The Inclusion of Former Rebel Groups in Post-Conflict Electoral Politics: The Guarantee for Durable Peace

A comparative case study of Rwanda, Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique

Name: Charlotte van Eijk

Student Number: 1693255

Course Specialization: Master Thesis Seminar, Conflict, Security & Peace in International Politics

Word Count: 9977

Date: 11th of January 2021

Thesis Supervisor: Juan Masullo J.

Second Reader: Corinna Jentzsch

Table of Contents

Abstract

This thesis aims to uncover the conditions under which the involvement of former rebel groups in post-conflict politics contributes to enduring peace. Many of today's peace settlements are built around the promises of post-conflict electoral politics and the involvement of former rebel groups in this process. Yet, the electoral process entails high levels of uncertainty for combatants, which makes credible commitment to electoral politics rather difficult. Therefore, conflict scholars have tried to identify ways by which the problems of commitment can be resolved. Nevertheless, there is a lack of consistency within the literature on what specific conditions determine whether the involvement of former combatants in post-conflict electoral politics contributes to durable peace. This study aims to fill this gap by examining how the interaction of the three main conditions: third-party assistance, levels of institutionalization, and power-sharing institutions, affects the relation between the participation of former combatants in post-conflict politics and durable peace. I combine within-case process-tracing with a case comparison of Rwanda, Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique.

1. Introduction

Nowadays most civil wars end in peace settlements rather than in a victory for one side. To settle the rules within the peace settlement context, both combatants and the international community point out the promises of post-conflict elections and the involvement of former rebel groups in post-conflict electoral politics for sustaining peace (Einsiedel 2017, 3; Matanock 2017a, 7). Therefore, examining the relationship between the participation of former combatants in post-conflict elections and enduring peace can provide relevant insights for scholars and policymakers that are interested in understanding what fosters peace in the long run.

The involvement of former rebel groups in post-conflict elections in relation to enduring peace after civil conflict appears to be a divisive issue. Most studies seem to agree on the idea that the involvement of former armed opposition groups in the post-conflict electoral process in itself does not provide for durable peace (Manning and Smith 2016, 973). Some even argue that the integration of former rebel groups within party politics may "reduce the chance of a stable settlement" given that they often fail to credibly commit to the electoral process (Matanock 2017a, 5; Walter 1999, 154). Therefore, scholars and policymakers[1] that focus on the reconstruction of war-torn states have tried to understand the relevant conditions under which post-conflict elections and the involvement of former rebel groups into the political process can produce durable peace. However, there is a lack of consensus within the literature on what specific conditions and more specifically what combination of factors determine whether the involvement of former combatants in post-conflict electoral politics contributes to sustainable peace.

[1] For example: Brancati and Snyder 2013; Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Jarstad 2009; Manning 2007; Manning and Smith 2016; Matanock 2017a, 2017b; Paris 2004; Walter 1997, 1999, 2002.

Therefore, this thesis examines the following research question: *under what conditions can the integration of former rebel groups in post-conflict electoral politics contribute to sustainable peace?* The aim of the analysis is to build a comprehensive framework that emphasizes the potential of the interaction between the three main conditions: third-party assistance, institutional reform and power-sharing institutions. I argue that the presence of these three factors during the peacebuilding process, positively impacts combatants' credible commitment to post-conflict electoral politics on the long run. The paper examines four case studies to find whether all three conditions are jointly necessary to consolidate credible commitment to the peace deal by former rebels. Here, I compare the Mozambican case study, a success story that includes all three conditions, with the cases of Rwanda, Liberia and Angola that deal with either ineffective third-party assistance, high levels of institutional instability, or the absence of power-sharing mechanisms.

First, I explore the literature that analyzes the impact of the three conditions on the relation between the inclusion of former rebel groups in post-conflict electoral politics and enduring peace. After that, I present my theoretical argument that is based on how the interaction between these three conditions may eliminate the problems of credible commitment to the post-conflict electoral process by former rebel groups. The research methodology presents the logic underlying the cases I select for process-tracing and cross-case comparison. To conclude, I outline my findings from the analysis, reflect on the possible limits of this study and consider how to move forwards to improve and further test it.

2. Third-party assistance, institutional reforms, and power-sharing pacts: The guarantors for the rebels' commitment to post-conflict electoral politics

Most scholars in the fields of peacebuilding and electoral politics research acknowledge the inability of combatants to fully commit to the electoral process without the provision of credible guarantees (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015; Hartzell et al. 2001; Ottaway 2003; Paris 2004; Santiso 2001, 2002; Walter 1999, 2002; Brancati and Snyder 2012; Flores and Nooruddin 2012; Jarstad 2009; Manning 2007; Manning and Smith 2016; Matanock 2017a, 2017b). The electoral process entails the possible threat of power loss and thus the ability for a rival to consolidate its authority and to exploit the increased control over state power to weaken its opponent. This makes "adversaries highly unlikely to be willing to play by the rules of the democratic game" (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 47; Walter 1999, 133). For combatants to fully commit to electoral politics and to accept electoral outcomes, a set of security measures has to be present (Walter 1999, 133). Both bodies of literature identify certain conditions that can deliver these security guarantees. However, these studies tend to disagree about what conditions provide the guarantees needed to overcome the problems of commitment for combatants. The examination of the factors pointed out within this literature and the lack of consensus among the different works can contribute to a better understanding of what specific conditions positively affect the relationship between the involvement of former rebel groups in post-conflict electoral politics and durable peace. Therefore, I examine three conditions that dominate these scholarly debates: (I) third-party assistance, (II) institutional reforms, and (III) power-sharing pacts.

2.1 International peacebuilding and risky early post-conflict elections

The end of the Cold War in the 1990s embarked the rise of international peacebuilding missions that aimed at ending and preventing civil conflicts around the world. To facilitate lasting peace in war-torn states, international peacebuilding follows the lines of democratization, which sets the foundations for democratic reform and assures that former

rebels demobilize (Manning and Smith 2016, 972; Ottaway 2003, 314-6; Paris 2004). Initially, the international community largely promoted "the holding of relatively free and fair elections," as it expected that electoral politics would contribute to the consolidation of democratic governance (Santiso 2002, 578). Here, outsiders provided "low-cost, long-term mechanisms," including technical support with regard to the design of the electoral system and the management of elections through observation and supervision (Santiso 2001, 163; Matanock 2017b, 107). According to Matanock, the implementation of such "electoral participation provisions, to detect and sanction noncompliance to the electoral process," is what makes third-party assistance a necessary component of peacebuilding in post-conflict states (Matanock 2017a, 11; Matanock 2017b, 130). Moreover, Walter argues that combatants' faith in democracy assistance by outsiders strongly depends on the degree of external engagement and the way in which third parties express their commitment to electoral management (Walter 1999, 129-30; Walter 2002, 27). She emphasizes that "the more committed and capable a third-party appears to be and the better able to communicate this commitment, the more likely it is to convince adversaries to disarm and comply with the electoral process" (Walter 2002, 27).

