BRAÇO FORTE, MÃO AMIGA?

MILITARIZATION OF SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN RIO DE JANEIRO

Master Thesis - MSc Political Science: International Politics

Rosina Haretche
Student Number: s2686732
Supervisor: Dr. Juan Masullo
Second Reader: Dr. Corinna Jentzsch
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Rosina Haretche
s2686732

Abstract

In a region more characterized by a history of military coups and autocratic military rule than by inter-state conflict, the armed forces have increasingly been deployed inside each state's own territory with the goal of fighting violent crime. Throughout the 21st century, Latin American countries have, without exception, progressively militarized their security. This thesis seeks to research whether this militarization is impacting the quality of democracy in the continent. Using Rio de Janeiro as an in-depth case study, I argue that the militarization of security has the potential to undermine the quality of democracy by diminishing state capacity.

My analysis is based on two distinct operations: the highly militarized, limited in time *Garantia da Lei e da Ordem* Operations; and the more permanent, community-oriented policing policy of *Pacificação.* Differences between the two can be observed regarding their impact on state capacity, that is, the degree at which they succeeded in re-establishing control over ungoverned territory and reducing violence. Subsequently, this contrast persisted in terms of accountability, corruption, respect for human rights, and trust among residents.

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Introduction

Every Latin American country has militarized law enforcement at the national level to varying degrees. Even those that do not have an army (Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2019). Simultaneously, citizens in the region identify crime as the number one problem affecting their societies (Latinobarómetro, 2018). Militarization in Latin America has often been instituted to address escalating levels of criminal violence or after civil conflict. Out of these two scenarios, the former is more extended throughout the continent.

Considering the precedent of civil-military dictatorships that has historically marked the region – especially in the Southern Cone – it is worth asking whether enhancing the armed forces participation in internal security can have unintended consequences. Specifically, this thesis aims at answering the following research questions: *Does security militarization affect democracy in Latin America? And, if so, how?*

Literature on the matter has often focused on militarization of law enforcement particularly in the United States. However, the trend manifests in Latin America with its own characteristics. When discussing the distinct regional context, existing research has addressed the link between civil-military relations and democracy. With this thesis, I look to contribute to this area of academic research by proposing a new mechanism. I argue that militarization of security has the potential of negatively affecting democracy in Latin America by diminishing state capacity.

Criminal violence related to drug trafficking has marked Rio de Janeiro since the 1980s. Since then, state and federal governments have tried to address the problem with policies that range from highly to less militarized, with the *Garantia da Lei e da Ordem* Operations and the *Pacificação* as

respective examples. By analysing these two strategies, I argue that more militarized approaches, although enacted with the aim of enhancing state capacity, in reality produce the alternative effect.

With the election of retired military officer Jair Bolsonaro to the Presidency in 2018 and his government largely composed of former military men, the question of whether increased military presence can have detrimental effects on democracy becomes ever so pressing. Moreover, a LAPOP survey conducted in Brazil in 2018/19 showed that 36.8% of respondents would tolerate a military coup "when there is a lot of crime", and 35.4% "when there is a lot of corruption".

This thesis is structured as follows. First, I give an overview of the current state of the literature on the relationship between militarization of security and democracy in Latin America. I then argue that the former affects the latter through a variation in state capacity. Third, I present my empirical strategy and explain my decision to use Rio de Janeiro as my case study. Lastly, I summarize the history of militarization of public security in the city since the end of the de-facto regime in 1985, present two different strategies executed in Rio de Janeiro using varying levels of militarization, and analyze their diverse impact on state capacity and democracy.

CHAPTER 1

Literature review and theoretical argument

The growing role that the armed forces are exercising in internal security matters has been signaled as one of the most pressing issues currently facing Latin America (Dammert & Bailey, 2007; Diamint, 2004; Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2019). While most of the literature on the militarization of security has focused on the United States and its Department of Defense's 1033 program, under which excess military equipment is transferred to local police units (Mummolo, 2018), academic research specifically addressing the Latin American reality has very often focused on civil-military relations in the aftermath of military dictatorships (Bowman, 2002; Pion-Berlin & Martinez, 2017). A second body of literature has focused on what drives citizens to support strong-arm policies such as militarization (Visconti, 2019). Lastly, a third stream of research centers on the role that criminal violence and organized criminal organizations play on state-building (Barnes, 2017; Kalyvas, 2019; Lessing, 2015).

