



# Transnational Nationalism

Hans Janmaat and the international contacts of the  
Centrumdemocraten

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# Preface

This thesis concerns the international contacts of the Centrumdemocraten and how the leader of the radical right party influenced the international contacts. I thought of the topic due to my interest in political leadership and the radical right. I had read a lot about the international contacts of the current day radical right and was wondering if the radical right formed a transnational network in the past.

This precise topic was not one I had looked into during my bachelor's and master's degree. I did study a wide breadth of topics. This included courses on neoliberalism, energy transitions, in and out groups in societies, formations of states and political leadership. However political leadership and the radical right have been the most interesting topics to me.

It even led to an internship in Israel where I did research for an anti-racism NGO. The internship included research into the political history of the region for an educational database. It gave me an insight in the complexity of the region but also the broader tendencies of in and out groups in a modern society. I finished my internship from the Netherlands as I had to return due to the global pandemic.

Just as the corona-virus forced me to be flexible concerning my internship it also forced me to be creative while writing my thesis. The institute responsible for Hans Janmaat's archives was forced to close down just one month into my research.

This leads me to the first person I want to thank, my supervisor Dr. Anne Heyer. When public institutes closed she gave advice on how to make my topic work even with less of the archival material. Additionally she has helped tremendously by giving insightful advice on how to make my analysis as sharp as possible.

Besides my supervisor I would like to thank my family. They have always been supportive and made sure I kept going. It was good to be able to occasionally go to my parents' house and be distracted from the writing process. This meant I could get back to work reinvigorated. Special thanks for my father for reading my thesis and correcting spelling and grammar mistakes but also adding the perspective of an outsider. It made sure that the language used was straightforward and more enticing.

I hope you enjoy your reading.

Robbert Bouterse

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## Introduction

In recent years there has been an increased effort to understand transnational radical right networks. This is due to the success of the movement in the United States and electoral success across Europe.<sup>1</sup> The European radical right formalized relations from 2013 onwards according to Duncan McDonnell and Annika Werner. These formal relations started in the European parliament where the radical right saw benefits in forming an alliance.<sup>2</sup> However this is not the first transnational radical right movement in Europe. According to Tamir Bar-On the radical right had been creating international networks ever since the 1970's and 1980s. The radical right movement spanned across Germany, France, Italy and Belgium. Strangely, the Netherlands did not have a political party which was part of the transnational radical right network before the 2000's.<sup>3</sup>

The lack of involvement in a transnational radical right network is strange as the Centrumpartij (CP) and its successors the Centrumdemocraten (CD) had become elected parties under the leadership of Hans Janmaat. They were part of a new wave of electoral success for radical right parties in Europe according to Piero Ignazi.<sup>4</sup> These parties were no longer directly linked with the right wing parties of the Second World War. The change was possible due to a shift to cultural racism instead of biological racism and by creating populist narratives instead of authoritarianism according to Jens Rydgren.<sup>5</sup> Radical right parties are defined by their ethno-nationalism, populism and xenophobia. The radical right claims to represent the majority of the native population. The radical right does not oppose a democratic system, instead it opposes its egalitarian principles. The opposition of egalitarian principles differentiates them from the extreme right which does oppose democratic systems.<sup>6</sup>

Cas Mudde sees the CD as part of a family of political parties. The family included the Centrumdemocraten, Centrumpartij, Centrumpartij '86 (CP '86), Deutscher Volksunion (DVU) and the Vlaams Blok (VB). Mudde notes that the party family had a core set of beliefs. These were nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism and faith in justice and order. In comparison to the other parties the CD was defined by its lack of in-depth writings and discussions about the core values of the party. What defines the CD amongst the family is the opposition against multiculturalism, focus on fighting criminality, populist antagonism towards party elites and the undemocratic measures taken against the CD.<sup>7</sup>

These nationalist values point towards a contradiction. This contradiction is whether nationalists could be working together across borders. Martin Durham and Margaret Power conclude that nationalist parties certainly had international contacts in their book: *New Perspectives on the Transnational Right*. Their position is that the radical right parties are

<sup>1</sup> Manuela Caiani "The rise and endurance of radical right movements" *Current sociology*, 2019-09-12, Vol.67 (6), p.918-935.

<sup>2</sup> Duncan McDonnell and Annika Werner, *International Populism: The Radical Right In The European Parliament* (Oxford, 2019) 1-5.

<sup>3</sup> Tamir Bar-On "Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite" *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 45, No. 3, (2011) 199-223.

<sup>4</sup> Piero Ignazi, "The silent counter-revolution. Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties", *European Journal of Political Research* 22 (1992) 3-34.

<sup>5</sup> Jens Rydgren, "Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family", *European Journal of Political Research* 44:3 (2005) 413-437.

<sup>6</sup> Jens Rydgren, *The Radical Right: An Introduction in The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*. (2008 Oxford)

<sup>7</sup> Cas Mudde, "The war of words defining the extreme right party family", *West European Politics* 19, (1996) 225-248

based on national structures and the belief in one unified nation but it does not mean they were isolated from foreign influences. The radical right can be seen as an international movement because they were sharing information, ideas and resources with each other across borders. The authors do note that not every transnational connection bore fruit, similar to other transnational political movements.<sup>8</sup>

This was the case for the Dutch CD and their contacts with the Flemish VB. The official contacts with the VB were not successful according to political scientist Meindert Fennema.<sup>9</sup> However it does not mean historical research concerning the international contacts of the CD is not an useful endeavor. Diffusion or transfer is a highly relational interaction according to Rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts and Sarah A. Soule.<sup>10</sup> Ideas and modes of action are transmitted through interpersonal contacts, organizational linkages. To understand the importance of interpersonal relations for transfer or diffusion the contacts of the actors should be traced. Trust between the actors is vital as diffusion hinges on it. There is value in understanding why relationships between two political actors with similar views failed to come to an understanding. Sean Chabot stated that interpersonal relations within transnationalism should receive more attention as it gives an insight in complexities and agency involved.<sup>11</sup> It must be said that diffusion can happen without personal meetings, but there were multiple meetings and letters between CD and VB so diffusion without direct interaction is not as relevant for my research.

One other historian propagating a closer look at international transfer of political practices is Henk te Velde.<sup>12</sup> He notes that many historians of the past have conducted *Lieux de mémoire*. The term means that historiography is limited to one place, often national borders. Comparative history has been on the rise in recent times but it still overlooks political changes and movements coming from abroad. Countries are not as isolated or unique as portrayed. The concept of political transfer can be used to show that in fact all kinds of politics have been part of international networks. Te Velde uses the practice of a Boycott as an example. Boycotts got their name from an incident in Ireland. Boycott is an interesting example as it spread from Ireland to other countries and changed to fit in with other national contexts. Transfer research means taking a look at a practice's origin, how it spread through interpersonal relations and/or through the media and how the practice was adapted and transformed in a different national context.<sup>13</sup> In the case of international contacts between the VB and the CD there is no specific political practice which was transported from one country to the other while undergoing a transformation. The transformation is necessary to adapt to a different political culture. However it is important to understand the national context, the aims of individual actors in partaking in the international contacts and explaining why the effort of both sides did not lead to meaningful cooperation.

Besides these official contacts between political parties there were unofficial transnational contacts involving individual CD members. These are also interesting for understanding the CD better. What kind of people did CD members interact with? What did

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<sup>8</sup> Margaret Power and Martin Durham, *New Perspectives on the Transnational Right*, (London 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Peter Vermaas, "Een Partij Op Papier." *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 16-12-2000.

<https://www.groene.nl/artikel/een-partij-op-papier>.

<sup>10</sup> Rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts and Sarah A. Soule, *Introduction: The Dimensions of Diffusion in The Diffusion of Social Movements Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects* Edited by Rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts and Sarah A. Soule. (Cambridge 2010).

<sup>11</sup> Sean Chabot, *Dialogue Matters. Beyond the Transmission Model of Transnational. Diffusion between Social Movements in The Diffusion of Social Movements Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects* Edited by Rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth M. Roberts and Sarah A. Soule.

<sup>12</sup> Henk te Velde, "Political transfer: an introduction", *European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire* 12:2(2005), 205-221.

<sup>13</sup> Ibidem

they see as a potential benefit? Did the party leadership know about these contacts and if so what was its reaction? By looking into these unofficial contacts we can understand how strict Janmaat's control over the party was and how the party operated.

Previous historical and political science literature has mainly focussed on the national history of the CD, *Lieux de mémoire* as Te Velde calls it. This means that the CD is defined by their national presence. The national historiography can be roughly divided into three types. The first type of literature tries to define the CP and CD by their genealogy: Who were the predecessors of the parties and what does this mean for how they should be defined? The second type of literature defines the CD by looking at their ideology: What do the party programmes and interviews with the press indicate about what the CD truly believed? The third type of research concerns the way in which the CD was perceived by Dutch society: How was the party contested by other political parties, the judiciary and non-governmental organizations?

Jaap van Donselaar is the most important historian who has extensively written on the CD's genealogy.<sup>14</sup> He saw the CD and CP as the natural successors of more extremist parties. Since the Second World War there were multiple organizations set up by former collaborators who worked with the German occupation. These groups had to deal with legal battles with the Dutch state. It resulted in the aims and true beliefs of the organizations being obscured to hide the extremism. In the 1970's caution was let go. Younger members without direct links to World War Two were unwilling to hide their political beliefs any longer and became more extreme. Older members remembered the judicial battles they fought and saw the openness as an invitation for more trouble. The group's more 'moderate' voices grew tired of the violent actions. It would not lead to effective change according to the 'moderates' so the direct predecessor of the CP was formed to become a political entity without links to overt fascists.

The second type of literature regarding the CP and CD defines the parties by their ideology. Cas Mudde, Meindert Fennema, Frank Elbers and Joop van Holsteyn are proponents of this categorization.<sup>15</sup> This group concluded that radical right parties are defined by their ethnocentrism, autocratic party-leadership and their scepticism and distrust towards the parties in power. The difference between radical right and extreme right must be made clear. The difference is that the radical right is not anti-democratic. They do have difficulties with laws and procedures which obstruct the "will of the people". The radical right believes that they are the ones to bring the will of the people to parliament. Other traditional parties have failed to do so according to the radical right. However they want to make their policies a reality through parliament. Extreme right parties such as (neo)-fascist and (neo)-nazi groups do not believe in the democratic power of parliament.<sup>16</sup> These radical right parties were viable as democratic parties due to a shift to cultural racism instead of biological racism and by creating populist narratives instead of authoritarianism according to Jens Rydgren.<sup>17</sup>

Nonetheless the radical right parties were despised by the broader Dutch public. The third type of research concerns the reaction of the Dutch society to the new radical right. So

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<sup>14</sup> Jaap van Donselaar, "Post-war fascism in the Netherlands" *Crime, law, and social change*, (1993), Vol.19 (1), p.87-100.

