

A stable Diversity of views on the EU

Among PRRPs in the Netherlands



Student: Bas Wendt

Student number: S1425382

Email: baswendt@hotmail.com

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Leiden University

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Abstract

This thesis researches how Dutch PRRPs agree or disagree over EU policy areas and whether this changes over time. At the national level, it is important to know how their EU positions vary for gauging the possibility of long-term cooperation and the exact areas that they might influence in the future. The content analysis based on election manifestos shows that there is a variety of views on the EU, while all parties are generally Eurosceptic. Further, it is shown that PRRPs do adopt a stable position on the EU and that the source of significant position change is a split of a PRRP. So, it is expected that PRRPs will stay Eurosceptic and therefore keep trying to complicate further European integration in the future.

Keywords: European Union, PRRPs, Euroscepticism, The Netherlands

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1. Introduction

The popularity of the radical right is rising throughout the world. The national parliaments of the Member States of the European Union (EU) and the European Parliament reflect this rise of popularity of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) (Schmidt, 2020). For example, the electoral success of the Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) demonstrate that PRRPs are relevant players in Member States' politics (Rooduijn, Burgoon, Van Elsas, & Van de Werfhorst, 2017). Due to their general Euroscepticism, there are worries that the rise of PRRPs will complicate EU decision making in the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Council. Especially, further deepening of European integration is expected to become increasingly difficult (Krause, & Giebler, 2020). In the Netherlands, this is illustrated by the no-vote in the referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as the PVV and FvD strongly campaigned against it (Otjes, 2021). A similar situation contributed to BREXIT (Mudde, 2016). This makes governments more reluctant to compromises within the EU and therefore puts a downward pressure on European integration (Hooghe, & Marks, 2009). However, it remains unclear what it exactly is that PRRPs want with the EU, what this could mean for specific EU policy areas in the future, and how this may vary from one party to another. At the national level, it is important to know how their EU positions vary for gauging the possibility of cooperation and the exact EU areas that they might influence in the future. Therefore, Mudde (2016) calls for research that specifically researches the diversity within the PRRP family (Mudde, 2016). Falkner and Plattner (2018, 2020) answered to the call of Mudde by comparing all European PRRPs on the national level and in the European Parliament based on election manifestos. They conclude that it is unlikely that PRRPs will manage to coordinate their policy preferences on the EU level (Falkner, & Plattner, 2020). Besides, they argue that further research is necessary to find out how stable the claims of PRRPs are in the future. Not only Euroscepticism, but specific EU policies should be included in further research based on post 2016 election manifestos to study whether and in what direction their EU positions develop (Falkner, & Plattner, 2018, 2020). Therefore, the research question is the following: How do Dutch PRRPs agree or disagree over EU policy areas and over time?

In-depth case studies outside of the larger West European Member States, and Central and Eastern European Member States are especially necessary (Mudde, 2016). The Netherlands are a relevant case for two main reasons. Firstly, the open representative and consensus democracy leads to a persistent presence of PRRPs. Since the Dutch elections in March 2021 and the split of FvD and JA21, three PRRPs are represented in both the Dutch Parliament and Senate, namely the PVV, FvD and JA21.

There are not many other cases where there is more than one PRRP in parliament yet, which makes the Netherlands an interesting case for comparative research on the national level, in the first place (Otjes, 2021). Secondly, the Netherlands as a founding EU Member State and an economically 'open country' are increasingly critical towards further European integration (Louwerse, & Otjes, 2018). Hence, it is important to see how these parties talk about the EU, because PRRPs bring issues into the public discourse. The research is based on election manifestos, because these documents are a crucial source to improve understanding of what the rise of PRRPs could mean to various EU policies and their reform (Falkner, & Plattner, 2018). This data will be analysed through a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of election manifestos. Further, it is relevant to find out which policy areas are especially interesting to the Dutch PRRPs, what topics do not get any attention and how this changes over time. This thesis shows that Dutch PRRPs vary in their views on the EU on most themes, despite their general Euroscepticism. Furthermore, it is also shown that PRRPs do adopt a stable position on the EU and that the source of significant position change is a split of a PRRP, because they are also constraint by earlier positions on the EU.

The first chapter defines PRRPs and their influence, and presents three different ways in which scholars talk about the EU views of PRRPs. Then, the research design explains the selected case of study, shows what data is collected and how this data is analysed. This is followed by the empirical analysis of the views of Dutch PRRPs on the EU based on six EU themes. Lastly, the discussion of the results and the conclusion are presented.

2. Populist Radical Right Parties

A large scholarly production discusses what PRRPs are and how they can influence the direction of EU politics, but there is a lack of understanding about what exactly it is that they want, and how this may vary from one PRRP to another and over time. Firstly, it is discussed what PRRPs are which is followed by their influence on EU politics. The next three sections present three different ways in which scholars talk about the views of PRRPs on European integration. Firstly, their general Euroscepticism. Secondly, the general views of PRRPs on EU policy areas. Lastly, it is shown that next to general EU views of PRRPs, it is also important to look at individual PRRPs and the heterogeneity of their EU positions.

2.1 Defining PRRPs

The populist radical right is a combination of populism and the ideology of the radical right. Different interpretations of populism are widespread and have in common that they say something about the relationship between the elite and the people (Mudde, 2004). While there is no real consensus on the concept and definition of populism, the definition of Cas Mudde is often used in academic research (Rooduijn, et al., 2017). Cas Mudde (2004, p. 543) defines populism “as an ideology, which considers society to be separated into the corrupt elite versus the people, whereas politics should follow the general will of the people.” It is a thin ideology that covers a limited range of ideologies, because populism does not hold the same consistency and intellectual background as established ideologies such as liberalism or socialism. Therefore, populism is often combined with another ideology (Mudde, 2004). Hence, Mudde (2016) argues that the populist radical right can be seen as a core ideology combining nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. There is no academic consensus on this definition, but most studies include largely the same parties and focus on a similar ideological core (Mudde, 2016). Nevertheless, PRRPs differ on multiple levels and can be categorised into four groups. Firstly, the neoliberal populists such as UKIP. Secondly, parties differ in origin and can be either a radicalised mainstream party or a moderate PRRP. Thirdly, there are differences in stability and longevity. A PRRP as National Front (FN) is a stable factor and 50 years old, but there are also many young parties. Lastly, PRRPs are differently organised ranging from one-member parties such as the PVV to parties that do allow party members (Mudde, 2016). Generally, voters of PRRPs are less educated, have lower incomes and have higher chances of unemployment. The low socioeconomic status can result in anti-globalisation, anti-European integration, and anti-immigrant attitudes. Further, radical right voters are often deeply dissatisfied with the functioning of the economy and

the national government, which results in low trust in institutions and their politicians (Rooduijn, et al., 2017). Zhirkov (2014) argues that these voter characteristics are more likely to be observed under non-voters. Hence, he identifies another group of supporters of PRRPs who are motivated by ideological considerations instead of socioeconomic variables or political mistrust. These voters show levels of participation in political protest and tolerance towards gays and lesbians, although the latter depends on the cultural perceptions of their particular EU Member State (Zhirkov, 2014). Overall, there is an extensive scholarly production on the voter motivations of PRRPs (Mudde, 2016), including in the Netherlands (Coffé, & Van den Berg, 2017; Otjes, 2021).

Political parties can include gradual change in their party preferences, but they struggle to respond to major change or crises, such as the Maastricht Treaty, Euro crisis, refugee crisis and now the Covid-19 crisis. These developments weakened the national sovereignty, promoted transnational economic activity, increased immigration and encouraged cultural and economic insecurity (Hooghe, & Marks, 2018). (New) PRRPs raise these issues that mainstream parties rather ignore, because the manoeuvrability of the mainstream parties is often constrained by earlier positions on certain issues. Therefore, voters turn to parties with a distinctive position on issues that they prioritise. So, voters changed, but the establishment did not change enough (Hooghe, & Marks, 2018). The PRRPs succeed in stably spreading a message of discontent (Voogd, & Dassonneville, 2020). Stability is also observable among voters in West European countries (Zhirkov, 2014). Voters who switched their vote to a PRRP can become consistent radical right voters, especially established PRRPs succeed in ensuring stable voters (Voogd, & Dassonneville, 2020). Therefore, PRRPs are a part of the political system rather than a deviation and they are expected to stay a part in the future (Zhirkov, 2014). Overall, the literature that analyses the stability of preferences is more focussed on the demand side, namely changes in voters' attitudes (Zhirkov, 2014; Coffé, & Van den Berg, 2017) instead of the stability of the radical right message over time. Generally, party-based Euroscepticism is of a "fluid nature" and changes over time, but is unclear to what extent this applies to the radical right (Conti, & Memoli, 2012, p. 105). Therefore, Falkner and Plattner (2020) argue that further research is necessary to find out how stable the claims of PRRPs are in the future, which also says something about the sources of position change.

