Universiteit Leiden

The People's Dirty War On Terror:

Analysing the nature of, and explanations for, recent state violence in Xinjiang

Daniela Karumaa

Supervised by Dr. Eelco van der Maat

Word count: 12 512

Thesis submitted by 3.6.2021 as partial requirement for fulfilling the course MA in International Relations: Global Conflict in the Modern Era

Table of Contents

1. **Introduction** **1**

2. **Literature Review** **3**

2.1 On the nature of civil war, genocide, counterinsurgency, and dirty war 3

2.1.1 Civil wars *3*
2.1.2 Genocides *4*
2.1.3 Authoritarian counterinsurgency violence *5*
2.1.4 Dirty wars *6*

2.2 Contrasting Xinjiang with types of mass indiscriminate violence 8

2.3 The People's Dirty War on Terror 9

3. Explaining the dirty war in Xinjiang **11**

4. **Research Design** **15**

4.1 Methodology 15

4.1.1 Variables for between-case comparison *16*
4.1.2 Observable implications and explaining outcomes process-tracing *17*

5. Cases **20**

4.1 Xinjiang, China (2010-) 20

4.2 Argentina (1976-83) 20

4.3 Sri Lanka (1983-2009) 21

4.4 Rakhine, Myanmar (2016-) 22

4.5 Chechnya, Russia (1999-2009) 23

6. Comparing cases and explanations for dirty war in Xinjiang **24**

6.1 Analysing the variables in a between-case comparison 24

6.2 Discussing the results and their implications on explaining Violence in Xinjiang 27

7. Conclusion **32**

Bibliography **35**

1. Introduction

> "Terror is not the same as violence; it is, rather, the form of government that comes into being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate but … remains in full control."
>
> (Arendt, 1970: 242)

In the aftermath of what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deemed a terrorist attack on the Kunming railway station in March 2014, the Chinese domestic security campaign against terrorism and religious extremism was renewed under the striking slogan of 'a People's War on Terror' (Sprick, 2020: 181). Conflict has for long been pervasive in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region[1] of China, but the intensity of the violence has risen in the past two decades, and has recently escalated further. The CCP's planned migrations of Han Chinese[2] into the region, as well as the implementation of discriminatory policies that favour the Han in various sectors have contributed to widespread discontent within the non-Han communities (Israeli, 2010; Purbrick, 2017). Ethnically Turkic Uyghurs, most of whom are Sunni Muslims, have faced hatred and animosity from Han Chinese, resulting in riots, pogroms, and sectarianism throughout Xinjiang. Their existence has been deemed a national security threat, which has resulted in the steady and rapid decline of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang (Odgaard and Galasz Nielsen, 2014; Minority Rights Group Int'l, 2017). It would appear the state has begun an active campaign of repression in Xinjiang against the Uyghurs.

The CCP have consistently justified their actions in Xinjiang through a narrative of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. While it is true that especially the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP, formerly East Turkestan Islamic Movement or ETIM[3]) has posed a terror threat on Beijing and the party-state, the CCP appears to have labelled the entirety of the Uyghur population as terrorists in their campaign to rid China of the 'three evils' of separatism, extremism, and terrorism (Clarke, 2018). In fear of possible ethnic uprisings, government and party officials reinforce a self-defence narrative (Beech, 2014) – even though separatist violence has significantly subsided since 2014 (Zenz and Leibold, 2020). State repression of

[1] Also known to Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities as East-Turkestan. Hereafter referred to as Xinjiang.
[2] The majority ethnic group in China who conforms to Chinese nationality dynamics.
[3] Both considered terrorists organisations in China and internationally.

Uyghurs in Xinjiang has not been explicit to global audiences until recently; news of China's mass detention camps for 'focus persons', or people suspected of unpatriotic acts (Khatchadourian, 2021), first surfaced in 2018. While the state has attempted to disguise their repression as China's own 'war on terror', the repression, violence and military operations against Uyghurs and other non-Han minorities in the region continue despite international uproar. In fact, the CCP's re-invocation of the Strike Hard -campaign in 2014, the passing of a new Chinese counterterrorism law in 2015, and the appointment of Chen Quanguo to Xinjiang Party Secretary in 2016 have all contributed to the intensification of the conflict (Greitens, et al., 2020).

Western governments have taken strong stances in declaring the conflict in Xinjiang a genocide (Lau, 2021; BBC News, 2021), but this categorisation is lacking as the violence occurring in Xinjiang is quite unique. Characterised by widespread secrecy and a denial of state repression, similarities between the violence against Uyghurs and other non-Han minorities in Xinjiang and the dirty wars experienced in Latin America during the height of the Cold War period can be identified. In both cases, underhanded state-induced violence has been cloaked in a façade of legality. The rolling back of Uyghur civil rights while boosting those of the Han population; the creation of a grid-like policing system; the mass-incarceration of Uyghurs into what the state calls 're-education camps'; and the lack of first hand interviews with survivors (Mumford, 2018; Famularo, 2018; Smith Finley, 2019b) all have precedents in the literature on dirty war.

Dirty war is distinct from other types of mass indiscriminate violence, but very little importance has been allocated to expanding the concept beyond the nominal cases. Some have attempted to conceptualise it as tangible and definable, but more modern considerations have eluded the concept, and this is the case especially with regards to Xinjiang. To genuinely understand the ongoing conflict in Xinjiang, examining the nature of the indiscriminate violence occurring there is merely the first step; the underlying causes also require assessment. Thus, the research question this paper asks is: *What is the cause of the type of violence occurring in Xinjiang?* In answering this question, further insights from other cases of dirty war and mass indiscriminate violence will be collated and considered to conduct a thorough analysis of both the nature of and explanations for the violence.

2. Literature review

Both indiscriminate and selective violence are tools with which to exert power (Menge, 2019; Arendt, 1970), but this paper focuses on the intricacies of indiscriminate violence. Violence is indiscriminate when "individuals are targeted solely on the basis of their membership in a group perceived to be connected with the opposition and irrespective of their individual actions", making individual guilt irrelevant (Kalyvas, 2004: 101). Indiscriminate violence can be either 'random' or 'retributive', and indiscriminate violence conducted by the state is rarely random but rather calculated, as the state targets those they perceive to be guilty by association (Souleimanov and Siroky, 2016; Mironova and Whitt, 2020). As a further point, indiscriminate violence often manifests when there is a steep imbalance of power between the regime and those it targets (Kalyvas, 2006); this imbalance is clear in the case of Xinjiang where the CCP is exercising overt power over the civilian population. Therefore it would be wrong to call CCP's violent actions in Xinjiang anything but indiscriminate, but the violence occurring there has yet to be thoroughly analysed in academic literature.

2.1 On the nature of civil war, genocide, counterinsurgency, and dirty war

This paper distinguishes dirty war from more commonly considered forms of mass indiscriminate violence such as genocide, civil war, or authoritarian counterinsurgency violence. All these different types of mass indiscriminate violence sometimes intertwine with each other, but still have characteristics that make them distinct from others; dirty war included. In other words, while dirty wars occur within states, they do not have established belligerents facing one another in organised military combat, so they are not civil wars. Dirty wars may exhibit genocidal features, however they are far more covert and secretive, and do not explicitly make it known what their purpose is. Authoritarian counterinsurgency violence shares similarities with dirty wars in that they may begin in similar ways, but dirty wars persist and even escalate once the insurgent threat has been defeated.

2.1.1 Civil wars

Civil war is often used as a catch-all term for characterising civil conflict, but, alongside all war, its prevalence has waned (Newman, 2009). Kalyvas has defined civil war as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a

common authority at the outset of the hostilities" (2006: 17), and it entails that all belligerents conduct organised military action against each other, and that there exists a de facto territorial division within the country. Furthermore, the Correlates of War (COW) dataset requires civil wars to have at least 1,000 battle deaths – five per cent of which should be inflicted by those who challenge the existing authority – and the active involvement of the national government (Sarkees, 2010). However, civil war is often used too widely to describe a multitude of conflicts (Sambanis, 2004), and many contemporary cases of civil conflict fall outside the definition of civil war. The requirements of organised military action and the involvement of a national government exclude insurgencies and anti-colonial or liberation wars from the classification of civil war. Explanations for civil war can be sought through the greed v. grievance debate that contrasts extrinsic and intrinsic rationalisations: economic gain, or relative deprivation and societal inequalities (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Gurr, 2015 [1970]).

Civil wars and dirty wars coincide in that they occur within states, but they do not share many more similarities. In dirty wars, there is no established opposition to the state; the state merely enacts terror on a portion of its population regardless of whether they promote dissident ideations or not. Dirty wars may erroneously be classified as civil wars by those that fail to question the concept of war as it applies to dirty wars. They are civil conflicts, but the war is merely an illusion.

2.1.2 Genocides

Genocide is, among many others, a contested concept that has endured a multiplicity of attempts to define it, both in legislature and otherwise. Legal definitions, including the one proposed by the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, define it as the result of actions taken to wholly or partly destroy a national, racial, ethnic or religious group through killings, causing bodily and mental harm, preventing births and forcibly transferring children away to other groups and through imposing conditions of a physical destruction of life (UN, 1948). More concretely, however, genocide is "a form of large-scale, group-selective violence" spurred on by a logic of group destruction (Straus, 2015). This implies a degree of selectiveness regarding the target group of genocide, but naturally the violence employed towards a selected group is indiscriminate.

States do not tend to hide their genocidal efforts, and it is often constructed in the open, as was the case of the Holocaust (Bahrampour, 2016) and the Rwandan genocide (Power, 2001).

Territorial dominance, large multi-agency operations, and the involvement of local actors in identifying target populations are necessary for genocides to occur. These characteristics make it unique from other types of mass indiscriminate violence. Genocide is a tool of social transformation that may be utilised as a tactic, a 'final solution' (Valentino, 2004) or perhaps for economic gain (Straus, 2015), which is why answers for why genocides occur often boil down to a synthesis of ideology and strategy. In comparing dirty wars and genocides, the target groups are similarly large and seemingly indiscriminately chosen, but the openness of genocidal practices is not reflected in dirty wars. Dirty wars are built on secrecy and covert intelligence operations that hide the extent of the conflict from both domestic and international audiences. However, Smith and Roberts also suggest politicides such as dirty war, when imbued with an ethnic or religious aspect, may transform into genocide towards the end of the period of violent state repression as it transitions from a concealed to an openly conducted conflict (2008).

