

Thesis Final Version

European ‘Twitplomacy’ as a conductor of ‘speaking with one voice’ ?

**Vertical coherence in the online Public Diplomacy of European actors during the
2013-2014 Ukraine Crisis.**

External Relations of the European Union

Supervisor : Nikki Ikani

Student : Michiel de Wit

Student number : s2071118

Word Count : 8170 words
(8,987 including all tables and respective headers)

RQ

What are the effects of the 2013-2014 Ukraine Crisis on the vertical coherence of the online
Public Diplomacy of European actors ?

02-06-2019

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	2
Literature Review.....	4
Theoretical Framework.....	7
Methodology.....	8
Results.....	12
Conclusion.....	28
Bibliography.....	30

Introduction

EU Coherence has been a central topic of theoretical discussion in political science (Gebhard, 2017). It is a concept of utmost relevance when evaluating EU Foreign Policy (FP) and Public Diplomacy (PD) in the international system. Foreign policy effectiveness cannot be deduced solely from the level of FP coherence that a political actor displays (Thomas, 2012). However, coherence is certainly a precondition for effective behaviour (Thomas, 2012). The Lisbon treaty was meant, in part, to create the potential for increased effectiveness in the EU, in this manner improving its standing as an international actor (Koehler, 2010). Furthermore, the concepts of ‘soft power’ and ‘public diplomacy’ have enjoyed increased relevance in scholarly circles, as is visible through the different discussions on what type of an actor the EU is and in what fashion it tends to portray itself in the international arena (Manners, 2002; Wagnsson & Hellman, 2018). PD has a long history as a way of promoting a country’s soft power and it was essential in winning the cold war (Nye, 2008). In short, two reasons make the topic of PD highly relevant. Firstly, the aforementioned increase in literature on the type of actor the EU supposedly is (Chad, 2012; Wolfgang, 2017) makes PD a salient subject in the academic field. The manner in which the EU represents itself can, at least partially, be explained as a reflection of how the EU wants to be interpreted by outside actors. Secondly, the challenges the EU faces in the international arena and the possibilities it embraces when it comes to the need of reinventing itself within it (EUGS, 2016) are underlined by its efforts to mark strategic communication as a driver of positive change (EUGS,2016). This need for extensive and clear communication is decisively more present in the 2016 EU Global strategy paper compared to its 2003 predecessor. In the EUGS paper this is expressed as strategic communication, which in turn stems from the prioritization of successfully marketing oneself to other political actors. The need to successfully market oneself has increased value in an increasingly more uncertain and changing multipolar world order since the fall of the wall (Cooper, 2004).

In this regard a question that exudes relevance and is composed of both concepts, namely coherence and public diplomacy, is formulated: How does EU PD coherence manifest itself when exposed to the continuous friction of the tumultuous international setting in which it needs to operate? This the crux of the thesis, as the effects of an influential event on the response of specific EU institutions and three EU member states will be analysed.

This event is the 2013-2014 Ukraine crisis, which some argue to be the biggest geopolitical upheaval in EU's neighbourhood since the fall of the wall (Menon & Rumer, 2015). This paper will be investigating the response from the European Commission, its president, the EEAS as well as the foreign ministries and the leading ministers of France, Germany and Poland.

So far, the scholarly focus has primarily tended to deal with the concept of coherence in relation to EU FP. Public diplomacy is a sub area of FP (Sandrin & Hoffman, 2018). Effects of EU FP coherence on different policy areas which are part of the EU's competencies, such as trade, development and FP tools such as the sanction regime have been researched (Portela & Raube, 2012). Papers in this area emphasised research on the causes for coherence in consecutive EU treaties (Portela & Raube, 2012; Mayer, 2013). Such work does ensure to clarify, distinguish between and elaborate on the nature of coherence and the EU as an actor in the international system (Marks, 2007; Smith, 2012). Referring to the earlier remarks on the importance of specific events on PD coherence is to mention that the scholarly literature has not particularly ventured into researching this combination. Including a specific political event, such as the 2013-2014 Ukraine crisis and its possible effects on PD coherence creates a research both manageable in scope and at the same time original in setup.

The 2013-2014 Ukraine Crisis contains certain features which make it particularly relevant in shaping the attitude of EU institutions for future encounters with third parties. It is prone to shape the contours of the European Neighborhood policy in a permanent manner (Birchfield & Young, 2018). Subsequently, Russia's aggression in Ukraine represents the greatest security challenge to the West since the end of the Cold War (Birchfield & Young, 2018). The Russian Federation, arguably only outdone by the U.S. plays the most significant role in the external positioning of the EU in world politics (Forsberg & Haukkala, 2016). Concepts such as Sakwa's (2014) 'Wider Europe', denoting clear EU enlargement to the east, are prone to experience a Litmus test through the aforementioned crisis. With such a context in mind, this thesis will focus on specific documentation involved in the public handling of the EU's foreign policy vis-à-vis Ukraine during the 2013-2014 crisis.

The research question is as follows : *What are the effects of the 2013-2014 Ukraine Crisis on the vertical coherence of the online public diplomacy of European actors ?*

The main aim of this research question is to uncover if the crisis evoked a similar response from the different actors constituting the EU. In the literature review the European actors of this case study will be presented. The methodology will further justify certain choices regarding the variables under scrutiny as well as establish the 'online PD' term. In the analysis, the principal manifestations of this response will be presented. This research question tries to enlarge the scope of the scholarly literature intent on discussing the inherent issues that arise from a European PD either coherent or incoherent in its nature. In the conclusion the effect of the Ukraine crisis on EU PD coherence and implications of the results for the wider Eastern Neighborhood relationship and even Russia-EU relations will be discussed. Finally, specific recommendations in for improving EU PD will be offered.

Literature Review

According to Mayer (2013), the topic of coherence within the EU's external relations has been one of the more active and repetitive theoretical debates in the general study of the EU's foreign policy, on par with the discussion of the 'capabilities-expectations' gap formulated by Hill (2003). In order to succinctly and concisely define what I mean by vertical coherence in the context of the Ukraine Crisis, a clear description on the different perspectives on coherence is in order. The framework presented here follows Mayer's (2013) five typologies of coherence. These are *Horizontal*, *Vertical*, *Strategic*, *External Engagement* and *Narrative* coherence.

The origins of the discussion on European Foreign Policy coherence date back to 1985, the year of the establishment of the Single European Act, the SEA (Gebhard, 2017). It was the SEA that produced a task divide for coherency management in European external relations. This divide came to be between the European Commission and the European Council (Mayer, 2013). All the discussion concerning coherence center around the ideal of converging different strands of EU foreign policy, both on a strategic as well as a procedural level (Gebhard, 2017).

