

Thesis Title

How can Brazil, Japan and South Africa's ODA to Mozambique be compared?

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Introduction

The primary aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive case study of various international actors' interactions with Mozambique in terms of foreign aid policy and practice. Specifically, Brazil, Japan and South Africa are used for the basis of this comparison and the subsequent central research question is: How can Brazil, Japan and South Africa's ODA to Mozambique be compared? The selection of donor and recipient nations, as well as the comparative nature of this research question allows for a variety of sub-questions to be addressed that are of import in the field of contemporary developmental studies.

The sub-questions that arise in this study are: *"Is there a difference in effectiveness of aid between DAC and non-DAC actors"*, *"Do emerging donors represent significant divergencies in ODA practices?"* and *"Does interrogation of the Mozambique case shed light on the direction contemporary ODA is taking."* The manner in which these questions are addressed includes a brief interrogation of the relevance of these questions to the field as well as an analysis of the findings of the comparative study and degree to which they answer these sub-questions.

This study is composed of four main sections: the introduction, chapters 1-3 and a conclusion. The introduction continues with a literature review which explores the current debates in south-south cooperation, followed by the methodology. Following the introduction, chapter 1 consists of Brazil's ODA to Mozambique, with Chapters 2 and 3 providing South Africa and Japan's ODA approaches. The end of Chapter 3 will consolidate the differences in these donors' approaches. Finally, the conclusion will explore the implications and limitations of the case study.

i. Literature Review

The debates relevant to our research topic are heterogenous due to the large amount of conceptual, theoretical, and practical connotations to international development, donor recipient relations, project management and the international donor regime. This review will approach these aspects systematically through a conceptual scale that is relevant to contextualizing the actions of emerging and existing donors. First critical development perspectives will be explored, in relation to the current world order and donor regimes to place the actions of emerging donors in context. Next, the ongoing debates and implications of south-south aid are discussed. Finally, as we move on to actual project organization and implementation, the debates surrounding project management and the improvement of project quality will be presented.

The discussion of donor regimes and the discourse from a critical development perspective are crucial to understanding emerging donor practices, as the nature of emerging donors can be considered representative of some critical development theories. Critical development perspectives often challenge the donor regime and its Foucauldian interpretation. Furthermore, criticisms from a Marxist and postcolonial perspective challenge the same foundations. Development donor practices are considered to have gone through neoliberal and capitalist dynamics, with an initial embrace of the free market before the Washington consensus encouraged institutional reforms focused on increasing state power in supporting the

free market (Kay, 2018; Nilsen, 2018). Critics of the neoliberal practices highlight the way the world bank and organisations such as the DAC take centre stage by consolidating their approach to aid and this approach shifting to the added aid conditionality of neo-liberal reforms in the global south (Silvey and Rankin, 2011; Van Waeyenberge, 2018; Babones, 2018). Through this conditionality, recipient nations had little freedom to choose their own development trajectory and the Foucauldian perspective highlights this power dynamics and the power the global north holds over the global south. To elaborate, the export of the western form of modernity; a social formation that moved outwards from the global north has led to development at times being interpreted as a disciplinary mechanism (Munck, 2018). Furthermore, critics argue that ODA has become a tool for resource extraction, political influence and the enforcement of policies shaped by the global north, and through this, the DAC and the world bank became the hegemonic powers shaping what is considered developmental aid (Kragelund, 2018; Tharamangalam, 2018).

The emergence of new donors, and in particular BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South-Africa) has been argued to challenge this hegemonic power by providing a source of developmental aid that is not restricted by the guidelines set by the DAC and the global-north and less interventionist in nature. Through their increased engagement non-DAC donors are becoming more relevant in aid politics. Authors supporting the current aid regime challenge the emerging donors, as they undermine development policy through their aid programs, and these aid programs are said to be of the same resource extractive nature and are used to gain political power (Sato et al., 2011). In this line of thought, non-DAC donors can be considered a hinderance to the organized development aid approach and structural readjustment efforts since the Washington consensus and the idea that these donors' intentions are the same as the global north is proposed. A perspective that challenges the first part of this statement is based on observations that emerging donors such as BRICS often base their developmental aid on their own developmental experience (Kragelund, 2011). This could mean that in terms of development practice, a divergence from neoliberal practices will be unlikely, as it will serve as an extension of the same structural readjustment policies or even neo-colonial policies from previously colonized nations such as brazil (Garcia and De Sá, 2018). If the introduction of emerging donors is meant to represent change, either on the policy level or project level, the degree of change can be considered contentious, at least certainly on the policy level, if the policies remain the same. The divergence from north-south to south-south relationships would differ only in name and change would have to be apparent in project management and implementation.

Alongside the argument that non-DAC donors hinder structural reform in developing nations, the notions that an increased access to aid could create a debt-trap in recipient countries, and that inadequate investment appraisal might lead to unproductivity or inefficient capital projects are of relevance (Sato et al., 2011). This, alongside the possibility of tied aid loans and the possibility of emerging donors focusing on their own economic interest presents a challenge for the DAC. Kragelund (2011), however, challenges the notion that the non-interventionist stance is said to hinder structural reform, as the relative success of conditional western aid is doubtful and did not pose a direct relation to changing policies, nor to the improvement of health, safety and environmental standards. He furthermore notes that in the case of Brazil, South Africa, China and India, the actual amount of cash flows is still only a fraction of total aid flows. Whilst in modern times the amount of Chinese cashflows to

the continent has increased, the amounts and nature of Brazilian, South African and Indian aid to Africa so small that emerging donor aid can be considered complementary, rather than challenging the traditional DAC form of aid. The notion of emerging donor aid complementing that of traditional aid is also shown through research promoting the green transformation of Africa, and development cooperation aimed at targeting gender inequality and the environment, which are often mentioned as inadequate in the traditional model by critics (Sato et al., 2011; Gu et al., 2018; Nilsen, 2018).

The debate that emerging donors bring change is not limited to the impact it would have on current donor regimes and coordinated strategies towards development, but there are many arguments made for the efficiency of projects. Central to this is the postcolonial line of thought, wherein donors from the global south, having experienced colonialism, would be able to work on a relationship founded on a better understanding with the recipient nation whilst rejecting conditionality and power dynamics (Ika and Hodgson, 2014; Munck, 2018). Whilst the post-colonial argument has its merits conceptually, Ika and Hodgson (2014) provide a compelling debate on the blending of critical project studies and critical development studies. The study of projects gives insight on the way project implementation in international development can evolve, especially when conducted by emerging donor nations not tied to DAC norms and the universal validity associated with those by its members.

From the perspective of those criticizing the validity of the DAC projects capability to deliver change, there are three key lines of thought. The argument they are criticizing is based on the DAC and more specifically the world bank's historical tendency to base its project life cycle on the Baum cycle. This cycle which dictates world bank lending accommodates diversity in recipient circumstances but provides a common framework through which to handle a project. The methods of identification, appraisal, negotiation, execution, and 'ex-post' evaluation in devising a country wide strategy has been adapted by the world bank and many DAC members (Baum, 1978). This is considered the orthodox approach to projects and often considers cost-effectiveness and formal rationality. The postdevelopmental line of thought criticizes the accountability involved in projects if they are "promoting other objectives such as capitalism, imperialism and globalisation" (Rist, 2008 in Ika and Hodgson, 2014, Gudynas, 2018). The habermasian critical approach rather challenges the rationality in international development projects. To expand, projects aimed at change are being conducted in the form of instruments and tools made by policy makers. Through this, agency is limited and the roles of managers is diminished significantly, resulting in a fracture between the policy makers and the policy implementers. This debate again refers to power, but also suggests that the people implementing projects are significantly limited and are not given the freedom and tools to adapt to situations that can arise within the context of the project, resulting in a loss of effectiveness (Ika and Hodgson, 2014). The Foucauldian perspective, previously used as a way to challenge the donor regimes, can also challenge project level and reporting issues. Under this line of thought project reports are not objective as there are interest groups (NGOs, developmental agencies) that benefit from the status associated with successful project reports (Dar, 2008 in Ika and Hodgson, 2014). These criticisms of how projects are managed and evaluated propose inefficiencies in the DAC standard of monitoring and evaluation, and furthermore highlight the importance of good monitoring and evaluation as well as the managerial set up. The fact that emerging

donors are not limited by DAC standards does not, however, immediately mean that they are more efficient, but rather that they have the opportunity to develop monitoring systems that could surpass those of the DAC.

To summarize, most of the literature on south-south aid focuses on the possibility of change and how international development as a field can change. Emerging donors can employ effective capacity development by building on their own developmental experiences and can export the lessons they learned from these experiences. Likewise in project management emerging donors have more room for innovation and effective monitoring and evaluation practices. Negative change caused by emerging donors involves resource extraction behaviour and an overemphasis on their national economic interest, possibly through public-private partnerships. The benefits of non-interventionist approaches are contentious as it is said to hinder neo-liberalist democratic reforms whilst many critical authors are of the opinion that these reforms are not ideal to begin with and nations should be given more room to employ protectionist measures (Chang, 2002).

ii. Methodology

This study will approach the issue as a comparative case study. Arguments and analysis will be made through a combination of qualitative and quantitative evaluation. After establishing national interest through a short exploration of each country's foreign aid policy, information will be collected on each country's interactions with Mozambique. This includes information on institutional organisation, cash flows, modalities of aid, as well as ODA projects.

The rationale for a variety of data collection without a consistent framework is explained through the respective countries' positions as donors. The reason these countries are chosen for comparison is their different developmental histories, both as recipients and donors, as well as their relationships with Mozambique. Whilst they all engage with Mozambique to a large degree, they have different motivations and connections to Mozambique. Japan, however, is a DAC member country whilst Brazil is not, and South Africa has only just emerged as a donor nation. This has resulted in differences in monitoring standards and apparatus. Japan's engagement is measured by DAC standards and quantitative information regarding their engagement is published by the DAC. Quantitative information from Brazil and South Africa is limited by what their relevant state institutions are willing to publish and will often use non-standardized frameworks with sometimes inaccurate information. In the case of South Africa, there is almost no official reporting so secondary sources . A direct comparison is therefore hard to make. Any available data is therefore of value, and the combination of quantitative and qualitative data will be valuable in ascertaining trends.