2.2 Influence on EU politics

It is important to know how stable the positions of PRRPs are over time, because they are a relevant player in European integration as they can influence EU politics in multiple ways and on both the national and the European level (Mudde, 2016). Worldwide and European problems including global

warming, migration and geopolitical tensions require a stable cooperation among Member States, whereas the raise of PRRPs encourages political conflicts over common issues. This can result in suboptimal compromises and the opposite effect of European integration, such as BREXIT (Hooghe, & Marks, 2018). More specifically, PRRPs have influence through direct and mainly indirect effects (Mudde, 2016). The direct effects of PRRPs will be discussed first, followed by the indirect effects. PRRPs can directly influence EU policy outcomes via their increased representation in national parliaments and the European Parliament, which gives these parties a stronger voice in EU decision making on both levels. Their direct influence depends on the relative presence of a PRRP in parliament and the structure of parliamentary decision making. So, the election results of national elections do not solely represent the actual influence, because of for example the government formation process. Only political parties that govern are represented in the European Council, Council of the European Union and can propose a commissioner for the European Commission (Falkner & Plattner, 2020). Furthermore, Mudde (2016) argues that PRRPs in government are relatively unsuccessful and that they mainly influence policies on mainstream parties' secondary issues, such as immigration and European integration (Mudde, 2016). For example, the PVV's government participation was very short after they redrew their support because of budgetary cuts resulting from the Eurozone crisis (Louwerse, & Otjes, 2018). The elections of the European Parliament are a second way for PRRPs to directly influence EU policies, but the previous system of an informal grand coalition largely side-lined the PRRPs (Falkner & Plattner, 2020). So, at the moment, the overall direct influence of PRRPs in Europe is limited.

PRRPs mainly influence EU decision making in an indirect way by convincing other parties to adopt their preferred topics and possibly viewpoints. So, the electoral success of PRRPs tends to negatively influence the support of mainstream political parties for European integration. This is especially likely to happen if European integration is a key issue for PRRPs (Meijers, 2017). Some studies question the indirect influence of the PRRPs (Mudde, 2013), but the majority supports this link empirically (Krause, & Giebler, 2020). Especially, the end of the permissive consensus resulted in a situation where EU topics became more politicised in national parliaments (Meijers, 2017). Therefore, the bargaining power of national governments is limited, because these parties worry about possible negative electoral consequences of EU legislation and fear defeat in referenda (Hooghe, & Marks, 2009). For example, in the Netherlands, there were two no votes of citizens in referenda about the European constitution and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement of which Dutch PRRPs strongly campaigned against the EU-Ukraine agreement (Otjes, 2021). These tendencies make governments more reluctant to compromise on the EU level and put a downward

pressure on European integration (Hooghe, & Marks, 2009). This is illustrated by the Eurozone crisis as national governments tried to take measures with minimum political resistance by regulatory measures instead of treaty reforms. Overall, if radical right parties continue with spreading a nationalist message, this complicates problem solving at the EU level in an indirect way (Hooghe, & Marks, 2018).

2.3 General Euroscepticism

This section and the two following sections discuss three different ways in which academics talk about the views of PRRPs on European integration. Firstly, their general Euroscepticism is discussed. PRRPs have often been considered as one political bloc in the literature. Because their positions on national policies are relatively coherent (Ennser, 2012), but also because of their general Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak, & Taggart, 2008; Ennser, 2012). Ennser (2012) analysed 94 political parties covering seventeen Member States and found that PRRPs have a relatively high degree of homogeneity on EU views. However, this is based on a very broad definition, namely whether the political party wishes to generally reduce the range of EU policy areas (Ennser, 2012). Szczerbiak & Taggart (2008) presented a more specific definition by distinguishing between hard and soft Euroscepticism. There is no consensus over how to classify Eurosceptic political parties, but the concepts of hard and soft Euroscepticism are often adopted (Taggart, & Szczerbiak, 2013). Political parties are hard Eurosceptic if they are principally opposed to the EU and further European integration. So, they favour their country to leave the EU. Soft Eurosceptic parties do not principally oppose membership of the EU and further European integration, but they are concerned about particular EU policy areas. So, a party is already Eurosceptic if a political party supports the EU in its current state whilst opposing further European integration, because this is in contrast to the ongoing trend of an ever closer union. Generally, PRRPs tend to belong to the hard Eurosceptic party group, but this is not always the case (Szczerbiak, & Taggart, 2008, p. 7-8).

Within the group of Eurosceptic PRRPs, Usherwood, & Startin (2013) distinguished between two classifications. The first type of Eurosceptic PRRPs covers the single-issue parties that are pro-sovereignty of which United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is the best-known. The opposition to the EU and European integration are the main issue to this group of parties. Therefore, these single-issue PRRPs are hard Eurosceptic. The second classification covers the PRRPs that oppose the EU as a way to widen their political agenda and appeal, next to their traditional anti-immigrant position. The extent to which these parties oppose the EU varies across parties and Member States,

but it is clear that Euroscepticism is now increasingly a part of PRRPs' programmatic claims. PRRPs with a long history of Eurosceptic discourse like the French Front National have been joined by relatively newer parties on the radical right, such as the Dutch PVV of Geert Wilders. For these parties, the opposition to the Eurozone, the Schengen Agreement and membership of the EU is strongly linked to their strong anti-immigration and anti-globalisation positions. Here, opposing the EU facilitates the goals of less immigration and countering globalisation (Usherwood, & Startin, 2013). However, it remains unclear what it exactly is what PRRPs want with the EU, because Euroscepticism does not explain how they want to change it.

2.4 General views on EU policies

This section goes one step further than the general Euroscepticism of PRRPs by discussing their general views on specific EU policies and policy areas. So, this focusses more on what PRRPs specifically find important EU areas next to their Euroscepticism. Most studies focus on immigration policies, but the scope has been broadened and more policy areas are being covered. Nevertheless, these studies are still limited in both number and policy scope (Mudde, 2016). Most of the more specific literature about the views of PRRPs is limited to their position on national policies (Krause, & Giebler, 2020; Liang, 2007) instead of EU policies or issues (Davidson, & Saull, 2017; Bergmann, Hackenesch, & Stockemer, 2021). At the same time, the information about their views is often not extensive, because it is not always the main focus of the articles. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify EU areas that are important to PRRPs, namely the economic and monetary direction of the EU, national social security and welfare systems, the Foreign and Security Policy and the development policy (Davidson, & Saull, 2017; Krause, & Giebler, 2020; Liang, 2007; Bergmann, Hackenesch, & Stockemer, 2021).

Firstly, PRRPs have a contradictory position on the single market of the EU. They support the internal market, but strongly oppose the institutions and to a lesser extent its symptoms. The institutional design of the Eurozone including the European Central Bank is supranational and falls short of democratic oversight from EU citizens. Thereby, an own national currency is seen as a strong and important symbol of national identity in a Member State, whereas the Euro replaced the national currencies. Further, PRRPs criticise the free movement of labour within the EU, because this is seen as migration. So, they mainly problematise the symptoms of the single market in a limited and specific way. Moreover, the position of PRRPs helps keeping this transnational labour insecure and cheap as they want to prevent as much migration as possible by providing bad working conditions (Davidson,

& Saull, 2017). Secondly, the radical right has a nationalist position on social security and welfare systems. Therefore, they present measures against immigration as an effective way to protect the social welfare benefits of the people (Krause, & Giebler, 2020). Thirdly, the Foreign and Security Policy position of PRRPs focusses on anti-migration. In addition, they oppose further enlargement of the EU, because this encouraged both legal and illegal migration (Liang, 2007). Lastly, the position of PRRPs on migration politicises the EU's development policy, because they argue to use development aid for migration prevention (Bergmann, Hackenesch, & Stockemer, 2021). Overall, the anti-migration position of PRRPs is strongly linked to the general EU policy areas that are identified as being important to them. However, the literature about the general radical right views on the EU is still limited. So, it would be relevant to identify more EU issues that are important to PRRPs, which tells what issues could become more politicised due to radical right involvement.

2.5 Diversity of views

This section shows that next to generalising EU views of PRRPs, it is also important to look at individual PRRPs and the possible heterogeneity of their positions on the EU (Ennsner, 2012; Taggart, 2008). Policy coherence is important here, because a high coherence increases the likelihood of radical right cooperation, whereas a low coherence would mean that PRRPs balance each other out (Falkner & Plattner, 2020). Therefore, exposing the diversity of views allows for gauging the long-term potential for EU policy influence of PRRPs and the likelihood of cooperation at the national level. Because of the relatively coherent political preferences on the national level and their general Euroscepticism in the past, PRRPs are often seen as one political bloc and as a largely homogeneous party family (Falkner & Plattner, 2020). However, the rapid increase in the amount of PRRPs has made this party group larger and more diverse in terms of ideology, origin, longevity and organisation. Therefore, Mudde (2016) calls for new research that acknowledges the diversity between radical right parties and focusses on what they want politically, because PRRPs increasingly affect European integration as illustrated by the pro-BREXIT campaign focussing on national identity and sovereignty, and by the problematic European decision making process in relation to the refugee crisis (Mudde, 2016).