Yet, other studies have uncovered shortcomings in the international approach of democracy assistance. The promotion of democracy in postwar societies has led to the conduct of increasingly early post-conflict elections (Brancati and Snyder 2012, 822-3). Brancati and Snyder acknowledge that the "international and domestic pressure to hold early elections" overshadowed the need to deal with local security problems and to develop stable and strong institutions (Brancati and Snyder 2012, 826-7). Similarly, Santiso claims that "elections do not equal democracy and are just the beginning of the longer and often messy process of democracy building" (Santiso 2001, 163). He shows that the international peacebuilding model fails to build a strategy that encompasses all issues that emerge during the transition towards durable peace. A policy framework that Ottaway describes as "a plan of action that is too complex and

too sophisticated" to be implemented on the long run (Ottaway 2003, 317). Hence, the promises of democracy assistance by external actors alone, in particular the promotion of early post-conflict elections by the international community, appears to be not enough for armed groups to demobilize and keep committed in the long-term.

2.2 Fragile states and the problems of weak institutions

Most states that suffered from civil conflict for years deal with a loss of "legitimacy, authority, effectiveness and efficiency" of their institutions (Santiso 2002, 579). According to Santiso, these public institutions are the first governing bodies that must be rebuilt to avoid the recurrence of war between adversaries and safeguard the rule of law and public security (Santiso 2002, 579). Hartzell et al. build a similar argument and claim that the absence of an effective state agency, which is able to perform the "society's agreed-upon rules," raises the levels of insecurity in a state (Hartzell et al. 2001, 185). Here, the authors underline two security problems that may arise when such state bodies are absent or limited: firstly, the potential threat of exploitation and repression of "politically disadvantaged peoples" by the political elite, and secondly, recurrence of conflict because of "the state's inability to provide durable leadership to society" (Hartzell et al. 2001, 184-5).

However, the consolidation of strong democratic institutions in war-torn states derives from a lengthy process of rebuilding democratic governance, restoring the rule of law, enhancing the judicial and legislative bodies, and reinforcing the political integration of minority groups (Brancati and Snyder 2013, 826-9; Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 562; Hartzell et al. 2001, 187; Santiso 2002, 578). Flores and Nooruddin link the degree of institutionalization to the levels of credible commitment to post-conflict electoral politics and stress that "inchoate political institutions cannot effectively manage the inevitable tensions accompanying early post-conflict elections" (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 558). With tensions, they refer to the possible failure of commitment to peace and democratic principles by the election winners,

which may result in enduring mistrust and the return of violence (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 558). These scholars suggest that if "democratic institutions are relatively stronger and more mature," officials are less likely to be fraudulent during elections, return to violence after electoral outcomes, and jeopardize the democratic norms after electoral victory (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 561-2). Therefore, an extended period of institution building prior to the first elections appears to be necessary to overcome noncompliance to the electoral process and increase the successes of post-conflict elections (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 568).

2.3 Power-sharing institutions and democratic practices

"Democracy requires uncertainty in order to function" (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 47). This statement made by Hartzell and Hoddie clarifies why adversaries cannot always adapt to the democratic game. In democracies, opponents must realize that they have the ability to win elections and obtain considerable state power, but simultaneously face the possible risk of losing elections and being excluded from the political arena (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 47; Walter 2002, 27). Moreover, Walter underlines that "new democratic institutions are oftentimes too fragile in the direct aftermath of civil conflict to halt a power grab and thus enforce what the disarmed opposition itself can no longer enforce itself" (Walter 2002, 29). To eliminate uncertainty amongst former combatants and encourage them to comply with the electoral rules that can be found in a democracy, both Hartzell and Hoddie, and Walter suggest that the implementation of power-sharing institutions can assure that all parties comply with the electoral process and respect the principles of democracy (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 49-50; Walter 2002, 28-9). Power-sharing institutions can safeguard various levels of political, military, territorial or economic power for certain groups, which ensures that not a single party is able to dominate state power and use it to promote its own interests while endangering the security of other groups (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 40; Lijphart 1977). Thus, power-sharing

settlements prove able to remove the risks of postwar elections, and thereby promote the adherence of sustaining democracy and peace in these states.

Nevertheless, Jarstad finds that the higher level of security offered by power-sharing settlements creates an unstable political climate rather than a solid democratic system (Jarstad 2009, 42-3). Here, the argument made by Brancati and Snyder about the possible risks associated with power-sharing seems to support Jarstad's findings (Brancati and Snyder 2013, 829). They argue that the rebel groups' leader can abuse its position of authority without the serious risk of losing office, because of its fixed power position in the government (Brancati and Snyder 2013, 829). Besides, the fixed dominance of former combatants in state bodies "provide group leaders with little incentive to broaden their support bases beyond old cleavage lines" (Brancati and Snyder 2013, 829). This can diminish democratic accountability and increase the chance of renewed conflict in the long run (Brancati and Snyder 2013, 829). Hence, scholars that focus on the potential of power-sharing elements seem to disagree on whether power-sharing institutions can secure combatants' credible commitment to the democratic game and prevent the misuse of state power.

The literature under review explores the functioning of third-party assistance, institutionalization and power-sharing institutions in countries that make the transition from war to peace. Scholars found that all three conditions impact the relationship between former rebels' participation in post-conflict elections and sustaining peace. However, they question the extent to which these factors are effective and legitimate tools for keeping former combatants committed to the post-conflict electoral process. Third-party assistance as such proves unlikely to ensure that former combatants remain fully committed to the post-conflict electoral process. The same applies to the other two conditions, considering that democratic institutions generate "a level of uncertainty" and power-sharing institutions involve the possible risk of exploitation of power resources by former rebel groups. Whereas scholars identified the possible

shortcomings of these conditions and the challenges that may arise when only one of these conditions is present, they have overlooked the potential of the interaction between all three factors. Yet, the way in which these factors seem to interact may allow for the creation of a comprehensive framework under which the involvement of former rebel groups in post-conflict electoral politics can produce sustainable peace. Therefore, the following section presents a theoretical framework in which the potential of the interaction between these three conditions will be further explored.