<sup>15</sup> Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (London, 2016) 155-157, Frank Elbers and Meindert Fennema, *Racistische partijen in West-Europa* (Leiden, 1993) and Joop van Holsteyn and Cas Mudde, *Extreem-rechts in Nederland*. (Den Haag 1998).

<sup>16</sup> Mudde, "The war of words defining the extreme right party family".

<sup>17</sup> Jens Rydgren, "Is Extreme Right-Wing Populism Contagious?".

Jan de Vetten does not mainly focus on defining the Dutch radical right but instead shows how the CD was contested. The main opponents of the CD were other political parties, the Dutch press, demonstrators and non-governmental organizations. The other political parties decided to have attack ads against the CD, ignored them when speaking in parliament and not interact with them in public debates. The Dutch press made a pact to ignore the CD as much as possible unless the story which was being told could have a negative effect on the party. Demonstrators, often Antifa, interrupted CD-meetings and protested outside of CD-offices and houses of members. Non-governmental organizations fought legal battles with the CD often suing party members for racist remarks and discrimination. This opposition combined with the fact that Janmaat was an ineffectual leader made sure that the party could never become a large player in Dutch politics according to De Vetten.<sup>18</sup>

What becomes obvious from the aforementioned literature is that the focus is clearly on the national situation for the party. It is important to study the international contacts of the CD because it shows how even ostensibly isolated nationalist parties were influenced by international contacts and it gives additional context for previous academic literature on how Janmaat forced the movement to his hand. The main question for the thesis is: How did Janmaat's leadership style shape the international contacts of the Centrumdemocraten? This question will be answered through three chapters.

The first chapter explains the origins and general background of the CD: how they were formed, what kind of policies were crucial for the CD and how they were perceived by other parties, the media and the public. It is important to understand the state of the party when international contacts were initiated. The second chapter shows what kind of leader Janmaat was. Janmaat's leadership style shaped the struggle for power in the party and the party's international cooperation with the Vlaams Blok. The third chapter will explain what remained after the power struggles within the party. How did Janmaat rule the remaining members of the party? Janmaat had all the power but still needed some support to remain in parliament and keep the enterprise profitable. Janmaat's strict control over the members and finances influenced international contacts among CD members. The structure of my thesis corresponds with the assertion of Joop van Holsteyn. Van Holsteyn concluded that Janmaat ran his party as a small business.<sup>19</sup> Janmaat purposefully kept the party structure manageable under his control. In the second chapter it will become clear how Janmaat dealt with rivals for power over the Dutch radical right while the third chapter shows how Janmaat ran a profitable small business in which international contacts often turned out to be profitable for Janmaat and the party.

To research the CD the archives of the International Institute for Social History (IISG) have been used. These contain the personal archive from Hans Janmaat, the party leader of the CD. The archive gives an insight of how the CD operated and how decisions were made within the party. There is also correspondence with Filip Dewinter of the VB. As Janmaat himself handed over the archival material there is a large chance he left certain information out. To give a more complete overview newspapers and other media outlets are used to contextualize the archival material and give a broader view. As Jan de Vetten made clear the journalists writing about the CD saw themselves as opponents fighting an dangerous enemy instead of describing the CD as a political party just like other parties. I will take this into account when using newspapers and documentaries.

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<sup>18</sup> Jan de Vetten, *In de ban van goed en fout, De bestrijding van de Centrumpartij en de Centrumdemocraten (1980-1998)* (Leiden, 2016).

<sup>19</sup> Van Holsteyn and Mudde, *Extreem-rechts in Nederland*, 47-60.

## Chapter 1: Janmaat's rise to leadership

In this first chapter the rise of the Dutch radical right and Janmaat's ascension within it will be shown. It is important to understand the background of the radical right in the Netherlands to be able to explain behaviour with foreign political parties and groups. The main question for the chapter is: How did Janmaat become the leader of the radical right?

In 1979 the *Nationale Centrumpartij*, the predecessor of the CP, was founded by Henry Brookman. Brookman was employed by the *Vrije Universiteit* as a teacher of the history of physics. According to Brookman it was necessary to establish a new form of party due to societal changes in the 1970's. Brookman lamented the decision by the Dutch government to attract migrant workers from Morocco and Turkey. It led to a change of population distribution in the inner cities which often housed the newcomers. Brookman held the belief that the societal change caused uneasiness amongst the white lower classes.<sup>20</sup>

Existing extreme right wing groups such as the *Nederlandse Volksunie* (NVU) also rebelled against the influx of immigrants. They saw them as a group taking their jobs, houses and women.<sup>21</sup> This kind of ideology could take root as the Netherlands was facing an economic recession combined with difficulties with housing in cities. During the 1980's the economic recession was met with austerity measures taken by the government. Radical right-wing groups came with their solution for restricting expenditure: expelling all immigrants which in turn would leave more government expenditure and housing available for the white population.<sup>22</sup> One of the first clashes along racial lines in the 1980's was the protest of the 'kerkmarrokanen', a group of Moroccan labourers who were resisting extradition to Morocco. The *Nationale Centrum Party* (NCP) used violence to break up the protest.<sup>23</sup> The reason the NCP was founded by Henry Brookman was to be a respectable entity viable for elections with similar views to the violent NVU. The plan failed almost immediately as the NCP was directly involved in violence just hours after its first meeting.<sup>24</sup> This led to the founding of the *Centrumpartij* (CP) which was supposed to be less extremist but had the exact same ten-point plan:

1. More democracy by way of referendum
2. Employment for every Dutch citizen
3. Addressing the increasing housing need
4. Aim for disarmament on both sides of the cold war conflict.
5. Stronger law enforcement and increased sentences for drug trade and related crime
6. Push back government expenditure and tasks

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<sup>20</sup> Peter Rensen, *Dansen met de duivel: undercover bij de Centrum Democraten* (Amsterdam 1994) 44 and typoscript of the autobiography written by Janmaat in the year 2000 P. 20, Archive Hans Janmaat arch.NR. 263, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>21</sup> "Constant Kusters, een overzicht", *Kafka*, 01-12-2008 <https://kafka.nl/constant-kusters>.

<sup>22</sup> CP Information package 1983, Archive Hans Janmaat Arch.NR. 24, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>23</sup> "Leden van racistische knokploeg veroordeeld", *De waarheid* 27-03-1980.

<sup>24</sup> De Vetten, *In de ban van goed en fout* p. 31-34.



7. No cuts to social security but hard stance on misappropriation of welfare. Coherent approach against tax fraud
8. No help for undemocratic countries
9. Comprehensive approach against animal abuse, environmental pollution and destruction of landscapes
10. The Netherlands is no immigration country so stop the stream of immigrants <sup>25</sup>

In the ten-point plan a clear anti-immigrant stance can be seen. There is a call for employment but only for native Dutch citizens. There should be a broad social security system in place but only for those who are Dutch. If anyone takes advantage of the system punishment should be harsh. This seems to hint to welfare chauvinism. This idea claims that only those of the right descent, Dutch, should be able to receive government assistance. In CP publications the increase of taxes and many rules is seen as oppressive and makes sure that the Dutch people can't thrive.<sup>26</sup>

These political stances and the violent actions of the NCP caused problems for Henry Brookman. As stated, Brookman was employed as a lecturer at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The university was hesitant to employ the leader of a controversial political party involved in a violent action against migrants. The university forced Brookman to resign from his position as leader of the CP and to not be involved with the party any longer. If Brookman would not comply, he would lose his employment. Brookman did eventually comply by resigning as leader of the party but did stay active behind the scenes. It resulted in the search for a new leader of the party.<sup>27</sup>

Hans Janmaat would become the new party leader. The The Hague native had studied political science and was working in two high schools as a civics teacher.<sup>28</sup> Janmaat's interest in politics extended beyond academics or education as he had tried to become an electable politician for both a Catholic worker's party (KVP) and a centre-left party (DS'70). Janmaat did however not become a full-time politician for either party as he was seen as unsuited for the job. The assessment was based on his abrasive personal style and the fact that he would continuously get into discussions with fellow party members. Discussions within a party can be seen as good of course but fellow party members had the feeling that Janmaat could not be reasoned with as he would only dig in in his previous position without conceding any ground whatsoever. Will Simon, fellow party member of the KVP, said the following: "Where one would usually grow closer during a debate and find common ground, Janmaat would always create new rifts." It led to exclusion within the party and left him no chance of becoming an elected politician.<sup>29</sup>

So Janmaat was forced to look for other political parties which could support his political ambitions. Janmaat eventually joined the CP as he was convinced by an article of CP-founder Henry Brookman. In it Brookman railed against multiculturalism in the Netherlands. Janmaat was able to gain the leadership position in the party due to Brookman's apprehension to become the leader himself. Alongside Janmaat, Mart Giesen and Willem Bruyn became prominent members. Giesen became party secretary and Bruyn

<sup>25</sup> Ten-point program of the Centruumpartij, Archive Hans Janmaat Arch. NR. 29. IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>26</sup> CD actueel, March 1992. Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 125 IISG Amsterdam and Cas Mudde, The ideology of the extreme right, (Manchester 2000) 135-136.

<sup>27</sup> Rensen, *Dansen met de duivel* 44.

<sup>28</sup> Correspondence between Janmaat and schools which employed him 1980-1981, Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 8 IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>29</sup> Zwart Wit, "De Erfenis van Janmaat", *NTR*, 18-01-2015.

became head of the CP think tank. Bruyn seemed well suited for the position as he had been active in politics for 25 years and had written books in favour of the South-African apartheid regime.<sup>30</sup> Other important members were Alfred Vierling and Willem Vreeswijk, both first time politicians. The party structure was made by Henry Brookman and was supposed to create a lively atmosphere with discussions and party documents in which the ideas and policies of the CP were supposed to organically come together.<sup>31</sup>

This did not come to be as prominent members started fighting for a seat in parliament. In the election of 1981 Janmaat and Brookman found it difficult to meet the criteria to become eligible. The CP needed to get enough signatures and funding to be allowed to run. The party only just managed to get enough signatures, Janmaat took out a second mortgage on his house and borrowed money from his brother to make sure the funding would be sufficient. Janmaat's brother only gave his support for the CP as long as Hans Janmaat would be the party leader in the election. However Janmaat was not the only one eyeing a parliamentary seat of the CD. Willem Bruyn and Mart Giesen thought they were the ones who should hold the seats. This led to anger from Janmaat as he had worked hard on gaining the signatures and had taken major risks financially to make the CP a viable party. Eventually Janmaat won the conflict and became party leader, but the party failed to gain enough votes.<sup>32</sup>