These different currents of research also reflect their variations in what is understood by "militarization". In this thesis, I will focus on the militarization of security understood as the direct deployment of the armed forces in internal security operations with the objective of fighting violent crime. Latin American countries have militarized their public security partly as a strategy to face escalating levels of criminal violence. This transformation has largely manifested through the deployment of the armed forces and/or police units with increasingly military features. In Rio de Janeiro, this can be observed in the Law and Order Guarantee Operations and the Military Police's *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* (Special Police Operations Battalion, BOPE) respectively.

Work by Bowman (2002) and Flores-Macías and Zarkin (2019) explore the consequences that militarization can have on democracy. In his study on Latin America, Bowman argues that the larger the military, the lower the levels of democracy (measured using the Freedom House index) over time and the greater the propensity for a democratic breakdown. Militarization, under his logic, alters power relations in terms of state apparatus (by concentrating all forms of coercion and violence), transnational connections (by increasing ties with foreign actors, of especial importance during the Cold War), and class (by taking power from the popular classes and towards the oligarchy) (Bowman, 2002, p. 46-51, p. 245).

An important precision regarding these findings is that his book focuses on the Cold War. His chapter addressing the situation in the entire Latin American region, from which I extracted the abovementioned conclusion, concentrates on the 1972-1986 period. Considering the number of countries undergoing autocratic military rule and civil war during these two decades, his idea that more military power reduces democracy is not entirely surprising, and one could therefore assume that it does not help us explain the effects of militarization of security as expressed in the 21st century in the continent.

On the other hand, Flores-Macías and Zarkin argue that differences between regular and militarized police forces in terms of accountability, weaponry, training, and organizational structure can in turn impact democracy through citizen security (by decreasing it), human rights (by augmenting its violations), police reform (by delaying it), and the legal order (by operating in a legal vacuum) (Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2019, p. 4). Moreover, Dammert and Bailey assess that security militarization could be problematic in terms of inadequate training by the armed forces to execute police functions, as well as decrease security by distancing civilians from the coercive

forces, involve the military in internal political tensions regarding security and criminality, further marginalize vulnerable groups, and generate a legal vacuum (Dammert & Bailey, 2007).

Latin America's history of military dictatorships is also an element of consideration. According to Pion-Berlin and Martínez, it is widely acknowledged that states attempting to consolidate their democracies, especially following periods of military-authoritarian rule, must transform their militaries "from political predator into compliant partners willing to commit their resources and talents to whatever policy priorities are set by elected governments" (Pion-Berlin & Martinez, 2017, p. 3).

The abovementioned studies share the notion that increasing the internal power of the armed forces could have detrimental effects. Thus, one could wonder why citizens back these policies and, more broadly, politicians who run on tough-on-crime platforms. In his study on Brazil, Visconti (2017) builds on research proving that having experienced crime can reduce a person's support for democracy, and shows that crime victims are 7 percentage points more likely to support strong-arm policies such as state repression than non-victims. Said policies include measures that undercut procedural rights, such as extra-legal detention, arbitrary punishment, and military occupation of entire neighborhoods. Likewise, exposure to crime reduces support for the belief that democracy is the best form of government by almost 7 percentage points. The author draws the conclusion that, as people become crime victims, their diminished support for democracy subsequently increases their tolerance for strong-arm policies that include non-democratic policies.

Alternatively, we can appreciate a debate regarding the role internal conflict short of civil war plays in state building. In this regard, it has been argued that criminal violence and organized crime are forms of political violence and could therefore be a part of state building (Barnes, 2017;

Kalyvas, 2019; Lessing, 2015). One key aspect that is often highlighted for its singularity is that crime does not aim at taking over the state or secede, but rather exercise its influence to be able to carry out its illegal activities (Lessing, 2015; Phillips, 2015). In light of this work, it is worth asking whether violent crime and combatting it by deploying the armed forces is currently working to advance state power, and with it democracy, or if the opposite is true. By attempting to control a part of the territory, and especially when succeeding, criminal organizations would be undermining state capacity. If a tough-on-crime security tactic has the result of escalating violence, state capacity could be even more negatively affected.

While these academics have greatly contributed to advance our knowledge about the effects of the militarization of security, I believe the field could benefit from further research on its consequences for democracy more specifically. This thesis aims at addressing this, and puts forward the argument that democracy could be affected by militarization through an intervening mechanism: state capacity.

