From Mining Conflict to Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration:

How Multi-stakeholder Platforms Can Promote Inclusive and Sustainable Mining Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Abstract

This thesis explores the potential of multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) to improve mining governance in Sub-Saharan Africa for inclusive and sustainable growth and development. It examines the challenges and opportunities of contemporary mining, highlighting the importance of accountability, transparency and representation in decision-making processes. Transformative governance is found to necessitate multi-stakeholder collaboration and mining-engaged MSPs are proposed as holistic initiatives to this end. The *5-2-3* model is introduced to guide mining-engaged platforms in conflict mitigation through trust-building and continuous reflection. Findings from a stakeholder-informed case study of Sierra Leone show that mining-engaged MSPs can promote inclusive and sustainable mining governance.

Acknowledgements

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMV	Africa Mining Vision
ASM	Artisanal and small-scale mining
CDA	Community Development Agreement
CDC	Community Development Committee
CDF	Community Development Fund
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CoRe	Collaborating for Resilience
DACDF	Diamond Area Community Development Fund
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
EPRM	European Partnership for Responsible Minerals
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IGF	Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development
ICMM	International Council on Mining and Metals

IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
ILC	International Land Coalition
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
LfL	Land for Life
LSM	Large-scale mining
MMA	Mines and Minerals Act 2009
MMSD	The Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project
MMSP	Mining-engaged multi-stakeholder platform
MSP	Multi-stakeholder platform
MTNDP	Sierra Leone Medium-Term National Development Plan 2019-2023
NaRGEJ	Natural Resource Governance and Economic Justice Network Sierra Leone
NES	National Engagement Strategy
NGO	Nong-governmental organisation
NMA	National Minerals Agency
NMJD	Network Movement on Justice and Development
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RMDI	Responsible Mineral Development Initiative
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal

SLO	Social Licence to Operate
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TNC	Trans-national corporation
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VGGT	Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security
WEF	World Economic Forum
WFP	World Food Programme
WHH	Welthungerhilfe
WoME	Women on Mining and Extractives

1. Introduction

Sierra Leone is one among many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) relying on mineral exports to fuel its economy. Whilst agriculture is the greatest contributor to national GDP, within the global economy Sierra Leone is best known for its mining industry, responsible for more than two-thirds of exports and the country's main booster of economic growth (Brightmore, 2020; Central Intelligence Agency, 2021, IGF, 2021a). Yet, it is also this sector that has historically tainted the country's development reputation. From blood diamonds allegedly funding the civil war to mercury-poisoned waterways, and from rural community displacement to elaborate tax evasion schemes; there are few positive narratives about the contribution of mining to Sierra Leone's development (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019; Dieckmann, 2011; Dietz, 2021; HRW, 2012). In its *2019-2023 Medium-Term National Development Plan* (MTNDP), Sierra Leone's government commits to a path of inclusive and sustainable economic growth to obtain middle-income status (GoSL, 2019). Unsurprisingly the MTNDP calls for a departure from mining. Yet, it still aspires to improved sector governance that promotes "value addition for employment, poverty reduction, community benefit, environmental rehabilitation, and revenue generation" (GoSL, 2019, p. 90).

The story of mining and development hardly differs for other countries in SSA. This thesis explores how mining governance in SSA has impeded or contributed to inclusive and sustainable growth and development. Additionally, it examines the effectiveness of several initiatives aimed at improving governance and proposes the multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) approach as an alternative. A MSP is a national or local level forum that engages diverse stakeholders around a specific issue or conflict situation for a sustained period of time. Their aim extends beyond conflict mitigation, to the formation of trust-relationships between stakeholders, encouraging further collaboration (Brouwer et al., 2015; Ratner et al., 2018). MSP initiatives that engage the land sector are increasingly common. Examples are the

platforms associated with the *Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security* (VGGT), the National Engagement Strategy (NES) and Land for Life (LfL), initiated by respectively the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Land Coalition (ILC) and Welthungerhilfe (WHH). These all take community rights-based approaches, whilst seeking to enhance inclusivity and sustainability in land governance that benefits all (Da Luz, 2021). Despite its successes in mitigating land conflicts, the MSP approach has been sparsely applied to the mining sector, particularly in SSA. This thesis therefore asks: What is the potential of the multi-stakeholder platform approach to promote the sustainable and inclusive governance of mining in Sub-Saharan Africa?

1.1 Research Objective

This thesis aims to contribute to societal and academic debates on the need for equitable governance of mining to promote inclusive and sustainable growth and development. It takes a critical approach, highlighting both the many negative externalities of mining and the multiple positive developments in the sector. In doing so this thesis intents to illuminate possibilities for transforming current mining governance in SSA, so that it may foster greater inclusivity and sustainability.

Mining has boosted the national GDPs of several mineral-rich states in SSA. Not only has it provided states with a critical source of income, it has also created jobs and developed infrastructure in remote regions unreached by governments and other industries. Consequently, the narrative of mining as the harbinger of development has been preached by political leaders, international institutions like the World Bank, and mining companies themselves. It is true that mining stimulates national revenue, employment, and local development projects, but this is not the full story. The distribution of wealth derived from mining has been inequitable, partially due to foreign ownership and alleged corruption (Dietz et al., 2011). The negative impacts on

environmental and human health of the extractives industry and its suggested infringement on human rights, has furthermore led many to question the virtuosity of the ever-rising demand for mineral resources and associated economic growth (Kropiwnicka & Van Paassen, 2020). Neither profits nor costs are equally shared, as the rural communities that were supposed to be uplifted by mining tend to bear the brunt of negative externalities without adequate compensation (Bainton, 2020).

Lacking accountability, transparency and representation all prevent mining-spurred growth and development from being inclusive and sustainable. Consequently, potential benefits for Sub-Saharan African countries are eclipsed by the negative manifestations of current mining governance. Alike communities, host country governments often do not reap the envisioned fruits. Revenues from mining are insufficient to cover the industry's socio-ecological costs, let alone to invest in other development programs (Bainton, 2020; Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Gilberthorpe & Rajak, 2017; Luning, 2014). Yet, these outcomes do not infer that only mining companies are to blame. Contrarily, it may exactly be the tendency to point fingers, that has impeded a more holist approach to development.

This thesis takes lessons learned from MSPs in land governance and applies them to mining, to understand how these platforms could promote sector governance that stimulates inclusive and sustainable growth and development in SSA. The importance of inclusivity for transforming governance is recognised by Buckles and Rusnak (1999), who argue that "a pluralistic approach that recognises the multiple perspectives of stakeholders and the simultaneous effects of diverse causes in natural resource conflicts is needed to understand the initial situation and identify strategies for promoting change." (p. 4). Accordingly, this thesis approaches mining from Buckles and Rusnak's framework for conflict resolution, which differentiates between conflict analysis and planned multiparty intervention. The former concerns the thorough study of the context of conflict. This should be performed not solely by

outsiders but also by those directly involved, i.e., the stakeholders. Therefore, the thesis seeks to present a holistic overview of mining-induced conflict, based on academic and stakeholder sources. It also moves beyond problem-description by sharing existing and proposing novel solutions. As such, it addresses planned multiparty intervention, referring to conflict resolution methods that engage multiple stakeholders, like negotiation and knowledge sharing. As part of this, the thesis proposes a scalable framework for mining-engaged MSPs.

1.2 Theoretical Framework: Governing for Economic Growth and/or Development?

According to Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington (2018) mining and development are intricately linked. Both concern the intentional disruption of one condition, to create a more seemingly advanced state of being. Yet, as a process based on non-renewable natural resource extraction and oftentimes local communities' dispossession, mining is generally not regarded as sustainable nor inclusive (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2018; Hilson, 2009; IGF, 2013).

Following the Brundtland Report, this thesis sees sustainable development as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising future generations' ability to meet theirs (IISD, n.d.). Sustainable development is often linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), formulated in 2015 as part of the United Nation's *Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development* (UNDP, 2017). Mining impacts all the SDGs, positively and negatively, directly and indirectly.[1] For example, through creating jobs and national revenue, the sector can contribute to the first goal *No Poverty*. However, labour exploitation, women's marginalisation and environmental degradation obstruct like *Good health and wellbeing, Gender Equality* and the various environmental goals such as *Life below water* and *Life on*

[1] For a detailed overview of how mining interacts with each of the 17 SDGs, see the white paper *Mapping Mining to the Sustainable Development Goals: An Atlas*. This document was published in 2016 following a collaboration between UNDP, WEF, the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investments and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network. It can be retrieved here: https://www.undp.org/publications/mapping-mining-sdgs-atlas

Land (Pedro et al., 2017). Since mining is a form of economic activity, of particular interest is SDG 8, which calls for the promotion of sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. According to the UNDP (2017), SDG 8 unites the economic, social and environmental aspects of development. It recognises that economic growth alone is not always beneficial to a country. Contrarily, in many developing countries, economic growth has fostered more social inequality. Often spurred by the extraction of natural resources, economic growth also exposes these countries to increasing (social) costs associated with the destruction of ecosystems. In response, the UNDP (2017, p. 14) presents three pathways towards SDG 8: (1) integrated planning, including evidence based analysis for national plans, economic diversification, and sustainable natural resource management, (2) employment creation, decent work and redistributive programmes, which also includes removing barriers to labour markets and (3) mobilising and scaling up finance, including fiscal policy, domestic resource mobilisation and innovative funding mechanisms.

1.2.1 A Closer look at the Inclusivity of Sustainable Development

This paper emphasises the inclusivity aspect of SDG 8 as the *sine qua non* for development that respects people and planet, and promotes prosperity, peace and partnerships. Some scholars (see for example Pouw & Gupta, 2017; Reinders et al., 2019) have distinguished inclusive development from sustainable development. According to Pouw and Gupta (2017), the term sustainable development provides space for market-motivated parties to prioritise economic growth over social and ecological development aspects. This can even be detected in the UNDP's (2017) definition of inclusive growth as development that "broadly shares prosperity resulting from economic growth" (p. 4). Inclusive development, on the other hand, "defines development as enhancing ecological and social wellbeing rather than as growth" (Pouw & Gupta, 2017, p. 104). Pouw and Gupta (2017) even disregard the idea of inclusive growth, arguing that present time demands a foregrounding of ecological, social and relational

inclusiveness over economic.

Reinders et al. (2019) provide a definition that balances the economic focus present in SDG 8's concept of inclusiveness and the subordination of economic growth in Pouw and Gupta's conceptualisation. The authors state that inclusive development "aims to reduce poverty, both in income and non-income dimensions, and inequality, through improved redistribution on these dimensions" (p. 4). These dimensions are economic growth, productive employment, social protection, provision of basic services, territorial development and spatial equity, and quality and inclusive governance. When applied to policy making, the authors stress the importance of equality, diversity and context. For any development initiative, this would mean that it fits the needs of those for whom it exists, is accessible to all, and benefits all. Accordingly, this thesis views inclusive growth and development as equitably improving the wellbeing of all in the social, ecological and economic domains.

1.3 Outline of the Thesis

Following this introduction, chapter 2 presents the thesis' research design. The subsequent chapters elaborate on four sub-questions.

1. What is sustainable and inclusive natural resources governance?

What sustainable and inclusive natural resource governance would constitute is answered in chapter 3. Through comparison with land governance in SSA, an analytical framework is developed that captures the domains of inclusivity and sustainability for natural resources management. This chapter also elaborates on the MSP approach.

2. What is the state of inclusivity and sustainability of mining governance today?

Chapter 4 lists the various challenges and opportunities of mining-led growth and development. Underlying causes are sought in the level of accountability, transparency and

representativeness of governance. The chapter also elaborates on existing development initiatives, and why these insufficiently transform the sector.

3. How does the MSP approach respond to the challenges of mining governance?

The MSP approach is applied to the current state of mining in SSA in chapter 5. The chapter answers how a mining-engaged MSP (MMSP) could address the challenges of mining governance and how this could lead to a positive development impact. Subsequently, it introduces a model MSP cycle, the *5-2-3* model, that could guide the initiation of a MMSP and its subsequent activities.

4. How could the MSP approach be applied to the national mining context of Sierra Leone?

Chapter 6 presents a case study of Sierra Leone, to understand how a MMSP could be applied in practice and with what effect. Following Buckles and Rusnak's framework, presented are both a multi-stakeholder informed analysis of conflict and a discussion of planned multiparty intervention, i.e., the MMSP approach.

Finally, chapter 7 presents a summary of the thesis to answer the research question. The chapter, and thesis, closes with recommendations for future research.

2. Research Design

Research for this thesis consisted of three phases, two of which were part of an internship at the non-profit organisation Collaborating for Resilience (CoRe). The final and main phase was conducted independently. After giving an overview of the internship, this chapter focuses on phase three.

2.1 Methods

During the internship, research was conducted on land governance MSPs in Sub-Saharan Africa. This work was focused on CoRe's assistance to MSPs. Guiding questions were: 1. What are MSPs? 2. What are the outcomes of MSPs? 3. What are the challenges faced by MSP practitioners? And 4. What would MSP practitioners need to succeed? Question 1 was answered through a review of the existing literature on MSPs. Questions 2 to 4 were answered through interviews with practitioners as well as desk research, which included documents prepared and published by the studied MSPs. Interviews were conducted with 6 practitioners active in NES and LfL platforms, across four countries: Malawi and Tanzania (NES), and Liberia and Sierra Leone (LfL). The platforms in these countries have received assistance from CoRe in their development. Findings from the interviews and desk research were supplemented by academic literature to formulate a Guidance Note on supporting MSPs in SSA (Da Luz, 2021). This Guidance Note is expected to be published separately.

Findings from the Guidance Note were built upon in subsequent research on the mining sector in SSA and the applicability of the MSP approach. During the internship, a policy brief was developed, sketching a framework for mining-engaged MSPs. Guiding questions were 1. how do the characteristics of MSPs relate to the characteristics of the mining industry? and 2. what would be the basic steps in applying the MSP approach to the mining sector? Both questions were informed by a literature review. Question 2 was furthermore substantiated by interviews. This included interviews conducted priorly for the Guidance Note, and additional

interviews with actors from the mining sector in Sierra Leone. Actors from Sierra Leone were contacted so that these interviews could also support this thesis (see below for further explanation).

This thesis is the product of the third research phase, elaborating upon the policy brief. It answers the question: What is the potential of the multi-stakeholder platform approach to promote the sustainable and inclusive governance of mining in Sub-Saharan Africa? A comprehensive literature review was conducted to answer the various sub-questions of this thesis. Diverse sources were used to capture multiple perspectives, including academic papers, online media articles and publications by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), governmental institutions, think tanks, and companies.

A case study was included to add practical value to the theoretical discussion. Sierra Leone was chosen due to its dual legacy with governing natural resources. Whilst still known for diamonds-funded conflict, Sierra Leone has made major strides in managing its land and mineral wealth (Anonymous, personal communication, February 16, 2021; World Bank, 2019). The case study was supplemented by a literature review and desk research of relevant non-academic publications. Furthermore, the perspective of stakeholders was included through interviews and a survey. Validity is thus ensured by the triangulation of academic, non-academic, and interview and survey derived data.

As mentioned, interviews were conducted with stakeholders of Sierra Leone's mining industry during the internship period. Interviewees were selectively sampled based on their, their company's, or their organisation's known role within Sierra Leone's mining industry. Possible respondents were contacted via email. Interviews took place in February and March 2021 and were all conducted virtually, using Microsoft Teams and WhatsApp. A total of 5 interviews were conducted with representatives of civil society, an international organisation and the private sector. No government, academia, or media representatives were interviewed

due to lacking response to invitations. The interviews were semi-structured and adjusted to the specific interviewees and the organisations they represented. This allowed both for focus and serendipitous findings. The interview template can be found in Appendix A. Interviews were recorded upon permission, and notes were taken manually throughout. The interviews were transcribed using the software Otter.ai.

Following difficulties in obtaining more interviewees, a survey was created (Appendix B). This survey was based on the interviews and the research that had been conducted up to that point. The survey was sent to candidates who had been unavailable for interviews and was also shared within a WhatsApp group concerned with mining in Sierra Leone. Those who received the survey were asked to forward it to other possible respondents. Snowball sampling resulted in 6 responses after 25 days. One respondent did not provide consent for their data to be used in this thesis and was therefore excluded from the study. For an overview of included respondents, see Appendix C.

Results from the interviews and survey were analysed through close reading. Due to the small volume of respondents, it was not considered necessary to perform multiple stages of coding. Rather, interview notes and transcripts were analysed and validated by listening to the recordings. Survey responses were coded for comparison with the interview results. All analyses were qualitative.

Figure 1 illustrates how the background study on land governance MSPs, the comparative study on the MSP approach and the mining industry, and the case study on Sierra Leone, form the basis for understanding if and how MSPs could contribute to mining governance, that in turn promotes sustainable and inclusive growth and development.

Figure 1

Graphic Representation of Thesis Components



2.2 Ethical Considerations

2.2.1 Data

This research used published and unpublished data. Published data derived from academic and non-academic sources. Unpublished data derived from internship research reports, and interviews and surveys conducted by the researcher. All unpublished data was stored on a pass-word protected cloud service.

2.2.2 Consent

Interview participants received an informed consent document, including a research description and data-usage explanation (Appendix D). Since interviews were conducted online, participants were asked to verbally confirm their consent. Survey respondents could indicate whether they gave consent for data-usage through the first question, which was preceded by a research description. Participants who did not give consent were automatically redirected to the end of the survey. Participants contacted during the internship period were also made aware that their data may be used for CoRe publication. Consent was withdrawable any time prior to publication.

2.2.3 Compensation and Sponsorships

Participants were made aware that participation was not subject to financial compensation. The thesis was also not sponsored. During the CoRe internship, the researcher was not financially compensated, yet benefitted from receiving feedback on intermediary research and access to interviewees.

2.2.4 Confidentiality and Risks

Due to the political nature of mining governance, interview and survey data had to be treated confidentially. Interview participants were given the chance to request anonymity both for themselves and for the organisation they represented. Survey participation was anonymous by default, although participants could leave their contact information for follow-up research. To protect all respondents, names and respondent numbers were omitted from the text. Derived findings were only linked to participants' respective stakeholder group and cited as '(R)'. Non-anonymous respondents are only mentioned by name in the respondent's overview. Furthermore, participants were not made aware of who else had contributed, except where they had directly referred to each other to suggest participation. The above measures were deemed sufficient to minimise any risks this research may pose to its participants. The researcher did not experience any concerns for personal safety.

2.2.5 Debriefing

Participants could request receiving the finalised thesis. One private sector participant, requested to preview the thesis if direct quotes were used. To prevent misunderstandings this participant was not quoted. Additionally, upon university submission the thesis was placed under embargo, giving the participant two months for reviews before online publication.

2.3 Limitations of the Research Design

Several limitations should be noted. Firstly, as the culmination of an internship project, the organisational standpoints of CoRe are reflected in the conceptualisation of 'the MSP approach'. Additionally, feedback was provided by CoRe colleagues on the Guidance Note and policy brief. Potential bias was minimised by actively researching alternative MSP approaches and seeking feedback outside of CoRe.

Secondly, COVID-19 travel restrictions inhibited on-site data collection and interviews to support the case study. This limited interviewees to those with a stable internet connection, a relatively privileged group within Sierra Leone. The survey mitigates this bias by being 'workable' under conditions of weak internet connection. Still, data collection relied on access to internet-operating devices such as desktops and mobile phones. This precondition may have excluded potential respondents.

Thirdly, reaching participants online may have impeded a higher response rate. Arguably this was not due to unwillingness to participate, but rather due to circumstantial inability. Several respondents expressed interest in participation but eventually did not contribute. Others did not respond to the initial email nor any follow-ups. Busy schedules and email inboxes may have caused contacts to forget about the research or overlook emails. This is also supported by respondents who indicated busy schedules as the reason for earlier non-responsiveness. Due to lacking time, a response rate of 11 was accepted.

3. Inclusivity and Sustainability in the Governance of Natural Resources

The UNDP (2017) recognises natural resource governance as a critical area for the pursuit of inclusive and sustainable growth and development. If governance means "the public and private interactions undertaken to address challenges and create opportunities within society" (Armitage et al., 2009, p. 96), the governance of natural resources is notoriously complex. This is mostly due to the diversity of stakeholders linked to the management of such resources as land and minerals. With great differences in power and interests both between and within stakeholder groups, the distribution of challenges and opportunities is often inequitable, non-inclusive, and non-sustainable (Berkes, 2008; Prell et al. 2009; Ratner et al., 2018; Zoomers & Kaag, 2014).

3.1 The Governance of Natural Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa

The governance of natural resources in SSA has received much attention. In recent decades, a major debate within the literature has concerned the so-called global land rush, understood as the regulated and irregulated encroachment of large-scale corporations on major areas of land in developing countries. This phenomenon has been problematised as occurring without full community consent and proper compensation. Reference is often made to 'land grabbing' which implies that companies acquire locally-used land through irregular channels. More often than not, however, such 'land grabs' occur in accordance with national law and are facilitated by both host and origin states (Borras & Franco, 2012; Kaag & Zoomers, 2014; Oram, 2014; Zoomers & Kaag, 2014). Behind the rush is an ever-rising demand for ever-cheaper land, caused by food availability crises and increasing needs for (green) fuel (Borras & Franco, 2012; Moore, 2010). Grabbed land is often intended for commercial agriculture, with large swaths also being bought for fuel generation, mining, tourism, urban expansion, and as assets. Land deals are consequently easily promoted as development advancing initiatives (Kaag & Zoomers, 2014; Oram, 2014).

