Partnership peacekeeping: African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the peacekeeping partnership between the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), in the context of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It investigates the question: "How did the AU and the UN institutional (in)compatibility impact the effectiveness of AMISOM?" Both the practical and executive sides of the institutions involved, and the congruence between the mandate, resources, and activities undertaken are considered when evaluating the effectiveness of the mission. This is done using the congruence component of the analytical framework of Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON). This part of the framework describes the strategic intent, mandate and aims to understand whether the mission has achieved its mandated tasks, and the extent to which there was consensus about this among various stakeholders. While the mission had a clear mandate, the main form of logistical support, the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), was not designed to do its job. Mainly because it had roots in the UN's bureaucratic system, UNSOA was never able to meet the expectations of the mandate and objectives of AMISOM. The partnership between the AU and the UN was born out of the mutual recognition that alone, neither of them could cope with the multitude of security challenges facing Somalia. The mission had a peace-*enforcement* nature but was unable to successfully carry out its mandate and objectives because of the limitation of using peace*keeping* logistics. The inability of overcoming the institutional differences between the two organizations has led to the failure to accomplish the mission's mandate and the additional objectives and has led to an ineffective peacekeeping partnership that was not successful in living up to its full potential. For future peacekeeping partnerships, this means that working on a more equal and consistent relationship between the AU and the UN will likely improve the effectiveness of the collaboration and the mandate, objectives, and activities of the mission.

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Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EPON	Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
GA	General Assembly
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
IGASOM	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NSSP	National Security Stabilization Program
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
PSC	Peace and Security Council
SPF	Somali Police Force
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFIs	Transitory Federal Institutions
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United nations Operation in Somalia II
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office for Somalia

Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Introduction

As the United Nations (UN) celebrates its 75th anniversary, UN2020, a group of civil society representatives, has put out the UN75 People's Declaration and Plan for Global action. This declaration reflects on the past, but more importantly focuses on the future that the people want and the UN that the people need. One of the purposes and principles to attain this goal is to boost partnerships. According to the declaration: "Today's challenges require cooperation not only across borders but also across the whole of society. We have to make the United Nations more inclusive and engage with all relevant stakeholders, including regional and sub-regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, academia, and parliamentarians to ensure an effective response to our common challenges. We will work together with partners to strengthen coordination and global governance for the common future of present and coming generations."[1] Nevertheless, partnerships are not new to the UN, especially not with regard to peacekeeping. As peacekeeping missions become more complex, the need for cooperation with other actors has become essential. One of those collaborations describes the partnership between the UN as a global actor and the AU as a regional actor in Somalia.

In 2007, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The still ongoing African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) focused mainly on supporting dialogue and reconciliation to assure that there is a peace to keep for when the UN takes over from the AU. AMISOM brought the creation of an unprecedented AU-UN collaborative mechanism: the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which provided logistical support using UN contributions and the AMISOM Trust Fund.[2] AMISOM is an interesting case study within the realm of global-regional collaboration between the AU and the UN (partnership peacekeeping), because it was designed and still operates differently from traditional peace support operations.[3] The still ongoing African Union Mission

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[1] "Declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations," United Nations, 2020, https://www.un.org/pga/74/wp-content/uploads/sites/99/2020/06/200625-UN75-highlight.pdf
[2] Paul D. Williams and Arthur Boutellis, "Partnership peacekeeping: challenges and opportunities in the United Nations-African Union relationship," *African Affairs* 113, no.451 (2014): 272.
[3] Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu and Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede, "AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions," *African Security Review* 26, no.2 (2017): 199.

in Somalia grew out to be one of the biggest and most complex peace operations the AU ever conducted. The distinct features of AMISOM can give useful insight and meaningful variation on the outcome of partnership peacekeeping.

The security challenges in Somalia needed a global-regional collaboration between the AU and the UN. This collaboration was born out of the mutual recognition that alone, neither of them could cope with the multitude of security challenges that faced the African continent. The AU lacked the experience, institutional infrastructure, and the ability to finance the peace support operation.[4] The UN lacked the political authority to operate effectively in Africa, but it could provide the institutional, logistical, and financial support that the AU needed.[5] The design for this collaborative peace support mission was thus mainly event-driven; the situation in Somalia required pragmatic solutions that could only be offered if the AU and the UN worked together.

1.2 Problem statement

The collaboration between the AU and the UN has proven to be increasingly fruitful. However, the foundations of the partnership are still built on the necessity of pragmatic solutions, which often creates fragmentation between the two institutions. For example, in Somalia there were contradictions and a lack of cohesion between the different political forces, mainly between the headquarters of AMISOM and UNSOA. This was the result of different priorities: the main priority for UNSOA was to gain control over the mission, whereas the headquarters of AMISOM were mainly focused on creating stability in Somalia. Moreover, for the troop contributing countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, border security was the most important.[6] Also, economic interests played a large role for almost all countries involved. This fragmentation caused by the different priorities was the result of different visions, concepts, and interests of the two institutions, which challenged the cohesion of the mission.[7]

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[4] Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein, "Fragmented peacekeeping: the African Union in Somalia," *The RUSI Journal* 161, no.1 (2016): 51.

[5] Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, "Peace operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: toward more effective partnerships," *International Peace Institute* (2013): 7.

[6] Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein, "Fragmented peacekeeping: the African Union in Somalia," *The RUSI Journal* 161, no.1 (2016): 53.

[7] Albrecht and Haenlein, "Fragmented peacekeeping: the African Union in Somalia," 52.

The question arises if the relation and cooperation between the two institutions can be improved when they create a shared vision that is centered on an integrated and mutually-reinforcing relationship.[8] The AU-UN partnership peacekeeping missions have already made some improvements, but there still exists some serious disintegration between the two institutions, making further collaboration difficult. It is critical to find out what lessons can be learned from past operations, such as AMISOM, to further integrate the two institutions and improve the collaborative process in regard to peace operations in Africa.

When investigating institutionalization, it is important to establish a definition. This thesis will use the following definition of institutionalization: "The establishment of frameworks and processes in which states and other actors meet on a regular basis and the allocation of capacities and power to supranational bureaucracies."[9] Institutionalization matters, because it can help develop cooperation amongst states and other actors, contribute to a sense of common identity and interests, and facilitate the coordination and/or development of common policies. In the absence of institutionalization, decisions will often be made ad hoc and the country will be easily vulnerable to disruption or loss of political support.

Besides adding to the knowledge about peacekeeping, the lessons learned from this thesis may also be used in future peacekeeping missions. For instance, AMISOM is still an active peacekeeping mission. Reflecting on the past, lessons can be learned about what worked and what could have be done differently. This also applies to other AU-UN peace operations, current and future. Even though the context and situation of these missions may differ from Somalia, there will still be general institutional adaptations that can be made that apply to all AU-UN peacekeeping operations (or not when it is apparent that they work fine).

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[8] Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu and Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede, "AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions," *African Security Review* 26, no.2 (2017): 214.

[9] Andrew Cottey, "Sub-regional cooperation in Europe: an assessment," *Bruges Regional Integration and Global Governance Papers,* no. 3 (2009): 18.

1.3 Research question

This thesis will examine the following research question:

> "How did the AU and the UN institutional (in)compatibility impact the effectiveness of AMISOM?"

The AMISOM peacekeeping mission runs from 2007 until present. However, this thesis will look specifically at the decisions made in July 2010. On the 22nd of that month, the AU wanted to expand the mission's mandate from a peacekeeping focus to a peace-enforcement focus, so that they could engage al-Shabaab, a militant organization fighting the Somali government and the foreign military presence supporting it, more directly. However, a few days later the AU agreed to not expand the mandate after being pressured by the UN. This strategic process of decision making is illustrative of the collaboration between the two organizations; the presence and/or absence of communication, similar objectives, organizational and bureaucratic structures, et cetera. This will thus show how compatible the two organizations are in terms of their mandate, resources, and activities, and how that affected the implementation of the mission.

Both the practical and executive sides of the institutions involved need to be considered when evaluating the effect of the (in)compatibility of the two organizations on the mission itself. This will be done using two sub questions:

1. "How did the organizational structures of the AU and the UN differ during the mission and how did the difference manifest itself?"
2. "How did the bureaucratic structures of the institutions differ and how did that difference manifest itself during the mission?"

The first sub question describes the practical/logistical side of the institutions with regard to the mission: where does they money come from? Who supplies the equipment and troops? The second sub question describes the executive side of the institutions: what bodies exist within these institutions? Who makes which decisions? Both of these sub questions are important for answering the main research question: peace support operations need practical means to successfully carry out a mission, but getting those means is a political process of deliberation.

1.4 Analytical framework

This thesis will focus on the concept of global-regional security collaboration, or more specifically partnership peacekeeping. This concept describes the collaboration between a global actor (in this case the UN) and a regional actor (in this case the AU) when looking at security issues and peacekeeping missions. Regional organizations often represent the first resort as far as the peaceful resolution of conflict is concerned. Often however, no action will be taken by regional agencies without the authorization of the UN Security Council. This leaves the global organization to deal with those problems that cannot be solved at lower levels.[10] In many instances, especially with the AU-UN collaboration, these kind of partnerships are thus driven by certain circumstances that require pragmatic solutions, instead of originating from a shared vision.[11] The collaboration between the AU and the UN was born out of the mutual recognition that alone, neither of them can cope with the multitude of security challenges. The AU is an important source of political authority in Africa, but it lacks the material and financial capabilities to resolve the problems. The UN on the other hand has the capabilities but is not well suited to undertake peace enforcement operations.[12] The assumption is thus that both organizations will benefit from the arrangement of partnership peacekeeping. This thesis will assume that both organizations are rational actors. However, it recognizes that the AU and the UN may have different interests and visions, which can result in joint irrational decisions. This thesis will not apply, reject or modify the concept of partnership peacekeeping, but it will test it: what works within this collaboration and what does not?