Falkner and Plattner (2018, 2020) answered to the call of Mudde for more specific research on European PRRPs by comparing these parties on the national level and in the European Parliament on the basis of election manifestos. Conti and Memoli (2012) researched this previously, but they focussed on the positions of radical parties including both the left and right relative to the

mainstream from 1979-2009. The researched dimensions include citizenship, representation, policy scope and identity. PRRPs appeared to be the most unconditional opposition to the EU which covers an essential part of their programmatic claims, whereas the content differs across Member States and parties (Conti, & Memoli, 2012). Falkner and Plattner (2018) specifically researched whether the programmatic documents of PRRPs expose coherent views on specific EU policies to explore what the rise of PRRPs could mean for future EU activities. In their article, Falkner and Plattner (2018) specifically looked at how the PRRPs agree on EU activities in the researched areas including the single market, social and environmental measures, migration management, and defence cooperation. PRRPs show incoherence in all these EU areas (Falkner & Plattner, 2018). The second article of Falkner and Plattner (2020) discusses how (in)coherent the preferences of different PRRPs are on reforming EU policies. Their article shows that the antidiscrimination area is the most coherent including freedom of religion, equality of people, the right to life and the acceptance of different ethnic backgrounds and sexual orientations. In contrast, the single market area did not show any coherence, whereas the area of foreign and defence policies is only a little coherent. Therefore, they conclude that it is unlikely that PRRPs will manage to coordinate their policy preferences on the EU level on these areas (Falkner & Plattner, 2020). Besides, they argue that further research is necessary to find out how stable the claims of PRRPs are in the future. Not only Euroscepticism, but specific EU policies should be included in new research on the basis of post 2016 election manifestos to study whether and how their EU positions develop from the pre 2017 documents analysed by Falkner and Plattner (2018; 2020). Further, the Dutch PRRPs might be differently different in comparison to other PRRPs in Europe on discrimination and more specifically on the protection of LGBT rights. Therefore, in-depth case studies could find out whether institutionalist expectations about the influence of historical cultural features on the views of PRRPs can be confirmed, because preferences are shaped by culture and political dynamics (Falkner & Plattner, 2018). In-depth case studies outside of the usual suspects such as Germany and France could clarify this, because the current research on PRRPs mainly targets the larger West European Member States, and recently Central and Eastern European states (Mudde, 2016). Overall, Falkner and Plattner (2018, 2019) identified the following EU areas as being important to PRRPs: internal market, social and environmental regulation, migration management, defence & security and discrimination. In addition, Conti and Memoli (2012) researched citizenship, representation, and identity. Moreover, it is relevant to find out whether there are more EU areas on which PRRPs have opinions than on the criteria presented by Falkner and Plattner (2018; 2020) and Conti and Memoli (2012).

3. Research design

This chapter, firstly, explains the selected case of study by introducing the Netherlands as a case. Secondly, it is shown what data is collected for the study of this case, and lastly it says how this data is analysed.

The Dutch case

The Netherlands are a relevant case to study for two main reasons. Firstly, the open representative and consensus democracy results in a persistent presence of PRRPs, because a representative electoral system makes it relatively easy for small and new political parties to win a seat in the elections. In addition, the Dutch political consensus tradition means that parties have to work together in order to ensure a majority for national policies. So, due to the consensus culture in Dutch politics, the parliament is relatively powerful. Therefore, the Dutch political system makes it relatively easy for PRRPs to influence decision making from the opposition (Louwerse, & Otjes, 2018). Since 1994, this results in a persistent presence of PRRPs in Dutch politics, of which List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) was the most successful. The party won 26 seats in the national elections nine days after the murder of party leader Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Pim Fortuyn was an openly gay party leader in the Netherlands and the first politician that combined a progressive position on LGTB and women rights with strong opposition to immigration, mostly from Islamic countries. Here, the Netherlands differ from most other EU Member States (Otjes, 2020). Since the Dutch elections in March 2021, three PRRPs are represented in both the Dutch Parliament and Senate, namely the PVV, FvD and JA21, of which two parties are also represented in the European Parliament. This is currently still a rare situation within one EU Member State and an unique one for western and northern European Member States, which makes the Netherlands a relevant case outside the usual cases for comparative research between PRRPs (Otjes, 2021; Nieuwsuur, 2021). The Dutch Freedom party (PVV, Partij Voor de Vrijheid) was founded in 2006. This makes it a good party to look at the stability of EU preferences of a PRRP. Furthermore, researching the split between Forum for Democracy (FvD, Forum voor Democratie) and the Right Answer 21 (JA21, Juiste Antwoord 21) improves understanding of the implications of a split of a PRRP for its EU position.

Secondly, the Netherlands are a relevant case, because they are a founding Member State and an economically open country that profits from its EU membership, while being increasingly critical towards further European integration. Since 2015, the permissive consensus was replaced by more contestation over EU issues. This has been illustrated by several events, such as the no vote of Dutch

citizens in referenda about the European constitution in 2005 and the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement. Especially, PVV and FvD as a think tank were strong supporters and campaigners for a popular no vote against the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement (Berg, & Eijk, 2012; Otjes, 2021). Furthermore, politically, a more reluctant attitude towards the EU can be observed. Economically at the EU level, there has been much contestation by Dutch radical parties and mainstream parties over the economic crisis, the Eurozone crisis and the Covid-19 crisis (Berg, & Eijk, 2012; Schmidt, 2020). In addition, Mudde (2016) calls for in-depth case study outside the usually selected cases, which are the Netherlands in this case.

Data selection

This section presents the research question and explains what data is necessary to answer this question. The debate about the incoherence of PRRP views on the EU asks for further research on possible differences in their EU positions and stability of preferences while being based on more recent sources. Specifically, it is clear that PRRPs are generally Eurosceptic, but it remains unclear what they exactly want with the EU. This is important to understand, because much agreement would increase their possible direct and indirect influence, whereas much disagreement would equal their wishes out. Therefore, it contributes to gauging the long-term potential for policy influence of PRRPs and to establishing sources of position changes on the EU (Mudde, 2016; Falkner, & Plattner 2018, 2020). The resulting research question is the following: how do Dutch PRRPs agree or disagree over EU policy areas and over time? Falkner and Plattner (2020) rightfully call for new empirical data on the basis of post 2016 election manifestos and policy statements. The election manifestos for the elections of the European Parliament in 2019 as well as the manifestos for the Dutch national elections in 2021 are not included in the research of Falkner and Plattner (2018; 2020). This excludes both the relatively new FvD, which is not included because it was a new party in the 2016 national elections, and the new JA21 party. Election manifestos and policy statements or documents are crucial sources to improve understanding of what the rise of PRRPs could mean to various EU policies and their reform. In addition, they are comparable and easily accessible (Falkner & Plattner, 2018). Therefore, the analysed data are the PVV's election manifestos for both the European and national elections from 2010 to 2021, which allows for researching their stability of preferences on the EU. Further, the election manifestos that are included of the FvD are the manifestos for the European Parliament elections of 2019 and the Dutch national elections of 2016 and 2021. There was another split of FvD in the final stage of this research, but the three politicians who left the party say that they still base their views on the current FvD election manifesto. This is exactly the source of this research, so it is not necessary to include a separate analysis (Hofs, & Hendrickx, 2021). JA21 only published a

manifesto for the national elections of 2021. There are now more diverse ways of political communication, but it is not feasible to include these in this thesis as the manifestos already are quite extensive and cover 328 pages. However, this is a limitation of the research, because other sources such as voting behaviour and social media could give a more complete picture of Dutch party positions on the EU. Election posters have been looked at, but the text is often limited to the party name. Therefore, these posters were not a good source to research salience and are not included.