However, investment deals are often made on the false presumption that the to-be-obtained land is empty. In reality, idle land is scarce in Africa. Beyond smallholder agriculture, land is used for grazing, foraging, hunting, and small scale mining, or holds traditional (religious) value. Losing land, even when homes are preserved, thus still constitutes a loss of livelihood to many people (Kaag & Zoomers, 2014; Oram, 2014). This is especially damaging to women who rely on land to provide for themselves and their families, and are already restricted in their access to land and the wealth found upon or beneath it, due to patriarchal traditions (Kropiwnicka & Van Paasssen, 2020; Oram, 2014). Overall, land deals in developing countries are "leading up to forced evictions, human rights violations, lost livelihoods, divided communities, destruction of culturally significant sites, rising food insecurity and, ultimately, increased poverty" (Oram, 2014, p. 7). The prospective rise in food prices as land becomes still scarcer and food and energy demand continue to rise, may eventually fuel broader social conflict (Bush & Martiniello, 2017; FAO, 2019).

Since land access often also entail access to other natural resource, the land grabbing debate shows many of the ills of natural resources governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. In general, the non-inclusive and non-sustainable governance of natural resources is sustained by lacking accountability, transparency and representation.

3.1.1 Accountability

Communities face many difficulties in demanding accountability from government and private actors. While land rights protecting local communities exist, these are often inadequately enforced. The same is true for international guidelines that push for greater accountability on behalf of all stakeholders, such as the VGGT (Oram 2014; Zoomers and Kaag 2014.). Rapid privatisation of land and the extraction of natural resources by foreign companies continues to be promoted as contributing towards economic growth and increased food security (Hall, Scoones & Tsikata, 2015; Kaag & Zoomers 2014; Moore, 2010; Oram 2014.). States

tend to encourage foreign investors through tax incentives and offering services to locate land for investment (Oram, 2014). This can result in the promotion of land dispossession and other harmful practices towards land-dependent communities. Meanwhile, many of these projects said to stimulate local and national economies, relieve poverty and increase food security, are abandoned. Initial projects, on the basis whereof legal approval had been acquired, are changed, or land remains completely untouched (Abdallah et al., 2014; Zoomers & Kaag, 2014). Moreover, it is increasingly recognised that 'trickle-down' compensation insufficiently alleviates these challenges to local people's livelihoods (Bush, 2010; McMichael, 2016). National and local level governments' encouragement of large-scale land investments and belief in trickle-down development can limit rural communities' ability to demand accountability. This is further problematised by the opacity of land governance in many African countries.

3.1.2 Transparency

Land deals are commonly made without complete consultation of all stakeholders and thus without free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) (Kaag and Zoomers 2014; Oram 2014.) Even under circumstances of informed consent, local communities may feel pressured into land deals, either by government goals or more powerful community members. (Oram 2014.). In addition, African countries often have a multiplicity of, sometimes contradictory, legal schemes and regulatory bodies. Furthermore, there are many international institutions and organisations operating in Africa with divergent land-related goals. Limited access to and/or understanding of such institutions and organisations can result in power differentials. In such scenarios some stakeholders may have inadequate knowledge of their individual rights, whilst others may be able to mobilise exactly those institutions that safeguard their interests. (Ratner et al., 2013). Land governance is further obscured by the overlap of formal and informal institutions. For example, legally state-held land may be de facto claimed by locals on the basis

of inheritance or tribal law (Oram 2014). The overall lacking institutional transparency does not aid in making stakeholders aware of their rights when it comes to the governance of natural resources.

3.1.3 Representation

Finally, for land governance to be inclusive, all stakeholders – particularly those most vulnerable – must be equitably involved in (policy) negotiations. Presently, this is not always the case. Affected communities and especially marginalised groups within them, tend to be underrepresented. Communities are often internally divided along strata such as gender, wealth, and ethnicity. Some actors like women and youth face structural constraints to participation. Furthermore, communities are continuously evolving in their relations among each other and with their surroundings. Consequently, values, priorities, but also capabilities, are likewise everchanging. (Leach, Mearns & Scoones, 1999; Ratner et al. 2013). This makes signalling out representatives for communities a sensitive and tricky task.

These intricacies illustrate the complexity of land governance and the need for proper communication between affected parties. Unfortunately, while international (financial) institutions, (activist) organisations and states often negotiate the privatisation of land in developing countries, many stakeholders, such as rural and otherwise marginalised communities, remain excluded (Oram 2014; Zoomers & Kaag, 2014). Consequently, pertinent issues are not discussed, producing a falsely positive image of the current African land affairs, and natural resources governance more broadly. Inequitable governance and weak cooperation between stakeholders inevitably foster inefficient management and consequently, non-sustainable and non-inclusive natural resources use (Buckles & Rusnak, 1999).

To illustrate what effective management would entail, figure 2 presents a model of natural resources governance for inclusive and sustainable growth and development. This

model combines the views on sustainability and inclusivity as presented in the SDGs, particularly SDG 8, and the perspectives from the UNDP (2017), Pedro et al. (2017), Pouw & Gupta (2017), and Reinders et al. (2019). It embeds the economic, social and ecological dimensions of growth and development within the political aspects of governance. Politics here refers to processes of decision-making carried out by both public and private actors, and affecting the broader society and environment. Acknowledging the current landscape of natural resource governance in SSA, the model frames quality, i.e., inclusive and sustainable, governance as accountable, transparent and representative. Where quality governance is practiced, the intersection with economics and ecology should promote export diversification and fiscal redistribution to maximise inclusivity and sustainability from the natural resources sector. Where the social and economic domains meet, quality governance promotes productive employment and social protection. Quality governance of the ecological and social domains should encourage investment in health and the development of both communities and landscapes. Within this framework of inclusivity and sustainability, the intersection of the ecological, economic and social aspects of development constitutes responsible production and consumption that reduces poverty, mitigates conflict and preserves the environment.

Figure 2

Analytical Framework for Natural Resource Governance Promoting Inclusive and Sustainable Growth and Development



3.2 Towards Greater Inclusivity in the Governance of Natural Resources

Over the last decades, the need for more inclusive approaches has increased the popularity of co-management initiatives. These initiatives are known under many names but are all premised on the idea that "people whose livelihoods are affected by management decisions should have a say in how those decisions are made" (Berkes, 2008, p. 1692). Central to them is dialogue between government and non-government actors at various scales, including local communities, business and academia (Armitage et al., 2009; Berkes, 2008; Prell et al., 2009; Ratner et al., 2018). Co-management essentially transforms natural resources governance into people-centred governance (Berkes, 2008). These initiatives are exemplary of broader governance trends like decentralisation and local participation in decision-making (Leach, Mearns & Scoones, 1999; Ratner et al., 2013). Such initiatives are sometimes accused of burdening private actors with government responsibilities. Yet, these costs may be offset by greater inclusivity, efficiency and legitimacy of interventions (Maconachie, 2010).

What sets dialogue in co-management schemes apart, is the active effort to involve stakeholders that may otherwise not enter into conversation. In doing so, such initiatives can build relationships of trust and mutual understanding between parties with divergent interests (Armitage et al., 2009). Within these networks, information can be shared more easily, which allows for social learning. This has the potential of enriching the strategies of all actors involved, and can serve towards governance schemes that are maximally locally appropriate (Berkes, 2008; Ratner et al., 2013). Since co-management involves multiple actors, consensus reaching may prove difficult and (time) demanding. In these cases, it is important to remember that such initiatives need not aim to resolve conflicts wholly but should rather aspire to manage them (Buckles & Rusnak, 1999). Likewise, Berkes (2008) proposed seeing co-management initiatives not as arrangements but rather as ongoing processes of "negotiation, deliberation, knowledge generation and joint learning" (p. 1698). As such "although consensus is not always possible, governance that is more inclusive, transparent, and efficient can help groups in conflict accommodate some differences, find some common ground, and improve key decisions affecting their livelihoods" (p. 9).

Yet, there are many challenges in applying co-management towards equitable and sustainable governance of natural resources. Stakeholder cooperation will not be inclusive if there is no level playing field, meaning that certain stakeholders are impeded from effective contribution to negotiations. Pre-existing power dynamics can be reinforced rather than reconfigured, if co-management does not incorporate marginalised actors into decision-making or does not provide them with adequate space or means to oppose local elites (Berkes, 2008; Leach, Mearns & Scoones, 1999; Prell et al., 2009). Yet, the execution of negotiated governance innovations often depends on powerful actors such as government and large corporations. Therefore, such actors must not be omitted from dialogue, even when it is feared they may overpower or intimidate other stakeholders (Buckles & Rusnak, 1999). Levelling the

playing field would firstly require careful analysis of the stakeholders in a specific context. Thereafter deliberate choices can be made to include both powerful and marginalised actors into co-management initiatives (Prell et al., 2009). Furthermore, support and training should be given to those actors who are less capable of contributing to dialogue. As stated by Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1999):

> Empowerment to subordinate groups … needs to accompany negotiation, through approaches aimed at enhancing the claim-making capacity of such groups [given that] failure frequently results less from people's lack of institutionally grounded claims, but their incapacity to make claims "stick" against those of more powerful actors (p. 241).

Or as Buckles and Rusnak (1999) put it: "the challenge is to enhance the capacity of marginal groups to use their power effectively to engage the overtly powerful in meaningful negotiation" (p. 7).

Both preceding and during co-management efforts, it may occur that certain stakeholders are unwilling to enter into conversation or seek comprises (Buckles & Rusnak, 1999; Prell et al., 2009; Ratner et al., 2018). Finding common ground between actors with very divergent principles, such as market versus conservation priorities, can be a major challenge to inclusive policy dialogue (Berkes, 2008). Scenarios like these may benefit from a third, neutral party's facilitation (Berkes, 2008; Ratner et al., 2018). Such facilitators must ensure that all types of knowledge derived from the stakeholders' background are considered, so that the potential for social learning and context-appropriate policies is maximised (Armitage et al., 2009; Buckles & Rusnak, 1999). At times co-management initiatives may require additional help from platform-creating organisations to create a safe space for negotiations. A relatively simple and scalable form of promoting such long-term dialogue and knowledge dissemination between diverse actors is through MSPs (Ratner et al., 2018).

3.2.1 The Multi-Stakeholder Platform Approach

Multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) are a form of multi-stakeholder partnerships. Brouwer et al. (2015) describe such partnerships as a governance form that convenes actors with different interests but shared goals, over a sustained period of time. Multi-stakeholder partnerships create bridges connecting stakeholders with divergent backgrounds. In doing so, they facilitate the establishment of new relationships of trust and mutual understanding, thereby mitigating existing conflict and promoting future cooperation. It is then no surprise that as part of SDG 17, *Partnerships for the Goals*, the UN (2015) encourages multi-stakeholder partnerships, particularly in developing states. Also in natural resource governance, co-management initiatives can take the form of multi-stakeholder partnerships. According to Jansen and Kalas (2020), when multi-stakeholder partnerships are referred to as platforms, the descriptive 'platform' indicates that partnerships extend to "learning alliances which promote multi-stakeholder learning processes for stimulating innovation and business development" (p. 5).

MSPs offer space for stakeholders to resolve problems through the sharing of expertise. As stakeholders employ their individual human capital on a shared problem, social learning occurs through learning-by-doing (Berkes, 2008). This process is further facilitated by the clear directions and/or objectives that MSPs generally help formulate for the negotiating stakeholders (Armitage et al., 2009). MSPs are often rich in both horizontal and vertical linkages, meaning that they connect actors within the local context and with stakeholders at the national and/or international level (Berkes, 2008). This enables parties like CSOs and the private sector to directly express their concerns to government, speeding up reform processes and making them more representative (FAO, 2020a). By bringing a plethora of actors together in facilitated dialogue, MSPs can divert attention away from inter-stakeholder conflict and towards a common goal (FAO, 2020a). This aligns with the win-win approach to conflict

resolution as described by Buckles and Rusnak (1999), in which negotiations focus on problems instead of people. According to the FAO, who recommends MSPs for the successful leveraging of the VGGT, a successful MSP involves a diverse set of stakeholders, creates a durable working group, finds common solutions and achieves lasting outcomes. When these conditions are met, MSPs become legitimate partnerships that foster accountability and transparency through inclusive national ownership (FAO, 2020a).

However, MSPs are not always appropriate. They will not function well in cases where conflict has escalated into violence, as they require a base level of willingness to convene and collaborate among the different parties to a conflict. This can be a challenging requirement in the case of natural resources governance, due to the political weight of access to natural resources (FAO, 2020a). Furthermore, MSPs are long-term commitments both temporally and financially. Acquiring adequate funding can be difficult. This is exacerbated by the relative newness of MSPs as an approach to conflict mitigation and the general 'slowness' at which they deliver concrete results. Both factors may prevent donors from investing in the platforms (FAO, 2020a), making them challenging to maintain where funds are limited.

3.2.1.1 The MSP Life Cycle.

Plenty guiding documents have been published for setting up multi-stakeholder partnerships in general, and platforms in particular (see for example Brouwer et al., 2015; Collective Leadership Institute, 2017; FAO, 2020a; Ratner & Smith, 2014) . Listing all of them would be beyond the scope of this thesis, although it is possible to list some of the recurring features of a MSP.

MSP approaches are often phased, with a minimum design, implementation and evaluation phase (figure 3). These form repetitive cycles reflecting the durable nature of MSPs. The overarching design phase begins with establishing a shared purpose, i.e., a goal that unifies the interest of various stakeholders. Defining this central goal is also supposed to indicate the

appropriateness of the initiative. As mentioned above, some conflicts require other interventions. At times, existing platforms or other types of partnerships already meet the established needs, making the creation of another initiative redundant. The design phase is also when stakeholders are selected and approached to join – a critical point for ensuring inclusivity and legitimacy. The minimum groups that should be represented are government, civil society and the private sector, with several guidelines also including academia and media. There are dozens of tools available to facilitate this process, but most boil down to a form of stakeholder mapping. This entails that besides listing the relevant actors within a system, effort is also undertaken to understand their interrelations. Since this will often involve relations of power, the term power mapping is also frequently used.

When it comes to implementation, many guidelines encourage appointing a facilitator and secretariat. One of the key activities throughout implementation is to keep all stakeholders involved and committed. Given that implementation can take very long, this is also one of the main challenges an MSP is likely to face. Underlying sustained commitment is trust between stakeholders. Trust building may be seen as the overarching goal of all MSP activities. Furthermore, MSPs will typically host trainings and workshops to build capacities for (policy) dialogue, raise awareness and develop locally-appropriate solutions.

The evaluation phase represents the closing stage of a project during which extensive reflection of results takes place. While designated as a separate phase, monitoring and evaluation should take place throughout the cycle. Yet, this third phase pays particular attention to the implementation of the implementation phase. In other words, it monitors whether plans are followed up on. Besides assessing what has been achieved, next steps are imagined. For example, an MSP might consider to scale up or decentralise. It may also choose to expand its mandate; a process that will often happen naturally.

Figure 3

Standard MSP Cycle



This chapter has detailed recent developments for greater inclusivity and sustainability in land governance in SSA. It suggested a framework that captures the materialisation of growth and development if the governance of natural resources is accountable, transparent and representative. MSPs were introduced as co-management initiatives for conflict mitigation that promote inclusive and sustainable governance. Before applying MSPs to SSA's mining sector, the following chapter analyses the manifestations of mining conflict.

4. An Unmet Potential: The Governance of Mining in Sub-Saharan Africa

Mining is one of the prime industries that can either promote or obstruct the realisation of SDG 8. As will be shown, it has historically been on the obstructing end. Yet, if governed well, it can also contribute to sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development, and provide decent work (Pedro et al., 2017). This chapter examines the current state of SSA's mining governance to understand which challenges and opportunities exist for greater inclusivity and sustainability.

4.1 Elements of Inclusive and Sustainable Growth and Development in the Mining Sector

4.1.1 Responsible Production and Consumption

As promised by international financial institutions, the liberalisation of African mining laws led to increased foreign investment (Jacka, 2018). Yet, as observed by Ushie (2017), the contrast between natural wealth and poverty has only become starker. The same resource-rich countries that saw their national economies grow at unequalled speed, also experienced the pervasiveness of poverty (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). This dynamic is often ascribed to the theory of the resource curse, which holds that countries with an abundance of natural resources tend to suffer rather than benefit from this wealth, mostly due to poor governance (Bainton, 2020; Bebbington, 2014; Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017; Gilberthorpe & Rajak, 2017).

The resource curse is often called upon to explain what is perhaps the greatest blemish on the mining industry; its complicity in (civil) wars. At the source of this lie so-called conflict minerals, believed to be used by rebel groups as income source for e.g., buying weapons (Jacka, 2018). 'Blood' diamonds from Sierra Leone are a famous example, as they funded civil war activities in the 1990s (Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005). Nowadays, minerals such as cobalt from the DRC and tanzanite from Tanzania are still accused of fostering violence

(Schroeder, 2010). Indeed, also in recent years, persistent inequalities and poor governance has heightened the incidence of conflict over natural resources (Ushie, 2017). This violence is not limited to armed conflict. Violent confrontations have also taken place between large-scale mining (LSM) and artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) practitioners. Generally, LSM is marked by high capital investment and executed by mining corporations, either privately or government-owned. ASM is practiced by individuals or families, and characterised by the use of simple methods, low levels of technology and capital, and high labour-intensity (Mutemeri, Walker, Coulson & Watson, 2016). Conflictual encounters are increasing as LSM moves into more remote regions, and ASM grows as a sector (Wall, 2010). Furthermore, clashes have been reported between LSM security personnel and community members, whether practicing ASM or not (Owen & Kemp, 2017). Also, within communities, mining can inspire violence. Researching in Madagascar, Baker-Médard (2012) found that ASM in the gemstone sector fosters jealousy, in turn leading to relations of distrust and violence.

The interface between LSM and mining communities is also characterised by disruption. LSM requires vast territories that need to be cleared before sub-soil minerals can be reached. Companies and governments will often wrongly claim that obtained concessions are empty (Bainton, 2020). In practice, mining hardly occurs in empty space, but rather "on and beneath *land* that has prior cultural and productive value" (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2017, p. 422 (emphasis in the original)). Land is inhabited by impoverished and indigenous rural communities, or used for agriculture, grazing, or even ASM. The greater power of LSM companies has often meant that their right to land was championed over that of communities. Consequently, land dispossession through privatisation and the enclosure of commons has become a common critique of the industry (Bainton, 2020; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2017).

Besides being a curse upon the people in mineral-rich countries, mining almost

inevitably leads to environmental destruction (Bainton, 2020; Bebbington, 2014). Possible impacts include deforestation, soil erosion, and air, soil and water contamination (Jacka, 2018; Puppim de Oliveira & Ali, 2011). Digging mines necessitates clearing existing vegetation, threatening endangered animal and plant species. This becomes increasingly problematic as global scarcity pushes mining companies onto previously untouched areas with often high and fragile biodiversity (Bridge, 2004; Prescott et al., 2020). Likewise, population increases caused by mining-induced migration put further pressure on the environment and its limited resources (IGF, 2013; Owen & Kemp, 2017). For example, in Madagascar protected areas are endangered due to informal mining activities that operate on conservation territory (Duffy, 2007). Furthermore, each stage of the mining process produces harmful waste such as dusts, effluent and tailings (Bridge, 2004). Besides damaging human health, toxic materials used for amalgamation also have great impacts on wildlife. Mercury is the best known example herein, which due to its effectiveness and relative cheapness is primarily used by ASM miners. In fact, worldwide no sector releases more mercury into the environment than ASM (IGF, 2017). Mercury is detrimental to the environment and is also of great danger to apex predators who build up high concentrations of the metal through eating contaminated prey (Jacka, 2018).

Ecosystems are also disrupted in less obvious but no less harmful ways. The simple act of digging can result in mine collapses and slope failures (Bridge, 2004). Unused and/or abandoned mines are particularly hazardous. Un-rehabilitated mining pits may fill up with toxic water, becoming hazardous for both wildlife and people (Bainton & Holcombe, 2018; Jacka, 2018). Rehabilitation has become a standard practice for most LSM companies, but is mostly absent in ASM (Jacka, 2018). Yet, even where mines are rehabilitated, this is no guarantee for environmental restoration. The damage done to an ecological system cannot always be reversed. One straightforward example hereof is the removal of the mined mineral, which will take hundreds of years to be replaced naturally (Bridge, 2004). Technological developments in

mining may prove a solutions to some environmental problems, and are often championed for this exact reason. However, as Keenan, Kemp and Owen (2018) describe, for many of such technologies it is not yet clear what their long-term impact will be. Some technologies may even create more waste, albeit of a different kind. The need to store this waste may further increase competition over land. Additionally, some technologies may work but are not compatible with the communities where they are implemented. An example would be the introduction of central processing units among ASM miners in SSA. This technology regulates mercury use in the processing of gold, and can be used by up to 40 miners at a time. However, in different countries, 40 is either too big of a number leading to under-utilisation, or too little which results in massive queues (Childs, 2008). Such technologies may thus be major investments with minimal or even negative developmental returns.

4.1.2 Export Diversification and Fiscal Redistribution

The most common benefit ascribed to mining is the provision of essential revenue for host country governments, which could be directed towards nation-wide development (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2017, Luning, 2014). This rhetoric supported the liberalisation of mining laws in Africa during the era of structural adjustment programs, which led to an increase in foreign investment (Bainton, 2020; Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Filer, 2018; Luning, 2014). Since the 2000's price boom of mineral commodities, African countries high in natural resources experienced greater domestic growth than their resource-poor counterparts (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). Mined goods like copper, diamonds, gold and iron are among the main export commodities across Africa (Gardiner & Mabogunje, n.d.; World Integrated Trade Solution, n.d..). It is thus hard to deny that mining is an important source of income for many African countries.

Yet, governmental income tends not to cover the costs of mining-induced damage repair, let alone broader development programmes (Luning, 2014; Puppim de Oliveira & Ali,

2011). There are several reasons why rents along the mining value chain do not accrue to national treasuries, and hence do not return to the host country's population in the form of development.

