the compromises made in the UN Charter established a system in which colonial powers were able to limit the ambitions of the Trusteeship System and advance their colonial interests. Rejecting Belhabib's claim that state-based membership of the Council had an anti-imperial effect, Pedersen argues that this made the Council more vulnerable to "the realities of power."[31] According to Pedersen, this resulted in a system in which strategic and political interests of member-states affected the functioning of the Council and quickly led to the entanglement of the Council's work with the political realities of the Cold War.[32] This idea of the Trusteeship Council as a political institution is recognized by George Thullen. He argues that – until the mid-1950s – the Council was unable or unwilling to adapt to the

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[26] Belhabib, 'Trusteeship', 90.
[27] Ibidem, vii.
[28] Lohrmann, *Voices,* 543-548.
[29] Luard, *United Nations*, 140-141.
[30] Ibidem, 142.
[31] Pedersen, *Guardians*, 400-401.
[32] Ibidem, 401-402.

increasing anti-colonial sentiments in global politics, as it remained divided on political issues regarding colonial governance and independence. According to Thullen, the mid-1950s progress towards decolonization of trust territories seems to have been the result of escalating developments in the colonies in general, rather than the successful conclusion of the Trusteeship System.[33] Lohrmann similarly argues that the independence of trust territories as Tanganyika was accelerated by the erosion of "political, economic and moral preconditions for the existence of colonial empires."[34] According to him, growing anti-imperial sentiment in the UN and increasing unrest among nationalist movements in the colonies led to the abandonment of the timetable for African development and to an acceleration of decolonization.[35]

Finally, there have been some scholars who have shown that negotiated flight played an important part in policies of decolonization in trust territories, although they do not use this term. In his study of Tanganyika, Lohrmann explains that British authorities sought to negotiate independence so that "Tanganyika would be regarded as a successful model of British decolonisation […] while still remaining a place in which British influence could be sustained."[36] In general, however, the issue of negotiated flight has hardly been part of the debate concerning the Trusteeship Council.

d. Conclusion

The role of the Trusteeship Council on developments of decolonization has thus been debated amongst scholars to some extent. Scholars have been divided on the question whether the Council should be seen as a facilitator or as an obstructor of decolonization of trust territories. To these discussions I add the argument of the Council's role in "negotiated flight," which deserves additional attention. Taking this concept as a premise for the decolonization of trust territories as well as colonies, this thesis researches the ways the Council managed policies of negotiated flight.

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[33] Thullen, *Problems,* 182-183.
[34] Lohrmann, *Voices,* 558.
[35] Ibidem, 558-560.
[36] Ibidem, 541.

Chapter 2: The Trusteeship Council

While negotiated flight affected trust territories in similar ways as it did colonies, the main difference was the supervision of the UN and its Trusteeship Council. This chapter questions how the Council managed policies of negotiated flight. To that end, I discuss the practical functioning of the Council, as well as its political alignments, particularly regarding questions of independence.

a. Background: responsibilities and mechanisms

The formal responsibility of supervision over the Trusteeship System did not actually lie with the Trusteeship Council, but with the General Assembly. The Council had been established in order to "assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions" and thus operated "under the authority of the General Assembly."[37] This meant that the actual power of approval or alteration of the trusteeship agreements lay with the Assembly, while the Council assisted the Assembly in their decisions by making recommendations based on their examination of developments in the trust territories.[38] The Council's mechanisms for exercising these responsibilities included the examination of reports from the administering authorities on the administration and development of the trust territories; the examination of petitions; and conducting periodic visiting missions.[39]

Scholars of the Trusteeship System have argued that the rules of procedure became a major source of division in the Council. As Thullen explains, some members sought to "limit the rules of procedure to the minimum requirements," while others "pressed for a broad interpretation of the Council's function […]."[40] This division stemmed from the political nature of the Council, which was consolidated in the Charter. According to the requirements of the Charter, the Council was equally divided between members who were administrators of trust territories and those who were not.[41] The position of administrating members within the Council was determined by their interests both as administrators of trust territories and as colonial powers. Three of the four administrators of Sub-Saharan African territories – Great Britain, France, and Belgium – had colonies in the immediate region. Their politics in the Council were

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[37] Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Chapter XII, Article 85, <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>, 24 October 1945, visited 18 February 2021.
[38] UN Charter, Chapter XII, Article 85 and 86.
[39] UN Charter, Chapter XIII, Article 87.
[40] Thullen, *Problems,* 63.
[41] UN Charter, Chapter XIII, Article 86.

thus determined by their anxieties over the dynamics of empire, as they sought to retain power or influence in Sub-Saharan Africa in the face of the UN's efforts of decolonization.[42]

These dynamics were further amplified by the politics of the Cold War. The dynamics of the Cold War affected the position of European empires, as they became both targets of communist propaganda and strategic localities of Western anti-communist efforts. Cold War alliances and strategies also became apparent in the Trusteeship Council. While the US delegation often used anti-colonial rhetoric, their position was also determined by their interests in appeasing European colonial powers. The US feared that "the potential fragmentation of the African continent would leave it open to the influence of the Soviet Union […]."[43] More importantly, the US administration of the special trust territories of the Pacific Islands reinforced US colonial interests, as these islands were seen as essential to the US strategic operation in context of Cold War dynamics.[44] On the other hand, the position of the Soviet delegation, as one of the most vocally anti-colonial members of the Council, should be understood in context of the Soviet interests of securing influence in Afro-Asian states.[45]

Meanwhile, the position of Asian and Latin American member states may be analysed as a response to Cold War bipolarity. These non-permanent Council members used tactics of non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity to actively influence the policies of the Council. The Indian delegation, a non-permanent member of the Trusteeship Council between 1954 and 1962, was especially active in promoting anti-colonialism and developments of decolonization.[46] Anti-colonialism was a central principle in India's foreign policy during the 1950s. According to L.P Singh, this was a strategy informed by both ideology and self-interest. Singh argued that: "[…] anti-colonialism provided a means with which India could play an international role and acquire world influence with a some-what inexpensive foreign policy."[47] With the rise of anti-colonialism in the UN, India took on the role of Afro-Asian leadership, especially under the direction of Jawaharlal Nehru in his capacity of prime minister of India during the 1950s. Nehru's ideas on anti-colonialism, self-determination and Afro-Asian solidarity shaped India's foreign policy and its position in the UN. Nehru also promoted the politics of non-alignment as part of India's foreign policy. As with anti-colonialism, non-alignment was not only an ideal,

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[42] Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization,* 100-101; Thomas, *Fight,* 267-275.

[43] Pearson, 'Defending Empire', 539.

[44] Pedersen, *Guardians,* 400-401.

[45] Louis and Robinson, 'Imperialism', 491; Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization,* 142.

[46] Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 'Index to the Proceedings of the Trusteeship Council: Thirteenth Session (1954)', <https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/trusteeship-council>, visited 18 February 2021, 1; 'Proceedings: Nineteenth Session, 6; 'Proceedings: Twenty-Fifth Session', 5; L.P. Singh, *India and Afro-Asian Independence,* (New Delhi, 1993), vii.