Data analysis

To develop new insights about PRRPs, it is necessary to generate new data which is based on more resource and time intensive research methods, such as a qualitative content analysis (Mudde, 2016). Therefore, the data will be analysed through a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of election manifestos and other policy documents. Firstly, the quantitative dimension reflects on the space given to a specific policy area. Secondly, the qualitative dimension focusses on the detailed elaboration of these themes in the manifestos in question (Havlik, & Vykoupilova, 2008). So, the analysis of election manifestos is an accurate source for research regarding the EU for two main purposes. Firstly, the presence of the EU in the manifesto. Secondly, the positions of PRRPs on the EU. The often limited parts of text about the EU makes it difficult to research salience of EU issues to PRRPs, because the themes can be very specific (Conti, & Memoli, 2012). The empirical analysis covers six themes including sovereignty and democracy, identity and European values, single market and social policy, the Eurozone and EU budget, foreign, security, defence and migration policies, and environment, climate change, agriculture and fisheries. These themes are based on a combination of EU areas that are mentioned in the literature review. Here, it is also relevant to find out which policy areas are especially interesting to the Dutch PRRPs and what topics do not get any attention. Firstly, the dimensions of Falkner and Plattner (2018, 2020) cover the single market, social and environmental measures, migration management, defence & security cooperation and discrimination. These areas are represented by the themes single market and social policy, environment and climate change policies, and security, defence and migration policies. Secondly, Conti and Memoli (2012) researched citizenship, representation, and identity, which are covered by the themes sovereignty and democracy, and identity and European values. Literature about the general position of PRRPs on EU issues covered the economic and monetary direction of the EU, the Foreign and Security Policy and development policy (Davidson, & Saull, 2017; Bergmann, Hackenesch, & Stockemer, 2021). These areas relate to the Eurozone and EU budget theme. Next to the themes that are mentioned in the literature, all Dutch PRRPs also related fisheries and sometimes agriculture to the EU. Therefore, these are included in the environment and climate change theme.

4. Empirical analysis

The empirical analysis starts with an introduction of Dutch PRRPs and their views on the EU. This is based on literature in order to set the stage for the empirical analysis. Then, the in-depth empirical analysis shows the diversity of views of Dutch PRRPs on specific EU issues. Lastly, the changes of EU positions over time are being discussed.

4.1 Dutch PRRPs on the EU

PVV, FvD and JA21

Since the Dutch elections in March 2021, three PRRPs are represented in both the Dutch Parliament and Senate of which two parties are also represented in the European Parliament, namely the PVV, FvD and JA21 (Otjes, 2021; Nieuwsuur, 2021). Currently, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Freedom party) is the oldest PRRP in the Netherlands which was founded in 2006 by the current party leader Geert Wilders who was a former member of the Dutch Liberal Party (Louwerse, & Otjes, 2018). The PVV decided to support a minority government in 2010, but this government quickly collapsed after the PVV redrew their support (Louwerse, & Otjes, 2018). At the moment, the PVV went from twenty to seventeen seats in the Dutch Parliament of a total of 150, has five seats in the Dutch Senate and has one seat in the European Parliament in the Identity and Democracy party group.

Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie, FvD) was founded in 2015 as a Eurosceptic think tank by Thierry Baudet. This think tank already argued for the consultative referendum about the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which rejected the Treaty. Nevertheless, the Dutch government decided not to veto the Treaty. Therefore, Thierry Baudet decided to register his think tank as a political party. In practice, the FvD can also be observed as a neo-liberal populist party. In 2017, FvD won two seats in their first national election and this increased to eight in the national elections of March 2021. Moreover, they became the largest party in the Dutch Senate in 2019 with nine seats of which two are still theirs after a split. In the European Parliament, they lost their three seats within the party group European Conservatives and Reformists after the split (Otjes, 2021). This split in 2020 resulted in the third PRRP in the Dutch parliament, namely the Right Answer 21 (Juiste Antwoord, JA21) of former FvD member Joost Eerdmans. The split was caused by the leak of anti-Semitic statements within the youth department of the party. Many politicians did not want to be associated with this and decided to establish and join JA21 (Trouw, 2020). JA21 won three seats in their first national elections in March 2021. Nevertheless, the party already has three seats in the

European Parliament within the European Conservatives and Reformists group originating from the FvD. In the Dutch Senate, JA21 has seven former FvD seats under the name fractie-Nanninga, which makes them a very relevant factor in Dutch decision making. There is a lack of literature about this new party, but it is widely covered in the news. JA21 wants more attention for right-wing themes by means of a less radical discourse than the FvD and PVV. For example, JA21 party leader Joost Eertmans says that they take Covid-19 much more seriously and are less radical on anti-Islam positions, but that they do not differ much on other themes besides leadership (Nieuwsuur, 2021).

Views on the EU

The literature on the views of Dutch PRRPs on the EU is mainly limited to their general views and the new JA21 party is not represented. Generally, both the PVV and FvD are hard Eurosceptic PRRPs that favour a NEXIT. Further, they pay similar attention to the EU (Otjes, 2021). The PVV is a PRRP that adopted strong anti-EU views next to their anti-Islam discourse (Berg, & Eijk, 2012; Harryvan, Hoekstra, 2013), while the EU has been the main element in the development of FvD. Hence, the election manifesto of FvD for the national elections in 2017 focussed on independence from the EU next to national democratic reforms. During the Eurozone crises, the PVV sharpened its position on European integration by advocating a NEXIT. At the beginning of 2012, Wilders stopped supporting the minority government of CDA and VVD as a protest against the cutbacks that were necessary under European budget rules (Vollaard, Voerman, 2017). Furthermore, the parties are equally anti-immigration and link this to the EU, because of their nativism, populism, and Euroscepticism (Otjes, 2021). Based on their national election manifesto of 2010, the only Dutch PRRP of which its EU positions are described in more detail is the PVV. Van Rooyen (2010) presents the most detailed overview of the position of Dutch parties on the EU including the PVV. This overview consists of five categories and covers EU issues that are present in the manifesto as well as issues that are not talked about by the PVV. Firstly, the internal market, finance and trade. Here, the PVV only advocates cuts of the EU budget. Secondly, agriculture, fisheries, environment and energy. The PVV is against any EU interference with Dutch fishermen, whilst the undiscussed issues include EU climate change and environment policies. Thirdly, asylum, justice and education. The only position of the PVV on this topic is their preference to nationalise immigration policies. Thirdly, the broad EU category. Here, the PVV says that the EU is a threat to the Dutch culture and identity. Further, it argues for the abolition of the monthly EP meetings in Strasbourg and against Turkey's accession to the EU. Lastly, foreign affairs and defence. The PVV is to a limited extent in favour of a coordinated foreign and defence policy and does not talk about EU development policies and an EU army (Van Rooyen, 2010). Overall,

there is a lack of empirical data in the literature about the EU positions of the three Dutch PRRPs, because the information on specific EU positions only covers the PVV and is limited to the national election manifesto of 2010. So, it is necessary to gather more empirical data to be able to research how their Euroscepticism varies and to find out where exactly there is space for agreement and disagreement. FvD is labelled as a hard Eurosceptic PRRP, but their specific views on the EU have not been researched. JA21 is not mentioned at all in the literature, because this is a new party. Therefore, this party has yet to be defined as a Eurosceptic PRRP. Nevertheless, their past as members of FvD, the membership of the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament and the news coverage suggests radical right Euroscepticism.

4.2 Diversity of views

This sub-section compares parties' views by themes that are based on the literature and adjusted to what the Dutch PRRPs discuss in their election manifesto(s). In order to give a picture of their recent views on the EU, the most recent national and European election manifestos are used as a basis. Issues that are not talked about in the 2021 national manifestos, but that are discussed in the more elaborate 2019 EP election manifestos are also included. The 2021 election manifesto's of PVV, FvD and JA21 do not have a specific EU chapter. Therefore, the EU is part of a broader chapter on the EU, defence and foreign policies (PVV, 2021; FvD, 2021; JA21, 2021). Nevertheless, the PVV pays much attention to the EU in their introduction and the first chapter which is named 'your Netherlands'. Further, the chapters 'your climate realism' and 'your animals, farmers and fishermen' refer relatively often to the EU (PVV, 2021). FvD also pays much attention to the EU in the introduction. Further, the two first chapters named 'sovereignty and democracy' and 'immigration and identity' pay much attention to EU issues, next to the foreign policy chapter (FvD, 2021). JA21 pays relatively less attention to EU issues in their introduction. Next to JA21's foreign policy chapter, the chapters 'lively society' and 'strong economy' focus the most on the EU. In contrast, the first chapter which is called 'trustworthy government' barely pays attention to the EU, besides the migration subsection (JA21, 2021).