2.1.3 Authoritarian counterinsurgency violence

Counterinsurgency operations undertaken by authoritarian states often result in mass violence due to the 'habitual use of coercive measures' by authoritarian regimes (Zhukov, 2007). States engage in counterinsurgency operations against a perceived or existing insurgent threat directed at the state's monopoly on violence or the regime's authority, posed by small and lightly armed bands that practice guerrilla warfare in rural areas (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Though not always the case, mass indiscriminate violence mostly occurs during the 'clearing' phase of authoritarian counterinsurgency that aims to regain control of contested or insurgent-controlled territory (Ucko, 2013). Authoritarian regimes have less concern for employing the 'hearts and minds' tactics than democracies do, and instead often resort to mass indiscriminate violence in their efforts to 'drain the sea' of possible insurgents (Byman, 2016; Valentino, 2014). For as long as winning control of the civilian population remains a key to success, the killing of civilians will likely remain a part of an authoritarian model of counterinsurgency. Authoritarian regimes can face a multitude of problems in their counterinsurgency campaigns, but they still seem to succeed more often than campaigns undertaken by democracies (Byman, 2016). Mass indiscriminate violence seems then intrinsic to the way authoritarian counterinsurgency campaigns utilise intelligence networks, mobilise support, create suitable narratives, and turn profit from their military advantage (Ucko, 2016).

Both authoritarian counterinsurgency campaigns and dirty wars emerge due to an insurgent or sectarian threat perceived as a challenge to the regime. However, in dirty wars, counterinsurgency operations continue even in the absence of an insurgency, and they often escalate after the threat has been eliminated. Additionally, the conception of the enemy widens to concern the group of people from which the insurgents or separatists arose. Intelligence operations in authoritarian counterinsurgency campaigns may be difficult to carry out, which is why regimes resort to draining the sea-methods (Valentino et al, 2004). In dirty wars, the regime can utilise its population control resources to gather HUMINT and SIGINT, making intelligence gathering the crux of dirty war operations. In contrasting dirty wars and counterinsurgency operations, it becomes evident that dirty wars reflect both the criminal justice model and the war model of counterinsurgency: the law is twisted and used strongly in favour of the regime to enable them to act with impunity. In fact, the conjoined relationship between counterinsurgency, dirty wars, and the subsequent escalation of conflicts (Campbell and Connolly, 2003) is apparent in many cases of dirty war, like Sri Lanka (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2010), Argentina (DerGhouhassian and Brumat, 2018) and Northern Ireland (Dickson, 2012; Edwards, 2010).

2.1.4 Dirty wars

The above exploration into the relationship between dirty war and other forms of mass indiscriminate violence has detailed their respective differences and similarities. Consequently, dirty war is a distinct form of mass indiscriminate violence that forms a strategy with which a regime hopes to attain political goals, including an aspect of politicide; the deliberate destruction of political opposition to the regime (Solonick, 2012). Ethnicity, religion, and politics, however, are often intertwined in cases of dirty war. Simply put, dirty war is an intelligence-based campaign waged by a political authority against a portion of its population (Smith and Roberts, 2008). As alluded to, the state creates an 'illusion' of a war it wages largely through intelligence-related, underhanded, and concealed activities in order to combat threats that arise from within the state and are perceived to be, or portrayed as, real (Solonick, 2012).

Smith and Roberts have suggested the following framework for distinguishing the characteristics of dirty war: 1) there is no formal declaration of war, nor clear beginning or end for hostilities; 2) the absence of rule of law leads to the prominence of rule *by* law and other authoritarian methods of imposing restrictions; 3) the civilian population is expressly targeted with distinction made between combatants and non-combatants; and 4) it manifests within

states, not between them (2008: 382). This framework is generic and may fit many forms of indiscriminate violence, which is why further clarifications have been sought from literature and case studies.

Firstly, state-employed paramilitaries and death squads are deployed *in secret* to carry out 'dirty jobs', including torture, kidnappings and targeted assassinations (Aliyev, 2016), a practice that forms the hallmark of dirty war.[4] Covertness is a defining element of dirty war, enabling the regime to direct attention away from itself so it may focus on intelligence gathering: a second corner stone of a campaign of dirty war (Smith and Roberts, 2008). Thirdly, this excessive intelligence network is often complemented by a heavy security presence and an environment of fear implemented in the civilian population by secret police who utilise co-ethnics to control the population (Smith and Roberts, 2008; Bramstedt, 2002 [1945]). Lastly, the subjugation of certain groups is institutionalised through the normalisation of extremely violent acts. This happens either through legislation or "the knowledge of 'terrible secrets'" (Smith and Roberts, 2008: 385): as individuals are placed beyond legal protection, the environment of terror prevents the civilian population from speaking out against the regime for fear of retribution.

Dirty war is an extreme form of countersubversion where illusionary conditions of war that result in mass indiscriminate violence seem to prevail. Any challenge to authority is treated as a threat until it is destroyed in its entirety. In many cases, these political challenges relate to ethnic and religious identity. Based on this clarification and the comparisons between other types of mass indiscriminate violence, a dirty war evolves from an escalated campaign of counterinsurgency, features heavy intelligence-based operations built on methods of authoritarian population control, and develops genocidal characteristics over time. Despite dirty war clearly being a distinct form of mass indiscriminate violence, analysis on the topic has been heavily focused on regurgitating the nominal cases. Identifying dirty war as something that can manifest even in a post-Cold War era is the first step for further scholarly research. Understanding the fact that dirty war is built on secrecy and covertness may explain the scarcity of research on the topic, but simultaneously opens a new dimension for conflict studies.

[4] In Argentina and Chile, the regime was known to use state-employed paramilitaries and death squads to tackle subversion (see McSherry, 2010). Equally in Northern Ireland, paramilitaries worked alongside the military and police forces in oppressing the minority population (see Bruce, 1992). The Spanish government employed the death squad GAL in their dirty war against ETA in the late 1980s (see Whitfield, 2014). Finally, the use of paramilitary organisations in support of the military and police can also be identified in Xinjiang.

2.2 Contrasting Xinjiang with types of mass indiscriminate violence

As has been detailed above, civil wars feature prominent belligerent sides and organised military action that may result in mass indiscriminate violence, as seen in the first Chechen war (Souleimanov and Siroky, 2016). Considering that the conflict in Xinjiang is domestic, it leads us to question if it would be correct to classify Xinjiang as the fighting grounds of a civil war. Alas, this is problematic because the party-state does not face military resistance to their actions in Xinjiang. Even in the early 2000s and 2010s, the resistance was minimal and mostly consisted of singular, unorganised acts of terrorism claimed by ETIM or the TIP (Greitens et al., 2020). The death toll is unconfirmed, and tracking deaths is difficult and unproductive due to heavy state censorship. State violence in Xinjiang therefore does not indicate civil war violence.

The discussion on ethnoreligious conflict in Western media and literature has highlighted the case of Xinjiang as state repression turned genocide (see Stavrou, 2019; Smith Finley, 2020; Corr, 2019; Zenz, 2020), and some have referred to it distinctly as cultural genocide (Roberts, 2021; The Washington Post, 2020). However, there are nuances to the violence in Xinjiang that are not explained by genocide. CCP actions in Xinjiang have not been openly constructed, and first-hand experience is hard to gather as the state carries out a concealed campaign. This indicates a more covert nature of violence and repression that should not be dismissed by attaching an overarching label such as genocide on it. However, if we consider the development of a dirty war as proposed above, it may acquire genocidal features if and when the illusion of war breaks.

Contrary to international outcry, early Chinese narratives have centred on the CCP carrying out a counterterrorism and -insurgency campaign against the perpetrators of the 'three evils' domestically (Purbrick, 2017). Authoritarian counterinsurgency tools include state repression, intelligence operations, population transfer and potential ethnic cleansing (Byman, 2016) – all of which can be identified in Xinjiang. Repression and intelligence operations are of course ubiquitous; the transport of millions of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities in concentration camps constitutes a population transfer; and ethnic cleansing is reflected in forced sterilisations and mass sexual abuse (Zenz, 2020; BBC News, 2020, Hill, et al., 2021). Torture, disappearances, and indefinite detention are also common practices during an authoritarian

regime's counterinsurgency campaign (Byman, 2016), and all are present in Xinjiang. It is notable that many of these practices and characteristics have also been identified by Smith and Roberts (2008) to be distinct markers of dirty war.

Can a counterinsurgency campaign exist without an insurgency? The disordered violence committed by Uyghur separatists is a far cry from the structured guerrilla violence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The Tamil movement's demands for justice began with street action that eventually developed into an insurgency (Marks, 2019), but it could be argued that Uyghur separatist violence remained on the streets. While some are convinced of the existence of a sustained indigenous insurgency campaign in Xinjiang (Wayne, 2012), it is nearly impossible to convincingly track separatist groups in China because of strict media control and the scarcity of reporters willing to dig past government statements. In reality, the violence in Xinjiang has been far from organised, and despite common narratives, Xinjiang separatists have not formed deep alliances with al-Qaeda or other Islamist terrorists (Potter, 2013). It would appear as though the government has inflated the threat or created an illusion of it to justify their actions (Esberg, 2018).

The state's campaign of indiscriminate violence in Xinjiang cannot be explained by categorising the conflict as a civil war. Similarly, calling the type of violence in Xinjiang a genocide conceals more than it reveals. Counterinsurgency arguments are rebutted by the fact that the frequency of incidents committed by Uyghur separatists have decreased significantly since 2016 (Zhang in ACCORD, 2016), and there have been few notable attacks since 2014 (Zenz and Leibold, 2020). Instead, this paper proposes that what began as an authoritarian counterinsurgency campaign has now developed into a campaign of mass indiscriminate violence on the Uyghur population, resulting in a 'dirty war'.

2.3 The People's Dirty War on Terror

Since the 2014 proclamation of the 'People's War on Terror', China has steered towards dirty war in their efforts to quell separatist sympathies (see Boehm, 2009; Van Wie Davis, 2008). This is evident in China's use of paramilitary forces (Greitens et al., 2020; Famularo, 2018), the grid-style policing (Roberts, 2018), forced disappearances (Smith Finley, 2019a; 2019b), and the enforced silence and surveillance of Uyghurs and other minority groups (Roberts, 2018). Drawing from the above examination into the nature of dirty wars, the case of Xinjiang

can also be identified as having evolved from authoritarian counterinsurgency (whether it was justified or not) into what the international arena has identified as a genocide.