[47] Singh, *India,* vii.

but also served as a strategy for Indian 'soft power' politics, as it allowed India to retain its recent independence and diversify both its political and economic relationships.[48] Crucially, anti-colonialism and Afro-Asian solidarity was an integral part of the movement. The anti-colonial agenda served to attract newly-independent states by providing them with a uniting issue as well as a way to participate in international power politics.[49] The anti-colonialism of Indian foreign policy was further amplified by the position of prominent Indian nationalists in the Trusteeship Council, such as V.K. Krishna Menon. who served as Chairman of the Indian Delegation to the General Assembly between 1953 and 1960, as well as representative to the Trusteeship Council between 1954 and 1957-8.[50] Sometimes described as "Nehru's 'roving ambassador'", he was a controversial figure, with strong anti-colonial and communist sentiments.[51] Menon's alternate representative to the Trusteeship Council was Arthur Samuel Lall, who was seen as the "moderating influence behind the Menon diplomatic team."[52]

Thus, the political schisms within the Council divided the members on issues of decolonization and rules of procedure. The disputes over the rules of procedure were facilitated by the vagueness of the UN Charter, which allowed for conflicts of interpretation.[53] While the administering members, especially those with colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa, sought to restrict the responsibilities of the Council to protect their colonial interests, the anti-colonial members worked to promote decolonization efforts by the UN by expanding the responsibilities of the Council. Additionally, they unsuccessfully sought to remove the distinction between trust territories and Non-Self-Governing Territories, placing all colonial and dependent territories under the Trusteeship System.[54]

The equal division between colonial and non-colonial powers often caused a stalemate in the Council, which led to conflict with the General Assembly. As anti-colonial sentiments grew in the Assembly, the pressure to implement measures aimed at decolonization became stronger. This was not reflected in the Trusteeship Council. According to Thullen, the Assembly

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[48] Andrew Kennedy, 'Nehru's Foreign Policy: Realism and Idealism Conjoined', in: David Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy,* (Oxford, 2015), 92-103, 96-97.

[49] Alanna O'Malley, 'Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations, 1960–1', *The International History Review*, vol.37:5 (2015), 970-990, 971.

[50] E.S. Reddy and A.K. Damodaran (eds.), *Krishna Menon at the United Nations: India and the World,* (London, 1994), xv; T/14S/SR.526-562, ix; T/18S/SR.701-745, xiii; T/SR.752-793, ix; T/SR.794-840, ix.

[51] Daniel Gorman, 'Britain, India and the UN: colonialism and the development of international governance, 1945-1960', *Journal of Global History*, vol.9:3 (2014), 471-490, 483.

[52] The New York Times, 'Arthur Lall, 87, Indian Diplomat and Scholar', 21 September 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/21/world/arthur-lall-87-indian-diplomat-and-scholar.html>, visited 5 February 2021.

[53] Ayouty, *Afro-Asia*, xvii-xix.

[54] Ibidem, 26-27; Singh, *India,* 46.

"considered the Council too conservative, lacking in dynamic initiative and too considerate toward the administering authorities."[55] The Assembly thus often pressured the Council to take stronger action to further the UN's decolonization efforts.[56] In these cases of conflict with the Assembly, the colonial members of the Council aimed at protecting their interests by emphasizing the rights and responsibilities of the Council as the main supervisory organ of the Trusteeship System. On the other hand, anti-colonial members defended the interventions by the Assembly, rejecting the colonial members' arguments as an attempt to "[concede] the right of a minority to overthrow the will of the majority."[57] In many regards, therefore, the functioning of the Trusteeship Council was a political affair, affected by colonial and anti-colonial interests, as well as Cold War geopolitics.

b. The Trusteeship Council and decolonization

In the Trusteeship Council, national interests, dynamics of empire and international politics came together. As Pedersen mentioned, the political nature of the Trusteeship Council meant that it often became caught up in Cold War geopolitics. The position of the Soviet delegation exemplified this. According to Belhabib, the Soviet representative was one of the most actively critical members of the Council and "could be consistently counted on to criticize any and all aspects of the administration of any given territory."[58] In some respects, this had a positive effect on the implementation of decolonization policies by administering authorities. However – because of the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War – other non-colonial members would often refrain from supporting Soviet criticism and initiatives.[59]

Rather more successful in gaining support for anti-colonial measures in the Council was India. As a leading power of the Afro-Asian bloc, the Indian delegation at the UN and Trusteeship Council worked to promote Global South solidarity and non-alignment, using anti-colonialism as a unifying agenda.[60] This appealed to the non-administering members of the Council, as many Asian and Latin American member states were sympathetic to the Global South solidarity movement.[61] India's policy of non-alignment also allowed them to manoeuvre between Cold War power blocs, navigating between anti-colonial ideology and the colonial and

[55] Thullen, *Problems,* 63.
[56] Ibidem*,* 86; Belhabib, 'Trusteeship'*,* 89; Luard, *United Nations,* 127.
[57] Thullen, *Problems,* 85.
[58] Belhabib, 'Trusteeship'*,* 342.
[59] Ibidem, 342-343.
[60] Alanna O'Malley, 'India, Apartheid and the New World Order at the UN, 1946-1962', *Journal of World History*, vol.31:1 (2020), 195-223, 196-197.
[61] O'Malley, 'Apartheid', 197; Gorman, 'Britain', 486.

strategic interests of these powers. According to C.S.R. Murthy, "India advocated moderation and mediation, often earning the grudging admiration of one Cold War camp without inviting distrust from the other."[62] India's role in promoting decolonization can be examined based on the issue of "attainment […] of self-government or independence" – an issue which was actively debated in the Council between 1953 and 1955. This issue revolved around resolutions from the General Assembly calling for more specific information from the Council and administering authorities on measures taken towards the independence of trust territories.[63] The colonial members sought to limit the involvement of the United Nations, arguing that the administering authorities already provided "adequate information" to the Council and Assembly.[64] The Indian delegation, on the other hand, pushed for action. They suggested that additional information should be made available by administering authorities to the UN when needed. The Indian delegation was willing to compromise, to secure the support of the colonial powers. India therefore accepted the suggestion by the French representative to give members notice in advance of the information used to draft reports to the Assembly, so that administering authorities could prepare commentary.[65] With this addition, the Indian proposal was adopted as resolution 886, which acknowledged the Assembly's call for more information on decolonization developments in the trust territories, and gave the Secretariat the task of drafting an interim report "in conformity with […] General Assembly resolution 752 […]" for the Assembly.[66] In this way, the Indian delegation was often able to implement more progressive policies and procedures.

On the other hand, the geopolitical divisions in the Council also obstructed developments towards independence. If the Soviet and Indian delegations were able to push more progressive policies by means of political support and compromises, the Cold War realities also greatly limited their efforts. Soviet proposals were rarely supported by non-aligned members of the Council. This division between administering and non-administering members often caused a stalemate, making compromises necessary. If the two sides were unable to come to an agreement, votes on proposals and resolutions would often end in a tie – the proposal not being adopted.[67] The position of the colonial powers can be explained from their position as administrators of trust territories and as colonial powers. In case of the issue of 'attainment of

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[62] C.S.R. Murthy, 'Assessing India at the United Nations in the Changing Context', *International Studies,* vol.47(2-4), 205-223, 208.
[63] A/Res/558(VI); A/Res/752(VIII).
[64] T/SR.517, 283.
[65] T/SR.518, 291; T/SR.519, 298.
[66] T/Res/866(XIII).
[67] For example: T/SR.735

independence,' the colonial powers clearly sought to minimize the ability of the Council to gain additional information on developments in the trust territories.[68] The unwillingness of colonial powers to provide additional information made it necessary to compromise. Still, the implementation of measures proved to be difficult, as Council members continued to disagree over the issue. These disagreements caused delay and led to impatience in the Assembly, which continued to pressure the Council to provide more information on the trust territories. In General Assembly resolution 946, the Assembly again requested the Council "to ensure that the procedure devised by it for dealing in future with this question will enable it to comply fully with the terms of the relevant General Assembly resolutions […]."[69] This shows that the Trusteeship Council – at least in the eyes of the General Assembly – failed to adequately facilitate developments towards independence.