Firstly, LSM mining operations in Africa have a tendency to become enclaves. This entails that capital enters and exists the mine site, without spreading to the surrounding areas (Luning & Pijpers, 2017; Pedro et al., 2017). Since a major part of value addition does not occur in the host county, profits do not trickle-down into local economies and taxation is beyond the governments' reach. Likewise, the possible fiscal benefits of employment are also externalised (Musiyarira et al., 2019; Puppim de Oliveira & Ali, 2011). However, Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen and Land (2017) dispute this argument, claiming that in their initial phases large-scale gold mines do have a ripple effect on economic growth of nearby communities.

Secondly, LSM have been found to engage in numerous tax and other cost evading schemes. Luning (2014) explains how in the exploration phase corporations classify their projects as constituting a high financial risk, referring to both geological and political circumstances of the host country. Rather than rejecting high-risk areas, LSM corporations use the classification to their advantage as it allows them to demand investment compensation from host governments. This may take the form of granting easy access and/or lower taxation rates. Tax evasion practices are allegedly common-place, such as using tax havens and intentionally miscommunicating profits (Löffler, 2019; Ushie, 2017).

Thirdly, at each stage of the mining value chain, informal and illegal conduct is common (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2017; Puppim de Oliveira & Ali, 2011). This particularly applies to ASM. While ASM also occurs formally, the majority is unregulated (Filer, 2018; Mutemeri et al., 2016). Consequently, governments cannot derive taxes from this relatively profitable subsector. Furthermore, through theft and smuggling, mined goods from both ASM and LSM end up in informal markets transcending national boundaries (Bosse

Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Schroeder, 2010). This can be a problem especially for gold and gemstones due to their high value and portability. Again, this inhibits governments from collecting the appropriate taxes (Wall, 2010)

Even if revenues did accrue fully to national governments, economic dependence on the export of minerals is non-sustainable. Pedro et al. (2017) mention several barriers to progressive mining-induced development, many of which point towards the risks of countries over-relying on mining. The authors refer to the non-renewable nature of minerals, the volatility of mineral prices on the global market and related tendency to induce shocks, and the power differences that shape relations between exporting and importing countries. Nationally, the arbitrary geographic distribution of minerals leads to scarcity of mineral-rich land. This is likely to support conflict between miners, especially ASM and LSM, as neither is willing to give up on mineral-rich concessions (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011).

The focus on mining as a dominant industry has also proven non-inclusive in terms of sharing wealth. Besides poorly redistributive tax schemes, accusations of corrupt politicians and other elites benefiting from Africa's mineral wealth at populations' expense, are common (Maconachie, 2010; Pedro et al. 2017; Ushie, 2017). The supposed exploitation perpetuated by TNCs, is said to be enabled by corrupt political elites who personally gain from deals with such companies (Gilberthorpe & Rajak, 2017). For example, in Tanzania, the government assigned economically important tanzanite concessions to foreign companies, evicting established ASM miners (Schroeder, 2010) Individual politicians are sometimes accused of complicity in 'shadow markets', where they seek to profit of the informal and illegal mineral trade (Baker-Médard, 2012). Such situations can delegitimise governments and create wider social unrest. In extreme cases, power inequalities endorsed by governments can contribute to the onset of mining-supported civil wars. If a political elite is also the only groups that financially benefits from mining, this further increases the chance of violent conflict because it heightens the desire

to seize power and simultaneously makes the existing elite unwilling to relent (Jacka, 2018; Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore, 2005).

4.1.3 Productive Employment and Social Protection

Employment is another prominent pro-mining development claim. Mining companies provide jobs and incomes through recruitment of local workers and through buying from local suppliers (Keenan, Kemp & Owen, 2018). Historically, mining operations have employed a large number of manual workers. As these workers came from near and far, this led to the establishment of mining towns, where non-miners could also find employment in service provision. (Filer, 2018). In places where mining is flourishing, wages are expected to increase alongside employment, including for non-mining sectors. This makes mining a viable alternative or complement to the generally less productive agricultural sector (Cartier & Bürge, 2011; Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). Importantly, mining creates employment for marginalised workers. Due to its large land demands, mining operations are often based in remote areas where other employment options are limited (Bainton, 2020; Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017; Keenan, Kemp & Owen, 2018; Prescott et al., 2020). Within these localities, mining can offer women a viable alternative to agriculture – either through direct mine employment or indirectly in providing services for the company and/or its labour force (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). Likewise, as has been observed in Australia, employment in mining is one avenue through which indigenous communities can become less dependent on state subsidies (Bainton, 2020).

ASM is also increasingly viewed as a promising sector for employment. Because ASM is more labour intensive than LSM, it tends to provide more jobs (Ushie, 2017). This is further bolstered by the relatively low barriers to entry in the sector (Hilson, 2009). Worldwide, more than 100 million people directly and indirectly derive income from ASM (Jacka, 2018; Wall, 2010). In Africa alone, this number stands at about 30 million (Ushie, 2017). ASM offers job

opportunities where other sectors, even LSM, cannot reach. In doing so it is a vital source of income and employment for (highly) remote rural communities (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Wall, 2010). Its income-generating potential is well-understood among practitioners. For some, ASM is part of their community's culture, for others it is a source of relatively 'quick money' or an income backup to agriculture and animal husbandry (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Cartier & Bürge; Jacka, 2018). ASM miners often portray an exceptional level of rural entrepreneurship, starting their operations without government support (Alpan as quoted in Hilson, 2009). Finally, its reach and low barriers to entry also make ASM a viable employment option for marginalised groups. The Maasai from Tanzania are a well-known example, as they have bolstered their incomes by becoming middle-men in the tanzanite trade (Jacka, 2018). Women are also often active is ASM, particularly in Africa where they make up around two-thirds of the labour force (Wall, 2010; Hilson, 2009).

Despite the historic relevance and great potential, nowadays both LSM and ASM tend to offer relatively few and unstable income opportunities. For LSM, there is only a limited number of jobs for African nationals. Higher positions, such as in management, are often reserved for expats (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). Responding to this, some countries, like Sierra Leone, have adopted policies demanding greater local sourcing of labour across positions (Anonymous, personal communication, March 24, 2021). Yet, developments like mechanisation and automation further drive down the possibilities for local employment. New technologies make LSM more capital and less manual labour intensive. The high-skilled staff hired to oversee such technologies is often flown in as expertise can be lacking among host country populations. The increasing industry demand for high-end technology also impacts local sourcing of materials and non-mining services, thereby narrowing the opportunities for indirect employment (Bainton, 2020; Filer, 2018; Keenan, Kemp & Owen, 2018; Pedro et al., 2017).

Employment in ASM can be similarly unstable, with workers sometimes losing their job and investments without prior consultation, when a pit owner decides to sell off their land (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011). The ASM sector is also plagued with a high prevalence of child labour. For example, Madagascar's mining industry is estimated to employ up to 85000 children (McClure, 2019). Such numbers are unlikely to decrease as long as rural communities face few educational opportunities or alternatives for generating incomes (Wall, 2010; Schroeder, 2010). Some go as far as to say that ASM creates a poverty trap in which the costs miners pay (production costs, human health, environmental health) are not compensated by their incomes (Childs, 2008).

Furthermore, the conditions under which ASM and LSM occur can be devastating to workers' health. Examples of poor labour conditions include narrow shafts with poor ventilation, high temperatures, and the constant threat of mine collapse. Miners are exposed to mineral dust particles and toxic processes of amalgamation. Contracts tend not to include health or life insurance, or are wholly informal (Puppim de Oliveira & Ali, 2011; Schroeder, 2010). All these elements have led some to declare that employment in the mining industry is so exploitative, that it constitutes a form of wage slavery (Bainton, 2020).

Despite the earlier mentioned potential, women are disproportionally negatively affected by mining (Bridge, 2004). By limiting their access to land, the privatisation of mining concessions impedes women in their daily responsibilities such as fetching water and subsistence farming. Often excluded from consultations on compensation for loss of livelihoods, these women tend to become more dependent on male members of the household (Kropiwnicka & Van Paassen, 2020; Pedro et al., 2017). Whilst men may find employment at LSM operations, women are less likely to benefit from such alternative income opportunities (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). Furthermore, the male predominance among LSM and ASM miners, especially migrants, can lead to unsafe environments for women (Bainton, 2020;

Kropiwnicka & Van Paassen, 2020). Where they find direct mine employment, women risk being exposed to discrimination and gender-based violence. Women seeking employment within a mining community often turn to sex work where they risk contracting sexually transmittable diseases (Jacka, 2018; Kropiwnicka & Van Paassen, 2020; Pedro et al., 2017).

Mining also impacts employment or self-sustainment opportunities in other sectors, most notably agriculture. Mining operations can contaminate water and soil to such extent that crops no longer grow properly. Lower productivity results in decreased income from agriculture. This in turn can create a chain reaction across sectors, especially in the rural communities close to mining sites whose economies are often centred around agricultural production (Bridge, 2004; Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017).

Where mining companies are invested, the training of employees can result in a more skilled workforce, the benefits of which are likely to transcends the mining industry (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017; IGF, 2013). Furthermore, ASM and LSM miners exchange knowledge that benefits from both sectors. In-depth local knowledge and know-how, means that ASM miners are often the first to discover a mineral-rich area that could be of interest to a LSM corporation. At the same time, ASM miners learn from the techniques and technologies employed by LSM, and apply this to their own operations (Luning & Pijpers, 2017). Yet, this relationship based on knowledge exchange can be very lopsided. For example, LSM companies have been found to free ride on the ability of ASM miners to locate deposits, whilst forcible removing them from such sites later. This is enabled in part by the greater legal power and knowledge of companies, which allows them to obtain licences whilst ASM miners face structural restraints to this process (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Luning, 2014).

Another aspect related to mining's ability to provide employment in LSM or self-employment in ASM, is (labour) migration (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2017; Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Owen & Kemp, 2017). Migration can have a number of negative

consequences for host communities, mining operations and the migrants themselves. For local governments, migration increases public expenditure as more people require (basic) services and infrastructure (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017; IGF, 2013; Owen & Kemp, 2017). This can be particularly problematic for remote communities, where government presence is already weak. Additionally, as previously explained, the mining operations that attract migrants often add little to the (local) government budget. Consequently, local governments may face deficits in providing for both the migrants and the original population. This may in turn lead to breaches in basic human rights such as access to clean water and adequate housing (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020; Owen & Kemp, 2017; Puppim de Oliveira & Ali, 2011). Such developments are exacerbated by the impact of ensuing scarcity on prices, creating downward spirals. For example, lack of housing may increase housing prices, offsetting any financial benefits from potential employment. Migration also increases job competition, provoking conflict between the migrant and original populations, whilst decreasing wages for all (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). Divergent values and traditions between migrants and original populations can lead to disagreements and mistrust (Baker-Médard, 2012; Puppim de Oliveira & Ali, 2010). The potential of migration to induce conflict also becomes a security concern for mining operations. Owen and Kemp (2017) describe how this can lead to another downwards spiral where social unrest leads LSM companies to make greater security investments, with the subsequent greater presence of security forces leading to more social unrest.

4.1.4 Health, Community and Landscape Development

LSM companies tend to engage in various forms of community and landscape development. Common projects include investment into a locality's infrastructure (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). What makes mining companies different from other development partners, especially among the private sector, is that their projects generally have

long life-cycles, which could make the companies relatively stable sources of national and local revenue, employment and development support (Prescott et al., 2020). As mentioned before, they also tend to be located in those regions were the presence of state and non-state developments organisations tends to be weak. However, in SSA mining is also characterised by instability as mines are operated by successive companies that fall into administration or leave due to conflict. This can be problematic for community development projects. For example, in Sierra Leone where mining companies are obliged by law to pay into Community Development Funds (CDFs), a mining company that took over an existing mine site was unwilling to compensate the accumulated CDF 'debt' left behind by its predecessor (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019).

The negative impact of mining on miners themselves has already been mentioned. However, the health impact of mining extends beyond the mine site and its direct labour force. Pollution of air, soil, and water, will accumulate in human diets (Jacka, 2018). Even where LSM have regulations in place, socio-ecological threats like cyanide and mercury contamination remain (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). Mining activity has also been linked with less obvious diseases such as STDs (Wall, 2010). HIV/aids rates are reportedly higher in mining communities, which is likely caused by flourishing sex work industries as response to increased demand from migrants (Jacka, 2018; Pedro et al., 2017). At present, COVID-19 is presenting itself as a new health challenge in the mining industry. In some countries, for example South Africa, mining is considered essential and workers are directly or indirectly forced to work (Prescott et al., 2020). Naturally, this puts them at greater risk of infection and may also limit the possibilities for recovery. Looking at the broader picture, research has found that resource-rich African countries score poorer as compared to non-resource rich African states on welfare indicators like life expectancy, literacy and nutritional status (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017).

One common practice within the mining industry that infringes upon human rights and is known for causing conflict, is the eviction and resettlement of communities occupying company-leased land (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011). (Forced) resettlement rarely benefits communities as they lose their productive, cultural, and ancestral ties to land they may have owned for centuries. New land and company-constructed facilities often fail expectations, and compensation does not cover imbued costs (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017; Owen & Kemp, 2017). Moreover, resettlement can have such severe impacts on people ability to secure livelihoods that human rights are breached (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020; Owen & Kemp, 2017). The preceding is becoming more acute as mining operation increasingly move into the habitats of more remote and previously isolated communities (Bridge, 2004; Prescott et al, 2020). This all is not only a problem for the communities involved. Resettlement requires great investments on behalf of the company, which are wasted if the new settlement is not habitable (Owen & Kemp, 2017).

4.2 Elements of Inclusive and Sustainable Governance in the Mining Sector

The above has listed how mining can benefit societies and how it currently fails them. Whether mining will have a positive or negative impact depends largely on governance (Pedro et al., 2017). Referring back to the analytical model for inclusive and sustainable natural resources governance, the enabling elements of progressive governance are accountability, transparency and representation. As noted by Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen and Land (2017):

> The positive effect of revenue windfalls is underpinned by several assumptions: namely, local politicians are responsive to the broad population, which requires well-functioning local institutions; a healthy degree of political competition; and local bureaucracies having the technical capacity to provide public goods and services. As such the general competence, honesty, and overall implementation capacity of local-level government are vital for enhancing welfare and development (p. 8).

However, as the authors note, mechanisms for representation and accountability tend to be inadequate in resource-rich countries. Likewise, Ushie (2017) notes that "the implication of Africa's political elites in tax evasion, corruption and mismanagement of mineral revenues shows that the continent cannot capture and strategically utilise resource rents without transparent, accountable and visionary political leadership" (p. 12). The following paragraphs look more closely at the state of the three governance elements across the African mining industry.

4.2.1 Accountability

The accountable governance of mining would entail that decision-makers are responsive to the needs of communities and the environment, whilst taking responsibility in mitigating conflicts. Non-accountability can be linked to the economic growth imperative, power inequalities and lacking state capacities.

The belief in economic development following foreign investment has previously been mentioned as impeding rural communities in demanding state and company accountability when suffering negative impacts from large-scale land acquisitions. This same reasoning applies to the mining industry, which, as show above, often arrives with development promises that are incompletely materialised. Based on the national revenue argument, many states are likely to support mining operations over those seeking to oppose mining. This is especially true for countries where extractives are a main exports source (Bridge, 2004). Consequently, governments often overestimate the economic benefits of mining, whilst underestimating the potentially greater social and environmental costs (Pedro et al., 2017)

The mining industry's promise of development may be harder to ignore than that of other land-demanding sectors due to the major power asymmetries that exist between TNCs, communities, and governments (Pedro et al., 2017). Filer (2008) observed the unequal power relations between mining-affected communities and mining TNCs, noting that "each

community is relatively isolated in its dealings with a vertically integrated corporation that has multiple investments in several different countries and can shift its capital from one place to another when its bottom line is under threat" (p. 8). In addition, the negative externalities that mining companies induce tend to have a far greater and longer-lasting impact on surrounding communities than on companies themselves (Bainton, 2020). Combined with the development promise, this agility has allowed some companies to get away with underperformance on social, ecological *and* economic responsibilities. Sometimes, such underperformance is unintentional. For example, certain externalities only become visible after a company has left. In other instances, the industry has yet to develop frameworks to capture certain negative impacts. Defining risk in terms of possible danger to communities and the environment is a novel practice for an industry where risk normally applies only to production and financial uncertainties (Owen & Kemp, 2014). Yet, as companies are not held accountable throughout their production cycle, they experience little to no pressure to improve externalities mitigation.

The power of LSM companies also follows from the support they generally receive from international financial institutions. Theoretically, African states holds sovereign power over their territory and the resources it contains (Luning, 2014). Yet, in practice, attempts to make mining more beneficial to national development, e.g., through protectionism, may be inhibited by a state's legal obligation to uphold free trade treaties (Ushie, 2017). Nevertheless, TNCs still rely on governments to provide them access to land as well as other services needed for extraction, such as functional infrastructure (Bridge, 2004). States should thus be able to exclude irresponsible foreign companies.

Unfortunately, many African governments lack adequate fiscal regimes and administrative capacity to properly manage natural wealth (Gilberthorpe & Rajak, 2017; Löffler, 2019). According to Bosse Jønsson and Fold (2011), governments have failed in resolving LSM-ASM conflict due to underperformance in "planning, coordination, monitoring,

information dissemination and cadastral computerization", as well as staff bias (p. 486). This becomes even more problematic in remote regions where state control tends to be weakest, but which are exactly the localities where mines are based (Bridge, 2004). Limited territorial reach may also explain why states often fail to nationally implement structures for progressive mining governance (Pedro et al., 2017). Finally, African states' failure in mining governance is exacerbated by the phenomenon of shrinking civil space. This entails that civil society has increasingly less room for holding states accountable, e.g., due to closed-door policies (Da Luz, 2021; Ushie, 2017)

4.2.2 Transparency

Transparency in mining governance would allow all stakeholders to review decision-making processes, and would offer them the opportunity to contest or consent. Lacking transparency is at the source of many problems in the mining industry. Inhibiting factors include incomplete information sharing, the role of non-government actors, and obscure regulatory systems.

FPIC is not always strictly adhered with the result that communities may give consent under false presumptions. One manifestation hereof is when companies promise to build new villages for resettling communities, but these end up failing expectations (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017; Owen & Kemp, 2017). Again, this need not be deliberate acts of disinformation. It should, for example, be noted that LSM companies are sometimes misinformed by authorities concerning what and who inhabits their concessions (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011). However, companies have infamously been found to incompletely share information with governments. The aspect of transparency that has probably received most attention is lacking transparency in LSM revenue registration. This has led to several well-known initiatives such as the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) which will be discussed later. The

involvement of non-government authorities can further complicate consent-giving and other decision-making processes. In many African countries, paramount chiefs hold considerable sway over rural communities and their land. As such, they are often involved in negotiations with foreign investors and LSM managers throughout a mine's life-cycle. There are examples of such chiefs abusing this power for personal gain. Yet, chiefs are not always the allies of foreign capital. Rather, as Luning and Pijpers (2017) found in Ghana, LSM miners had to negotiate with local chiefs in order to gain customary rights to land that was legally already theirs. This pre-acquired legal status was not recognised by ASM miners, who saw their chief as the only legitimate authority in such affairs. Having been allowed access to the land by their chiefs, the ASM miners considered it their right to mine the LSM concessions. In both cases described by Luning and Pijpers, the LSM companies had to agree to sharing land with the ASM miners, although they were also able to set certain limits, e.g., only allowing local miners access. Either way, the direct or indirect recognition of chief as local authorities by both communities and miners (ASM and LSM), can undermine the state's presence in a given locality as government officials are bypassed (Luning & Pijpers, 2017). This in turn complicates governance and renders obscure to the public how certain decisions are being made – and by whom.

The latter example points to the problem of overlapping institutions, which alongside copious and sometimes contradicting regulations also obscure the mining governance landscape. Figure 4 provides an overview of the numerous parties involved in decision-making. The juxtaposition between formal rights and customary rights to land and its resources is a main cause for conflict (Pedro et al., 2017). A further complicating factor is that many mined commodities have their own specific markets, procedures, standards and regulations (Bridge, 2004). In general, LSM companies are more familiar with these intricacies than other stakeholders. Greater legal power and knowledge of legislation and official procedures gives

LSM a favourable position relative to ASM. For example, LSM are able to obtain licences over concessions whilst ASM miners face structural restraints to this process even if they have been mining that concession for extended periods of time (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Luning, 2014). On the contrary, affected communities are often unaware of promising governance initiatives and frameworks, limiting their ability to mobilise them. A good example hereof is the very limited local knowledge of the *Africa Mining Vision* (AMV), a holistic policy framework developed by the African Union to promote inclusive development through mining (Ushie, 2017).

Figure 4

Key Components of Extractive Sector Governance (Pedro et al., 2017, p. 158)



4.2.3 Representation

Proper representation is especially critical in making mining governance more inclusive. Yet, as previously mentioned, holistic representation is difficult to obtain in the governance of natural resources due to the great number of stakeholders and their differential interests. Within community differences, lacking awareness, and arbitrary terminology all hinder the inclusion of all stakeholders and perspectives into decision-making processes.

Including representatives from mining-affected communities in decision-making, does not guarantee inclusivity. As the previous chapter has explained, representatives are not always representative. The first thing that should be considered is that mining tends to reconfigure

power relations wherever it arrives, allowing some to rise in social status whereas others are reduced to the side-lines or further marginalised (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2017). This alone makes signalling out representatives a highly political process that confirms of defies new power dynamics. Such within-community power relations also manifest in the structural oppression of some members, and the suppressing of their needs and perspectives. Beyond divides along the lines of gender, ethnicity, or wealth, community members may have clashing interests and ambitions (Baker-Médard, 2012). For example, some community members may themselves be miners, either LSM employees or ASM practitioners. Furthermore, the non-compatible understanding of land between miners and non-miners, can be a main cause for distrust between stakeholders, even if they belong to the same group (Bainton, 2020; Baker-Médard, 2012; Jacka, 2018). Among the miners themselves, there might also be friction. Researching in Madagascar, Baker-Médard (2012) found that ASM in the gemstone sector fosters jealousy, in turn leading to relations of distrust and violence. Whenever consent is thus obtained from representatives, it should be questioned how representative these parties are of their respective communities.