This thesis will use an analytical framework to determine the effectiveness of the mission. This helps determine if the partnership between the AU and the UN was more or less effective than more traditional peacekeeping operations. When investigating the impact of partnership peacekeeping on the mission in AMISOM, and whether this has been more or less effective than more 'traditional' peacekeeping, it is first necessary to define what effectiveness exactly constitutes. This thesis will use the following definition of effectiveness: "Effectiveness may be viewed as a transnational public good that provides nonrival and nonexcludable

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[10] Bjorn Moller, "The pros and cons of subsidiarity: the role of African regional and subregional organizations in ensuring peace and security in Africa," *DISS Working Paper* 4, no.1 (2005): 4.
[11] Paul D. Williams and Arthur Boutellis, "Partnership peacekeeping: challenges and opportunities in the United Nations-African Union relationship," *African Affairs* 113, no.451 (2014): 265.
[12] Cedric de Coning, "Peace enforcement in Africa: doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations," *Contemporary Security Policy* 38, no.1 (2017): 146.

benefits by achieving the stability aim of peacekeeping missions".[13] This thesis will use this definition because it's one of the most broad and applicable definition for peacekeeping, not specific to the context of just one mission. Effectiveness is hard to identify, especially in the post-Cold War peacebuilding and peace enforcement missions that are often more complicated, with multiple tasks to achieve. The big issue of effectiveness is how to gauge it. Often, there is only one criterion used to judge efficiency, or a few are selected with an (implicit) bias. Another issue can be the time period for the criteria used to judge effectiveness: how long must peace be maintained for the mission to be successful?[14] Nevertheless, with all these issues and complications of measuring effectiveness in mind, this thesis will use part of the analytical framework of Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) to gauge the effectiveness of AMISOM. EPON was established by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in collaboration with more than 40 researchers and institutes, and undertakes collaborative research into the effectiveness of specific peace operations using a shared methodology across case studies.[15] Part of the existing framework and data will provide a solid basis for this thesis since doing extensive research of this kind falls outside of the scope of this thesis. The analytical framework and data will thus be applied to the case study of Somalia to answer the research question of this thesis. To the extent possible, some comparisons will be made with more traditional peacekeeping operations such as the ones in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali.

The analytical framework of EPON consists of two components: relevance and congruence. Relevance describes the situation in the host country and/or regional conflict system and aims to investigate the effects of the mission's activities on the political and security situation in the host country, especially for those most affected by the crisis. Congruence describes the strategic intent and mandate and aims to understand whether the mission has achieved its mandated tasks, and the extent to which there was consensus about this among various stakeholders.[16] Because this thesis has a focus on impact of the (in)compatibility of the structures of the institutions of the AU and UN, only the congruence part of the analytical

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[13] Todd Sandler, "International peacekeeping operations: burden sharing and effectiveness," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no.9 (2017): 1890.

[14] Sandler, "International peacekeeping operations: burden sharing and effectiveness," 1890.

[15] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia/AMISOM," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* 1 (2018): 17.

[16] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia/AMISOM," 24.

framework will be used. Describing the situation of the host country is also important when investigating the effectiveness of peace operations, but lies outside the scope of this thesis.

This thesis will thus investigate the congruence between the mission's mandate, its resources and capabilities, and its actual activities. The congruence of these three things has significant repercussions for the effectiveness of the mission. The better the three components fit together and work with each other, the more effective the mission will be. This will also depend on how the AU and the UN work together on the mandate, capabilities, and activities. The congruence of the different components, the compatibility of the organizations and the effectiveness of the mission are thus all connected with each other. The framework is divided in three parts. The first part is a measuring stick according to which the effectiveness of the organizational and bureaucratic structures, which are described in the second and third part, will be compared. It looks at the most important mandated goals and strategic objectives, and the evolution of these goals and objectives. The second part relates to the organizational structures within the institutions; the more practical and logistical side of the organizations and mission. It investigates the necessary resources and relevant capabilities to actually implement these objectives. Have these been sufficient and effective enough to achieve the set objectives? And does the partnership between the AU and the UN help to get the relevant resources and capabilities in comparison to more traditional operations? The third and last part refers to the bureaucratic structures within the institutions; the more executive and regulating side of the organizations and mission. It investigates the activities undertaken to implement the objectives. Have these been proportional to the resources and capabilities? Have the activities been effective enough to accomplish the objectives? And again, does the partnership between the AU and the UN help or worsen the effectiveness of the activities undertaken? The focus of the overall analytical framework will thus lay on the impact of the peacekeeping partnership on effectiveness as opposed to more traditional peacekeeping operations.

1.5 Research design and methodology

1.5.1 Sources

The selected data for this thesis will consist of primary sources, but will be supplemented with secondary sources. The primary sources will give insight into the structures, both organizational and bureaucratic, of the two institutions. For the AU, they will include reports, treaties, decisions and declarations of the assembly, et cetera. For the UN, they will include Security Council resolutions, the UN Charter, peacekeeping mandates, reports (of the Secretary General), specific arrangements, et cetera. However, these primary sources have limitations. Not everything will be made public, such as documents on certain meetings. This can result in a gap in the existing data. Moreover, the documents coming from specific institutions can be biased; they only show one perspective. Lastly, the sources about organizational and bureaucratic structures can be very cut and dry; not giving much insight in the day-to-day activities. It is important to keep this in mind when analyzing the primary sources and using them in this thesis.

The primary sources will be supplemented with secondary sources. These will mostly cover the insight into the AMISOM mission. Many scholars have already investigated the course, evolution, and effectiveness of this specific mission. Paul D. Williams has written a lot about partnership peacekeeping in general and AMISOM specifically.[17] His work will be supplemented with multiple other articles and books, such as the article from Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein about fragmented peacekeeping in Somalia[18], and the article from Cedric de Coning about the doctrinal distinctions between the two institutions.[19] The insights drawn from the primary sources (institutional structures) will be used to evaluate the insights from the secondary literature (the functioning of AMISOM). The secondary sources also have some limitations. The articles and books are written by specific people who will be influenced by their

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[17] Paul D. Williams and Solomon A. Dersso, "Saving strangers and neighbors: advancing UN-AU cooperation on peace operations," *International Peace Institute* (2015): 1-15.
Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, "Peace operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: toward more effective partnerships," *International Peace institute* (2013): 1-21.
Paul D. Williams and Arthur Boutellis, "Partnership peacekeeping: challenges and opportunities in the United Nations-African Union relationship," *African Affairs* 113, no.451 (2014): 254-278.
[18] Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein, "Fragmented peacekeeping: the African Union in Somalia," *The RUSI Journal* 161, no.1 (2016): 50-61.
[19] Cedric de Coning, "Peace enforcement in Africa: doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations," *Contemporary Security Policy* 38, no.1 (2017): 145-160.

own background and biases. Their insights will thus only offer one side of the issue. In addition, the literature on AMISOM is selective and incomplete, because one can never mention everything that happened during the mission. This can be because there was no knowledge that something occurred, or because it was not deemed important enough to report. Lastly, the organizational and bureaucratic structures are just two variables that will be examined in this thesis. In reality, there are probably a lot more variables that influenced the decision-making process during AMISOM. However, these other variables cannot be examined in this paper. The causal relation between the effectiveness of the mission and the (in)compatibility of the organizational and bureaucratic structures of the AU and the UN is thus not completely without fault.

1.5.2 Methods

The selection of primary and secondary sources will be analyzed using both a descriptive approach and case-centric process tracing. The descriptive approach will be used when looking at the institutional structures of the AU and UN, because this methodological approach describes the characteristics of a phenomenon. Instead of focusing on the 'how', 'when', and 'why' (for instance, why did this particular structure develop this way?), the focal point will lie on the 'what'; describing the characteristics of the phenomenon (i.e. the institutional structures). It is important to use the descriptive approach first to identify the similarities and differences between the two institutions and how this manifested itself in the mission, before using process tracing that investigates if this had an effect on the decision-making process.

Case-centric process tracing will be used when examining the evidence derived from the descriptive approach (the institutional structures). Instead of extracting implications of a theory, implications will be extracted from a phenomenon, namely the institutional structures. This method will be used, because generalization in a complex and interrelated social world is very difficult. However, it is possible to try and find the explanation for a certain outcome in a specific case. In this case, the outcome is AMISOM and decisions made within the mission. (In)compatibility between the two organizations explains part of this outcome. A connection will thus be sought between the (in)compatibility of the institutional structures and the effectiveness of the mission. These methodological approaches are relevant for this thesis, because when answering the research question, first it needs to be established how the institutional structures work (within the AU, UN, and AMISOM), and then how they have an

effect on decision-making within the peace mission. Respectively, the two methodological approaches do exactly that.

1.6 Limitations and delimitations

As mentioned before, this thesis does have some limitations. Because it focuses only on the impact of the organizational and bureaucratic structures of the AU and the UN on the effectiveness of the mission, many other factors that can influence this are not taken into account. For example, non-state actors, other political or non-political events, et cetera can also have an influence, but will not be taken into account in this thesis.

The sources and their analysis also have some limitations. As mentioned before, sources are almost always biased, implicitly or explicitly. Also, not all sources that will be relevant for this study will be available, leaving a gap in the data. Lastly, the methodology of case-centric process tracing assumes a connection between the outcome and a phenomenon. However, as mentioned before, the phenomenon studied in this thesis (institutional (in)compatibility) does not fully explain the outcome (the effectiveness of the mission). The use of a single case study also has implications for generalization. Generalization will not really be possible because this thesis looks at specific decisions made during AMISOM. However, this study does uncovers the (in)compatibility between the AU and the UN during AMSIOM, which can possibly be indicative for their relation during other partnership peacekeeping missions.