Thus, while some non-colonial members of the Council actively sought to facilitate decolonization, the political divisions in the Council caused an obstruction to these aspirations. Not only did the Council disagree on issues of independence and colonial governance, they were also divided on procedural issues. Meanwhile, the General Assembly increasingly pressured the Council to adopt further measures to ensure that the objectives of the Trusteeship System would be achieved.[70] It should be noted that scholars, such as Pedersen and Lohrmann, have argued that the mechanisms of the Council provided African nationalist movements with a platform.[71] In that sense, the Council could be said to fulfil a facilitating role for decolonization. However, when analysing the issue from the perspective of the Council and its members, it can be argued that the Council was more of an obstructer than a facilitator.

c. Managing negotiated flight

National and colonial interests shaped the relationship of the administering members with the Trusteeship Council, where they served as permanent members. The administering authorities were responsible for the practical administration of the trust territories. The administration of these trust territories and its developments towards independence were very much affected by political developments in the African colonies.[72] This is where the issue of negotiated flight comes in. As we have already seen, from the mid-1950s onwards, colonial authorities took deliberate steps towards decolonization on their own terms, as they realized that the

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[68] T/SR.517, 283.
[69] A/Res/946(X).
[70] Idem.
[71] Pedersen, *Guardians,* 399; Lohrmann, *Voices,* 543-548.
[72] Thullen, *Problems,* 182-183; Lohrmann, *Voices,* 558-560.

decolonization of the empires was imminent.[73] These attempts to negotiate decolonization also affected the administration of trust territories and thus also the work of the Trusteeship Council.

Negotiated flight took on different forms in British and French colonial contexts. In the British context, political developments towards self-government were promoted through "reforms […] intended to strengthen local democratic participation and prepare the territories for self-government in a distant, otherwise unspecific future."[74] In the French context, negotiated flight took the form of a "territorialisation" policy, aimed at autonomy within the French Union. This policy allowed colonies "the power to set its budget, under French overview, and to administer much of its domestic affairs."[75] However, in practice, decolonization of African colonies was not as smooth a process as the idea of negotiated flight implied. As Jansen and Osterhammel explain, "initial French and British approaches to the reform of colonial rule took on a dynamic of their own that could barely be controlled by colonial authorities."[76] The new institutions established through colonial reforms proved to be potential platforms for African nationalist movements, allowing them to let their demands be heard. Through the establishment of general elections, African political parties were able to consolidate their position as representatives of the population.[77] Although colonial authorities sought to limit the political influence of more radical nationalist parties, they were not always able to do so. Meanwhile, African nationalist parties "moved quickly to establish their authority" and intensified their demands of independence. These developments were accompanied by political unrest, especially in the major African cities, where major strikes and protests added another layer of pressure to the colonial project.[78]

Although developments of colonial reform led to an acceleration of decolonization, the concept of negotiated flight did clearly inspire post-war colonial policies, which can be traced in the trust territories of French and British Togoland. As such, an examination of the role of the Trusteeship Council in policies of negotiated flight is crucial for understanding how these policies developed. Their position was informed by Article 76b of the UN Charter, which stated that one of the key objectives was the "political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-

[73] Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization,* 100-101; Louis and Robinson, 'Imperialism', 487-488.
[74] Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization,* 103; Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: the Past of the Present*, (Cambridge, 2002), 77.
[75] Cooper, *Africa,* 77-78.
[76] Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization,* 102.
[77] Ibidem, 102-103; Cooper, *Africa,* 76-80.
[78] Cooper, *Africa,* 80; Jansen and Osterhammel, *Decolonization,* 102-103.

government or independence […]."[79] This objective was the core of the trusteeship agreements and thus of the administration of the territories, at least formally. The trusteeship agreements could be terminated when this objective had been fulfilled satisfactorily. Therefore, Article 76b was very important in the Council's discussions on issues of decolonization. Colonial members generally favoured "strict legal interpretations of Charter provisions whenever they felt their position jeopardized."[80] Non-colonial members, on the other hand, presented a more liberal interpretation. They often used the objectives stated in Article 76b as an argument for pushing more progressive policies, as was the case with the "attainment of independence" debate.

Also important for understanding the role of the Council in negotiated flight is its relationship with the General Assembly, and their demands of progressive measures towards independence. The increasing pressure by the Assembly forced the Council and the administering authorities to rethink their plans for decolonization. The Assembly especially pressured the administering authorities to provide timetables and target dates for the development of trust territories and their expected independence. These targets would, in the Assembly's opinion, help to "speed up the political development in trust territories."[81] Again, Article 76b provided the justification for non-colonial powers to demand these target dates, as these would benefit a speedier realization of the objectives of the Trusteeship System. This was resisted by the administering authorities, who favoured a more cautious and slower development towards independence.[82] The representative from New Zealand, for example, argued that "it was unnecessary, and in some cases even impossible, to estimate the period of time within which a Trust Territory should attain independence or self-government."[83] According to the administering authorities, the progress towards independence could not be predicted as long as the trust territories were not yet in an advanced stage of political development.[84] However, as anti-colonialism in the Assembly rose from the mid-1950s onwards, the Assembly continued to demand time-tables for independence from the administering authorities, judging that most trust territories were ready for independence.[85] Although administering authorities continued to protest these demands, the Council did implement measures obligating the authorities to include such targets in their annual reports.[86]

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[79] UN Charter, Chapter XII, Article 76b.
[80] Belhabib, 'Trusteeship', 54; Thullen, *Problems,* 81.
[81] Thullen, *Problems,* 110.
[82] Ibidem, 110-111.
[83] T/SR.518, 292.
[84] Thullen, *Problems,* 111.
[85] A/Res/1064(XI); A/Res/1207; A/Res/1274; A/Res/1413.
[86] T/SR.759; T/SR.943.

In this way, the colonial members of the Council were forced to take into account the demands of the United Nations in their plans for negotiated flight.

d. Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the political and organizational relations which shaped the functioning of the Trusteeship Council. It refutes some of the arguments that the Council was a purely colonial organ and an obstructer of decolonization, arguing that the Council's politics proved to be much more complex, as it was affected by geopolitical dynamics and strategic interests. Specifically, the role of the Indian delegation in negotiating more progressive policies was crucial in the Council's facilitating role regarding decolonization. Additionally, the increasing pressure of the General Assembly forced the colonial members of the Council to comply with its demands. Still, the equal divide between administering and non-administering members often led to a stalemate and obstructed the implementation of more progressive policies. How this affected the Council's managing role regarding negotiated flight will be assessed in the following case studies of British and French Togoland.