As established in the literature review, whilst there is research on the topic, there is a limited amount of research looking at this from a comparative angle, and a similarly limited amount of contemporary information. ODA engagement, particularly in the area of projects and spending will therefore be limited to engagement from

2015 onwards. Limiting the research to this timeframe will allow for more specific and relevant analysis.

Limitations in the research include issues related to the availability of data as well as foreign language sources. Information that would help determine national interest is often limited to primary sources involved in the relevant bureaucracy, and information regarding policy in the cases of Brazil and Japan is often published in Portuguese and Japanese. The most recent ODA reports published by Brazilian state institutions involve data from 2016 at the latest, and the latest translated publication is that of the 2010-2013 ODA figures.

Chapter 1 Brazil

Brazil's ODA approach to Mozambique and other African nations is defined by the underlying historical trend of lusotropicalism and the export of expertise based on Brazil's own developmental experience. This chapter will interrogate those trends and argue that Brazil's institutional organization has led to fluctuations their volume of ODA spending due to a lack of coherent policies and direction. An empirical overview of Brazil's most recent ODA engagement will show the modalities of aid, as well as their sectoral focus and will reinforce the notion that Brazil is focusing primarily on capacity development in the agricultural and healthcare sectors, two sectors vital to their own developmental experience. Finally, the prospects for effective project management will be interrogated through an overview of Brazil's project monitoring and evaluation practices.

1.1 Brazilian ODA policy

1.1.1 Brazil's historical approach to Mozambique: constructivist or realist?

The first recurring theme in Brazil-Africa and more particularly Brazil-Mozambique relations is that of lusotropicalism. Sousa Leite identifies lusotropicalism as the result of a Portuguese-Brazilian community that was based on racial, linguistic and cultural similarities (Sousa Leite, 2018). To expand, Brazilian lusotropicalism can be considered a melting pot that benefits from good bilateral relations (Brazil-Portugal) and increased dependence. Brazil's engagement with Africa can be interpreted as the export of lusotropicalism. Due to their colonial heritage, African nations such as Mozambique have a Portuguese based linguistic and cultural identity and the strengthening of ties could result in a triangular movement of culture and goods. This manner or foreign policy is one that is closely linked to the solidification of Brazil's own national identity in the 1960s and Sousa Leite's narrative promotes the notion that Brazil's approach to Africa in this same period was primarily constructivist in nature. He furthermore identifies the pragmatist approaches under the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) in 1961 as one inhibiting the diversification of partnerships and one that ultimately failed to match Brazil's internal affairs and search for values.

Whilst a constructivist approach supports the idea of Brazil's engagement being fuelled by a shared historical and cultural identity, Brazil's ambitions in recent times have seen a shift to political interests and power driving their more realist approach to Africa (McGlinchey et al., 2017). Brazil presents its poverty reduction program as an example for the rest of the world through its guarantees of basic food supplies and social protection, with the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) stating in 2013 that Brazil is helping to reduce world poverty (Hall, 2018). The concept of exporting successful domestic policies could be considered lusotropicalist in nature, however, Hall notes that there is a lack of evaluation studies proving any effectiveness of these policies in Africa, and that Brazilian concepts are inadequately transferred to the African context. Brazil is instead focused on expanding the country's influence through the acquisition of diplomatic roles in the Union of South American Nations as well as UN organisations such as the WTO (Kragelund, 2018; Hall, 2018). Likewise, the emphasis on technical cooperation as well as trilateral

cooperation could be motivated by Brazil's ambition to garner influence on the international stage (Abdenur, 2015; Kragelund, 2018).

1.1.2 Features of contemporary Brazilian ODA Policy

The way in which the institutions related to technical cooperation function is heavily influenced by a combination of Brazil's national institutional framework and their foreign policy. This is due to both a lack of a coherent ODA charter as some countries have, or the DAC norms agreed on by DAC member countries. Most authors therefore argue that foreign policy dictated by incumbent governments at different times, as well as the roles different state institutions played in Brazil's development and their resulting influence have been most important in deciding Brazil's ODA direction at any given time (Leite et al., 2014; Esteves et al., 2019). The result of this has seen a mixture of policies, often outward oriented, but with different political goals. The most notable policy initiatives were employed under the presidency of Lula da Silva, though other presidents have each had unique policies. Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the early 2000s focused on a peace-based diplomacy to gain international support in Brazil's bid for a security council seat. Whilst this set the foundation for international cooperation, this manner of cooperation was more diplomatic and focused on multilateral ventures rather than technical cooperation projects and capacity building. Under president Lula the focus shifted to South-South cooperation primarily through technical cooperation. This was brought on due to Brazil's national deindustrialisation, and Brazil's focus on outward economic relations with other countries and the need to shift financial relations to a greater number of countries (Leite et al., 2014). During this period under the worker's party, the Brazilian foreign policy community worked on changing how Brazil was perceived by the international community. This was primarily based on the establishment of moral authority in fields where they were previously perceived as bad, such as inequality, poverty and hunger (Esteves et al., 2019). More recently, Temer's administration's focus shifted from strategic political partnership to one of trade and investment (Reis da Silva and Pérez, 2019). The effects of this policy are likely not apparent in analysis of Brazil's current projects as project design and implementation take time and will not have been completed. Furthermore, there is an uncertainty with regards to how Bolsonaro's administration will adjust these policies.

Despite different presidential administrations shaping policies, there are a variety of concepts which remain central to Brazilian ODA during different administration. First of these is the concept of horizontality. Brazilian south-south development claims to be horizontal, as a part of the efforts among developing countries to unite against the global north (Seifert, 2021). Development projects should therefore not involve donors and recipients but rather partnerships, with equal representation between Brazil and the partner nation. The result of this is that almost all projects are those that involve technical cooperation, rather than grants or loans. Second, the notion of non-interventionism is central to Brazilian ODA. Non-interventionism does not dictate modalities, as other BRICS nations such as China and India have used non-interventionism approaches in their investment. Brazil, however, combines non-interventionism in conjunction with their horizontal partnerships. Multilateral projects, however, are often subject to conditionality and it

is difficult for Brazil to both participate in these projects and maintain their stance. Finally, Brazilian ODA is influenced by the concept of mutual benefit. This directly opposes grant aid which can be perceived as being part of the neo-liberal reforms and is criticized for the

1.1.3 ODA Mechanisms & Institutions

The argument that emerging donors can approach projects more efficiently due to more freedom in their institutional arrangements, project cycles, and evaluation and monitoring is valid in potential, but evidence from Brazil shows that their current institutional arrangements are possibly not as efficient as the DAC standard. This section will provide an empirical overview of funds allocated to different institutions, will describe the mechanisms of project planning in Brazil, and finally evaluate Brazil's monitoring and evaluation.

To begin with institutional functions, the ABC, part of the MRE (Ministry of External Relations), is the primary agency in charge of Brazil's technical cooperation (Seifert, 2021). Subsequently, the ABC is the primary origin of most decision-making and coordination of the 120+ other national agencies involved in Brazil's ODA process (Leite et al., 2014). Despite this centralisation, judiciary and bureaucratic hinderances have led to a large amount of independent decision making and difficulty gaining project approval. Policy comes from a small amount of MRE members, however, projects related to Brazil's finances or to natural resources must be approved by congress. Furthermore, labour laws have made it difficult to hire public staff for these same projects. The MRE's close cooperation with the UNDP has resulted in the exchange of staff, with UNDP providing a lot of the ABC staff as well as training programmes to address the high staff turnover the ABC experiences.

The distribution of federal funds towards various institutions involved with developmental programmes is shown in Table 1 below. From the data we can see that the majority of funds has gone to the Ministry of Finance (MF), with a more equal division between the ABC, MCTIC (The Ministry of Science and Technology), Embrapa (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation), CGFOME (Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation and the Fight Against Hunger), and MS (The Ministry of Health). Furthermore, public health research institutions such as Fiocruz (Oswaldo Cruz Foundation) are allocated federal funding. The large percentage of funding to the MF and the MP (Ministry of Planning, Development and Management) is due to the accumulation of debts and the resulting sanctions such as losing the right to vote in the ICC and the Aiea. By way of extraordinary credit, the congress approved a \$R 3 billion payment to settle these outstanding debts in 2016. Table 2 below shows the same information, with the exemption of the MP and MF to gain a better understanding of the division of funds between the remaining institutions. From Table 2 we can see that technology and agriculture related institutions such as Embrapa and MCTIC receive a combined 34% of the remaining funds, with the ministry of health receiving 10%. This is indicative of Brazil's general ODA focus, wherein projects are related to research and capacity development in the agricultural and health sectors. Money transferring through the MF is often used for the funding of projects later operated by one of these other institutions, or research institutions such

as universities. The spread in financial allotments could be interpreted in different ways; it is positive that proportionate amounts of funding is transferred to institutions specialized in areas relevant to ODA, however, organisational problems could arise, particularly issue of monitoring.