3. Understanding the dynamics between third-party assistance, institutional reforms, and power-sharing institutions

3.1 The electoral process and the problems of credible commitment by former rebels

Post-conflict electoral politics entails high levels of uncertainty about how state power is distributed. When a former rebel party loses or feels that there is a chance of electoral defeat, it may foresee greater gains by returning to violent means instead of keeping committed to the negotiated settlement. In this case, continued commitment may jeopardize the group's survival (Matanock 2017a, 6-7; Matanock 2017b, 95; Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 47). Moreover, the party that wins post-conflict elections may exploit its political victory to enhance further concessions, weaken its political opponent or renege on the peace settlement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 47; Walter 1999, 133). In both instances, adversaries struggle to show credible commitment to the rules of the electoral game (Matanock 2017a, 8; Fearon 1995, 408).

Accordingly, to ensure that former armed opposition groups will comply with the electoral process, the benefit of commitment should outweigh the costs (Matanock 2017a, 9; Martin 2014, 83). Here, combatants assess whether the adaptation to electoral politics benefits their goals and popular support base (Martin 2014, 83; Manning 2007, 254). However, as Martin underlines, "adaptation to electoral politics is costly," because it demands a shift in the rebels' sources of organizational power and control, which makes them vulnerable for exploitation and loss of power (Martin 2014, 83; Manning 2007, 254). As long as such security concerns exist, rebel groups probably prefer fighting and are more likely to return to the battlefield (Kirschner 2010, 746; Walter 1997, 338-9).

To prevent renewed fighting between the adversaries and enable rebel groups to adhere to the post-conflict electoral process on the long run, I argue that a combination of internal and external conditions should be present during the peacebuilding process. With these factors in place, combatants are more likely to adjust to and invest in electoral politics on the long run.

Nevertheless, as the literature study in the previous part revealed, the individual effectiveness of the three main factors, third-party assistance, institutional reforms, and power-sharing pacts, in keeping former combatants committed to post-conflict electoral politics, tends to be limited. The way in which these conditions interact, on the other hand, seems more promising given that third-party assistance, institutionalization and power-sharing institutions appear to positively affect each other's functioning as guarantees by which combatants will credibly commit to post-conflict electoral politics on the long run. Here, each factor seems to compensate for the limitations of the other factors. Hence, I build my theoretical argument on the interaction of these three conditions. Third-party assistance, a level of institutionalization, and power-sharing institutions altogether are guarantees under which continued participation of former combatants in post-conflict electoral politics can produce enduring peace.

3.2 How these factors interact

Third parties assist in the reconstruction of fragile states that just made the transition from war to peace, to prevent the return of civil conflict between adversaries (Santiso 2002, 557). To consolidate stable peace, the international peacebuilding model strongly promotes democratic reform and assists in the recovery of state institutions, like the judiciary and the legislation (Santiso 2002, 579). External actors can, amongst others, provide technical advice, assist in the creation of democratic institutions – in particular electoral bodies –, monitor the electoral process, develop legal frameworks, smoothen the communication between opposing parties, and sanction the possible non-performance by adversaries (Matanock 2017b, 101-7; Santiso 2001, 163; Walter 2002, 13-4; The UN Secretary-General 2019, 11-2). Hence, the levels of institutionalization in war-torn states oftentimes largely depend on the assistance provided by outsiders.

Nevertheless, whereas third-party assistance seems to largely facilitate institution building, external actors do not always have the required means to check and foster the

principles of democracy in unstable states (Walter 2002, 27; Ottaway 2003, 320; Santiso 2002, 573-81). The "democratic reconstruction model" that has been developed by third parties, seems to be over-ambitious and unrealistic. In this design, war-torn states are expected to deal with their issues through the implementation of multiple democracy reforms. Yet, the weak and chaotic institutional climate in these countries makes this impossible without the presence of strong and long-term third-party assistance (Ottaway 2003, 317). In practice, however, third parties often prove incapable to fully operationalize the complex and costly policy framework by which democracy can be rebuild (Ottaway 2003, 320; Santiso 2002, 573). Instead of a robust, long-term intervention by third parties, the international community have increasingly promoted the holding of early post-conflict elections in war-torn states (Brancati and Snyder 2012, 823). Such elections may increase the chances of renewed fighting between the warring factions, because states that just come out of civil war still largely suffer from a weak institutional environment (Brancati and Snyder 2012, 824-6).

Even when fragile states enjoy massive third-party assistance and a prolonged period of institutional consolidation prior to the first post-conflict elections, A certain level of institutional reform cannot remove the uncertainty about who wins elections and who not. Walter argues that "combatants will need far more convincing guarantees that they will not be eliminated from power than the promise of democratic institutions" (Walter 1999, 141). Here, the implementation of power-sharing instruments can safeguard a level of political, military, economic or territorial power for all parties involved, which facilitates the cooperation between the adversaries in government and keeps them committed to electoral politics (Jarstad 2009, 42-3; Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 40). Therefore, power-sharing elements can remove the security issues that come with democratic institutional reform.

However, in the absence of other favorable conditions, like third-party assistance and the presence of powerful institutions, the implementation of power-sharing institutions may

create either short-term or long-term instability (Brancati and Snyder 2012, 829; Jarstad 2009, 42). First, powerful forces sometimes oppose to the implementation of power-sharing agreements, because such agreements may pose a threat to their position of power (Brancati and Snyder 2012, 829). In the long run, power-sharing elements may undermine the levels of democratic accountability in a state, because of the fixed position of authority for former combatants. After all, former rebel leaders can abuse their fixed political power position without the possible threat of losing office (Brancati and Snyder 2012, 829). Here, the creation of a strong institutional framework can minimize the risks of reduced levels of democratic accountability in the long run, given that powerful institutions can check the ex-combatant's credible commitment to democratic governance (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 561).

A framework has been built on the interaction between the three conditions that seem to strongly impact combatants' commitment to post-conflict electoral politics in relation to durable peace between the adversaries on the short as well as the long term (see figure 1). Following this framework, I have come to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: Former rebel parties are more likely to keep committed to electoral politics instead of returning to the battlefield, if all three conditions, third-party assistance, a certain level of institutionalization, and power-sharing institutions are present and interact with one another during the peacebuilding process.