Chapter 3: Togoland under British administration (1946-1957)

In Togoland under British administration, negotiated flight was tied in with colonial policies in the neighbouring British Crown Colony of the Gold Coast. The administrative integration of the crown colony and the trust territory was the main issue of discussion for the Trusteeship Council. This chapter asks how the Council managed these integration policies and its effects on the political development of the territory. As we will see, the Council, in this case, facilitated negotiated flight through its approval of the integration policies.

a. Background

Togoland had been a German colony since 1884, until 1914, when British and French forces invaded the colony. After the end of the war, the former colony was divided in two parts and mandated to Great Britain and France under the League of Nations Mandates System. After the Second World War, the mandate was transferred to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. British Togoland was administered as part of the British Crown Colony of the Gold Coast, which lay adjacent to the territory. Togoland's political development towards independence was thus very much connected to the colonial administration of the Gold Coast.[87]

Soon after the end of the Second World War, the issue of self-government became a pressing issue for British authorities, as African nationalism in the Gold Coast gained momentum in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Negotiated flight kicked in, with British authorities acceleration developments towards independence to "hold the initiative."[88] According to Cooper, British authorities in the Gold Coast had previously pursued a policy bringing "local subjects first into local government and then slowly, as they proved worthy, into territorial "self-government" within the Commonwealth."[89] However, this strategy soon gave way to accelerated developments towards independence as "urban youth and parts of organized labor joined a radical intelligentsia in quickly pushing for African self-government […]."[90] The Convention People's Party (CPP) – a nationalist party led by Kwame Nkrumah – was able to establish itself as the major party of the Gold Coast after winning general elections in 1954 and 1956, despite attempts by the colonial authorities to prevent this by jailing leading

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[87] Dennis Laumann, 'A Historiography of German Togoland, or the Rise and Fall of a "Model Colony"', *History in Africa,* 30 (2003), 195-211, 195-199; Kate Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: Literacy, Politics and Nationalism, 1914-2014*, (Cambridge, 2015), 10; T/8, 2.
[88] Anthony Low, 'The End of the British Empire in Africa', in: Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *Decolonization and African Independence,* (New Haven and London, 1988), 33-72, 39.
[89] Cooper, *Africa,* 39.
[90] Idem.

nationalists, including Nkrumah.[91] This victory for the nationalists further accelerated developments towards independence. In August 1956, "Nkrumah introduced a motion in the legislative assembly calling for independence."[92] After negotiations between the British and the Gold Coast Assembly, the date for independence was set for 6 March 1957.[93] These accelerating developments led to increasingly urgent debates in the Trusteeship Council about the position of British Togoland.

b. Negotiated flight: Togoland and the Gold Coast

The administrative integration of the trust territory of British Togoland with the Crown Colony of the Gold Coast stemmed from the establishment of the trusteeship itself. Kate Skinner has argued that "[t]he [trusteeship] agreement that was approved for British Togoland in 1946 was deliberately drafted so as to allow for an administrative union between the trust territory and […] the Gold Coast."[94] Indeed, the agreement stated that Great Britain had the power to administer the trust territory "in accordance with his own laws as an integral part of his territory […]."[95] Additionally, the administering authority was "entitled to constitute the Territory into a customs, fiscal or administrative union or federation with adjacent territories under his sovereignty or control […]."[96] According to Skinner, the British justified this union based on the small size of the trust territory, which made it impractical to administer separately. In the report of the 1951 UN visiting mission to Togoland, the British administration argued that Togoland was not "a viable unit" and stressed that "the only practical means to self-government for the peoples of British Togoland is to remain closely associated with the Gold Coast […]."[97] Skinner has also argued that, in context of decolonization, the political development of the Gold Coast was also used as legitimate grounds for the integration of the territories. She states that:

> […] once the British were faced with a wave of anti-colonial protest in the neighbouring colony of the Gold Coast, where they responded by moving towards

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[91] Roger Gocking, *The History of Ghana,* (Santa Barbara, 2005), 93-95; Cooper, *Africa,* 52; Low, 'British Empire', 39.

[92] Low, 'British Empire, 39; Gocking, *Ghana,* 109-110.

[93] Gocking, *Ghana,* 112.

[94] Skinner, *Fruits,* 10-11.

[95] T/8, 3.

[96] Ibidem, 4.

[97] Skinner, *Fruits,* 10-11; T/798, 102.

self-government, they were also able to justify the relationship between the trust territory and the colony on the grounds that it was politically progressive.[98]

The unification of the Gold Coast and Togoland thus became entangled with policies of negotiated flight.

This integration of colony and trust territory was controversial in the UN and led to disagreement within the Trusteeship Council. On the one hand, the Council accepted the British argument that the association of Togoland with the Gold Coast led to accelerated political development. The report of the 1952 visiting mission to West Africa concluded that "the colony [of the Gold Coast] has moved faster and farther towards self-government than any other territory of West Africa, and it has taken Togoland with it […]."[99] Colonial members of the Council generally supported the British position, who emphasized the positive effects of integration on the political progress of Togoland. Additionally, the representative of New Zealand argued that the administrative union was justified by the "cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties" between the territories and noted that "[Togoland] participated in the political structure of the Gold Coast, which was politically the most advanced of all the dependent territories of West Africa."[100]

Non-colonial members, on the other hand, feared that the unification of the territories would result in unclear administrative practices and intentions for self-governance. The delegations scrutinized the British authorities for not administering Togoland as a trust territory, but rather as an integral part of the crown colony. Semen Tsarapkin, the Soviet representative, concluded that "[i]t was only in theory that Togoland was a Trust Territory since in practice it was regarded as part of the neighbouring colony."[101] Similarly, Max Dorsinville, the Haitian representative, criticized the "lack of plans for the development of the Territory's resources as a separate entity."[102] Rafik Asha, the Syrian representative, argued that all administrative institutions for Togoland were merged with those of the Gold Coast, so that there were no institutions specifically designated to deal with the administration of the trust territory.[103] He stated that:

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[98] Skinner, *Fruits,* 11.
[99] T/1040, 17.
[100] T/SR.498, 129.
[101] T/SR.500, 143.
[102] T/SR.499, 137.
[103] Ibidem, 135.

> In Togoland […] there was no Commissioner for the Territory, no special budget and no indication that the people would be allowed to decide whether they should have a regional organization with separate executive and legislative organs, although it was clear from the petitions received and from the reports of the 1949 and 1952 Visiting Missions […] that they wanted those things.[104]

The delegations also criticized the minimal representation of Togoland in the political institutions of the Gold Coast. Tsarapkin stated that the development of the trust territory "was hampered by the absence of a central administration."[105] He therefore argued that "[e]xecutive, legislative and judicial bodies independent of those existing in the Gold Coast must therefore be established."[106] Additionally, the delegations concluded that there was a lack of Togolese civil servants in the administrative institutions. Dorsinville pointed out that, as of 1954, "no Togolander had yet become a member of the Executive Council and […] out of 84 members of the Legislative Assembly only five were Togolanders."[107] The representative of El Salvador argued that "a larger representation was required […] in order to prepare a sufficient number of Togolanders for the future task of governing their own country."[108]