Even where representation is appropriate, the expression of consent should be questioned. This is especially true in contexts of lacking transparency. Whilst a community might agree to a mining project, for example in the expectation of economic benefits, they are not always fully informed about mining externalities (Bainton, 2020). Environmental externalities are illustrative hereof. Local, especially indigenous, communities, are often seen as intimately tied with their natural environment and therefore as mining opponents. However, as noted above, some members within these communities may be willing to overlook environmental damage (Filer, 2008). Proper representation demands that these voices are also heard. Yet, it may be wondered whereas those willing to overlook environmental damage, are fully aware of the consequences, for example on human health. Dilemmas like these make

representation a sensitive issue, where the opinions of some may have to be purposefully 'ignored' in order to be inclusive and sustainable. As mentioned by Bridge (2004), this sparks questions about "the ownership and exercise of rights (to land and water), the criteria and processes for valuing land, and the legal rights of the state vis-a-vis the moral rights of local peoples" (p. 2017).

Representation is furthermore complicated by the vagueness of terminology and concepts within the mining industry. A case in point are the definitions of ASM and LSM, which are arbitrarily assigned to mining operations on the basis of capital and labour intensity (Mutemeri et al., 2016). Luning (2014) speaks of a 'politics of scale' (p. 68) in which mining operations are classified according to the level of technology employed. As the term suggests, this classification is not devoid of privilege, as it is often only those operations classified as large-scale that are deemed to have development potential, and are consequently favoured in questions over inclusive and sustainable growth.

When important concepts remain vaguely defined this can also result in an inability to quantify social and ecological costs. Without this knowledge, it is difficult to accurately state who is impacted by mining activities and who should thus be involved in decision-making processes. Take for example the notion of mining communities. Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen and Land (2017) give a quantitative definition based on a community's physical distance from a mine, and the district in which it is located. Yet, this still begs the question of what distance justifiably designates a community as a mining community (the authors chose a radius of 100 km). Furthermore, as the authors themselves notice, both inputs and outputs are unlikely limited to singular districts, which are themselves arbitrarily defined areas. This is problematic because if it is not clear who belongs to a mining community, it is impossible to choose appropriate representatives (Filer, 2018).

4.3 The Missing Pieces: Why the Development Potential of Mining Remains Unmet

The ills of the mining sector are well-recognised. This is evidenced by the plethora of national laws and international regulations that have been introduced to ameliorate mining externalities. Well-known examples are the OECD's *Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas*, the IFC's *Equator Principles*, the European Union's *Conflict Minerals Regulations*, and the *Natural Resources Charter* developed by the IMF and World Bank. These legislative frameworks predominantly serve to protect human rights and minimise social and environmental risks in relation to mining. Yet, as recognised by the European Partnership for Responsible Minerals (EPRM, 2021), a multi-stakeholder effort to enhance compliance with OECD Due Diligence standards and the European Union Conflict Minerals Regulation, legislation has limited impact in and on practice. Furthermore, some standards have been accused of protecting business and government interests over the rights of mining-affected communities (Filer, 2018; Keenan, Kemp & Owen, 2018).

Following the trends in natural resources governance, the mining sector has also seen its fair share of co-management initiatives that aim to positively impact accountability, transparency and representation. Such programs and projects have been set up by governments, intergovernmental organisations, NGO, CSOs, academia, and the private sector, particularly LSM companies. This multiplicity of actors mimics what Luning (2014) calls "the neoliberal rescaling of governance" referring to processes of decentralisation that has seen numerous non-state actors assume the role of "actors of development" (p. 73).

Many of the initiatives that have spread universally have elements of co-management and try to involve miners and local populations in decision-making processes alongside government and private sector actors. Some have even become codified or law, or standardised business practice. Examples are the notion of FPIC and the idea of Corporate Social

Responsibility (CSR). Yet, these initiatives often suffer from the shortcomings detailed in chapter 2. Unequal relationships of knowledge, resources and ultimately power can impede the success of theoretically inclusive and sustainable interventions. FPIC and CSR are good examples hereof, but other common and presumably promising efforts at regulating and transforming mining have also been criticised for failing to deliver on promises of inclusivity and sustainability.

The issue of representation is well-illustrated by the problematic side of FPIC, which mining companies are increasingly expected to obtain. Whilst the importance of FPIC is without question, obtaining it is not straightforward. As there is no universal definition for what FPIC should entail nor how it should be obtained, each company is free to pursue its own interpretation (Owen & Kemp, 2014). Importantly, it is not a guarantee for inclusivity in decision-making. This has to do with the before-explained problem of representation; who has the right to give consent? Indigenous communities are often wrongly seen as static and homogenously motivated. Consequently, FPIC may be obtained on paper, while in practice the decision was not representative of the community's needs. For example, female members of a community are often absent from any FPIC consultations (Kropiwnicka & Van Paasssen, 2020). Currently the right to FPIC mostly only applies to indigenous communities. As such, when a community loses that status through natural development, they tend to also lose the right to FPIC despite still been subjected to mining externalities (Bainton, 2020; Owen & Kemp, 2014). Finally, engaging in FPIC processes may put both communities and companies at risk, for example where a state does not recognise indigenous people's sovereignty over land (Owen & Kemp, 2014).

Another example of insufficient consultation and lacking representation of miners, as well as lacking resources on behalf of governments can be found in the many attempts at formalising ASM. Whilst each country has its own procedures and objectives for regulating

the subsector, there are plenty commonalities. Motivating formalisation efforts is often a belief that ASM is chaotic, dangerous, illegal and, importantly, less economically beneficial than LSM (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011). On the contrary, ASM tend to be highly organised and self-regulating and is an important contributor to local economies. Nevertheless, a plethora of initiatives deriving from government and non-government sources have attempted to formalise the sector according to their own standards. These are often initiated without coordination between the implementing actors, and moreover without consultation of miners. The result tends to be bureaucratic frameworks that do not fit local contexts and are therefore unsuccessful (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Mutemeri et al., 2016). Formalising ASM is undoubtedly beneficial to national economies as it could lead to more secure employment and provide income for governments. Yet, such benefits can only be reaped through programs that align with the needs and capabilities of ASM miners (Childs, 2008; Hilson, 2009). Beside the ill-fit of many formalisation schemes, implementation is also inhibited by government's lacking financial and human resources, and their limited territorial reach. Consequently, the enforcement of ASM regulations is often subpar (Corneau, 2017a).

Moving to another class of interventions, issues of accountability, transparency and representation have been identified among the broad group of industry-led initiatives often referred to as CSR. Since the nineties, mining companies, with great assistance from the World Bank, have sought more structural ways to improve the poor reputation of the industry. Many have phrased this as obtaining a 'Social Licence to Operate' (SLO), referring to supposed acceptance of mining activity by affected parties. Beyond doing no harm, companies are expected to actively do good, especially for the local mining-affected communities (Bainton, 2020; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2018; Filer, 2018; Pedro et al., 2017). CSR programs are common ways through which companies seek to obtain their SLO. These programmes often constitute a form of infrastructural community development, e.g., building

roads and public facilities like hospitals. CSR has become standard practice among LSM companies (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017; Jacka, 2018).

CSR initiatives have faced harsh criticisms, often centred around companies' lack of genuine interest in community development and the limited long-term impact of their interventions (IIED, 2018; Jacka, 2018; Pedro et al., 2017). The SLO has been accused of wrongfully suggesting consent with many activity. As an abstract concept, companies may easily claim to have obtained a SLO, while in reality those who may oppose mining have not been heard or are for various reasons unable to express their disapproval (Pedro et al., 2017). Furthermore, CSR projects are often slowly implemented and do not always have the advertised positive community impact (Chuhan-Pole, Dabalen & Land, 2017). This is exacerbated but the fact that many projects are evaluated along the company's own standards of success (Jacka, 2018).

At times, companies will enter into contracts with communities that explicitly list expectations on both ends. Among these are CSR efforts on behalf of the companies, as well as mechanisms for resolving conflicts if they are to occur. Such contracts are often referred to as Community Development Agreements (CDA's), and tend to be accompanied by a Community Development Committee (CDC) that oversees implementation. Particularly important herein are agreements surrounding Community Development Funds (CDFs), and the role of the CDC in allocating fund resources to different projects. Whilst theoretically promising, CDAs have also been accused of disingenuity and serving foremost to protect company interests (Bainton, 2020; Conteh & Maconachie, 2019). Likewise, agreements between companies and governments are not always created on equal terms due to differences in knowledge, resources and negotiation skill between contracting parties (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019; Mann et al., 2012). Studying the effectiveness of CDAs is difficult as they are often not made publicly available (Bainton, 2020). This attests to the problem of

transparency that haunts the mining sector.

Overall, the business promise that SLO, CSR and CDA's would turn mining into a responsible and sustainable industry has not been readily accepted (Gilberthorpe & Rajak, 2017; Owen & Kemp, 2017). Yet, these programs have resulted in an adequate level of tolerance for companies to continue their possible harmful practices with minimal opposition (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2017; Jacka, 2018).

Next, fair trade and other certification schemes deserve a closer look. Such initiatives have been applauded by some. For example, Bosse J~~o~~nsson and Fold (2011) state it is only through third party certification that all actors along a value chain can be held accountable. The best-known international mining standard is likely the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which was initiated to curb the sale of conflict diamonds by preventing them from entering value chains (Corneau, 2017a). The development of the standard was an effort of several leading diamond companies, united in the World Diamond Council, to respond to growing public discontent with the war-implicated diamond industry. Supported by the UN and independent states, the standard was universally adopted. The main actors are companies that voluntary seek to obtain certification and governments that control which diamonds are being exported and imported. Both parties are supposed to provide extensive documentation in order to trace diamonds as conflict-free. It is generally believed that the KPCS has increased the formal diamond trade, thereby contributing to reduced conflict and higher national export revenues (Haufler, 2010).

Besides the KPCS, the Association for Responsible Mining and the Fair Trade Labelling Organization have taken notable steps in certifying mineral resources by introducing *Fairmined.* This standard has been developed for gold derived from ASM, but is also applicable to several other minerals (ARM, 2007; Childs, 2008). *Fairmined* captures four domains: organisation development, social development, working conditions, and environmental

protection. In each of these areas it demands benchmarks of sustainable development from gold suppliers wishing to obtain the fair trade mark (Fairmined, 2019)

Yet, certification schemes are not a panacea. The number of schemes that have been introduced over the last years have created a saturated landscape of sometimes contradictory programs, where companies can pick which standards to uphold (Childs, 2008; Schroeder, 2010). Whilst Bosse Jønsson and Fold (2011) point at the positive impact certification could have on ASM, Schroeder (2010) and Corneau (2017a), looking at tanzanite and coltan respectively, noted how ethical and sustainability standards can create monopolies in which the products of ASM miners are declined. This can even occur without the guarantee that 'approved' minerals have in fact been ethically and/or sustainably mined, especially when it concerns company-developed certification scheme (as for tanzanite). Likewise, critics have pointed out that the KPCS cannot always ensure that diamonds are conflict free and that miners have not been exposed to human rights abuses, especially when specimens derive from ASM (Bosse Jønsson & Fold, 2011; Flores, 2018). This may in part be due to the failure of some states to ensure strong border controls, which are central to the KPCS' traceability imperative. Furthermore, cases of supposed corruption hinder the scheme's success, as some government members and companies seek to profit from selling diamonds with KPCS branding without actually adhering to quality standards. Finally, despite being the model mining standard, the KPCS has limited applicability for other mineral resources besides diamonds (Haufler, 2010). Other well-known international standard-setting organisations have similar limited applicability. For example, the before mentioned EPRM focuses solely on gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten from conflict areas (EPRM, 2021). Certification is thus not always appropriate or sufficient, and this is also the critique that *Fairmined* has received. The fair trade program was launched in Latin America where it applies to formal ASM. In SSA, the majority of ASM is informal, limiting the applicability of the program (Bosse Jønsson and Fold (2011). Likewise,

the range of miners that can participate in the scheme is restricted, resulting in the exclusion of many producers. This is mostly due to the greater offer than demand of fair trade gold. The changing prices of mineral commodities also complicates fair price-setting. Moreover, the fair trade premise of selling to buyers from the Global North, would limit to possibility for establishing local linkages and may serve to weaken national economic growth in the countries of extraction (Childs, 2008).

Finally, some initiatives check all the theoretical boxes, yet have limited practical effectiveness. The AMV is arguably the most important example hereof in SSA. Adopted in 2009 by the African Union, it encourages the sharing of benefits derived from mining among Africa's populations. The AMV provides a policy framework often considered one of the most holistic approaches to mining governance (Pedro et al., 2017; Ushie, 2017). It addresses six domains for monitoring and evaluation of the Vision: "legal and institutional framework; geological and mineral information system; fiscal regime and revenue management; linkages, investment and diversification; artisanal and small scale mining; environmental and social issues" (UNECA, 2017, p. 4). Despite covering every stage along the mining value chain, providing clear and context-appropriate guidelines and stressing the need for inclusivity and sustainability, the vision of the AMV has yet to materialise. This has been linked to the general low awareness of the AMV (Ushie, 2017). The beforementioned lacking implementation capacities among African government may also explain the delayed potential.

What these examples have in common is that they are often developed by a single or limited number of parties and are imposed top-down. Despite being a good start, they fail to align more closely to the needs of those for which they are officially intended, e.g., by not adequately involving them in design and implementation (Hilson, 2009). Additionally, limited applicability or lacking awareness, minimises the inclusivity of these initiatives. Consequently, positive impacts are restricted to relatively small groups of mining-affected actors. Overall,

these findings illustrate the need for greater communication and collaboration among the diverse group of stakeholders affected by mining operations.

This sentiment is reflected in both academic and non-academic literature on the future of development initiatives in the mining sector (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2018; Mutemeri et al., 2016; World Bank Group, 2013). Citing members from development organisations and leading LSM companies, Prescott et al. (2020) share insights from mining experts, that convey a need for multi-stakeholder cooperation. From a mining company's perspective, they note that a durable development impact would necessitate "different forms of stakeholder engagement, a commitment to getting things done more slowly – and sometimes more painfully – if needed, to ensure government and institutions are truly on board" (p. 11). Likewise, to manage expectations among all stakeholders there is need for companies "to work strategically with local partners to strengthen institutions and public services, address structural inequalities and transform economic and social outcomes in a manner that has measurable business benefits as well as development impact" (p. 11). Similarly, Ushie (2017) writing for Oxfam International, argues that effective implementation of the AMV would require close cooperation between policy makers, companies, civil society and affected communities. Concerning environmental regulation, Bridge (2004), whilst cynical of mining's development potential, states that positive development in the relation between mining and the environment will depend on "the extent to which processes of stakeholder dialogue and public participation enable communities to reject mining as a land use or to impose significant conditions on its form, rate, and extent" (p.250). The IFC and ICMM, in their toolkit on LSM-ASM promotion, explicitly mention the need for a multi-stakeholder approach in addressing and mitigating conflict between the subsectors (Wall, 2010). Additionally, according to the IGF (2013), transformation of ASM would require "a multi-stakeholder, multi-sectoral approach that will be slower but will create more sustainable results" (p. 42). Mutemeri et al. (2016), likewise

looking at the ASM sector, advocate for multi-stakeholder strategies that convene "community representatives, customary authorities, NGOs, the state security apparatus, local government and other state regulatory authorities, and representatives from large-scale companies" (p. 657). According to the authors, only such an approach would be inclusive of marginalised groups' perspectives. Pedro et al. (2017) list further stakeholders that should be involved in mining governance, stating that:

> Responsibility does not only rest with governments and industry but also with countless other non-governmental actors, who include unions, non-governmental organisations, think tanks and academics, and who can share public auditors' burden, analysing data, reporting on findings, and demanding more accountable governance and management in the mining sector (p. 160).

The need for multi-stakeholder initiatives to transform the mining sector in SSA is thus well-recognised across both academic and non-academic literature. The next chapter will explore further which form of multi-stakeholder collaboration can respond to the challenges and opportunities in mining listed above.

5. The Case for Multi-Stakeholder Platforms to Promote Inclusive and Sustainable Growth and Development from Mining

The previous chapters have provided a thorough conflict analysis. According to Buckles and Rusnak (1999), the next step in conflict resolution is planned multiparty intervention. As mentioned, the intervention of interest in this study is the MSP approach. This chapter investigates whether MSPs have the theoretical potential to mitigate mining conflict. It then proposes a model framework for a successful mining-engaged MSP (MMSP).

5.1 Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration in the Mining Sector

Some of the most successful mining development initiatives involve multi-stakeholder collaboration. Whilst listing all examples is beyond the thesis' scope, it is valuable to examine a few cases that illustrate the benefits and challenges of multi-stakeholder collaboration in mining. The first example is the beforementioned EITI. Following the 2002 Rio+10 Earth Summit, the EITI was launched internationally to curb corruption and other forms of natural resources mismanagement. Central to the EITI are reports composed by companies and governments. Companies report all financial transactions made to governments. Governments consequently state how much income they have received from extraction and where the money derived from. The EITI aims to promote transparency in the extractives sector's financial streams, thereby contributing to improved governance that benefits more people. Increasingly, it has been demanding disclosure on aspects beyond finances, like gender representation and environmental impact. To oversee reporting cycles, member countries set up a multi-stakeholder groups, compromising government, private sector, and civil society representatives (EITI International Secretariat, 2020; Gruzd et al., 2018; Jacka, 2018). Yet, Gruzd et al. (2018), who studied the impacts of the EITI, African Peer Review Mechanism and Open Government Partnership, found that membership in such initiatives generally does not translate in great governance improvements. Despite embracing ideals of transparency and accountability, de

facto reforms are few. This may be linked to the fact that, despite the possibility for suspension, membership in EITI is voluntary. Consequently, failing to comply with good practice standards does not impose any material costs on a country. Furthermore, reforms that do take place cannot always be traced back to the initiative (Gruzd et al., 2018).

Concerning industry initiatives, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) is likely the most important actor claiming to be founded upon multistakeholder dialogue. In 1998, the poor status of the industry's SLO lead several of the biggest LSM companies to commission the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) to conduct a large-scale research project: *The Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project* (MMSD). Research occurred between 2000 and 2002, during which more than 150 representatives were involved in detailing the possible contribution of mining to sustainable development. Ten years following the final publication, the IIED conducted a follow-up which showed that despite some progress, the industry as a whole still struggled to meet sustainability standards (IIED, 2018).

The MMSD resulted in the construction of the ICMM. Mining companies can join the ICMM if they meet the organisations 10 principles of practice (Filer, 2018; Jacka, 2018). These cover both the production process and externalities management. Closely aligned with the SDGs, many of the principles directly reference sustainable development and call for inclusive governance (ICMM, 2021a, 2021b). They also build upon other frameworks such as the United Nations' *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights* and the International Finance Corporation's *Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability* (Owen & Kemp, 2017). Of particular interest here is principle 10 on stakeholder engagement. The ICMM requires its members to involve major actors in interventions for more sustainable practice. Members are also expected to report upon such engagements, and to cooperate with accountability and transparency monitors like the EITI and the Global Reporting Initiative

(ICMM, 2021b). Yet, the ICCM has been criticised for being a restricted group of major LSM companies and for failing to penalise members that breach its principles (Bainton, 2020; Filer, 2018). Like other industry initiatives, an argument may be made about the scope of their commitments. Principle 10, for example, only explicitly refers to transparent engagement with other corporate-level stakeholders (ICMM, 2021b).

Several initiatives exist that gather and share knowledge in order to facilitate research and dialogue. Whilst these initiatives are not always multi-stakeholder initiatives or do not market themselves as such, they do provide knowledge bases that tend to cover the interests of multiple actors. Two examples are the Responsible Mineral Development Initiative (RMDI) and the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF). The RMDI was set up in 2010 by the World Economic Forum (WEF) to spread knowledge on mining externalities and opportunities (Pedro et al. 2017; WEF, 2017). The RMDI aims to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogue by providing the necessary tools and information. It is a generic model that can be adapted to different contexts. While is seeks to engage multiple actors, it is often implemented by governmental bodies, making it a top-down approach (WEF, 2017). The IGF was formed following the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. The initiative supports national governments in improving the governance of mining and encouraging mining's contribution to sustainable development. It does so by providing various research and monitoring services to member states. Its aim is to "demonstrate that mining could be a potentially significant driver of development" (IGF, 2021b). Like RMDI, it captures diverse perspectives to improve governance, but is itself not directly involved in decision-making processes.

In conclusion, the mining industry is rich in efforts to create more sustainable and inclusive growth and development of which plenty involve multi-stakeholder collaboration. Yet, as chapter 4 has shown, much progress is still to be made. Even the above-mentioned

initiatives tend not to reach their full potential. Lacking (public) awareness, lacking de facto reform and lacking capacity on behalf of civil society to demand change are some of the obstacles faced (Gruzd et al., 2018; Ushie, 2017). Often, approaches are still imposed top-down, and are generic rather than suited to local contexts. Where the focus is narrower, initiatives tend to centre around diamonds or gold, limiting applicability to the dozens of other minerals implicated in mining conflict. Accusations of inadequate representations of local stakeholders and disproportionate efforts to protect business interest, are common place. Finally, the sheer number of initiatives increases rather than decreases the complexity of the mining sector. How can the MSP approach attempt to overcome these problems?

5.2 From Partnerships to Platforms

Several of the initiatives listed above already contain elements of a MSP, like the EITI multi-stakeholder groups. Yet, the MSP approach as outlined in chapter 2 has been scarcely applied to mitigate mining conflict in SSA. Lessons from land-engaged platforms provide a theoretical justification of the potential that MSPs may have when engaging the mining industry.