Sovereignty and democracy

This category covers sovereignty and democracy issues. Firstly, all parties are in favour of European cooperation, but they want to do this on the basis of sovereign nation states with strong bilateral and economic ties that facilitate market access. So, they all strongly oppose the idea of an ever closer union and they want to defend and preferably extend the veto rights of Member States (PVV, 2021;

FvD, 2021; JA21, 2021). In contrast, the parties differ in their preferences on EU membership. The PVV is in favour of a NEXIT and wants to make the date that the Netherlands leave the EU a national holiday (PVV, 2021). In the meantime, the PVV is opposed to any further European integration, including a European Public Prosecution Service, European pensions, European taxes and further EU rules and laws (PVV, 2019). According to FvD, a NEXIT is inevitable, but they argue for a binding referendum about EU membership. Inside the EU, FvD wants to use vetoes for any further deepening of European integration such as EU taxes (FvD, 2021). So, PVV and FvD think that it is not possible to reform the EU from the inside. In contrast, JA21 does want to drastically change the EU from the inside. However, the goal of European cooperation between sovereign states is the same. JA21 wants to revise the Treaties to transfer decision making power back from Brussels to the Member States, because they think that the Netherlands do not have enough influence in EU decision making. In the meantime, JA21 wants the Netherlands to choose more for itself within the EU in order to win back the trust of Dutch citizens. Therefore, JA21 wants smarter, more flexible and mainly economic cooperation by means of opt-outs (JA21, 2021). Overall, PVV and FvD want a NEXIT, whereas JA21 wants to achieve a similar goal but from within the EU. All parties want to block any further deepening of European integration.

Secondly, the democracy issues. PVV labels the EU as being politically corrupt and uses terms as “Brussels’ bureaucrats” and “Europhile elite” to describe the people that work for the EU (PVV, 2021, p. 40). FvD uses a similar vocabulary as they call the EU “an anonymous bureaucracy that damages national democracies” (FvD, 2021, p. 35). JA21 refrains from such labels (JA21). Democracy is a category on which the parties also have some relatively constructive changes in mind. PVV wants a salary cut of 20 percent of members of the European Parliament, whilst JA21 wants to limit European Parliament meetings to one location and they argue for a dual mandate for national and European Parliament members (PVV, 2021; JA21, 2021). Both FvD and JA21 want to establish a dualistic system with a constitutional court to end the direct effect of international law (FvD, 2021; JA21, 2021). FvD is the only party that refers to behaviour in the European Parliament as they want to strengthen the voice of the opposition and to organise blocking minorities against EU budgets and legislation (FvD, 2019). Overall, PVV and FvD use strong rhetoric to label the EU as undemocratic, while JA21 refrains from such labels.

Identity and European values

The second category includes positions on national identity and culture, European values, and open mindedness to, for example, sexual orientation and women rights. Firstly, the PVV refers most often

to national identity and culture. They argue that it is necessary to defend freedom in the Netherlands and to safeguard the Dutch culture, way of life and core values. This mainly relates to their anti-immigration position as the PVV says that the EU encouraged the influx of Islamic migrants. Further, the PVV does not want the EU flag on government buildings (PVV, 2021). FvD is more nuanced and argues that political centralisation at the EU level does not work if the cultural and social cohesion is insufficient. Further, they emphasise the Euroscepticism among Dutch citizens as illustrated by the 2005 and 2016 referenda about the European Constitution and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (FvD, 2019). Besides, the FvD is the only party that relates national identity to international students as they argue that these EU students lower the Dutch level of education and culture (FvD, 2021). JA21 perceives the Islam as the main threat for the national identity and culture, and argues that it is important to safeguard the cultural differences between Member States (JA21, 2021). Secondly, European values are only criticised by FvD, because they think it is a powerless instrument, which is randomly and poorly applied (FvD, 2021). Lastly, all parties are very open minded towards gender and sexual orientation, but not towards the Islam. According to FvD, all people are fundamentally equal, regardless of gender, race or sexual orientation, while PVV and JA21 emphasise the need to protect these rights against the Islam (FvD, 2021; PVV, 2021; JA21, 2021). Overall, PVV takes the most nationalistic position, while FvD mainly relates national identity to a lack of popular support for the EU. FvD is the only party that talks about European values and in a negative manner. Further, there is a high coherence in open-mindedness towards gender rights and sexual orientation, and opposition to the Islam.

Single market and social policy

The category of single market and social policy can be subdivided into goods, trade agreements, labour migration and European social policy. FvD and JA21 agree that the regulatory pressure of the EU is too high (FvD, 2019; JA21, 2021). FvD calls this “European micromanagement and unnecessary regulations” (FvD, 2019), which negatively affects the Dutch Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (FvD, 2021). JA21 emphasises that construction is increasingly difficult due to EU regulations (JA21, 2021). PVV and FvD both want to protect the Dutch market and manufacturers from European competition. The PVV, therefore, wishes to promote Dutch products by labelling them with a Dutch flag, whereas FvD advocates to act against unfair competition from mainly Eastern European Member States and to protect national companies in crucial sectors (PVV, 2021; FvD, 2021). In addition, FvD wants to stop EU privacy regulations and to tax Big Tech companies. When it comes to trade agreements, FvD is against free trade within a supranational political structure, because the interests of the bigger countries such as Germany and France often outweigh the interests of the Netherlands

(FvD, 2021). For similar reasons, JA21 advocates to veto trade agreements that are not in the interest of the Netherlands, whereas FvD wants referenda on multilateral trade agreements between the EU and third countries (JA21, 2021; FvD, 2021). Further after NEXIT, FvD specifically wishes to make Dutch trade agreements with growing markets including Asia and South America, while they are also interested in joining the European Free Trade Association (FvD, 2019). Overall, the discussed topics show a high incoherence. FvD and JA21 are frustrated by the EU's regulatory pressure, while PVV and FvD want to promote and protect Dutch products and industries. All parties are critical to trade agreements, but JA21 wants more influence from within the EU whilst PVV and FvD want to make trade agreements outside of the EU.

PVV and FvD are very critical on the free movement of people or more specifically labour migration within the EU and their access to social welfare benefits (PVV, 2021; FvD, 2021). Therefore, they and JA21 want to restore Dutch border controls in order to limit the influx of eastern and central Europeans (PVV, 2021; FvD, 2021; JA21). However, their motivation differs. PVV does not want to provide work permits, houses or other social benefits to labour migrants, because the Covid-19 crisis already affects Dutch employment (PVV, 2021). FvD focusses more on unfair competition and social dumping due to cheap labour from Eastern Europe, whilst JA21 is mainly concerned about the pressure on the housing market. Therefore, FvD and also JA21 want labour migrants to work under the same terms and conditions as Dutch workers, which would encourage hiring Dutch employees instead (FvD, 2021; JA21, 2021). So, the PVV wants to ban all labour migration, while FvD and JA21 also propose measures to regulate it. The protection of the Dutch welfare state is important for PVV and JA21, therefore they are against any form of social security at EU level (PVV, 2021; JA21, 2021). Overall, all parties want to restore Dutch border controls in order to limit the influx of eastern and central Europeans. Here, FvD and JA21 also propose measures to regulate this migration by increasing work incentives for Dutch workers. Only PVV and JA21 mention to be against any social security at the EU level.

The Eurozone and EU budget

The Eurozone category shows high levels of coherence as all parties wish to leave the Eurozone although FvD and JA21 first want a referendum. Common complaints include the transfer union that is alleged of transferring Dutch welfare to Southern Europe (PVV, 2021; FvD, 2021; JA21, 2021). PVV takes the most nationalist position by arguing that the money should be spend on Dutch citizens (PVV, 2021), whereas FvD and JA21 have a more economic position. They want to get rid of the Euro, because the European economies are unequal as 'one size fits none'. Therefore, the parties think that

the Euro should not be an obligation for Member States. Furthermore, the European Central Bank (ECB) is seen as too powerful and its policies are criticised, namely the low interest rate harms Dutch pensions, housing and makes saving more difficult (FvD, 2019; 202; JA21, 2021). Therefore, JA21 seeks a compensation for these losses from the EU (JA21, 2021). Besides, FvD opposes European Covid-19 funds (FvD, 2021). The only party that mentions the EU budget is the PVV and calls it “megalomaniac” or in other words, way too high (PVV, 2021, p. 51). Overall, the Eurozone theme shows a high coherence as all parties want to leave the Eurozone. In addition, FvD and JA21 are critical towards the ECB. PVV does not mention the ECB, but they are the only party that says that the EU budget is too high.

Foreign, security, defence and migration policies

The raised topics in this subsection are: common foreign, security and defence policies, enlargement, geopolitical orientation, and asylum and border control. The parties are all against further enlargement of the EU and a European army. Further enlargement is undesirable due to expected increased migration, while the European army is seen as politically undesirable in terms of sovereignty and expenses (PVV, 2019; FvD, 2019; JA21). PVV only wants to deploy the army for Dutch interests, such as permanent national border control (PVV, 2021). PVV and FvD are strongly opposed to European foreign policies for sovereignty arguments (PVV, 2021) and practical arguments as FvD observes paralysis in the Councils (FvD, 2021). JA21 does not talk about this, but advocates foreign policy based on *realpolitik* (JA21). In regard of development aid, there is a similar range of opinions. PVV and FvD both want to stop with development aid, while FvD is open to provide emergency aid to affected regions (PVV, 2021; FvD2021). The position of JA21 is more moderate as they wish to reduce the Dutch development aid at least to the European average (JA21). Overall, there are different party positions on the discussed topics. All parties are against further enlargement of the EU and a European army. Other positions are more incoherent as PVV and FvD are strongly opposed to European foreign policies and development aid, while JA21 does not talk about EU foreign policy and only wants to reduce development aid.