Interestingly, India supported the integration of Togoland with the Gold Coast, citing the opportunities this association provided for the political development of the trust territory. Indeed, according to Singh, the Indian delegation shifted its position in favour of the British, because of the prospect of early independence for the trust territory as part of the Gold Coast.[109] The Indian delegation emphasized the importance of self-determination for the people of British Togoland. While Krishna Menon, the Indian representative, argued that a "total integration" of the two territories should take place if the population of Togoland wished it, they warned that "any transfer should take place within the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement and with the consent of the people."[110] Indeed, the Council generally agreed that the issue of unification could only be resolved in a manner agreed to by the population of the trust territory. Elections were therefore proposed as a solution. The British administration welcomed this idea as a means of legitimizing their policies of negotiated flight.[111] This position was voiced by John Scott, the representative of New Zealand, who argued that "if the Territory wished to accept association

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[104] T/SR.499, 135.
[105] T/SR.500, 143.
[106] Idem.
[107] T/SR.499, 137; T/SR.500, 143.
[108] T/SR.499, 137.
[109] Singh, *India*, 33.
[110] Idem.
[111] T/SR.648, 3.

with the Gold Coast, it would seem to have the opportunity of becoming one of the first Trust Territories to achieve self-government."[112] This would only be welcomed by the Council, explained Scott, as it would mean a successful fulfilment of the obligations stated in Article 76b.[113] Elections could thus serve to legitimize the colonial route to decolonization, where the colonial powers could retain their control over colonies and trust territories. Responding to the idea of holding elections to ascertain the wishes of population of Togoland, the non-colonial delegations questioned the validity of these potential elections. They doubted whether the results of such an election would indeed represent the actual wishes of the population. The representatives of Syria and El Salvador feared that the major political party in Togoland would be able to shape the results, as they had access to more extensive resources and then those of Togoland, as well as the political support of the British authorities.[114] In general, however, the Council agreed on the necessity of elections.

The issue of the administrative integration of Togoland with the Gold Coast remained a source of criticism and discussion, but, with the support of the colonial powers and of India, the administering authority was able to continue this policy.

c. Negotiated flight: constitutional reforms and the 1956 plebiscite

Negotiated flight in British Togoland took on the form of processes of association and unification with the Gold Coast. British colonial authorities were unwilling to administer Togoland as a separate unity.[115] In context of policies of negotiated flight in the Gold Coast, the British therefore took steps to formally integrate Togoland into the colony. The UN had stipulated that a formal unification of the two territories could only come about if the population of the trust territory could voice their support through democratic processes and following the rules of the Trusteeship System. In December 1954, General Assembly resolution 860 demanded that "steps should be taken […] to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants [of Togoland] as to their future […]."[116] The resolution also requested the Trusteeship Council to discuss the necessary arrangements for elections in Togoland.[117] To that end, the Council convened for a special session in November and December 1955. This session considered the report of the 1955 UN visiting mission to British and French Togoland, which recommended

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[112] T/SR.498, 129.
[113] Idem.
[114] T/SR.499, 136-137.
[115] T/1277, 3.
[116] A/Res/860(IX); T/SR.499, 138; T/1218, 18.
[117] Idem.

the organization of a plebiscite in British Togoland to determine the level of popular support for a unification with the Gold Coast. The visiting mission also recommended "full United Nations observation and supervision at all stages of the arrangements for the conduct of the plebiscite […]."[118] The British colonial authorities welcomed the recommendations of the visiting missions of a UN supervised plebiscite, although they emphasized that the UN should be restricted to a supervisory role only.[119]

The British authorities clearly sought to control the results of the plebiscite. They objected to the visiting mission's recommendation that "[…] the results of the plebiscite be determined separately [in four districts]," demanding a majority in all districts rather than simply a general majority of votes in the trust territory.[120] The visiting mission reasoned that the opinions regarding the unification question differed very much per district. Whereas the northern district of Togoland "was overwhelmingly in favour of integration of the Territory with the Gold Coast," opinions in the southern districts were much more divided. The ethnic differences between these districts were also taken into account by the visiting mission.[121] However, the British representative to the Council argued that "the very conception of a sub-division into areas was contrary to the essential purpose of a general test of public opinion […]."[122] In the British opinion, the "will of the majority should govern the whole result and […] the minority should loyally abide by that result whatever it might be."[123] The British authorities thus very much opposed a sub-division of districts. From the perspective of colonial interests in context of negotiated flight, this makes sense. If the territory were to be divided, and a majority would be required in each district, it would be much harder to gain majority support for unification.

The British representative also sought to restrict the questions asked at the plebiscite. The visiting mission had recommended to put two questions to the population of Togoland. The first questions should ask whether the population wanted a unification with the Gold Coast, while the second would ask if the population preferred a separation of the trust territory from the Gold Coast. The British representative, however, emphasized the position of the British authorities that it would be impractical to administer Togoland as a separate entity, and that they were unwilling to do so.[124] Britain thus sought to exclude the second question from the plebiscite,

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[118] T/1218, 15-19.
[119] T/SR.648, 4.
[120] T/1218, 16; T/SR.648, 3.
[121] T/1218, 16.
[122] T/SR.648, 3.
[123] Ibidem, 3-4.
[124] T/1218, 15; T/SR.648, 4.

erasing the possibility of the population to vote in favour of a separate administration of the territory, as this would be obstructive to the British plans of negotiated flight.

The British position was generally supported by the other administering authorities, as well as India. This might have had to do with the interplay of national interests and bilateral relations. According to Singh, India's support of the British policy of negotiated flight was the result of the Commonwealth relationship between Britain and India.[125] However, Gorman argues that this relationship was uncertain with regard to questions of colonialism: "Indian membership on the Trusteeship Council directly threatened British imperial interest."[126] A direct connection between the British-Indian connection and Indian support for British administrative policies in Togoland cannot directly be made. In terms of India's anti-colonial agenda, their support for British negotiated flight may have resulted from the prospect that the independence of Togoland would come about much sooner if they were part of the bigger constellation of the Gold Coast, rather than remain a separate territory.[127]

Like India, the American delegation sought to compromise between anti-colonial ideals and colonial realities. Although the American delegation did not agree entirely with the criticisms of the British colonial authorities on the suggestions of the visiting mission, they did argue that the cooperation between the UN and the administering authority was important to successfully organize the plebiscite. As Benjamin Gerig, the American representative, viewed the plebiscite as essential, he "would naturally be prepared to consider adjustments of alternative arrangements […]."[128]

The Syrian delegation objected to the British position. The Syrian representative, Salah El Dine Tarazi, had himself been a member of the visiting mission which made the recommendations regarding the questioning and the sub-division. Tarazi now defended these conclusions, and was backed up by some non-colonial members of the Council. He also defended the recommendation that: "[…] a plebiscite should not be held in the Trust Territory until a constitutional separation had been effected between the Gold Coast and Togoland under British administration."[129] This idea had been formulated by the Togoland Congress as a way of countering the influence of forty years of integrated administration on public opinion. The Togoland Congress, backed up by the Syrian delegation, feared that public opinion would be flawed, as the territory "had no separate identity."[130] The Syrian representative therefore argued

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[125] Singh, *India*, 34.
[126] Gorman, 'Britain', 480-481.
[127] Singh, *India*, 33.
[128] T/SR.649, 9.
[129] Ibidem, 10; T.SR.650, 15; T/1218, 15.
[130] T/SR.649, 10; T/1218, 15.

that "[…] before the question of integration was put to the people of Togoland […], those people should […] be given an opportunity to set up a Legislative Assembly of its own choosing to debate the political problems confronting it."[131] This idea was strongly opposed by other members of the Council, who argued that this would unnecessarily delay the plebiscite.[132]