Comparing the framework proposed by Smith and Roberts and case observations from Xinjiang, it becomes evident that this war on terror has indiscriminately been directed at an entire population, rather than an organisation (Shepherd, 2020). New national security and terrorism laws concerning Xinjiang have legitimised "the abuse of power by state", by using legislation as a tool of control (Teng in Famularo, 2018: 69). No clear beginning for the hostilities can be determined as they have developed over time and are still ongoing. Furthermore, no distinctions have been made between separatists and civilians, and indeed the conflict has not spilled over onto other states, though it may have international ramifications (Smith Finley, 2019a; Greitens et al., 2020).

Despite the above inferences, scholars have not yet utilised the dirty war framework for understanding the conflict in Xinjiang. This is reasonable; not only is dirty war often associated within a specific context, but as a concept it can also be quite murky. The above analysis into the nature of dirty war is clear in identifying it as separate from civil wars, genocides, and authoritarian counterinsurgency violence, but still sharing some similarities as all these forms do. Analysing the violence in Xinjiang and subsequent explanations for it could bring about further insights into the conflict, and could contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the many forms indiscriminate violence a state can take.

3. Explaining the dirty war in Xinjiang

Scholars have identified several causes for indiscriminate violence: the centralisation of power in authoritarianism (Rummel, 1995); the state's ideological fervour (Weitz, 2003); and the impact of inter- and intrastate wars (Melson, 1996). These explanations may also explain dirty war. Inferences drawn from the dirty wars discussed in this paper suggest that threats to economic and strategic resources and strongholds may lead to a form of economically motivated combat that results in mass indiscriminate violence (Osiel, 2001).

Firstly, political change, especially transitions in regime type, can lead to indiscriminate violence because it helps the regime establish, or retain, their role as the protector of the nation, and allows them to secure their interests (Wilson, 2019). As part of the centralisation of power in authoritarian regimes, the threat of a coup or political change is ever present[5] (Rummel, 1995; see also Svolik, 2012 on problems of authoritarian control and power-sharing). These threats may motivate the regime to engage in mass murder and even ethnic cleansing against any opposition or outgroup that might challenge their authority. The Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) has sensed their position weaken in Rakhine, and they have activated a campaign of genocide against the Rohingya who they blame for their weakened position (Wilson, 2019, Alam, 2021). Even before the military coup of February 2021, the Tatmadaw have been de facto leaders of Myanmar, and have spearheaded the efforts against the stateless Rohingya to strengthen their border region (Alam, 2021).

Militaries with authoritative capacity (Rummel, 1995) may thus be the ones to lead violent and even genocidal efforts in cases of ethnic conflict to protect their status and interests (Wilson, 2019). In dirty wars, institutionalised repression is conducted by the military under direct command of the regime, military or otherwise. If the state in question is not a military regime, militaries may be granted special powers (like in Northern Ireland, see Blackbourn, 2015) to ensure that they remain in full control of operations. Furthermore, seeing as dirty war occurs

[5] When authoritarian regimes perceive a threat, they may rationalise their actions based on that perceived threat. Regimes face a "justification dilemma": they claim to manage a threat against the state, but the level of threat is not high enough to warrant a continuation of rule. Therefore, they carry out violence to prove the presence of a threat (Esberg, 2018). The theory of the two demons (*teoría de los dos demonios*) surfaces: Argentine military rationalised that state terrorism against leftist guerrillas in Argentina was perceived to be the lesser evil in comparison to supposed guerrilla-violence (Martín, 2012). While it is a straw man-argument, similar sentiments of moral ambiguity can be found in all cases of state indiscriminate violence that are prefaced with a struggle against subversion.

to combat a perceived national security threat, and involves a political dissonance between the target group and the regime's ideology, the fear of political change may be used as justification for creating an illusion of war.[6] The CCP have used this tactic of justifying their violence and repression through a narrative of curbing sectarianism and political Islam confused with terrorism (Purbrick, 2017). These rationalisations make this explanation plausible, but it is worth noting some dirty wars also occur under consolidated regimes where there is little threat of political change since the political opposition does not have enough power or popular support to convincingly challenge the regime. Thus, the illusion of such a threat is created to justify any actions the regime takes, and therefore this explanation may not contribute to understanding all dirty wars.

Secondly, indiscriminate violence can occur when the regime acts in ideological fervour against growing opposition (Weitz, 2003), wishing to preserve the status quo or strengthen a specific notion of national identity (Marks, 2019). Tied in with ethnic or religious identity, these nationality dynamics result in acts of mass ethnic violence on part of the state, which can clearly be seen in the Sri Lankan conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. In Sri Lanka, the division between the ethnic groups grew as the Sinhala-majority government began to oppress Tamils through legislation, leading to improved standards of living and more opportunities for the Sinhalese. Wanting to preserve their privileged societal status, the Sinhala elites entered a cycle of violence and repression against the insurgent LTTE and later all Tamils (DeVotta, 2000). Other dirty wars can also exhibit similar ideological tendencies since politicides are also built on political ideological fervour. The ethnonationalist element of ideological fervour especially works to explain cases that feature politics intertwined with both religion and ethnicity, which is why it can ring true in the case of Xinjiang where Islam and Uyghurs have been securitised. However, it does not explain dirty war in Argentina or Chile where the conflicts much more overtly reflect Cold War dynamics and a division of political ideology.

Thirdly, international and civil war can be linked to outbreaks of mass indiscriminate violence perpetrated by the state (Melson, 1996). Similarly to a coup threat, the threat of war or a

[6] Spurred on by the United States, the military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina felt threatened by communism (see Esparza et al., 2010). In Northern Ireland, the conflict was built on a religious divide that saw Catholics in Northern Ireland vying for a united Ireland, and Loyalists and Unionists supporting Westminster (see Tonge, 2013[1998]). In both cases, there was a chance of large scale political change, and even regime transition (dictatorship to democracy, and monarchy to democracy).

perception thereof can be enough to push an authoritarian regime towards violence, and a regime may aim to create conditions that are favourable for them to act in (Ibid, 1996). The regime can seize the opportunity against dissident groups as a preventative measure to stop the state from sliding into war. Similarly, the Russian government acted pre-emptively against the Chechen Wahhabi insurgents in the second Chechen war who were attempting to instigate nationalist rebellions in the regions surrounding Chechnya. Russia adopted a text-book authoritarian counterinsurgency operation to ensure the insurgents would not have the means nor the public support to wage a credible campaign (Lyall, 2009).

The threat of international or civil wars may also be used to explain dirty wars specifically, since in the case of Chile, dirty war was instigated allegedly as a preventative measure to stop the country from sliding into civil war (Ortiz de Zárate, 2003). Similarly in the case of China, the CCP are attributing their dirty war within the wider global war on terror, originating from outside Chinese borders but allegedly encouraging anti-Chinese ideations within the Islamic communities of Xinjiang (Mumford, 2018). While this may be a plausible reason for dirty war to begin, it is unlikely that the threat of a civil or international war can thoroughly explain the occurrence of dirty wars specifically. 'War' in dirty war is an illusion, and does not require an actual threat of war to manifest – an act of securitisation by the regime that paints the outgroup as a national security threat is sufficient. Therefore, even though the CCP have been quick to hop on the bandwagon of the global war on terror, which can be problematised through analysing the nature of war and warfare, the allegations of masses of Uyghur separatists being trained by al-Qaeda are exaggerated at best. There is a difference between the actual threat of an international or civil war, and the perceived or alleged threat of such, which may be tackled if one considers whether the target group of dirty war posed an organised military threat prior to outbreak as per the requirements of civil wars.

Finally, looking directly at cases of dirty war including China and Argentina, it is suggested regimes may use state terror and mass indiscriminate violence as "an economic policy instrument" to counter a domestic threat to their national interests (Buchanan in Osiel, 2001: 121). The perception of a heightened threat to a region that the regime is economically and strategically reliant on can justify engaging in economically motivated combat (Osiel, 2001), something Pion-Berlin (1989) also characterises as intrinsic to the Argentine dirty war. In Argentina, the mass disappearances and extra-judicial killings and torture were ultimately designed to enable the implementation of economic policies that served the regime and their

interests (Osiel, 2001). The CCP's use of mass indiscriminate violence in Xinjiang may be explained in a similar way: not only is China reliant on Xinjiang's natural resources and (forced) organised labour, but Central Asia is key in advancing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), further economic goals, and a 'westward opening-up' (Greitens et al., 2020; Clarke, 2018). Beijing's actions in Xinjiang are attempts to stabilise a region that is both economically and strategically too important to lose control of while also advancing their ideological narratives. This conjoined relationship between economics, politics, a strong state capacity for population control measures, and identity-based state ideology seems like the most plausible explanation for dirty war, especially in Xinjiang.

4. Research Design

To reiterate, the research question this paper attempts to answer is: *What is the cause of the type of violence happening in Xinjiang?* In essence, it consists of two issues: 1) what is the type of violence in Xinjiang? and 2) what is the explanation for that violence? The answer to the first question has been provided in the literature review, concluding that the violence in Xinjiang is indeed dirty war. Therefore, the paper attempts to generate both generalisable and case-specific explanations (for Xinjiang) regarding the nature of dirty war and why states engage in it. Four rival explanations emerge from the literature available and the author's own case-observations: 1) militaries wanting to retain or secure their authoritative position may engage in mass indiscriminate violence; 2) states acting in ideological fervour and hoping to preserve the status quo in favour of the in-group may engage in mass indiscriminate violence; 3) the regime acting against the outgroup to prevent (perceived) international or civil war may engage in mass indiscriminate violence; and 4) regimes wanting to counter a domestic threat to their economic and strategic interests may engage in mass indiscriminate violence.

The cases have been chosen across continents from varying points in time to enable generalisation and to move beyond a framework heavily influenced by regional circumstances or a temporal phenomenon. The cases that will be considered alongside that of Xinjiang are the Argentine military dictatorship between 1976-1983, the Sri Lankan civil war that began in 1983 and ended in 2009, the second Chechen war that spanned from 1999 to 2009, and the Rohingya genocide in Rakhine, Myanmar ongoing since 2016.