The main theoretical discussion in the coherence literature is about horizontal coherence, which refers to the scope of differences and similarities between different policy areas at the Union level (Gebhard, 2017; Mayer, 2013). It takes up most of the scholarly debate (Mayer, 2013). This has been evident as horizontal coherence has been evaluated in the aforementioned settings of different policy areas (trade, development, humanitarian aid)

and even in the context of public diplomacy with regards to the Ukraine Crisis (Iarovy, 2014).

The study on horizontal coherence is especially praised for its ability to uncover the structural rather than purely political outcomes needed to enhance the institutional steps of coherence (Gebhard, 2017). Despite this considerable advantage, the difficulty of examining coherence through the horizontal lens has only increased after several amendments in the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties. These treaties did not repair the divide on coherence management between the Council and the Commission (Mayer, 2013). It does not take into consideration the all important individual stances of member states, which count more in an impromptu situation such as the Ukraine Crisis. Both Mayer (2013) and Gebhard (2017) state that the Lisbon treaty was not able to push the EU into a dreamlike supranational state of coherence, but was set up to fail from the outset in its lofty goals.

This is where research on vertical coherence can bolster the the literature on FP or PD in the international relations field. Vertical coherence symbolises the integration and convergence of a single Foreign Policy or Public Diplomacy approach between the units of the member states and the EU itself. There is a lack of vertical coherence research overall and in particular on the methods applied by the EU in the Ukraine crisis situation (Iarovy, 2014). This despite the fact that vertical coherence never ceased to be a topic of debate in scholarly circles in general (Gebhard, 2017). Results derived from research on vertical coherence could offer tangible recommendations for improving relations with the Eastern Neighborhood in general and Ukraine in particular (Iarovy, 2014).

A caveat has to be placed when researching vertical coherence in connection to the Ukraine crisis and other unpredictable and volatile one off political events. The caveat refers to the lesser utility of researching vertical coherence, for two reasons. First, the member states and the EU institutions differ in the set of fields in which they possess full competence when dealing with third party actors (Mayer, 2013). As such different fields are eligible for use of a 'carrot and stick' approach by either the member state or the European Union (Mayer, 2013; Naumescu & Dungaciu, 2015). Secondly, because it is in the nature of vertical coherence to constantly observe the differences and friction between national and supranational Foreign Policy or Public Diplomacy coherence, it gives too much attention to the short term political stances of member states and does not focus sufficiently on the structural external PD coherence towards third party actors. The latter caveat can be

circumvented by not overemphasizing the differences between different actors over a short period of time. Instead research should stretch the period of analysis, in a manner covering the entire beginning of the Ukraine Crisis.

Finally, a short elaboration on the choice for researching the public diplomacy coherence of the EEAS, the European Commission, the states of France, Germany and Poland is in order. First, the EU overall, both in form of its institutions and some of its members states was chosen over other historically plausible and understandable mediating states such as the U.S. This happened because the Obama administration, who at the time was indirectly involved in the Syrian civil war offloaded responsibility for US-Russia relations to the EU, an abrogation of U.S. responsibility not seen since 1947 (Larson, 2018). The EU is represented through the EEAS and the EU Commission, and not by, for example, the European council. This is done for two reasons. First, considering the first two institutions are most involved with the European Neighborhood Policy (Ikani, 2019), one can assume their responsiveness is high when it comes to crises arising in these areas. Secondly, the European council consists of the member states and can thus not be analytically separated from the member states (Ikani, 2019). As such research on the original task divide in respect to coherence management (between the European Council and the Commission) is outside of the scope of this paper. But more broadly, the question remains : Could an analysis of the EU online PD response to the 2013-2014 Ukraine crisis be complete without involving individual member states ? The short answer is no. Vertical coherence of online public diplomacy within the EU institutions is impossible to measure, as preparatory work groups such as COREPER and Director Generates do not possess PD tools. But most importantly, the fact is that the EU was mostly missing in action during the 2013-2014 crisis whilst the process itself was taken over mainly by France and Germany (Haukkala, 2018; Sakwa, 2014). Even Poland disappeared from the active negotiation and policy mandating scene (Haukkala, 2018). However, it is not the direct involvement of the states that is in question here, but the extent to which the PD of these actors cohere around a single narrative. In this light, evaluating vertical coherence through the lens of the EU and the Weimar triangle framework, which is seen as the most potent force for reconciling EU-Russia differences in the Ukrainian context (Romer, 2014), is the most appropriate analytic approach.

Theoretical Framework

According to Sandrin and Hoffman (2018), “the ‘linguistic turn’ in IR theory branched out to EU foreign policy analysis” (p. 4) Within this linguistic turn, four different approaches are applied. These are interpretative constructivism, post structuralism, discursive institutionalism and critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Sandrin & Hoffman, 2018). In this paper the focus will be on the last method, an approach suited for research on communication, culture and society (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2010).

Sharing the idea that ‘all Foreign Policy is a discursive practice’ with the former French president François Hollande (Hutton et al., 2018), and the aforementioned concept that PD is an extension of Foreign Policy (Sandrin & Hoffman, 2018), it is appropriate to utilize a constructivist approach for examining the data at hand. In contrast to Sandrin and Hoffman’s article, which applies a poststructuralist approach, the CDA method applied here, according to Jorgensen and Phillips (2010), “stresses the importance of doing a systematic analysis of spoken and written language” (p.65). To be precise, this paper utilizes CDA as practiced and formulated by Norman Fairclough (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2010).

A short elaboration on the basic tenets of CDA follows. Most centrally in Fairclough’s theory stands the understanding of discourse as both constitutive and constituted. This means that language use as a social practice is both constitutive for its environment whilst simultaneously being constantly constituted by this same environment (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2010). This connotes a lesser degree of stability for a given discourse by Fairclough compared to other CDA methods (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2010). Two dimensions of discourse are important focal points for any analysis, namely (1) the communicative event (the tangible instance of language use in any given medium) and (2) the order of discourse, denoting the configuration of all the discourse types used in a social institution. In this paper only a small fragment of the entire order of discourse that is present within the EU will be analysed, as elaborated on in the methodology. Fairclough’s precise three-dimensional approach for tackling the examination of specific communicative events is what elevates its usefulness as a method in the wider field of qualitative analyses of political discourse. Fairclough, as mentioned by Jorgensen and Phillips (2010) accepts that “every instance of language use is a communicative event consisting of three dimensions” (p.68).




Figure 1. Fairclough's three dimensional model (Jorgensen & Phillips, p.68).