4. Research Methodology

4.1 Within-case process tracing and comparative analysis

The aim of this research is to find what conditions favor rebels' participation in post-conflict elections on the long run. Here, I assume that prolonged involvement of former armed opposition groups in post-conflict electoral politics eliminates the possible return of conflict and thus facilitates durable peace. Most conflict studies often focus on the impact of one of the various factors, instead of the possible meaningful interaction of these factors. Therefore, I will examine the interaction between the three main conditions, third-party assistance, levels of institutionalization, and power-sharing institutions, as this allows for a better understanding about the functional dependence of the factors in contributing to the integration of former rebels in the post-conflict electoral process on the long run. Furthermore, this study may explain the problems of credible commitment that may arise when one of the factors is missing in the peacebuilding process.

This thesis builds on two qualitative research tools, the within-case process tracing method and the comparative case analysis. As argued by Beach and Pedersen, process tracing aims to "identify the intervening causal process between the independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable" (2013, 1). I use the commitment theory, as presented within the theoretical framework, to structure and guide for process tracing. The set of favorable conditions that derived from the credible commitment theory allows for "within-case inferences about whether the combination of factors functioned as expected in a particular case" (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 3). Hence, this approach follows the theory-testing process tracing method.

Nevertheless, the results from the within-case analysis will not enable me to formulate arguments about whether these conditions are jointly necessary to create durable peace (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 3). I tackle this problem by using a comparative case study analysis. I compare four cases, one case study that includes all three factors, one that misses the presence

of third-party assistance, one that lacks a certain level of institutional stability, and one that does not include power-sharing elements. This comparative method enables me to assess if the interaction of the three conditions most consistently produces the favorable outcome.

4.2 Variables

The broad phenomenon of durable peace is taken as the dependent variable. In this thesis, enduring peace is defined as the commitment to the peace settlement by both former rebels and the government on the long run. Here, it is important to note that it only considers the return of conflict between the *same* armed opposition group and government. The implementation of a peace agreement is considered successful when there has not been a return to major violence for at least five years, and when parties have made the attempt to at least partially adopt to the terms of the peace deal (Findley 2013, 914; Walter 2002, 53). I specifically focus on peace deals that include provisions by which former rebel groups transform into political parties, hereby allowing them to engage in post-conflict elections alongside government parties. According to Matanock, the implementation of such participatory arrangements "is associated with an 80 percent increase in the chance that a settlement will produce durable peace" (Matanock 2017a, 4). This high percentage accentuates the potential of participatory elections in sustaining peace after civil conflict (Matanock 2017a, 7).

The involvement of former rebel groups in post-conflict electoral politics refers to the process of the legal transformation of an armed opposition group into a political party and the participation of the rebel party in post-conflict elections, especially in the first election after civil war resolution. Yet, the promise of participatory elections alone seems insufficient in keeping former combatants committed to the peace deal (Walter 1999, 129-30). Therefore, third-party assistance, institutional reforms, and power-sharing elements are taken as the independent variables to determine whether the involvement of former rebel groups in post-conflict electoral politics will be strong enough to produce durable peace.

The first independent variable, third-party assistance, points to the engagement of external actors in the consolidation of durable peace. The UN has been one of the biggest players in promoting new kinds of peacebuilding and peacekeeping models since the 1990s. Therefore, a historical account of UN assistance to member states is presented, including the "democratic governance assistance programs" and "electoral management bodies" that monitor compliance with "the principles of universal and equal suffrage" (The UN Secretary-General 2019, 8-14; Santiso 2002, 556-7). Moreover, the involvement of other external actors, including regional organizations, NGO's, and neighboring countries will be taken into account as well.

Second, institutional reform is assessed by a historical record of the levels of disarmament by former rebels, the military and political security measures introduced to resettle combatants into civilian life, the (re)building of democratic order, the implementation of rule of law and electoral management bodies to control the administrative and electoral procedures, the right to vote, and the conduct of multiparty elections (Ottaway 2003, 316).

The last independent variable – power-sharing institutions – will be measured by the inclusion of power-sharing mechanisms in the negotiated deal. Such institutions can take various forms, including "formation of a grand coalition, proportionality in the distribution of government positions, right of veto for minority groups, and levels of military, territorial, economic, or political autonomy for former rebel groups" (Lijphart 1977; Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 39).

I gather my data from primary and secondary sources, including academic articles, peace accords, UN reports, electoral outcomes, political party campaigns and media sources.

4.3 Case selection: Rwanda, Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique

The empirical analysis will be based on a combination of within-case process tracing and comparative analysis of four case studies. This design enables me to strengthen the causal inferences and provides more certainty about whether the phenomenon can be applied more

broadly. The first three case studies presented, demonstrate the return of conflict between the same adversaries, because one of the conditions was either absent or unsuccessfully implemented. The last case is one in which all three factors can be found. Here, the interaction between these conditions seems to positively impact the involvement of former rebel groups in post-conflict elections, and hereby minimize the threat of renewed civil war between the same adversaries and stabilize peace in the long run.

First, the Rwandan civil war of the early 1990s illustrates the failure by the international community to deliver the resources and protection needed for opponents to remain committed to the peace terms. The second case, Liberia's post-conflict elections of 1997 show the return of conflict due to the historical patterns of institutional breakdown. Thirdly, Angola's electoral process of 1992 exemplifies a case in which no power-sharing elements were implemented. Lastly, Mozambique proves that the transition towards elections with the support of third parties, a strong enough institutional framework and power-sharing institutions have resulted in the survival of post-conflict democracy for more than twenty years (See Table 1).

Table 1 *Case selection*

Country	Present conditions	Absent conditions	Outcome
Rwanda: The Arusha Accords of 1993	Power-sharing elements A certain level of institutionalization	Legitimate and effective third-party assistance	The Rwandan genocide of the 1990s
Liberia: The Abuja Peace Accords of 1996	Power-sharing elements Third-party assistance	Stable institutional framework	Return to war between Taylor's party NPP and militias
Angola: The Bicesse Accords of 1991	A certain level of institutionalization Third-party assistance	Power-sharing measures	Return to war between UNITA and MPLA
Mozambique: The General Peace Agreement of 1992	Third-party assistance A certain level of institutionalization Power-sharing elements	None	Durable peace between FRELIMO and RENAMO

5. A comparative case analysis of Rwanda, Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique

5.1 Rwanda's genocide of the 1990s: The lack of credible third-party assistance by the UN

Rwanda, a small country in Central Africa, presents the first comparative case study and illustrates the possible failure of third-party assistance to keep all actors committed to the implementation phase of a peace deal. With the signing of the Arusha Accords in 1993, the Hutu government and Tutsi-led rebel force, RPF, agreed on the transition from ethnic civil conflict to a "participatory, multi-party democracy" (Paris 2004, 70). The United Nations (UN) took the leading role in protecting the safety of both parties when they entered the demobilization phase and prepared for peace. Nevertheless, the UN did not have the required means to perform this security role (Walter 2002, 158). The failure of the UN to offer protection to the adversaries, fueled instability and violence and ultimately caused a genocide in which around 250 000 Tutsi's were killed (Walter 2002, 156). Following the Rwandan example, third party assistance seems to play a leading role in the levels of commitment to the implementation of peace settlements by rebel groups.