1.7 Chapter outline

After this introduction, the existing literature will be reviewed. Then, the third chapter will reveal background information about the long-lasting conflicts in Somalia in general and the African Union Mission in Somalia specifically. The fourth chapter describes the analysis of the effectiveness of the mission. First, a baseline of the mandated goals and strategic objectives will be established. Then, the resources and capabilities will be investigated. These organizational structures focus on UNSOA and describe the more practical/logistical side of the institutions. This part of the analysis will indicate whether the organizational structures were more effective during the peacekeeping partnership or during more traditional peacekeeping operations. Third, the analysis will investigate the activities undertaken. These activities describe the executive and regulating side of the AU and the UN. This part of the analysis will show whether the bureaucratic structures involved have been effective enough to accomplish

the objectives, and whether the partnership between the AU and the UN helps or worsens the effectiveness in comparison to more traditional peacekeeping operations. The last chapter, the conclusion, will summarize the findings, mention implications and existing limitations to the study, and make future recommendations.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This literature review will focus on peacekeeping partnerships, in particular on the collaboration between the AU and the UN. Peacekeeping partnerships emerged in response to the changing nature of peacekeeping operations. As the mandates of peacekeeping operations became more complex and multidimensional, peacekeeping tasks became more challenging to carry out in difficult environments.[20] Partnerships were often formed in places where there was little peace to keep and where robust action was required to implement mandates on the protection of civilians.[21] In 1992, the UNSC authorized for the first time the use of force by a regional organization, regarding the former Yugoslavia.[22] Since the establishment of the AU in 2002, the protocol creating the Peace and Security Council (PSC) mandated it to cooperate closely with the UNSC. Since then, the engagement of regional partners in peacekeeping operations has become the norm rather than the exception.[23] The establishment of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in 2010 has been instrumental in further advancing the cooperation between the two organizations. Furthermore, close and constant consultation between the UN and regional organizations such as the AU has been essential in creating convergence, both strategically and politically. The following section will review the existing literature and main scholars with regards to peacekeeping partnerships, with a focus on the collaboration between the AU and the UN.

2.2 Collaboration AU-UN and its shortcomings

The existing literature on the global-regional security collaboration between the UN and the AU when looking at peacekeeping can be divided up into multiple sections. The first and probably most researched section of the literature focuses on the (shortcomings of) the collaboration between the two institutions. Tieku and Hakak find that the concept of hybrid paternalism provides an accurate description of the complex nature of the AU-UN relationship.

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[20] Katarina Grenfell, "Partnerships in UN peacekeeping," *International Organizations Law Review* 13, no. 1 (2016): 1.

[21] "Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping," United Nations Security Council (2015): 2.

[22] "Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security," United Nations Security Council (2008): 6.

[23] "Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping," United Nations Security Council (2015): 2.

They describe hybrid paternalism as: "The asymmetric relationship between the AU and the UN in which the UN has more resources and experience and the advice and resources only flow from the UN to the AU and not the other way round."[24] They identify five different dimensions of hybrid paternalism. When analyzing these dimensions, it becomes clear that the relationship between the AU and the UN is inherently symbiotic and codependent. They use each other as scapegoat when things do not go according to plan. On the other hand, they can make use of the opportunities provided by the codependent nature of the relationship by influencing decision-making processes and the organizational behavior of the other. Despite the opportunities that hybrid paternalism provides for both organizations, Tieku and Hakak argue that the UN can do more to create an equal partnership.[25] This thus suggests that the partnership is unequal and that more of the power lies in the hands of the UN. Williams and Boutellis look more at the evolution of the collaboration between the two institutions on peace operations and how they can operate more effectively.[26] In another article, they state that besides great power politics and the international normative context, bottom-up challenges and constraints of partnership peacekeeping are important too.[27] These bottom-up challenges arise from within the missions and institutions. In one of his articles, De Coning gives an overview on peacekeeping partnerships and calls for the need for better cooperation.[28]

Whereas Williams and Boutellis did not mention the origins of the ineffective peace operations, De Coning argues that the individual organizations aren't flawed, but the relationship between them is.[29] In another article, he dives further into this, examining the doctrinal distinctions between the AU and the UN and the effect that this has on peace support operations.[30] Paddon too investigates the implications of partnerships for peacekeepers; its principles, and UN's legitimacy as a primary actor. Instead of focusing on the AU, as Williams

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[24] Thomas Kwasi Tieku and Tanzeel F. Hakak, "A curious case of hybrid paternalism: conceptualizing the relationship between the UN and AU on peace and security," *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 4, no.2 (2014): 134.

[25] Tieku and Hakak, "A curious case of hybrid paternalism: conceptualizing the relationship between the UN and AU on peace and security," 151.

[26] Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, "Peace operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: toward more effective partnerships," *International Peace institute* (2013): 1.

[27] Williams and Boutellis, "Partnership peacekeeping: challenges and opportunities in the United Nations-African Union relationship," 254.

[28] Cedric de Coning, "The emerging UN/AU peacekeeping partnership," *Conflict Trends* 1, no. 1 (2010): 10.

[29] de Coning, "The emerging UN/AU peacekeeping partnership," 9.

[30] Cedric de Coning, "Peace enforcement in Africa: doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations," *Contemporary Security Policy* 38, no.1 (2017): 145.

did, she mentions the UN as the primary actor and cautions it against prioritizing external partnerships, that are often driven by operational necessities, at the expense of internal partnerships.[31] Labbé and Boutellis instead, turn to the implications of peacekeeping partnerships on humanitarian action. Hereby, they focus on the tension between political peacekeeping missions and humanitarian principles, arguing that because of the deeply political nature of the UN, impartiality is often abandoned, which leads to inconsistent engagement with non-UN security forces in the protection of civilians.[32] Things thus need to be done differently for the collaboration to work better.

Mwanasali has already established this need for change in order to operate more effectively. He claims that a collective African intervention doctrine will do just that.[33] Williams and Dersso also state that the institutions face significant challenges, and that these challenges and institutional differences reduce the ability to deploy effective peace operations. But their solution is more focused on the attention that needs to be paid to the relationship between the UNSC in New York and the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa.[34]

Pergantis focuses more on the institutional and operational details of the partnership and how to deal with issues of shared responsibility. He argues that the AU is the facilitator of the UN's will. The problem according to him is that the UN has too little responsibility. Sharing responsibility will embed and deepen the common interests and objectives and thus lead to a reinforced collaboration between the two which will make the shared operations more effective.[35] Yamashita too focuses on peacekeeping cooperation, at multiple levels, which influence each other. However, he lays the problem with the AU, stating that the organization and its member states are unable to present themselves as a serious, equal, and effective peacekeeping partner. The AU needs to overcome its ambivalence about cooperation with

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[31] Emily Paddon, "Partnering for peace: implications and dilemmas," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no.5 (2011): 517.

[32] Jérémie Labbé and Arthur Boutellis, "Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces," *International Review of the Red Cross* 95, no.891/892 (2013): 556.

[33] Musifiky Mwanasali, "The African Union, the United Nations, and the responsibility to protect: toward an African intervention doctrine," *Global Responsibility to Protect* 2 (2010): 388.

[34] Paul D. Williams and Solomon A. Dersso, "Saving strangers and neighbors: advancing UN-AU cooperation on peace operations," *International Peace Institute* (2015): 1.

[35] Vassilis Pergantis, "UN-AU partnerships in international peace and security and issues of responsibility allocation in cases of UN support to regional missions," *International Organizations Law Review* 13, no.1 (2016): 85.

outsiders to achieve effective peacekeeping partnerships.[36] Lastly, Wondemagegnehu and Kebede analyze the AMISOM experience and its contribution to articulating the AU Commissions Peace Support Operation doctrine and policymaking. They state that the peace missions' doctrine should be centered on an integrated and mutually-reinforcing relationship among operations, institution-building, logistical support, and politics.[37] However, they fail to map how these things are currently arranged within the separate institutions. Williams also takes AMISOM under review. However, he explores some major challenges that hindered the ability to achieve its tasks and argues that AMISOM cannot be expected to implement a successful exit strategy unless these issued are addressed.[38] The issues he uncovers are mostly from the African side: internal AMISOM problems, problems with the Somali national army, Al-Shabaab, and political progress in Somalia. Thus, he does not acknowledge possible challenges that exist within the UN structure.

This section of the literature about the collaboration between the AU and the UN has revealed that all authors are of the opinion that there are shortcomings and that the AU-UN partnership can be more effective. Authors attribute this to different causes, from bottom-up factors to doctrinal distinction to sharing too little responsibility to the AU not being a serious, equal, and effective partner. However, too little attention is focused on the institutional (in)compatibility between the two organizations. Pergantis does pay attention to the institutional details of the separate organizations, but not on the (in)compatibility between them. Williams and Dersso do focus on institutional differences, but more on a general level instead of on the individual level of a specific mission such as AMISOM. The article of Williams and Dersso can be useful in the examination of this thesis on the impact of institutional (in)compatibility on the effectiveness of AMISOM.

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[36] Hikaru Yamashita, "Debating peacekeeping cooperation at multiple levels," *International Peacekeeping* 23, no.2 (2016): 362.
[37] Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu and Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede, "AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions," *African Security Review* 26, no.2 (2017): 199.
[38] Paul D. Williams, "AMISOM under review," *The RUSI Journal* 161, no.1 (2016): 40.