The geopolitical orientation of PVV and JA21 compares as both parties are in favour of NATO, supporters of Israel, a Turkish exit of NATO and a normalised relationship with Russia. The difference is that PVV cares more about human rights, opts for a more normative approach and appreciates institutions as the International Criminal Court in contrast to FvD (PVV, 2021; FvD, 2021). Further, FvD and JA21 advocate a strong approach to China, because they think that the trade relationship is asymmetrical with high changes of espionage. The PVV does not mention China (PVV, 2021; FvD,

2021; JA21, 2021). All parties are very critical towards Erdogan's Turkey. Specifically, FvD does not want a visa-free entry for residents of Turkey to the EU, while PVV argues to scale down diplomatic relations with Islamic countries in general (PVV, 2021; FvD, 2019; JA21). JA21's approach is based on realpolitik, so they want the Netherlands act on the world stage with respect to the current power relations and Dutch interests (JA21, 2021). Overall, all parties value NATO, are critical towards Turkey and want a normalised relationship with Russia. Only PVV does not mention that a stronger approach to China is necessary and FvD is especially critical to intergovernmental organisations.

All parties have strong anti-migration positions on migration from outside the EU. They generally call the EU an immigration machine that is not capable of protecting its own borders (PVV, 2021; FvD, 2019; JA21, 2021). Therefore, PVV and FvD wish to terminate the Schengen Treaty and JA21 wants to reform it. Here, the common goal is reintroducing national border controls, because the parties think that it is important to be able to decide over who enters the Netherlands. The PVV and JA21 mainly relate migration to the Islam and FvD to crime and social order (PVV, 2019; FvD, 2019; JA21, 2021). Further, PVV wants to abolish the refugee deal with Turkey, advocates a complete asylum stop and wants to close asylum seekers' centres (PVV, 2021). In the EU, FvD wants to support Hungary, Austria, Poland and other immigration-critical Member States to allow them to set their own requirements for legal immigration. In the meantime, they support Mediterranean countries that refuse to accept migrant boats (FvD, 2019). JA21 is the most specific on EU policies as they do not want an EU migration pact to be mandatory. So, they wish an opt-out of the migration pact of the EU. Furthermore, JA21 thinks that a more effective containment of migratory flows from the Middle East and Africa is necessary (JA21, 2021). Overall, the parties coherently oppose European migration policies and want to close the national borders, because they want to decide over who can migrate to the Netherlands.

Environment, climate change, agriculture and fisheries

The last category covers the following issues: climate change, EU climate policies, energy and fisheries and agriculture. The parties prefer to adapt to climate change instead of fighting it, whilst FvD and PVV say that humans do not affect climate change because the climate is always changing. None of the parties want to contribute to the ambitions of the UN Paris Climate Agreement and the European Green Deal. These targets are seen as too expensive, unrealistic and polluting the horizon. PVV and JA21 specifically mention that they do not want to be involved in international climate agreements. Further, JA21 emphasises that climate measures should not affect Dutch housing. However, if the CO2 measures continue, JA21 says that the national measures cannot go further than

EU regulations. The most popular energy sources are nuclear power plants and clean Dutch coal, whereas PVV and FvD also mention thorium. These energy sources are seen as efficient sources and without polluting the horizon. In regard to agriculture and fisheries, all parties want to allow pulse fishing, which is a fishing technique that is forbidden by the EU and was widely used by Dutch fishermen. Moreover, the PVV and FvD want no EU rules for agriculture and fisheries. FvD and JA21 are more specific by arguing for allowing more innovation and market forces in agriculture and fisheries. After BREXIT, both parties want a lobby to fight for fishing areas and quotas which are in the Dutch interests. Lastly, JA21, constructively calls for fishing quotas with all Member States (PVV, 2021; FvD, 2021; JA21, 2021). Overall, the PRRPs are coherent in their opposition to climate change measures at the European level, whereas JA21 adopts the most cooperative position. There is less coherence in regard to European fisheries policies. PVV and FvD oppose common policies, whilst JA21 does want common quotas. In contrast, the parties are coherent in their wish to allow for more innovation in fisheries and agriculture.

4.3 PVV's change over time

This section compares PVV's views by themes over time. Therefore, all the election manifestos from 2012 to 2021 are included. An important remark is that the PVV manifestos of 2014, 2017 and 2019 only cover one page, which automatically leaves many topics undiscussed. The most recent EU positions of PVV are discussed in the previous section, therefore mainly the position changes will be discussed in this chapter. PVV's 2012 national election manifesto is mainly focussed on the EU and is called 'Their Brussels', which is also the first chapter of the manifesto (PVV, 2012). In contrast, the 2016 national election manifesto only mentions NEXIT (PVV, 2016). The 2021 election manifesto of PVV does not have a specific EU chapter. Therefore, the EU is part of a broader chapter on the EU, defence and foreign policies (PVV, 2021). Nevertheless, the PVV pays much attention to the EU in their introduction and the first chapter which is named 'your Netherlands'. Further, the chapters 'your climate realism' and 'your animals, farmers and fisherman' refer relatively often to the EU (PVV, 2021). Generally, the EU has a less important position in the national election manifestos after the 2012 manifesto. Nevertheless, the EU is a main issue throughout the 2021 manifesto.

Sovereignty and democracy

This category is observable in all election manifestos and the main similarity is the argumentation for a NEXIT (PVV, 2012; 2014; 2017; 2019; 2021). The differences lay in some specific measures that would encourage national sovereignty. In 2012, the PVV wants to abolish the European Parliament

and at least limit its meetings to one location, whereas they want a twenty percent salary cut in their 2021 election manifesto (PVV, 2012; 2021). In 2012, 2019 and 2021, the party is planning to block everything that involves the transfer of sovereignty to the EU and to defend the Dutch veto rights (PVV, 2012; 2019; 2021). Generally, the opposition to the EU on this theme is stable.

Identity and European values

All manifestos argue that the national identity and culture have to be protected against the EU and its attraction to asylum seekers. In addition, national symbols instead of European symbols should help to protect the national identity and culture (PVV, 2012; 2014; 2017; 2019; 2021). The two more elaborate election manifestos do mention more specific measures (PVV, 2012; 2014). The main difference is the motivation for these measures. In 2012, the PVV is mainly concerned about the influence of the EU on the Dutch identity, while in 2014 and 2017 the PVV is relatively more concerned about the Islam influencing Dutch identity (PVV, 2012; 2014; 2017). The current position of the PVV combines these concerns (PVV, 2021). Generally, since 2012, the focus of the PVV shifted a little bit, but they stably accuse the EU and the Islam of negatively affecting Dutch culture and identity.

Single market and social policy

The main similarity over time is PVV's anti-migration position related to the labour migration within the internal market (PVV, 2012; 2014; 2019; 2021). Only the national election manifesto of 2017 does not mention anything that relates to the single market and social policy (PVV, 2017). In 2014, the PVV argues that it would be financially beneficial to be able to make trade agreements with the rest of the world as an individual country (PVV, 2014). In 2012, the PVV is concerned about the negative economic implication of the regulatory pressure of the EU (PVV, 2012), while the PVV is currently more concerned about housing, promotion of Dutch products and the protection of the Dutch welfare state (PVV, 2021). Generally, the PVV stably opposes labour migration. Over the last ten years, they highlight different issues of the single market and social policy, but the overall positions are stable.

The Eurozone and EU budget

The common dominator of the manifestos that cover these themes is the wish to leave the Eurozone and restore the Gulden as a national currency (PVV, 2012; 2014; 2021). The main difference is that the 2012 manifesto focusses more on the Eurozone crisis by disapproving the European stability mechanism, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the transparency of EU expenditure (PVV,

2012), whereas the current focus is on spending Dutch tax money on the Dutch fight against the economic implications of the Covid-19 crisis (PVV, 2021). Generally, the PVV stably opposes the Eurozone and EU budgets and relates this to different crises over time.

Foreign, Security, Defence and migration policies

The PVV is not interested in any common European policies on foreign and defence issues and wants to close the borders for Islamic migrants. Security should be ensured by transatlantic links instead of on the EU, such as NATO (PVV, 2012; 2014; 2019; 2021). The main differences are observable between the election manifestos of 2012 and 2021. In 2012, the PVV wants to stop the negotiations about the EU accession of Turkey, whereas the current focus is on an exit of Turkey from NATO (PVV, 2012; 2021). Further past positions of the PVV include the wish for an opt-out on immigration and attention for human rights in foreign policy, such as LGBT emancipation (PVV, 2012). New positions include cancelling the European refugee deal, a complete asylum stop, a normalised relationship with Russia and scaling down diplomatic ties with Islamic countries (PVV, 2021). Generally, the PVV consistently opposes common European policies on foreign policy, defence, security and migration and the geopolitical orientation is stable. The PVV also stably wants to close the borders, whereby the means slightly differ.