The first dimension signifies that the communicative event is a *text* and as such can be interpreted through its linguistic features. Secondly, it is a *discursive practice* which involves the production and consumption of the text. Lastly, it is a *social practice*.

The primary disadvantage of Fairclough's method is the author's insistence on not solely applying CDA to textual analysis. This particular application of the CDA method comes from Fairclough's idea that textual analysis can only be successful if combined with a social analysis, in order to craft a truly multidisciplinary approach to analyses of (prominent) societal discourses (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2010). Considering this it must be said that a thorough social analysis of the Ukraine crisis and the responses it evoked is beyond the scope of this paper.

Methodology

The framework of analysis consists of a mixed method approach. In the first place, to visualize the data and clarify the classification of it, a content analysis lays at the foundation of this paper. On this foundation the main body of analysis is structured as a qualitative CDA analysis which will produce the greatest amount of output, on which to base the further discussion of the paper. The former part will enable an examination of trends and patterns in the documented discourse (Stemler, 2001). The latter will connect the all important political context which is constituted by the 2013-2014 Ukraine crisis with the EU institutional and member state messages and their subsequent categorization. The variable 'online PD' in this paper is operationalized by looking at the information found in the Twitterfeeds of the

European actors included in this paper. There are several reasons to be found for this decision in favour of other social media platforms, such as Facebook. First off, not every political actor active on Twitter is active on Facebook (Iarovy, 2014). Secondly, Twitter provides a broader sphere of EU communications as most of the Twitter messages are repeated on Facebook while this is not the case the other way around (Iarovy, 2014). Third, comparisons are facilitated with studies embedded in similar research focused on social media and PD diffusion within the EU institutions (Kenna, 2011) and articles combining this particular focus with the Ukraine crisis context (Iarovy, 2014). The conclusions of this paper also aid studies with a more general aim of examining concepts like strategic communication and discursive constructions of self in the Ukrainian context (Hutton et al., 2018; Strau et al., 2015). The tool used for researching the available twitter accounts is the Advanced Twitter Search machine on Twitter itself. First, all tweets written during the specified time frames (discussed in cases) are included and counted. Secondly, only tweets are included that contain key words such as Ukraine, Crimea, EaP, Russia, MH17, and the signifiers of the European actors. Specific language variations are all included (Krim, Crimée, Ukrainy etc.)

Cases

Social media is sometimes considered a grey area when it comes to what communication diffusion is official and what communication diffusion is private in nature (Iarovy, 2014). However, certain actors can be earmarked as persons acting in institutional functions of official representative value, such as the ministers of foreign ministries and in the case of EU institutions, Commissioners and the High Representative (HRVP) (Iarovy, 2014). A disadvantage with including the data of institutional heads are the clear gaps in comparable information supply. For one, the two foreign ministers of Germany during the Ukraine crisis, Westerwelle and Steinmeier, do not have active twitter accounts that detail their narrative as the events in and around Europe were unfolding in 2013-2014. As such the data that is produced from comparing the different leadership statements during this period cannot be considered as conclusive. The same issue is present with the EEAS, as its High Representative, Catherine Ashton, did not possess a Twitter account in the 2013-2014 period. Although the results from the heads of the organizations that did have traceable Twitter Feeds are analysed and will be presented they will not be discussed in the conclusion.

The internal and external validity of this paper are of different value. The internal validity (measuring the strength of the independent variable), in this case the specific public diplomacy discourse utilized, can certainly turn out to be of a high level. This is due to the CDA method, considered the most developed critical discourse method for research in communication, culture and society (Halperin & Heath, 2017; Jorgensen & Phillips, 2010). It is more questionable whether a strong external validity can be produced with the CDA approach. The extent to which the results of this qualitative method can be extrapolated for further research is hard to determine, but considering the shallow application of quantitative methods used in this paper one can assume external validity to be low. This assumption is validated by the fact that in the paper considers only the 2013-2014 Ukraine crisis PD response, designating the research in question a case study. Qualitative case studies by themselves are comparably lower in external validity than its quantitative counterparts (Halperin & Heath, 2017).

The time frame of the empirical research presented is divided into three distinct periods in the 2013-2014 period of the Ukraine crisis. This is in keeping with other scholarly articles discussing the Ukraine crisis during the period of 2013-2014 as a critical juncture capable of substantially influencing European conduct in matters of the European Neighbourhood policy and EU discourse generally (Ikani, 2019; Smit, 2019). There exists a ‘scarcity of attention’ dilemma in regards to Public Diplomacy in the modern age, as described by Nye (2008). With this in mind it is unavoidable to set clear boundaries with respect to what information to incorporate in the paper. The delineation of the three periods moderately follows the events described by Sakwa (2014) as most crucial in the development of the international Ukrainian crisis during 2013-2014 period. These are (1) the two weeks that marked the outset of the Maidan protests beginning from the 21st of November until the 5th of December 2013. This includes the analysis of the PD response on the Vilnius Eastern Partnership summit held on the 28-29 of November of that year. To round it down to include a full two week (14 day) period, the cut off mark fell on the 22nd of November. The second (2) period includes the four weeks (29 days) between February 21st and March 21st 2014 that covered the occurrences of the Yanukovich- EU-Russia agreement on the 21st of February, Yanukovich’s flight from Ukraine, the Crimean annexation and the referendum of the 16th of March. The (3) third period encompasses the day of the downing of the passenger airline

MH17 and the week after (17 July until 24 of July- 8 days). This last event is what truly transformed the crisis into an even bigger international conflagration with a increased meaning for the European community (Sakwa, 2014).

At last, as mentioned in the theoretical framework, the second dimension of any discourse (the order of discourse) which should be included in a CDA based paper, is of a very limited nature in this thesis. Although the RQ specifies the fact that online PD is exclusively considered, the discourse of the diverse actors presented on Twitter is only a small fraction of the order of discourse represented online. Specific online archives that include declaratory statements of a more official nature by the member states and EU institutions in question are not included in this paper. This despite the fact these sources are at least equally relevant when determining the online PD of the European actors. Here as well, two similar arguments are in place for not including this material in the thesis paper. Whereas the European, German and French archives were easily accessible, the Polish information was only available upon special requests. Furthermore, as with the choice for the EEAS and the Commission as representative bodies for the EU response, the choice for a unique focus on Twitter output was made because of the hardly analytically separable information found on the websites of the individual European actors. What is meant by this is that whereas official transcripts of declarations and announcements by FP actors are regularly pronounced on and meant for ‘offline’ platforms, only to be reproduced on the Internet, the Twitter data is specifically and uniquely produced for ‘online’ audiences.