2.3 Solutions for more effective peacekeeping partnerships and cooperation

Whereas the previous section mainly focused on the shortcomings of the collaboration and only briefly mentioned possible solutions to improve the partnership, another section of the existing literature focuses entirely on the solutions for a more effective peacekeeping partnership. The focus of many authors lies on the presence or absence of frameworks and structures for cooperation. Two of the advocates for a predictable conceptual framework for cooperation are Labbé and Boutellis. According to them, the main challenge of peacekeeping missions is the deeply political nature of the UN, which often leads to the abandonment of impartiality. Working with a framework will lead to more consistent engagement with other parties on the protection of civilians and might alleviate some of the tensions. The formalization of a stricter chain of command can lead to more consistent use of mortar and artillery fire for instance.[39] Instead of mainly focusing on the UN, Yamashita takes a global perspective on the institutional angle of peacekeeping partnerships, stating the importance of the subcontracting model of cooperation. This means that Yamashita sees the UN as supporting system for security-related institution building and the regional organization of peacekeeping operations.[40] Rolfe also advocates for an international institutional structure that will produce routine and common approaches to protect civilians. Extensive pre-mission preparation, in-mission coordination, and post-mission evaluation will need to be embedded in a structure to be effective.[41] Where Rolfe focuses on form, Smith is of the opinion that function is more important. He argues that a global system may not solve the most pressing and persistent peacekeeping challenges and therefore aims for context-specific tools and strategies, instead of solving dilemmas which can never be done (function over form).[42]

Smith's idea of a framework that focuses more on function than on form comes close to Spandler's idea of a flexible framework. The key formula here is that the UN includes regional organizations but maintains its own authority. This flexible framework of cooperation assumes

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[39] Jérémie Labbé and Arthur Boutellis, "Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces," *International Review of the Red Cross* 95, no.891/892 (2013): 556.

[40] Hikaru Yamashita, "Peacekeeping cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations," *Review of International Studies* 38, no.1 (2012): 185.

[41] Jim Rolfe, "Partnering to protect: conceptualizing civil-military partnerships for the protection of civilians," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no.5 (2011): 570.

[42] Adam C. Smith, "Peacekeeping: the global enterprise," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no.5 (2011): 512.

the notion of complementarity (the idea that each organization takes advantage of its own comparative advantage), instead of aiming towards integration and equality. Spandler also warns that effectiveness is only one dimension of partnership, but does not go into further detail about the other dimensions, such as authority claims, conflicting historical narratives, et cetera.[43]

Then there are also the authors who are against any framework for cooperation at all. Peake for example argues that one needs to involve everyday realities. Frameworks are too rigid and static to reflect real life turn of events. This shows the gap between those making reform and those carrying it out. He argues that people need to embrace the complexity and not force a simplistic framework.[44] Wyss too mentions that convergence in practice depends on the nature of the individual crisis and the political, strategic, and economic interests of the parties involved. Setting up a general framework for cooperation would thus be of no use since theory does not necessarily translate into practice.[45] Boutellis and Williams add to this by stating that cooperation in peace operations is context-specific and depends on the different political agendas of the parties involved. A general framework will not guarantee automatic consensus on how to approach certain issues during an operation. A cooperative framework is thus difficult. Therefore they call for pragmatic operational responses to the different crises.[46]

Lastly, there is Mancini, who is of the opinion that structural challenges need to be managed instead of eliminated, because complete elimination is impossible. He argues that partnerships are rarely productive and reliable. However, the structural dimensions of partnerships are often better solutions than 'ideal' solutions. Instead of calling for a general framework, he argues for applying specific approaches depending on the varying level of agreement between the two partners, with the goal of making partnership more manageable and thus more effective.[47]

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[43] Kilian Spandler, "UNAMID and the legitimation of global-regional peacekeeping cooperation: partnership and friction in UN-AU relations," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 14, no.2 (2020): 198.

[44] Gordon Peake, "If this is the way the world works…," *International Peacekeeping* 23, no.1 (2016): 207.

[45] Marco Wyss, "France and the economic community of West African states: peacekeeping partnership in theory and practice," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35, no.4 (2017): 499.

[46] Paul D. Williams and Arthur Boutellis, "Partnership peacekeeping: challenges and opportunities in the United Nations-African Union relationship," *African Affairs* 113, no.451 (2014): 260.

[47] Francesco Mancini, "Managing partnership," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no.5 (2011): 627.

This section of the literature about the solutions for more effective peacekeeping partnerships shows that there is no consensus on the way to go. Some advocate for a general framework, arguing that it is more consistent and predictable. But even the proponents of a framework do not agree about how this can be structured best. Others are against any framework at all, arguing that it is too rigid and static and does not take into account everyday realities. Then there are authors in between, arguing for a flexible framework or specific approaches for making partnerships more manageable and thus more effective. Solutions for more effective peacekeeping partnerships are not within the scope of this thesis, but they do give insights into what authors think are shortcomings that prevent effective partnerships. This can be useful when looking at the impact of institutional (in)compatibility on the effectiveness of AMISOM, since effective cooperation will increase the chance of an effective peacekeeping mission.

2.4 AU and its role in peacekeeping partnerships and operations

Another section of literature is heavily centered on Africa and the AU and their role in peacekeeping partnerships and operations. Albrecht and Haenlein for instance, focus on structural fragmentation within the AU and the effect that this has on the tactics and overall strategy of the AU. According to them, this fragmentation damages the ability to achieve the mission objectives. They do not argue for better cohesion between the two institutions, like many other articles do. Instead, they point out that there needs to be more cohesion among the member states within the AU.[48] Maseng and Lekaba underscore this by arguing that African unity is sacrosanct in order for the AU to make significant contributions to the reform of the UNSC. If every country within the AU only advances its own interests and these clash with each other, this forms a threat to African unity and cohesion. They put extra emphasis on the role of the personality and leadership aspirations of a head of state in foreign policy. The challenges that come before the AU and its membership countries require leadership and deliberate strategizing.[49] Murithi too states that the AU needs to make improvements in order to enhance its role in peace operations. According to him, the AU will need to address its issues of financial and logistical weakness. Additionally, just like Albrecht and Haenlein, and Maseng and Lekaba,

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[48] Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein, "Fragmented peacekeeping: the African Union in Somalia," *The RUSI Journal* 161, no.1 (2016): 58.

[49] Jonathan Oshupeng Maseng and Frank Gadiwele Lekaba, "United Nations Security Council reform and the dilemmas of African continental integration," *African Security Review* 23, no.4 (2014): 400.

Murithi is also of the opinion that the lack of political consensus within the AU poses a problem.[50] Rwengabo summarizes all opinions by underscoring the need to harness Africa's potential to address its peace and security challenges. He uses the argument of the African value of 'African solutions to African problems,' stating that "borrowed fists cannot solve most of Africa's security problems."[51]

The role of the AU in partnership peacekeeping and peace operations can be improved according to several authors. The most important thing that can be improved is the cohesion among African states. For example, the lack of political consensus can form a huge problem in their partnership with the UN. Some also argue that other weaknesses, such as financial and logistical problems can be improved to harness Africa's potential to address peace and security challenges. In terms of looking at the question of the impact of institutional (in)compatibility on effectiveness of AMISOM, it can be useful to look at the weak spots and points of improvement of one of the institutions. However, only looking at one of the two institutions in not enough, since this thesis investigates (in)compatibility, and that can only be done by looking at the collaborative effort between both the institutions.

2.5 Legality and issues of authority, legitimacy, and responsibility

This section of the literature focuses on the legal side of peacekeeping partnership. As partnerships involve the collaborative effort of two actors, issues of authority, legitimacy and responsibility can arise. Some of the authors who investigate the legal implications of peace operations by proxy (UN peacekeepers partnering with national or regional non-UN security forces) are Labbé and Boutellis. They show that to ensure that mistakes from the past do not happen again, the UN now has policies with a defensive character to shield the UN from any legal responsibility incurred by the behavior of the security forces that it supports.[52] Grenfell too looks at issues of responsibility, by examining different types of partnerships and the policy and practice of the UN regarding the use of these partnerships. She concludes that, regarding

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[50] Tim Murithi, "The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union mission in Somalia," *African Security Studies* 17, no.1 (2008): 81.

[51] Sabastiano Rwengabo, "AMISOM and African-centered solutions to peace and security challenges," *AfSol Journal* 1, no.1 (2016): 91.

[52] Jérémie Labbé and Arthur Boutellis, "Peace operations by proxy: implications for humanitarian action of UN peacekeeping partnerships with non-UN security forces," *International Review of the Red Cross* 95, no.891/892 (2013): 555.

joint operations, responsibility flows where command and control are vested.[53] Where the joint mission is under a single chain of command provided by the UN, they take certain measures of due diligence to ensure that personnel serving under the UN flag meet UN standards, in terms of equipment, training and human rights conducts.[54] Pergantis argues that soft/indirect influence exercised by the UN will inevitably escape responsibility. Soft influence describes for instance the model of subcontracting, where the AU is the facilitator of the UN's will. Besides just looking at the problem, he also proposes a solution. He argues that the UN needs to be more responsible, since sharing responsibility will deepen and common interests and objectives, and thus make the joint peacekeeping more effective.[55]

Instead of focusing on responsibility, Paddon and Spandler research legitimacy. Spandler analyzes the evolution of legitimation of global-regional security governance and questions of authority. He argues that over time, the initial process of mutual legitimation gave way to competitive legitimation between the two organizations. A rigid form of cooperation was incompatible and thus the institutions moved towards a discourse of complementarity rather than integration and equality. For instance, the UN included regional organization in global peacekeeping while maintaining its own authority.[56] Paddon focuses on the UN's legitimacy as a primary actor tasked with maintaining international peace and security. She looks at different dimensions of legitimacy, such as procedural, substantive, and effective/consequential legitimacy. Some ethical and operational dilemmas raised by partnerships have implications for the UN's legitimacy. An example of a dilemma is the balancing of a rapid response with partner impartiality for a robust response with consent and long term capabilities.[57] True burden sharing thus calls for deeper internal partnerships and more predictable alliances. Consensus, clarity of vision and the scaling back of expectations,

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[53] Katarina Grenfell, "Partnerships in UN peacekeeping," *International Organizations Law Review* 13, no.1 (2016): 68.
[54] Grenfell, "Partnerships in UN peacekeeping," 70.
[55] Vassilis Pergantis, "UN-AU partnerships in international peace and security and issues of responsibility allocation in cases of UN support to regional missions," *International Organizations Law Review* 13, no.1 (2016): 95.
[56] Kilian Spandler, "UNAMID and the legitimation of global-regional peacekeeping cooperation: partnership and friction in UN-AU relations," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 14, no.2 (2020): 195.
[57] Emily Paddon, "Partnering for peace: implications and dilemmas," *International Peacekeeping* 18, no.5 (2011): 517.

amongst other things, are needed to accomplish this goal.[58] Legitimacy thus depends on the relationship of the two organizations.