4.1 Methodology

To support the hypothesis that the conflict in Xinjiang is indeed a dirty war, and to distinguish which of these rival explanations for the conflict holds weight, the paper compares Xinjiang with two other conflicts in which the outcome has been a dirty war (Argentina and Sri Lanka) alongside one in which it has been a genocide (Rakhine) and one that can be characterised as a civil war/authoritarian counterinsurgency violence (Chechnya). Since including negative cases among the positive will increase the validity of research granted the elements analysed are constant across all cases, the cases of Myanmar and Chechnya will function as control cases (Zartman, 2005). In all five conflicts, the state has conducted mass indiscriminate violence

against a portion of its own population. However, they also represent different manifestations of state-executed mass indiscriminate violence, and analysing the differences and similarities is valuable for understanding the nature of violence.

To create generalisable observations about the nature and explanations for the causes of dirty war, the paper undertakes a tentative small-N case study built on between-case comparison. All cases considered in this paper comprise of unique conditions that will be detailed below. The analysis hopes to pinpoint a determining variable shared by the cases of dirty war and absent in those that reflect other types of mass indiscriminate violence. Afterwards, to create further case-specific explanations for the violence, the paper utilises the findings of the between-case comparison to consider the relevance of the plausible rival explanations concerning the case of Xinjiang.

4.1.1 Variables for between-case comparison

Large-scale military repression

The more authoritarian a regime is, the more inclined they are to engage in mass violence against civilians (Rummel, 1995; Davenport, 2007), and military regimes are much more likely to engage in such violence than other types of authoritarian regimes (Geddes et al., 2014). This does not mean, however, that state repression in other types of authoritarian regimes cannot be largely conducted by the military. However, to produce results that are not too generic, the variable requires militaries be the primary instigators and conductors of violence and repression. If such large-scale military repression can be identified in a case, it will be attributed a 1, and a 0 in all other cases.

Legislative repression

This variable depicts state legislation that is passed to substantially weaken an outgroup's position in society through institutionalising repression. It renders the outgroup beyond the protection of the law. These outgroups are often formed due to clear state ideology that purports a certain ethnicity or religion over others, and so legislative repression may occur in identity-based conflicts that are driven by issues of ethnic and religious identity (Licklider, 1995). Based on the literature, cases where legislative repression can be identified will be attributed a 1 for legislative repression. Otherwise, the variable will be attributed a 0.

Threat of civil war

As detailed above, the threat of civil or international war is a plausible explanation for why conflicts happen. Especially of importance for this paper is the threat of civil war or other large-scale domestic conflict that may lead to the regime taking preventative actions. These actions may consist of mass indiscriminate violence and can be framed as a counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign to justify unproportionate violence. The cases will be attributed a 1 if it is apparent in the literature that the threat of domestic conflict led to the instigation of violence, and a 0 if not.

Distinct intelligence apparatus

Intelligence is the backbone of both counterinsurgency and dirty war, especially for the latter. A distinct intelligence network here refers to one that is unmistakably more far-reaching than what a successful counterinsurgency campaign traditionally requires. The regime purports an increased security presence in the conflict area, the combined use of HUMINT and SIGINT for repression, and using co-ethnics for information and policing purposes. If such a significant intelligence network can be distinguished, the case will be given a 1 for the variable. If not, it will be given a 0.

4.1.2 Observable implications and explaining outcomes process-tracing

An additional explaining outcomes process-tracing will establish what rival explanation(s) fit best in the case of the dirty war in Xinjiang, and it will give further case-specific insights on how a potential common independent variable may be related to that outcome (Bennett and Elman, 2007). The explaining outcomes process-tracing aims to establish a minimally sufficient explanation for violence in Xinjiang through a qualitative analysis of the observable implications that can be drawn from the possible explanations for mass indiscriminate violence and dirty war. For 1) militaries that want to retain their strong position, observable implications include either real political change and/or regime transitions or a threat thereof. Also present are the state's economic and strategic interests that are seemingly threatened by the existence of the outgroup. For 2) states that act in ideological fervour and are hoping to preserve the in-group's dominance, observable implications are growing ideological or ethnic divisions within society, a disproportionate expansion of the dominant group's rule, and otherwise strong nationality dynamics. In the case of 3) the regime acting against an outgroup to prevent a slide into international or civil war, the threat of war and societal divisions are observable implications. The blame for any violence or instigation of such is also attributed to an outgroup.

Lastly, for 4) the regime wanting to counter a domestic threat to their economic and strategic interests through economically motivated combat, observable implications include clear strategic and economic goals that are the focus of their national security doctrine. The doctrine enables the securitisation of economic and strategic interests, and regional resources the state is reliant on. Furthermore, engaging in combat requires a vast security and intelligence operation in the region to avoid infrastructural damage or damage that would otherwise hinder regional economic/development plans. Figure 1 provides a more thorough overview of observable implications.

Figure 1: Rival explanations for mass indiscriminate violence and their observable implications

Rival explanations	Observable implications
Militaries want to retain or secure their position in the face of opposition	- Strong military presence - Threat of political change - Economic and strategic interests - Outgroup that challenges authority
States act in ideological fervour, hoping to preserve the status quo in favour of the in-group	- Legislative repression - Disproportionate expansion of dominant group's rule - Strong nationality dynamics
Regime act against the outgroup to prevent international or civil war	- Threat of war, domestic or international - Societal discord - Blame attributed to outgroup
Regimes act to counter a domestic threat to their economic and strategic interests	- State reliance on regional resources - Economic and development plans - Detailed national security doctrine - Intelligence apparatus

As a within-case research method, explaining outcomes process tracing normally leads to case-specific conclusions that cannot be generalised (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). However, through also conducting a between-cases comparison the paper hopes to potentially reach conclusions that can be generalised between Xinjiang and other cases, echoing a positivist standpoint for research in international relations. Primary sources and first-hand data is largely unavailable

either because it is not publicly available or because there is a language barrier that the author cannot cross, and so the research will rely on secondary sources. As the research is qualitative in nature, observations will be made using readily available material, including newspaper articles, transcribed interviews, translated government statements and documents, and academic literature.

5. Cases

5.1. Xinjiang, China (2010-)

Since the 1990s, China has actively encouraged mass migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang to supersede the Uyghur population (Ucko, 2016). This has pitted the Uyghurs of Xinjiang against the majority irreligious or Buddhist Han Chinese, which has contributed further to the steadily increasing religious repression of Uyghurs: practicing Islam in any shape or form has effectively been made illegal in Xinjiang (Smith Finley, 2019b). The Uyghurs do not constitute the only victims; other Turkic minorities in the region are also targeted. No clear start to the conflict can be distinguished, but an escalation into a dirty war can be identified since the early 2010s, when the government's repression of religious everyday activities began to result in state violence against Uyghurs, which led to retaliations from Uyghur communities (Ibid, 2019b). The CCP's conception of Uyghur separatism and Islamist extremism as two sides of the same coin (Mumford, 2018), may have encouraged ETIM (later TIP) to act.

ETIM's separatist efforts ultimately fell short of gaining public support, and state repression grew. This led to the establishment of 're-education' or concentration camps that function as mass political indoctrination centres, which have since become the destination for millions of Uyghurs for various different reasons that are perceived to portray extremism (Greitens et al, 2020; Smith Finley, 2019a). The number of detainees has rapidly arisen due to arrest quotas placed on police units in each city in the efforts to curb extremism and any dangerous religious influence (Famularo, 2018). State organised violence in the cities in Xinjiang has diminished, largely because there is no one to direct that violence at but also because the environment of terror controls the population. The Chinese 2015 Terrorism Law and the 2017 national security doctrine are clearly tied to the 'ideological turn' that has led to both the appointment of Chen Quanguo and the dehumanising of Uyghurs (Smith Finley, 2019a; 2019b). Furthermore, nationality dynamics in the protection of economic/strategic interests in China are emphasised.

5.2 Argentina (1976-83)

The Argentine dirty war was set in motion in March 1976, when General Jorge Rafael Videla rose to power in a palace coup. The coup was facilitated by a power vacuum that arose in the aftermath of the death of Argentine president Juan Perón in 1974 and created social unrest and

uncertainty in Argentina. Beginning the National Reorganisation Process, the regime seized all power over Argentina until "all the country's problems had been 'put right'" (Rouquie, 1983:575), entailing that the regime would decide when to transfer power to a civilian government.

Supported by the United States, the Argentine junta launched Operation Condor, an anti-subversion campaign that formed the basis of a larger continental counterinsurgency regime (McSherry, 2010). It soon escalated into widespread state terror towards the political left-wing, which included Peronist movements and the insurgent group Montoneros, as well as their supporters, sympathisers and potential sympathisers (Smith and Roberts, 2008). Operation Condor was a highly secretive intelligence system built on extra-legal operations that reflected an intent to destroy all political opposition (McSherry, 2010). Torture, disappearances, killings, and concentration camps were common, but the environment of fear and terror meant few people truly knew the extent of the repression and violence or were too afraid to speak out. For this reason, the Argentine dirty war became known as the "quiet war" (Smith and Roberts, 2008). Even though the junta had defeated all guerrilla combat forces by the end of 1976, the repression continued. Some argue there was a clear economic motive: the disappearances and repression facilitated the implementation of economic policy that only served international capital and the rural oligarchy (Osiel, 2001).

5.3 Sri Lanka (1983-2009)

The conflict in Sri Lanka emerged out of a violent tradition of political instability (Selvadurai and Smith, 2013). Ethnic divisions in Sri Lanka were so deeply entrenched they seeped into every aspect of life, widening societal cleavages between the Tamil and Sinhala populations. The origins of the conflict reach as far back as the 1950s when the majority Sinhalese politicians embraced 'ethnic outbidding', or the "auction-like process wherein politicians create programmes to 'outbid' their opponents on the anti-minority stance adopted" (DeVotta, 2005: 141). This ethnic outbidding stemmed from the Sinhala majority group's desire to acquire and maintain power within the newly independent Sri Lankan society.

The passing of ethnocentric legislation strengthened Sinhala ethnonationalism and in turn worsened the Tamils' social standing. Societal divisions and state repression grew and anti-Tamil riots became common, and by 1983 the LTTE had hijacked the Tamil separatist

movement and started waging an insurgency campaign that terrorised Sri Lanka. As militant action increased, "[s]tate forces responded to the LTTE challenge with indiscriminate use of force, disappearances and torture" (Selvadurai and Smith, 2013: 554), thus instigating the dirty war. The state's use of death squads became common practice, and the LTTE retaliated by establishing a covert warfare unit, Black Tigers, who popularised suicide bombings (Ibid, 2013). The illusion of war the Sinhala government purported became reality, and the resulting dirty war was fuelled by an escalation dynamic between the state and the Tamils.