The tables and the format of the three-dimensional CDA method are modeled after the layout present in the earlier work by Iarovyi (2014). This is specifically done to drive similar further research on the topic of coherence in connection to European FP and PD and also to facilitate reproduction of this paper’s results in the future .

Results

Table 1.

Results of the content analysis of the messages of the EU foreign policy actors and the Weimar triangle foreign ministries in the period from 22 November to 5 December 2013,

Actor	Overall number of tweets and retweets	Number of tweets and retweets on Eastern Partnership; On Ukraine	Percentage of tweets and retweets on Eastern Partnership (of that - on Ukraine)
European External Action Service (EEAS)	100	15; 4	15%; 4%
European Commission	128	7; 10	5.5%; 7.8%
José Manuel Barroso	50	8; 4	16%; 8%
Auswärtiges Amt	70	0; 14	0; 20%
France Diplomatie	96	0; 1	0%; 1%
Laurent Fabius	82	0; 1	0%; 1%
Poland MFA	53	18; 1	34%; 1.9%
Radek Sikorski	64	1; 14	1.6%; 21.9%

European Commission

Linguistic features

The tweets of the EC, both concerning the situation in Ukraine and on the Eastern Partnership, are short and informative in nature.

Discursive features

The main discourse concerning the Eastern partnership is based on ‘economic development’. This is based on another discourse determined as the necessity of ‘international cooperation’. The tweets on Ukraine focus on a discourse of ‘Political aid’.

Social Practice

The referral to the press corner in tweets by the EC is a returning occurrence, also in the case of the EC linking to official statements such as Barroso’s and Ashton's on Ukraine, from December 2nd and November 25th respectively, with a joint statement on the 30th of November. Vertical coherence in the form of mentions of other member states is absent.

José Manuel Barroso

Linguistic features

The language of Barroso is informative, concise and lapidary. It doesn't follow a strict narrative but instead focuses on the practical facets of the Vilnius Summits and their factual results. Transitivity is present as Barroso occasionally presents remarks in an informal tone, with personal forms such as my ('My remarks; my statement, my joint statement' - Tweets 29th and 25th of November)

Discursive features

The clearest discourse is found in the joint declaration of van Rompuy and Barroso, from a hyperlink of a November 25 tweet . In it, the "Open Europe" discourse is present. This discourse is focused on communicating towards Ukraine that the figurative door remains open for Ukraine to sign the AA at a later date.

Social Practice

Barroso links many statements in his tweets. He includes other political actors in his tweets about the Eastern Partnership summit, such as the organizer of the summit, Lithuanian president Grybauskaite. However, vertical coherence on the topic of Ukraine is not present.

EEAS

Linguistic features

The tweets of the EEAS are the most brief out of the institutions analysed. They provide clear and concise informative remarks on the events at the Vilnius summit.

Discursive features

The discourse for the Eastern Partnership in the embedded document from the 28th of November tweet is recognizable as the necessity of 'international cooperation'. The tweets on Ukraine focus on a discourse of 'Political aid'.

Social Practice

Links are embedded in a majority of the tweet by the EEAS. No value based commentary is espoused. The member states constituting the Weimar triangle are not specifically mentioned.

Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Ministry)

Linguistic features

The communication present in the German foreign ministry twitter account is moderately formal in its nature. It has an informative character whilst describing the accounts in short sentences.

Discursive features

The range of tweets cohere mostly around the discourse of 'international assistance', which focuses on German officials not remaining indifferent towards Ukraine's political future. It describes the pathway for Ukraine's rapprochement towards the European Union as an inviting one, which qualifies as an 'Open Europe' discourse .

Social Practice

Mentions of other European actors such as the Polish foreign minister Sikorski are present. The focus of the tweets is on multilateral cooperation. Auswärtiges Amt takes the effort to formally respond to specific questions on the Ukrainian travels of foreign minister Westerwelle towards other netizens.

FranceDiplo (French Foreign Ministry)

Besides a tweet dating from the 4th of December, which is informative, objective and lapidary in nature, tweets on the subjects of the Vilnius summit are absent.

Laurent Fabius

In the same manner as France Diplo, minister Fabius only mentioned Ukraine in a tweet on the 2nd of December, making CDA inapplicable.

Poland MFA (Polish Foreign Ministry)

Linguistic features

The tweets of Poland MFA are short, active instead of passive language is used for the reader to become involved (learn more, discover the, compare with) in the realization of European processes like the Eastern Partnership.

Discursive features

The account is focused on commenting objectively on the trade relationships entertained by the countries of the Eastern Partnership. It does so by including informative spreadsheets with

economical data presented in brief sections. The discourse that follows from this can be characterized as ‘Economic Cooperation’.

Social Practice

The multilateral character of the German tweets is also present in the Polish tweets, with a similar focus on presenting the utility of the Eastern Partnership for the non-EU states through the lense of the EU. Nevertheless, there is a noticeable difference in emphasis on Ukraine and the Eastern partnership as evidenced from the larger quantity of tweets on the Eastern Partnership by Poland and its comparably lacking commentary on events in Ukraine compared to the Auswärtiges Amt.

Radek Sikorski

Linguistic features

Sikorski writes both in Polish and English on his account, to cater to Polish as well as international followers. It uses less diplomatic rhetoric than one could expect from a foreign minister, speaking in direct terms. Modality is moderate as specifics on economic data is mentioned in certain tweets, but otherwise broad statements on the situation abound.

Transitivity is moderately low, as direct personal forms (EU and PL ready to help *you* [ukraine], December 1; *I am* afraid, November 27) are sparsely used.

Discursive features

The main narratives of Sikorski’s tweets revolve around two discourses, the first being ‘economic cooperation’ and the second being ‘European solidarity’. The first is evident from the profusion of tweets covering the economic benefits of Ukraine’s possible AA signing. The second is demonstrated through the tweets focusing on aiding Ukraine in its struggle for western rapprochement.

Social Practice

Replies to other Twitter users are frequent. Quotes from and referrals to other sources, such as the Klitschko brothers, businessweek or euractiv, are frequent. Sikorski’s statements are primarily concerned with the economic facets of EU-Ukraine and Polish-Ukrainian relations, as seen from the tweets of November 24 and the 1st and 5th of December. Sikorski mentions the EU and the Partnership summit very frequently.