5.1.1 The Arusha Accords: Successfully negotiated, incorrectly implemented

The brutal political struggle for state power between the Hutus and Tutsis started already in the 1960s, when the Belgian colonial rule was forced by both the Hutus and the international community to introduce democratic reform. Subsequently, state control was taken over by the Hutus, who started to violently repress, exclude and ban the Tutsi minority out of Rwanda (McDonough 2008, 364; Paris 2004, 69-70). Most of the Tutsi refugees fled to neighboring state Uganda, where they received military training while serving in the Ugandan army. These Tutsis united in an armed wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that launched an attack on the Hutu regime in Rwanda in 1990 (Paris 2004, 70; Brattberg 2012, 157). The invasion of 1990

by the RPF produced a civil war that later gave rise to "the most rapid genocide in history" in 1994 (McDonough 2008, 363; Walter 2002, 143).

The fighting continued until 1993, when the rivals made concessions and negotiated a peace accord, the Arusha accords. The Arusha accords included the principles of power-sharing through the establishment of a transitional government run by both Hutus and Tutsis. Besides, the deal included the involvement of two competitive armed forces, the reintegration of Tutsi refugees, and the holding of parliamentary elections in 1995 (Walter 2002, 150-1; Paris 2004, 70). On paper, the Arusha accords presented a sound civil war resolution. However, compliance with the peace deal by both groups rapidly diminished as ethnic tensions and mistrust between the rivals grew (Walter 2002, 20-1, 153-160; Kirschner 2010, 746). Radical Hutus were particularly unsatisfied with the power-sharing agreement and started a violent genocide against the Tutsis (Brattberg 2012, 157; McDonough 2008, 364).

5.1.2 The Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the failure of third-parties assistance

As Walter argues, "implementation depends on the willingness of the third party to fulfill its promised role" (Walter 2002, 154). In Rwanda, the UN mission, UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), supervised the implementation of the agreed terms of the peace deal (Paris 2004, 72). UNAMIR had multiple responsibilities, including the protection of Rwanda's capital city Kigali, the observation of the frontier with Uganda, the monitoring of military reforms, and from 1995 onwards, the contribution to the groundwork for presidential and parliamentary elections (Paris 2004, 72; Walter 2002, 150-3). However, the UN mission became one of the biggest peacebuilding failures of all time and the confidence in the international community and the promotion of liberal democratic principles by third parties was strongly challenged by the return of violence in Rwanda in 1994 (Brattberg 2012, 156; Paris 2004, 72).

First, the UN Security Council did not approve the mission until two months after the signing of the peace accord, which resulted in an immediate delay of the implementation of the

peace agreement, mostly the establishment of a transitional government (Walter 2002, 154; Barnett 2002, 74-75). Second, the lack of sufficient resources for the UN mission made it impossible for the UNAMIR force to properly observe, monitor, supervise and guarantee the levels of security needed for the rivals to remain committed to the peace deal (Brattberg 2010, 157-8; Paris 2004, 73-4; Walter 2002, 154-5). Indeed, the overall security promise by the UN failed, given that the number of peacekeepers sent by the UN was much lower than recommended in the first place (Walter 2002, 154). Besides, most of these peacekeepers were oftentimes either badly equipped or inexperienced (Brattberg 2010, 158). Lastly, the attempts to strengthen UNAMIR were largely unsuccessful, because of the little interest of the UN member states to expand UN force to Rwanda (Paris 2004, 73). Hence, in Rwanda, the UN failed to deliver the resources needed to fulfil the promise to monitor and secure the principles of liberal democracy, which in turn made the commitment to the peace process by adversaries highly unlikely.

5.2 Liberia's elections of 1997: State collapse and the continuation of authoritarianism

This section examines the case study of Liberia, a small state situated along the west coast of the African continent. The Liberian experience exemplifies the possible recurrence of civil conflict after the holding of post-conflict elections, when no effective government bodies are present to check and sanction exploitation and repression of state resources and rivals by the political elite (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 558). Accordingly, the case of Liberia underlines the need for the consolidation of strong political, administrative, and judicial institutions to prevent potential abusive practices by the political elite and keep them committed to the principles of electoral politics (Brancati and Snyder 2013, 829).

5.2.1 An authoritarian past

Liberia's political climate became increasingly fragile and volatile, when a small political elite of Americo-Liberians took over power after Liberia's independence of 1948. The ruling elite was the first to exploit its state power to strengthen clientelist networks and secure their "feudal oligarchic regime" (Paris 2004, 90; McDonough 2008, 360). In 1980, however, the Americo-Liberian regime was overthrown by a military coup under Master Sergeant Samuel Doe (Ciment 2015, 202; Paris 2004, 90). The violent takeover by Doe led to the continuation of institutional breakdown, given that his rule progressively undermined the Liberian bureaucracy and reinforced the patronage system that mostly benefited his own ethnic minority group (Paris 2004, 90; McDonough 2008, 360). Hence, Liberia's institutional capacity has been continually challenged by manipulation, clientelism and violent suppression of ethnic minorities, which gave rise to an illegitimate, ineffective and inefficient institutional framework long before the start of Liberia's civil war in the 1990s.

By the late 1980s, resistance to Doe's repressive authoritarian regime grew enormously and a former member of the Doe administration, Charles Taylor, saw his chance to seize power over government bodies with the assistance of his rebel force, National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Taylor's coup received widespread support by Liberians and the territorial control by the opposition force rapidly increased. Yet, the NPFL split up into different military factions that started to fight against Taylor's militia and hereby prevented a victory for Taylor (Ciment 2015, 204; Paris 2004, 91). As a result, fighting continued between the different rebel forces, which ignited a civil war that costed the lives of many civilians.