Legality and issues of authority, legitimacy and responsibility focus mainly on the UN, since this organization is the primary actor tasked with maintaining international peace and security. The UN has become more and more defensive, trying to protect itself from responsibility and legal implications. While some argue for the UN to share more responsibility because it creates deeper internal partnerships, others argue for a discourse of complementarity rather than integration and equality, with the UN including regional organizations but maintaining its own authority. This thesis will not look at the legal side of peacekeeping partnerships, but this can give some insight into the relation between the two organizations. Especially the issue of authority can say something about the (in)compatibility between the AU and the UN.

2.6 Gap in the literature review

As has become clear by the literature review, the AU and the UN separately are often the focal point of research, as well as the challenges, solutions and legal side of peacekeeping operations. The gap in the literature however constitutes the investigation to the degree of compatibility between the two institutions, as well as its impact on the effectiveness of a specific mission, for instance of AMISOM. The article of Williams and Dersso does focus on institutional differences, but more on a general level instead of on the level of a specific mission. There does not necessarily need to be a difference, but some institutional divergences can be more pronounced in certain missions. Variability in the context of the mission may highlight particular problems or things that work well in the collaboration between the AU and the UN. Also, Williams and Dersso do not make an explicit connection between the institutional differences and the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The degree of compatibility between the AU and the UN, and the impact of the effectiveness on AMISOM thus need to be investigated further.

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[58] Paddon, "Partnering for peace: implications and dilemmas," 530.

Chapter 3 – Background: the conflict in Somalia and AMISOM

This chapter will give some background information about the history of conflict in Somalia and the origins and development of the African Union mission in Somalia. This is necessary to better understand the analysis of the mandate, objectives, resources, capabilities, and activities undertaken which will be provided in the next chapter. This analysis will subsequently answer the research question. Thus, understanding the history of the situation in Somalia provides the foundation of answering the research question about institutional (in)compatibility and the effectiveness of the mission.

3.1 Conflict in Somalia

For a long time, Somalia resisted conquest by the Britain, France, Italy and Ethiopia. But in 1920 Somalia was nevertheless conquered, dividing the land in French Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland and the Ogaden region for Ethiopia (now the Somali region). In 1960, the two territories of the British and Italian Somaliland united and gained independence, together forming the Somali republic. Since then, Somalia has had multiple crises. In 1969, officers from the army, led by general Siad Barre, committed a coup d'état. Barre wanted to incorporate the Ogaden region and in 1977, war broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia[59]. This ended in a truce, but Somalia became internationally isolated and eventually, the US came to its rescue. In 1986, a civil war broke out in Somalia, where revolutionary troops in the North fought against the government. In 1991, British Somaliland announced its independence, although its sovereignty has not been recognized by any other nation. Since then, there has been no functional central governing authority in Somalia.[60] This is a large reason for crises such as criminality and armed conflict, but it is not inherently linked. The civil war not only caused many deaths, but also disrupted agriculture and food distribution.

The UN initially responded by authorizing a limited peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). However, the warring factions soon disregarded the mission. Then, in 1992, the United States organized a military coalition, the Unified Task Force or UNITAF, to create a secure environment for the conduct of humanitarian operations.

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[59] World bank, *Conflict in Somalia: drivers and dynamics* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2005), 9.
[60] Ken Menkhaus, "State collapse in Somalia: second thoughts," *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no.97 (2003): 407.

The coalition was largely successful in restoring order and alleviating the famine, and in 1993 was replaced by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The mandate of UNOSOM II was much more expansive: assisting Somalis in promoting national reconciliation, rebuilding the central government, and reviving the economy[61] However, UNOSOM II was seen as a threat to power and was attacked by militias, causing the UN to withdraw in 1995. A year after, the self-proclaimed president of Somalia, Mohamed Farrah Aidid, was killed, and a few years later the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established, which was internationally recognized. The rival Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was driven out by an United States-backed intervention by the Ethiopian military. However, more radical elements of the ICU, such as Al-Shabaab, continue their insurgence against the TFG and Ethiopia's presence in Somalia.

Menkhaus argues that attempts to revive a centralized state have actually exacerbated armed conflicts. State building and peace building then are two separate enterprises in Somalia. This is because in Somalia, the revival of a state is seen as a zero-sum game, creating winners and losers in a game with very high stakes. The winners will gain control over the central government and appropriate economic resources at the expense of others. Thus, not the existence of a central government, but the process of state-building appears to create armed conflict.[62] Nevertheless, in 2007, the UNSC authorized the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission in support of Somalia's Transitory Federal Institutions (TFIs). The establishment of transitional institutions represents a significant step towards reconciliation and stability.[63] AMISOM continues to support the Federal Government of Somalia's (FGS's) commitment to a credible electoral process and is actively working to bring peace and stability to the nation.[64]

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[61] World bank, *Conflict in Somalia: drivers and dynamics* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2005), 11.
[62] Ken Menkhaus, "State collapse in Somalia: second thoughts," *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no.97 (2003): 408.
[63] World bank, *Conflict in Somalia: drivers and dynamics* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2005), 14.
[64] "About Somalia: Brief History," AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia, accessed October 23, 2020, https://amisom-au.org/about-somalia/brief-history/

3.2 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

AMISOM is an interesting case study within the realm of global-regional collaboration between the AU and the UN (partnership peacekeeping), because it was designed and still operates differently from traditional peace support operations.[65] The distinct features of AMISOM can give useful insight and meaningful variation on the outcome of partnership peacekeeping. The still ongoing African Union Mission in Somalia was born out of the mutual recognition that alone, neither the African Union, nor the United Nations could cope with the multitude of security challenges that faced the African country. The security challenges in Somalia thus needed a global-regional collaboration between the two organizations. The AU lacked the experience, institutional infrastructure, and the ability to finance the peace support operation.[66] The UN lacked the political authority to operate effectively in Africa, but it could provide the institutional, logistical, and financial support that the AU needed.[67] The design for this collaborative peace support mission was thus mainly event-driven; the situation in Somalia required pragmatic solutions that could only be offered if the AU and the UN worked together.

AMISOM replaced the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which provided peacekeeping forces for the latest phase of the Somali civil war in 2005. By June 2006, the ICU had established control of the capital. They opposed IGASOM, which they saw as a western means to curb the growth of the Islamic movement. The UN first tried to impose an arms embargo, but when this failed, they authorized the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months to support the national reconciliation congress. Later, AMISOM got the green light to further continue its mission and to take all measures appropriate to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation.[68]

AMISOM eventually grew out to be one of the biggest and most complex peace operations the AU has ever conducted. AMISOM also brought the creation of an unprecedented AU-UN collaborative mechanism: the UN Support Office for AMISOM, which

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[65] Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu and Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede, "AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions," *African Security Review* 26, no.2 (2017): 199.

[66] Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein, "Fragmented peacekeeping: the African Union in Somalia," *The RUSI Journal* 161, no.1 (2016): 51.

[67] Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, "Peace operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: toward more effective partnerships," *International Peace Institute* (2013): 7.

[68] "About AMISOM: AMSIOM Background," AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia, accessed October 26, 2020, https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/

provided logistical support using UN contributions and the AMISOM Trust Fund.[69] In 2017, the UN Security Council issued a resolution which enabled the gradual handing over of the security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces. The mandate also included the assistance to Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels, as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia.[70]

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[69] Paul D. Williams and Arthur Boutellis, "Partnership peacekeeping: challenges and opportunities in the United Nations-African Union relationship," *African Affairs* 113, no.451 (2014): 272.