The Council forwarded the report of the visiting mission to the General Assembly, together with the observations of Great Britain on the report, in which their objections to the report were repeated. Based on this information, the General Assembly decided that the plebiscite should be organized based on the recommendations of the visiting mission. The Assembly also recommended that the plebiscite should give the option between unification and separation of Togoland with the Gold Coast.[133]

The plebiscite took place on 9 May 1956. The ballot, in line with the Assembly's recommendation, gave the population of Togoland the choice between a union or separation of Togoland with an independent Gold Coast in the near future. The issue of sub-division had been rejected by a majority of the General Assembly, and was therefore not implemented. In total, 38 per cent of the population of Togoland voted, of which 58 per cent voted in favour of unification with the Gold Coast.[134] During the next session of the Trusteeship Council, the results of the plebiscite were discussed. It was the Council's job to determine whether the plebiscite had taken place in line with the provisions of UN, so that the General Assembly could decide whether the trusteeship agreement for British Togoland could be terminated.[135] The British representative welcomed the results of the plebiscite, which indicated that Togoland was to be united with the Gold Coast at the moment of its independence. The British authorities had already announced that they would "take immediate steps for the preparation of constitutional instruments conferring upon the Gold Coast full responsibility for the conduct of its own affairs."[136] Most members of the Council also acknowledged the results of the plebiscite as a clear directive of the population of Togoland to unite the trust territory with the Gold Coast.[137] The Council therefore adopted a resolution recommending the General Assembly to take steps to terminate the trusteeship agreement.[138] The trusteeship agreement was finally terminated on 6 March 1957, on which date the Gold Coast became independent and the trust territory of

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[131] T/SR.649, 10.
[132] T/SR.648, 4-5; T/SR.649, 9
[133] T/1218, 61-63.
[134] A/3173, 13; 47; 183-184; 467.
[135] T/SR.736, 292.
[136] T/SR.733, 279.
[137] T/SR.734, 281-283; T/SR.735, 287-288; T/SR.736, 291-294.
[138] T/Res/1496(XVIII).

Togoland was united with the former colony. The new independent and united country of Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan African colony to gain independence, and with it, the first trust territory to gain independence as well. The independence of the colony and trust territory would serve as an example and stimulator for other dependent and trust territories in the following years.[139]

d. Conclusion

In the case of British Togoland, the Trusteeship Council proved to be a facilitator of negotiated flight. The tie-breaking support of the Indian delegation for the integration of Togoland with the Gold Coast provided the British authorities with the opportunity to rid themselves of the untenability of the administration of a separate trust territory, while still securing lasting influence. The acceleration of decolonization developments, and the victory of Ghanaian radical nationalists, subsequently dampened policies of negotiated flight. This was something the Council could not control or manage, since it developed in the sphere of the crown colony rather than the trust territory.

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[139] A/Res/1046(XI); Lohrmann, *Voices,* 559.

Chapter 4: Togoland under French administration (1946-1960)

While policies of negotiated flight in British Togoland were, overall, supported by the Trusteeship Council, they proved to be much more obstructive in the case of French Togoland. Negotiated flight in French Togoland was manifested in French attempts to integrate the trust territory into the French Union. This chapter investigates how the Council managed these policies, and how their obstruction affected the acceleration of decolonization developments.

a. Background

Like British Togoland, the trust territory of Togoland under French administration had been a League of Nations mandate before the Second World War.[140] As was the case with most French dependencies, Togoland was administered as part of the French Union. French legal and judicial systems were put in place, and training of African administrators, especially for higher positions, was done in France. Togoland was also represented in French Parliament and legislative authority over Togoland mostly lay with the French Parliament. The Togolese population was able to participate in the administration of the territory only through the Territorial Assembly, which consisted of thirty members "elected by direct suffrage exercised by specific categories of voters."[141] Early on, the Assembly solely had an advisory role, and did not possess any legislative powers. Over the years, their powers were extended, so that in the report on the visiting mission of 1955, the mission concluded that the Assembly "debates the territorial budget, free to vote or reject items other than those defined as obligatory, [...]"[142]

Negotiated flight in the French context took the form of a territorialisation policy, which also affected the trust territory of Togoland. The plebiscite in British Togoland and subsequent independence of the territory as part of Ghana had accelerated political developments of French Togoland, as nationalist movements increasingly demanded full independence, following the example of their neighbor. French authorities therefore sought to consolidate the position of the moderate parties friendly to France in order to secure French interests the territory France "by means of the introduction of suitable institutions and a referendum-plebiscite."[143] The French government therefore announced the introduction of a new constitution in July 1956, which gave Togoland the status of an autonomous republic within the French Union. This was

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[140] Laumann, 'German Togoland', 195-199.
[141] T/1218, 9.
[142] T/1108, 7; T/1218, 13.
[143] Marc Michel, 'The Independence of Togo', in: Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis, *Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980*, (New Haven and London, 1988), 309.

followed by a referendum on the autonomy status in October 1956, which resulted in a victory for the French measures.[144] The United Nations heavily criticized these measures.

b. Negotiated flight: integration into the French Union

The French administration of Togoland as part of the French Union was a source of much debate in the Trusteeship Council. The administering authority, as well as most colonial members of the Council, defended the integration of Togoland into the French Union by arguing that this was beneficial to the political development of Togoland. The French representative argued that withdrawal of the territory from the Union would result in the forfeiture of "parliamentary representation and equal treatment for its inhabitants with French Union citizens […]."[145] This view was shared by other colonial members of the Council. The representative of New Zealand felt that "[t]he administration of the Territory as an integral part of the French Union gave it the benefit of close association with French liberal and democratic tradition, which furthered the purposes of the Charter and the Trusteeship System."[146]

However, critics within the Council argued that Togoland's integration into the French Union negatively affected the political development of the trust territory. The delegations of India, the Soviet Union and Syria argued that this association actually had the reverse effect of hampering the progressive development of Togoland's political institutions, thus obstructing its progress towards independence.[147] The Indian representative voiced these complaints as follows:

> It was clear that, so long as the French Government adhered to its constitutional theory of Associated Territories, and tried to turn Africans into Frenchmen, the Trust Territory of Togoland under French administration would continue to lag behind other West African territories in the march towards independence and self-government.[148]

He continued to voice his disappointment over the progress of political institutions in Togoland, stating that "the Administrative Authority appeared to lack a sense of urgency."[149] According to him, proposals for political reform were stalled in French Parliament, and these reforms still

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[144] Michel, 'Togo', 310.
[145] T/SR.505, 181.
[146] T/SR.503, 167.
[147] Ibidem, 166; T/SR.504, 175-177.
[148] T/SR.503, 166.
[149] Idem.

did not go far enough, as they did not grant any legislative or executive powers to Togolese institutions.[150]