Environment, climate change, agriculture and fisheries

The PVV argues that the European climate measures have to stop, because they say that it is unnecessary and too expensive to the extent that the measures will bankrupt the Netherlands (PVV, 2012; 2019; 2021). The current position specifically disapproves the UN Paris Climate Agreement and the European Green Deal. Further, it is the first time that the PVV mentions fisheries and agriculture, namely no EU rules for agriculture and fisheries. Especially, pulse fishing should be allowed by the EU and PVV wants no wind turbines at sea that negatively affect fishermen (PVV, 2021). Generally, the PVV stably opposes European climate measures. Agriculture and fisheries policies are newly highlighted, but also opposed.

4.4 FvD's change over time

This section compares FvD's views by themes over time. Therefore, all the election manifestos from 2017 to 2021 are included. The 2017 national election manifesto does have a specific EU chapter, whereas the 2021 national election manifesto does not have a specific EU chapter (FvD, 2017; 2021). Here, the EU is part of a broader chapter on the EU, defence and foreign policies (FvD, 2021). Next to

the EU chapter, most attention is on the EU in the Chapters 'Sovereignty' and 'Immigration & Remigration', while the first three chapters do not refer to the EU (FvD, 2017). In both years, the FvD pays similar attention to the EU in the introduction (FvD, 2017; 2021). Further, the two first chapters of the 2021 manifesto named 'sovereignty and democracy' and 'immigration and identity' pay much attention to EU issues, next to the foreign policy chapter (FvD, 2021). Overall, FvD pays similar attention to the EU throughout their manifestos and relates this to similar issues.

Sovereignty and democracy

FvD's position on sovereignty and democracy is very consistent, besides different terminologies and some specific issues. In short, sovereignty has to be transferred back from Brussels to the Netherlands. FvD thinks the EU is undemocratic and unreformable, so they want referenda on the Eurozone, NEXIT and open internal borders. Further, a constitutional court should end the direct effect of international law (FvD, 2017; 2019; 2021). In the meantime, FvD argues for referenda on everything that involves the further transfer of national sovereignty (FvD, 2017). In addition, they want to organise blocking minorities against EU legislation and louden the voice of the opposition (FvD, 2019). Lastly, an actively use of veto rights should stop further European integration (FvD, 2021). Overall, FvD stably argues for a NEXIT after a referendum and opposes the direct effect of international law and any further deepening of European integration.

Identity and European values

FvD does not directly relate national identity to the EU. Indirectly, they argue that there is insufficient cultural and social cohesion between Member States to establish successful political centralisation at the European level. This is illustrated by no votes in referenda about the European Constitution and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (FvD, 2019). In 2021, they only mention that International EU students negatively influence the Dutch educational level and culture (FvD, 2021). The only time that FvD talks about European values it is in a negative way (FvD, 2019). Furthermore, FvD consistently thinks that all people are fundamentally equal, regardless of gender, race or sexual orientation (FvD, 2017; 2019; 2021). Overall, the position of FvD is stable on the equality of people and the indirect negative relation between the EU and national identity. The recent negative view on the European values makes the party more radical on these themes.

Single market and social policy

Besides some differences in the detail, FvD has a consistent view on the single market and European social policy. They oppose the labour migration from Eastern Europe and their accession to the Dutch

social welfare system. Further, FvD wants referenda about the open borders and international trade agreements, but preferably they wish to join EFTA and conduct international trade agreements independently of EU Member States without any transfer of sovereignty (FvD, 2017; 2019;2021). In their 2021 election manifesto, they are against any form of social security at the EU level (FvD, 2021). Overall, FvD opposes labour migration and their access to Dutch social welfare in a stable way. Further, FvD consistently wants the Netherlands to be able to conduct their own trade agreements with third countries.

The Eurozone and EU budget

FvD consistently opposes the Eurozone, because they think that it destroys the southern economies and costs the northern economies billions. Therefore, they want a referendum about the euro (FvD, 2017;2019; 2021). In 2019, FvD emphasises that the low interest rate of the ECB harms Dutch pension and they also talk about organising blocking minorities within the EU against EU budgets (FvD, 2019). Obviously, the opposition to European Covid-19 funds is a new argument of FvD, but it relates to their anti-transfer union position. Further, FvD argues for enabling EU membership without being part of the Eurozone (FvD, 2021). Overall, the FvD opposes the Eurozone in a stable manner by highlighting different issues over time, whereas EU budgets are opposed in a less consistent way.

Foreign, Security, Defence and migration policies

The FvD is generally consistent on these EU policy areas as they oppose enlargement and common foreign, security, defence and migration policies. Furthermore, FvD argues for the reintroduction of border controls in order to stop immigration. In addition, they want to stop development aid and only allow emergency aid (FvD, 2017;2019; 2021). In 2017, FvD wants the non-ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (FvD, 2017). In 2021, a new position for FvD is that Turkey should leave NATO (FvD, 2021). Overall, the position of the FvD is stable by consistently opposing EU integration on these areas and by arguing for national border controls, whereas the highlighted specific issues differ over time.

Environment, climate change, agriculture and fisheries

FvD has become more critical towards climate change measures. In 2017, FvD wanted to encourage research on sustainability, the environment and innovative technology. Moreover, they wished to invest in the energy transition (FvD, 2017). In 2019, FvD argues that it is absurd that the Paris agreement obliges Member States to participate in the energy transition. Therefore, they want the

Netherlands to leave this agreement (FvD, 2019). In 2021, FvD, again, became more critical towards measures against climate change. They advocate that humans do not affect climate change, which is why they see CO2 reduction as an useless investment. In addition, the Green Deal has to be cancelled (FvD, 2021). A consistent factor is the motivation to make sure that the air and water are clean. The second consistency, is the opposition to the Common Fisheries Policy and the support for pulse fishing technology (FvD, 2017; 2019; 2021). Although, the FvD also argues for a lobby to defend the Dutch fishing interests in case the Common Fisheries Policy will continue (FvD, 2021). Overall, FvD has become increasingly radical on European climate measures. They switched their position from wanting to invest in the energy transition to outright opposition of European climate measures and denial of the climate crisis.

5. Discussion of results

This chapter discusses how the results relate to each other and to the literature. Firstly, the general Euroscepticism of Dutch PRRPs is discussed followed by their diversity of views and changes over time.

General Euroscepticism

Recently, Otjes (2021) defined PVV and FvD as hard Eurosceptic. The empirical analysis confirms that these parties principally oppose the EU and further European integration as they want the Netherlands to leave the EU. The new JA21 party is not mentioned in the literature. The results show that JA21 does not mention a NEXIT, but that they want to reform the EU from the inside. A party is Eurosceptic if a political party supports the EU in its current state whilst opposing further European integration (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008). Therefore, they take a Eurosceptic position by arguing against any transfer of sovereignty to the EU and by the wish to revise the Treaties to transfer decision making power back from Brussels to the Member States. Here, the goal of European cooperation between sovereign states is similar to PVV and FvD. This can be seen as principal opposition to the EU and therefore hard Euroscepticism, but without wanting a NEXIT. Overall, JA21 opposes the EU less outright than PVV and FvD.

Dutch (in)coherence

This section relates the main views on the EU of Dutch PRRPs to each other in order to point out the diversity of views including the split of FvD and JA21. Firstly, the theme sovereignty and democracy. All parties want European cooperation on the basis of sovereign nation states and to block further European integration. However, the diversity lays in the means as PVV wants a NEXIT, FvD wants a NEXIT after a referendum and JA21 wants to reform the EU from within. Only PVV and FvD clearly argue that the EU is undemocratic. Secondly, there is diversity on the theme of identity and European values which is mainly captured by the PVV and to a lesser extent by FvD, whereas JA21 does not relate this theme to the EU. All parties are open-minded towards gender rights and sexual orientation. Thirdly, the single market and social policy theme shows high levels of coherence on positions relating to labour migration, social welfare and border control. Especially, labour migration and border control are key issues to all parties. The main difference is that JA21 is critical to but does not rule out new EU trade agreements in advance. Fourthly, all parties want to leave the Eurozone while highlighting different relating issues, whereas the EU budget as a waste of Dutch tax money is

only mentioned by PVV. This relates to the nationalistic position of PVV, while FvD and JA21 argue that the Eurozone does not work due to economic and monetary arguments. Fifthly, the views of parties on the areas of foreign, security, development policies and geopolitical orientation differ in a limited way as JA21 often adopts a less radical position than PVV and FvD. In contrast, the parties coherently oppose European migration policies, EU army, enlargement and want to close the national borders. Lastly, all parties coherently oppose European climate measures, whereas JA21 adopts the most cooperative position. Further, there is less coherence in regard to European fisheries policies as PVV and FvD oppose any common policies, whilst JA21 does want common quotas. The parties are coherent in their wish to allow for more innovation in fisheries and agriculture.