Table 2. Results of the content analysis of the messages of the EU foreign policy actors and the foreign ministry actors of the Weimar triangle states in the period from 21 February to 21 March 2014

Actor	Overall number of tweets and retweets	Number of tweets and retweets on Ukraine and on Crimea	Percentage of tweets and retweets and on Crimea
European External Action Service (EEAS)	278	101	36.3%
European Commission	427	104	24.4%
José Manuel Barroso	127	46	36.2%
Auswärtiges Amt (Germany)	110	74	67.3%
France Diplomatie	159	38	23.9%
Laurent Fabius	143	102	71.3%
Poland MFA	84	22	26.2%
Radek Sikorski	177	38	21.5%

EEAS

Linguistic features

The nature of EEAS messages is very diplomatic, brief in its wording, clearly intend to effectively inform the reader.

Discursive features

The discourse of the EEAS consists both of ‘international cooperation’ as Ashton assures continued communication with the Russians, as well as a firm ‘territorial integrity’ discourse.

Social Practice

The EEAS in most instances intends to inform its readership on the practical efforts organized by its institutions and representatives to conciliate the different parties to the conflict. These revolve around the political and economic implications of the events for the European states. However, no acknowledgement of the Weimar triangle or its individual member states is present in its communication on Ukraine over this period. It can be stated that, in this particular case, vertical coherence is not existent.

EU Commission

Linguistic features

The vocabulary and phrasing of this account is formal, focused on distributing informative updates on the EU's commission practical steps for realizing a common response in the Ukraine crisis. Transitivity is low as the Commission does not refer to itself or third actors in personal forms. Modality is moderate as specifics are only sporadically brought up, as in the tweet of March 11 on proposing temporary tariff cuts for Ukrainian exports.

Discursive features

The principal discourse relates to the Commission's commitment for the 'Territorial Integrity' of Ukraine. This is demonstrated by the tweets on the 12th and 17th of March.

Social Practice

Re-tweets are non-existent whilst it is usual for the Commission to embed hyperlinks for the presscorner, including larger statements on topics like aid for Ukraine. The two main themes concern economic and political matters, such as the sanction regime imposed on Russia.

Vertical coherence is not present in the tweets as no member states efforts in the resolution of the crisis is mentioned.

José Manuel Barroso

Linguistic features

The transitivity of Barroso's tweets is high as he applies personal forms throughout his feed, sharing with the reader about the occurrences in Ukraine and the EU ('My statement on the unilateral trade measures'). Modality is moderate.

Discursive features

The discourses adheres mostly to 'International Cooperation' and 'Territorial Integrity' of Ukraine.

Social Practice

Barroso ensures that his tweets stay formal, without any specific value judgements attached.

Although reference is made to Ukrainian prime minister Yatsenyuk and other

Commissioners, no other European players involved in resolving the crisis are acknowledged in Barroso's feed.

Auswärtiges Amt

Linguistic features

The language used by the German MFA account is lapidary, brief and informative.

Transitivity is moderate as personal and possessive forms are used throughout this period ([I am] not content about the results, March 5; our Baltic partners, March 11; our support, February 28) . Furthermore, a forceful tone of voice is expressed in the tweets, in which, just as in the French statements, an upscaling of retaliatory measures to level 3 is threatened(March 13th).

Discursive features

The discourse of “European Solidarity”, is evident from the German tweets. The fear of the Baltic states of future Russian aggressions is uttered as this account publishes tweets on the 10th and 11th about ongoing discussions with these states. In the same vein, the discourse on the importance of ‘Territorial Integrity’ is mentioned in three different tweets.

Social Practice

The German MFA account focuses primarily on the political and security facets of the Ukraine Crisis. The level of apparent vertical coherence is at a minimal level as the EU Foreign Minister Council is mentioned twice only, whereas cooperation with the Polish FM Sikorski is named once only.

France Diplo

Linguistic features

The French MFA is high in transitivity as many tweets actively use the plural personal form of ‘we’ (i.e ‘we condemn, we propose, our embassy, we call to). Mentions of minister Fabius are common and both the formulation of his words as those of the MFA account are of a diplomatic nature. Furthermore, the language is lapidary, informative and in certain instances declarative in nature.

Discursive features

The discourses mentioned are ‘international cooperation’, ‘European solidarity’, ‘importance of dialogue’ as well as ‘territorial integrity’. The first is amply demonstrated through tweets confirming regular contact between France, Germany and Poland, as well as French insistence on continuous open lines with Russia, as seen in tweets from March 5th and 12th. The importance of continued dialogue is mentioned twice, in tweets on 13 and 17 March.

Social Practice

The French MFA is responding to the crisis by clearly communicating towards the readers that it is in close contact with other states and the EU. This account tries to emphasize the importance of the EU in its dealings with Ukraine and Russia, as seen from a series of tweets from the 4th, 12th and 17th of March. Vertical coherence as such is high in this period.

Laurent Fabius

Linguistic features

Transitivity in Fabius' communication is moderately high, as the minister does not shy away from speaking in first person singular (I will be interviewed, I will receive, I will participate) with a high cluster of personal forms appearing in tweets on the 17 and 18 March. Modality is moderately high as well, switching between concrete tweets on the prospect of cancelling visa provisions and upgrading the sanction regime to level 3 to simply mentioning that sanctions are on the way (tweet 11 March).

Discursive features

The scope of discourse ranges from 'Importance of Dialogue' (i.e. tweet march 17th; We try to be firm whilst proposing pathways of dialogue') to 'international cooperation' whilst mentioning Ukraine's territorial integrity once in a tweet March 16th. Fabius' account adds one more distinct discourse variant, which will be referred to as 'national resolve' This is visible in tweets on 12, 17 and 18 March, describing the supposed 'firmness', which is determined here as resolve, by which the French government intends to act towards Russia. At the same time 'international cooperation' did not exclude the sale and transfer of high tech military equipment to Russia, even after the annexation of Crimea, as Fabius stresses that 'we want to do everything to not suspend the delivery of three helicopter carriers [to Russia]' in a tweet on the 18th of March. This is a remarkable statement considering the fact that on the same date, the minister articulates the observation that according to him, it is the most meaningful crisis in recent times, comparing it to tensions only seen during the cold war.

Social Practice

Fabius reacts forcefully to the events in Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula, whilst ensuring to include Russia in its mentions about a continuing dialogue. Despite the fact that the EU is mentioned nine times in this period, he refers to it only in superficial terms, referring specifically only the European Council on Foreign affairs. Poland and Germany are not

specifically mentioned whilst Steinmeier's name is only mentioned once. Overall the remarks emit a low level of vertical coherence.

Poland MFA

Linguistic features

The description of the Ukraine crisis and its handling by the Polish MFA is illustrated through informative and brief vocabulary. It is moderately low in transitivity with the personal form 'we' used on three occasions, whilst the language use is occasionally active (do not enter east ukraine.. March 14 ; ..spirit of the agreement should be respected, February 27; let's light candles to show solidarity, February 21).