[70] "About AMISOM: AMSIOM Mandate," AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia, accessed October 26, 2020, https://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/

Chapter 4 – Analysis: assessing effectiveness

4.1 AMISOM's mandated goals and strategic objectives

The first category of the framework describes the mandate's goals and strategic objectives. This is used as a measuring stick according to which the effectiveness of the organizational and bureaucratic structures (the second and third categories of the framework) will be compared. On February 20th 2007, by unanimously adopting resolution 1744, the Security Council authorized a six-month African Union Mission in Somalia. The original mandate of AMISOM, agreed upon in 2006/2007, was focused mainly on supporting dialogue and reconciliation to assure that there was a peace to keep for when the UN takes over from the AU. The initiative, taken by the Transitional Federal Institutions and President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, was welcomed by the Council. The Council requested the Secretary-General to assist with that congress and to promote an ongoing all-inclusive political process, including the AU, the League of Arab States and the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD).[71] Therefore, AMISOM was mandated to: "Conduct Peace Support Operations in Somalia to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the United Nations (UN)."[72] The mission's activities and strategic objectives reflect this main goal of stabilization of the conflict. The mandate came with the following seven tasks: (1) Support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders; (2) Provide protection to Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and key infrastructure to enable them to carry out their functions; (3) Assist in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Program (NSSP); (4) Provide technical assistance and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts; (5) Monitor the security situation in areas of operation; (6) Facilitate humanitarian operations including the repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); and (7) Protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self-defense.[73]

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[71] "Meetings coverage and press releases," United Nations, accessed December 15 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8960.doc.htm

[72] "Mandate: 2006-2007," AMISOM-AU, accessed December 15 2020, http://amisom-au.org/mandate-2006-2007/

[73] "Mandate: 2006-2007," AMISOM-AU, accessed December 15 2020, http://amisom-au.org/mandate-2006-2007/

To help achieve these goals, the UN Security Council (UNSC) lifted the arms embargo established by resolution 751 (1992) for weapons and supplies for use by the mission and for the purpose of helping develop security sector institutions - under the condition that states using such weapons first notify the sanctions committee.[74] The mandate has been extended a couple of times by the AU, namely on July 18th 2007, January 18th 2008, June 29th 2008, and January 8th 2010. This has been agreed upon by the UN on August 20th 2007, February 20th 2008, August 19th 2008, and January 28th 2010.[75]

In the period between 2007 and 2010, the mandate has been revised and extended once, adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) on December 22th 2008, and by the UNSC on January 16th 2009. The communiqué of the PSC mentioned that the expansion of the mandate included the right of self-defense and protection of installations, equipment, and personnel. In the same communiqué, the PSC noted with concern that two years after the deployment of AMISOM, the mission had yet to reach its authorized strength of nine battalions. Reiterating the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the council called on the UNSC to immediately take the steps expected of it, in particular by authorizing the deployment of an international stabilization force and, subsequently, that of a peacekeeping operation to take over from AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia. Since the continued stay of AMISOM forces who depended on the availability of the required resources, the council also requested the UNSC to authorize a support package for AMISOM.[76]

The meeting of the UNSC on the January 16th 2009 noted the communiqué of the AU whereby they called for an interim stabilization force in anticipation of a UN peacekeeping operation to take over from AMISOM. They also underlined that AMISOM was to be authorized to "take all necessary measures to provide security for key infrastructure and to contribute to, as may be requested and within its capabilities and existing mandate, to the creation of the

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[74] "Meetings coverage and press releases," United Nations, accessed December 15 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8960.doc.htm

[75] "AU statements and reports," AMISOM-AU, accessed December 15 2020, http://amisom-au.org/key-documents/au-statements-reports/
"United Nations Security Council resolutions," AMISOM-AU, accessed December 15 2020, http://amisom-au.org/key-documents/united-nations-security-council-resolutions/

[76] "Communique of the 163rd meeting of the Peace and Security Council," Peaceau, accessed December 15 2020, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquesomaliaeng.pdf

necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance."[77] The UNSC thus also adopted the expansion of the mandate that included the right of self-defense and protection of installations, equipment, and personnel.

As mentioned before, between 2007 and 2010 the mandate was only revised once. However, on July 22nd 2010, the AU wanted to expand the mandate from a peacekeeping focus to a peace enforcement focus. This was because they believed that this way, they could engage al-Shabaab more directly. Besides, this was a chance for the AU to assert ownership over an African conflict and a chance for the UN to avoid having to do so. However, there were still discussions on how to execute such a mission (financing, number of troops, governing rules) and how to deal with the threats faced, such as attacks by al-Shabaab .[78] Eventually, the mission had a peace-*enforcement* nature but was unable to successfully carry out its mandate of taking all necessary measures to provide security (for the provision of humanitarian assistance) within its capabilities and existing mandate, because of the limitation of using peace*keeping* logistics.[79] Thus, the AU was effectively pressured by the UN to not focus the mission on peace enforcement because the AU relied on the UN for logistical and financial support.

Next to the mandate for AMISOM, there was also a mandate for the monitoring group of the UN. Since this only concerns one actor, the UN, and does not influence the effectiveness of the mission (it only monitors it), this mandate will only be explained briefly. On December 16th 2003, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1519, in which the Council requested the establishment of a monitoring group to investigate violations of the arms embargo against the country.[80] The arms embargo was already established in 1992, and after multiple calls of violations, a monitoring group was established. At the beginning of AMISOM, on July 23rd 2007, the mandate of the Monitoring Group was once again extended. It was noted that the arms embargo on Somalia does not apply to supplies and technical assistance from states intended solely for the purpose of helping develop security sector institutions.[81] The mandate was

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[77] "Resolution 1863 (2009) adopted by the Security Council at its 6068th meeting, on 16 January 2009," UNSCR, accessed December 15 2020, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1863

[78] Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu and Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede, "AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions," *African Security Review* 26, no.2 (2017): 203.

[79] Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, "AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions," 207.

[80] "Resolution 1519 (2003) adopted by the Security Council at its 4885th meeting, on 16 December 2003," UNSCR, accessed December 16 2020, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1519

[81] "Resolution 1766 (2007) adopted by the Security Council at its 5720th meeting, on 23 July 2007," UNSCR, accessed December 16 2020, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1766

extended a couple of times for a few months, but on March 19th 2010, it was expanded to also investigate transport routes used in the violation of Eritrea and Somalia arms embargoes, and economic activities generating funds for the violation of the same.[82]

4.2 Resources and capabilities

Now that the mandate and therefore the objectives of AMISOM have become clear, attention needs to be paid to the second category of the framework: the necessary resources and relevant capabilities to actually implement these goals. This also relates to the first sub question about the differences in organizational structures of the AU and the UN. Special focus needs to be on the question if the resources and capabilities have been sufficient and effective enough, as well as on the question if the partnership between the AU and the UN has helped to get the relevant resources and capabilities in comparison to more traditional operations.

The most obvious and most present logistical provision is the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which in 2015 transitioned into the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). The relationship between the AU and the UN was based on the mutual dependability of the two actors. The UN recognized the need for an UN peacekeeping operation, but also recognized that this would be difficult to launch. Practically, this mutual dependability manifested in the provision of logistical support from the UN to the AU mission and furthering the political process in Somalia.[83] Resolution 1863 requested the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund to provide financial support to AMISOM until an United Nations Peacekeeping Operation was deployed and to assist in the reestablishment, training, and retention of all-inclusive Somalia security forces.[84] The resolution thus mandated the establishment of UNSOA, which authorized funding for a non-UN peace operation launched by a regional organization. The resolution was also part of a plan to strengthen the TFG's security sector and create conditions for the transition from AMISOM to an UN peacekeeping operation.

UNSOA support included the operation's provision of food, water, health and sanitation, fuel, facilities and engineering, vehicles and other equipment, communications and information

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[82] "Resolution 1916 (2010) adopted by the Security Council at its 6289th meeting, on 19 March 2010," UNSCR, accessed December 16 2020, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1916

[83] Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu and Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede, "AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions," *African Security Review* 26, no.2 (2017): 205.

[84] "Resolution 1863 (2009) adopted by the Security Council at its 6068th meeting, on 16 January 2009," UNSCR, accessed December 16 2020, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1863

technology, property management, capacity building, aviation and medical services. This was financed by UN member states and voluntary financial contributions from other actors. The supply of military assets and ammunition however, needed to come from AMISOM's troop contributing countries (TCCs).[85]

As mentioned before, UNSOA was intended to improve AMISOM's operational standards to facilitate its transition into a UN peacekeeping operation. The support office underwent two reviews, one in 2012 and one in 2015. After the last one, UNSOA transitioned into UNSOS. According to the last report, UNSOA had a mixed record but produced positive results and provided a new mechanism for the UN to deliver field support. However, the report also analyzed five sets of problems that formed an obstacle for the operational effectiveness of AMISOM.[86] These problems are included within the organizational category of the framework (second category), because they affect the executive side of the mission. However, the problems are not all necessarily organizational/logistical in nature. The following section will further investigate these five problems. First, the problem will be elaborated upon. Second, UNSOA's flaws will be compared to the logistical provisions in more conventional peacekeeping missions, specifically looking at the question of if/how the problem also exists in more traditional peacekeeping missions. Lastly, UNSOA's flaws and its effect on the mandate and tasks of AMISOM will be analyzed: did the problem get in the way of accomplishing the mandate and tasks? And was the partnership beneficial and/or efficient compared to more traditional peacekeeping operations?

4.2.1 First problem: expansion list of tasks

The first problem of UNSOA described the expanding list of tasks without the subsequent expansion of resources. Between 2009 and 2015, the mandate was expanded eight times, without the necessary resources. One of the causes of this problem was that AMISOM did not always make their requests on time. Especially before the establishment of the headquarters in 2012, there were no staff officers with tasks such as ordering (logistical) items. Even when AMISOM made requests, these often consisted of lists of items of which the

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[85] Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu and Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede, "AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions," *African Security Review* 26, no.2 (2017): 205.

[86] Paul D. Williams, "UN support to regional peace operations: lessons from UNSOA," *International Peace Institute* (2017): 2.

necessity was difficult to assess by UNSOA.[87] Because of the lack of resources, there came to be a gap between the mandated tasks and the capacity to deliver. In practice, UNSOA was thus not really serving as a support office.[88]

The system of UNSOA, where AMISOM requests and UNSOA delivers (partly) is not something that exists in other, more conventional and traditional peacekeeping operations. Take the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for example, where the UN and the Congolese authorities cooperated on issues where their agenda and interests overlapped.[89] MONUSCO also worked together with regional organizations, but faced a problem of continuity because of shifts in leadership and subsequent priorities. Mobilizing all the partners had an effect on the effectiveness of the mission, which increased and decreased depending on the relationship between the partners.[90] MONUSCO tried to enable these international, regional, and national actors (including the private sector) to provide services and stimulate the local economy.[91]

In comparison to the provisions in more traditional peacekeeping missions such as MONUSCO, UNSOA had the advantage of being more stable. Where the cooperation between partners and therefore the provision of resources in Congo fluctuated, this was not the case in Somalia. However, although UNSOA was a stable support office, it clearly did not have enough capacity to deliver the necessary resources. In the case of Congo, although the provision of resources fluctuated, there were times that partnerships and resources were present and sufficient, as opposed to UNSOA.