5.4 Rakhine, Myanmar (2016-)

A confrontation between Rohingya Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine broke out in 2012 due to increased Buddhist nationalism and tensions between the religious groups (Mojahan, 2018; Kipgen, 2014). Myanmar does not constitute the Rohingya as citizens, but instead as 'Bengali' immigrants; foreign invaders on Myanmar's land (Washaly, 2019). A state-sponsored campaign of violence against the stateless Rohingya began in 2016 fuelled by populist hatred (Siddiquee, 2019), eventually morphing into the genocidal campaign it is known as today (Mojahan, 2018). Rohingya separatist attacks against the state perpetrated by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) were met with the full onslaught of the Tatmadaw, but it was unleashed on the Rohingya, not just the separatists (Wilson, 2019). This led to hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims to flee Rakhine to Bangladesh and elsewhere (BBC, 2020). Further clashes with the state and the Arakan Army (AA) in 2018 have led to more strife in the region (Morada, 2020).

The Myanmar government argues there is no truth to the genocide claims, but their goal of eradicating the Rohingya population in Rakhine, and their efforts to do so, are obvious (Wilson, 2019). Both the military and the civilian government before the coup of February 2021 have described their actions as a crackdown on Islamist terrorism (Beech, 2018), which is eerily reminiscent of the narratives in China. However, while the conflict may be characterised by ethno-religious divisions, there are also geostrategic dimensions to it: the land on which the Rohingya reside is important for strengthening the border region between Myanmar and Bangladesh (Alam, 2021). While there have not been massive undertakings by the Tatmadaw against the Rohingya since 2018, the conflict is ongoing and resolution seems far away. The 600,000 Rohingya still living in Myanmar are now faced with an even more dire situation, as

the recent military coup may have removed any remaining governmental inhibitions (Westerman, 2021).

5.5 Chechnya, Russia (1999-2009)

While a Chechen nationalist sentiment fuelled the first Chechen war against a Russian imperialist threat, an Islamist discourse characterised the second war (Oten, 2020). Chechnya underwent a phase of radicalisation in the interwar period (Ibid, 2020), and a strong conservative and fundamentalist Wahhabi faction grew out of the trauma and loss the Chechens had endured at the hands of the Russians (von Kumberg, 2020). In August 1999, the Wahhabi-leader Shamil Basayev led Wahhabi radicals to invade the Republic of Dagestan, which was part of the Russian Federation. While the invasion did not last long, they had effectively invaded Russia, which is why Russia began combat operations in Chechnya a month later. The Wahhabi-dimensions and the radical incursion to Dagestan enabled Russia to label their efforts as part of the global war on terror.

The Second Chechen War became a brutal counterinsurgency operation exaggerated by a Russian counterterrorism strategy that turned Chechnya into a wasteland through the indiscriminate bombing and shelling of civilians and insurgents alike ((Kim and Blank, 2013; HRW, 2000). Russia focused on winning the hearts and minds of the Russian people rather than the Chechens, and perceived the threat to Russia's power and authority to be originating from outside Russian borders but manifesting within them (von Kumberg, 2020). This perfectly demonstrates the authoritarian counterinsurgency practices Russia employed, even though they were not fully authoritarian at the time. The insurgency has its origins in political struggle but due to the pervasiveness of radical Islam, religion and ethnicity have become the drivers of the insurgency, spreading it throughout North Caucasus (Kim and Blank, 2013).

6. Comparing cases and explaining dirty war in Xinjiang

6.1 Analysing the variables in a between-case comparison

The variables detailed above have been compiled in Figure 2 with the cases and their respective values regarding each variable.

Figure 2: Cases and the occurrence of large-scale military repression, legislative repression, a distinct intelligence apparatus and the threat of civil war (variables 2-5)

	Xinjiang (China)	**Argentina**	**Sri Lanka**	**Rakhine** (Myanmar)	**Chechnya** (Russia)
Large-scale military repression	0	0	1	1	1
Legislative repression	1	0	1	0	0
Threat of civil war	0	0	0	0	1
Intelligence apparatus	1	1	0	0	0

The first variable aims to clarify whether large-scale military repression might contribute to the occurrence of dirty wars. Like explained above, this variable implies the military is the primary instigator and conductor of repressive violence or dirty war. Two out of three cases of dirty war, Xinjiang and Argentina, have been coded as not having this type of large-scale military repression, despite Argentina being a military regime. Dirty wars often utilise various actors to actively repress a portion of the state's population, and military is simply one of these actors. Often the secrecy and covertness of dirty wars requires using secret police, paramilitaries, death squads or other types of non-state actors to keep repression behind a façade of legality that may be upheld by the military.

In China, the repression is primarily conducted by the People's Liberation Army, a state-employed paramilitary force, and the police force composed of both Han Chinese and those

that represent the target group to create an environment where Uyghurs police over other Uyghurs (Zenz and Leibold, 2020). In Argentina, the repression was orchestrated by the secret police force Intelligence Battalion 601, state-employed deaths squads, and paramilitaries, making the military merely the public arm of the regime (Scharpf and Gläßel, 2020). In the case of Sri Lanka, however, militaries had a much larger role; the conflict involved not only the Sri Lankan state military but also the Indian military (Marks, 2019). While the Sri Lankan regime also employed death squads, their impact was lesser when compared to China and Argentina's institutionalised repression and disappearances. Therefore, while Sri Lanka has been categorised as dirty war, the conditions for the violence are different to China and Argentina. The first variable does not sufficiently explain the occurrence of dirty war, but it could explain the onset of genocide as proposed by Wilson in the case of Myanmar, and naturally plays an extensive role in authoritarian counterinsurgency operations; the Russian operation in Chechnya has levelled entire cities.

Legislative repression, the second variable, can be identified in Xinjiang and Sri Lanka, explained through the fact that it strengthens ethnocentric ideologies. Furthermore, it reflects a profound degree of institutionalisation and organisation of repression within society that is imbued into political decision-making. In cases where regimes act in ideological fervour, their actions and ideations are heavily tied in with the duality or multiplicity of ethnicities and religions in their society. Scholars agree a strong state ideology that strives to sculpt society through a common identity can increase how much state repression is exercised by the state security apparatus (Scharpf, 2018; Holquist, 2003). Thus, legislative repression can be practiced to keep power within the majority or dominant group, and it targets other ethnicities and religions possibly because they are expressions of identity that can easily be identified.

Therefore it is not surprising that while Argentina is also considered a dirty war, there is no legislative repression in Argentina as far as can be derived from the literature. To explain this, we need to consider the definition of an identity conflict as something built on ethnic and/or religious identity (Licklider, 1995). Although the doctrine of the Argentine junta was dictated by a deeply ingrained Catholic nationalism, the anti-subversion campaign was directed towards left-wing guerrilla groups who opposed the right-wing economic policies of the military (Osiel, 2001). While it is relatively easy to target these groups extra-judiciously, it is difficult on the state level to enact legislation that would target specific political groups when all civilian political representation is excluded. The absence of legislative repression directed towards a

specific group does not therefore mean there is no dirty war, but it certainly is prevalent in them. The absence of legislative repression is also present in Rakhine and Chechnya despite Myanmar and Russia's high command over legislative institutions as military and single-party regimes, respectively. There, it would seem the mass indiscriminate violence and repression is not institutionalised, unlike in dirty wars.

As for the third variable, the threat of civil war, it only appears present in the 1999-2009 conflict in Chechnya. The threat of civil war on Russian soil can have attributed to the deployment of troops to Chechnya in response to the brief invasion of Dagestan by radical Islamist insurgents. While the Chechen Wahhabi troops were not necessarily an organised military, tensions between Chechnya and Russia had been rising since the first Chechen war, which can also have attributed to the threat's probability. However, in understanding why the threat of civil war is less prevalent in the other cases chosen for this study, it is worthwhile to mention that both dirty wars and genocides often involve a significant power imbalance. There are rarely two opposing belligerent sides, as the regime is overpowering and actively seeks to decimate the insurgents. For example in Rakhine, the impact of insurgent groups has been minor, as they are poorly organised and state terror has drained them of a support base (Ware and Laoutides, 2018). Furthermore, while dirty wars by name might suggest such a threat, it has been thoroughly discussed that the 'wars' are merely illusions created by the regime to justify their actions. There is often not a credible enough threat against the regime it would fulfil the requirements for even a budding civil war; organised military challengers to the regime do not exist in dirty wars. Therefore, while the regime may present dirty war as a measure to prevent the onset of war by the outgroup, dirty wars do not require a credible threat of civil war and thus this variable cannot explain dirty wars.

Lastly, an extensive intelligence apparatus that is built by the regime to support their repressive campaign and seeks to preserve infrastructure is clear in the cases of Xinjiang and Argentina, but once again absent in Sri Lanka, Rakhine, and Chechnya. As argued above, this intelligence network facilitates the regime's engagement in economically motivated combat as it relates to the national security doctrine. A well-constructed and well-managed intelligence apparatus prevents the destruction of the region and its infrastructure, as it focuses instead on removing those that are a hindrance to economic and strategic plans. On the one hand, though the ideology behind the national security doctrines in Argentina and China differ, the sentiment remains the same: Argentine socialists were a disease within the nation that threatened to

obstruct the implementation of economic and development directives the junta were planning for their profit (Feitlowitz, 1998; Pion-Berlin, 1989); Uyghurs in Xinjiang are viewed as an extremist cancer that threatens China's gas and coal reserves, cotton production, and their plans regarding the BRI (Boehm, 2009; Greitens et al., 2020). Economic policies are of great importance both in Argentina and in China when considering their assault on the target groups, and it would explain the onset of the dirty wars, since economically motivated combat does not allow for the destruction of that infrastructure that enables economic gain.

On the other hand, in Sri Lanka, the conflict's length, the prominence of the LTTE and other militant groups, and the failed intelligence operations all resulted in the regime's heavily armed dirty war approach (Selvadurai and Smith, 2013). HUMINT and SIGINT operations were common, but an environment of terror was arguably the result of both the state and militant forces clashing, and not necessarily of the secrecy that engulfs dirty wars as according to Smith and Roberts. In that way, the conflict simultaneously bore characteristics of dirty war, authoritarian counterinsurgency violence, and civil war. Based on a brief analysis of the literature, there were no discernible economic motivations behind the Sri Lankan state's repression, only ethnonationalist ideology. Similarly, the cases of Rakhine and Chechnya show a more direct approach to battling the enemy; the Tatmadaw have undertaken heavy armed assaults on the Rohingya that have also affected Rakhine Buddhist communities (Gorvett, 2019), and the indiscriminate bombings and shelling of Chechens in their attempts to drain the sea of insurgents levelled entire towns (HRW, 2000). In these cases, it could be argued intelligence operations either failed or were not as important.