Table 1: Brazilian Federal Funds Allocated per Institution (Brazilian Real)

Institution	2014	2015	2016	Total	Percentage
MP / MF	176,831,775	90,840,224	2,939,911,181	3,207,583,180	80.34%
ABC	48,827,943	63,014,836	60,480,602	172,323,381	4.32%
MCTIC	35,590,852	71,578,102	49,584,658	156,753,612	3.93%
Embrapa	61,672,318	24,372,605	21,178,121	107,223,044	2.69%
CGFome/ABC	40,945,729	34,005,123	21,307,551	96,258,403	2.41%
MS	14,909,901	10,165,863	48,103,219	73,178,983	1.83%
Capes	22,639,497	19,923,303	14,383,838	56,946,638	1.43%
Conab	21,107,811	26,567,943	3,627,996	51,303,750	1.28%
CNPq	12,331,428	10,842,942	10,086,957	33,261,327	0.83%
MJ	5,500,000	7,412,000	1,853,000	14,765,000	0.37%
Anvisa	4,983,895	3,037,494	2,528,209	10,549,598	0.26%
DCE/MRE	979,102	1,215,315	1,557,572	3,751,989	0.09%
Caixa	672,200	1,543,720	1,151,834	3,367,754	0.08%
Ipea	604,422	533,784	526,891	1,665,097	0.04%
Fiocruz	777,120	522,160	357,240	1,656,520	0.04%
MDS	444,014	450,670	166,647	1,061,331	0.03%
ICMBio	150,146	165,961	118,133	434,240	0.01%
Inmet	64,591	156,347	87,596	308,534	0.01%
Ibama	80,637	98,246	46,092	224,975	0.01%
Total	449,113,381	366,446,638	3,177,057,337	3,992,617,356	100%

Source: Author using data from (Lima et al., 2018)

Table 2: Brazilian Federal Funds Allocated per Institution Adjusted (Brazilian Real)

Institution	2014	2015	2016	Total	Percentage
ABC	48,827,943	63,014,836	60,480,602	172,323,381	21.95%
MCTIC	35,590,852	71,578,102	49,584,658	156,753,612	19.97%
Embrapa	61,672,318	24,372,605	21,178,121	107,223,044	13.66%
CGFome/ABC	40,945,729	34,005,123	21,307,551	96,258,403	12.26%
MS	14,909,901	10,165,863	48,103,219	73,178,983	9.32%
Capes	22,639,497	19,923,303	14,383,838	56,946,638	7.25%
Conab	21,107,811	26,567,943	3,627,996	51,303,750	6.54%
CNPq	12,331,428	10,842,942	10,086,957	33,261,327	4.24%
MJ	5,500,000	7,412,000	1,853,000	14,765,000	1.88%
Anvisa	4,983,895	3,037,494	2,528,209	10,549,598	1.34%
DCE/MRE	979,102	1,215,315	1,557,572	3,751,989	0.48%
Caixa	672,200	1,543,720	1,151,834	3,367,754	0.43%
Ipea	604,422	533,784	526,891	1,665,097	0.21%
Fiocruz	777,120	522,160	357,240	1,656,520	0.21%
MDS	444,014	450,670	166,647	1,061,331	0.14%
ICMBio	150,146	165,961	118,133	434,240	0.06%
Inmet	64,591	156,347	87,596	308,534	0.04%
Ibama	80,637	98,246	46,092	224,975	0.03%
Total	272,281,606	275,606,414	237,146,156	785,034,176	100%

Source: Author using data from (Lima et al., 2018)

The issue of monitoring is one that has been highlighted in the existing literature on Brazil's ODA. First of all, there is no unified monitoring and evaluation system in place for Brazilian development cooperation (UNDP, 2016). This has led to incoordination between their technical cooperation, humanitarian cooperation and NGO practices. For bilateral cooperation, a technical manual is used, however, at the time of publishing this manual was not used consistently by all institutions involved in programmes. Furthermore, evaluation is not consistent in that the evaluation standards and references are negotiated with partners on a project basis. Whilst the impact of projects is somewhat measured, the monitoring of projects is not translated into standardised project evaluation reports. Without a systemized evaluation method, different institutions reflect on projects in different ways creating efficiencies in areas such as cost-effectiveness (UNDP, 2016).

1.2 Projects in Mozambique

Recent ODA projects in Mozambique show evidence that Brazil's approach has not differed significantly from the historical approaches in the previous section. Their focus on technical cooperation based on their own developmental history remains central in their project allocation and support their horizontal approach to the implantation of projects. The support of private sector initiatives, however, whilst promoting economic growth, clashes with the horizontal approach and leads to themes of duality in their ODA approaches. This section provide an empirical overview of all the projects completed and ongoing after 2015, followed by an evaluation of the agriculture, healthcare and private sector related projects.

Table 3: Multilateral, Bilateral and Trilateral Allocations of Federal Funds (Brazilian Real)

	2014	2015	2016	Total	Percentage (%)
Multilateral	178,879,811	93,617,686	2,942,515,647	3,215,013,143	80.5
Bilateral	116,737,009	123,591,283	123,326,920	363,655,211	9.1
Trilateral with international organizations	89,223,952	49,382,521	39,446,293	178,052,765	4.5
Group of countries	29,787,917	72,518,581	43,570,660	145,877,158	3.7
Not applicable	31,795,080	25,167,809	26,892,767	83,855,656	2.1
Trilateral with countries	2,689,610	2,168,758	1,305,051	6,163,419	0.2
Total	449,113,379	366,446,637	3,177,057,336	3,992,617,352	100

Source: Author using data from (Lima et al., 2018)

The empirical overview highlights trends in the modalities and sectoral distribution of Brazil's ODA to Mozambique. Table 3 above shows that if we negate the debt payments in 2016, their engagement with Mozambique is still divided between bilateral and multilateral approaches, with a decline in trilateral agreements. As for projects, there are 36 completed and 19 ongoing projects. Table 5 below shows the complete list of completed projects, with the largest number of projects being agriculture related (8), followed by defence (6), education (6), and health (6) related projects. 8 of the 36 projects involved trilateral cooperation with either international organisations, or organisations from Japan, Germany and Italy. The projects that are still ongoing, shown in Table 6, exhibit a similar spread of modalities and flows. The projects targeting the healthcare sector are those with the longest project duration, the earliest still ongoing project being the one targeting the development of antiretroviral medicines and is expected to finish in 2021 after 13 years. Additionally, 2011 saw a large amount of agriculture related projects begin, whilst 2017 exhibits a similar trend with projects targeting social development. The distribution of funds to a large variety of institutions is mirrored in the variance of partner institutions associated with these projects. The intricacies of these projects

will be explained through more in-depth explanations of the larger projects in the major sectors of agriculture, healthcare as well as development through investment.

Table 5: ABC projects completed after 2015

Project	Partner Institution	Start Date	End Date	Sector	Status	Manner of Cooperation
Technical training - financial systems	Central Bank of Brazil	01/07/2018	12/31/2018	Public Administration	Completed	South-South
Technical training - Labor inspection	Ministry of Labor and Employment	01/03/2018	06/30/2018	Labor and Employment	Completed	South-South
Security training	Institutional Security Office of Brazil	02/01/2018	12/31/2019	Defense	Completed	South-South
Diplomatic training	Diplomatic Institute of Suriname	12/13/2017	01/31/2019	Education	Completed	South-South
Agricultural training	Ministry of Education, SETEC	01/08/2017	03/30/2018	Education	Completed	South-South
Technical cooperation project in food security	Ministry of health, MDS, CONSEA, FIDCRAZ	01/06/2017	10/31/2018	Social Development	Completed	South-South
Security training	MRE, GSI	15/05/2017	08/31/2017	Defense	Completed	South-South
public policy dialogue for family farming	SEAD	06/12/2016	12/31/2019	Agriculture	Completed	Trilateral
Strengthening HIV and AIDS response system	STD and AIDS reference and training center of Sao Paolo	01/12/2017	9/27/2018	Health	Completed	Trilateral
Technical cooperation resource optimization		10/24/2016	12/24/2017	Agriculture	Completed	South-South
Training for newborn care		08/23/2016	08/23/2017	Health	Completed	Trilateral - JICA
Neonatal Resuscitation program support	Brazilian Society of Pediatrics	05/07/2016	09/04/2016	Health	Completed	South-South
Diplomatic training	Diplomatic Institute of Suriname	18/01/2016	18/02/2017	Education	Completed	South-South
Defense Cooperation	Ministry of Defense	01/11/2016	31/01/2017	Defense	Completed	South-South
PROSAVANA support activity	Federal University of Vicosa	28/07/2015	28/07/2016	Agriculture	Completed	South-South
Strengthening of Fisheries and Aquaculture	Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture	01/07/2015	01/07/2019	Fishing	Completed	Trilateral
Technical and Institutional strengthening of INNOCQ - phase II	INMETRO	25/03/2015	31/10/2017	Technical Cooperation	Completed	Trilateral
Rural extension system strengthening ProSAVANA	SENAR, State University of Southwest Bahia, Federal University of Vicosa	01/03/2015	30/08/2019	Agriculture	Completed	Trilateral
Institutional Strengthening - FORTINNOQ - Phase III	INMETRO	06/02/2015	06/05/2015	Technical Cooperation	Completed	Trilateral, with germany
Military training	Ministry of Defense	18/12/2014	31/01/2016	Defense	Completed	South-South
Military training	Ministry of Defense	20/01/2014	31/01/2015	Defense	Completed	South-South
Technical assistance for PRONAE	National Fund for the Development of Education	10/07/2013	10/07/2016	Education	Completed	South-South
Vitoria - Xai-Xai development	Vitoria City Hall	12/06/2012	31/12/2016	City development	Completed	South-South
Technical support for Nutrition and Food security programs	Embrapa	12/01/2011	31/12/2015	Agriculture	Completed	South-South
Sustainable Vegetable production		10/11/2011	31/12/2015	Agriculture	Completed	South-South
Research capacity and technology transfer in Nacala corridor	Embrapa	01/05/2011	01/05/2016	Agriculture	Completed	South-South
Modernization of social security systems	DATAPREV, MPS	01/01/2011	30/01/2018	Social Development	Completed	South-South
Strengthening cancer prevention	INCA, Ministry of Health	08/10/2010	30/04/2017	Health	Completed	South-South
Training of dental technicians	Ministry of Health	06/09/2010	30/12/2020	Health	Completed	South-South
Urbanization of Chamanculo	CAIXA, Moid	02/09/2010	04/03/2018	City development	Completed	Trilateral, Italy
Development of school lunch program	FNDE	04/08/2010	30/06/2016	Education	Completed	South-South
Oral health research, policy development	Ministry of Health	06/07/2010	30/12/2020	Health	Completed	South-South
Labor inspection capacity development	MTE	06/04/2010	31/05/2017	Labor	Completed	South-South
Maputo vocational training	SENAI	22/05/2009	31/12/2018	Education	Completed	South-South