The expansion of the list of tasks without the subsequent expansion of resources had major consequences for the mandate and tasks of AMISOM. The mission needed to perform under a persistent gap between its mandated tasks and its authorized capabilities, which undermined its operational effectiveness.[92] Without sufficient resources, it was difficult to stabilize the situation in the country and to create the conditions for an immediate take over

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[87] Williams, "UN support to regional peace operations: lessons from UNSOA," 16.
[88] Ibidem, 8.
[89] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in the DRC/MONUC – MONUSCO," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* 3 (2019): 15.
[90] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in the DRC/MONUC – MONUSCO," 16.
[91] Ibidem, 18.
[92] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia/AMISOM," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* 1 (2018): 76.

by the UN. This is clearly evident, seeing as the UN still has not taken over from the AU, almost 13 years later. The tasks that needed to be carried out to meet the mandate were also more difficult to achieve without sufficient resources. As mentioned before, this can largely be ascribed to the slow and inefficient structure of the UNSOA support office. But part of the blame could also be attributed to AMISOM, who often asked for resources too late.

The partnership and therefore merger of issues have certainly not always helped the situation in Somalia. Supporting dialogue and monitoring the security situation are difficult with little resources, but can often still be done. As described in EPON's report on the effectiveness of AMISOM, one of the successes of AMISOM was the provision of space for political dialogue and reconciliation between Somali political elites.[93] . However, especially the tasks of providing protection (to TFIs, AMISOM personnel, installations, and equipment), facilitating humanitarian operations, and providing technical assistance became very hard to achieve. Providing the local population with significant access to medical facilities and humanitarian relief supplies was mentioned amongst one of the mission's successes.[94] But humanitarian relief is not the same as providing protection beforehand, as the current problem has shown.

4.2.2 Second problem: clash of organizational cultures

The clash of organizational cultures formed the second challenge during the AMISOM mission. The main problem was the difference in doctrinal and organizational cultures of the AU and the UN concerning peace operations. The doctrine of UN peacekeeping is based on consent of the main conflict parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force. The AU on the other hand is more willing to engage in combat and does not wait for a peace to keep. Instead, it sees peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it.[95] UNSOA was thus rooted in an organization that was not willing to use force, but had to support an organization that was fighting to establish a peace to keep. This disjunction between UNSOA's structures designed for peacekeeping and the realities of war constituted some bureaucratic challenges, such as slow decision making that was unable to cope with the high tempo of war fighting and different views on how to fight Somalia's insurgents.[96] Besides, the type of equipment UNSOA was able

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[93] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia/AMISOM," 77.

[94] Ibidem, 77.

[95] Paul D. Williams, "UN support to regional peace operations: lessons from UNSOA," *International Peace Institute* (2017): 8.

[96] Williams, "UN support to regional peace operations: lessons from UNSOA," 10.

to provide and accountability challenges also formed problems due to the clash of organizational cultures. Coordination problems between AMISOM and UNSOA were thus not uncommon.

Because this form of cooperation between the AU and the UN, through UNSOA, was unprecedented and completely unique; it cannot be compared to other peacekeeping operations. The logistical challenges before UNSOA were huge, and the support office had given some backbone for AMISOM. But it cannot be denied that UNSOA had roots in the UN's bureaucratic systems, and that therefore, UNSOA had to do a job it was not designed to do. The problem of being designed for peacekeeping but supporting a war-fighting mission meant that UNSOA was overwhelmed by the pace of operations.[97] Therefore, UNSOA could have never met the expectations of AMISOM and the mandate and objectives coming with it.

4.2.3 Third problem: insecurity in Somalia

Thirdly, insecurity in Somalia formed a serious challenge to UNSOA. Although it has nothing to do with resources or capabilities, it is included here because it made the 'resource' UNSOA less able to fulfill its function of giving support so that activities could be undertaken. The insecurity in Somalia was so significant, that the security situation in the capital of Mogadishu ultimately drove UNSOA's approach. It provided logistical support through remote management and a light footprint of UN personnel from Nairobi, Kenya. Deploying UN personnel was almost impossible because of the high risks involved, such as attacks by al-Shabaab.[98] Therefore, UNSOA relied upon contractors who were willing to assume the risk, in exchange for money. This meant that the support to AMISOM was dependent on many actors: UNSOA, various private firms, and bilateral donors that supplied the ammunition and equipment. While this outsourcing saved money, it also raised the concern of safeguarding information, because contractors were given access to UN information systems.[99]

This problem of insecurity in the conflict area affected the logistics of the mission and was a challenge that probably every other peacekeeping mission had. Again, taking MONUSCO as an example, where the UN had to work with a government that did not want its help and

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[97] Ibidem, 17.
[98] Ibidem, 12.
[99] Ibidem, 13.

where neighboring states were fueling instability.[100] These conditions impeded MONUSCO in getting the resources necessary to achieve their mandate to help reform and rebuild national institutions and to prevent a relapse into violent conflict.[101] Thus, no matter the presence of a support office like UNSOA, insecurity in the country of a peacekeeping mission hinders logistical support.

The fact that the situation in Somalia still remains insecure, means that the mandate of stabilizing the situation in the country to create conditions for an immediate take over by the UN has not been achieved. Although AMISOM has made significant progress in reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab (they no longer pose an existential threat to the government), this is not enough to create a secure country.[102] Building up good governance practices, security and justice are also necessary to stabilize the country. Although AMISOM has secured two electoral processes, Somalia's political elites have not fully taken advantage of this. The Somali authorities do not yet provide good governance in areas that are recovering, and AMISOM is not yet able to give control to the Somalia security forces.[103] Thus, since AMISOM does not have the resources to support the leading authorities or have the lead on government issues, the situation in Somalia remains instable and insecure, prone to attacks from Al-Shabaab. Therefore, the tasks supporting the mandate have also partly failed. Task four in particular has failed, which aims for the provision of technical assistance and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts. The peacekeeping partnership is not likely to have had a huge effect on the persistent insecurity in Somalia. Although the partnership between UNSOA and AMISOM was stable, it did not provide sufficient resources to stabilize the country. This did not differ from more traditional peacekeeping operations, where there was often also a lack of sufficient resources because of the instability of donors and TCCs.

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[100] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in the DRC/MONUC – MONUSCO," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* 3 (2019): 19.
[101] "Resolution 1925 (2010) adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting, on 28 May 2010," UNSCR, accessed December 23 2020, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1925
[102] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia/AMISOM," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* 1 (2018): 78.
[103] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia/AMISOM," 79.

4.2.4 Fourth problem: distance

Geographical distance forms the fourth problem for the effectiveness of UNSOA. Just like the previous problem, this problem made UNSOA less effective in fulfilling its function of giving support. Once AMISOM pushed the al-Shabaab forces out of Mogadishu in 2011, al-Shabaab spread out and the area of operations became significantly bigger. Some of UNSOA's resources could be spread, but it was impossible to deal with the logistical problems when the operation expanded from just Mogadishu to the south of Somalia. Establishing sufficient communication, supply routes, and personnel posed risks. The need to meet AMISOM's rapid reaction requirements over large distances proved impossible for UNSOA with the bureaucratic procedures of the UN. UN standards were static, while they called for flexibility in Somalia.[104]

This problem of distance is not one prone to only Somalia. In South Sudan, for example, one of the mandated areas was the protection of civilians. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) did so by providing space within its compounds to those fleeing violence. However, they did not have enough resources to patrol the conflict-prone areas, leaving still a large number of people vulnerable to violence.[105] The difference with AMISOM however, is that UNMISS did not have to rely on a static and inflexible support office like UNSOA. Therefore, they could better handle the difficulties of distance better and more quickly. However, the mission encountered the problem of difficult terrain and systematic obstructions to the freedom of movement of UNMISS and its partners by the Sudanese government and other parties.[106] Thus, other peacekeeping operations have had problems (similar or other) with distance as well, suggesting this is not something subjected only to AMISOM and UNSOA.

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[104] Paul D. Williams, "UN support to regional peace operations: lessons from UNSOA," *International Peace Institute* (2017): 14.
[105] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan/UNMISS," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* 2 (2019): 2.
[106] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan/UNMISS," 4.

4.2.5 Fifth problem: AMISOM as a client

The last problem described AMISOM as a client itself. There existed many problems within AMISOM, such as the complex issues that overwhelmed the officers, specialists that rotated frequently (which hampered institutional memory), and the late establishment of a multinational force headquarters. UNSOA may not have been a perfect fit for the mission, for example because of its inability to keep pace with AMISOM's demands, but AMISOM was also not in a position to work well with its UN partner.[107]

This issue is naturally an issue that only exists in Somalia because UNSOA was the first support office of its kind. As mentioned before, the way that UNSOA was set up, with its inflexible structure, made it difficult to work with AMISOM. However, a partnership goes both ways. The mission itself was also full of flaws, some of the examples are mentioned above. The imperfections within a mission, no matter if led by the AU or the UN, also exists in other, more traditional peacekeeping operations. What is unique however is the partnership between the AU-led mission and the UN-led support office. Imperfect from both sides, the problems became especially clear due to the partnership; cooperation exposed the flaws from the UN-side, such as the confinement to rules and procedures which led to inflexibility, but also the flaws from the AU-side, such as the lack of knowledge, experience, and resources.