5.2.2 The promising elections of 1997: Taylor's victory and "fake" democratic peace

The establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by Liberian's neighboring countries in the 1970s marked the beginning of a peacebuilding process in Liberia, which was later joined by several other international organizations, including the

UN. ECOWAS initiated multiple peace negotiations, but it was not until 1996 that all factions agreed upon the second Abuja Peace Accord (Paris 2004, 91; Abuja Agreement 1995). With the signing of the Abuja agreement, all factions agreed upon a cease-fire by which a transitional government – a power-sharing government that was run by six different faction leaders – together with international monitoring bodies supervised the process of disarmament and demobilization and prepared for democratic elections (Abuja Agreement 1995; Call 2010, 347; Paris 2004, 91). The international community offered technical assistance and shaped the electoral rules, among which the ability of a majority vote for a single presidential candidate was precluded (Paris 2004, 91). Nonetheless, Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) won with more than two-third of all votes, which enabled the NPP to secure power over the parliament and congress (Tanner 1998, 139). Despite "complete victory" for Taylor, the international community expressed its optimism about the effective conclusion of disarmament and demobilization prior to the elections and the relatively smooth running of the electoral process. Shortly thereafter, the UN stated that the peacebuilding mission was successfully completed and left (Call 2010, 347, 359; Paris 2004, 92).

Although the elections of 1997 ended civil conflict in Liberia and contributed to increased levels of political stability, the "political liberalization" did not facilitate any required state reforms (Paris 2004, 95). As a result, the fundamental conditions that resulted in Liberia's state collapse and the outbreak of civil conflict were still largely present. The weakening of the state's bureaucracy and the expansion of patronage networks continued under the Taylor administration (McDonough 2008, 365-6; Paris 2004, 95-6). Manipulation of government agencies by Taylor's presidency was reflected in his exclusionary behaviour by which his regime harassed and oppressed political opponents, monopolized media sources, intimidated journalists, and sustained strong organizational networks and enormous financial and military resources (Paris 2004, 92-96; Brancati and Snyder 2013, 829; Call 2010, 348, 353-5, 359-60;

Tanner 1998, 138). Thus, the elections of 1997 provided for the continuation of a competitive authoritarian regime rather than a transition towards democratic governance and stable peace.

However, from 1999, Taylor's self-serving government faced growing resistance from rebel groups, which again fueled violence throughout the country and led to the return of civil conflict from 2000 until 2003. In 2003, a major attack on the Liberian capital city of Monrovia by the rebel groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), overthrew Taylor's regime and forced him into exile in Nigeria (Ciment 2015, 208-11; McDonough 2008, 366).

5.2.3 Institutional failure and the problems of underlying war patterns

The Liberian electoral experience of 1997 points out the possible threat of renewed civil conflict, when institutional checks are weak or absent. The absence of a strong bureaucracy, an autonomous and effective judiciary and legislature, and independent media bodies in Liberia, tempted the political elite to exploit the state's administrative, judicial, and financial resources and repress political opponents (Brancati and Snyder 2013, 829). Liberia's problems of institutional breakdown by the late 1990s, largely followed from the "underlying historical patterns of conflict" in which political leaders "hijacked" state institutions for self-serving purposes (Brancati and Snyder 2013, 829; Paris 2004, 94). Therefore, case studies that lack the historical legacy of strong political institutions, like Liberia, require intensive levels of institutionalization during the post-conflict period before and alongside the holding of elections.

5.3 Angola's "winner-take-all" elections of 1992

This part presents the case study of Angola, a country situated along the Southwestern African coast. In Angola, the peace settlement of 1991 between the rebel group, UNITA, and the ruling party, MPLA, facilitated the holding of presidential elections that conformed to the principles of a liberal democracy (Paris 2004, 63). Yet, such "free and fair" elections may result in

electoral loss if not total exclusion from political power (Hartzell and Hoddie 2015, 47; Walter 2002, 27). In this regard, UNITA struggled largely, because of the high levels of uncertainty imposed by the electoral process. Hence, the Angolan case illustrates the need for "far more convincing guarantees" – here, the implementation of power-sharing elements – than the ability to secure political power through electoral participation (Walter 1999, 141).

5.3.1 Angola's independence of 1975: Civil conflict onset and the first peacebuilding efforts

When Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975, the leftist party, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), took over power. However, MPLA was brutally contested by two rival forces, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the rising rival party, Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Ciment 2015, 86). Whereas the FNLA was rapidly defeated, UNITA posed a bigger challenge to the ruling party and the fighting between the latter two groups continued for over fifteen years (Paris 2004, 63). The continuation of conflict largely benefitted the rebel group, considering that it "simply had to survive in order to win" (Ciment 2015, 90). Nevertheless, the war gave rise to massive casualties, hunger and refugee flows, which resulted in growing pressure from financial donors and sanctions posed by foreign states (Ciment 2015, 90).

Accordingly, civil conflict in Angola alarmed the international community, which made multiple attempts to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table, yet without much success. Peace negotiations only succeeded in 1991, when both parties signed the Bicesse Accords. This accord included procedures for a cease-fire, democratic multiparty elections based on a majority system and supervised by the UN, the admission of two military forces into the national army and the establishment of a joint committee to rebuild the constitution. The implementation of the peace accords was monitored by the UN and international electoral observers (Ciment 2015, 90; Paris 2004, 64). However, the adversaries entered the peace negotiations bearing in mind that they could obtain total power over the government. Herewith, the rival groups assess if a

turn to electoral politics benefits their objectives and increases popular support (Martin 2014, 83). UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi wrote that "only through elections will the Angolan people get a government that they see as legitimate" (Savimbi 1998; Spears 2010, 196). Thus, the participation of the rival group can be considered as "a tactical move to win" rather than a genuine effort to cooperate and build a stable democracy (Lyons 2005, 63).

5.3.2 From peace settlement to elections: Winning the elections is a zero-sum game

The very short implementation period before the holding of elections in 1992, led to the absence of a strong combined military force and limited demobilization by both adversaries, who rejected to surrender their military power to meet the rules of the electoral game. The sustained military strength of both UNITA and MPLA provoked prolonged threats of war during the transition towards democracy (Lyons 2005, 64-6; Spears 2010, 199). Nonetheless, as concluded by UN observers, the months ahead of the election days were quite peaceful and similarly, the days of polling proceeded in a fair and peaceful manner (Lyons 2005, 65; Paris 2004, 66). Whereas the election days were relatively steady, the following months of vote counting suffered from increased tensions among UNITA officials, who ran behind in the vote count (Paris 2004, 66-7). Once Savimbi heard that he lost the first election round to the MPLA, – the party did not achieve a majority vote – he did not acknowledge the electoral outcomes and returned to the battlefield where UNITA still possessed over considerable power (Paris 2004, 67; Lyons 2005, 66). Hence, the performance of free and fair elections in Angola that developed during the peacebuilding process of the 1980s and 90s, caused renewed civil war that continued until 1994 (Lyons 2005, 66).