6.2 Discussing the results and their implications on explaining violence in Xinjiang

The paper has not been able to outline a clear uniting variable for understanding what has caused dirty war in the cases discussed in this paper. Institutionalised legislative repression may characterise dirty war in that it ostracises target groups who do not and cannot conform to dominant nationality dynamics. This type of legislative repression that occurs in conflicts that are built on ethnic or religious identity is enabled also by the implementation of an all-encompassing intelligence network. Alternatively, dirty war may also have simply one or two of these characteristics, and could instead be identifiable as a dirty war through analysing its progression; beginning as a counterinsurgency-esque operation, ending as a genocidal campaign. The extra-judicial killings and torture, the joint framework that combines

characteristics of both a criminal justice and a war model of counterinsurgency, and the secrecy and façade of legality that creates an environment of terror are identifiable features of dirty wars, most of which are evident in all cases of dirty war chosen for this paper. What leads to the development of these features, however, remains inexplicable through the variables discussed.

To explain the case of Xinjiang, however, the tentative analysis here has suggested comparisons can be made between the cases of Xinjiang and Sri Lanka, and Xinjiang and Argentina. In the case of Xinjiang and Sri Lanka, the conflicts have been the result of strong nationality dynamics that have enforced ethnonationalist ideations. Furthermore, these nationality dynamics have contributed to the passing of legislation that purposely discriminates against and represses those who are othered in society based on their ethnic or religious identities that are contrary to the desired national identity. The ideological fervour that the regimes both in China and Sri Lanka have acted under relates identity to state ideology, leading to renewed national security doctrines that securitise religion and/or ethnicity. Legislative repression is thus also justified through conceptualising the outgroups as national security threats that need to be eradicated. Xinjiang also shares similarities with the case of Argentina, highlighting the economic and strategic aspects of the national security doctrines at play during their respective conflicts. The targeting of the opposition group, whether it be through securitising an ethnicity, religion, or political ideology including communism, is conducted in a way that makes repression evident to the targets but hides it in plain sight from domestic and international onlookers. A vast intelligence network ensures the profitability of both the repression and the infrastructure within which it is being conducted, and gives options to authoritarian counterinsurgency or genocidal tactics that would destroy both the outgroup and the environment they live in.

Therefore, while truly generalisable inferences cannot be made, the explaining outcomes process-tracing can help understand the cause of the dirty war in Xinjiang. Taking into consideration the above breakdown of the results of the comparative analysis, the possibility of arriving at a minimally sufficient explanation for the violence in Xinjiang as per the explaining outcomes process-tracing is thus derived from the two rival explanations these variables were drawn from: ideological fervour and economic motivations.

Regimes that engage in mass indiscriminate violence due to heightened ideological fervour do so because they feel an outgroup poses a threat to the in-group's dominance (Weitz, 2003). Observable implications for this explanation are ethnic and often ideological divisions in societies that have led to clear societal cleavages between the majority and/or dominant ethnic group and those that do not conform to mainstream nationality dynamics. The dominant group's rule within society expands, and it is achieved through passing legislation that favours the dominant group and represses the outgroup(s), and through the securitisation of ethnicity and/or religion.

Ideological fervour can be used to partly explain CCP actions in Xinjiang. The CCP have encouraged and orchestrated the mass-migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang for decades, seemingly in efforts to civilise a 'barbaric' region (Boehm, 2009). Subsequently, the state has pitted Han against Uyghurs, and Uyghurs against Uyghurs, invoking a narrative of self-colonisation (Smith Finley, 2019a). The economic development that has taken place in Xinjiang over the decades has largely only benefited the Han Chinese (Van Wie Davis, 2008), creating wide societal cleavages between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese. The apparent self-colonisation, relative deprivation, and decrease in the Uyghurs' quality of living have contributed to separatist narratives and a nationalist movement within the Uyghur population. This has spurred sporadic separatist attacks both in Xinjiang, most notably in Ürumqi in 2009 and in Kunming in 2014; these attacks illustrated the underlying grievances and social tensions that had steadily escalated with increasing state terror against so-called East Turkestan terrorists (Purbrick, 2017). The state has labelled all Uyghurs as terrorist threats in the context of China's own People's War on Terror, which has facilitated the passing of legislation that further contributes to the repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang on the basis of religion and ethnicity. This legislation includes the 2017 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on De-extremification, that identifies the Sinification of religion into a Chinese model of socialism as paramount (Smith Finley, 2019a).

This argument of ideological fervour may account for the underlying causes of the violence in Xinjiang, but not its nature. If the goal was merely to obliterate an ethnic group that does not conform to nationality dynamics, it is unlikely that the CCP would deem it necessary to explicitly employ tactics of population control, including the grid-like surveillance system and the force-sterilisation of Uyghurs. These actions may, however, be explained by economic motivations. An observable implication for regimes wanting to engage in economic combat is

a clear set of economic and strategic interests in the region within which conflict occurs, but which the regime simultaneously relies on. Further implications include vast security capabilities and an intelligence operation in the region that enables the continuity of economic and strategic developments and strict repression of those who remain integral for economic gain but might hinder plans that do not benefit them.

The mass indiscriminate violence the CCP have inflicted on the Uyghurs through their use of police, paramilitary forces, and co-ethnics transforms repression into a policy instrument employed as a tactic to counter an Uyghur separatist threat. Regardless of the true extent of that threat, the CCP has waged an illusionary People's War on the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism that has enabled them to subjugate an entire people. The illusion of war hides the magnitude of Chinese state terrorism but also what may be the true motive for the violence; the preservation and subordination of both Xinjiang's natural resources and the labour that can be used to exploit them. The stability of the region is massively important for the development of the BRI, a project that undoubtedly helps China to promote their ultimate goal of the socialist modernisation of society (Raik et al., 2018). The institutionalised and organised repression acknowledges the importance of the preservation of infrastructure and stability of life for the now-majority Han Chinese. Incidentally, it is precisely why state violence is not explicit and why draining the sea -tactics to tackle perceived terrorist or insurgent threats are out of the question. The pervasive intelligence apparatus' purpose is thus twofold: firstly, it functions as a thoroughly repressive means to find, track and control any focus persons by sending them to the concentration or labour camps. Secondly, it also keeps up appearances of a well-functioning society that has embraced the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the pinnacle of Han-centric assimilationist policy in Xinjiang (Smith Finley, 2019a).

Evidently the protection of economic and strategic interests in China ties in with the need to maintain nationality dynamics. Therefore, the ongoing conflict in Xinjiang is best understood through a joint explanatory framework of both ideological fervour and economic interests. To snuff out growing sectarianism and stabilise a region of such economic and strategic importance, the Sinification of the population must be strengthened, and this is evident in the 'ideological turn' discussed above (Kallio, 2019; Smith Finley, 2019a; 2019b). Sinification occurs both in the mass concentration camps and work camps that Uyghurs indiscriminately find themselves in, and failure to conform to a uniform Chinese identity leads to torture,

disappearances, and indefinite detention. This process of Sinification is relayed onto all those who become focus persons, and increasingly all Uyghurs or otherwise ethnically Central Asian persons cannot avoid the web of intelligence that encompasses the Western regions. Due to this, their role in society is reduced to either an organised labour force that will benefit China's economic and strategic goals, or an infectious disease that spreads extremism throughout society.

7. Conclusion

Following from the research question, this paper has presented a clear chronology in the issues it has discussed. To establish whether the violence in Xinjiang is truly a dirty war, it has aimed to answer what dirty war is. The analysis of different types of mass indiscriminate violence presented in the cases as well as a thorough look at the available literature has proved that it is certainly an elusive concept. Often tied to temporalities and presumptions, dirty war may easily be confused with other, more familiar, concepts like genocide, civil war, or counterinsurgency violence. Alas, this may partly be why dirty wars succeed in being secretive; they combine features of counterinsurgency operations and genocide, making it difficult to pinpoint the nature of the violence so as to prevent it from happening in the first place. The other, more sinister characteristic of dirty war that makes it so secretive is the state terror that almost seems to deafen and blind an entire society, creating quiet wars that perpetuate the regime's ultimate power in a rule by law society.

In concert with, and building on, prominent literature on the topic, it has been proposed that politicides like dirty war evolve from a counterinsurgency campaign, where the power imbalance heavily favours the regime, into a genocidal attempt to eradicate an entire people considered antithetical to mainstream nationality dynamics. It is therefore an amalgamation of characteristics that can be identified in other types of mass indiscriminate violence, but also of characteristics that cannot jointly be found elsewhere: covert and extensive intelligence operations; using state-sponsored paramilitaries or death squads for extra-judicial detention, killings, and torture; and institutionalised repression. This makes dirty war a distinct form of mass indiscriminate violence, and it should be considered more than a Cold War phenomenon.

With this exploration into the nature of dirty war, the paper has in turn discussed the nature of violence in Xinjiang, arguing it is indeed a dirty war. The characteristics of dirty war as defined by Smith and Roberts are evident in the case of Xinjiang, and inferences drawn from the other cases of dirty war considered here, Argentina and Sri Lanka, can also be identified. The conflict has been shrouded in a façade of legality that uses the criminal justice system to render Xinjiang's ethnic minorities beyond legal protection, and legitimises the mass internment of people on account of charges of the 'three evils' of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism, or merely of being unpatriotic due to a seemingly arbitrary reason. Despite it sharing some

characteristics of counterinsurgency violence and genocide, it is evident that Xinjiang cannot comfortably be classified as either because doing so obscures the true extent and nature of the conflict. These characteristics Xinjiang shares with counterinsurgency operations and genocides, however, only further strengthen the assertion that the conflict there is a dirty war: it has followed the escalation pattern discussed above. What began as the CCP's counterinsurgency operation against Islamist separatists in Xinjiang has morphed into a genocidal campaign in which the power balance is heavily in the CCP's favour.