Discursive features

The main discourse is based on 'International cCooperation'. A secondary discourse is 'Russian aggression', explicitly mentioned twice.

Social Practice

The vertical coherence is most present in the Polish communication on the events in Ukraine and Crimea. EU efforts and frameworks for construction of a common response are brought up four times. EU foreign minister decisions are detailed twice (February 26 and March 7th). The Weimar Triangle is only acknowledged once, in a tweet dated 28 of February, whilst the Baltic states and specifically Estonia are mentioned a total of five times, which points to a lesser degree of importance of this framework for the Polish state compared to the latter states. In general terms, the EU is not acknowledge as playing a specific role in the resolution of the Crisis.

Radek Sikorski

Linguistic features

The level of transitivity is high as Sikorski uses personal forms such as 'we' on a recurring basis. At the same time, the level of modality is low as Sikorski offers only vague prescriptions for appropriate behaviour of both Ukraine and Russia in the crisis, as evident from the very beginning of this period. An example is a February 21st tweet on the signing of an accord with erstwhile president Yanukovych ('WE are about to sign. Good compromise. Gives peace a chance").

Discursive features

The discourse is mainly centered around ‘international cooperation’ and ‘territorial integrity’.

Social Practice

Sikorski acknowledges his continuous contact with other European foreign ministers (March 1st) however he does not refer to other European states nor institutions. As a result the vertical coherence in his diplomatic messaging is very low.

Table 3.

Results of the content analysis of the messages of the EU foreign policy actors and the foreign ministry actors of the Weimar triangle states in the period from 17 July to 24 July 2014

Actor	Overall number of tweets and retweets	Number of tweets and retweets on Ukraine and on MH17	Percentage of tweets and retweets on Ukraine & MH17
European External Action Service (EEAS)	66	25	37.9%
European Commission	60	4	6.7%
José Manuel Barroso	5	2	40%
Auswärtiges Amt	60	11	18.3%
France Diplomatie	93	5	5.4%
Laurent Fabius	5	0	0%
Poland MFA	18	3	16.7%
Radek Sikorski	14	3	21.4%

European Commission

Linguistic features

The four tweets on MH17 are short, precise and informative in their character. They are focused on sharing EU’s response to the crash and its commitment towards the victims. One Dutch tweet is specifically directed towards the Dutch speaking audience.

Discursive features

A declarative discourse is employed in two tweets , referring to the minute of silence the EU took up for the victims, declaring its condolences for those who lost dear friends and family.

Social Practice

No mentions are made of the three main Weimar triangle states involved in resolving the flaring tensions. Instead, the MH17 disaster is mentioned in the same breath as the Gaza operation, indicating its decreased level of importance relative to the other two analysed periods.

EEAS

Linguistic features

The tweets of the EEAS are formulated in a careful, diplomatic manner. This does not hinder the phrasing to be direct. The EEAS takes a clear stance in the occurrence of the MH17 downing, as witnessed by its July 22 tweet (‘..Council strongly condemns illegal activities by armed militants in E.Ukraine..’). It reflects the two traits - prudence and assertiveness - mastered by the EEAS twitter account. Transitivity and modality are both low.

Discursive features

A declarative discourse is utilized by the EEAS in their handling of the MH17 downing. Condolences are offered and a discourse of ‘international cooperation’ is urged.

Social Practice

EEAS takes care to put the innocent lives of flight MH17 lost due to the Ukraine conflict into primary consideration.

José Manuel Barroso

Linguistic features

Transitivity is high as both tweets concerning MH17 are written in personal forms (My thoughts with, 17 July; my joint statement, 17 July). Modality is low, as only a broad outline for further action is proposed (‘facts need to be established’). Overall a diplomatic tone is established.

Discursive features

The narrative is declarative in nature, as Barroso offers his condolences to the victims families.

Social Practice

No third state is mentioned. One of the two tweets dedicated to MH17 is a hyperlink to a longer statement, comparable with his efforts in the February-March period.

Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Ministry)

Linguistic features

The German response to the MH17 downing is high in transitivity, as minister Steinmeier is reacting in personal responses towards the crash (i.e. July 21; it makes me incredibly angry..? July 23; We are willing to increase pressure..?). Modality is moderate, as specific steps alluding to judicial steps are mentioned whilst details are left out (i.e. in a tweet on July 17; '[we] need a speedy international investigation..?'; July 22 'need to speak with one voice')

Discursive features

The main discourse concerning Ukraine and the MH17 crash is based around 'international cooperation'. Also apparent from the communication is the 'European Solidarity' discourse (i.e. the 23 July tweets 'Germany rests at the sides of its partners' 'Poland is one of Germany's most important partners overall, not just during the Ukraine Crisis'). The vertical coherence is clearly visible as EU institutions are mentioned.

Social Practice

Vertical coherence is visible as the German MFA twitter account describes its efforts on July 21 and 22 on the level of the EU FM council. Value statements abound as Steinmeier is quoted on July 18 that 'if proven that one of the conflict partners is involved, it would be an unimaginable atrocity'. Finally, Poland receives important mentions in regards to its standing in the international cooperation efforts for Ukraine.

France Diplo (French Foreign Ministry)

Linguistic features

The language of the French MFA account is lapidary, informative and prudent. Much, but scarcely detailed, information related to several different events is composed into one tweet (i.e. the 2014 Gaza crisis and Iran negotiations are mentioned in the same tweet as Ukraine-tweet July 21).

Discursive features

The main discourse is clearly focused around ‘international cooperation, with mentions on telephone calls with Putin and a demonstration on its willingness to cooperate with an international investigation into the crash (Tweets from respectively July 21st and 18th).

Social Practice

The French MFA account focuses principally on clarifying the positions of other international actors (in)directly involved with the crash, and on demonstrating its willingness to communicate clearly and abide by international legal standards.

Laurent Fabius

Interestingly, the foreign minister scarcely used twitter in the 17-24 of July period and thus does not merit a CDA analysis

Poland MFA (Polish Foreign Ministry)

Linguistic features

The tweets are written in a lapidary, unpersonal manner.

Discursive features

The discourse of Poland is only identifiable as ‘international cooperation’.

Social Practice

In the 3 tweets of this account only a partial level of coherence is found, as France and Germany are mentioned whilst the EU is left out of the equation. In the July 19 tweet, however, the three states are mentioned explicitly in connection to the publication of their joint statement.