Source: Author using data from (ABC, 2021)

Table 6: ABC ongoing projects

Project	Partner Institution	Start Date	End Date	Sector	Status	Manner of Cooperation
Training program for military personnel	Ministry of Defense	17/12/2020	03/31/2022	Defense	Ongoing	South-South
Technical training of Mozambican research and education network employees		20/10/2019	12/31/2021	Science and Technology	Ongoing	South-South
Vocational training - food and nutrition	National Industrial Training Service (SENAI)	06/12/2018	03/06/2022	Education	Ongoing	South-South
Promotion of food/nutrition issues	Ministry of Health	31/08/2018	12/02/2022	Health	Ongoing	South-South
Vocational training - Agriculture, construction, tourism	SETEC, Ministry of education, CONIF	30/08/2018	12/31/2021	Professional training	Ongoing	South-South
UN Women partnership program - promotion of gender equality		12/05/2018	12/05/2022	Social Development	Ongoing	Trilateral
Sustainable coffee production in gorongosa	Federal University of Espirito Santo	06/11/2017	12/31/2022	Agriculture	Ongoing	South-South
Cotton production and by-product training	Brazilian Cotton Institute	10/01/2017	12/31/2023	Social Development	Ongoing	Trilateral
Technical training - health, nutrition, education, combating child mortality	National Conference of Bishops of Brazil	01/05/2017	08/31/2018	Social Development	Ongoing	South-South
International Course on Humanized care for childbirth	Sofia Feldman Hospital	30/01/2017	01/31/2022	Health	Ongoing	South-South
Strengthening cotton sector in lower Shire and Zambeze	Embrapa	21/11/2014	30/06/2021	Agriculture	Ongoing	South-South
UNESCO - Management and Sustainable use of water resources		19/12/2013	19/12/2021	Environment	Ongoing	Trilateral
Human milk bank and lactation center (REDEBLH-BR)	Ministry of Health	28/02/2011	30/07/2021	Health	Ongoing	South-South
Women's health learning	Ministry of Health, FIOCRUZ	28/02/2011	31/12/2022	Health	Ongoing	South-South
Training for legal professions	ESMPJ	13/01/2011	31/07/2021	Justice	Ongoing	South-South
Training for teachers	Ministry of Education, CAPES, SEED, UNILAB, UFG, UFJF, UFRJ, UFF	09/11/2010	30/06/2021	Education	Ongoing	South-South
Capacity building for sustainable school food programs	FNDE	15/09/2010	30/06/2022	Social Development	Ongoing	Trilateral
Urban Development Support - Phase II	CAIXA, USP, UNICAMP, UFRJ, UFRGS	10/06/2010	30/06/2022	City development	Ongoing	South-South
Support for implementation of national archiving	NAC ARCHIVE	06/08/2009	30/12/2020	Public Administration	Ongoing	South-South
Training in the production of Antiretroviral medicines	Ministry of Health, FIOCRUZ	29/09/2008	30/06/2021	Health	Ongoing	South-South

Source: Author using data from (ABC, 2021)

1.2.1 Agriculture

Projects in the agricultural sector are clearly shaped by their own domestic proficiencies, evident in the export of the bolsa familia family farming, capacity training in the cotton industry and the focus on sustainable food supplies. The Agricultural Innovation Policy Network (AIPN) was a key feature in the modernization of Brazil, wherein scientific research and training were central to the Brazilian National Innovation system (Esteves et al., 2019). The creation of Embrapa was a significant development in this process and created national linkages between universities and research centres and as a result the AIPN had deep social roots and connections with Brazil's agricultural business and smallholder farming innovation. In Brazil's international development sphere, Embrapa is also a key actor in the project implementation, and the projects show evidence that Brazil is utilising the linkages created through AIPN in their projects. This is shown, for example, with the Federal University of Espirito Santo leading the sustainable coffee production project in Shire and Zambeze and the Federal University of Vicosa having participated in ProSAVANA support projects.

The argument can be made that Brazil's branching out from projects involving research partnerships with their universities to these large scale trilateral projects is evidence of Brazil's ambition for moral authority and political power (Esteves et al., 2019). Trilateral cooperation has been core to projects in food production and sustainability. Mozambique experiences a very low farmer surplus, estimated at 29% in 2012 (Abdenur et al., 2014). The biggest project Brazil is involved with is the Triangular Cooperation Programme for Agricultural Development of the Tropical

Savannah in Mozambique (ProSAVANA). The project framework was constructed in line with Mozambique's Strategy Plan for the Agricultural Sector Development (PEDSA) and is a joint undertaking by Japan's JICA and the ABC (ProSavana, n.d.). Three major projects are the development in the Nacala Corridor, the project for the improvement of research and technology transfer capacity in the Nacala corridor, and the project for the establishment of a development model at communities' level through rural extension service. ABS participates in the exchange of personnel for training, farm management and the research involved in creating a framework through assessment of land conditions, environmental concerns, forestry and natural resources as well as zoning and the shift of population (ProSavana, 2013). The ProSavana project differs from other projects due to the amount of funds and manpower involved, as it requires a greater quantitative effort than joint research and training. This project is therefore also the greatest divergence from the concepts of horizontality and mutual benefit as through trilateral cooperation Brazil has adopted more of a donor stance.

1.2.2 Healthcare

The Brazilian approach to healthcare and south-south corporation is centred around the export of its own development experience as well as the promotion of horizontal cooperation. Healthcare capacity building and technical cooperation is a significant export of Brazil's own developmental experience due to influence of the Public Health Policy Network (PHPN) in Brazil. The PHPN started with the creation of prevented medicine departments in the 1950s and the development of this network through the institutionalization of the Unified Health System meant that shared social values based on the right to healthcare and the PHPP's political preferences became a core concept in Brazil (Esteves et al., 2019). These same values are often used by Brazilians as an opposition to the structural reforms proposed by the world bank as they promote more autonomy in domestic choices to provide basic health care provisions. Whilst the PHPN is yet another institution with a degree of autonomy in international aid strategy leading to possible fragmentation, its moral foundation based on health care as a human right and the implementation of such projects supports the notion of horizontality in Brazilian foreign aid to Mozambique. This is furthermore supported by the export of the role of state and national institutes of health, as the PHPN would like structural reforms, not in the neo-liberal way, but in national healthcare structures that allow universal access to medicine through a health-industrial complex (Esteves et al., 2019).

The healthcare projects identified are often ran by the Ministry of Health as well as Fiocruz and provide mixed evidence on the implementation of horizontal aid. The qualitative nature of the projects supports the construction of structure and institutions that benefit health care sustainability focus on neonatal healthcare as well as HIV/AIDS prevention, the latter of which is often approached trilaterally. The role of Fiocruz, however, will show elements suggesting a vertical power dynamic.

The projects in Mozambique are very diverse and range from the 10-year ongoing project focused on the establishment of a milk bank in Maputo to the completed training of dental surgeons to improve dental care. Furthermore, the project involving the production of antiretroviral medicine, previously mentioned to be the longest ongoing project, is one that is indicative of the structural approach taken by Brazil and Fiocruz to their healthcare related projects (Seifert, 2021). Despite the main plant being financed by Brazil, Mozambique has invested in the construction of a similar plant which highlights the importance of investment in structural independence and horizontal cooperation. This is part of a larger focus on capacity, rather than one focusing on a specific disease. Fiocruz's efforts to improve capacity are also shown through the efforts they spend on research and health systems. Past projects have involved the development of web portals and archiving tools to index Mozambique's public health history (Abdenur et al., 2014). The way in which the milk bank project is being constructed further supports this view, as aside from the main milk bank area, another area is being constructed for library functions whilst the third area is used for capacity building workshops (Abdenur et al., 2014; Seifert, 2021). Fiocruz's engagement with Africa in practice resonates with Brazil's publicly stated ODA objectives, though, there are some obstacles limiting this engagement. The obstacles inhibiting cooperation are varied in nature. Issues like monitoring and evaluation and cultural barriers to capacity development are quite common, and expected, considering Mozambique's current developmental status as well as Brazil's development institutional framework. The political obstacles do, however, raise questions as they include delays in the legal institution of a cooperation agreement between Fiocruz and Mozambique. These decrees are related to the permanent establishment for a legal framework on which Fiocruz would operate in Africa. Peireira (2017) cites Telles (2011), the Fiocruz office coordinator at the time as saying: "The approval of the decree is the first step in this form of institutionalization that will permit Fiocruz to have a permanent leadership body in Africa." Whilst certainly a hinderance to Fiocruz's ambitions, the notion of a permanent leadership body as well as the degree of autonomy Fiocruz wishes for in the same decree both oppose the concepts of horizontal partnerships as cooperation of that nature does not seem balanced.

1.2.3 Infrastructure and Private Investment

The support for private investment projects in Mozambique represents a divergence from the identity horizontal aid-based identity Brazil claims to pursue. This section will explain the perceived economic effects of two of these projects and the theoretical implications of Brazil pursuing projects in this direction.