Luckily a second chance came around quickly as the Dutch government fell in 1982 and new elections were held. Janmaat did gain a seat this time. The goal was reached with a campaign which was maligned by the national press for being racist. In one instance a former resistance fighter from World War II was quoted saying that the CD was just the natural successor of the Dutch Nazi party.<sup>33</sup> The 1982 party programme claimed that parties from both sides of the political spectrum were ineffective in dealing with the problems in the Netherlands. The CP claimed to be able to resolve societal unrest surrounding issues such as nuclear energy, abortions and the "flow of illegal immigrants" due to their central position on the political spectrum. Other parties were supposedly afraid of the CP's ability to deal with these issues and as such the parties in power used terror and libel to shut down the CP. The CP's programme was in favour of a smaller government and more direct influence in the political system by the Dutch population. The smaller government should do more to take care of native Dutch citizenry but should not support minorities. The CP believed that the Netherlands should not be an immigration country and its social security system attracted too many immigrants. By only taking care for Dutch citizens the amount of immigrants would go down according to the CP. People of Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan descent should be part of a re-immigration plan.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> W.J Bruyn, *Het recht op apartheid: inleiding tot de Nederlandse problematiek* (Arnhem 1965) and typoscript of the autobiography written by Janmaat in the year 2000 P. 24, Archive Hans Janmaat arch.NR. 263, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>31</sup> Description of the party organisation by Nico Konst and Henk de Wijer, Archief Hans Janmaat Arch. NR. 15 IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>32</sup> Internal documents written by the Dutch intelligence agency BVD surrounding Centrum Partij, report of CP meeting of 16-05-1982. Stichting Argus <http://www.stichtingargus.nl/bvd/r/cp-01-03.pdf> P 1-10 and report of the daily council of the CP (undated) Archive Hans Janmaat inv. NR. 15 IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>33</sup> "De centrumpartij is de plaats waar de rechtse macht zich zal concentreren" *Algemeen Dagblad* 19-11-1983 and "De centrumpartij is niets anders dan een verlengstuk van de NSB" *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 17-08-1983.

<sup>34</sup> "Party Program Centrumpartij 1982", Hosted by *Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen*. <https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/287/1/Partijprogramma%20CP%201982.pdf>.

The CP/CD's program of welfare chauvinism is underlined by Cas Mudde's analysis of the social-economic plans of the CD. He concludes that most plans were vague but the welfare chauvinism was preeminent. Agriculture and small Dutch businesses should thrive once again after years of supposed heavy burdens of high taxes and intrusive regulation.<sup>35</sup> In the meantime the subsidies for new ethnic minorities were to be curtailed. The aversion to immigrants was a clear through-line for the CP and CD when looking at language used in the party magazines. In the march 1992 edition the CD railed against ethnic minorities within the police. These minorities, especially from Suriname, could not be trusted as they supposedly had close contacts with criminals who came from the same background. This supposedly led to an increase of drug smuggling. Islamophobia also played an important role in the CD magazines. Utrecht, the fourth largest city in the Netherlands, would be full with mosques in 2010. According to the CD it was a natural outcome of the higher birth-rate amongst muslims. It would eventually lead to an eventual implementation of Sharia-law as it happened in muslim-majority countries as well. The solution was sending refugees to countries with similar views. Communists from Chile should go to other communist nations. The reason they came to the Netherlands was purely financial. The newcomers lead to dissolution of social cohesion according to the CD due to ideological differences.<sup>36</sup>

As mentioned earlier the ideas of the CD led to a strong reaction from the press. The traditional parties in parliament were similarly appalled. The difficult relationship between the CD and the parliament was obvious whenever Janmaat spoke. At this time the other MP's would leave Janmaat to speak for an almost empty room. According to Wil Schuurman it did not matter to Janmaat as he was only there to speak the truth to the ministers.<sup>37</sup> As Cas Mudde concluded the CD/CP policy was always anti-establishment. Among these parties the feeling existed that the party leaders did not listen to the real voice of the people anymore. Janmaat and his fellow party members themselves were the real voice of the people.<sup>38</sup>

But the difficult relationships with other parties did not hamper the CP. The internal affairs did however. Nico Konst, a history teacher from Nijmegen had become party chairman and felt that he was supposed to be the party leader. He and Janmaat fought over control of the party.<sup>39</sup> The dispute was a sign of broader rifts within the party as in 1984 Henry Brookman was fired from his position at the Vrije Universiteit. It meant that the party founder no longer had limitations to become more active within the party. Brookman decided he wanted to become the first name on the CP ballot for the European elections of 1984. Other party members were of the opinion that Brookman had not been active enough in the party. So jumping the line was seen as unfair to other more active members. It can be seen as strange that the European elections lead to such strife between members of the radical right party.<sup>40</sup> The European elections did not have to be a matter of contest as the electoral threshold was six times higher than in the Dutch elections. In the 1982 election the CP only managed to get 1 seat out of 150 seats. So the CP voting block had to grow sixfold in three

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<sup>35</sup> Cas Mudde, *The ideology of the extreme right* 135-138.

<sup>36</sup> CD actueel, July 1994 Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 125, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>37</sup> Zwart Wit, "De Erfenis van Janmaat".

<sup>38</sup> Mudde "The war of words defining the extreme right party family", 225-248.

<sup>39</sup> Typoscript of the autobiography written by Janmaat in the year 2000 P. 37, Archive Hans Janmaat Arch.NR. 263, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>40</sup> Intelligence service report from the leadership council meeting CP held on 10-02-1984 *Stichting Argus*, [www.stichtingargus.nl](http://www.stichtingargus.nl) Can be found under the section: extreemrechtse groeperingen de CP/CD en jonge Geuzen map 2 deel 6 And Intelligence service report from the leadership council meeting CP held on 10-02-1984 *Stichting Argus*, [www.stichtingargus.nl](http://www.stichtingargus.nl) Can be found under the section: extreemrechtse groeperingen de CP/CD en jonge Geuzen map2 deel 6 vervolgbld 1

years just to get one seat in the EU parliament. For one seat in Dutch parliament 0.66% of the votes were needed. For the European parliament 4.0% of the Dutch votes were needed for one seat. Something which was out of reach for the CD as they only managed 2.4% of the votes in 1994, their most successful election.<sup>41</sup>

The fact that it did lead to disputes nonetheless is easily explained by looking at previous power struggles and the fact that Brookman was the founder of the whole party. Some members thought it gave Brookman the credits to become more important immediately. Meanwhile others were in favour of building up Brookman's position organically. Brookman was eventually moved to unimportant positions in the party organization, which bolstered Janmaat's position. In the same year Janmaat also tried to gain power over Nico Konst. Janmaat accused Konst of wanting to create a security force for the CP. Janmaat seemed to know that this would cause alarm bells to ring because of societal apprehension towards SA like groups. The Sturmabteilung (SA) was the violent arm of the Nazi party. They would beat up journalists, socialists and jews because they were seen as the enemy of the German people. Konst was furious over these accusations as they appeared to be untrue and in fact Janmaat himself contemplated the idea. This was just the start of the mudslinging. Both men accused each other of unsavoury connections with more extremist individuals and groups.<sup>42</sup>

However extremist contacts and positions did not really separate the men. Both visited the widow of Rost van Tonningen. Her late husband had been a leading member of the NSB, the collaborationist party during the Second World War. She herself had been a central figure in the fascist scene after 1945. She delivered pro-fascist speeches, spread leaflets and held multiple meetings with (Neo-)Nazis in her villa.<sup>43</sup> The dispute within the CP escalated when Janmaat and his allies came together to discuss their plan for action regarding Konst and how to weaken his position. The meeting was non statutory and as such led to trouble for Janmaat. Janmaat and his accomplices released a press statement stating they were unhappy with Nico Konst and Willem Bruyn as their statements were too harsh and gave the CP a bad reputation.<sup>44</sup>

Konst and his group were agitated by all the events which were unfolding and expelled several of Janmaat's group. The measure was necessary according to the daily council, led by Konst, as Janmaat was acting ever more independently. Instead of resolving the issues, Janmaat decided to go his own way. He started making plans for his political party, while still being a member of the CP. When this came to light the Centruumpartij expelled their own party leader. Janmaat was able to keep the parliamentary seat and established the Centrumdemocraten(CD). The CP was left without representation in parliament. The infighting had a negative effect on both of the parties' ability to contend in the 1986 election. The CP did not have its leader anymore while Janmaat had lost most of the party apparatus behind him. Thus both parties failed at gaining a seat. The fact that the CD did not have a comprehensive plan or apparatus yet was made clear by the fact that

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<sup>41</sup> Mudde "The war of words defining the extreme right party family", 225-248.

<sup>42</sup> Report of the daily council Centruumpartij (No date) Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 15 IISG Amsterdam and "Orde dienst voor de CP in de maak", *Algemeen dagblad* 4 juni 1984.

<sup>43</sup> Addy de Jong "Zo veel geweld tegen Janmaat, dat verbaasde mij" *Reformatisch Dagblad*, 08-10-2015 <https://www.rd.nl/artikel/633939-zo-veel-geweld-tegen-janmaat-dat-verbaasde-mij> and "Weduwe Rost van Tonningen overleden" *Het Parool*, 24-03-2007. <https://www.parool.nl/nieuws/weduwe-rost-van-tonningen-overleden~b3f6980a/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F>.

<sup>44</sup> Report of the daily council Centruumpartij (No date) Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 15 IISG Amsterdam.

their party programme was a blatant copy of the CP's ten-point plan. The only thing which had been altered was the logo on top of the leaflets.<sup>45</sup>

The failure of both the CP and the new CD to win a seat in an election led to contemplation among both parties. Janmaat even tried to exit politics and become a representative of car manufacturers, however it was impossible due to his infamy. So Janmaat was forced to remain in politics as job prospects were scarce.<sup>46</sup> How could Janmaat get back into the parliament? One of the ideas which followed was the reconnection of the CD and CP but it never worked out, partly due to a violent anti-fascist attack on a CD congress in Kedichem. The hotel which hosted the event caught fire as left wing groups surrounded it. It is unclear how the fire exactly started but claims are that the protestors threw incendiary devices or smoke bombs. The CD members had to flee the scene and Janmaat's partner, Wil Schuurman, got severely injured and lost her leg as they had to jump from a hotel room.<sup>47</sup> The attack ensured that the parties would not work together anymore. Some members of both parties believed that an aggrieved CP-member purposely leaked the location of the meeting to Antifa rioters.<sup>48</sup>

However these attacks did not prevent Janmaat from regaining his seat in parliament in 1988. He was the only representative for the CD. It meant that Janmaat could not play a big role in debates. Janmaat was once again positioned at the back of the chambers where no-one could really see him. His offices were also stowed away in the attic. The location of the office showed little regard for the CD as Schuurman, Janmaat's partner and also party secretary, could not easily access this office due to the injuries she sustained in Kedichem in 1986.<sup>49</sup> However Janmaat and Schuurman were undeterred to resume their political career in parliament.