After reviewing the literature and case observations, the thesis has focused on collating answers for the question of what actually might cause dirty war. Variables for the between-case design were chosen from the rival explanations identified in the literature review, and contrasted against the five case studies (Xinjiang, Argentina, Sri Lanka, Rakhine, and Chechnya). While some commonalities were identified between Xinjiang and Argentina (vast intelligence apparatus that enables repression but preserves infrastructure and stability in the region) and Xinjiang and Sri Lanka (ideology-based conflict), the paper failed to decisively underline any specific conditions might make regimes choose to undertake a dirty war. When considering explanations for mass indiscriminate violence, like the ones presented in this paper, it would appear that few inferences can be drawn for the causes of dirty war itself that could be identified in all cases. This may be because the conditions upon which cases of dirty war are built on vary so widely, or perhaps because despite this paper's best efforts to clarify the concept, it remains complex and multifaceted. Regardless, examining the complexities of each case, as well as the commonalities the paper succeeded in finding, it becomes clear case-specific explanations can be drawn even if generalisable ones cannot.

Finally, this paper has attempted to establish an explanation for the dirty war in Xinjiang through an explaining outcomes process-tracing. Considering the commonalities Xinjiang shares with both Sri Lanka and Argentina, albeit separately, in the between-cases design, the most convincing explanation for the dirty war can be derived from building a joint framework of ideological fervour and economic motivations. Weitz's ideological fervour argument is identifiable in China, as the CCP has strengthened Chinese nationality dynamics that see Han Chinese as the civilised ethnic group that should work to equally civilise the rest of China, the Western territories included. These ideological dynamics explain the underlying tensions and ethnic divisions in Xinjiang, as they have highlighted the extent of how the Uyghurs do not conform to the national identity. However, even though their existence is argued to be a threat

to national security, China simultaneously depends on their labour for their economic and strategic initiatives in the region. Because of this dependency, the CCP have engaged in economically motivated combat that has manifested in a dirty war; the widespread intelligence network polices the target group and allows the Han Chinese to live with relative ease, while the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities are policed. Having successfully institutionalised and organised repression through a widespread intelligence network, the CCP ensure both the preservation of economically beneficial infrastructure in Xinjiang as well as the façade that hides the dirty war. Drawing on the quote by Arendt at the very beginning of this paper, to call CCP actions in Xinjiang state violence would be to thoroughly undermine the severity of the situation. The CCP have implemented a government of terror that is omnipresent throughout the Western territories, even after the regime's challengers have all but ceased to exist.

Following from the concepts discussed in this paper, future research on the topic of mass indiscriminate violence should entertain the framework of dirty war to aim to produce more generalisable outcomes through a larger-N analysis, or perhaps a most different similar outcome (MDSO) design that might identify any shared dependent variables drawn from a wider set of literature, both theoretical and case specific. Additional questions arise from whether dirty war is a concept that can withstand rigorous study or if it is merely a categorisation scholars can attribute to a conflict that is the antithesis of what is generally understood as 'clean' and 'just' war. Nevertheless, the situation in Xinjiang is still evolving, and students and researchers of international relations should do well to monitor any developments and their outcomes.

Bibliography

ACCORD (2016) 'China: Situation of Uyghurs', *COI Compilation*. Accessed at: https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=571f843c4&skip=0&query=uyghur (9.3.2021).

Alam, M. (2021) 'Mass violence against the Rohingya: Strategic and ideological drivers of ethnic cleansing', pp. 101-114 in Zucker, E. M. and Kierna, B. (eds) *Political Violence in Southeast Asia since 1945: Case Studies from Six Countries*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Aliyev, H. (2016) 'Strong Militias, Weak States and Armed Violence: Towards a Theory of 'State-Parallel' Paramilitaries', *Security Dialogue*, 47(6), 498–516.

Arendt, H. (1970) *On violence.* New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.

Bahrampour, T. (2016) 'What did Americans know as the Holocaust unfolded? Quite a lot, it turns out.', *Washington Post*, April 12th. Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/what-did-americans-know-as-the-holocaust-unfolded-quite-a-lot-it-turns-out/2016/04/12/ff4f0ec2-fcec-11e5-9140-e61d062438bb_story.html (9.3.2021).

BBC News (2020) 'Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis', January 23rd. Accessed at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561 (13.5.2021).

BBC News (2020) 'China forcing birth control on Uighurs to suppress population, report says', June 29th. Accessed at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-53220713 (22.10.2020).

BBC News (2021) 'Canada's parliament declares China's treatment of Uighurs 'genocide'', February 23rd. Accessed at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56163220 (20.3.2021).

Beach, D. and Pedersen, R. B. (2013) *Process-tracing Methods.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Beech, H. (2014) 'Deadly Terrorist Attack in Southwestern China Blamed on Separatist Muslim Uighurs', *TIME,* March 1st. Accessed at: https://time.com/11687/deadly-terror-attack-in-southwestern-china-blamed-on-separatist-muslim-uighurs/ (27.10.2020).

Beech, H. (2018) 'Myanmar's Military Planned Rohingya Genocide, Rights Group Says', *The New York Times*, July 19th. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-genocide.html (13.5.2021).

Bennett, A. and Elman, C. (2007) 'Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(2), 170-195.

Blackbourn, J. (2015) 'The 'normalisation of security' II: the military in Northern Ireland', pp. 99-121 in *Anti-terrorism Law and Normalising Northern Ireland*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Boehm, D. C. (2009) 'China's Failed War on Terror: Fanning the Flames of Uighur Separatist Violence', *Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law*, 2(1), 61-124.

Bramstedt, E.K. (2002 [1945]) 'Terror and Resistance: Techniques of Terror', pp. 137-157 in *Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technique of Control by Fear*. London: Routledge.

Bruce, S. (1992) The Problems of 'Pro-State' Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(1), 67-88.

Byman, D. (2016) 'Death Solves All Problems': The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency,' *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 39 (1), 62-93.

Campbell, C. and Connolly, I. (2003) 'A Model for the 'War Against Terrorism'? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew', *Journal of Law and Society,* 30(3), 341-375.

Clarke, M. (ed) (2018) *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China: Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4), 536-595.

Corr, A. (2019) 'State Sponsorship of Uyghur Separatists: the History and Current Policy Options for East Turkestan (Xinjiang, China)', *Journal of Political Risk*, 7(3), no page numbers. Accessed at: https://www.jpolrisk.com/state-sponsorship-of-uyghur-separatists-the-history-and-current-policy-options-for-east-turkestan-xinjiang-china/ (18.2.2021).

Davenport, C. (2007) 'State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(4), 485-504.

DerGhougassian, K. and Brumat, L. (2018) 'The Argentine Military and the Antisubversivo Genocide: The School of Americas' Contribution to the French Counterinsurgency Model', *Genocide Studies International*, 12(1), 48-71.

DeSilva-Ranasinghe, S. (2010) 'Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan Military's Counter-Insurgency Operations', Strategic Analysis Paper for *Future Directions International.* Published February 12th. Accessed at: https://www.futuredirections.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/1266992558-FDIStrategicAnalysisPaper-12February2010.pdf (8.3.2021).

DeVotta, N. (2000) 'Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka', *Pacific Affairs*, 73(1), 55-76.

DeVotta, N. (2005) 'From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict: the institutional bases for Sri Lanka's separatist war', *Nations and Nationalism*, 11(1), 141-159.

Dickson, B. (2012) 'Counterinsurgency and Human Rights in Northern Ireland' pp. 291-313 in Dixon, P. (ed) *The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Edwards, A. (2010) 'Misapplying Lessons Learned? Analysing the Utility of British Counterinsurgency Strategy in Northern Ireland, 1971-76', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 21(2), 303-330.

Esberg, J. (2018) 'The Audience of Repression: Killings and Disappearances in Pinochet's Chile', *Stanford University Dept. of Political Science*. Accessed at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3246120 (10.5.2021).

Esparza, M., Huttenbach, H. R. and Feierstein, D. (eds.) *State Violence and Genocide in Latin America: The Cold War years.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Famularo, J. (2018) ''Fighting the Enemy with Fists and Daggers': The Chinese Communist Party's Counter-Terrorism Policy in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region', pp. 39-74 in Clarke, M. (ed) *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China: Domestic and Foreign Policy Dimensions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fearon, J. D. and Laitin, D. D. (2003) 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1), 75-90.

Feitlowitz, M. (1998) 'A Lexicon of Terror', pp. 21-72 in *A Lexicon of Terror*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Geddes, B., Frantz, E. and Wright, J.G. (2014) 'Military Rule', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17(1), 147-162.

Gorvett, J. (2019) 'It Isn't Just the Rohingya. Myanmar Is Now Attacking Buddhists in Rakhine State Too.', *Foreign Policy*, October 31st. Accessed at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/31/rohingya-refugees-myanmar-attacking-buddhists-rakhine/ (1.6.2021).

Greitens, S. C., Lee, M., and Yazici, E. (2020) 'Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression', *International Security*, 44(3), 9-47.

Gurr, T. R. (2015 [1970]) *Why Men Rebel*. New York: Routledge.

Hill, M., Campanale, D., and Gunter, J. (2021) ‘'Their goal is to destroy everyone': Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape’, *BBC News*, February 2nd. Accessed at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071 (12.2.2021).

Holquist, P. (2003) ‘State Violence as Technique: The Logic of Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism’, pp. 129-156 in Weiner, A. (ed.) *Landscaping the Human Garden*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Human Rights Watch (2000) ‘War Crimes In Chechnya and the Response of the West’, February 29th. Accessed at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west (11.5.2021).

Israeli, R. (2010) ‘China's Uyghur Problem’, *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 4(1), 89-101.

Kallio, J. (2019) ‘The Sinification of China: How the Minorities Are Being Merged Into One Nation’, *FIIA Briefing Paper*, 260, 3-8. Accessed at: https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/bp260_sinification_of_china.pdf (24.4.2021).

Kalyvas, S. N. (2004) ‘The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War’, *The Journal of Ethics*, 8(no issue number), 97-138.

Kalyvas, S. N. (2006) *The Logic of Violence in Civil War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Khatchadourian, R. (2021) ‘Surviving the Crackdown in Xinjiang’, *The New Yorker*, April 5th. Accessed at: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang (25.4.2021).

Kim, Y. and Blank, S. (2013) ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Russia: Contending Paradigms and Current Perspectives’, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(11), 917-932.

Kipgen, N. (2014) ‘Addressing the Rohingya Problem’, *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 49(2), 234–247.

Lau, S. (2021) 'US declares Xinjiang 'genocide'', *POLITICO*, 19th January. Accessed at: https://www.politico.eu/article/us-declares-xinjiang-genocide-ahead-of-key-uk-vote/ (12.2.2021).