Radek Sikorski

Linguistic features

Sikorski’s language is declaratory in nature, as he condemns the perpetrators of the violence as well as giving his condolences to the victims families. Although diplomatic language is used, Sikorski’s language lacks the prudence of his French and German counterparts in describing the impact of the MH17 crash, using words such as ‘aggression’ and ‘violation’.

Discursive features

The ‘international cooperation’ and ‘European solidarity’ discourse is present in one tweet only, referring to a common appeal by France, Germany and Poland in a tweet on July 19th. No mention is made of any European institutions, but Europe as a unity is mentioned on July 18th (‘Europe grieves’).

Social Practice

In Sikorski’s communication on the MH17 downing, the interactivity with other media stands out once more. He refers to Polish (18 and 19 July) and British media (20 July).

Table 4.

Results of the Critical discourse analysis of the messages of the EU foreign policy actors and the Weimar triangle foreign ministries in the period from 22nd of November 2013 to 5th of December 2013

Actor	Prevailing discourses	Language characteristics	Re-tweets of other actors	Level of focus	Interactivity	Level of Vertical Coherence
European External Action Service (EEAS)	International cooperation, political aid	Strongly official style, general formulations	Rare	Moderate	High	Absent
European Commission	International cooperation, economic development	Strongly official style, general formulations	Frequent	High	High	Absent
José Manuel Barroso	Open Europe	Strongly official style, general formulations	Rare	Moderate	High	Low
Auswärtiges Amt (Germany)	International cooperation, Open Europe	Moderate official style, diplomatic rhetoric	Frequent	High	High	High
France Diplomatie	-	-	-	-	-	-
Laurent Fabius	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poland MFA	Economic cooperation	Strongly official style	Frequent	High	High	High
Radek Sikorski	Economic cooperation, European Solidarity	Narrative style, diplomatic rhetoric	Frequent	High	High	High

Table 5.

Results of the Critical discourse analysis of the messages of the EU foreign policy actors and the Weimar triangle foreign ministries in the period from 21 February to 21 March 2014

Actor	Prevailing discourses	Language characteristics	Re-tweets of other actors	Level of focus	Interactivity	Level of Vertical Coherence
European External Action Service (EEAS)	International cooperation, territorial integrity	Strongly official style	Frequent	High	High	Absent
European Commission	Territorial integrity	Strongly official style	Frequent	High	High	Absent
José Manuel Barroso	International cooperation, territorial integrity	Strongly official style, general formulations	Rare	High	High	Absent
Auswärtiges Amt (Germany)	European Solidarity	Strongly official style, general formulations	Rare		High	Low
France Diplomatie	International cooperation, european solidarity	Strongly official style, both general and specific formulations	Frequent	High	High	High
Laurent Fabius	International cooperation, national resolve	Narrative style, diplomatic rhetoric	Rare	High	Medium	Low
Poland MFA	International cooperation, Russian aggression	Strongly official style, general formulations	Frequent	High	High	Low
Radek Sikorski	International cooperation, territorial integrity	Narrative style, diplomatic rhetoric	Frequent	High	High	Low

Table 6.

Results of the Critical discourse analysis of the messages of the EU foreign policy actors and the Weimar triangle foreign ministries in the period from 17 July 2014 to 24 of July 2014

Actor	Prevailing discourses	Language characteristics	Re-tweets of other actors	Level of focus	Interactivity	Level of Vertical Coherence
European External Action Service (EEAS)	Declarative, international cooperation	Strongly official style, general formulations	Frequent	High	Medium	Absent
European Commission	Declarative	Strongly official style	Absent	Medium	Medium	Absent
José Manuel Barroso	Declarative	Strongly official style, general formulations	Absent	Medium	Low	Absent
Auswärtiges Amt (Germany)	International cooperation, european solidarity	Moderately official style with rare emotional observations, moderately specific formulations.	Frequent	High	Medium	High
France Diplomatie	International cooperation	Moderately official style, general formulations	Absent	High	Medium	Low
Laurent Fabius	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poland MFA	International cooperation	Diplomatic rhetoric General formulations	Absent	High	Low	Low
Radek Sikorski	International cooperation, European Solidarity	Diplomatic rhetoric, accusatory style	Very frequent	High	High	Low

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the EU claimed ‘strategic communication’ to be one of the more relevant added priorities in the 2016 EUGS document, the outcome provided by this paper proves that the goal of strategic communication by itself is inadequate. Whatever may be the ultimate aim of this improved strategic coherence concept, it should be emphasized that no matter how deeply the member states will be integrated with the EU institutions, the idea of complete coherence remains a futile and unachievable one (Mayer, 2013). The second caveat - the incapability of reviewing the long term effects of the states stances relating to external PD dissemination - of vertical coherence is somewhat alleviated by the procedure of focusing on three distinct periods within the 2013-2014 Ukraine Crisis.

With this in mind and stating the RQ again (*‘What are the effects of the 2013-2014 Ukraine Crisis on the vertical coherence of the online Public Diplomacy of European actors?’*) the results of this thesis demonstrate an astounding lack in the level of vertical coherence at the European institutional level (the EEAS and EU Commission). The EEAS and the Commission seemingly omit attempts to include or at least mention the most important European actors in the crisis resolution. Iarovyι’s 2014 paper clearly presented the general cohesiveness of the horizontal level coherence at the EU institutions in the context of the Ukraine crisis (Iarovyι, 2014). However, the results demonstrating the clear absence of vertical coherence at the EU institutional level justify the remarks by scholars such as Sakwa (2014) that the EU as an institution often struggles to make itself relevant in devising policies offering solutions to international problems. The three states of the Weimar Triangle take scant effort at including their counterparts in all three periods of the 2013-2014 crisis, but manage to acknowledge them consequently nonetheless. In the cases of the German MFA twitter account during the November-December period and the French MFA account in the February-March period, the accounts do detail their cooperation with EU based institutions on resolving the unfolding crisis at hand. Poland fails to do so consistently. This, together with the fact that in certain instances Sikorski uses a firmly accusatory style, fits with Sakwa’s conclusion that the Polish FP direction did nothing but amplify the crisis at hand, by not committing to a nuanced European response, instead opting for a brazen discourse (Sakwa, 2014).