The next chapter will show how Janmaat shaped his new party to his liking and how it influenced international relations. What happened between 1988 and 1992 that two important members wanted to burn their bridges with the CD and start their own VB-like party? This first chapter gave an introduction for the CD. It was the project of Hans Janmaat himself who wanted to make sure he could not get expelled from a political party again. He had tried for years to become an elected official but had failed to do so due to his personal style clashing with other members of the parties he had joined. Janmaat eventually ended up with the CP as they were in need of a leader. Janmaat held and lost his leadership position due to conniving and widely publicized spats with other members of the CP. Once he was established as the face of the radical right in the Netherlands he became the king-maker for international radical right relations. The next chapter will show how these international contacts were formed and why they failed.

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<sup>45</sup> Party programme 1986, Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 37, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>46</sup> Rensen, *Dansen met de duivel*, 114-115.

<sup>47</sup> "BVD kende uitgelekte brief, maar Kedichem brandde toch", *Het vrije volk: democratisch-socialistisch dagblad* 03-04-1986.

<sup>48</sup> Van den Brink, *De internationale van haat*, 188.

<sup>49</sup> Zwart Wit, "De Erfenis van Janmaat", *NTR*.

## Chapter 2: Tightening of the Reins

This chapter will make clear how Janmaat tried to make sure the failures of the CP could not be repeated as he got back in parliament. He tried to tighten the reins over the party to make sure he would not be ousted. It had a major impact on how the international contacts were shaped with official parties abroad.

Janmaat's attempt to gain total control can be understood when taking a look at his problems within the CP but also during previous political encounters. Janmaat's choice to strengthen his own position instead of trying to become more popular among his own party members through discussions and in meetings like more traditional parties gives an indication about what kind of leader he was. According to Jerrold M. Post there are three archetypes of leadership personalities. The narcissist, the obsessive-compulsive and the paranoid.<sup>50</sup>

The narcissist believes he knows all and is surrounded by yes-men who would agree with anything the leader says. The support holds up the world view of the leader in which he is always right, information indicating the opposite is disregarded. The leader does have a moral compass but can turn on a dime as the situation asked for it. Promises and speeches are just window dressing as the leader's actions can vary widely from promises made. The relationship with the yes-men is warm until the support is no longer needed. The leader can throw anybody under the bus if it becomes the best political move.

The obsessive-compulsive (O.C.) leader tries to follow rules and regulations to the letter. It means that ratio prevails in decision making. The leader aims to gather as much information as possible before making a decision. This can be disadvantageous during times of crisis when swift and decisive decision making is necessary. As stated the decision making is based on cold hard data instead of an emotional reaction. The emotionless aspect of O.C. leadership carries through to personal relations. The O.C. leader is sometimes described as an automaton who can do wonders in solving a single issue but their depth of knowledge can cause issues as the leader loses the general overview and with it the ability to be a manager on a project can also be lost.

The paranoid leader is the third and last archetype according to Post. The leader is continuously suspicious towards others both within and outside of the respective movement or party of the leader. Once the leader has taken a disliking towards a person it is almost impossible to come back within the good graces of the leader. The leader will always look for evidence to show that other persons can not be trusted. Evidence which shows the opposite will not be taken into account. This is where a paranoid leader goes too far according to Post. Post concluded that a healthy suspicion towards others is healthy for political leaders as long as there is evidence for the disloyalty.<sup>51</sup>

According to political opponents Janmaat would fall within the third archetype. Some even called Janmaat Stalinistic in his attempts to get rid of other party members. Janmaat was supposedly a total paranoid.<sup>52</sup> Remarks like these were exaggerations of course, made by spiteful former CD members. However CD members and outside observers noticed that Janmaat saw government agents everywhere. These agents were supposed to bring down

<sup>50</sup> Jerrold M. Post, Edited by R.A.W. Rhodes en Paul 't Hart, *The Oxford Handbook of political leadership*, (Oxford 2014) 328-346.

<sup>51</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>52</sup>"Ruzie bij de CD" *KRO Reporter / Sting like a bee*, 26-02-1993  
<https://www.stinglikeabee.nl/ruzie-cd-centrumdemocraten/>.

the CD, just like what happened to the CP according to Janmaat.<sup>53</sup> The conduct shown in this chapter, will support the claim that Janmaat was a paranoid leader. It shaped the party and its international contacts. How this happened is the subject of research.

In 1989 Janmaat regained a seat with the Centrumdemocraten. His new party had a new set up but old problems remained. One was the ever existing inner struggle. Janmaat had made it clear he wanted to form a new party; he wanted to dispose of the troubles facing the CP. Effectively it meant getting total control over decision making. Janmaat made sure that he had the upper hand and that others in nominally important positions were inexperienced people who would comply with Janmaat's wishes and would not dare to speak up against him.<sup>54</sup>

Janmaat's autocratic rule led to trouble with Alfred Vierling and Willem Vreeswijk, two prominent members. Both felt like they could not add anything of value to the party. They also claimed that the CD could never become a viable party as long as internal discussions were met with resistance from Janmaat. Vierling had made his views on the undemocratic practices already clear in 1984 but was forced to switch to the CD or he would lose his job at the thinktank for the CD. In 1990 the tensions came to the surface as Vierling felt betrayed by Wil Schuurman. She supposedly told him that he was needed in The Hague to work for the party. When Vierling was making the arrangements for moving to The Hague he found out that the position was not vacant at all. After this he wanted to participate in the The Hague municipal council and the provincial government. But he was misinformed on the confirmation meetings so he was not attaining. Vierling felt that this was done on purpose to make sure he would not speak out anymore. What added to Vierling's fury was the fact that employment in the private sector was no longer an option. His membership of the CD was well-known and would deter possible employers.<sup>55</sup>

There clearly was no blood lost between Vierling and Schuurman. Vierling: "Clearly one leg is enough to deliver a kick". Vierling did not like Janmaat much better. According to Vierling the couple was often referred to as the Ceaucescu's by other party members. Vierling's prominence within the party was not the only reason Janmaat disliked him. Janmaat despised the fact that Vierling got a softer stance on family migration to the Netherlands. This supposed softer stance came after Vierling got into a relationship with a man from the Philippines. After his expulsion Vierling made clear that the only people remaining within the party were idiots. However Vierling also tried to make a comeback in 1992 in the CD as he "was in the gutter" because he could not find a good job.<sup>56</sup>

Vierling eventually decided to try to create his own party based on the ideals of the successful Belgian Vlaams Blok (VB). The Flemish radical right party had started to get electoral success in the 1990's. Vierling founded the Nederlands Blok (NB). Besides its

<sup>53</sup> Letter from Vreeswijk to Janmaat, 27-12-1986, Archive Hans Janmaat, Arch NR. 35a IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>54</sup> "De ware aard van de Centrumdemocraten (CD) van Janmaat", *Achter Gesloten Deuren RTL 5* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6\\_9S\\_wWuw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6_9S_wWuw)

<sup>55</sup> Letter of Alfred Vierling sent to the local leaders of the CD in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht criticizing their inability to hold party leadership accountable, December 1990, Arch. nr 69. IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>56</sup> Erik van Gruijthuisen and Jos Verlaan, "Allemaal clubs die van rancune aan elkaar hangen 'Janmaat denkt alleen nog maar in complottheorieën'", *Het Parool*. 19-02-1994. <https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:48MV-Y6T0-0151-017F-00000-00&context=1516831>. and "Verwachte 'doorbraak' brengt Centrum-democraten in roes; De grillige hofhouding van Hans Janmaat", *NRC*, 04-04-1992. <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/1992/04/04/verwachte-doorbraak-brengt-centrum-democraten-in-roes-7138840-a852963>.

name it also copied the Flemish slogan of protecting "our own culture". Filip Dewinter, leader of the VB was less than pleased with the development of a new party on the radical right. Dewinter had been trying to form a radical right alliance in the Netherlands, so he did not want a seemingly exclusive alliance with the NB. Dewinter: "The creation of the Nederlands Blok directly interferes with our meetings (With other radical right parties). Besides we are not pleased with the role of mother in law, which is forced upon us. What Dutchman is interested in a party with Flemish patronage?"<sup>57</sup> Dewinter and Vierling did have contact prior to the creation of the NB but Dewinter asked Vierling to at least wait until the talks with other radical right parties had ended.<sup>58</sup>

Dewinter's apprehension to support a CD dissident is understandable when looking at the goals of the Flemish nationalists. The VB wanted to work together to have a Europe of peoples. This would mean culturally cohesive peoples would be represented in the European parliament instead of representatives of the respective states. This fits with the aim for an independent Flemish country. To further its European goals the VB needed more similar minded parties to form an European coalition.<sup>59</sup> The VB was in favour of eventually forming a union with the Netherlands as they were part of the same "volk" according to the VB.<sup>60</sup> The CD was the most logical option to have talks with as they were the only ones with a seat in the national parliament. However other parties were also invited as Dewinter saw it imperative to create an united radical right front in the Netherlands.<sup>61</sup> Cooperation with a broader radical right makes sense as the CD would not be able to gather enough votes for a seat in the European parliament on their own. As mentioned in the previous chapter the electoral threshold was higher in Europe and the CD on its own did not reach this requirement.

Despite the fact that the VB managed to get multiple Dutch radical right parties together it did not turn out to be successful. The failure was due to the unwillingness of the CD to work together with other Dutch parties and the VB. Janmaat did not attend such meetings with other Dutch radical right parties, instead he sent lower ranked members to state that cooperation was not a possibility. Janmaat himself did not attend because the other parties should just all become part of his party as he had the biggest success. Janmaat did not want to give an inch to his Dutch opponents.<sup>62</sup> The invitation of other parties did show that the VB did not see the CD as the only option for working together. If the CD happened to be the only party able to win a seat in the European parliament then the VB would work together with them even if they rather see another party in Europe according to party-secretary Frank van Hecke.

Janmaat made clear that cooperation with other Dutch radical right parties was impossible. Under the pseudonym Wansink Janmaat said he was to be the only partner at the table, as he had the only politically successful radical right party in the Netherlands.<sup>63</sup> Besides this issue there was another problem concerning cooperation between the VB and CD. This problem was Janmaat did not seem to be the preferred candidate within the CD for the VB. They supported Wim Vreeswijk to become the party leader for the 1994 elections. Wim Vreeswijk was a member of the CD and represented them in the municipal council of

<sup>57</sup> "Nederlands Blok lijkt kort leven beschoren", *Trouw* 16-09-1992.

<sup>58</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>59</sup> Mudde, *War of words*.

<sup>60</sup> Aart Brouwer and Sander Pleij "Groot-Nederland" *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 14-05-1997 <https://www.groene.nl/artikel/groot-nederland>.

<sup>61</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>62</sup> Rinke van den Brink, *De internationale van haat*, (Amsterdam, 1994) 216-220.

<sup>63</sup> Ibidem 226-228.