Moatize coal mine

The Moatize coal mine, located in the Tete province, was acquired by Vale and later Mitsui and has been operating through Vale Mocambique since August of 2011 after gaining approval in 2006 (NS Energy, 2021). The project initially started as a joint Brazilian-Mozambiquan venture with Vale owning 95% of the mine while the remaining 5% is allocated to EMEM, a Mozambiquan state owned mining company (Mizuho Bank Ltd., 2017). At the time of its inception, the project represented the largest mining company in Brazil's biggest international venture and was expected to produce over 11 million tonnes of coal per annum. (Vale, 2021). According to Vale's latest annual report, the actual production of coal from 2018-2020 amounted to 11.5, 8.7 and 5.7 million tonnes respectively (Vale and Federative Republic of Brazil, 2021). Whilst the 2018 figures match the initial expectation the decline in production could be related to Vale's intention to distance themselves from coal production in order to become carbon neutral as well as the debt the project has accumulated. As of January 2021, Mitsui has sold its equity share to Vale for \$1 citing the large amount of debt as the primary reason (Mining Technology, 2021; Mitsui, 2021). However, Vale still has a contract with the government of Mozambique until 2032, with an option for a 25 year extension, and despite the reduction in production journalistic sources suggest that Vale is looking for other potential investors whilst upgrading their capabilities to reach production levels of 15 million tonnes in order to recoup some losses. (Vale and Federative Republic of Brazil, 2021; Fawthrop, 2021). A project of this scale has various spill over effects that could be beneficial to Mozambique, such as job creation and infrastructure development.

First is the case of the power supply contract, where the power is provided by a local utility company in Mozambique. For the coal mine deal to go ahead, the Brazilian government cancelled 95% of Mozambique's debt and the job creation was estimated at 3000 jobs (Konijn and Lenfant, 2013). Furthermore, whilst Vale operates in multiple African countries and Mozambique is not specified, they list a total of 3698 employees in Africa by 2020, an increase of 1035 since 2018 (Vale and Federative Republic of Brazil, 2021). Nationality is not specified, however, due to cost constraints logic would suggest that a large portion of these employees would be locally hired. News reports stating that during the COVID-19 epidemic Brazil flew around 200 workers home from the Moatize mine further supports the notion that a lot of the workforce is African.

The private sector projects lead to debates about Brazil's foreign policy intentions, as well as their capabilities of providing a new form of development cooperation. Brazil's support of these projects are representative of Brazil's intentions to take on a role of power in global capitalism, and shows the manner in which Brazil combines diplomacy, investment and cooperation for development (Garcia and De Sá, 2018). The mixture of these different goals can also indirectly be considered a result of their institutional arrangements leading to different parties in charge of different projects Cesarino, who provides an anthropologist's perspective to developmental studies, observed a duality in Brazilian approaches to Africa with regards to the importance of culture. Diplomats and government officials concerned with Brazil's image would consistently emphasise the shared cultural heritage and affinity, whilst agronomists and researchers in the agricultural field were observed to

be disinterested in it (Cesarino, 2017). The ventures involving the export of capital has previously been called sub-imperialism, and the fact that significant investment as well as ownership has been put into the Moatize coal mine project also suggests a resource extractive nature to this engagement. This also follows in line with more traditional development practices of outsourcing development cooperation to private sector actors and letting the private sector be the catalyst for development (Kragelund, 2018). The introduction of private sector actors leads to issues of accountability, transparency and profit-seeking behaviour, concepts which conflict with the nature of developmental aid and the manner of aid Brazil had previously stated they would engage in. Companies such as Vale will likely feel no responsibility to consider environmental factors, nor the displacement of people in their construction, as long as their project guidelines are signed off by the governments of Brazil and Mozambique. Whilst Brazil's engagement with Mozambique is not dominated by private sector involvement and is still in an early stage, it an increased amount of this involvement could lead to increased criticism of Brazil's approach. Critics of the global north's approaches in the 1980s have highlighted the manner in which ODA is used to facilitate the acceleration of financial flows such as FDI, and rather than proposing a new manner of developmental cooperation, private sector support in this manner more resembles the approach the global north took just before the Washington consensus (Kragelund, 2018).

Chapter 2 South Africa

South-Africa's recent economic development and role in the African Union has resulted in it being referred to as one of the rising actors in geopolitics and the foreign aid debates as well as its inclusion in BRICS. Despite this prominent role, this section will show that their engagement with Mozambique, one of their closest neighbours is rather limited. This section will show that from a technical cooperation view, South Africa's contribution is not as relevant as that of Brazil, but that its role as an emerging donor reopens the constructivism vs realism debate. It furthermore introduces an emerging donor as one supporting neo-liberalist reforms whilst at the same time opposing neo-colonialism. South-Africa's development as a political and humanitarian actor focused on security issues raises the debate about what is considered foreign aid, and whether this alternative angle could be one of the complimentary effects of the introduction of new non-DAC donor nations.

2.1 South African ODA policy

2.1.1 South Africa's ODA history: the result of international pressure

South-Africa as a nation has the least amount of experience as an ODA donor and their approach to ODA has primarily been political. Similar to Brazil, changing foreign policy objectives in the last 30 years has resulted to differing foreign aid objectives based on their incumbent governments. During the apartheid period South Africa adopted the Economic Cooperation Promotion Loan Fund in 1968. This approach was adopted in order to garner support for UN votes from neighbouring countries and to cope with international pressures and sanctions imposed as a opposition to apartheid (Goitom, 2011; Besharati, 2013). As a result, most aid became bilateral as avenues into multilateral organisations were blocked. The African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund Act was composed in 2001 as a replacement, and the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF) was established as a tool to carry out the new act. Under the ARF, South Africa's agenda switched to both a multilateral and a geographic perspective. Emphasis was placed on cooperation between African countries, and the promotion of good governance in these countries. Conflict prevention and integration were central to this scheme, and aid would shift to humanitarian assistance, capacity development and projects that strengthened regional integration. Without any definitive ODA charter or OECD membership to guide policy, changes made by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), who provide oversight to ARF, dictate South Africa's approach.

2.1.2 Contemporary ODA Policy & Agenda

There are contrasting views about South-Africa's objectives and their foreign policy. In particular, the manner in which South Africa conducts its foreign aid is so significantly different from other nations that developments in this field are often attributed to alternative aid, and their status as 'donor' nation is questioned.

The 2015-2020 strategic plan published by DIRCO includes the goals & objectives South Africa have set for their foreign relations in period this paper is addressing. The strategic plan promotes a wide range of development goals that are primarily focused on multilateral cooperation. First, South Africa aims to align its foreign policy engagement with Africa's Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 is a proposed initiative by the African Union that has identified 15 projects aimed at creating economic development, the eradication of poverty and security on the continent. Projects include train networks, a free trade area, passport changes and African financial institutions. Additionally, the 50 year project should tackle integration, gender and governance issues (African Union, n.d.). The second main strategic goal is the strengthening of the AU and South Africa's role as a leader in conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Third is support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), another AU program aimed at promoting economic cooperation and finally, South Africa aims to improve its institutional capacity for developmental aid (DIRCO, 2020). Because of South Africa's multilateral approach, interrogation of South Africa's ODA to Mozambique will involve the identification of cash flows to these institutions and the manner in which these initiatives impact Mozambique.

One of the criticisms of the South African contribution as an emerging donor is that most of their efforts are focused on developing Africa as a region that embraces development cooperation from, for example, the global north (Vickers, 2012). Activities South Africa participates in such as peacekeeping activities and the strengthening of regional institutions for development. This builds the impression that South Africa is the main advocate for adopting the neo-liberal structural reforms that the global north has been pushing since the Washington consensus and that South Africa would prefer a leadership role in this regional transformation. To this end, South Africa can be considered a bridge between the global north and the global south (Sidiropoulos, 2012). South Africa is at times, due to the economic differences between them and their neighbouring countries, portrayed as an economic hegemon, however, Vickers portrays the idea that South Africa are vehemently opposed to the notion that they are economic hegemons and that they do not want to be perceived as bullies. Despite this, South-Africa's behaviour can be considered profit-seeking as they do not provide manufacturing and production opportunities for recipient nations in their supply chain investment (Chidaushe, 2010). T

2.1.3 ODA functions & institutions

As South Africa's foreign aid & international cooperation is a tool of its foreign policy, the relevant agencies are managed under the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. The ARF is the primary agency in charge of designing and implementing cooperation projects. Despite the ARF being the primary agency, aid is still channelled through a variety of institutions and governmental agencies and in the early 2000s ARF assistance would only make up around 3% of South Africa's total development assistance (Braude et al., 2008). For example, many public entities play a role in South-Africa's cooperation projects, with funding going to the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police Services for their assistance in security ventures (Kragelund, 2010).

The deployment of South-Africa's peacekeeping projects supports the notion that South Africa is a reactive state. Whilst their initial reforms to the post-apartheid state were certainly due to foreign pressure, consistent policy reforms and dispatch of peacekeeping operations based on regional African pressure suggests that they do not have an overlying tactic. At the same time, there is evidence that South Africa sends an increased amount of troops to target unrest in areas where they have commercial interests, such as Sudan in the early 2000s (Vines, 2010). This mirrors behaviour not dissimilar to that of the global north as donor nations intents are often challenged and the securitization of aid has become prominent especially in north-south linkages (Brown and Gravingholt, 2016).

Evaluation of project cycles, management practices and monitoring and evaluation practices is currently impossible. Due to the infancy of South Africa's donor status, there is no database for ODA tracking, nor are there project reports. There are, however, recurring issues of organizational deficiencies and hurried policies, probably as a result of the lack of evaluation (Sidiropoulos, 2012).

To address organisational issues, DIRCO and ARF are currently in progress of establishing a development agency to replace the ARF, called the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) which will inform and direct South Africa's development assistance framework. This agency would follow the same objectives of promoting the African agenda, regional integration and south-south cooperation while addressing the organisational issues the ARF currently experiences. Currently, the ARF struggles with implementation as well as management issues and SADPA through a higher degree of transparency would through better organisation also improve monitoring and transparency. Whilst SADPA was initially expected to be in place by 2012, ARF remains the primary agency and SADPA developments are still in progress (PMG, 2011; PMG, 2016).