When the organizational structure of a partnership does not function the way it is set up to function, the mandate and tasks consequently also fail to be accomplished. The necessary resources and relevant capabilities to implement the objectives have not been sufficient and effective enough, as has become clear by the five previously mentioned problems. Even though there have been some positive results and new mechanisms to deliver field support, the sets of problems formed an obstacle for the operational effectiveness of AMISOM.

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[107] Paul D. Williams, "UN support to regional peace operations: lessons from UNSOA," *International Peace Institute* (2017): 15.

4.3 Activities undertaken

Now that the mandate, goals, objectives, necessary resources, and relevant capabilities of AMISOM have been investigated, attention needs to be paid to the third and last category of the framework: the operational, executive and regulating side of the organizations and the mission (also relating to the second sub question; the difference in bureaucratic structures in the AU and the UN). This requires investigating the activities undertaken to implement the previously mentioned goals and objectives. Special attention needs to be paid to the effect of the AU-UN partnership on the effectiveness of the activities undertaken. Seeing as the scope of this thesis is limited, not all activities undertaken will be discussed: only some deemed important in relation to the partnership between the AU and the UN.

As mentioned previously, the two organizations filled in different roles within their partnership. Between the two organizations, the AU has been more willing to deploy rapidly and engage in more dangerous situations, despite the risks. But it has not always been able to provide enough troops with the capabilities that is in line with UN standards. Therefore, the UN established the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in 2010. The office had a dual role. On the one hand, it worked with the AU to plan and manage current operations and policies. On the other hand, UNOAU supported the development of institutional capacities focused on the operationalization of the African peace and security architecture.[108] The UN thus worked closely with the AU to support their efforts of improving their capabilities. The Office helped the AU with the development and review of key policies, the police, and the rules of law amongst other things.[109] Thus, it worked together with the AU while at the same time improving the AU to become more self-sufficient.

This close cooperation also existed because of the model of sequential deployment on which the mission is based. This model describes the transitioning from an AU-led operation to a UN-led one, which often takes place through the provision of support to the AU before and during the deployment of the mission. Close cooperation was meant to ensure an efficient transition from the AU to the UN.[110] The report on partnering for peace described AMISOM as

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[108] "Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping," United Nations Security Council (2015): 4.
[109] "Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping," United Nations Security Council, 10.
[110] Ibidem, 7.

a successful example of joint planning.[111] Although collaboration had been successful, especially in the planning phase, and had increased over the years (e.g., the 2013 joint AU-UN assessment mission that established shared strategic objectives and benchmarks), the fact that the UN still has not taken over from the AU as previously intended, could be seen as a failure.

But what has this cooperation brought to the actual activities undertaken to implement the objectives of the mission? What is clear is that the extremely volatile situation in Somalia has had a negative impact on the achievement of AMISOM's mandate. The initial mandate was to protect TFI's in order to facilitate state-building and political stability. Only in 2010 did police officers arrive to provide training to the Somali Police Force (SPF). However, more police was needed because of the state of the SPF, but this was not endorsed by the UNSC. Only a few years later did the UNSC authorize the deployment of more AMISOM police.[112]

Setting up effective Somali security forces and institutions, and implementing Somalia's Transition Plan has also been difficult, partly due to lack of funds. The transition plan required securing specific sites, such as Mogadishu, certain supply routes and handing them over to the Somali forces. AMISOM's exit strategy was partly reliant on Somali, especially on the political stability, governance, rule of law, and the security sector.[113] But the AU working together with the UN could certainly have helped if there were enough funds and effort into the Somali Transition Plan. However, a lack of real commitment into effective activities that were needed to accomplish the mission's mandate made it so that the goals have not yet been accomplished and the peacekeeping partnership has not lived up to its full potential.

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[111] Ibidem, 7.
[112] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia/AMISOM," *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* 1 (2018): 62.
[113] EPON, "Assessing the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia/AMISOM," 70.

Chapter 5 – Conclusion

This thesis focused on partnership peacekeeping between the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), specifically looking at the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It investigated the question: "How did the AU and the UN institutional (in)compatibility impact the effectiveness of AMISOM?" Both the practical and executive sides of the institutions involved needed to be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of the mission. This was done using two sub questions. The first constituted: "How did the organizational structures of the AU and the UN differ during the mission and how did the difference manifest itself?" It described the practical and logistical side of the institutions with regard to the mission. The second sub question: "How did the bureaucratic structures of the institutions differ and how did that difference manifest itself during the mission?" described the executive side of the institutions.

This thesis used part of the analytical framework of Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) to gauge the effectiveness of AMISOM. It consisted of two components: relevance and congruence. However, only the congruence component was used, which described the strategic intent and mandate and aimed to understand whether the mission had achieved its mandated tasks, and the extent to which there was consensus about this among various stakeholders. The analysis using this framework first looked at the (evolution of the) mandated goals and strategic objectives to use as a measuring stick to which the effectiveness of the organizational and bureaucratic structures were compared to. Then it looked at the organizational structures within the institutions and the effect that the partnership had on the effectiveness (first sub question). Lastly, the analysis looked at bureaucratic structures within the institutions and the impact of the partnership on effectiveness as opposed to more traditional peacekeeping operations (second sub question).

The original mandate of AMISOM, agreed upon in 2006/2007, was focused mainly on supporting dialogue and reconciliation to ensure that there is a peace to keep for when the UN takes over from the AU. AMISOM was mandated to: "Conduct Peace Support Operations in

Somalia to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the United Nations (UN)."[114]

The most obvious and present logistical provision to ensure this mandate was the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which provided logistical support from the UN to the AU mission and furthered the political process in Somalia, to create the conditions necessary for the transition from AMISOM to a UN peacekeeping organization. Reports reviewing UNSOA have provided a mixed record of positive results and new mechanisms for the UN to deliver field support, but also identified five problems that formed an obstacle for the operational effectiveness of AMISOM. The five problems describe: the expanding list of tasks without the subsequent expansion of resources, the clash of organizational cultures, the insecurity in Somalia, geographical distance, and AMISOM as a client itself. Some problems were not subjected to only AMISOM and also existed in other peacekeeping missions, such as insecurity in the country of conflict and distance. The other three problems however, were unique to AMISOM.

The problem of an expanding list of tasks without subsequent expansion of resources was an unique problem, because the system of UNSOA, where AMISOM requested and UNSOA delivered is not something that exists in traditional peacekeeping operations. It had the advantage of being stable, but it also lacked the capacity to deliver the necessary resources. The mission always performed under a persistent gap between its mandated tasks and authorized capabilities, which undermined its operational effectiveness. The problem of the clash of organizational cultures also showed a disjunction, this time between UNSOA's structures designed for peacekeeping and the realities of war. This caused bureaucratic challenges such as slow decision making. UNSOA had roots in the UN's bureaucratic system and therefore had to do a job it was not designed to do, thus never being able to meet the expectations of the mandate and objectives of AMISOM. Taking action and carrying out the transition plan was thus very difficult because AMISOM had to work with a support office that was not designed for that purpose. Lack of funds were a big problem and ultimately, AMISOM's exit strategy was partly reliant on Somali, especially on the political stability, governance, rule of law, and the security sector.

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[114] "Mandate: 2006-2007," AMISOM-AU, accessed December 15 2020, http://amisom-au.org/mandate-2006-2007/

Coming back to the research question: "How did the AU and the UN institutional (in)compatibility impact the effectiveness of AMISOM?" The collaboration between the AU and the UN was born out of the mutual recognition that alone, neither of them could cope with the multitude of security challenges facing Somalia. But the two institutions are designed differently and have diverging philosophies, objectives, and motivations. The AU had the political authority to operate in Somalia but lacked the experience, institutional infrastructure, and funds. The UN lacked the political authority but had to ability to finance and logistically support the peacekeeping operation. UNSOA, the supposed solution to overcome this gap in institutional structures, ultimately did not solve the most persistent problems between the two organizations. The mission had a peace-*enforcement* nature but was unable to successfully carry out its mandate and objectives because of the limitation of using peace*keeping* logistics. The inability of overcoming the institutional differences between the two organizations has made it so that the mission's mandate and the additional objectives have not been accomplished and the peacekeeping partnership has not lived up to its full potential.

For peacekeeping partnerships, this means that in the future, more attention needs to be paid to achieving congruence between the mandate, its resources and capabilities, and its actual activities. This can only be done when the two organizations work together and become more compatible. This starts with evaluating the past; what worked and what did not? Both the AU and the UN will have to look critically at their own organizations. For example, a less bureaucratic structure within the UN, with less confinement to rules and procedures, can help to solve the inflexibility of the organization. This way, the UN can better connect their financial and logistical support to the needs of the AU. The other way around, the AU can take a critical look at their institutional infrastructure (the lack of knowledge, experience and resources), and how this can be improved to better align with the UN. Deepening the responsibility of both organizations (but especially the UN) will also deepen the common interests and objectives and therefore lead to more effective joint peacekeeping. Improving the relationship between the two organizations will lead to less ad hoc collaborations and more consistent engagement. Thus, working on the relationship between the AU and the UN, especially the skewed power dynamics, will likely improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping partnerships.

This thesis has some shortcoming and limitations. The most obvious one is the limited scope. This thesis only focused on one particular peacekeeping operation, which can cause generalization issues. The (in)compatibility between the AU and the UN during AMISOM can be indicative for their relation during other partnership peacekeeping missions, but because every mission is different, one needs to be cautious with making generalizations. Also, this thesis only investigated two factors that can influence the effectiveness of the mission: the organizational and bureaucratic structures. Thus, other factors, such as non-state actors, political or non-political events et cetera can also have an influence. Therefore, possible future research could focus on other factors that may influence the relationship and change the dynamic between the AU and the UN. This will hopefully lead to a more fruitful collaboration between the two organizations in future peacekeeping operations.

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