Most remarkable in this respect is the complete lack of acknowledgment that emanates from the EEAS and EU Commission accounts regarding the efforts of the Weimar Triangle -or for that matter any specific member state - in the negotiations for a successful resolution and termination of the great tensions in between Russia, Ukraine and the EU. Although generally it is expected that the EU and its institutions will be careful in their public communications as its actions are dependent on the willing consent of the member states to in fact formulate their stance, in the case of the Ukraine conflict this doesn't hold. This is true for the simple reason that it was widely accepted that the Weimar Triangle, or at least France and Germany, would take hold of the initiative for defending the European interests (and, to some extent the American interests) in the negotiations and resolution of the issues with Russia and Ukraine (Larson, 2018). In that vein it follows that even spurious remarks or acknowledgements of the EU Commission or the EEAS towards the efforts of the Triangle in the early period of the crisis would have strengthened and reinforced the European resolve to 'speak with one voice' overall. Other fora and platforms of EU (online) PD must be researched further and investigated vigorously in order to come to a clear scholarly consensus on the overall degree of EU vertical coherence in (online) PD during instances of major geopolitical importance. It is recommended that the other forms of coherence as formulated by Mayer (2013), the Narrative and External Engagement coherence, also be subject to further investigation.

As can be seen from the results of the CDA method and the content analysis, different narratives are constructed in order to engage with a wider audience on issues vital to EU member states and the EU itself. In general, a distanced and informative approach is utilized with the intention to inform the reader of the situation within the EU institutions on the one hand and the priorities of the member states on the other. Naturally, states such as Poland, naturally more antagonistic towards Russia (Romer, 2014), express their position in a more unrestrained manner, whilst France and Germany retain a more discreet position in respect to its handling of the crisis, in the context of a continuous need for Ruso-European dialogue and exchange (Sakwa, 2014). With a few exceptions, the interactivity between the accounts and other Twitter users is high, affirming new and innovative pathways for the European project to generate higher levels of both external, strategic, narrative and vertical coherence (Strau et al., 2015). A clear recommendation for future communication of the European actors with third actors, both on individual, organizational and state levels, is to truly capitalize on the great potential of an interactive and dynamic Public Diplomacy as facilitated through Twitter.

Bibliography

- Chad, D. (2012). Market Power Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy* 19(5), 682-699.
- Cooper, R. (2004). *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*. Atlantic Monthly Press.
- Fix, L. (2018). The Different 'Shades' of German Power: Germany and EU Foreign Policy during the Ukraine Conflict. *German Politics* 27(4), 498-515.
- Freyburg, T., Lavenex, S., Schimmelfennig, F., Skripka, T., Wetzel, A. (2015). *Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation : The European Union and its Neighborhood*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gebhard, C. (2017). The Problem of Coherence in the European Union's International Relations. In Hill, C., Smith, M., & Vanhoonacker, S. (Eds.) *International Relations and the European Union* (3rd ed., pp. 123-142). Oxford University Press.
- Harris, B. (2013). Diplomacy 2.0: The Future of Social Media in Nation Branding. *Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy* 4 (1), 17-32.
- Haukkala, H. (2018). 'Crowdfunded Diplomacy'? The EU'S Role in the Triangular Diplomacy Over the Ukraine Crisis. In Birchfield, V., L., & Young, A., R. (Eds.), *Triangular Diplomacy Among the United States, the European Union and the Russian Federation ; Responses to the Crisis in Ukraine* (pp.77-94). Palgrave Macmillan
- Hutton, G., Morrell, S., & Hayes, J. (2018). Democracy and Progressive Modernity in Constructions of Community: Europe, the United States, and the Russian 'Other'. In Birchfield, V., L., & Young, A., R. (Eds.), *Triangular Diplomacy Among the United States, the European Union and the Russian Federation ; Responses to the Crisis in Ukraine* (pp.77-94). Palgrave Macmillan
- Iarovyi, D. (2014). Horizontal Coherence in EU Social Media Diplomacy : The Case of Ukraine. *Informacijos Mokslai* 70(4), 7-24.
- Ikani, N. (2019). Change and Continuity in the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Ukraine Crisis as a Critical Juncture. *Geopolitics* 24(1), 20-50.
- Jorgensen., M. & Phillips, L. (2010). *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. Sage.
- Kenna, M. (2011, July) *Social Media: following EU Public Diplomacy and friending MENA*. European Policy Center (Policy Brief)
- Koehler, K. (2010). *European Foreign Policy after Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an international*

- actor. *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 4(1), 57-72.
- Larson, D. W. (2018). Outsourced Diplomacy: The Obama Administration and the Ukraine Crisis. In Birchfield, V., L., & Young, A., R. (Eds.), *Triangular Diplomacy Among the United States, the European Union and the Russian Federation ; Responses to the Crisis in Ukraine* (pp.55-76). Palgrave Macmillan
- Mayer, H. (2013). The Challenge of Coherence and Consistency in EU Foreign Policy. In Telò, M., Ponjaert, F. (Eds.) *The EU's Foreign Policy ; What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action ?* (pp. 105-117). Ashgate.
- Naumescu, V. & Dungaciu, D. (2015). *The European Union's Eastern Neighbourhood Today*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Nye, J. (2008). Public Diplomacy and soft power. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, 94-109.
- Portela, C., & Raube, K. (2012). The EU Polity and Foreign Policy Coherence. *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 8(1), 3-20.
- Romer, J.C. (2014). The Weimar Triangle and the Ukrainian Crisis. Вестник РУДН, серия Международные отношения (4) 7-12.
- Sakwa, R. (2014). *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*. London ; I.B. Tauris.
- Schoeller, M. G. (2020). Tracing leadership: the ECB's 'whatever it takes' and Germany in the Ukraine crisis. *West European Politics* 43(5) 1095-1116.
- Siddi, M. (2016). German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik? *Europe-Asia Studies* 68 (4), 665-677.
- Smit, O. (2019). *The effects of the Crisis in Ukraine on the European Neighborhood Policy* (Bachelor's Thesis) Leiden Student Repository. Submission ID: 1144505783. Retrieved from <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/77114/Smit%2c%20Olivier-s1681427-BA%20Thesis%20POWE-2019.pdf?sequence=1>
- Smith, N., R. (2014). The EU's Difficulty in Translating Interests into Effective Foreign Policy Action: A Look at the Ukraine Crisis. *Baltic Journal of European Studies* 4(1), 54-68.
- Strau□, N., Kruike-meier, S., van der Meulen, H., van Noort. G. (2015). Digital Diplomacy in GCC countries: Strategic Communication of Western Embassies in Twitter. *Government Information Quarterly* 32(4), 369-379.

Thomas, D. (2012). Still Punching below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European Union Foreign Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50(3), 457-474.

Wagner, W. (2017). Liberal Power Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 55(6), 1398-1414

Wagnsson, C.& Hellman, M. (2018). Normative Power Europe Caving ? EU under pressure or Russian Information Warfare. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(5), 1161-1177.