2.2 ODA to Mozambique

There is little evidence of direct bilateral flows from South Africa to Mozambique in the contemporary period. South Africa's approach to Mozambique in the post-apartheid era began with them forgiving Mozambique's debt of ~1 million ZAR to atone for the role South Africa played in Mozambique's civil wars (Besharati, 2013). Later, South Africa was involved in the initial construction of the Maputo corridor. Table 7 below shows an estimate of South Africa's total ODA spending, which is primarily composed of funding for peacekeeping operations. Aside from the MOZAL aluminium smelter in Mozambique, South Africa's current focus is on their multilateral approach to the continent and their cooperation with Mozambique is limited to an extension of the policies made by these multilateral entities.

Table 7: South Africa estimated total ODA spending

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
USD (millions)	148	100	95	104	111

Source: Author using data from (OECD, 2019)

2.2.1 Multilateral Cooperation

Since South-Africa's engagement with Mozambique is limited to multilateral cooperation, the two main ventures South Africa is involved with will be discussed in this section. Due to Mozambique's membership in these organisations, we can speculate that they are party to the universal policies presented by these organisations and have the same right to the capacity building ventures these organisations support.

NEPAD

President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa was one of the founding members of NEPAD in 2001. Since, NEPAD has shaped African development models and serves as the overlying framework. South Africa has been one of the biggest contributors to NEPAD, providing 35 million ZAR yearly as well as offices and equipment (Besharati, 2013). In essence, NEPAD is an extension of the African Union initiatives and serves as a backstop for the African Union developmental initiatives. Their mandate is as follows: "Strengthen capacity of African Union Member States and regional bodies, advance knowledge-based advisory support, undertake the full range of resource mobilisation and serve as the continent's technical interface with all Africa's development stakeholders and development partners" (AUDA-NEPAD, 2021). This somewhat contrasts the results of their initiatives, which are centred around reforestation, medical provision and job creation. The reason for this is that their mandate statement suggests a focus on capacity building, whilst the results of their progress signify very specific results of projects that aren't necessary capacity building related. There are divided interpretations of what capacity development entails in developmental policy and practice. Mayville interprets capacity as "a discursive tool of state-making that reveals the flow of international and transnational power in the construction and circumvention of the state—as a site for the intersection of globalization and capitalist development" (Mayville, 2019). Furthermore, capacity is seen as the capacity of the state for sustained centralized governance. Mayville goes on to highlight the notion that capacity is akin to original concepts of development; it represents the state's ability to govern a country per the standards of modernization, meaning that developed countries are those with the greatest capacities. Individual studies use this concept of capacity building to various degrees as they focus on different facets of state capacity. Berliner et al, for example, apply the concept of administrative state capacity to the issue of labour rights. In this case regulatory failures in providing laws protecting labourers are attributed to weak state capacity (Berliner et al., 2015). These views, however, are

very state-centric and the definition of capacity provided by the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) provides a broader interpretation of capacity. They define capacity as “ the ability of people, organizations, and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully” (African Capacity Building Foundation 2017, 15). This means that smaller-scale individual projects, such as administration in local levels or that of hospitals can be categorized as capacity building. NEPADs initiatives provide institutional frameworks for initiatives such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme which would directly benefit institutional capacity building. At the same time they mention one of their results as being: 1.2 million directly impacted in 38 countries and 112,900 direct jobs created through construction (AUDA-NEPAD, 2021). Considering the total population of the African member states these numbers seem exceedingly small for a regional initiative. This divergence in developmental intent and the presentation of results links into the argument of how South-Africa, and as an extension the AU initiatives in which they play a leading role, present themselves to the international sphere. Their capacity development goals and coordination seem well presented but many of their stated results show little linkages to their intent and more resemble the garnering of goodwill by presenting arbitrary numbers. The resulting speculation would be that the current state of NEPAD suffers from the same organisational deficiencies as its member states and that as of now does not present real quantitative results.

2.2.2 Trilateral Cooperation

Private sector projects

The Mozal aluminium smelter

The case of the Mozal smelter shows that South Africa does participate in resource extractive investment, and whilst it does support their encouragement of FDI reception from the global north, it somewhat contradicts the structural reform encouraged in their multilateral initiatives with regards to environmental issues.

The Mozal aluminium smelter is a private company in Maputo, of which the Government of Mozambique owns 3.9% and the Industrial Development Cooperation of South Africa owns 24%, with the rest divided between Australia and Japan. This project exclusively exports aluminium and can be considered FDI of the resource extractive nature. Whilst resource extractive practices are widely denounced by academics in the critical development field, Mozambique requested this project and encourages FDI in order to reinvigorate the economy. The economic benefits of this plant are primarily due to the power consumption necessary to operate it. The power consumption of 450MW it reached as early as 2000 was more than double the entire power consumption of Mozambique and generated profits for Mozambique’s hydroelectric companies (Pretorius, 2005). Mozambique, however, is a country that does not have universal access to electricity and considering the significant energy consumption of these projects this raises ethical and environmental concerns in terms of priorities (Naidoo and Loots, 2020).

Chapter 3 Japan

This section will show that Japan's engagement with Mozambique has resulted in the most significant monetary loans and disbursements of the three case studies, but will also show evidence of a high degree of private sector involvement and the promotion of neoliberal reform.

3.1 Japanese ODA

3.1.1 ODA Policy & Agenda

Japan's approach to Mozambique is largely dictated by its consolidated approach to African relations established in the Tokyo Conference on African Development (TICAD), a dialogue and security-oriented commitment that contrasts Japan's resource and manufacturing driven approaches to, for example, Asia (Raposo, 2014). TICAD is a conference led by Japan in coordination with the UNDP, World Bank and African Union Commission (AUC) and leaders from 53 African countries. The first Tokyo Action Plan consolidated a focus on specific areas of development, and Japanese projects would be designed in accordance with these areas of development. Important areas noted are Economic Development through Activities of the Private Sector, Regional Cooperation and Integration, Emergency Relief, Political and Economic Reforms, as well as the application of the Asian experience to African Development (MOFA, 1993).

The most recent TICAD conference (2019) has led to the Yokohama declaration and plan of action and is the result of constant alterations to the initial declaration to suit both African and Japanese ambitions. The assumed positive outcomes of this conference are that they promote cooperation towards long-term sustainable developmental goals. Multilateral actors as well as Japan are involved, and projects must be in line with recipient country's domestic conditions as well as AU initiatives. This degree of planning allows for easier coordination and evaluation of projects, as well as better donor-recipient relations. This is explained through the establishment of three main pillars: (i) accelerating economic transformation and improving business environment through innovation and private sector engagement, (ii) deepening sustainable and resilient society, and (iii) strengthening peace and stability (MOFA, 2019b). In the plan of action, these pillars are split into focus areas, with detail paid to actions, actors, measures, and outcomes. Furthermore, focus areas are linked with African Union initiatives and are intended to suit the long-term goals of the continent. An example of this is Pillar 1, focus area 2 (1.2), the strengthening of connectivity and integration through quality infrastructure investment. This focus area has been identified as corresponding with the AU initiatives to establish a Single African Air-Transport Market, an integrated high speed train network, the development of geothermal energy resources, the implementation of the Grand Inga Hydropower Dam, as well as the AU strategy for gender equality & women's empowerment. This focus point is then split into goals such as the 'Construct and facilitate effective implementation of economic corridors' which is then divided into goals for different actors. In this example, Japan will handle quality

infrastructure investment in line with the G20 principles for quality infrastructure investment whilst the World Bank Group (WBG) will handle support for trade and transport corridors in response to requests from African countries (MOFA, 2019b).

From the information provided in the TICAD conference it is evident that Japan prioritizes capacity development and peace building, but also the more contentious concepts of good governance and public-private relationships. Good governance arose as the explanation for the failure of the structural reforms in the initial Washington consensus policies, as the world bank decided that the capacity of public and private entities in recipient countries were insufficient for the implementation of reforms (Van Waeyenberge, 2018). In essence, good governance entails an increased conditionality associated with aid, and a reduction of policy space for the recipient governments. Recipient governments would suddenly have to make changes in their legal framework, public sector management and transparency. Whilst the neo-liberal arguments for economic growth in a country with institutions that facilitate this approach has its merits, the continued restriction on access to aid raises an ethical dilemma of donor-recipient relationships and furthermore reinforces the notion that there is a significant power dynamic as a result of this conditionality. Likewise, the practicality of governance of this manner is questionable, as the principles in establishing governance and regimes have yet to show effectiveness in other sectors such as climate change and migration (Janus et al., 2015).

3.1.2 Japan-Mozambique relationship and approaches

Through assessment of Japan's diplomatic approach to Mozambique three focus areas arise. These are: the joint commitment to the TICAD initiative, a Japanese interest in Mozambique's natural resources, and consistent humanitarian aid as a response to natural disasters. Since 2013, there have been six significant meetings between either the presidents or emissaries from both countries. On June 1st, 2013 Fumio Kishida and Aiuba Cuereneia met during the TICAD V proceedings, this meeting served to promote the Agreement between the government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique on the reciprocal liberalisation, promotion and protection of investment (The Agreement). This agreement established the guidelines for investment, as well as joint committees, free transfers, conditions for expropriation and compensation and the way in which dispute settlements must be handled (MOFA, 2013a). Notably, this agreement is Japan's first investment agreement with a Sub-Saharan country (MOFA, 2013b). MOFA's in their official statement on the agreement mention "Mozambique, where the world's largest natural gas reserve and the Africa's largest coking coal reserves have been confirmed in recent years, is now attracting attention as a resource-rich country whose development Japanese private companies are participating in" (MOFA, 2013b), highlighting the focus on Mozambique's natural resources and economic cooperation through the private sector.