Firstly, MSPs improve stakeholder relationships. A neutral facilitator encourages stakeholders to define shared objectives, thereby shifting attention to a common problem and away from interpersonal conflict. Trust is enhanced, ameliorating the problem-solving abilities of the whole group. This is vital in the mining industry where distrust is pervasive and actors along the value chain have little knowledge of each other (IGF, 2013). Greater trust can foster mutual understanding and the feeling of a shared purpose. In turn, this can heighten commitment to platform activities, and help translate vision into reality.

Secondly, MSPs build capacities for participation in (policy) dialogue, especially for marginalised stakeholders. Through MSPs, rural and impoverished communities are made aware of their rights and are given backbone support in defending them. Trainings are

organised to build the necessary skills for marginalised actors to negotiate with more powerful parties, promoting actual inclusive dialogue. This is important for the mining sector, as local stakeholders tend not to have the necessary skills for effective dialogue with other stakeholders (Weldegiorgis, 2018)). When these capacities are strengthened this can, for example, contribute to the establishment of better-informed and representative CDAs (Huang, Faysse & Ren, 2017). Mining companies may also benefit from more efficient dialogue with locals and other capacitated actors. For example, local stakeholders can at times give invaluable advice to mining companies, preventing conflict-fostering investments and helping create higher returns on development projects (Hurrell & Tennyson, 2006). This may also lead to more efficient mining, for example by improved communication and knowledge exchange between LSM and ASM miners.

Thirdly, MSPs heighten awareness and challenge stereotypes through active engagement. Stakeholders gain better understanding of each other's needs and wishes. Additionally, opportunities for fruitful collaboration in the present and future are identified. CSOs, governments and companies obtain a more holistic view of the communities and miners with which they engage. The private sector stands to benefit greatly in this area as it will aid in validating its SLO (Bainton, 2020; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington, 2018; see also Huang, Faysse & Ren, 2017). In general, a SLO can only be obtained when trust between a company, the communities surrounding its operations, and other stakeholders is strong enough for its activities to be (ethically) accepted (Kenton, 2021). Heightened awareness of other stakeholders may lead to more appropriate business conduct, which can help companies cultivate the necessary level of trust. In turn, communities stand to benefit when the mining companies in their vicinity are more socially and environmentally aware.

Fourthly, due in part to greater awareness, MSPs can serve to coordinate initiatives and prevent the duplication of efforts. Rather than commencing on isolated activities, stakeholders

come together in a single platform. Especially for CSOs, this has proven to substantiate their argumentation and augment policy impact (Gruzd et al., 2018; Da Luz, 2021). Furthermore, in a sector as complex as mining, avoiding the duplication of efforts by joining forces would benefit the developmental impact on the industry as a whole. Research among African countries has found that government engagement in multiple (multi-stakeholder) development initiatives can limit the impact of each. This due to increased pressure on government officials, who sometimes already lack the necessary implementation and monitoring capacities. In addition, competition may arise between such initiatives (Gruzd et al., 2018). A MSP can simplify government engagement with various actors by constitution a single point-of-contact. The coordinating role of a MSP extends to adapting general guidelines and regulations to local contexts and ensuring their implementation. This can also facilitate the appropriate local realisation of initiatives developed at the headquarters of international NGOs and TNC's (Gruzd et al., 2018; Hurrell & Tennyson, 2006). Finally, since MSPs are supposed to be durable, they can coordinate and monitor development throughout and beyond mine life cycles, and different license holders.

Fifthly, MSPs have the potential to fix reputations and leverage international support for the mitigation of national and local level conflict. Grounded in transparency, accountability and inclusivity, platforms are prime targets for effective development support. Both technical and financial aid can be directed to an easily distinguishable, secure and locally embedded initiative (Gruzd et al., 2018). Prominent international development actors like the World Bank have cooperated with land-engaged MSPs, and may thus be accessible for MMSPs as well (Da Luz, 2021). Additionally, Engagement in multi-stakeholder initiatives can improve reputations. For governments, support of such initiatives enhances their regional and international status. This is one of the underlying motivations that has pushed many countries worldwide to uphold

their EITI membership (Gruzd et al., 2018). As mentioned, MSP engagement can help mining companies acquire their SLO and ameliorate the industry's standing.

5.2.1 Challenges for MMSPs

The potential for MMSPs to positively impact mining governance is not without challenges. The previous chapters have shown that the mining sector is plagued by particularly high levels of non-accountability, non-transparency and non-representativeness. Whilst this strengthens the need for more collaboration, it also lowers the chances of successful MMSP implementation. The political nature of natural resources governance has proven a challenge to MSPs working on land tenure (FAO, 2020a). As the extractives sector is even more politically fraught, one of the most critical preconditions for success can be the most challenging: overcoming distrust. MSPs demand that stakeholders are willing to convene. Yet, certain parties might not want to collaborate with actors who they see as the root of their problems. In a similar vein, some parties like CSOs and NGOs may feel uncomfortable partnering with mining companies given the latter's bad reputation (Hurrell & Tennyson, 2006). In more severe cases, where distrust has turned into violent and/or armed conflict, the MSP approach is wholly unfit (Ratner et al., 2013). Experience from land-engaged MSPs in SSA shows that trust-building is a continuous job that greatly depends on stakeholders' willingness to engage. The facilitator can aid the process through transparent, neutral and professional conduct. This essentially entails that each platform member is treated equally and is continuously involved (Da Luz, 2021).

In practice, MSPs generally experience most difficulties with engaging the private sector (Da Luz, 2021; FAO, 2020a). Companies may be distrusting of other stakeholders or unmotivated to join. Highlighting membership incentives may help. The above already listed some of the reasons why investing in MMSPs could be beneficial to companies. One major mining multi-national that has attested to the benefits of partnering with diverse actors is Rio

Tinto. During the 1980s-1990s the company invested in numerous community development programmes with little coordination among them and integration into the wider business model. Simultaneously, despite improving its practice, Rio Tinto suffered from bad reputation. In the late 1990s the company initiated a new partnership approach that was more integrated with the business, whilst directly engaging staff and local communities based on the MSP-like principles of "mutual respect, active partnership, and long-term commitment" (Hurrell & Tennyson, 2006, p. 4). The partnering approach led to an improved reputation for Rio Tinto as well as improved working relations with stakeholders, which facilitates the whole mining process. For partners, the provision of funds and other resources allowed them to build their own capacities towards reaching development goals. Despite its success, the approach faced many MSP-like challenges, such as trust-building, communication, and the temporal investment required. The company found that the help of an external third party was necessary (Hurell & Tennyson, 2006). Rio Tinto's case demonstrates how companies can benefit from partnering with other stakeholders. Additionally, their difficulties attest to added value of an MSP with its neutral facilitator(s) helping guide dialogue in a safe space.

The difficulties in engaging the private sector allude to another main objective and obstacle: mitigating power imbalances. MSPs reduce the impact of power differences by training marginalized stakeholders, but still imbalances must be carefully monitored. For example, platform abuse or green-washing should be avoided. Companies and governments should not join for the mere reason of reputation improvement. Civil society should have an active role within the MMSP and should be enabled to demand change from corporate and government actors. At times, more powerful parties may encourage CSOs to join initiatives to present an inclusive image, without involving them in implementation. The shrinking civic space across African countries heightens the risk for such 'tokenistic' engagement (Gruzd et al., 2018, p. 5). These challenges emphasise that an MMSP should be a bottom-up approach,

that not only pursues inclusive development but has itself been inclusively developed. This is also evidenced by a MMSP in China, which was initiated by a mining company. Whilst representatives from the company, local government, surrounding communities and a university were all included, the village representatives were de facto excluded from negotiations and the divergent interests were hardly considered. Consequently, the MMSP's activities had a short-term perspective that failed to promote durable, sustainable and inclusive change (Huang, Faysse & Ren, 2017).

A fourth challenge is maintaining platform momentum and stakeholder motivation. MSPs are long-term investments and may appear slow in delivering concrete results. Internal and external communication are critical to keep stakeholders and external parties, such as donors, interested (Gruzd et al., 2018). Yet, effective communication may require skills that are not readily present among mining stakeholders themselves (Da Luz, 2021). This points to the importance of including members that may be less directly tied to mining, such as journalists. Still, communication alone is not enough. Motivation and momentum can be impeded by the highly political nature of mining governance. For example, (staff) changes in government can block a priorly successful initiative as new administrations distance themselves from predecessors (FAO, 2020a; Gruzd et al., 2018). Finally, MMSPs must be careful not to create progress-impeding competition. MSPs are not intended to substitute governmental duties, but rather to support the formulation, implementation and evaluation of more inclusive governance. Likewise, they do not replace other efforts at transformation of the mining sector, such as locally-organised protests or internationally implemented certification schemes.

Lastly, acquiring sufficient funding is a hurdle. This issue can be particularly pertinent in developing countries. MSPs require considerable monetary investments over a sustained period of time. A platform can become more costly as it becomes more established, e.g., due

to the need to maintain a physical infrastructure. Financial (self-)organisation was also found to be an underdeveloped skill among land-engaged MSPs in SSA (Da Luz, 2021). If MMSPs are able to engage substantial donors, such problems may be partially overcome.

5.3 A Model for MMSPs

To complement the discussion with a more practical guide, figure 5 presents the *5-2-3* model life cycle of an MSP concerned with mining related conflict. It is based on four proven models and guides for setting up multi-stakeholder initiatives: The MSP Guide (Brouwer et al., 2015), the CORE model (Ratner & Smith, 2014), the Dialogic Change Model (Collective Leadership Institute, 2017), and EITI's *Guidance note 14 on the establishment and governance of multi-stakeholder group* (EITI, 2018). The first three provide general guidelines for multi-stakeholder partnerships and dialogue. The MSP guide is one of the most recognised guidelines within the field (A. Fiorenza, personal communication, April 28, 2021). The CORE and Dialogic Change Model were mentioned by practitioners interviewed in the research on multi-stakeholder platforms on Africa (Da Luz, 2021). Whereas the former three are generally applicable, the EITI approach is more directly suited to the context of the extractive industries.

The model consists of five phases containing two broad activities. Each phase is specified by three main questions and three end products. Alike the general MSP life cycle, the *5-2-3* cycle is repetitive. The individual phases will be explained below in the context of setting up a platform. Yet, this cycle is also applicable when starting new projects or during reorganisation. Before detailing stage one to five, a few of the overarching details that set it apart from general MSP guidelines will be explained.

Those familiar with mining, particularly LSM, may recognise the phases of a mine's life cycle. The *5-2-3* model has indeed been designed to figuratively align with mine development. Not only does this bring a sense of familiarity to the stakeholders, it also creates a model that is more fun. Fun is an often overlooked element that can heighten the chance of

success.

Besides bringing familiarity and fun into the process, the five stages allow for a more carefully-thought out platform. As mentioned, the mining sector is in need of 'slow thinking'. This model requires practitioners to work through more phases than the common three-staged model. Each phase also consists of two sub-stages which are in a constant reflective cycle with each other. For example, in phase 2, designing informs planning which in turn will lead to reflection upon the design at hand. Importantly, the model encourages continuous reflection upon membership and encourages practitioners to foster relationship-building. Thus, as advocated by many MSP guidelines – but not necessarily reflected in associated models – this model highlights the centrality of reflection at each stage of the cycle. Yet, the model still corresponds with the design-implement-evaluation cycle introduced in chapter 2. The first two stages 'Explore-Prospect' and 'Design-Plan' correspond with the initial design phase. 'Develop-Construct' and 'Extract-Process' constitute the implementation phase. Finally, the evaluation phase is captured by 'Decommission-Reclaim'.

Figure 5

The 5-2-3 Model for a Mining-Engaged MSP



5.3.1 Phase 1: Explore – Prospect

A promising site must be located before a mining operation can begin. Once found, several type of analyses take place to predict a mine's possible yield and impact on the area. This first phase in the life cycle of a mine is essentially one that seeks to understand the context and what it allows for. As such it aligns well with what is required before a MMSP can be set up. Firstly, fertile ground must be explored, referring to a conflict situation that could be mitigated through the MSP approach. The context around this situation must then be carefully mapped. At this point, no hard decisions need to be made about the shape of the MSP. Rather, an initial idea should form of a shared purpose and the opportunities for an MMSP to make a positive impact.

Stakeholders can then convene to prospect – which essentially concerns getting them engaged. It is not yet necessary, and likely not yet possible, to include all stakeholders at this stage. However, the convening group should include representatives from each broad stakeholder group (including but not limited to government, civil society, and business) Together a more holistic map can be created of what has happened and who is involved. Recommended is a consideration of prior interventions and their pitfalls, or of interventions elsewhere that have proved effective and might be translated to the conflict at hand. Questions to be asked include:

1. What are the dimensions of the conflict?

The conflict at hand must be well understood before undertaking any of the next steps. Consideration should be made of the social (which may include historical and cultural aspects), political, economic and ecological dimensions. Context analysis will indicate whether the MMSP approach is appropriate and, if yes, who needs to be involved. This is also the starting point for imagining what resolution would look like in a manner beneficial to all involved. In other words, it initiates developing a shared understanding and a shared purpose. An MMSP

may choose to tackle mining conflict as a whole, or start with a specific problem. Example goals are preventing water contamination, tackling biodiversity loss, improving health and safety at mine sites, regulating informal practices or confronting human right abuses. Research has found that narrower foci may yield greater efficiency (Gruzd et al., 2018). Yet, the goal must be broad enough to interest all stakeholders.

2. Who are the stakeholders?

A MMSP becomes inclusive through the participation of all stakeholders in a conflict. This requires understanding of who these actors are and what roles they play within the system. it should be noted who the leaders or otherwise powerful actors are, who will likely have the greatest impact on the MMSP initiative (either positive or negative). Furthermore, an initial understanding must be developed of what the stakeholder's interests are, where they clash, and, more importantly, where they overlap. The latter will indicate a possible shared purpose behind which the actors can be mobilised. Key stakeholders are likely to include: miners, mining associations, traders, dealers, investors, shareholders, governments, regulators, mining-affected communities, media, NGO's, CSOs, academia and training institutions (Hurrell & Tennyson, 2006; Weldegiorgis, 2018)).

In any case, it is recommended that the MMSP actively engages government parties. This group alone can ensure the platform's legal protection and incorporate its findings into new or improved mining governance policies. Without government supports, MMSPs are destined to fail (Gruzd et al., 2018; Weldegiorgis, 2018).

3. What has been tried before?

In order for MMSPs to be successful and attract participation, it should differentiate itself positively from other initiatives. Prior interventions should be carefully studied for strong and weak points. Likewise, initiatives might exist elsewhere from which valuable lessons can be

learned. A study of existing initiatives should also indicate whether the platform should be a stand-alone entity or if it would be more beneficial to collaborate or integrate with other programs. This is an important consideration in order to minimise the complexity of the mining sector caused by the abundance of interventions and regulations. The final products of phase 1 should include:

1. A shared purpose
2. A map of stakeholders
3. Overview of other initiatives and possible merger options

5.3.2 Phase 2: Design – Plan

Before a mine can be established it must be carefully designed to fit with the context uncovered in the previous phase. This is the stage where all contextual information is examined to identify the most appropriate structure and strategy for the platform. The design phase consists of collective brainstorming. By involving all stakeholders in this and later stages, a sense of ownership is created that motivates the members (Weldegiorgis, 2018).

In the planning phase the different designs are assessed on feasibility. Plans should capture possible timelines, availability of resources and indicators of success. They should be created for different designs, before choosing the best long-term option. Designs and plans should be openly shared to gain an understanding of the members combined stock of capacities, resources and ideas. Questions to be asked include:

1. Who should be part of the MSP?

In the previous phase, the stakeholder groups within the system were identified and mapped along their interests and power. At this stage, it must be chosen who will be part of the MMSP. Ideally, this will include representatives from all sectors involved, but in practice this may not yet be obtainable. Those who are not yet willing to join should be given the possibility to be in

regular contact with the MMSP, and to enter the initiative at a later stage. If those that refuse to join or particularly powerful, the platform should attempt to counterbalance this deficiency through their other members. The initiating group should consider taking on a leading role, such as that of a steering body or secretariat. If deemed more appropriate, other members should take on the position or be elected into it. In the experience of the FAO (2020a), governments tend to take a leading role e.g., through hosting the secretariat.

2. What are potential strategies for transformation?

In this first brainstorming phase, the emphasis is on possibilities and opportunities. This stage should not yet be constrained by realities and expectations. The members are encouraged to freely consider what they would do to achieve the shared purpose. They should consider what would be necessary for these initial designs; who needs to be involved? What resources are needed? They should attempt to make plans; what outcomes could be achieved along the way? Which preparations should be made and when? The members should feel free to come up with different work packages (designs + plans), and should discuss the merits and risks of each. Preferably this discussion takes place during an MMSP meeting with all representatives present. However, different members should restrain from dismissing each other's ideas.

3. What can the MSP achieve?

The second brainstorming phase examines what the MMSP can realistically achieve. This entails reflecting on the conflict description established in phase 1 and comparing it to proposed designs. Which aspects of the conflict would obstruct progress along a certain path? How could such obstacles be overcome? But also, which aspects allow for certain strategies to function well? Likewise, the feasibility and practicality of plans should be assessed. Do the members have the willingness and capacity to commit to proposed plans? Are there for example upcoming events along the suggested timeline that would slow down or could be mobilised for

executing the proposed plan? From the possible work packages proposed, the most appropriate elements should be selected. Finally, based on the different ideas put forward by the members, the group or the steering body, should try to pinpoint implicit agreements such as the narrowness or broadness of the MMSP's agenda. The final products of phase 2 should include:

1. Work packages consisting of designs and plans
2. MSP member base
3. MSP Secretariat

5.3.3 Phase 3: Develop – Construct

Before construction of the mine begins, the best plan must be further developed. Likewise, this is the stage at which the MMSP members decide upon their design. The shared purpose is reformulated into more concrete and narrower (if appropriate) vision and mission statements to develop a Theory of Change. The members agree on a Memorandum of Understanding that lays down the roles, rights and responsibilities between them.

The associated plan is then materialised in the construction phase, which marks the true materialisation of the MMSP. This also entails erecting the steering body and other organisational structures, setting up the physical structure of the platform, i.e., an office space, and collecting the necessary resources and permits. Questions to be asked include:

1. What will be the organisational structure of the MSP?

Having already agreed upon a purpose, a leading group of members, an agenda and possible strategies, the MMSP is now formally set up. This requires practical thinking and action on aspects such as: regulation (What will be the rules of the game? How do we treat each other?), communication (What medium will be used to keep in touch? where can we meet online and offline), and institutionalisation (What will be our legal backing? At what level will we operate?).

2. What will be the strategy of the MMSP to impact conflict X?

The brainstorming phases of the prior stages should be developed into concrete action plans. Members should list outcomes (What do we work for?), interventions (How can we work for it?), and indicators (How can we measure success?). To map this out systematically, a Theory of Change should be developed that illustrates how the chosen work package leads up to the shared purpose. The elements of the Theory of Change should be carefully questioned: What are the priorities? How can we collect the necessary resources? What will the timeline look like? How does the chosen design impact stakeholders?

3. What will be the responsibilities of all members?

Role allocation deserves separate consideration from strategy formulation. Clarifying roles is important to involve members and motivate active participation. The CORE approach (Ratner & Smith, 2014, p. 27) differentiates between control, influence and appreciate tasks. Control tasks are those that the members can pursue independently. This includes activities, methods and resources. The basic questions are: What can I (or 'we' as a member group) do? Where, when and how can I/we do it? What do I/we need to do it? Influencing is needed where tasks cannot be done by members on their own, but require the help of other members or actors outside of the initiative that are open to collaboration. Members are tasked with identifying who or what to influence, and how to go about this. Questions that should be asked here include: Which people do we need to involve? From where can we get our resources? Which events are held that we should we attend? Finally, appreciation covers everything outside of the member's reach. The responsibility of members in this domain is to familiarise themselves with these elements and learn how to work with or around them; Which actors are outside our circle of influence that can still impact our work? Which important knowledge do we lack? Enumerating roles alongside the lines of control, influence and appreciate will make it more

clear to individuals what they can and cannot do, and where they can help each other or must seek outside assistance. The final products of the phase 3 should include:

1. Memorandum of Understanding / Partnership Agreement / Terms of Reference
2. Theory of Change
3. Action plans

5.3.4 Phase 4: Extract – Process

With the mine established, production can start. There are two general phases to this that occur on the mine site itself: extraction of the ore from the soil, and processing of the ore to derive the sought-after minerals. These are metaphoric for the repetitive cycle of MSPs, in which stakeholders' knowledge is constantly extracted and processed. In more familiar collaborative terms, this refers to the sharing, analysing, and absorbing of findings, skills and resources to reach the platform's vision. Questions to be asked include:

1. What are the impacts of MSP activity on conflict X?

Members of the MMSP should regularly reflect upon the progress they are making. What are the intended and unintended effects of the platforms activity upon the conflict they have sought to mitigate? Members are encouraged to share their results to maintain momentum. However, there should be space for both concrete and non-concrete results-sharing. Practice has shown that MSP activities can have many non-concrete impacts, such as changing mindsets (Da Luz, 2021). These results are no less important that more concrete impacts, but can sometimes be overshadowed which dampens motivation. To prevent this, all types of results should be celebrated. Beyond acknowledging results, they should also be analysed; Which findings are of interest to which stakeholders? How do findings relate to the shared purpose? What adjustments to the strategy or new activities do they call for?

2. What are the challenges and opportunities faced by the MMSP?

This is another reflective question, but it focuses on the process rather than the outcomes. Encountered obstacles and opportunities should be assessed. The members should be able to communicate the outcomes of these reflections with each other. Trough sharing experiences, members can learn from each other. They also remain up-to-date on the activities of their peers and can adjust their activities accordingly. Furthermore, when one member lacks the skills or resources to overcome an obstacle, others might be able to provide. This encourages the members to collaborate, increasing both efficiency and trust.