Utrecht. Vreeswijk had a difficult relationship with the party leadership as it saw him as an oppositional voice from within. Vreeswijk's ideology does not seem to differ but Vreeswijk did want a more important position himself. Vreeswijk thought himself to be a more capable leader in the likes of Filip Dewinter. Vreeswijk was a member of the VB and attended multiple political events of the party. Vreeswijk's tight relation with the VB led to animosity within the CD. The matter exploded when KRO reporter, a news program, showed Dewinter and Vreeswijk together. Vreeswijk made less than flattering remarks about Janmaat's leadership style and his inability to form a real movement. Dewinter said that Vreeswijk should be at least included in parliament as he would be an adequate MP. Dewinter's attempt at a conciliatory meeting where Vreeswijk, Janmaat and Alfred Vierling attended failed. In this gathering Vierling, Vreeswijk and Dewinter attempted to persuade Janmaat to give his party leadership to Vreeswijk.<sup>64</sup>

Vreeswijk was eventually expelled after saying Janmaat was simply too ugly to gain a mass following. Janmaat claimed that Vreeswijk wanted unification with Flanders to create a larger "Dutch" nation and that Vreeswijk's contacts with Belgian extremist groups went too far. Vreeswijk was prepared as he had already been involved with the Nederlands Blok together with Vierling. As mentioned earlier Dewinter said that he had no hand in the creation of this party. He just simply wanted to work together with nationalists in the Netherlands regardless of party. The critical remarks in the *KRO reporter* interview were simply taken out of context and Vreeswijk had never mentioned unification with Flanders.<sup>65</sup> Nonetheless Dewinter eventually gave up on working with Janmaat. After years of trying he concluded that the "snake-pit" of Dutch nationalism was not worth getting into again.<sup>66</sup>

During the Vreeswijk saga Janmaat made clear he had no real interest in creating a unified people of Flanders and the Netherlands. It was one of the reasons mentioned by Janmaat to expel Vreeswijk as well as his supposed extremism.<sup>67</sup> Janmaat saw more benefit in a Europe of strong nations instead of the Europe the VB wanted. The Flemish nationalists wanted Europe to be governed through national peoples such as the "Diets" (Dutch-speaking) peoples. This can be seen as an extension of their want for Flemish independence on the basis of being an independent people.<sup>68</sup> But in 1998, the last year of the CD in parliament, the official party programme showed a sudden shift. The CD suddenly claimed to be in favour of unifying with the Flemish to create a stronger Dutch speaking nation. There are multiple possible explanations for this shift.<sup>69</sup> Janmaat no longer saw the VB as a threat for his national political interests and could change his stance to gain votes with the knowledge that the VB would not react to the ideological change. It can also be true that Janmaat genuinely had a change of heart in wanting for a "Diets" nation. However it does make it more unlikely that Janmaat had genuine problems with Vreeswijk's "Diets" idealism. Once the strife with Vreeswijk and Dewinter was over, Janmaat saw no ideological problems anymore with creating a union with the Flemish. It is hard to prove but Janmaat might have seen the popularity of the unification ideals and decided to copy it. The Vlaams Blok had been rising in the polls ever since the beginning of the nineties in campaigns where a Dutch-speaking union was always one of the goals of the party.

<sup>64</sup> "Ruzie bij de CD" *KRO Reporter* and "Versplinterd volk eerst" *Het Parool* 06-05-1995.

<sup>65</sup> Letter from Dewinter to Janmaat concerning Vreeswijk's expulsion written in 1992, Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 191, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>66</sup> Vermaas, "Partij op papier", *De Groene Amsterdammer*.

<sup>67</sup> Letter Dewinter to Janmaat concerning Vreeswijk's expulsion, IISG Arch NR. 191, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>68</sup> Mudde, *War of words*.

<sup>69</sup> *Party program 1998*, Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 142, IISG Amsterdam.

On other issues similar views were held. To show how similar the CD and VB were in their views the CD magazines will be compared with the seventy-point plan by the VB. The seventy-point plan was a party document to make the VB's views on immigration clear. Some of the seventy points will be discussed and similarities between these points and the CD's ideology will be shown.

The first point of the seventy was the dissolution of the centre for equal opportunities and combating racism. Many VB-members saw the institution as a nuisance. The relationship was strained and filled with legal battles. The government agency was eventually successful in 2004 when the Vlaams Blok had to restructure under the name of Vlaams Belang after being convicted for racism and being a racist organization. This is similar to the CD's struggles with the Anne Frank foundation. Even though this is a private institute the aims were similar to the Flemish government agency. The Anne Frank foundation tried to combat racism through education and lawsuits. Janmaat and his companions resented them and were always aware of the chance of legal consequences of their statements. The CD-leader had founded multiple organizations in case of the CD's dissolution. These were created in the name of fighting the rising crime levels. Janmaat himself called them a lifeboat in case they were needed if the Anne Frank foundation succeeded in banning the CD.<sup>70</sup>

The second point was stopping the influx of immigrants. The VB believed there were organizations behind the immigrants coming to Belgium. These organizations needed to be revealed and stopped. The measure was seen as necessary as millions of Francs went to the support of immigrant-organizations annually. The sunk-cost led the government to be apathetic to the problems caused by the immigrants. According to the VB the government did not want to admit failure in the integration process. Stopping the subsidies for these organizations would lead the government to take real actions and leave more money on the table for more important issues. The CD also believed that the influx of immigrants needed to be stopped. According to them it led to less social cohesion within the inner cities. Social benefits were under pressure as more people applied.<sup>71</sup>

Both parties agreed that immigrants also committed more crimes than the local population. To show this the VB asked for truthful crime statistics just for immigrants. The VB believed that the government purposefully hid the true crime statistics of immigrants in an effort to protect their own popularity. The deception concerning crime statistics prohibits a successful prevention, even crime concerning the trade of narcotics was allegedly not brought to the light anymore since 1993. The CD also linked the increase of narcotic crime to immigration. Even Surinamese-Dutch police officers could not be trusted as the CD claimed they were responsible for making the trade in cocaine easier by notifying relatives of routine drug inspections.<sup>72</sup>

The ninth point and tenth point make clear that non-native Belgians should not be able to participate in government. The ninth rule states that non-natives should not be able to vote while the tenth rule states that participation in organizations such as labour unions is not allowed. Because it would ensure non-Belgians could have a say in politics without being able to vote. Together with points 22-24 it becomes clear that the VB believes in welfare

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<sup>70</sup> Jan de Vetten "Bestrijding van CP en CD in de rechtszaal" *Historiek*, 10-09-2020 <https://historiek.net/bestrijding-van-cp-en-cd-in-de-rechtszaal/128324/> en "Wim Vreeswijk", *Kafka* 15-04-2000, <https://kafka.nl/wim-vreeswijk/>.

<sup>71</sup> CD actueel, July 1992 Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 125, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>72</sup> CD actueel, March 1992 Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 125, IISG Amsterdam.

chauvinism. This means that perks such as cheap housing, employment and political expression need to be given to Belgians (Flemish) first.

The general ideology is the same as the CD's ideology. Both parties wanted to limit control of 'outside' groups on politics, were in favour of welfare chauvinism and railed against immigration. However the CD did not have the same depth of plans. The attacks against immigration in the *CD actueel*, their magazine, were very broad. New migrants lead to higher levels of crime, loss of Dutch culture and less social benefits for the indiginous Dutch people. There were few times where the CD would propose a specific law or policy which they would like to see implemented.<sup>73</sup>

This was one of the many things the CD could have learned from the VB as the VB was much more successful in creating a well oiled political machine even though they were met with similar challenges as the CD. It meant that all other Belgian parties solemnly vowed to never work together with the VB. Members of public networks were explicitly told to ask critical questions to the VB and prohibit extensive airtime. However the decision did not have the intended effect and in 1991 the VB had major electoral success on a day dubbed black sunday by other parties. The success was due to the organization of the party. It meant that the VB was a professionally led party, had good funding, an unusually clear political position and charismatic leadership with good verbal skills. These verbal skills were used to create an omnipresent populist messaging. There were almost no disagreements and certainly no widely publicized infighting.<sup>74</sup>

The success of 1991 was not immediate however. The Flemish radical right party was founded in 1978 and immediately had the backing of former collaborators who supported German occupation during the second World War. Initially the party did not have much success and they only focussed on Antwerp. Some of the most extreme voices were lost when new faces started joining the party in an effort to gain more support. This led to greater success in 1987 with the slogan: "*Eigen Volk eerst!*" (Own people first!). In 1991 the VB also managed to gain a European parliamentary seat besides the gained seats in the national parliament and senate. The seat in the EU parliament was occupied by Karel Dillen who made a pact with the Republikaner from Germany.

The VB did not work together with the French Front National (FN); they only made the deal to formally form a coalition for financial reasons. These finances as well as national resources were used to expand the party into a larger apparatus, These increased finances were used to create local branches and offices. In 1996 the VB had 180 local branches and 6 local offices. These branches were led by VB members with approval of the national leadership. Leaders of local branches received ideological training from the *Nationalistisch Vormingsinstituut* (Nationalist education institute).<sup>75</sup>

Janmaat had no interest in transferring the VB structures to the Netherlands. Others in the party such as Vreeswijk and Vierling wanted to emulate the successes of the Flemish party by using their structures in the Netherlands. Everett Rogers is the classic author on political transfer and his theory can be applied to the CD's situation. Rogers divided the diffusion of politics into separate units, such as innovation, transmitters, communication channels and receivers, and the receivers are divided into, among other things, early adopters and

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<sup>73</sup> Mudde, "War of words".

<sup>74</sup> Stefaan Walgrave & Knut de Swert, "The Making of the (Issues of the) Vlaams Blok", *Political Communication*, (2004) 21:4, 479-500.

<sup>75</sup> Ibidem.

laggards.<sup>76</sup> If these units would be used in the case of the CD it becomes clear that the innovation would come from the Flemish side. From De Kurt and Walgraeve's article it becomes clear that the VB was a successful party from 1990 onward and had set up local offices, a congruent ideology among members and a stable financial basis to operate from. To form a coalition within the European Union more seats were needed through a stable and electorally viable Dutch radical party. Dewinter saw Janmaat as standing in the way of electoral success in the Netherlands and wanted Willem Vreeswijk to take the leadership role. Vreeswijk had visited VB meetings twice a month to learn lessons from the VB establishment and said he wanted to transmit these ideas to the CD.<sup>77</sup> The communication went through these meetings, letters written by Dewinter to Janmaat and through national media. Dewinter made clear that he wanted Vreeswijk to lead in the national press. Janmaat in return said in convened meetings, columns in the CD magazine under the pseudonym Wansink and in the national press that he would not work together with Dewinter as long as he was not the only option for the Flemish. Vreeswijk and other political parties should have been excluded from the process of creating a partnership between Dutch and Flemish radical right parties. As such Janmaat can be seen as the laggard. He did not see any merit in Dewinter's "help" and said that the Flemish politician had much to learn in politics. Janmaat's full authority over the party made sure that adopters such as Vreeswijk and Vierling could not prevail.

So Janmaat was not interested in copying Flemish political structures. Besides he was unwilling to listen to critical voices from within the party. To run a political party however some degree of electoral support is needed. The next chapter will show how Janmaat ran his political party without the help of more experienced politicians and without a traditional set of structures within the party.