. A meeting between Abe and Nyusi in 2017 resulted in the most recent statement on Japanese-Mozambique relations was published (MOFA, 2017a). The statement

reaffirmed many of the previous focus areas and furthermore promoted the strengthening of open markets and trade and investment between the two countries. Central to this section II, Partnership for Prosperity, promotes mutual economic benefits through cooperation, highlighting Mozambique as an area of focus for Japanese foreign investment (MOFA, 2017c). Subsequent to this, the Japan-Mozambique Investment Agreement was introduced, and Prime Minister Abe promoted Mozambique and specifically the Nacala corridor's role in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, a joint American-Japanese investment strategy that President Nyusi was keen to participate in (MOFA, 2017b).

3.1.3 ODA Mechanisms & Institutions

The primary agency in charge of Japanese ODA is the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), who after their merger with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) handle Japan's technical cooperation, ODA loans as well as grant aid. The current iteration of JICA, which serves as one of the most comprehensive and integrated development agencies in terms of implementation, is the result of 50 years of shifting institutional dynamics and relationships in Japanese ODA.

Japanese ODA modalities have historically been biased towards Yen loans and technical cooperation. In the 1970s Yen loans made up 67% of Japan's total bilateral aid, and by 2002 the percentage was already more than halved to 32%. Whilst the number of yen loans is steadily reducing, the DAC member average was only 2% in 2000 meaning Japan's approach still differs substantially from other developed actors (Fujita, 2000). Under their loan aid scheme projects were handled on a request basis and projects were designed by consultants from the private sector. Infrastructure and production related projects make up the largest percentage of these projects, although recently under pressure from the DAC Japan has increased the amount of grants it disburses.

Aside from the numerous steps in project creation, JICA's project evaluation scheme is what is most beneficial in terms of sustainability of developmental projects. Their own stated objectives for their evaluations are to 1) manage the project cycles, 2) present 'learning effects' to increase efficiency and 3) to ensure accountability (JICA, 2004). A four-step revision through different committees ensures there is no bias. First, for projects related to Mozambique, ex-ante evaluations are common wherein projects are evaluated for their necessity to the recipient country as well as conformity with JICA standards. Mid-term and ex-post evaluations are utilised to look at issues that arise in sustainability such as environmental concerns or practicality of manuals in capacity building projects and the findings from these evaluations are used to improve subsequent projects in the region, or projects elsewhere that are thematically similar. Monitoring of this nature supports long term sustainable goals and this will be evident in the Japanese Projects.

3.2 ODA to Mozambique

This section will provide an empirical overview of Japan's engagement with Mozambique and evaluate two projects and the Japanese approach to project planning.

Table 8 below shows the cash flows from Japan to Mozambique from 2010-2019. From 2013 onwards, the net total ODA has increased significantly, with the highest totals achieved in 2017 and 2018. Furthermore, there is a significant outlier in 2018, where the total ODA and OOF (other official flows) reached as high as 775 million USD. As investments, bonds, securities etc are not considered ODA but rather OOF by OECD standards, we can deduce that 2018 has seen a significant amount of investment in Mozambique by Japan, outside of traditional ODA channels. The amount of technical cooperation as well as grants disbursed are consistent, whilst the disbursement of loans has increased after 2015.

Table 8: Japanese cash flows to Mozambique by type (USD, millions)

Recipient	Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Technical Cooperation		11.06	13.1	24.06	33.07	25.29	24.81	25.42	26.08	19.31	18.47
Grants		51.09	23.84	42.49	120.89	51	63.82	59.49	49.36	60.08	37.98
ODA Gross Loans		0.31	13	11.09	19.43	34	6.07	30.02	105.21	86.48	54.74
Humanitarian Aid		0.03	0.02	0.08	0.04	1.1	0.33	0.63	0.07	0.13	
ODA Net Total		51.39	36.84	53.58	91.98	85	69.89	89.5	153.63	145.62	91.79
ODA + OOF		79.12	105.99	160.92	270.91	93.07	166.87	263.54	164.15	775.61	190.13

Source: Author using data from (OECD, 2020)

3.2.1 Projects

Tables 9-13 provide an overview of the main technical cooperation, ODA loan, and grant projects that have been or are due to be completed or repaid post 2015.

Technical cooperation projects make up the largest number of projects. The sectoral division of these projects is quite varied, with only two main infrastructure and regional development related projects, however, the Nacala corridor development project is the highest cost project at a 1072 million yen contributing to the large amount of spending in economic infrastructure and services. The currently ongoing projects, however, primarily deal with agricultural, environmental and education related issues. The agricultural projects involve capacity development in rice productivity and many projects are in some way related to the large amount of development happening in the Nacala corridor. Unlike the technical cooperation projects, apart from the Maputo gas fired combined cycle power plant project all the ODA loan projects are infrastructure projects. The repayment and grace periods add up to 50 years, with the largest loans being the aforementioned power plant and the Nacala port development projects. Grant projects follow the same trends as the loan and technical cooperation projects, often in the same areas, and are of significant value. The project on the construction of bridges on the N380 for example, was funded through a grant amount of 3419 million yen, larger than the loan given for the Montegeuz-Uchina road project. Project grants are supplemented with humanitarian

grants for disaster relief, with 5 of these disbursed in the period of 2015-2020, often due to the results of cyclones and rainfalls that are common in the region. The fact that the technical cooperation, loan and grant projects all target similar regions and sectors are due to the approach JICA has taken, as well as the Japan-Mozambique agreements. Evident in the project reports, the different modalities of aid are intended to serve larger developmental goals and supplement each other. Interrogation of the Mandimba-Lichinga road project that was recently finished in 2020 shows these dynamics.

Table 9: Japan-Mozambique technical cooperation projects

Project	Start	End	Sector	Cost (million yen)	Executing Agency	Japanese firms involved
Improvement of techniques for increasing rice cultivation productivity in Nante	2010	2015	Agriculture	420	Ministry of Agriculture, District Services of Economic Activities (SDAE)	none
Enhancement of the Capacity of Destination Marketing and Promotion through Strengthening the Linkage among Tourism Related Organizations	2011	2015	Tourism	358	Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MICULTUR), National Directorate of Tourism (DINATUR), Mozambique Tourism Authority (INATUR)	PACET Corporation, PADECO Co., Ltd.
Improving Research and Technology Transfer Capacity for Nacala Corridor Agriculture Development	2011	2017	Agriculture		The Ministry of Education and Human Development	
Development of Local Industry through One Village One Product Movement	2012	2017	Business Management	430	Institute of Promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises	KRI, Unico
Improvement of Nacala Port	2012	2015	Infrastructure			
Nacala Corridor Economic Development Strategies	2012	2016	Regional Development Planning	1072	Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Agence de Promotion des Investissements et des Exportations (APIEX)	
Promoting Sustainability in Rural Water Supply, Hygiene and Sanitation in Niassa	2013	2017	Water and Sanitation		The Department of Water and Sanitation, DPOPHRH	
Establishment of Development Model at Communities' Level under Nacala Corridor Agricultural Development	2013	2019	Agriculture		Coordination with Brazil	
Supporting the Promotion of Nacala Corridor Development	2015	2018	Infrastructure		APIEX, Ministry of Industry and Commerce	Oriental Consultants Global Co., LTD.
Expansion of New Curriculum of Teacher Training Institute (IFP)	2016	2020	Education	500	The Ministry of Education and Human Development	
Improvement of Rice Productivity in Zambezia	2016	2021	Agriculture	670	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, DNEA / DPASA	
Enhancing Capacity of Investment Promotion and Facilitation	2016	2020	Private Sector Development		APIEX	
Strengthening Resilience in Cyclone IDAI-Affected Areas	2019	2022	Disaster Risk Reduction	737	Ministry of State Administration and Public Service	
Solid Waste Management	2019	2022	Environment	450	Maputo Municipality	
Sustainable Forest Management and REDD+ SDG global leadership Program	2019	2024	Environment	480	MITADER (DINAF)	
	2020	2023	Education		Institute of Scholarship	

Author using data from (JICA, 2021)

Table 10: Japan-Mozambique ODA loans

Project	Start	End	Sector	Amount (millions; yen)	Repayment Period (years)	Grace Period (years)	Executing Agency
Montepuez-Lichinga Road Project	2007	2016	Infrastructure / Transportation	3282	40	10	Administracao Nacional de Estradas (ANE)
Nampula-Cuamba Road Upgrading Project	2010	2014	Infrastructure / Transportation	5978	40	10	Administracao Nacional de Estradas (ANE)
Nacala Port Development Project Phase I	2013	2017	Infrastructure / Transportation	7889	40	10	Ministry of Transport and Communication
Mandimba - Lichinga Road Upgrading Project	2013	2020	Infrastructure / Transportation	6773	40	10	Administracao Nacional de Estradas (ANE)
Maputo Gas Fired Combined Cycle Power Plant Development Project	2014	2025	Energy	17269	40	10	Eletricidade de Mocambique (EDM)
Nacala Port Development Project Phase II	2015	2018	Infrastructure / Transportation	29325	40	10	Ministry of Transport and Communication

Author using data from (JICA, 2021)