3. How do members engage with the MMSP?

Throughout the process, the platform, particularly its steering body, should not lose sight of inclusivity. This means that not only outcomes should be tracked on outcomes but also on progress on relationship-formation; Is trust between the members maintained and growing? Are all members included in the process? Do the members regularly share information with each other and help each other build capacities? Are members still committed to the shared purpose? Are they still satisfied with their role in the initiative? Is everyone receiving the necessary support? Have reflections on outcomes and process revealed that some stakeholders were overlooked? If yes, how can they be involved? Ideally, the MMSP transforms from a single intervention into a community of stakeholders working towards the same goals within the mining industry. This would mean that an inclusive network is build that can outlast the platform if it is dismantled. The final products of phase 4 should include:

1. Regular evaluations
2. Knowledge and tools database
3. A sense of community around the shared purpose

5.3.5 Phase 5: Decommission – Reclaim

Once production comes to an end, a mine is closed. Nowadays, it is common practice that efforts are made to rehabilitate the site. As mentioned, MMSPs are intended as permanent structures, so 'closure' is not envisioned here as platform dismantling. Rather it refers to the completing of a design-implement-evaluate cycle. This would generally be followed by a progress report that includes an extensive evaluation of and reflection upon the past cycle of action. Based on the results hereof, important decisions must be made concerning the next steps of the MMSP. This includes reassessment of the vision, strategy, organisational structure, membership, etc. Following this, a process of reclaiming the platform should take place; the MSP is repositioned to take on the next challenge. Questions to be asked include:

1. How has the situation changed?

After the MMSP has completed its work package, the final results should be reported upon and communicated within the platform and beyond it; Has the MMSP reached its goal? If not, what has been achieved? What would be needed to still pursue the goal? What has prevented the goal from being reached? If a particular conflict has been mitigated, what was the role of the MMSP therein? And of the members? And how will stakeholders both within and outside of the platform benefit or suffer from the transformation? The answer to this overarching question is central in establishing platform legitimacy.

2. Is the design/strategy/purpose still appropriate?

Whether the goal has been reached or not, at this point the members must reflect on their strategies, the organisation of the platform, and the goal itself; Are all of these still appropriate moving forward? Perhaps the situation has been changed by external factors, such as the exit or introduction of new stakeholders, complicating initial plans. Perhaps a certain member has proven to lack the necessary capacities to lead the MMSP, calling for a reorganisation of the

platform. Or perhaps the platform has been so successful that certain goals have become obsolete. Having assessed such aspects, it should become clear what the MMSP needs to be successful (again) in the next cycle. For example, the platform may want to involve new members or seek out new partners to obtain (financial) resources. This also relates to the next question.

3. Is there potential for scaling the MMSP?

In its initial design, the MMSP may have chosen to focus on a sub-national level and can now consider to scale up to the national level. Or, if the platform was situated at the national level, it may consider decentralising. The MMSP may consider expanding its network either through new members, new partners or new endorsements. Importantly, members should also evaluate how to maintain and strengthen the existing network, to create a durable platform. For example, a more formal steering body may be desirable, if the initial organisation was loosely configured. However, care should be taken not to fix the MMSP to such an extent that there is no more space for members to experiment. Above all, the platform should remain an open an inclusive space, accessible to all. The final products of phase 5 include:

1. End-of-cycle progress reports
2. Sustainable platform
3. A mitigated conflict

In exploring what an MMSP could look like, this chapter applied lessons from land governance MSPs to the pitfall of mining in SSA, including the shortcomings of other multi-stakeholder initiatives. MMSPs have the theoretical potential to build trust, strengthen capacities, raise awareness, coordinate efforts and leverage support for and among mining stakeholders. This can help overcome hurdles to inclusive and sustainable development by creating a capacitated community of divergent stakeholders who collaborate towards a shared

goal. Yet, an MMSP would likely be challenged by power, skills and motivation differentials. Nevertheless, the *5-2-3* model can guide effective collaboration for mining conflict mitigation, by highlighting reflective practice and relationship-building.

6. Turning Conflict into Collaboration in Sierra Leone

This thesis has so far taken a theoretical approach to assess the challenges and opportunities a MMSP would face. Combined with existing MSP approaches, this led to the development of the *5-2-3* model. It is beyond the (temporal) scope of this research to individually initiate a MMSP and test the model. Moreover, this would be contrary to the ideals of inclusive development and local ownership underlying the MSP approach. To still examine practical applicability, this chapter analyses the potential for a MMSP in Sierra Leone. This relatively small African country has a rich but tainted mining history characterised by high-stakes conflict. In contrast to this legacy, the past decade saw Sierra Leone successfully host several land-engaged platforms. This begs the question: How could the MMSP approach be applied to the national mining context of Sierra Leone? To answer this question, this chapter builds upon stakeholder interview and survey findings, complemented by existing literature.

6.1 Sierra Leone: Geography and Demography

The Republic of Sierra Leone is a coastal country in West Africa. It consists of three provinces and one area surrounding the capital Freetown (figure 6). Its provinces consist of 12 districts and 149 chiefdoms (HRW, 2014). In 2021, Sierra Leone's population stood at approximately 6,8 million people (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021). The FAO (2020b) estimated that the rural population in 2018 was around 4,5 million, making it the majority. The population of Sierra Leone is generally young and growing, with most people living in the south and west of the country (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021). There are at least 10 ethnic groups spread across Sierra Leone, as well as a minority of foreigners from neighbouring countries, Europe and Asia. The Temne and Mende people are the majority at respectively 35.5% and 33.3% of the total population. More than three-quarters of Sierra Leoneans identify as Muslim. Around 20% identifies as Christian. Sierra Leone has been a recognised democracy since 1998 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021). Agriculture is the biggest GDP-contributing

industry in Sierra Leone (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021; IGF. 2021a). Around 66% of Sierra Leoneans practice small-scale agriculture (FAO, 2018). According to the CIA (2021), agricultural land made up 56% of total land use in 2018, whereas the FAO (2020b) places the number as high as 85% for the same year .

Figure 6

Map of Sierra Leone (WorldAtlas, 2021)

6.2 Inclusivity and Sustainability in Sierra Leone's Mining Sector

In 2019, the GoSL presented its 4-years *Mid-term National Development Plan* (MTNDP). The document attests to a development conceptualisation in which economic growth is central. Yet, it also highlights that this growth ought to be in line with the SDGs. Furthermore, the MTNDP presents an aspiration for inclusive growth, paying special attention

to the inclusion of women, youth and other marginalised actors. Importantly, it recognises Human Capital Development, i.e., investing in education, health care and social protection to enhance productive employment, as the main path towards poverty reduction. Several of the goals outlined in the MTNDP relate to natural resources management, including economic diversification, inclusive rural economies and environmental risk mitigation. To achieve these goals, the GoSL promotes decentralisation and local governance, and lists the needs for accountability, transparency and representation of all stakeholders. In direct regards to mining, the MTNDP states that: "The strategic objective is to improve the governance and management of the mining sector, including value addition for employment, poverty reduction, community benefit, environmental rehabilitation, and revenue generation" (GoSL, 2019, p. 90).

Achieving this vision would require a substantial transformation from the current state of mining in Sierra Leone. Minister for Planning and Economic Development Nabeela Farida Tunis, refers to Sierra Leone as "a stressed state" in need of a socio-economic and political reset (GoSL, 2019, p. iii). Natural resources mismanagement can be seen as a main contributor to the country's dire condition. Years of violent conflict have resulted in insufficient attention being paid to the governance of land and related resources (HRW, 2014; Mabikke et al., 2020; Yembilah et al., 2019). According to the World Bank (2019), Sierra Leone has made major progress over the last decades, but the weak governance of natural resources persists, especially concerning transparency and turning government revenue into development. This can also be observed for the mining industry. Look for example at this statement from one Sierra Leonean civil society representative:

> The mining sector is the most complex to understand in my country largely due to the lack of transparency and accountability, the secrecy and lack of community consent in mining contracts is stifling growth and development. My experience has been bitter due

> to violence and excessive force meted out by the state and local leaders on the ordinary people to keep them quiet (R).

The next sections detail how mining has contributed to or impeded growth and development, and how accountable, transparent and representative its management has been.

6.2.1 The State of Mining-led Growth and Development

Sierra Leone is rich in mineral resources and is particularly known for its bauxite, chromite, diamonds, gold, iron ore, rutile and titanium deposits, and to lesser extent columbite, ilmenite, platinum, tantalite and zircon (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021; GoSL, 2019). In 2018, Sierra Leone's economy grew by 3.8% and exports amounted to nearly 1.1 billion US dollar. The growth rate of industrial production was the third highest in the world (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021). At 77% of the total, mined commodities are the majority of Sierra Leonean exports and thus form the foundation of growth in the country (Brightmore, 2020). Yet, the interviewees and survey respondents, most of whom represented CSOs, generally agreed that the current contribution of mining to inclusive and sustainable development is very low. This conviction was not rooted in inherent antagonism towards mining, as the majority also believed that mining could have a positive impact on inclusive and sustainable growth in Sierra Leone (R).

6.2.1.1 Responsible Production and Consumption

Sierra Leone's mining sector has failed to foster responsible production and consumption that reduces poverty, is free from violent conflict and does not harm the environment. Despite its natural riches, Sierra Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world (GoSL, 2019; Robert & Lavali, 2016). The UN World Food Programme (WFP, 2020) estimates that 53% of Sierra Leoneans live in poverty. Disparities between rural and urban populations are evident from 2018 statistics, which show that rural poverty is more than 30% higher than urban poverty (GoSL, 2019). After a decade of decreasing levels of undernourishment, the

period between 2014 and 2019 saw severe food insecurity rising slowly but steadily to affect up to 63% of the population (FAO, 2020b; WFP, 2020). Child and maternal mortality are exceptionally high, limiting the population growth. Among the nevertheless majority population of youths, about 60% is unemployed (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021). These statistics suggest that the (excessive) contribution of mining to national revenue has not been used to alleviate living conditions of the Sierra Leonean people.

Furthermore, in Sierra Leone's recent history, mining has been the harbinger of destruction rather than development. Accounts of the country tend to emphasise the blood-diamond-funded civil war that took place between 1991 and 2002. This thesis will not elaborate upon the actual role of mining in that conflict, as a step away from this narrative is overdue (Flores, 2018). Yet, its impact is hard to ignore. According to one private sector respondent, the stigma of blood diamonds continues to stain Sierra Leone's mining sector, in particular ASM. This affects the sector in numerous ways, e.g., through investors' unwillingness to engage with ASM for fear of complicity in illegal activities (R). Yet, while Sierra Leone has improved greatly, violent conflict still plagues the mining sector. This was observed by Human Rights Watch (2014), who wrote a report mentioning several cases of lethal confrontations between LSM and mining-affected community members.

Environmental damage caused by mining was deemed a major problem by two CSO representatives. One respondent noted the non-sustainability of mining in Sierra Leone, stating that:

> We are giving out the resources we have and destroying our own natural resources, because the environment is destroyed. It is going to take ages, decades for it to come back to its normal state. We are losing so much (R).

Indeed, the environmental impact of mining is Sierra Leone is notable, especially for ASM. Air and water pollution are common place, although mercury contamination is relatively low

due to the use of other amalgamation methods (Masseroli, 2020). Sierra Leone has also signed the Minamata Convention on Mercury (IGF, 2021a). Still, water pollution is profound and has resulted in competition over fresh water sources. Other common problems are deforestation and soil erosion (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). Likewise, rehabilitation of mine sites is low, especially for ASM (Masseroli, 2020). Of particular danger to Sierra Leone is mining's climate impact. The processing of increasingly remote and lower-grade ore deposits will require more energy and produce more waste. Considering that Sierra Leone is already among the most climate change vulnerable countries, mitigating this transboundary impact is critical for all stakeholders.

Yet, Sierra Leone has been putting measures in place to ensure that mining licences are only awarded to responsible companies. For example, one interviewee, a LSM representative, mentioned the risk of licence loss if the company would not comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's standards (R). Furthermore, Sierra Leone partakes in a high number of international conventions protecting human rights and the environment (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021; IGF, 2021a; HRW, 2014). Thus, small but vital steps towards responsible production and consumption are being made.

6.2.1.2 Export Diversification and Fiscal Redistribution

The development argument for mining in Sierra Leone has centred around the industry's contribution to economic growth and national revenue generation. Three respondents also listed government revenue, e.g., through taxes, as the main benefit from mining (R). Yet, these developments have not been fully inclusive and sustainable, as the redistribution of wealth is weak and the dependence on mining disproportionate.

The government earns from mining through taxes, royalties, licenses and leases. During the civil war all LSM operations were shut down and many mine sites were ravished. Yet, the sector recovered to become the main export industry in little more than ten years. Between

2009 and 2013, foreign investment in Sierra Leone's mining sector peaked alongside a general increase in miner's productivity. Consequently, more than 80% of national export revenues was derived from this sector. Iron ore has been at the centre of this boom, accounting for more than half of mining-derived GDP contributions, exports, and government revenue (GoSL, 2019). Despite these numbers, the importance of mining to Sierra Leone has been called disproportionate to its ability for revenue generation (Dieckmann, 2011). Indeed, the contribution to national GDP has generally remained below 20%, and has been falling steadily since the 2013 spike (GoSL, 2019). Four respondents also mentioned that national revenue from mining was insufficiently reinvested in communities (R).

As elsewhere in SSA, several practices minimize mining's contribution to national revenue. Tax evasion by companies was not explicitly mentioned by the respondents, although two did refer to irresponsible conduct on behalf of companies (R). Contrarily, the literature agrees that Sierra Leone's fiscal regime allows for tax evading practices (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). In 2010, transfer pricing, false invoicing, thin capitalisation, ring fencing, manipulation of permanent establishment regulations, and the use of tax havens were found to be widespread among the major mining companies operating in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the government had been granting tax concessions on an individual basis (Dieckmann, 2011). Companies have even been found to overstate community development spending to reduce taxation (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019).

In 2019, ASM was still responsible for the total of gold exports and half of diamond exports. This makes the sector of critical importance to Sierra Leone's economy, although national benefits are limited due to largely informal practice (GoSL, 2019; Masseroli, 2020). Illicit mining was also mentioned by respondents as one of the ways trough which mineral wealth did not accrue to governments and hence could not be distributed among society (R). The government struggles to curb smuggling due to the ease of transporting pocket-sized

commodities like gold and diamonds across porous borders. As mentioned LSM are also involved in illicit practices that reduce taxability (Dieckmann, 2011; GoSL, 2019). Respondents also perceived greed and corruption as obstacles to equitable wealth sharing (R). The high level of corruption has been acknowledged by the government (GoSL, 2019). Notable actors in such affairs have been local chiefs, who often hold excessive power. Power abuses are not uncommon, particularly in the lucrative diamond trade (Maconachie, 2009). Unsurprisingly, Sierra Leone is among the highest scoring countries globally on corruption and bribery (HRW, 2014; IGF, 2021a).

Finally, economic diversification is low in Sierra Leone. Since 2010, the country has disproportionally depended on its mineral exports. Especially its dependency on iron ore has resulted in various crises related to slumps in global prices (GoSL, 2019). The detrimental impact of global commodity depreciations on Sierra Leones mining sector and broader economy was also mentioned by one private sector representative and one representative from an international organisation. Likewise, the dependency on foreign companies was deemed problematic by a representative of academia. According to the latter, Sierra Leone suffers from lacking national ownership of mining operations and lacking national capacities to do so (R). This also relates to problems with productive employment, discussed in the next section.

6.2.1.3 Productive Employment and Social Protection

Employment as a positive result of mining was mentioned by two respondents (R). About 300,000 Sierra Leoneans are dependent on LSM, a tenth of whom is directly employed in mining. Yet, it is contestable to what extent the sector has resulted in productive, safe and secure employment and has exposed people to the benefits of social protection. In fact, mining has created relatively limited employment in Sierra Leone and its trickle-down effect is likewise poor (GoSL, 2019). While the government has imposed legal measures to ensure more local sourcing of labour, according to the LSM representative compliance is not easy because:

> In Sierra Leone … we have serious challenges when it comes to skill sets, when it comes to acquiring skills for certain positions, especially because mining operations are evolving … nationally, we do not have the skills (R).

This statement signals that increasing automation in LSM is also affecting Sierra Leone's labour force. ASM, on the other hand, is recognised for its positive contribution to employment. More than 100,000 Sierra Leoneans are believed to be ASM miners, most of which practice informally. Yet, ASM miners are facing increasing obstacles to obtaining licences relative to LSM. This has been linked to the costs associated with the nowadays mandatory Environment Impact Assessment (GoSL, 2019; Masseroli, 2020).

The mining boom of the early 2010s, which saw an increase in workers' productivity, was not accompanied by improved livelihoods of miners (GoSL, 2019). Whether in ASM or LSM, miners face unfair wages, bad working conditions and insecure employment (Maconachie, 2014). This was confirmed by a representative from a diamond buying company, who stated that the ones benefitting from mining are not the miners but the middlemen (R). Still, a study among youths employed in LSM and ASM diamond mining found that miners considered themselves lucky to be employed at all (Maconachie, 2014). This attitude may allow for the continued exploitation of miners desperate to secure a livelihood.

Marginalised groups face additional employment challenges and are insufficiently protected from abuse. The share of female miners in Sierra Leone's ASM sector is relatively low. Nevertheless, they are still disproportionally affected and exposed to gender-based violence (Masseroli, 2020). The differential impact of growth and development on women versus men is reflected in Sierra Leone's Gender Development Index; at 0.884 the country has among the greatest gender-based human development disparities globally (UNDP, 2020). On a more positive note, the diamond-buyer representative noted that child and forced labour are relatively low in Sierra Leone (R). Yet, child labour is recognised to still be practiced in ASM

(Masseroli, 2020). Overall, mining has provided employment, but not in an inclusive and sustainable manner.

6.2.1.4 Health, Community and Landscape Development

The negative externalities of mining in Sierra Leone extend to health risks and lacking community and landscape development. The health impact of mining is closely linked to its environmental externalities. Water pollution is a major problem causing several diseases. A study of health impacts of gold mining in Sierra Leone, found that people living close to rivers are exposed to dangerous metals that accumulate in the riverbank soil and in the fish they consume. The danger was especially high for children, for whom it was estimated that 1-in-417 up to 1-in-20 for certain locations, would likely develop cancer due to heavy metals exposure. A point of concern is that the study did not even measure metal concentrations in river water itself, which is used by communities for everything from drinking to bathing (Marcantonio et al., 2021). Likewise, Air pollution has caused respiratory problems. Lacking rehabilitation has resulted in water-filled pits that form drowning-hazards and mosquito breeding grounds. The degradation of farmland has also affected food supplies, which alongside fish stocks' contamination exacerbates food insecurity (Masseroli, 2020). For women, additional health impacts have included exposure to sexually transmitted diseases (Masseroli, 2020).

Contaminated drinking water, child labour and forced resettlement are some of the ways in which mining in Sierra Leone continues to breach basic human rights (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). One civil society representative elaborated upon the damaging impact of relocation, noting that it can foster conflict, especially when a community is relocated to an already occupied area. Issues of land ownership and cultural differences can lead to clashes between new and native inhabitants. People have also felt betrayed by companies, for example as they were provided low-quality housing (R). As mentioned in

chapter 4, failure in these areas is not always intentional. The LSM representative seemed genuinely distraught that for "all we have been spending on, millions and billions of Leones, we have not seen any tangible developments" (R). When it comes to other infrastructural developments, mining seems to have had little significant impact as Sierra Leone remains among the ten least infrastructurally developed countries in SSA. According to the government, its ability to structurally invest in public services like infrastructure has been stunted by the fact that revenue derived from mining is instable and unpredictable (GoSL, 2019). Concluding, in Sierra Leone mining's contribution to community and landscape development is disappointing, and its health impact alarming.

6.2.2 The State of Mining Governance

According to interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch (2014), common Sierra Leoneans perceive powerful actors like politicians, paramount chiefs and LSM as profiting of the country's mineral wealth, at the expense of the population. This sentiment was also present among the civil society representatives who partook in this study. Generally, the respondents perceived the current state of mining governance as poor to very poor. National government was generally blamed for perpetuating this, although some did perceive a strong commitment on behalf of the current government to improve the situation. Critical herein is the ongoing review of the Mines and Minerals Act (MMA), which has guided mining governance since 2009. Despite this promising development, there was still a sense that progress is slow and that Sierra Leone is lacking behind other (African) nations (R).

6.2.2.1 Accountability

How responsive has mining governance been to the needs of the Sierra Leonean people and their environment? Who has been taking responsibility for mitigating conflict and how? State accountability has been seen as a general issue in Sierra Leone (Robert & Lavali, 2016). In chapter four, it was found that non-accountability in mining governance is fostered by the

economic growth imperative, power inequalities and lacking capacities. So how has Sierra Leone fared in these aspects?

Starting with the question of who is responsible, the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources is in charge of drafting mining legislation and policies. Since 2012, implementation has been delegated to the National Minerals Agency (NMA), which acts as a partially independent government agency (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019). Other relevant government bodies are the Corporate Affairs Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, Local Content Agency, National Revenue Authority, and Sierra Leone Investment & Export Promotion Agency. The responsibility for assuring community benefits from mining operations lies with local governments and chiefdom administrations (GoSL, 2019). The interview and survey respondents were sceptical about those in charge of decision-making. Only one respondent expressed enthusiasm about the NMA. Others were less optimistic. One civil society representative complained that the NMA is not responsive to local contexts, pursuing a national agenda even where that may not be appropriate. The same respondent noted that the NMA served the interests of companies rather than communities (R). Both accusation indicate critical obstacles to one of the NMA's main task; the facilitation of CDAs (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019). Interestingly, one private sector respondent also expressed dismay with the NMA's lack of support in contesting what the company considered unjust policies. They also complained about the antagonistic treatment the company has received, referring to the multiple government agencies that monitored operations and the constant threat of licence-loss to "a more responsible company" (R). While a burden to the company, this monitoring effort can be seen as a sign of government accountability. A more positive review was also given by an international organisation's representative, who stated that "at the end of the day, the government would not like to develop a policy that is not in the interest of the entire constituency" (R). Yet, as has been seen before, complexity and divergent objectives can limit

the practical impact of well-intended measures.