More specific criticism was aimed at the powers of the Territorial or Legislative Assembly of Togoland. This institution, consisting of thirty Togolese elected politicians, which possessed "certain powers of decision and consultation on local administrative matters."[151] While France and other colonial powers argued that this Assembly "was an effective instrument of progressive development towards independence,"[152] others found the powers of the Territorial Assembly lacking. During the Council's thirteenth session in 1954, the USSR called the Assembly "powerless" and Syria argued that "the Territorial Assembly was not really sovereign, but still under control of the Administering Authority."[153] When the powers of the Assembly were extended in 1955 after the establishment of the Autonomous Republic, non-colonial powers still found their powers lacking. Their criticism was backed up by the report of the UN Commissioner inspecting the effects of the autonomous status of Togoland. The commission concluded that, while a number of powers had been transferred to the government of the Autonomous Republic of Togoland, there remained several restrictions on the autonomy of the territory, notably "powers of legislation and regulation in respect of […] external defence, currency and the foreign exchange system […]."[154] The report also noted that several high positions remained in the hands of French or European officials, particularly in the services of the ministries. The commission concluded that steps had been made towards the autonomy of Togoland, and that full autonomy would be "attained through the progressive transfer of more […] powers not yet within the competence of the Government of Togoland."[155]

Non-colonial members of the Council were quick to support their criticism with statements from the commission. They criticized the remaining restrictions on the autonomy of the trust territory. The Indian delegation pointed out that, although the territory "enjoyed a large measure of internal autonomy […] there should be a further transfer of powers."[156] The Syrian representative pointed out that "a large number of important matters did not come within the legislative competence of the Assembly and […] the French Minister for Overseas Territories had the right to veto Togoland laws."[157] He argued that "true self-government required that [the

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[150] T/SR.503, 166.
[151] T/1218, 13.
[152] T/SR.505, 181.
[153] T/SR.504, 175-177.
[154] T/SR.783, 227; T/1343, 57.
[155] Ibidem, 58.
[156] T/SR.843, 9.
[157] T/SR.842, 6.

Togoland authorities] should be above the French authorities […], whereas they were in fact below them."[158]

Thus, France – more so than Great Britain – received backlash to their attempts of incorporating the trust territory in a larger political structure in order to secure their influence. The administrative authority came under increasing pressure from the Council, as well as the General Assembly, to expand the powers of Togoland institutions and autonomy.

c. Negotiated flight: terminating the trusteeship agreement

As politics of negotiated flight set in around 1956 across French Africa, the French colonial authorities sought to secure their interests in West Africa by formally integrating dependent territories into the French Union. For Togoland, this meant that, in 1956, the territory was given the status of autonomous republic within the French Union. France defended this move by arguing that this would give Togoland more executive and legislative power of determining policies of internal administration, "in response to the wishes of the Territorial Assembly."[159] From now on, Togoland would be able to govern its internal affairs, while France retained authority over external security and defence, as well as currency and foreign affairs.[160] As this decision brought Togoland closer to full autonomy, in the eyes of the French authorities "the main objective of trusteeship had been attained, and the Trusteeship Agreement should accordingly be terminated."[161] In order to legitimate this move, France organized a referendum in October 1956, in which a large majority of the population of Togoland "had voted in favour of the Statute of the new Republic and hence for the termination of the trusteeship."[162] In December 1956, France thus formally requested the UN to terminate the trusteeship agreement.[163] The General Assembly subsequently dispatched a commission to Togoland to "examine […] the entire situation in the Territory resulting from the practical application of the new Statute and the conditions under which the Statute is being applied […]."[164] In July 1957, the report of the commission came back to the Trusteeship Council. The main controversy lay with the request for termination of the trusteeship agreement. While the commission had concluded that the autonomy of Togoland "represent[ed] a very significant step in the achievement of the objectives of Article 76 of the Charter and of the Trusteeship Agreement

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[158] T/SR.842, 7.
[159] Cooper, *Africa,* 77-78; T/SR.747, 3.
[160] T/SR.747, 3-6.
[161] Ibidem, 3.
[162] T/SR.746, 1.
[163] Idem; T/1290.
[164] A/Res/1046(XI).

[…]," they recommended that the issue of terminating the trusteeship agreement should be considered in consultation with the people of Togoland and in agreement with the United Nations.[165]

Responding to this report, the French authorities argued that – until the trusteeship had been terminated – it would be impossible to extend the powers of the Togoland government, as France had certain obligations as an administering authority.[166] France thus argued that the trusteeship "constituted the last obstacle to the free exercise of full autonomy […]."[167] Non-colonial members disagreed with this logic. The Soviet delegation complained that France attempted to terminate the trusteeship agreement before its objectives had been achieved. The Syrian representative argued that the full transfer of powers to the Togoland government should occur before the termination of the trusteeship, not afterwards. India, likewise, stated that termination of the trusteeship could only occur "on the attainment by Togoland of self-government or independence" and that there still a way to go before that could happen.[168] For these delegations, one thing that stood in the way of termination of the trusteeship was the position of the Legislative Assembly. In particular, there was some discussion as to the representative nature of the current Assembly, which – as some members argued – had been elected based on restricted suffrage prior to the implementation of the Statute. These members argued that, with the new autonomous status of Togoland, new elections should be organized based on universal adult suffrage, to secure adequate representation of the population. In their report, the Commission had made a similar recommendation. They pointed out that the Statute had provided for universal adult suffrage and argued that "the holding of such elections […] would represent the implementation of an important democratic principle embodied in the Statute […]."[169] In that sense, it could be seen as a major step towards the fulfilment of Article 76b.

French authorities, however, argued that by voting in favour of the Statute, the people of Togoland had "thus voted to retain the Assembly until [1960]."[170] The French representative in the Council stressed the integral whole of the Statute. Changing the article in the Statute on the Assembly would mean breaking this up. France also distanced itself from the organization of elections, arguing that this was not part of French jurisdiction anymore, and should be left to the Togoland authorities. The representative of the Togoland government found that it was

[165] T/1343, 58-60.
[166] Ibidem, 37; T/SR.841, 2.
[167] T/SR.841, 2.
[168] T/SR.842, 7; T/SR.844, 13-14; T/SR.845, 21.
[169] T/SR.842; T/SR.843; T/SR.844.
[170] T/SR.841, 2.

unnecessary to call early elections, since the referendum of October 1956, in which universal adult suffrage had been implemented, had shown the support of Togoland for the Statute and, consequently, the Assembly. He pointed out that: "any pressure for elections before the expiration of the term of the present Assembly might appear as interference in the internal affairs of Togoland."[171] Again, the French position was supported by the colonial members of the Council, who emphasized that the 1956 referendum had made clear the wishes of the people of Togoland regarding the termination of the trusteeship. The Australian representative, Kevin Kelly, therefore argued that the Council did not have the right "to fetter the freely expressed wishes of the people of Togoland […]."[172] He added that:

> [the UN Charter] prohibited any Power in the Council from placing restrictions on the right of the people of Togoland to attain self-government and independence, whether they did so in association with the French Union or with other States or without any form of association whatsoever.[173]

Still, the pressure of non-colonial members of the Council, as well as the delegation of the United States, for early elections prior to the termination of the trusteeship agreement, increased. These delegations were able to push the adoption of a resolution based on one remark by the representative of the Togoland government, Georges Apedo-Amah, who suggested that early elections were a possibility. During a Council meeting, the representative mentioned in a side-note that "elections to the new Assembly […] might be held before the regularly scheduled date."[174] The American representative used this remark as legitimization for the introduction of a draft resolution on early elections. This resulted in the adoption of resolution 1785, in which the Council noted "with satisfaction […] the intention of the Togoland Government to hold new elections before 1960, on the basis of direct universal suffrage for a new Legislative Assembly."[175] The General Assembly supported the idea of early elections. There thus existed a consensus within the UN that the trusteeship for Togoland could not be terminated without holding elections for the Legislative Assembly. France therefore sought to meet the demands of the United Nations to move along the termination of the trusteeship. In the Fourth Committee, the French representative agreed to move up the general elections to 1958. These