The design of Angola's elections of 1992 was built on the "winner-take-all" principle in which the winning president would obtain almost total control over state institutions, including political, administrative and financial resources. Thus, no power-sharing elements were implemented, which made electoral defeat equivalent to the loss of control over the

government (Matanock 2017a, 249; Spears 2010, 199). Consequently, when UNITA lost round one of the presidential elections, the rebel group had little incentive to continue their compliance with the negotiated settlements (Matanock 2017a, 248-9). However, the possible failure of establishing power-sharing institutions in Angola's peacebuilding process of 1992 can be linked to the demand for complete state control by the rebel force. After all, UNITA's objective was to achieve full state power (Spears 2010, 203).

5.4 Mozambique's peace deal of 1992: A success story of credible commitment and democratic consolidation?

Finally, the case study of Mozambique, a southeastern African country that successfully ended civil conflict between the FRELIMO government and the rebel group RENAMO with the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992. Mozambique's civil war resolution shows that despite high levels of uncertainty throughout the negotiation as well as the implementation phase of the peace settlement, rebels were able to demobilize and adapt to post-conflict electoral politics on the long run (Weinstein 2002, 141; Walter 1999, 144). Continued commitment to the peace agreement by the rivals can be mostly attributed to a combination of intensive assistance by the international community and the establishment of power-sharing institutions. For RENAMO, these conditions provided the political and financial incentives to demobilize, transform into a political party and participate in multiparty elections alongside FRELIMO (Weinstein 2002, 149). On the other hand, the presence of these factors pressured FRELIMO to adopt a new constitution that allowed for the holding of multiparty elections and the participation by new political parties (Walter 1999, 146). Accordingly, Ottaway's description of Mozambique as "the poster child of the early period of democratic reconstruction" seems fairly convincing (Ottaway 2003, 316).

5.4.1 From war to peace: The General Peace Agreement of 1992

Mozambique followed a similar path to independence from the Portuguese domination as Angola. In 1975, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) ousted the Portuguese colonists and took over state power (Ciment 2015, 230; Paris 2004, 141). Two years of peace followed, however the provision of support to black armed opposition groups in neighboring state Rhodesia – now known as Zimbabwe – entailed the rise of a violent campaign by the Rhodesian white political elite against Mozambique in 1976. This violent campaign was executed by an armed opposition group, Resistencia Nacional Moçambique (RENAMO), which mostly consisted out of Mozambican soldiers (Paris 2004, 141; Manning 2008, 54). To account for the use of violent tactics and attract popular support, RENAMO created a storyline that incorporated local grievances (Manning 2008, 58; Carbone 2003, 424-5). Moreover, both groups received considerable support by outsiders, resulting in the intensification of fighting between the FRELIMO government and the rebel group RENAMO. The civil war continued for more than fifteen years and led to the killing of roughly one million people (Paris 2004, 141; Ciment 2015, 236).

By the late 1980s, the devastating effects of the war combined with protracted drought and growing pressure from the international financial institutions, spurred the first attempts at peace talks. After two years of peace negotiations, the adversaries finally reached a peace agreement in 1992 under the supervision of the Catholic Church in Mozambique, the General Peace Agreement (Weinstein 2002, 149). The peace deal marked the very beginning of the transition towards democratic governance (Carbone 2005, 419; Paris 2004, 141). The principal conditions of the peace agreement included the disarmament of RENAMO's military force to enable the creation of a national army that integrated an equal amount of RENAMO and FRELIMO troops, the return of power over RENAMO-held territory to the central government, the implementation of multiparty elections, the freedom of press, association and movement, and finally the establishment of an independent commission that observes rule of law (Manning

2008, 59; Paris 2004, 14). Hence, democratic reform was essential for returning peace to Mozambique (Carbone 2005, 419).

5.4.2 Third-party assistance, power-sharing institutions and the construction of democratic governance

Because of the high levels of uncertainty associated with demobilization and the little trust in the FRELIMO government to keep its compliance with the peace deal once RENAMO start to disarm, RENAMO pushed for considerable UN assistance in the observation and supervision of the implementation of democratic peace (Walter 1999, 147). Accordingly, the UN operation in Mozambique (ONOMUZ) was founded to provide the guarantees needed for RENAMO to sign the peace agreement and commit to the principal conditions of the deal (Walter 1999, 147-8; Paris 2004, 142). First, the UN made available enormous financial resources to stimulate the process of demobilization and RENAMO's transformation into a political party (Paris 2004, 142; Weinstein 2002, 149). These financial investments contributed to greater confidence among RENAMO leaders about the real chance of compete with the FREMILO party (Weinstein2002, 149). Moreover, the UN deployed UN peacekeeping troops that monitored compliance to the cease-fire agreement, oversaw the process of demobilization, and provided security on the ground through the installation of military personnel (Paris 2004, 142; Weinstein 2002, 149-50). In addition to the financial and military support, the UN oversaw the consolidation of a multiparty electoral system in Mozambique. The UN assisted in the implementation of electoral laws, supervised the electoral process, monitored the respect for civil rights and eased communication between the former rivals (Paris 2004,142; Santiso 2001, 163; The UN Secretary-General 2019, 11-2). Thus, third-party assistance largely facilitated the integration of RENAMO in the post-conflict multiparty system. The institutionalized party system contributed to the consolidation of a market-oriented democracy in which the rule of

law was promoted alongside increased levels of electoral accountability (Paris 2004, 142; Carbone 2005, 418-9).

However, the promotion of democratic governance by the international community was not enough for former combatants demobilize completely (Brown and Zahar 2008, 78; Walter 1999, 141). In 1994, there was still widespread mutual distrust among both groups as both FRELIMO and RENAMO continued to perform smaller violent attacks on each other (Brown and Zahar 2008, 78). To overcome the problems of commitment for the adversaries, power-sharing guarantees were implemented in the General Peace Agreement. These power-sharing institutions consisted of military and territorial guarantees, which prevented the political domination by FRELIMO (Walter 1999, 148; Brown and Zahar 2008; 78-9). First, RENAMO and FRELIMO obtained an equal share of military power in the new national army. Second, FRELIMO approved the presence of RENAMO in most of the territory it had invaded before the adversaries came to an agreement. This would secure RENAMO's position in the government, even if FRELIMO won the elections and declined to establish a coalition (Walter 1999, 149). Thus, the combination of third-party assistance, institutional reform and power-sharing mechanism resulted in prolonged compliance with the peace accord in Mozambique.