Licklider, R. (1995) 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993', *The American Political Science Review* , 89(3), 681-690.

Lyall, J. (2009) "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya", *Journal of Conflict Resolution'*, 53(3), 331-362.

Marks, T. (2019) 'Sri Lanka: State response to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam', pp. 316-352 in D'Souza, S.M. (ed.) *Countering Insurgencies and Violent Extremism in South and South East Asia*. London: Routledge.

Martín, L. (2012) 'On Innocent Victims and Demons in Argentina (1983-1985)', *African Yearbook of Rhetoric*, 3(2), 65-75.

McSherry, P. (2010) '"Industrial repression" and Operation Condor in Latin America', pp. 107-123 in Esparza, M., Huttenbach, H. R. and Feierstein, D. (eds.) *State Violence and Genocide in Latin America: The Cold War years.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Melson, R. (1996) 'Overview and Major Themes', pp. 1-40 in *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Menge, T. (2019) 'Violence and the Materiality of Power', *Critical Review of International, Social and Political Philosophy*, volume and issue numbers unknown, 1-26. Accessed at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698230.2019.1700344 (10.3.2021).

Minority Rights Group Int'l (2017) *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – China: Uyghurs.* Accessed at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d3c4b.html (24.10.2020).

Mironova, V. and Whitt, S. (2020) Public Tolerance of Retributive Violence Against Insurgencies', *published as part of a project on the Rule of Law in Iraq*, 1-42. Accessible at: https://vmironova.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Extrajudicial-Killings_manuscript.pdf (10.3.2021).

Mojahan, H. K. (2018) 'History of Rakhine State and the Origin of the Rohingya Muslims', *The Indonesian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 2(1), 19-46.

Morada, N. M. (2020) 'Continuing Violence and Atrocities in Rakhine since 2017: Beyond the Outrage, Failures of the International Community', *Global Responsibility To Protect,* 12(no issue number), 64-85.

Mumford, A. (2018) 'Theory-Testing Uyghur Terrorism in China', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 12(5), 18-26.

Newman, E. (2009) 'Conflict Research and the 'Decline' of Civil War', *Civil Wars*, 11(3), 255-278.

Odgaard, L. and Galasz Nielsen, T. (2014) China's Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23(87), 535-555.

Ortiz de Zárate, V. V. (2003) 'Terrorism and Political Violence During the Pinochet Years: Chile, 1973–1989', *Radical History Review*, 85(no issue number), 182-190.

Osiel, M. J. (2001) 'Constructing Subversion in Argentina's Dirty War', *Representations*, 75(1), 119-158.

Oten, J. (2020) 'The Second Chechen War, guises of "International Terrorism," and Putin's Power Consolidation', *Medium*, July 8th. Accessed at: https://medium.com/@josephoten/the-second-chechen-war-guises-of-international-terrorism-and-putins-power-consolidation-efbceb93b57 (11.5.2021).

Pion-Berlin, D. (1985) 'The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 27(2), 55-76.

Pion-Berlin, D. (1989) *The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Argentina and Peru*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers.

Power, S. (2001) 'Bystanders to Genocide', *The Atlantic,* September, date unknown. Accessed at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/ (9.3.2021).

Purbrick, M. (2017) 'Maintaining a Unitary State: Counterterrorism, Separatism, and Extremism in Xinjiang and China', *Asian Affairs*, 48(2), 236-256.

Raik, K., Aaltola, M., Kallio, J., and Pynnöniemi, K. (2018) 'The Security Strategies of the US, China, Russia and the EU: Living in Different Worlds', *FIIA Report*, 56, 1-78. Accessed at: https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/fiia_report56_web_security-strategies.pdf (16.5.2021).

Roberts, S. (2018) 'The Biopolitics of China's "War on Terror" and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs, *Critical Asian Studies*, 50(2), 232-258.

Roberts, S. (2021) 'The Roots of Cultural Genocide in Xinjiang', *Foreign Affairs*, February 10th. Accessed at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-02-10/roots-cultural-genocide-xinjiang (10.3.2021).

Rouquie, A. (1983) 'Argentina: The Departure of the Military-End of a Political Cycle or Just Another Episode?', *International Affairs*, 59(4), 575-586.

Rummel, R. J. (1995) 'Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(1), 3-26.

Sambanis, N. (2004) 'What is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(6), 814-858.

Sarkees, M. R. (2010) 'The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars', *Correlates of War Project*, version 4. Accessed at:

file:///Users/Daniela/Downloads/COW%20Website%20-%20Typology%20of%20war.pdf (5.5.2021).

Scharpf, A. (2018) 'Ideology and state terror: How officer beliefs shaped repression during Argentina's 'Dirty War'', *Journal of Peace Research*, 55(2), 206–221.

Scharpf, A. And Gläßel, C. (2020) 'Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina', *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(4), 791-806.

Selvadurai, S. D and Smith, M. L. R (2013) 'Black Tigers, Bronze Lotus: The Evolution and Dynamics of Sri Lanka's Strategies of Dirty War.' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 36:547-572.

Shepherd, C. (2020) 'China's Crackdown on the Uighurs', *Financial Times*, October 19th. Accessed at: https://www.ft.com/content/6cceb0c1-dc43-48a4-81cc-2debcac0148a (25.4.2021).

Siddiquee, A. (2019) 'The portrayal of the Rohingya genocide and refugee crisis in the age of post-truth politics', *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 5(2) 89–103.

Smith Finley, J. (2019a) 'Securitization, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang: has PRC counter-terrorism evolved into state terror?', *Central Asian Survey*, 38(1), 1-26.

Smith Finley, J. (2019b) 'The Wang Lixiong prophecy: 'Palestinization' in Xinjiang and the consequences of Chinese state securitization of religion', *Central Asian Survey*, 38(1), 81-101.

Smith Finley, J. (2020) 'Why Scholars and Activists Increasingly Fear a Uyghur Genocide in Xinjiang', *Journal of Genocide Research*, volume and issue numbers unknown, 1-23.

Smith, M. L. R. and Roberts, S (2008) 'War in the Gray: Exploring the Concept of Dirty War.' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 31(5), 377-398.

Solonick, R. D. (2012) 'Dirty War: Across Borders and Generations', *Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects*. No. 194. Accessed at: https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/194/ (9.3.2021).

Souleimanov, E. A. and Siroky, D. S. (2016) 'Random or Retributive? – Indiscriminate Violence in the Chechen Wars', *World Politics*, 68(4), 677-712.

Sprick, D. (2020) ''Killing Rats in the Street' for the Paramount Human Right of Security: The Law and Policy of China's People's War on Terror', pp. 181-205 in Paulussen, C. and Scheinin, M. (eds) *Human Dignity and Human Security in Times of Terrorism*. The Hague: Asser Press.

Stavrou, D. (2019) 'A Million People Are Jailed at China's Gulags. I Managed to Escape. Here's What Really Goes on Inside', *Haaretz,* October 17th. Accessed at: https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-a-million-people-are-jailed-at-china-s-gulags-i-escaped-here-s-what-goes-on-inside-1.7994216?utm_source=digg (18.10.2020).

Straus, S. (2015) 'The Concept and Logic of Genocide', pp. 17-33 in *Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Svolik, M. (2012) *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

The Washington Post (2020) 'Opinion: What's happening in Xinjiang is genocide', July 6th. Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/whats-happening-in-xinjiang-is-genocide/2020/07/06/cde3f9da-bfaa-11ea-9fdd-b7ac6b051dc8_story.html (6.3.2021).

Tonge, J. (2013) *Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Ucko, D. H. (2013) 'Beyond Clear-Hold-Build: Rethinking Local-Level Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 34(3), 526-551.

Ucko, D. H. (2016) ''The People are Revolting': An Anatomy of Authoritarian Counterinsurgency', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 39(1), 29-61.

United Nations (1948) *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.* Accessed at: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf (7.3.2021),

Valentino, B. A. (2004) 'The Strategic Logic of Mass Killing', pp. 66-90 in *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Valentino, B. A. (2014) 'Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence against Civilians', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17(no issue number), 89–103.

Van Wie Davis, E. (2008) 'Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China', *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 35(1), 15-30.

Von Kumberg, K. (2020) 'Russian Counterinsurgency Doctrine During The Second Chechen War 1999-2009', *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, March 6th. Accessed at: https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2020/03/06/russian-counterinsurgency-doctrine-during-the-second-chechen-war-1999-2009/ (11.5.2021).

Ware, A. and Laoutides, C. (2018) 'Recent Violence and Significance', pp. 35-36 in *Myanmar's 'Rohingya' Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Washaly, N. (2019) 'Rohingya: The Identity Crisis', *Ecos de la Academia.* Accessed at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Najeeb-Washaly/publication/331286962_Rohingya_The_Identity_Crisis/links/5c7045b7a6fdcc47159418ce/Rohingya-The-Identity-Crisis.pdf (13.5.2021).

Wayne, M. I. (2012) 'China's Society-Centric Counterterrorism Approach in Xinjiang', pp. 335-346, in Rich, P.B. and Duyvesteyn, I. (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency.* Florence: Taylor and Francis.

Weitz, E. D. (2003) *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Westerman, A. (2021) 'What Myanmar's Coup Means For The Rohingya', *NPR*, February 11th. Accessed at: https://www.npr.org/2021/02/11/966923582/what-myanmars-coup-means-for-the-rohingya?t=1620905877555 (13.5.2021).

Whitfield, T. (2014) *Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country*. London: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, C. (2019) 'Military Anxiety and Genocide: Explaining Campaigns of Annihilation (and Their Absence)', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 21(2), 178–200.

Woodworth, P. (2000) 'A Basque spiral that has to be addressed', *The Irish Times*, November 11th. Accessed at: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/a-basque-spiral-that-has-to-be-addressed-1.1115121 (11.5.2021).

Zartman, W. (2005) 'Comparative Case Studies', *International Negotiation*, 10(1), 3–15.

Zenz, A. (2020) 'Sterilizations, IUD's, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP's Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang', *The Jamestown Foundation*, 1-32. Accessed at: https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf?x50971 (10.3.2021).

Zenz, A. and Leibold, J. (2020) 'Securitizing Xinjiang: Police Recruitment, Informal Policing and Ethnic Minority Co-optation', *The China Quarterly*, 242(no issue number), 324–348.

Zhukov, Y. (2007) 'Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army', *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 18(3), 439-466.