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[171] T/SR.841, 2; A/3673, 16-17; T/SR.845.
[172] T/SR.844, 17.
[173] Idem.
[174] T/SR.841, 4.
[175] T/SR.844, 17; T/Res/1785(S-VII).

elections would be supervised by the United Nations. French authorities also prepared to "carry out the transfers of power […] according to the procedure laid down in the Statute."[176]

The elections of April 1958 resulted in the appointment of the nationalist politician Sylvanus Olympio as Prime Minister. The Autonomous Republic of Togoland became the Republic of Togoland. According to the French delegation to the Trusteeship Council, the full transfer of power over the internal affairs of Togoland became effective from February 1958, with France retaining responsibility over "external affairs, monetary policy and defence."[177] After negotiations between the French and Togoland governments, a joint statement was published in which both governments recognized that Togoland "had opted for independence" and which fixed 1960 "as the year in which Togoland was to attain independence and in which, simultaneously, the Trusteeship Agreement was to be terminated."[178] The Trusteeship Council recognized this decision and agreed to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement as soon as Togoland became independent.[179]

d. Conclusion

French Togoland, much more than is British equivalent, proved to be a case of failed negotiated flight. Instead of autonomy within the French Union, the trust territory gained independence and became the Togolese Republic, or Togo, led by a nationalist Prime Minister. The Trusteeship Council was instrumental in obstructing French negotiated flight, and their pressure for early elections prior to the termination of the trusteeship agreement led to an acceleration of decolonization developments. Still, Togo remained dependent on the financial assistance of France.[180] In that sense, France continued to be present in Togolese affairs.

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[176] A/C.4/SR.707, 308-309.
[177] T/SR.937, 2.
[178] Ibidem, 3.
[179] T/Res/1921(S-VIII).
[180] T/SR.1008, 295.

Conclusion

The independence of Ghana in 1957 served as an example to African nationalists across the continent, and to the Trusteeship Council as well. Within five years, all African trust territories gained independence. Policies of negotiated flight and increasing pressure from African nationalist movements had accelerated developments of decolonization, with which the Trusteeship Council barely could keep up. The 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples further fanned the flames within the realm of the United Nations and the Trusteeship Council.

This thesis has shown that the UN Trusteeship Council functioned as both a facilitator and obstructer of negotiated flight. In the case of British Togoland, the Council allowed the British authorities to administer the trust territory as a part of its crown colony. However, in the case of French Togoland, the Council proved to be effective in obstructing policies of negotiated flight and thus of furthering developments towards the independence of the territory. How can the discrepancy of the Council's position between British and French Togoland be explained? One explanation is the fact that, while the British integration of Togoland and the Gold Coast was seen to have a positive effect on the political development of the trust territory by the majority of the Council, the French administration lacked behind in its progress of political development. Additionally, the plebiscite integrating Togoland with the Gold Coast was a clear step towards the independence of the territory, while the French sought integration of the territory with the French Union as an autonomous, rather than an independent, state. These understandings were informed by the Council's position regarding Article 76b of the UN Charter, and especially by the liberal interpretation of this article by the non-colonial members of the Council. At the same time, a significant difference was the support of the Indian delegation, who acted as a sort of tiebreaker. The Indian position as a leading force of the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN, and its ability to compromise between anti-colonial objectives and colonial realities, had a great influence on the support or hindrance of the Council. India was able to use the rhetoric of anti-colonialism, as well as strategies of non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity, to gather support for the decolonization of trust territories. Moreover, their non-aligned position allowed them to move between and negotiate with the opposing Cold War superpowers.

The idea of the Trusteeship Council as a strictly conservative, colonial organization therefore does not hold. As we have seen, the relationship between members of the Council and with the General Assembly made the Council's position much more complex. The non-colonial

members pushed for the adoption of progressive policies and resolutions, with increasing success. The role of the Indian delegation as a deciding vote and as a compromiser between the colonial and non-colonial position often led to the adoption of more progressive policies. On the other hand, the Belhabib's view of the Council as a beacon for decolonization also falls apart. Although the non-colonial members were often very vocal in criticizing the measures and policies of administering authorities, and stirred up much discussion in the Council, the implementation of progressive policies was often held back by the administering members of the Council. The equal division between administering and non-administering members often led to a stalemate and delay as a result of disagreement.

Moreover, the politics of the Council were often determined by the interplay of national interests and the dynamics of empire. The Council was a political organization, where national and colonial interests and Cold War geopolitics came together. The colonial members' interest regarding the development of the trust territories were integrated with broader colonial interests, as the administration of the territories was often interlaced with colonial politics and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The position of administering members regarding the independence of trust territories was therefore informed by their anxieties of decolonization of their colonies. As colonial members sought to retain political control in context of increasing pressures of decolonization, they worked to limit the Council's influence and responsibilities. Meanwhile non-colonial members, especially the Indian delegation, sought to expand the responsibilities of the Council and the scope of the Trusteeship System. The role of the Trusteeship Council in developments of decolonization therefore is an ambivalent one: neither a facilitator nor an obstructer, or perhaps both.

The Council's management of negotiated flight should also be understood in relation with the General Assembly. As a subsidiary organ, the Council was able to make recommendations to the Assembly, often on the Assembly's request. In the end, however, the decisions on decolonization and independence were made in the Assembly. The development of the Trusteeship System and the workings of the Council were therefore very much influenced by the UN's integrated efforts of managing decolonization. From the mid-1950s onwards, changes in the dynamics of Cold War politics and international attitudes towards imperialism led to more active UN involvement in questions of decolonization. As the General Assembly became more vocally anti-colonial with the entrance of newly independent states in the UN, they sought to expand the UN's efforts to further developments towards independence. In that context, the Assembly was also able to pressure the Trusteeship Council to move along with the UN's

adoption of anti-colonial policies. In some ways, the Council's more progressive policies were imposed from above.

We have thus seen that decolonization in the Trusteeship Council manifested itself in three ways. First, the Council was a chief actor in the supervision and regulation of developments of decolonization. Its policies determined the way the Trusteeship System developed and its recommendations to the Assembly shaped decisions regarding the decolonization of trust territories. Second, the Council provided a forum for both colonial and anti-colonial interests. In the Council, administering and non-administering members were able to discuss how they perceived their supervising role, and compromises between them shaped the way the Council operated. Third, the Council was a locality of international politics and geopolitical tensions. The context of the Cold War, intertwined with the context of post-war imperialism, determined the positions of the Council's members vis-à-vis trusteeship, colonial administration, and decolonization.

In this thesis, I have attempted to reposition the UN Trusteeship Council in the historiography of the United Nations' role in the decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa. Of course, I have not been able to include all aspects of the Council's role. For example, I have not paid attention to the influence of internationalist and domestic colonial and anti-colonial interest, nor have I included an analysis of the Council's mechanism of petitions, which was important tool for nationalist movements in the trust territories. This does not mean that I ignore the agency of African and Afro-European movements. In this case, it is simply a case of overwhelming amounts of sources and materials and having to focus the research. The need for historiographical research into the Trusteeship Council therefore continues.

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