General views on EU policies

On the one hand, coherent themes of Dutch PRRPs include the Eurozone, climate measures, migration and border control, enlargement, open-mindedness to sexual orientation and equality of people, single market, social welfare and innovation. On the other hand, incoherent themes cover sovereignty, democracy, identity, European values, trade agreements, EU budget, development aid, geopolitical orientation and fisheries. This supports the claim of Davidson and Saull (2017) that PRRPs criticise the free movement of labour within the EU and the institutional design of the Eurozone. However, other claims cannot be confirmed due to the variety of views of the Dutch parties, such as a general support of PRRPs for the internal market. Here, a free trade area is often preferred by Dutch PRRPs. In addition, the rejection of the Eurozone is mainly based on national identity and economic issues instead of democracy arguments. Krause and Giebler (2020) say that PRRPs have a nationalist position on social security and welfare systems, which is supported by the empirical analysis. This analysis also supports that PRRPs oppose further enlargement to avoid more labour migration in the EU, but next to that the parties are also concerned about the loss of Dutch influence in EU decision making (Liang, 2007). However, the claim of Bergmann, Hackenesch and Stockemer (2021) that PRRPs want to use development aid or the EU's development policy for migration prevention is not observable among Dutch PRRPs as they think that border control is the right solution. Besides that the generalisations leave many issues undiscussed, they often highlight only one aspect of a party position and tend to give an incomplete or wrong picture in comparison to the results of this in-depth case study based on election manifestos.

EU-wide and Dutch (in)coherence

Here, the (in)coherence of EU positions of the Dutch PRRPs are compared to the EU-wide (in)coherence as researched by Falkner and Plattner (2018; 2020). Firstly, Falkner and Plattner (2018) established that PRRPs show incoherence in all the researched areas, namely the single market, social and environmental measures, migration management, and defence cooperation. In contrast, the empirical analysis shows that those are exactly the areas on which the Dutch PRRPs are relatively coherent. Further, Falkner and Plattner (2018) expect that Dutch PRRPs might be differently different on discrimination and more specifically the protection of LGBT persons due to longstanding cultural practice. This claim is confirmed as Dutch PRRPs show a high open-mindedness to sexual orientation and equality of people, so longstanding cultural practices can also influence the positions of Dutch PRRPs. Secondly, Falkner and Plattner (2020) show that the antidiscrimination area is the most coherent. In contrast, the single market area is completely incoherent, whereas the area of foreign and defence policies is only slightly coherent. As mentioned in relation to longstanding cultural practices, it is already shown that Dutch PRRPs are coherent in the area of discrimination. Further, the observed complete incoherence of positions on the single market does not compare to Dutch PRRPs as this is a relatively coherent issue, besides trade agreements and the EU budget. Falkner and Plattner (2020) found a small amount of coherence in the area of foreign and defence policies. This compares to some extent to the coherence among Dutch PRRPs as the parties are coherent on the issues of migration, border control and enlargement, while the incoherence relates to the geopolitical orientation and development aid. Overall, Falkner and Plattner leave some topics that Dutch PRRPs do talk about undiscussed, namely sovereignty, democracy, identity, European values. These are all incoherent issues among Dutch PRRPs. Conti and Memoli (2012) researched this previously under the dimensions citizenship, representation and identity, but they focus on the positions of both the radical right and the radical left relative to the mainstream. So, it is not possible to separate the position of the radical right and the radical left. Overall, the coherence of PRRPs on the national level appears to be higher than the EU-wide coherence of radical right party position on the EU. Therefore, it is more likely that PRRPs can successfully work together on the national level than on the European level in order to influence EU decision making.

Changes over time and the split

This section compares the changes over time of EU positions of PVV, FvD and JA21 after their split. Since 2012, the PVV has a stable position on the EU, while highlighting different issues that often depend on the context in time. Only, agriculture and fisheries policies are talked about in 2021 for

the first time and being opposed. However, according to Van Rooyen (2010) the PVV is already against any EU interference with Dutch fishermen, while further findings also reflect a stable opposition on EU areas since 2010. Generally, the EU has a less important position in the national election manifestos after the 2012 election manifesto. Nevertheless, the EU is a primary issue throughout the 2021 manifesto. Overall, FvD's positions on EU issues also appears to be stable with some more radical exceptions. The recent negative view on the European values makes the party more radical on this theme. Especially, FvD has become increasingly radical on European climate measures. They changed their position from willing to invest in the energy transition to outright opposition of European climate measures and denial of the climate crisis. Generally, FvD pays similar attention to the EU throughout their manifestos over time and relates this to similar issues. JA21 moved in the opposite direction of FvD by becoming less radical. Overall, JA21 has become less radical and changed more than the slightly more radical development of FvD. More specifically, JA21 became less radical on the themes sovereignty and democracy, identity and European values, foreign security defence and migration policies, and European fisheries policies. In contrast, the position on the Eurozone, EU budget, the single market and social policy remained stable relative to the position of FvD. The first two chapters of the FvD's manifesto named 'sovereignty and democracy' and 'immigration and identity' pay much attention to EU issues, next to the foreign policy chapter (FvD, 2021). JA21 pays relatively less attention to EU issues in the introduction of their manifesto than FvD. Next to JA21's foreign policy chapter, the chapters 'lively society' and 'strong economy' focus the most on the EU. Besides the migration subsection, the first chapter which is called 'trustworthy government' barely pays attention to the EU. So, JA21 mostly relates economic and societal issues to the EU, while FvD focusses more on sovereignty, democracy and migration issues. Overall, PVV and to a lesser extent FvD have a stable position on the EU. Furthermore, the split of FvD resulted in the less radical JA21. Conti and Memoli (2012, p. 105) say that party-based Euroscepticism is of a "fluid nature" and changes over time and that it is unclear to what extent this applies to the radical right. Further, Falkner and Plattner (2018) also argue for research on how stable the claims of PRRPs are over time. The results of the current research show that the PVV and FvD do adopt a stable position on the EU. JA21 is the exception as they became less radical on EU issues than FvD. This is in line with the claim of Hooghe and Marks (2018) that new parties have more room for manoeuvrability than established parties of which positions are often constrained by earlier positions on certain issues. So, this is also the case within the group of radical right parties.

6. Conclusion

There is an extensive scholarly production on what PRRPs are, voter's motivations and on how PRRPs can influence the direction of EU politics. However, there is insufficient understanding of what exactly it is that they want, and how this may vary from one party to another. Therefore, the research question asks how Dutch PRRPs could agree or disagree over EU policy areas and whether this changes over time. This thesis shows that Dutch PRRPs vary in their views on the EU, despite their general Euroscepticism. At the national level, it is important to know how their EU positions vary for gauging the possibility of cooperation and the exact areas that they might influence in the future as they have both direct and indirect influence on EU decision making. Dutch PRRPs could agree on the following coherent themes on the national level: the Eurozone, climate measures, migration and border control, enlargement, open-mindedness to sexual orientation and equality of people, single market, social welfare and innovation. In contrast, radical right cooperation in the Netherlands is less likely on the incoherent themes that cover sovereignty, democracy, identity, European values, trade agreements, EU budget, development aid, geopolitical orientation and fisheries. So, there is no consensus about whether the Netherlands should leave the EU. It is likely that this variety of views differs across Member States for two reasons. Firstly, longstanding cultural practices influence PRRPs' views on the EU. Secondly, the coherence of EU positions within the Netherlands is higher than the EU-wide coherence because of the national context. Therefore, more in-depth national case studies in other Member States are necessary to find out how likely it is that PRRPs will cooperate and on what issues, which would tell us something about the possible direction of further European integration. As more data on radical right positions on the EU could tell whether they have similar goals or equal each other out and on what areas. Furthermore, it is also shown that PVV and FvD do adopt a stable position on the EU. JA21 is the exception as they became less radical on EU issues after their split from the FvD. This shows that PRRPs do adopt a stable position and that the source of significant position change is a split, because PRRPs are also constraint by earlier positions on the EU. Therefore, it is expected that PRRPs will stay Eurosceptic and therefore keep trying to complicate further European integration in the future. It is shown that election manifestos are clearly a relevant source for researching party positions. Further research could include other sources to expose differences and similarities between and to embed the results in topical statements such as speeches in parliament or elections, voting behaviour, social media and interviews with politicians.

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