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<sup>76</sup> Te Velde "Political Transfer: An Introduction".

<sup>77</sup> "Ruzie binnen de CD", *KRO Reporter*.

## Chapter 3: The CD as a small business.

What is obvious from the previous chapters is that Janmaat often had to deal with internal struggle. Even the international contact with the VB was shaped by the struggle between Vierling, Vreeswijk and Janmaat. Vreeswijk and Vierling were seen as more competent partners by the VB and Janmaat was never popular with the Flemish leadership. This third chapter shows what remained after Janmaat consolidated his power. What kind of people were left in the party and what effect did this have on international contacts?

Meindert Fennema concluded that Janmaat only worked with people with an IQ lower than 80 points. Only family members were excluded from this rule.<sup>78</sup> This is of course hard to prove but what has become obvious from the previous chapter is that Janmaat often butted heads with other members of his party. Vreeswijk, Vierling, Konst and Brookman all had a falling out with Janmaat, while Janmaat himself did not fit in as a member of more traditional parties before he joined the CP. The CD did not operate as a traditional party. Joop van Holsteyn asserted that Janmaat ran his party as a small business. In the small business it was paramount that Janmaat controlled the 'employees' and the steady flow of income. This had an effect on how the international contacts were maintained. First the 'employees' will be examined, what kind of person would remain under Janmaat's strict rule?

During my research I discerned two types of prominent CD members: the opportunists and the extremists. The opportunists were people who saw the CD as a vehicle to obtain a good income or to benefit their own personal businesses. These people would not oppose Janmaat as he was the gatekeeper to political success together with Wil Schuurman. The second group consisted of more extreme members. These people were not afraid to support fascist groups and militias and saw Janmaat as the only successful Dutch politician supporting their cause. First the opportunist members will be discussed.

Chiel Koning was the most obvious case of an opportunist. He was a landlord in Dordrecht, the municipality where he won a seat. He himself proclaimed that he had become a politician to defend his own business' interests. This was necessary because his enterprise was not profitable and he had been losing property to rent out. He even paid Janmaat 10.000 guilders to secure his first placed ballot in Dordrecht. He was not the only one who got involved with the CD in an attempt to personally benefit. Among the rank and file members of the CD it was openly discussed how well being a member of parliament paid. It would also mean securing retention pay for multiple years afterwards, it was definitely worth paying 10.000 guilders to Janmaat to secure a higher place on the ballot.<sup>79</sup> Even the party secretary, Wim Koetsier, paid to secure his position. The reason he did so will be discussed later in this chapter.<sup>80</sup>

Cor Zonneveld might not have paid for his parliamentary seat in 1994, but he is a very good example of the wheeling and dealing done by Janmaat to gather support. Zonneveld joined Wil Schuurman and Hans Janmaat as the third CD member of parliament. Zonneveld had been the accountant for the CD and had done a good job according to Janmaat. Besides working as an accountant Zonneveld had been successful in his endeavors in local politics in Schiedam. He rose through the ranks even though he was

<sup>78</sup> Jaap Stam. "Een merkwaardige familie". *de Volkskrant*. 12-07-2001.

<sup>79</sup> Rensen, *Dansen met de Duivel*, 20-22 and 65-66.

<sup>80</sup> Ten Brinke, *De internationale van haat*, 207-209.

known for being absent in political events, during parliamentary and municipal meetings.<sup>81</sup> Janmaat started getting annoyed by the apparent disinterest of Zonneveld as it had an adverse effect on the CD. Journalists had started to notice that he never used his speaking time to make CD opinions heard and Janmaat did not like the fact that Zonneveld did not attend CD meetings. This led to a situation where Zonneveld was signed up for economic commission in parliament without his consent. Zonneveld had not attended the meeting where CD-commissions were discussed. He was angry that he could not be part of the commission on immigration and judicial matters as he felt it would suit him better. Janmaat grew tired of having to force Zonneveld to attend and made the deal that Zonneveld would turn up around 10 A.M. at the CD fraction. Janmaat would have liked to expel Zonneveld but it would mean losing a seat in parliament and also losing a substantial part of the subsidies received. Subsidies were partly dependent on the number of seats held.<sup>82</sup> If Zonneveld was expelled from the CD he could keep his seat and continue as an independent member of parliament, just like Janmaat had done 10 years earlier after his debacle within the CP. Eventually Janmaat and Schuurman found a solution. They decided to hire Zonneveld's girlfriend as an office worker for the parliamentary party. This meant she was dependent on the CD and would lose income if she was fired. Zonneveld had something to lose again if he ever felt inclined to leave the party.<sup>83</sup>

These opportunists were flanked by more extremist members of the party. People like Yge Graman and Richard van der Plas were known for their radical sometimes violent beliefs. Graman was part of a documentary made by *KRO reporter*. What became obvious is that the Amsterdam councilman was the proud owner of many books concerning many books on the Second World War and the Nazi's especially. Graman also bragged that he committed arson against immigrant organizations.<sup>84</sup> These extremist CD-members were allowed to have international contacts. Janmaat knew of them and did not see them as a problem unless they would lead to a criminal conviction.<sup>85</sup>

Janmaat could use the more extremist members as they were not afraid of public scrutiny or the loss of employment. The extremists were the ones who would always go out and spread flyers no matter the public reaction. They also provided the party with the necessary signatures to be able to run in elections. Van der Plas: "There were not many people active in politics so the choices were limited. Only the strongest were capable of dealing with the ostracization".<sup>86</sup> Finally they were also the persons willing to fight any anti-fascist groups who could always show up at CD meetings and conventions. The fighting was done by a small group of skinheads who had joined the CD. They did so through Van der Plas, as he had multiple contacts in skinhead groups. This made the Purmerend council member even more important for Janmaat.<sup>87</sup>

Van der Plas also had contacts in even more unsavoury circles. He was also infamous for his (neo) nazi beliefs. The Purmerend councilman was known for his

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<sup>81</sup> Chris van de Wetering. "Cor Zonneveld 1954-1997, Een kleine zelfstandige in de politiek". *Het Parool* 17-12-1997  
<https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:48MV-TYB0-0151-02N6-00000-00&context=1516831>.

<sup>82</sup> Typoscript of the autobiography by Janmaat (2000), archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 263 165-170.

<sup>83</sup> Ibidem 168.

<sup>84</sup> Mudde, *Ideology of the extreme right* 125-128.

<sup>85</sup> Van den Brink, *Internationale van haat* 268.

<sup>86</sup> Zwart Wit, "De Erfenis van Janmaat", *NTR*.

<sup>87</sup> Van den Brink, *Internationale van haat* 269-272.

membership of violent extreme-right groups before he joined the CD. As a member of the CD he was very active in the national campaigns and he was elected for the municipal council of Purmerend in North-Holland. In 1989 it became public knowledge that Van der Plas was a member of the Aktionfront National-Socialisten (ANS). His house was raided by police for illegal possession of a fire-arm. During the raid the police found ANS stickers and documents stating that Europe needed to get rid of the Jews. He was indicted for membership of a criminal organization. This case was eventually dismissed due to procedural errors made by the prosecution.<sup>88</sup>

The ANS was part of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei Auslands-Organisation (NSDAP-AO). This NSDAP-AO was a National-Socialist group spanning across multiple countries. It was originally founded by an American, Gary "Gerhard" Lauck, who felt connected to Nazi-Germany after reading *Mein Kampf*. Lauck made a fortune by selling propaganda to nazi's worldwide from 1972 onward. Michael Kuhnen was the leader of the German cell and the Netherlands were seen as a shire within Greater Germany. This view was shared by Gerrit Wolsink, former SS-man and Eite Homan, neo-nazi. These Dutch ANS leaders fought against Antifa and left-wing squatters.<sup>89</sup>

These links with the ANS were not just limited to gathering nazi material for Van der Plas. He also gathered illegal weapons and during searches lists of targets were also found. Van der Plas had noted down the Anne Frank foundation and its policy maker Joke Kniesmeijer. Van der Plas claimed they were only listed as he wanted to spread propaganda against them. But among the to-do lists were also 1. Forming a group. 2. Acquiring financial means 3. Using said financial resources for buying weaponry. The Purmerend councilman also said that he saw the ANS as the new Sturmabteilung (SA). The SA was the group of Goons willing to engage in street brawls and murders for Hitler before they were disbanded in 1933. Van der Plas was also happy to join another CD-member on a trip to neo-nazi's in Germany.<sup>90</sup> Van der Plas was aware of the controversial nature of the ANS. When Homan and Wolsink were interviewed by journalist Michael Schmidt, Van der Plas hastily fled the scene as he did not want to be publically associated with the ANS.<sup>91</sup>

However Van der Plas might not even be the most extreme member of the CD. Douwe van der Bos was a member of the provincial council of Frisia. He was a member of several organizations on the far right. Most notably he was known for his connections with South-African boers. These descendants of Dutch colonists were supposedly under threat of the black tribes of South Africa. From the CP and CD's founding Van der Bos had held multiple speeches at party events concerning the fate of the "Dutch" settlers. In 1991 Van der Bos was still active for the CD, later he would switch among numerous parties. During his CD-period he founded the *Kroatische werkgemeenschap* (Croatian working community) and had contacts with Voorpost, a Flemish fascist organization. The Kroatische werkgemeenschap was a militia under the leadership of Van der Bos himself. As a veteran he felt the need to help the Croatian army in active combat. This was necessary to prevent communist success under Serbia. As such thirty Dutchmen ended up fighting for the HOS,

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<sup>88</sup> Verwachte "doorbraak" brengt Centrum-democraten in roes; De grillige hofhouding van Hans Janmaat", NRC.

<sup>89</sup> Michael Schmidt, *Neonazi's: Onderzoek naar een verschrikking*, (Amsterdam 1993) 266-269. "Radicaal Rechts hijst zich in het nette maatpak" *Trouw* 19-02-1994.

<sup>90</sup> Ten Brinke, *Internationale van haat*. 266-268 and Kees Kooiman, "Undercover in de CD", *De Groene Amsterdammer* 23-03-1994 <https://www.groene.nl/artikel/undercover-in-de-cd--2>.

<sup>91</sup> Schmidt, *Neonazi's*, 290.

an extreme right Croatian militia. It is unclear when Van der Bos officially left the CD but he joined up with Vreeswijk at the NB.