6. Conclusion

To conclude, this paper has tried to explore the relevant conditions under which the involvement of former rebel groups in post-conflict electoral politics can contribute to enduring peace. The implementation of free and fair elections after civil war resolution and the integration of former rebel groups in this process seems promising for sustaining peace in the long run. Nevertheless, combatants find it extremely difficult to commit to post-conflict electoral politics, given the high levels of uncertainty associated with democratic governance. Hence, for adversaries to close a peace deal, a set of security measures needs to be present. In this analysis, I found that the interaction between third-party assistance, institutional reform and power-sharing elements, in particular, is crucial to avoid renewed civil conflict. The failure of the UN to protect the peace deal in Rwanda, the institutional breakdown in Liberia, and the "winner-take-all" post-conflict elections in Angola show the little chance of long-term commitment to the peace deal without the presence of these three factors.

In contrast, Mozambique, a country that experienced major external engagement, democratic reform and military and territorial power-sharing pacts, underlines the potential of the interaction of these conditions in keeping former combatants committed to post-conflict electoral politics in the long run. However, despite the enormous efforts to consolidate democracy by both the international community and internal actors in Mozambique over the past 25 years, Mozambique's liberal-democratic system has been constantly challenged by political and social pressures (Ali and Matthews 2016, 142). These challenges seem to hinder the quality of peace in Mozambique. This paper has not explored the quality of peace, as the focus was mostly on the length of peace. Nonetheless, incorporating the quality of peace in this study could provide promising findings about the impact of the three conditions on the relation between the participation of former combatants in post-conflict elections and peace.

Bibliography

'Abuja Agreement to Supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement'. 26 August1995. U.N. Doc. No. S/1995/742. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08191995.pdf.

Ali, T., & Matthews, R. (2016). *Durable Peace : Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa* (Heritage).

Barnett, Michael. 2002. 'Chapter 3: "If This is an Easy Operation…"'. In *Eyewitness to a Genocide*. Cornell University Press.

Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2013. *Process-tracing methods: foundations and guidelines*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Brancati, Dawn, and Jack L. Snyder. 2013. 'Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Postconflict Stability'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57 (5): 822–53.

Brattberg, Erik. 2012. 'Revisiting UN Peacekeeping in Rwanda and Sierra Leone'. *Peace Review* 24 (2): 156-62.

Brown, Stephen, and Marie-Joëlle Zahar. 2008. 'Committing to Peace: Soft Guarantees and Alternative Approaches to Power-Sharing in Angola and Mozambique'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 4 (2): 75-88.

Call, Charles T. 2010. 'Liberia's War Recurrence: Grievance over Greed'. *Civil Wars* 12 (4): 347–69.

Carbone, Giovanni M. 2005. 'Continuidade Na Renovação? Ten Years of Multiparty Politics in Mozambique: Roots, Evolution and Stabilisation of the Frelimo-Renamo Party System'. The Journal of Modern African Studies 43 (3): 417-42.

Ciment, James. 2015. *Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II.* Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.

Fearon, James D. 1995. ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’. *International Organization* 49 (3): 379–414.

Findley, Michael G. 2013. ‘Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution’. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57 (5): 905–32.

Flores, Thomas Edward, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2012. ‘The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction’. *The Journal of Politics* 74 (2): 558–70.

Hartzell, Caroline A., and Matthew Hoddie. 2015. ‘The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post—Civil War Democracy’. *World Politics* 67 (1): 37–71.

Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. 2001. ‘Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables’. *International Organization* 55 (1): 183–208.

Jarstad, Anna K. 2009. ‘The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace’. *Africa Spectrum* 44 (3): 41–62.

Kirschner, Shanna A. 2010. ‘Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars’. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54 (5): 745–70.

Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in plural societies: a comparative exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lyons, Terrence. 2005. ‘Chapter 3: The Legacy of Fear and Voting for Peace’. In *Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace.* Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Manning, Carrie. 2007. ‘Party-Building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique’. *Democratization* 14 (2): 253–72.

———. 2008. ‘Chapter3: Mozambique: RENAMO’s Electoral Success’. In From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War, edited by Jeroen de Zeeuw. Boulder, Colorado; London; Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Manning, Carrie, and Ian Smith. 2016. ‘Political Party Formation by Former Armed Opposition Groups after Civil War’. *Democratization* 23 (6): 972–89.

Martin, Susanne. 2014. ‘Dilemmas of “Going Legit”: Why Should Violent Groups Engage in or Avoid Electoral Politics?’ *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 6 (2): 81–101.

Matanock, Aila M., 2017a. *Electing peace: from civil conflict to political participation*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2017b. ‘Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict’. *International Security* 41 (4): 93–132.

McDonough, David S. 2008. ‘From Guerrillas to Government: Post-Conflict Stability in Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda’. *Third World Quarterly* 29 (2): 357–74.

Ottaway, Marina. 2003. ‘Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices’. *International Studies Perspectives* 4 (3): 314–22.

Paris, Roland. 2004. *At war’s end: building peace after civil conflict*. Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Santiso, Carlos. 2001. ‘International Co-operation for Democracy and Good Governance: Moving towards a Second Generation?’. *The European Journal of Development Research* 13 (1): 154-80.

———. 2002. ‘Promoting Democratic Governance and Preventing the Recurrence of Conflict: The Role of the United Nations Development Programme in Post-Conflict Peace-Building’. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34 (3): 555–86.

Savimbi, Jonas. 1989. ‘Opinion | I Have No Secret Agenda (Published 1989)’. *The New York Times*, October 30, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/30/opinion/i-have-no-secret-agenda.html.

Spears, Ian S. 2010. ‘Chapter 4: The Angolan Civil War’. In *Civil War in African State: The Search for Security*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Tanner, Victor. 1998. ‘Liberia: Railroading Peace’. *Review of African Political Economy* 25 (75): 133–47.

The UN Secretary-General. 2019. ‘United Nations Electoral Assistance, Report of the Secretary-General A/74/285’. A/74/285. United Nations. https://dppa.un.org/en/elections.

Walter, Barbara F. 1997. ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’. *International Organization* 51 (3): 335–64.

———. 1999. ‘Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace’. *International Security* 24 (1): 127–55.

———. 2002. *Committing to peace: the successful settlement of civil wars*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2002. ‘’Mozambique: A Fading U.N. Success Story”. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (1): 141-56.