Table 11: Japan-Mozambique project grants

Project	Start	End	Sector	Grant amount (millions yen)	Executing Agency	Japanese firms involved
Construction of Bridges on N380 in Cabo Delgado	2017	2022	Infrastructure / Transportation	3,419	ANE	
Reinforcement of Transmission Network in Nacala Corridor	2015	2019	Energy	2,012		AICHI Electric
Construction of Health Science Institute in Nacala	2015	2018	Health	2,121	MISAU	
Construction of Health Science Institute in Maputo	2014	2016	Health	2,071	MISAU	
Construction of Bridges on the Road between Ile and Cuamba	2013	2016	Infrastructure	3,215	ANE	
Construction of Monapo Primary Teacher Training Institute in Nampula Provinc	2013	2013	Education	1,024	Ministry of Education and Human Development	Matsuda Consultants International Co., LTD
Urgent Rehabilitation of Nacala Port	2012	2015	Infrastructure	2,628	Ministry of Transport, Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Mocambique (CFM)	Penta-Ocean Construction Co., Ltd., Echo Corporation Oriental Consultants
Construction of Secondary Schools in Nampula Province in the Republic of Mozambique	2012	2015	Education	1,063	Ministry of Education and Human Development	Matsuda Consultants International Co., Ltd

Author using data from (JICA, 2021)

Table 12: Japan-Mozambique humanitarian grants

Grant	Date	Grant Amount (USD)	Specifics
Response to El-Nino (Foodshortages as a result of heavy rainfall)	02/08/2016	5,000,000	Collaboration with the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
Response to Cyclone Dineo	01/03/2017	-	Provision of plastic sheets, jerry cans etc
Response to torrential rainfall	14/02/2018	-	Tents, blankets and emergency relief goods
Response to cyclone damage	27/03/2019	-	Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Expert team and Medical Team
Response to cyclone Idai	23/04/2019	9,850,000	Food assistance to 350,000 vulnerable people. 27,000 people gaining access to safe drinking water. Approx 150 government and NGO staff trained. Provision of shelters to 25,000 people
Response to deteriorating security conditions in Cabo Delgado	09/10/2020	4,200,000	Emergency shelter and hygiene kits to 2,500 vulnerable households. Food assistance to 23,000 displaced persons. Improved access to medical service for 290,000 people. Protection and monitoring for 10,000 people. Provision of greater access to legal service for 10,000 people. Improvement of nutritional condition for 25,600 infants

Author using data from (MOFA, 2020)

Infrastructure - Mandimba-Linchinga road project

The Mandimba-Linchinga road project was a 7-year project funded through a loan of 6,773 million Japanese yen. This road connects to the Nacala Corridor, a main point of interest, and is one of Japan's priority areas as part of their goal of "regional economic revitalization including corridor development. This larger plan is meant to promote development in infrastructure, agriculture and social development. Previous ODA loan projects such as the Monteguez-Lichinga Road project, the Nampula-Cuamba road project, the Nacala Port Development project as well as technical cooperation projects such as Nacala corridor agricultural development and the Nacala corridor economic strategies projects are all individual projects meant to build upon a larger goal (JICA, 2013).

Multilateral cooperation is also heavily present, as JICA and the African Development Bank (AfDB) jointly finance the Mandimba-Lichinga project with JICA funding 89km of road and two bridges, whilst the AfDB funded 61 km of road and 5 bridges. ANE would execute the project and handle operation and maintenance after consulting services from JICA. Individual projects such as these are aimed at promoting economic development in the country but also wider poverty alleviation in the entire region. Evaluation of the individual projects and the consistent addition of projects through various modalities and international cooperation ensures that lessons are learned as well as sustainability. If a project falls short on for example, environmental or agricultural concerns, the next project is aimed at targeting these issues in order to keep promoting development, as opposed to simply moving on to a different project elsewhere.

Despite the good organizational features of these projects, the heavy involvement of the Japanese private sector is a major criticism. Japan's national interest in Japan-Africa relations at times can be interpreted as either contrasting or complementing

their TICAD initiatives due to the way the private sector and public private partnerships (PPP) serve Japan's national interests (Ampiah and Rose, 2012). Japan's economic stagnation has driven private sector engagement in resource laden African countries and that this is running concurrent with other forms of ODA such as peacekeeping (Hirano 2012). Like the cases of Brazil and South Africa, however, Mozambique has invited this manner of investment.

Agriculture - The Project for Rice Productivity Improvement in Chokwe Irrigation Scheme

Agricultural projects in Mozambique show evidence of the Japanese universal approach, as well as the export of technology based on its own domestic developments. Despite Japan focusing on large scale irrigation projects in their capacity development, these projects are also indicative of Japan following general trends in developmental aid from the global north as irrigation projects have become more popular as part of DAC rural poverty reduction schemes. The project for rice productivity in Chokwe is the result of a wider approach to capacity development and multiple steps. A previous project running from 2007 to 2010 was aimed at developing farming technologies for small scale farmers, as well as manuals for irrigation facility management, training of water use, and the preparation of action plans called "The Integrated Agricultural Development for Small Scale Farmers in Chokwe Irrigation Scheme." The second project, targeting rice productivity, ran from 2011-2014 focused on rice cultivation techniques, direct sowing, transplanting and the training of personnel who could provide this training locally in Mozambique. The projects involved the training of a total of 25 people in Japan by 14 Japanese 'experts' on the topic as well as the provision of goods. The revisiting of regions in order to further provide technical guidance on farming equipment provided as well as sustainable usage, maintenance and manuals further supports sustainable development (JICA, 2018). This same project was used as the foundation of projects such as "The project for improvement of techniques for increasing rice cultivation productivity in Nante" as well as agricultural developments in the Nacala corridor(JICA, 2019).

Conclusion

Explanation and theorization of findings

This section will aim to consolidate the findings of the three case studies in order to answer the sub questions and debates established previously. From the research collected it is evident that the notion that the post-colonial heritage of emerging donors does not lead to a universal promotion of development opposing the neo-liberal approach of DAC donors. The Japanese approach closely matches the promotion of good governance, structural reform and private sector engagement to promote economic growth, and evidence from South Africa show that they support this engagement. Brazil showed the greatest divergence in this regard and whilst there was criticism of the divergence between their intended horizontal approach and practice, their engagement most opposed the conventional ODA approach.

All three countries showed evidence of participating in peacekeeping activities. In the case of Brazil, however, this was limited to military training, whilst South-Africa and Japan both participated in UN led peacekeeping activities in Mozambique. Discourse on the topic of peacekeeping explains why South Africa and Japan, who have been identified as more closely identifying with the approach of the global north prefer this method of engagement. Peacekeeping can be understood as system maintenance in the sense that it is part of a larger package of conditional reforms, and that it allows for a presence on the African continent (de Carvalho et al., 2019). Similarly, the good governance approach has been discussed as possibly being an extension of power and can even be considered more of an effect than a cause of development, in which case it shouldn't warrant such a prominent place in development policy objectives. The reason for this is that when development happens organically, institutions should strengthen alongside the economic growth as societies are having to deal with concepts like land ownership, public reforms and copyright laws as relevant problems arise (Goldsmith, 2012). Most importantly, these reforms should happen in a way in which institutions favour the public sector, rather than the private, in order to create a fair playing field in transitional economies (van Arkadie, 2012).

Strategic and political interests remained central to the foreign policy of all three cases, wherein Brazil, South Africa and Japan all held ambitions to gain political support in the African continent. Despite this degree of political proactivity, the reactive state approach could possibly explain the differences in projects and implementation. The reactive state approach has primarily been applied to Japan's conduct and their shift in foreign aid policy into matching DAC norms (Calder, 1988; Hook, 2005). Under this approach, Japan made concessions not in their economic interest, but rather political interest, as aligning more with world bank and DAC norms would benefit their ambitions for a UN security council seat. South-Africa similarly exhibits a history as a reactive state. The post-apartheid was brought on by a combination of domestic revolt as well as international embargoes and pressures. Their subsequent conduct, however, involved the promotion of multilateral development that would help them become a world actor similar to those in the global north by adopting many of their policies. Brazil has enjoyed more political freedom in

that regard, wherein they made the decision to distance themselves from the United States and took more of a political risk in their engagement with Africa. The lower degree of international political pressure on Brazil could explain a greater degree of autonomy in their ODA approaches.

Despite the difference in approaches between Brazil and South Africa, both cases suggest that non-DAC donors' ODA practices are complementary and not likely to replace existing policies. The evidence shows that they are both focusing on their own developmental history, as South Africa historically used the aid it received to finance democratization, whilst Brazil's national policy structuring of their healthcare and agricultural sectors have led to domestic poverty reduction (Kragelund, 2011). Expertise of this nature as well as the manner of cooperation in Brazilian research projects are based on a more contemporary method of development and more closely resonate with the case of Mozambique. Despite that, the significant impact and long-term economic growth of projects financed by DAC member nations, such as the infrastructure projects Japan has been undertaken involve such significant amounts of spending that Mozambique will likely always opt for these kinds of projects. The spending shown by Brazil and South Africa is relatively insignificant in that regard. For that same reason, the criticisms of emerging donors relating to a hinderance of structural reform seem to hold little merit in this study, as the manner of aid provided does not hinder, nor replace the neoliberal structural reform.

The infancy of the non-DAC member's donor experience furthermore establishes that there currently is no real benefit in autonomous project management practices. Japan employs the traditional project cycle used by the world bank, and whilst flaws in this project cycle have been highlighted, especially in terms of autonomy of managerial staff and biased evaluation, the fact that Brazil and South Africa have little to offer as alternative means that the traditional model is in this context the most effective.

To conclude, most of the debates on emerging donors seem to stem from the introduction of China on the world stage, as despite some resource extractive tendencies, Brazil's engagement more matches the postcolonial way of thinking. For that same reason, it is difficult to apply a single theory to any of these nations, and the theory related to emerging donors is not universal. International pressure and political proactivity seem to be the only dominant themes as the research has shown that emerging donors do not all have the same amount of political autonomy necessary to make foreign aid decisions that drastically differ from those of the global north.

The limitations of this research are primarily centred around the availability of contemporary research and the recency of the ODA engagement of the emerging donors, particularly South Africa. Additional research on the effectiveness of the South African advocacy for reform as well as the development of project cycles by emerging donors would provide a better conceptual overview of the role emerging donors can play in the future of developmental aid.

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