The controversies surrounding the extreme right members did hurt during election cycles but Janmaat depended on the radical members of his party. According to the *Algemeen Dagblad*, a national newspaper, it was all part of a deliberate effort to maintain control over the party. If the party did not grow too much it would mean it would still be controlled by Janmaat. Janmaat's fame was always larger than the party's or other members of the CD. People such as Vreeswijk and Vierling were removed because they fought against the status quo within the party. The membership of extremists was needed according to the newspaper as they attracted votes from more extreme right-wing voters. The more extreme CD members were also the ones who were the most active in spreading party material and by doing so created an extreme image. This would in turn ensure that the party did not grow too fast for Janmaat to control.<sup>92</sup> Peter Rensen also came to a similar conclusion as he worked as an undercover journalist within the CD. He saw that many calls for new members were left unanswered by Janmaat who controlled the membership list himself.<sup>93</sup>

The extremist members contributed to downsizing the CD after elections. Janmaat's unwillingness to disassociate from Van der Plas until May 1994 meant that other party members became annoyed by their lack of input. Multiple municipal representatives for the CD consolidated behind Toon Poppe who was tired of the strict rule of Janmaat and Schuurman. Poppe claimed that Janmaat welcomed extremist members and they even made it into important positions. Poppe wanted to democratize the party so that other members could decide to expel more extremist voices. It did not end well when Poppe questioned Janmaat's position as the party leader. Poppe would be expelled but the damage had been done.<sup>94</sup> Over the years the CD started losing seats because individual members decided that they did not want to be associated with the CD. These councilmen and women left but kept their seats in their own name or joined other smaller radical right parties. Janmaat had lost almost half of his 70 municipal representatives by 1996.<sup>95</sup>

The loss of seats did not seriously hamper the continuous flow of income for the party and Janmaat himself. Janmaat purportedly had access to the CD coffers without having to show how these finances were spent or earned. Janmaat himself admitted that he made the costs of the party look higher than they actually were. He boasted using subsidies for building a new kitchen in his home. Janmaat said that this was done to create more costs he could then write down in the party finances. This would later be subsidized by the government. Former CD-members claimed that Janmaat was only in politics to secure his own finances and regularly made financial transactions between different organizations under his leadership.<sup>96</sup>

For Janmaat and the CD most of the funding came from state subsidies and the salary for being a member of parliament.<sup>97</sup> According to the *Leeuwarder courant* the CD made 1.2 million guilders through subsidies. The newspaper indicated that Janmaat and the CD did not want to share their financial reports, even though they said that they did not have anything to hide. Janmaat was only willing to tell that the party offices were located in his

<sup>92</sup> "Familiebedrijf van beheersbare afmetingen" *Algemeen Dagblad* 17-05-1994.

<sup>93</sup> Rensen, *Dansen met de Duivel* 68-71.

<sup>94</sup> "Janmaat laat zich niet aan de stoelpoten zagen", *Trouw* 16-05-1994.

<sup>95</sup> Mudde, *The ideology of the extreme right* 124-127.

<sup>96</sup> De Vetten, *In de ban van goed en fout* 160-162.

<sup>97</sup> Van Holsteyn and Mudde, *Extreem-rechts in Nederland* 47-60.



house and it only contained one computer. Janmaat's hesitance to show his finances can be seen as suspicious but his fraught relation with the media can also be seen as a likely reason to not divulge information. The *Leeuwarder Courant* did get information from the government concerning the allocation for subsidies. Part of this information was that Janmaat tried to get 20.000 guilders in subsidies to rent an office. The office was in Janmaat's personal apartment as mentioned earlier. This obvious financial trick meant that the request for the subsidy was denied.<sup>98</sup>

Jan de Vetten concluded from archival materials that most of the requests for subsidies were denied by the government as there was no merit for the requests. The three CD think tanks which asked for subsidies were the Stipolka, responsible for the CD magazines, the *Karel de Grote* foundation (Karthago) which was responsible for the contacts with eastern European parties and the Thomas Hobbes / SWOCI foundation. These organizations saw an average of 29.8%, 22.4% and 12.1% of their requests for subsidies granted.<sup>99</sup> Many of these requests were based on no real output. SWOCI for instance was responsible for writing essays and think pieces for the CD but had only managed to write a handful of articles. It meant that no big expenditures were made and they could not be shown to the authorities to warrant the subsidies being given. The ideological vacuum did not only possibly have an electoral cost but also led to a diminished income for the party. The other two organizations were vague with their costs. Karthago was responsible for events with radical right parties from eastern Europe. Stipolka had an inexplicable rise in reported costs all the while the output of CD magazines diminished. The cost increase was never fully explained to the authorities.<sup>100</sup>

But the amount of subsidies being granted was still higher than it should have been. According to one of the persons responsible for political party subsidies the approach was lenient. They were afraid of being seen as partial and being guilty of preferential treatment of the bigger parties. The ministry was aware of the suspicious nature of the requests but did not dare to harshly enforce the rules. In internal documents it becomes clear that Janmaat had made bold claims of the cost his organizations had made without giving any proof of these made costs.<sup>101</sup>

The aforementioned contacts with Eastern European radical right parties are very interesting as they ran through the party secretary. As mentioned earlier Wim Koetsier paid a hefty sum to obtain his position within the party. Besides secretary, Koetsier was the leader of this Mun-church in the Netherlands. His religious views become relevant when it becomes apparent that he donated 20.000 Gilders in the name of the Dutch Mun-church to the CD. Janmaat and Schuurman also attended at least one Mun event. This event focused on the role of women in reaching world peace. The event was hosted by Mun's fourth wife. Janmaat was not welcomed by all however as some attendees saw Janmaat's political expressions as incongruous with the aims of the gathering.<sup>102</sup>

Janmaat's links with the Korean mega church can be seen as surprising because the CD did not seem to be particularly interested in religion and because of the vast distance between the Netherlands and Korea. The party magazine does refer to the Netherlands as being based in Christianity but there does not seem to be religious ideology implemented.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> "De BV Janmaat" *Leeuwarder Courant* 21-05-1994.

<sup>99</sup> De Vetten, *In de ban van goed en fout* 164

<sup>100</sup> De Vetten, *In de ban van goed en fout* 163-166.

<sup>101</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>102</sup> Rensen, *Dansen met de Duivel* 49-55.

<sup>103</sup> Middenkoers 21-12-1986, Archive Hans Janmaat Arch NR. 123 IISG Amsterdam.

The Korean religious movement is often described as a cult and is loosely based on christianity. The leader of the religion called Sun Myung Mun titled himself reverend, in line with other Christian faiths. He was the leader of the unification church or movement. The followers of Mun were sometimes called *Moonies*. They are a controversial movement across the world with membership estimates ranging in the hundreds of thousands.<sup>104</sup> The movement is controversial due to their cultish recruitment of new members. New members are forced to forfeit former religions, distance themselves from relations outside of the church and hand over any financial means they have.

Within the church Reverend Mun was seen as an almighty deity who controlled which members could marry and who they married.<sup>105</sup> Mun believed that he got revelations from Jesus, Budha, Sun Tzu and Satan.<sup>106</sup> Aside from conversations with people of religious importance Mun also believed himself to be the messiah. In church gatherings Mun pronounced himself to be the new Messiah, sent to the world to get rid of sin. The exemption of sin could have come from a lineage from Jesus himself if he would have had kids. Mun and followers blame the Jewish people of Israel for the death of Jesus and perpetuating people living under sin. Mun likened himself to Goliath, the giant from Persia who tried to expel the Jews from Israel. The beliefs caused the Church of Unification to be accused of anti-semitism. The Mun-church was also involved in anti-communism groups on the far right.<sup>107</sup> This includes an effort in South America through an organization called Causa. Causa had the goal of fighting communism in the eighties through propaganda but also funded the Nicaraguan Contras who were fighting Sandinista's left wing government. They were supported in this effort by the Reagan administration in the U.S.<sup>108</sup>

The Mun church's broad network becomes obvious from looking at Wim Koetsier's conduct. Koetsier combined his role as church leader with his position with the CD. The combination of roles led to a conference in Poland<sup>109</sup> and contacts with a Bulgarian politician. Koetsier connected the CD with Front National leader Jean-Marie le Pen and Bulgarian ultranationalist Ivan Georgiev.<sup>110</sup> Georgiev was a well-known ultra-nationalist who had endured persecution in communist Bulgaria, he rose to prominence after the fall of the communist government.

In letters to Koetsier, Georgiev indicated that he needed funding to fight the Turkish threat. Georgiev sees Pan-islamic and Pan-turkish alliances forming in Georgia through Koran teachings and the foundation of new mosques. To fight the perceived Islamic changes coming to Bulgaria Georgiev would use training and distribution of pamphlets. Georgiev would need funds to be able to provide these courses and pamphlets. Georgiev got assistance out of the Netherlands from the CD secretary. Koetsier applied for subsidies from the Dutch government, the subsidy would come from the "Foundation and education for the

<sup>104</sup> Daniel Burke "Unification Church founder Sun Myung Moon dies at 92"

*Washington Post* September 4, 2012

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/unification-church-founder-sun-myung-moon-dies-at-92/2012/09/02/631f1060-f548-11e1-863c-fe85c95ce4ed\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/unification-church-founder-sun-myung-moon-dies-at-92/2012/09/02/631f1060-f548-11e1-863c-fe85c95ce4ed_story.html).

<sup>105</sup> "I was a Moonie cult leader", *The Guardian* 3-09-2012.

<sup>106</sup> Burke "Unification Church founder Sun Myung Moon dies at 92".

<sup>107</sup> Rensen, Dansen met de duivel 49-55.

<sup>108</sup> "CIA, Moonies cooperate in Sandinista war," *Washington Post* 16-08-1994

<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000100130060-4.pdf>

<sup>109</sup> De Vetten, *In de ban van goed en fout* 158-159.

<sup>110</sup> "Noord-Holland Centrumdemocraten", *Kafka* 16-02-1992

<https://kafka.nl/noord-holland-centrumdemocraten/>, Vermaas, "Een partij op papier" and Antoni Todorov "The Extreme Right Wing in Bulgaria", January 2013  
<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09660.pdf>.

political framework in Middle and Eastern Europe.” The total cost was 45.000 Guilders, a large sum of money which was at least partially brought to Bulgaria, in cash, by Koetsier.<sup>111</sup>

According to multiple FN-members Le Pen also had a financial relationship with the Unification movement. Le Pen hired a Moon-follower as a staffer after he had been given 500.000 francs by the Church. Mun’s second in command was impressed with FN’s vehement anti-communism and asked to formalize relations. Le Pen’s history of making anti semetic remarks did not hinder the relationship with the Church and Le Pen supposedly added more references to god in speeches to please the Church. Le Pen’s statement such as that the holocaust was just a footnote in human history did not bother his Korean backers but it did hinder a closer connection with the CD.<sup>112</sup>

Janmaat had written a letter to Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1988 stating that he would like to work together, but he later recanted. The FN-leader’s position and statements were too extreme and would lead to too much controversy if said by Janmaat. This was also noted by Dutch newspapers who saw that Janmaat made an effort to not be as extreme as Le Pen. The FN did invite Janmaat to join gatherings in France but these were all declined. Janmaat did receive a one time donation from the French nationalists according to Wil Schuurman. However it did not lead to long standing cooperation. Janmaat wanted to distance himself from Le Pen's statements as they were too extreme and would lead to bad press.<sup>113</sup>

In the end the attempt to keep the CD name clean failed. All the controversies surrounding the CD and their individual leaders led to its downfall in 1998. It failed to win enough votes for even one seat in parliament and made a silent exit. Janmaat himself claimed his loss was due to rigged voting machines. Besides, the person who was to hand in the official list of CD candidates to the government was also apprehended according to Janmaat. The CD official was only released after the hand-in date had expired. These seem like extravagant claims which only Janmaat himself made.<sup>114</sup>

According to Meindert Fennema the eventual failure of the CD can be blamed on the fact that they never managed to become a "legitimate" party. This happened because the CD and CP previously were continuously linked with racist parties and organizations from the past, mainly from the second world war. This occurred at the hand of the national press according to Fennema. They had secretly made a pact to ignore the CD and CP as much as possible. When they were discussed they were mainly named as a threat even though they were not anti-democratic. According to Fennema one possible explanation for the ideological vagueness of the CD were the concerted efforts of the Anti-Fascist movements. They made it impossible for the CD to convene and talk strategy. Events were kept secret and locations were unknown until the very last moment. Places such as pubs and restaurants refused to host the CD, fearing reprisals or other consequences.<sup>115</sup> Jan de Vetten researched how opponents of the CD such as journalists, anti racism organizations and political parties fought the CD. He came to the conclusion that these opponents were successful in their fight against the CD as it had no real success while in parliament. However Janmaat himself also made it difficult to be successful. His way of leading the party created many opponents

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<sup>111</sup> Vermaas, "Een partij op papier", *De Groene Amsterdammer*.