The government has been fixated on economic growth and attracting foreign mining investment. The lenient fiscal regime that benefits companies can be seen as result hereof. In pursuit of middle-income status, the government has failed to protect the human rights enshrined in its constitution and the various international regulations it a signatory to (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). An illustration of the advancement of economic growth over inclusive development is given by the legal obligation of companies to pay into CDFs. Companies are namely only obliged to contribute 0.01 % of profits to CDFs – notably less than the 1% initially suggested by policy makers. Government has accused a typing error of causing the discrepancy, but activists consider it a deliberate act of favouritism to attract more investment (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019). At times, the MMA also enshrines preferential treatment of LSM over ASM. For example, ASM miners are obliged to gain explicit consent from landowners. Contrarily, LSM and smaller mining companies are only required to inform or consult landowners (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020).

Besides government, mining companies in Sierra Leone have adopted development responsibilities. Yet, several of their interventions have been exposed as green-washing, serving only to obtain a SLO (Maconachie, 2014). Nevertheless, the private sector representatives interviewed for this thesis showed sincere development interest. The diamond-buying company had invested in a holistic training program to improve working conditions for ASM miners, and ensure fair pricing. In doing so, they had involved international NGOs as well as local CSOs, all of whom would not have cooperated where green-washing was suspected. Likewise, the mining company's representative listed a long number of initiatives, mostly community infrastructural projects. Yet, they also mentioned several implementations obstacles. The LSM respondent was very aware that the company was still disappointing community members and mentioned employment as a particularly difficult domain to please

communities. As stated, “the company cannot employ everybody at the same time” (R). The inability and perhaps unwillingness of companies to reach high expectations, has led some to contemplate whether mining companies can ever fully meet the needs of communities – and if they should be expected to take on this burden. After all it is the nature of the capitalist private sector to pursue profit rather than development (Maconachie, 2014). Yet, even if companies in Sierra Leone are not responsible for development, they may still be expected to take responsibility for mitigating company-community conflicts and environmental externalities.

Different notions of accountability and responsibility became clear when the mining company representative complained that they were charged for using water from a nearby stream (R). Such perspectives are endorsed by the MMA, which can be vague in its prescriptions, for example in granting companies the right to use water as seen fit (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). CDAs and the corresponding CDCs and CDFs can clarify expectations. They were noted by three respondents as positively impacting negotiations between companies and communities. Even the mining company representative mentioned that the CDC has greatly improved development efforts (R). The literature suggests that this relatively positive role in fostering accountability, is due to the fact that CDAs are legally obliged in Sierra Leone (as opposed to CSR programs) (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019). Yet, two respondents were sceptical about the true inclusivity of CDCs, arguing that companies have disproportional (financial) power within them (R). Likewise, Conteh and Maconachie (2019), argued that ordinary citizens remain underrepresented in CDAs and that structural inequalities weaken the potential for a significant development impact. This was partially confirmed by the interviewed LSM representative, who stated that the company sometimes refuses to give money for certain projects. Whilst the reasoning for this showed some accountability – rejected projects were taught to only serve the “selfish” interests of its proponents and not the broader constituency – it indicated that companies indeed a certain veto

power (R).

Such arguably undue power has also been observed among government and traditional authorities. By law, mining companies must adhere to FPIC. Yet, chiefdom committees and the Minister of Mines have the power to respectively dismiss the need for obtaining consent and undo withheld consent (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). Overall, whether LSM, politicians, or chiefs, those benefiting from the current governance of mining are well-disposed to maintain the status quo (Maconachie, 2008). As elsewhere in SSA, civil society is increasingly limited in demanding accountability of such powerful actors (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). This aggravated by lacking capacities among CSO and community members. A 3-year project to strengthen civil society found that CSOs are fragile, lack basic abilities, are poorly organised and have limited coordination among them. The study also found that constitutional rights of civil society, e.g., their freedom of assembly and protection from arbitrary arrest, are not always enforced (Robert & Lavali, 2016).

Such inconsistencies between law and practice may follow from lacking capacities for successful implementation and monitoring of (development) policies (GoSL, 2019). One respondent noted that despite many legislative improvements, challenges persist in the implementation of progressive policies and the monitoring hereof (R). Lacking financial capacities is a similar problem. As one LSM representative noted about receiving government support during COVID-19: “Government is also cashed up. They cannot give [pandemic] support. In fact, it is making life more difficult for the mining companies in terms of increasing tax” (R). Contrary to this statement, the literature accuses lacking capacities of granting mining companies more leeway. For example, environmental protection policies are weakly enforced due to insufficient government monitoring capacity, but also due to the power of chiefs who are easily swayed by companies not to call for environmental impact assessments (Marcantonio et al., 2021). Furthermore, CSR projects are not subject to state oversight, reducing the

likelihood of tangible positive impact (Maconachie, 2014). Likewise, Sierra Leone imposes banal penalties on companies that breach the MMA. Most are monetary penalties that would not significantly affect TNCs (Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). Since 2018, the NMA has been revoking licenses of underperforming mining companies, but this is restricted to those in the exploration phase (GoSL, 2019). Another case of failed implementation concerns the transparency network envisioned in the MMA, but yet to be executed (GoSL, 2019). This brings us to the next section.

6.2.2.2 Transparency

Are all stakeholders able to access and review decision-making processes in mining governance? In Sierra Leone this is often not the case. Lacking transparency was previously said to follow from incomplete information sharing, the role of non-government actors, and obscure regulatory systems. All of these challenges were mentioned by the respondents as obstacles to inclusivity and sustainability in the mining sector (R).

Some respondents referred to a culture of secrecy and silencing on behalf of company and government stakeholders (R). This would imply that information is not shared on purpose. Whether purposefully or not, the unavailability of crucial information is recognised in the MTNDP as impeding more inclusive governance (GoSL, 2019). An example would be geological data, often possessed by companies, but lacking for other stakeholders. This can lead to skewed negotiations, especially when companies are not subjected to standard models and rules, but are free to negotiate mining development agreements (GoSL, 2019; Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). The MTNDP also highlights difficulties in assessing data validity (GoSL, 2019). This can be a problem in e.g., tracing ASM-mined commodities to their origins, as most data on these goods is only collected upon export (Masseroli, 2020). According to two respondents, a major source of "accusations [and] counter-accusations" is lacking knowledge on money flows. Especially for mining-affected

communities, not knowing how and how much money was returned to them, e.g., through CDF's can result in feelings of deprivation (R).

Chapter 4 argued that the presence of powerful customary authorities can also obscure the mining governance landscape through the bypassing of official decision-making pathways. In Sierra Leone, the authority of paramount chiefs in mining governance is undeniable. Their power derives from Sierra Leone's colonially inherited dual tenure system, consisting of the ill-fit 'British' statutory land tenure system and uncodified customary law. In simple terms, all land outside Freetown is under the customary rule of paramount chiefs (Mabikke et al., 2020). This system is considered outdated and undemocratic (Anonymous, personal communication, February 16, 2021). Despite the introduction of the updated National Land Policy in 2017, customary land rights are still insufficiently regulated (Cartier & Bürge, 2011; FAO, 2018; Yembilah et al., 2019). Consequently, decision-making and conflict mitigation occurs in an ad hoc and arbitrary manner. Land investors often make direct verbal deals with community representatives. These deals have no legal basis, resulting in land acquisition without promised compensation. Local elites holding legal custodianship over rural land can take advantage of lacking legislature by making self-serving land deals without community consultation (FAO, 2018, Mabikke et al., 2020). As in the case presented by Luning and Pijpers (2017), companies appear to recognise the centrality of paramount chiefs in local governance. Both private sector respondents noted how chiefs are their main point of consultation with local communities. The mining company representative stated that chiefs constitute the main communication channel through which the company receives and responds to complaints (R). The role of chiefs in mining governance is an issue of both transparency and accountability since it places great responsibility on the traditional authorities to manage mining.

The overlap between legal and customary institutions can also be found in the idea of

ownership, which was highlighted by four respondents as a major problem in Sierra Leone's mining governance (R). Particularly important is the claim upon mineral wealth by government and rural communities. Whilst sub-soil resources legally belong to the state, local communities often express sovereignty over them. Consequently, they feel entitled to reap the benefits of mineral exploitation (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019; Maconachie, 2014; Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). According to one civil society member, this is why smuggling is pervasive. When it comes to mineral wealth there is little sense of 'common good', which makes people less inclined to pursue formal transactions that can be taxed by the government (R). As mentioned in chapter 4, this sense of ownership also explains why people practice ASM on LSM concessions. Beyond ASM, local communities expect to be consulted and receive renumeration in line with their ownership-status when external companies mine within their locality. Companies, on the other hand, will often recognise the state as rightful owner and thus as their main point for consultation and renumeration (in the form of taxes, royalties, etc). This mismatch is likely to foster grievances as communities persistently feel neglected or betrayed. Again, this as issue of transparency and accountability. If ownership is unclear, ascribing accountability can be challenging.

Even without customary institutions obscuring the governance landscape, the numerous formal bodies, guidelines and standards create a complex management environment. This was detailed by one CSO and one private sector respondent. The former indicated that:

> There are so many instruments around the extractives sector, which you have to understand and be able to relate to your own country, even within your own setting there are so many, many stages, to understand all of them from contract to concession … all of these are so many, many, many documents … this makes it very challenging (R).

As previously mentioned, there are several ministries, departments and agencies involved in mining governance. Overlapping mandates have fostered an environment of competition rather than collaboration. Likewise relevant legislations tend to overlap, and new policies rarely take into account existing frameworks (GoSL, 2019). As observed by the above quoted CSO representative, further complicating the matter is that laws change on a regular basis (R). The lack of coordination is not only found on the national level, but also extends to local and customary authorities and their interrelations (GoSL, 2019).

Yet, Sierra Leone has striven to improve transparency in the mining sector. According to the representative from an international organisation, the MMA that is currently under review contains more "transparency-sensitive" laws (R). The country has also seen several initiatives that promote transparency, such as the Sierra Leone EITI. Yet, in 2009, Maconachie, questioned what impact the EITI would have, given that access to transparently published information would not directly mean that CSOs could use it to hold the state and LSM companies accountable. Following the persistence of obscure practices, this question remains valid.

6.2.2.3 Represenation

Finally, are all stakeholders and interests equitably represented in Sierra Leonean mining governance? According to the respondents the answer is no, with community voices being the least represented in decision-making (R). Lacking accountability and transparency contribute to under- and mis-representation. As mentioned in chapter 4, other causes are within community differences, lacking awareness, and arbitrary terminology.

Power imbalances within communities challenge holistic representation. Community representatives are often still members of the privileged class (Maconachie, 2010). For example, one CSO respondent noted how nearly all positions of power are held by men. Consequently, women are neither consulted nor considered in negotiations. Affirmatively, all

but one survey respondents rated the representation of women in mining governance as very poor (*1/5*), even when community representation itself was rated higher. The divergent response still rated female representation as poor (*2/5*) (R). This translates to the national level, where women have generally been neglected in policy reviews surrounding natural resources (Mabikke et al., 2020; Yembilah et al., 2019).

Overall, Sierra Leoneans face several challenges to acquiring and understanding policy information, which limits their possibility to engage in decision-making (Robert & Lavali, 2016). On average adults have undergone 3.7 years of schooling and illiteracy among those above 15 is estimated at 43-57% of the population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021; UNDP, 2020). Women are less likely to receive education beyond the primary stage. In terms of communication, only 9% of the population has access to internet (UNDP, 2020). These factors contribute to lacking awareness of ongoing land deals and land rights, which may impede community members from demanding accountability (FAO, 2018; Yembilah et al., 2019). An example of failed representation impeding the success of a development initiative is the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF). This project was meant to ensure that diamond-exports revenue was re-invested in diamond-communities. While the fund has been used accordingly, there have also been concerns over abuse. This abuse was said to result from lacking transparency, lacking community awareness of the fund, and lacking community participation in decision-making as to how the money was to be spend. In turn, this may have been the result of lacking (government) monitoring of the management of the DACDF (Maconachie, 2010).

Finally, the problem of arbitrary terminology also affects the inclusivity of mining governance. One example can be found in CDA legislation. Both small and large scale mining companies are only expected to draft CDAs with primary host communities. This description allows companies to neglect other communities that they do not deem ‘primary’, despite the

impact mining might have there (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019; Mebratu-Tsegaye, Toledano & Thomashausen, 2020). These intricacies of representation have made mining governance in Sierra Leone less than inclusive, thereby also limiting sustainability.

6.3 The MMSP Potential

The analysis of mining in Sierra Leone shows that conflict is complicated by intertwined problems and causes. There are several competing interests, but also indications of a willingness among stakeholders to collaborate, stunted by miscommunication and lacking capacities. As shown in previous chapters, the MSP approach is a good fit for mitigating complex conflict in natural resources management. This would suggest that there is potential for an MMSP to be successful in Sierra Leone. The interview and survey findings support this. Six out of eleven respondents, most of whom were already familiar with the general MSP approach, foresaw high to very high demand for such a platform. Seven explicitly mentioned that a MMSP could have a high to very high impact on improving mining governance. This included a respondent who only saw a medium-level demand. Likewise, seven respondents explicitly indicated that the organisation they represented would join such a platform. Those that did not mention this had not been asked to indicate their willingness, yet for all but one their willingness could be deduced from their enthusiasm. The exception was the mining company, who indicated a preference for existing communication channels. There was no respondent who fully rebuked the potential of a MMSP (R).

6.3.1 Experience with the MSP Approach

The fact that several respondents were already familiar with MSPs is not surprising as Sierra Leone hosts several platforms concerned with natural resources governance. At the national level, the VGGT platform has significant governmental backing and involvement of land-related ministries. According to the FAO (2020a), the platform has engaged over 300 stakeholders and has led to greater recognition and protection of land rights while also

mitigating conflicts and curbing corruption. A noteworthy achievement of the MSP has been its engagement of the normally reluctant private sector, and the consequent reduction in company-community conflict. FAO (2020a) noted direct access to ministry officials as one of the incentives for agribusiness to participate actively in the platform.

Another land governance MSP is the LfL platform. Whilst the initiative derives from and is supported by WHH, the platform itself is run by five CSOs: Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD), United for the Protection of Human Rights, Community Empowerment for Poverty Alleviation, Partners Initiative for Conflict Transformation, and Sierra Leone Network on the Right to Food. The MSP focuses on land rights and food security (Land Portal, 2020). Whilst not the focus of the platform, several of the CSOs are also involved in mining advocacy. Especially the leading organisation, NMJD, is well-known for its work on extractives. NMJD also hosts the Natural Resource Governance and Economic Justice Network Sierra Leone (NaRGEJ), a CSO network and advocacy platform on extractives that has been closely involved in reviewing the MMA (Kamara, 2021).

Furthermore, Sierra Leone is a compliant member country of the EITI, meaning that it currently upholds the initiative's standards to a satisfactorily level (IGF, 2021a). It was accepted as a member in 2008, but was temporarily suspended following a first report that did not meet standards (HRW, 2014). This seemed to confirm worries that the country would lack the abilities for regular monitoring (Maconachie, 2008). Yet, nowadays Sierra Leone is one of the (few) countries where CSOs have been able to effectively demand greater transparency and accountability through the EITI (Gruzd et al., 2018).

Another interesting multi-stakeholder effort in Sierra Leone followed from implementing the KPCS on a regional level across the Manu River Union. The KPSC itself was introduced in Sierra Leone to curb the trade in blood diamonds. The scheme successfully increased the flow of legitimate diamonds. Yet, due to the large number of alluvial diamond

deposits and corresponding ASM, it has proven impossible to track every stone. The KPCS has also had limited impact on the livelihoods of miners who continue to work in dire circumstances for below-minimum wages. Referred to as 'The Regional Approach for the Mano River Union', the recent multi-stakeholder initiative acts as forum for dialogue and capacity building around diamond smuggling (IMPACT, 2019).

What these initiatives show is that the institutional space for a MMSP exists in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, whilst these platforms are relatively new, they have trained a workforce in the skills needed for platform maintenance. Finally, they provide valuable examples of best practices for MSPs in Sierra Leone.

6.3.2 How a MMSP Relates to Development Needs

Central to MMSPs is trust building through establishing a common goal, facilitating dialogue and promoting shared learning. This can prove decisive to transforming mining governance in Sierra Leone where stakeholders are distrusting and accuse each other of pursuing personal agendas (Conteh & Maconachie, 2019). As a durable structure, a MMSP can pursue long-term conflict mitigation, providing a more holistic perspective that outlast the development contracts between individual companies, communities and government. Simultaneously, it can oversee the practical implementation of mining legislation and provide more locally attuned development support. Besides vehicles for conflict mitigation, the ability of MSPs to provide a space for knowledge exchange makes them instruments for human capital development. With a diverse set of members, MMSP-offered trainings raise awareness and build capacities among communities, but also among CSO, (local) government and private sector parties. As such they contribute to the MTNDP's goals on promoting skills for local level resource management, including the ability of the general public to demand accountability.

Overall, the respondents foresaw several improvements in governance through the MSP

approach. According to them, a MMSP could promote collaboration and communication among stakeholders, including the sharing of best practices (R). This could help in overcoming the present complexities caused by overlap between governing bodies and their different mandates. Likewise, one CSO representative thought that a MMSP could foster mutual understanding to overcome conflict, especially in negotiations with mining companies:

> If we have the government, civil society and the community come together and talk, then maybe we will see how some of these issues can be addressed, because if you go as an individual or civil society group, [companies] are not comfortable. But when we all sit together and talk on a particular goal … I think it is possible, if we have government, if we have the mining companies, to maybe see certain things that they do not see or they do not understand, so that they find an amicable way to tackle some of these problems (R).

Two respondents thought an MSP could improve monitoring of the sector (R). A key task could, for example, be the reviewing and monitoring of CDAs and CDCs. This would then promote up-to-standard practice. One CSO respondent even thought that better collaboration between stakeholders following MMSP engagement could make mining more lucrative (R). This infers that a MMSP provides return upon investment both in better industry conditions, but also in monetary terms. Whilst this should not be the objective, it is undoubtedly a strong argument in favour of platforms. Overall, a MMSP fits well with Sierra Leone's development needs and ambitions.

6.3.3 Challenges for a MMSP

Despite the potential, a MMSP would face several challenges in Sierra Leone. The dominant obstacles that can be expected are lacking willingness and lacking human and financial capacities. Based on the representatives' responses to the challenges they perceived

for a MMSP and the challenges they faced in their own organisations, the major hurdle would be national government's willingness to set up or collaborate in a platform. The international organisation' s representative mentioned that it can be difficult to engage senior government officials in voluntary initiatives. Additionally, one respondent noted that "government changes, and when it changes people have different perceptions," referring to the challenge of sustaining government cooperation across administrations. Yet, the same respondent also believed that it should be possible to convince government as other platforms has also received support and a MMSP would be "a platform we need" (R).

Interestingly, whilst CSO respondents were sceptical about mining companies, lacking willingness among private sector parties was only mentioned once as explicit obstacle to MMSP success. In fact, the two company representatives showed great investment in the platform cause. One even indicated willingness to join such a platform initiative (due to time restraints the other had not been explicitly asked about this). Still one civil society member was very straightforward when asked about the relation between companies and CSOs: "They hate us" (R). Naturally, antagonism would hamper the willingness to collaborate on which MSPs depend.

These willingness challenges are also closely linked to the challenge of maintaining motivation. In the experience of two respondents, from the private sector and civil society, progress on development initiatives can be very slow and results can be difficult to pinpoint. Momentum has also been lost due to the inability to reach agreements on development projects, as different parties pursue their own interests rather than the group interests. Closely linked to loss of momentum is the obstacle of lacking capacities to collaborate within a MMSP. This was observed mostly among local community members who are not directly engaged in mining. However, the LSM representative who noted that CSR projects had failed, also stated that more tangible impact was being achieved though the CDC, indicating that communities do

have the skills for transformative governance. Still, knowledge inequities can impede democratic decision-making processes. An academia representative specifically mentioned lacking technical knowledge on mining as problematic (R).

A third indicated challenge is funding. Interestingly, four respondents indicated that obtaining funds for the MMSP should be possible. Yet the challenge remained in acquiring enough funds, including funds to entice participation of all stakeholders (R). As previously mentioned, lack of financial compensation can lead to disinterest among stakeholders in higher positions. However, lacking funding can also disable participation, e.g., of members in distant regions with limited transport options (R). A possible solution to the latter challenge, is online platform activity. The respondents who were familiar with performing MSP-like activities online, were highly positive about this, noting especially how it allowed for broader participation (R).

A fifth significant obstacle to participation can be found within power dynamics. Loyalty to existing leaders was indicated as impeding people from supporting or engaging initiatives like a MMSP that challenges the status quo (R). This challenge could also be observed in the experiences of respondents and can be referred to plainly as fear. For example, one respondent who requested anonymity stated that "this government agency, you do not want them to know that somebody … is giving this kind of impression to a researcher" (R). Others were not necessarily afraid, but considered powerful stakeholders, particularly national government, guilty of purposefully silencing dissent. Furthermore, as has been explained, the greater technical and financial power of companies, particularly foreign-owned LSM, can impede levelled negotiations. Hope lies in the sincerity of development interest expressed by the private sector respondents in this study, and in the ability of civil society to present a united counterforce. Finally, power dynamics on the local level may form an obstacle to the participation of marginalised groups such as women. Yet, where gender was discussed, all

respondents showed great awareness. Since these were also the people interested in participating in a MMSP, there is hope that gender balance would not be neglected in such a platform. Keeping these challenges in mind, the next section envisions implementing the MMSP.