<sup>112</sup> Harvey Simmons, *The French National Front: The Extremist Challenge To Democracy*, Chapter 9 and Vermaas, "Een partij op papier", *de Groene Amsterdammer*.

<sup>113</sup> Vermaas, "Een partij op papier", *de Groene Amsterdammer* and Zwart Wit, "De Erfenis van Janmaat", *NTR*.

<sup>114</sup> typoscript of the autobiography written by Janmaat in the year 2000 177-178, Archive Hans Janmaat Arch.NR. 263, IISG Amsterdam.

<sup>115</sup> Meindert Fennema, *Help! De elite verdwijnt veertig jaar Nederlandse politiek* (Amsterdam 2012) 52-58.

within the party and did not garner much support outside the loyal members which. Other parties made sure to never cooperate with the CD and Janmaat saw his speeches in parliament mainly as a way to spread more party propaganda.<sup>116</sup>

These problems facing the CD also showed in their international contacts. Janmaat made sure that the international contacts were kept limited to make sure it would not alter his power position. The only international contacts were for monetary gain or made by members of the party who would not rebel against CD leadership. The party did not have international contacts a more traditional party would have. There was no long lasting cooperation with other established parties abroad. Instead the ties of Richard van der Plas added to the infighting by creating unhappiness among CD council members. They were unhappy with reading media reports which shed light on how extreme the ties of Van der Plas were. Janmaat kept Van der Plas on as long as possible even when it hampered the possibility to grow the party.

## Conclusion

In the introduction it became apparent that the CD had not been part of extensive research concerning transnational radical right networks. This is unlike the modern transnational movement bolstered by cooperation within the European parliament. Historians and political scientists such as Duncan McDonnell, Annika Werner and Manuela Caiani have taken a look at modern transnational networks of the radical right. Tamir Bar-On has done similar research but for the radical right from the nineteen seventies onward. He concluded that the network spanned across many European states but did not include the Netherlands until the two thousands.

This seems strange as the Netherlands did have parties on the radical right which had electoral success. Martin Durham and Margaret Power did research on transnational radical right networks and concluded that the radical right did have international contacts just like other political movements. It might seem contradictory to the nationalist and sometimes xenophobic rhetoric used by these parties but radical right parties did often convene with likeminded parties. This was done in an effort to learn from each other and copy political rhetoric. Similar to other political networks, cooperation could be either successful or unsuccessful. Success was highly dependent on interpersonal relations. Meindert Fennema concluded that the CD did not have many international contacts despite attempts made by the Flemish Vlaams Blok to cooperate in the European parliament. The main question for this thesis was: How did Janmaat's leadership style shape the international contacts of the Centrumdemocraten? The question is answered through three chapters. The first chapter explains the origins and general background of the CD: how they were formed, what kind of policies were crucial for the CD and how they were perceived by other parties, the media and the public. The second chapter shows how Janmaat's struggle for power shaped the party and its international cooperation. Chapter 3 shows how the party was organized in an effort to keep it manageable and profitable. This influenced international contacts among individual CD members.

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<sup>116</sup> Jan de Vetten, *In de ban van goed en fout* 274-277.

These questions concerning the international contacts of the CD are important as previous research has been concerned with *lieux de mémoire*. This means that they have focussed on the national aspects and importance of the CD. Jaap van Donselaar has focussed on the genealogy of the CD. He defines the CD by looking at the extreme right wing predecessors of the CD. These include post-war collaborationist organizations and the (neo) fascist organizations which helped form the Centriumpartij and Centrumdemocraten.

The difference with the more radical parties of the past is that the CD and CP did want to make their policy reality through parliament. They did have major difficulties with laws and procedures which obstruct the "will of the people". The radical right believes that they are the ones to bring the will of the people to parliament. Other traditional parties have failed to do so according to the radical right. Extreme right parties such as (neo)-fascist and (neo)-nazi groups do not believe in the democratic power of parliament. The radical right parties were viable as democratic parties due to a shift to cultural racism instead of biological racism and by creating populist narratives instead of authoritarianism according to Jens Rydgren.

Cas Mudde, Meindert Fennema, Frank Elbers and Joop van Holsteyn are in favour of categorizing the CD by their ideology which included populism. This group concluded that radical right parties are defined by their ethnocentrism, autocratic party-leadership and their scepticism and distrust towards the parties in power. Cas Mudde concluded that the CD was part of a family of radical right parties. Mudde notes that the party family had a core set of beliefs, these were: Nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism and faith in justice and order. In comparison with the other parties the CD was defined by its lack of in-depth writings and discussions about the core values of the party. What defines the CD amongst the family is the opposition against multiculturalism, focus on fighting criminality, populist antagonism towards party elites and the undemocratic measures taken against the CD.

These undemocratic measures are part of Jan de Vetten's dissertation *in de ban van goed en fout*. In it it becomes apparent that the CD was ostracized by three groups. NGO's and action groups tried to fight the CD through the justice system and by disrupting CD meetings. The second opponent of the CD was the media, which according to De Vetten, made sure they only spoke in negative terms when discussing the CD. If there was no negative article to be written the CD would be ignored. The third group consists of other political parties. These parties continuously denounced the CD and usually did not react when CD politicians spoke in parliament.

The goal of my thesis is to give a new insight of the Centrumdemocraten as a party. What were their international contacts and how were these shaped by Hans Janmaat? It is a departure from more traditional research with a focus on the national history of the party. The previous literature has provided answers on how to define the ideology of the Centrumdemocraten. In addition it shows the CD's genealogy and how they were contested by others in Dutch society. This thesis shows that even reclusive nationalist parties have an transnational aspect which can be learned from.

What can be concluded from my research is that the CD did have international contacts but these were limited by design. Every official contact was run by Janmaat and Wil Schuurman who purposefully limited opportunities to grow an international movement and gain more contacts and benefit from them. Everything was seen through the lens of personal gain for Janmaat. Janmaat did not oppose extremists within his party but did sometimes use accusations of extremism against opponents. The deep distrust of others made it harder to

form connections unless it was profitable for Janmaat personally. It was the problem which ultimately led to the downfall of the CD as a party. The party was mainly seen as a vehicle for Janmaat to be in politics instead of being a party with its own dynamic between members.

This fits in with the assertion that Janmaat was a paranoid leader. According to Jerrold M. Post this type of leader would keep his circle close and would see conspiracies against him at every moment. For Janmaat these came in the form of rigged elections, interference by secret police and people within the party. Janmaat lost multiple relatively capable members of his parties due to his unwillingness to share some of the power within the party. Infighting combined with the constant scrutiny from the media made it impossible to form a long lasting and successful party structure.

Janmaat's distrust towards others was not always without reason. The interaction with the VB indicates this. From the onset Janmaat did not appear interested in contacts with the more successful Flemish counterpart. The CD leader often ignored invitations for meetings and protests. If the CD did work together with the VB only lower ranked members were sent to the conventions. As discussed in the introduction diffusion or transfer is highly relational. How people interact and relate to each other is crucial to understand complexities and agency involved in the process. What can be concluded is that Janmaat was dismissive of the VB's involvement in Dutch politics and that the VB tried to work with the CD but grew tired of Janmaat. Filip Dewinter tried to involve Vreeswijk, someone who was trying to emulate the Flemish nationalists. Dewinter tried to make it work with Janmaat but only did so out of necessity for his European ambitions. The VB made clear that Janmaat was not the preferred or only partner.

The interaction between the CD and VB ended when Janmaat made clear he would not give up his position and Vreeswijk was forced to leave the party. It was far from the only time when Janmaat was involved in power struggles. Janmaat had disputes with Nico Konst and Henry Brookman in the CP and with Vreeswijk, Vierling and Poppe in the CD. The disputes in the CP seem to have had a major impact on Janmaat. He made sure he could never be challenged again by creating an autocratic structure within the CD. In this structure Vreeswijk and Vierling were seen as opponents who were only interested in their bids for a more powerful position.

Janmaat was not interested in a more traditional party structure with more discussions and a large member base. This was something Janmaat could have copied from the VB but Janmaat had no interest in copying the Flemish party. Instead Janmaat ran his party as a small business, control over employees and a steady flow of income were paramount. The pattern can be seen in the international contacts of the party. Janmaat did not care about extremist connections abroad as long as it had no negative effect on the party. Van der Plas was allowed to be involved with the ANS until he was prosecuted. Janmaat needed the full support of the small group of extremists. They were the ones handing out flyers, fighting anti-fascists and offered the necessary signatures to run for elections.

Besides these extremist ties abroad Janmaat made connections for financial gains. Janmaat had total control over the parties finances and allegations of personal gain were always ongoing. The CD sometimes wrongfully gained government subsidies and Janmaat rented out his apartment to the party so he could pocket the rent himself. The limited contacts the CD had outside of the VB were meant to create funding. Wim Koetsier paid for his position as party secretary. He used his position and connections as Dutch leader of the Mun-Church to support the CD financially and too help anti-communist groups in Eastern

Europe. Janmaat was once again not bothered by extreme beliefs held by his international contacts.

All of these factors combined show that Janmaat was a shrewd operator when it came to transnationalism. He safeguarded his position of power by allowing contacts with non-threatening groups. In the meantime Janmaat would use extremism as a reason to dissociate from party members. This thesis shows how a paranoid leader makes it impossible to form a transnational alliance between parties but can still benefit from occasional chances to interact with foreign radical right groups.

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