6.4 The MMSP in Practice

Now may be the best time for the initiation of a MMSP. As observed by the majority of respondents, the current MMA review offers a window for positive change (R). This may include an opportunity for granting the platform a legal basis, which could provide invaluable legitimacy. Besides increased governmental awareness, two respondents noted that awareness of the interplay between mining and development is also rising among the broader constituency. Furthermore, as observed by a private sector representative, successful CDA processes have led to less company-community conflict in the last year (R). If this development is mirrored in other communities, a critical trust-barrier to collaboration would be brought down. Besides timing, some suggestions can be made for organisational structure and membership.

6.4.1 Organisational Structure

When it comes to organisation, it can be considered beforehand on which level the MMSP should operate and whether it should be a stand-alone initiative. So far, this thesis has accentuated national-level MSPs. It is, however, also important to consider the benefits of local presence. As one respondent noted "mining is not done in the capital, it is done in communities" (R). Another respondent stated that local presence increases awareness and leads to greater reach among mining-affected communities. Yet, the experiences of respondents also showed that national-level initiatives have greater visibility and are perceived as more legitimate. This allows them to reach possible partners and supporters, and collaborate with powerful actors, importantly national government (R). A possible midway is the decentralisation approach in

which national level secretariat is informed by local level working groups. LfL Sierra Leone has successfully taken this approach, which has reportedly increased the sense of inclusivity of the initiative. However, it must be noted that a decentralised MMSP can be (even) more expensive to maintain (Anonymous, personal communication, February 16, 2021).

One respondent suggested that a MMSP should build upon existing structures (R). This should be simple as Sierra Leone is home to various platforms on natural resources that already touch upon issues relevant to mining governance. A MMSP could be integrated within the already decentralised LfL platform. Alternatively, if decentralisation is considered, building upon CDCs is recommended. Although not without flaws, CDCs were considered promising agents of change (R). However, the complexity of mining governance may also demand a more focused approach offered by a stand-alone platform. The respondent who had elaborated on the saturation of guidelines in mining, did not consider an additional platform as burdensome. Although other platforms exist, they indeed indicated that the very complexity of the mining sector allowed for another initiative:

> I think it will have added value. I do not think there is an issue having different platforms to address a particular theme, especially when the problems continue to compile. Maybe this one will speak to the issues that need to be addressed better (R).

6.4.2 Minimum Recommended Members

Following the *5-2-3* model, an MMSP should collaboratively perform a stakeholder analysis to uncover who should be involved in the initiative. However, it is possible to already list potential candidates. The suggestions in this section include actors mentioned by the interviewees and survey respondents, as well as those that recurred in the literature.

Whilst government was perceived as the least willing collaborator, the MMSP would achieve little without government participation. At a minimum, the Ministry of Mines and Minerals and the NMA should be represented. Furthermore, it is advised to have

representatives from the Corporate Affairs Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, Local Content Agency, National Revenue Authority, and Sierra Leone Investment & Export Promotion Agency, as well as their respective ministries. Including these actors will promote collaboration between government bodies and can help prevent mandate-based tunnel vision. Although not part of formal government, paramount chiefs cannot be overlooked (Maconachie, 2010). Therefore, the National Council of Paramount Chiefs should be represented at the national level, whilst local level platforms should aspire to have the respective chief or chiefdom committee among its members. This is already standard practice for CDCs and should thus be achievable.

Suggesting private sector members is trickier. As mines regularly change hands, e.g., due to insolvency, there are few stable private sector actors in Sierra Leone. According to the mining company representative, there are currently only three secure companies: Sierra Rutile Limited, Sierra Minerals Holdings Limited and Koidu Holdings (R). These are all foreign-owned LSM operators, yet, their relative stability makes them important participants in a national-level MMSP. Emerging companies may first collaborate at the local level, before they establish themselves as durable partners. This should include exploration companies, whose participation can ensure that the MMSP can address conflict along the full mining cycle. To achieve similar holistic coverage across the value chain, it is recommended to include dominant buyers. A worthwhile member would be GemFair, which acts both as diamond-buyer and provider of ASM trainings. It may prove more difficult to involve the numerous small to medium-sized mining companies, of which many are Chinese-owned.

Sierra Leone has a rich civil society scene, with several mining-engaged CSOs that are “always ready to engage” in platform initiatives (R). Individual CSOs may struggle to engage other stakeholders, but practice among land governance MSPs has shown that there is strength in numbers (Da Luz, 2021). Notable national CSOs that should be considered for membership

are NMJD, the NaRGEJ network, the National Advocacy Coalition on Extractives, Women on Mining and Extractives (WoME), Forum for Human Rights and Development, and the Partner Initiative for Conflict Transformation. Some of these are already collaborating in land-engaged platforms, which might prove valuable partners to a MMSP. Several relevant international CSOs and NGOs active in Sierra Leone include the Kimberley Process Civil Society Coalition, Transparency International and RESOLVE. Whilst not generally considered an NGO or CSO, the EITI should also be represented. Since community-representation through CSOs is not always sufficient, the most important stakeholder group to include are community spokespersons.

With the three main groups represented, the MMSP should also consider engaging academia and media. Sierra Leone has several universities whose alumni can provide useful (technical) input into decision-making processes. Among national media, the Association of Journalists on Mining and Extractives may prove a valuable addition. Several international research initiatives are also active in Sierra Leone. For example, Sierra Leone is member of the IGF. It is also one of the launch countries of the *Extractives Hub*, which hosts a major online knowledge database (Corneau, 2017b). All these actors would be value-adding members or partner of a MMSP.

In conclusion, this chapter has shown that Sierra Leone's mining governance requires transformation if the country wishes to realise its MTNDP. Economic diversification and fiscal redistribution are largely absent. Mining has introduced limited employment, accompanied by minimal social protection. Investment in health, community and landscape development has likewise remained subpar. Despite the progress that has been made across these areas, the governance of mining in Sierra Leone has failed to significantly reduce poverty, prevent conflict, and protect the environment. As such, while economic growth has been boosted, this has not been inclusive nor sustainable. Yet, there is reason to be hopeful as awareness of the

need for change is rising among stakeholders. A MMSP could be a helpful transformation tool for holistic decision-making, as was recognised by the majority of stakeholder representatives that participated in this study. The *5-2-3* model in particular will promote accountability, transparency and representation due to its focus on inclusive membership, stakeholder trust-building and continuous reflection. Furthermore, its 'slow' step by step approach can help in tackling the immense complexity of mining conflict in Sierra Leone.

7. Conclusion

This thesis sought to explore the potential of the MSP approach to promote inclusive and sustainable governance of mining in Sub-Saharan Africa. It followed Buckles and Rusnak's (1999) methodology for conflict resolution, consisting of conflict analysis and planned multiparty intervention. As such, it first described what inclusivity and sustainability entail in the governance of natural resources for growth and development. Using the well-researched example of land governance, findings suggest that inclusive and sustainable growth and development is reflected in responsible production and consumption, export diversification and fiscal redistribution, productive employment and social protection, and health, community and landscape development. Governance that promotes these standards is accountable, transparent, and representative. Unfortunately, the current governance of natural resources in SSA lacks inclusivity and sustainability. This is no less true for the governance of mining.

In exploring the state of inclusivity and sustainability in mining, this thesis performed a thorough literature review of the sector's challenges and opportunities. It found that despite many positive developments and initiatives aimed at regulating the sector, mining in SSA still fosters non-sustainable and non-inclusive economic growth. Mining governance is tainted by inadequate accountability, transparency and representation. Major power imbalances appeared as an exacerbating factor across the three domains. Existing initiatives, even those building on co-management principles, have generally failed to address mining conflict holistically.

Following this finding, the thesis continued to ask how the MSP approach could be employed. It found that the characteristics of MSPs complement the needs of mining-led development, particularly in creating trust between stakeholders and facilitating equitable dialogue. Yet, challenges were also identified. Taken into consideration the general structure for land-engaged MSPs and the mining sector's specific needs, the *5-2-3* model for a mining-engaged MSP (MMSP) was introduced. This model is 'slow-paced' in comparison to standard

MSP cycles, which allows for more reflection and the gradual formation of stronger partnership ties among stakeholders.

Finally, this thesis moved beyond theory by applying MMSPs to Sierra Leone. It first provided a conflict analysis using the analytical framework developed in the previous chapters. It then assessed the potential for a MMSP, based on the literature, interviews and survey results. Findings suggest that a MMSP could promote more inclusive and sustainable mining governance. Yet, this would not be without hurdles, the most important of which are lacking willingness among government and companies, and lacking capacities among civil society including mining-affected communities. The *5-2-3* model, could help overcome some of these challenges by maximising stakeholders' communication and collaboration.

Overall, this thesis has sketched a mostly negative image of the current state of mining in SSA. Yet, it is important to remember that this was not the objective. Rather, it has showed the challenges of mining governance in order to highlight the opportunities for inclusive and sustainable growth and development. As this thesis has shown, MMSPs, guided by the *5-2-3* model, constitute a promising avenue to this end. Complementing rather than substituting other development initiatives, the potential of MMSPs reinforces the notion that inclusivity and sustainability in mining is possible. The industry still has a long way to go, but there seems to be light at the end of the shaft.

7.1 Recommendations for Future Research

This study experienced limited participation from stakeholders in Sierra Leone's mining sector. Future research may expand the case study, building upon a greater number of local perspectives. Importantly, it should seek out community and government members, which this research failed to engage. Furthermore, other countries should be studied to understand if the potential for MMSPs remains significant across SSA, and possibly on a global scale. If a

MMSP is erected, based on the *5-2-3* or another model, longitudinal studies are advised to pinpoint challenges and opportunities.

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Appendices

Appendix A – Interview Template

1. Introduction
2. Explanation of the objective of this interview and the research
3. Explanation of agenda
4. Ask consent to be recorded
    - Start recording upon consent
5. Ask for a confirmation of informed consent
6. Q1: Could you introduce yourself and how you got engaged with the mining sector?
7. Q2: Context SLE
    - If you had only a few sentences to describe the state of mining in Sierra Leone, how would you describe it?
    - In general, how inclusive are policy debates surrounding mining?
    - Are you aware of any structures / initiatives that promote inclusive dialogue?
    - What are the remaining gaps?
8. Q3: General questions about represented organization
9. Q4: Organisation's engagement with stakeholders
    - How is your engagement with X?
    - Which challenges do you face in your engagement with X?
10. Q5: Prospective MSP debate
    - Are you familiar with MSP approach?
    - Do you think a national level multistakeholder platform could help in making the mining sectors more inclusive and sustainable?
    - Would your organization join such a platform?
    - What challenges would such an alternative face?

Appendix B – Survey

Underlined questions are branches. Portrayal of the question depended on the answer to the previous questions. For example, depending on the response to question 3, the participant would be redirected to the version of question 4 that corresponds to their answer.

Survey:

From Mining Conflict to Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration in Sierra Leone

A survey to scope the potential for engaging Sierra Leone's mining sector through the multistakeholder platform approach

* Required

Introduction and Informed Consent

Dear,

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this research on the potential of multi-stakeholder platforms to make the governance of mining in Sub-Saharan Africa more inclusive and sustainable.

For a number of years, the multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) approach has been successfully applied to land governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. MSPs promote dialogue and collaboration between stakeholders with divergent objectives, and in doing so, have the potential to reduce conflict and promote sustainable and equitable land use and governance. MSPs continue to prove their worth in the agricultural sector, but what is their potential in other areas like the mining sector?

This survey scopes the perspectives of mining stakeholders in Sierra Leone, to answer if and how MSPs could promote dialogue and collaboration among mining stakeholders. If you

agree to participate in this research, the information you provide may be used in my thesis for the MA African Studies at Leiden University. Depending on the quality of the final product, this thesis may be published. Please note the following considering your participation:

- Results of this survey will be anonymous
- You are free to withdraw your consent at any moment before this research is published
- Data will be subjected to peer review before being made publicly available
- Participation is not subjected to financial compensation

1. Do you give consent to the recording of your results and possible use thereof for my Master thesis? *

O No, I do not give consent

O Yes, I give consent

Relation to Mining

Mining refers both to large scale and artisanal or small scale (ASM) mining

2. Are you employed in mining? *

O No

O Yes, as an ASM miner

O Yes, as a miner employed by a mining company

O Yes, as an employee of a mining company but not a miner

3. In which group of stakeholders would you place yourself? *

Please choose the one you identify with most closely

O Civil Society

O Private sector

O Local government

O National government

O Academia

O Media

O Mine-affected community member, not active in the above mentioned sectors

O Other

4. Which community do you represent?

Please note that this question is optional, you may choose not to provide this information.

4. Which organisation or institution do you represent?

Please note that this question is optional, you may choose not to provide this information.

4.Which company do you represent?

Please note that this question is optional, you may choose not to provide this information.

4. Which department or governmental body do you represent?

Please note that this question is optional, you may choose not to provide this information.

Mining in Sierra Leone

Mining refers both to large scale and artisanal or small scale (ASM) mining

5. What do you consider the biggest problem(s) related to mining in Sierra Leone? *

6. What do you consider the greatest benefits related to mining in Sierra Leone? *

7. How would you rate the contribution of mining to sustainable development in Sierra Leone? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

8. How would you rate the contribution of mining to inclusive development in Sierra Leone? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

9. In general, how would you rate the current governance of mining? *

Governance refers to the public and private interactions undertaken to address challenges and create opportunities within society

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

10. How would you rate the transparency of mining-related governance? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

11. How would you rate the accountability of government in mining-related governance? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

12. How would you rate the accountability of the private sector in mining-related governance? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

13. How would you rate the accountability of civil society in mining-related governance? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

14. How would you rate the representation of communities in mining-related governance? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

15. How would you rate the representation of civil society in mining-related governance? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

16. How would you rate the representation of the private sector in mining-related governance? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

17. How would you rate the representation of women in mining-related governance? *

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

18. Do you think there is a potential to govern mining in a way that contributes to inclusive and sustainable development in Sierra Leone? *

O No, mining could never contribute to inclusive and sustainable development

O No, mining could contribute to inclusive and sustainable development but not in Sierra Leone

O Maybe, mining could contribute to inclusive and sustainable development but I am not sure if it will in Sierra Leone

O Yes, mining could contribute to inclusive and sustainable development in Sierra Leone

O I do not know

19. Are you aware of any initiative(s) to improve the governance of mining in Sierra Leone? *

If yes, please indicate which initiative(s)

Imagining a Multi-Stakeholder Platform

Multi-stakeholder platforms are initiatives that bring together stakeholders with divergent backgrounds over a sustained period of time. Their goal is to facilitate dialogue and build trust between stakeholders to mitigate existing conflict and promote future cooperation. Members of a multi-stakeholder platform are encouraged to share knowledge, and possibly other resources, in order to help and learn from each other. The platforms tend to be co-led by their members and will often have designated facilitators and organizational bodies such as a secretariat. Multi-stakeholder platforms are long-term investments that may require considerable funding whilst also requiring substantial time to deliver concrete results.

23. Were you familiar with the multi-stakeholder platform approach before undertaking this survey?

O No

O Yes

O Somewhat

24. Do you think there is a demand for engaging Sierra Leone's mining sector through the multi-stakeholder platform approach? *

O No

O Little demand

O Medium demand

O High demand

O Very high demand, negotiations are already taking place to engage the mining sector through the multi-stakeholder platform approach

25. Do you think there is a willingness among mining stakeholders to collaborate within a platform? *

O No

O Little willingness, some groups are willing other are not

O Medium willingness, most or all groups are willing but not greatly

O Great willingness but not among all stakeholder groups

O Great willingness among all stakeholder groups

26. Which stakeholder group(s) might not possess the necessary willingness? *

O Local communities, not directly engaged in mining

O Local communities, directly engaged in mining e.g. through ASM

O Civil Society Organizations

O Private sector

O Local government

O National government

O Academia

O Media

O Other

☐

27. Do you think mining stakeholders possess the necessary capacities to collaborate within a platform? *

O No

O Somewhat, some stakeholder groups possess some of the necessary capacities

O Reasonably, all stakeholder groups possess some of the necessary capacities

O Yes, but not all stakeholder groups possess all the necessary capacities

O Yes, all stakeholder groups possess all the necessary capacities

28. Which stakeholder group(s) might not possess the necessary capacities? *

O Local communities, not directly engaged in mining

O Local communities, directly engaged in mining e.g. through ASM

O Civil Society Organizations

O Private sector

O Local government

O National government

O Academia

O Media

O Other

☐

29. Do you think funding could be arranged for engaging Sierra Leone's mining sector through the multi-stakeholder platform approach? *

O No

O Not enough and it will be difficult

O Not enough but it can be arranged with no great difficulty

O Yes, but it will be difficult

O Yes and it can be arranged with no great difficulty

30. Can you think of a maximum of 3 challenges that engaging the mining sector through the multi-stakeholder platform approach might face? *

31. Can you think of a maximum of 3 opportunities for engaging the mining sector through the multi-stakeholder platform approach? *

32. Overall, do you think engaging the mining sector through the multi-stakeholder platform approach would contribute to more inclusive and sustainable mining-related governance? *

O No

O Little impact

O Medium impact

O High impact

O Very high impact

33. Do you think the community/organization/institution that you represent would be interested to join a multi-stakeholder platform that engages the mining sector in Sierra Leone? *

O No

O Yes

O Maybe

Thank You for Your Time!

34. Are there any additional comments you would like to make?

35. Do you give consent to be contacted for follow-up clarification concerning your responses to this survey? *

O No, I do not give consent

O Yes, I give consent

36. Please enter your name and email for follow-up clarification *

The information provided here is only for the purpose of follow-ups, it will not be shared in the thesis unless permission to do so has been granted at a later stage.

Appendix C – Overview of Participants

Participant	Name	Stakeholder group	Represented organisation
Interview			
1	Berns Komba Lebbie	Civil Society	Network Movement for Justice and Development / Land for Life Sierra Leone
2	Anonymous	International Standard-setting organisation	Sierra Leone Office
3	Anonymous	Private Sector	Mining company
4	Esther F. Kandeh	Civil Society	Women on Mining and Extractives
5	Anonymous	Private Sector	ASM Buyer
6	Ibrahim A. S. Bockarie	Civil Society	Network Movement for Justice and Development
Survey			
1	Anonymous	Civil Society	RESOLVE
2	Anonymous	Civil Society	Transparency International Sierra Leone
3	Anonymous	Civil Society	Forum for Human Rights and Development
4	Anonymous	Civil Society	Partner Initiative for Conflict Transformation
5	Anonymous	Academia	University

Appendix D – Informed Consent Form

Informed consent form during internship period:

This informed consent form is for interviewees participating in the research *From Mining Conflict to Multi-stakeholder Collaboration*.

Principle investigator: Samantha da Luz

Affiliated organizations: Collaborating for Resilience (CoRe), Leiden University

Background to the research

For a number of years, the multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) approach has been successfully applied to land governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. MSPs promote dialogue and collaboration between stakeholders with divergent objectives, and in doing so, have the potential to reduce conflict and promote sustainable and equitable land use and governance. MSPs continue to prove their worth in the agricultural sector, but what is their potential in other areas like the mining sector? By talking with the representatives of MSPs across Sub-Saharan Africa and mining stakeholders in Sierra Leone, this research seeks to answer if and how MSPs could promote dialogue and collaboration among mining stakeholders towards more sustainable and equitable practice.

This research consists of two parts:

- Part l: Scoping the potential of engaging the mining sector through MSPs
    - Aims to uncover the needs, challenges and opportunities for (further) engaging the mining sector in Sub-Saharan African countries with existing MSPs on land governance.
    - Research partially conducted for CoRe, an international non-profit change initiative that provides services and resources to strengthen MSPs that deal with natural resource competition.

- Part II: Case study on Sierra Leone
    - Research conducted for Leiden University master's thesis that applies the results of part I to the specific context of Sierra Leone.

Your participation

You have been invited to participate in this research because of your noteworthy experience with the mining sector in Sub-Saharan Africa and/or Sierra Leone. If you agree to participate in this research, parts of the information you provide may be used as input for publications by CoRe for the purpose of probing new grounds for MSP engagement. Furthermore, the information provided by you will contribute to my thesis, which may be published depending on quality. Please note the following considering your participation:

- The information in this study will be used only for research purposes and in ways that do not reveal who you are if this would risk to harm your privacy and/or safety.
- You are free to stop participating in this research at any moment
- Data will be subjected to peer review before being made publicly available
- Participation is not subjected to financial compensation

If you agree, you will be asked to verbally express your consent in our upcoming meeting.

Thank you for your time!

Informed consent form post internship period:

This informed consent form is for interviewees participating in the research *From Mining Conflict to Multi-stakeholder Collaboration*.

Principle investigator: Samantha da Luz

Affiliated organizations: Leiden University

Background to the research

For a number of years, the multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) approach has been successfully applied to land governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. MSPs promote dialogue and collaboration between stakeholders with divergent objectives, and in doing so, have the potential to reduce conflict and promote sustainable and equitable land use and governance.

MSPs continue to prove their worth in the agricultural sector, but what is their potential in other areas like the mining sector? By talking with the representatives of MSPs across Sub-Saharan Africa and mining stakeholders in Sierra Leone, this research seeks to answer if and how MSPs could promote dialogue and collaboration among mining stakeholders towards more sustainable and equitable practice.

Your participation

You have been invited to participate in this research because of your noteworthy experience with the mining sector in Sierra Leone. If you agree to participate in this research, the information you provide may be used in my thesis for the MA African Studies at Leiden University. Depending on the quality of the final product, this thesis may be published.

Please note the following considering your participation:

- The information in this study will be used only for research purposes and in ways that do not reveal who you are if this would risk to harm your privacy and/or safety.
- You are free to stop participating in this research at any moment
- Data will be subjected to peer review before being made publicly available
- Participation is not subjected to financial compensation

If you agree, you will be asked to verbally express your consent in our upcoming meeting.

Thank you for your time!