For this purpose, the work of Flores-Macías is once again relevant. In his research on the militarization of security as used to fight drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, he finds that it has diminished state capacity, measured in terms of public safety and fiscal extraction (Flores-Macías, 2018). Moreover, work by Phillips (2015) found that drug trafficking organizations in Mexico were affected by leadership decapitation in the short term, but that drug related homicides increased in the long run. He argues that this variation is due to the disruption experienced in the immediate aftermath of a leader's death, but, as the demand for drugs is still present, inter and intra-group fragmentation increases violence as they fight for market control. Relatedly, Lessing (2017) argues that varying levels of cartel-state conflict are explained by the degree of

conditionality attached to state repression. When governments command a full crackdown, cartels have incentives to fight back. By establishing policies of conditionality, on the contrary, criminal organizations are faced with incentives to deter violence, as they are presented with the possibility of avoiding costly confrontation.

Drawing on this research, I argue that the militarization of security in Latin America has the potential of negatively affecting democracy by diminishing state capacity. My theoretical contention is that militarized approaches to public security contribute to antagonize criminal organizations, which respond to acute state repression with more violence. As such, territorial "vacuums" are created, where state presence is either diminished or simply non-existent. These areas are effectively controlled by criminal organizations, who are also known to extract resources from the local population, foment corruption among forces of the order, and increase human rights violations from both state and non-state actors, having a direct impact on democracy. Relatedly, the diminished state presence could mean an increase in criminal violence which, as cited by Visconti (2017), erodes the legitimacy of the political system and public support for democracy and the rule of law, while augmenting support for radical change and regimes that reduce civil liberties. Moreover, perspectives based on "war on drugs" or "tough on crime" paradigms could contribute to a normative shift in which military presence is seen as necessary and encouraged in the internal order, rendering the exceptional conventional.

The main research goal of this thesis is, therefore, to explore *if and how* democracy is being affected by militarization. Accordingly, it proposes the following hypothesis and causal mechanism:

Hypothesis: Increased militarization of security negatively affects democracy by reducing state capacity.



Empirical Approach

Methodology

In this thesis, I will be conducting an in-depth case study of Rio de Janeiro using qualitative methods. According to Robert Yin, case studies are the preferable research method when dealing with "how" questions and when the focus of the study is a contemporary (as opposed to historical) phenomenon (Yin, 2018). With the goal of understanding the impact militarization of security can have on democracy, my research focuses on *how* this impact might occur, and advancing the theoretical argument that state capacity plays a role as an intermediary factor.

As further outlined below, Rio de Janeiro provides an opportunity for an elaborate in-depth case study. The city has been the scenario of multiple attempts at curtailing criminal violence, many of which instrumentalized militarization at different degrees, thus showing variations in my main independent variable. Comparing a set of countries or states would present the problem of having distinct aspects, stemming from each state's own history, government, and reality that could be influencing my research variables in a myriad of ways; focusing on one state within Brazil can help reduce this problem and enhance the robustness of my findings. The exploratory nature of my research regarding these unfolding processes is better served by this one-case study.

My analysis will rely primarily on the collection and examination of qualitative data. Taking into account that the goal of this research is not only to assess the impact of militarization, but also to unpack *how* can it do so, this exploration of the mechanisms at play can benefit from a deep examination of the Brazilian reality, along with the analysis of government documents, news reports, surveys and statistics to shed light on this unfolding reality.

Case study and justification

My decision to select Rio de Janeiro as my case study is based on several reasons. First, Brazil presents a high level of autonomy at the federal level, which means that public security strategies are designed by the state. Second, as previously stated, militarization of security has often been enacted in Latin America as a response to civil war or violent organized crime. As the second scenario has been the most frequent, I will focus on an instance of violent organized crime in the interest of expanding the scope conditions of my study and the generalizability of my findings. Brazil, and especially Rio de Janeiro, constitutes an example in which the armed forces have been directly involved to combat escalating levels of criminal violence. On the other end of the

spectrum, the Pacification program, only implemented in Rio de Janeiro thus far, has the stated goal of being an alternative to more militarized strategies, allowing for a comparison between the two paradigms.

Third, as stated in my research puzzle, I am interested to see how, in a region that has been marked by military coups and dictatorships, the armed forces are permitted and encouraged to act in the internal order, and whether this could be bringing about changes in democratic quality. Brazil has a history of democratic breakdowns and military rule.

Having the largest economy and population in the continent and being part of the BRICS, Brazil is considered not only a key regional power, but a global one. This crucial and relevant role it occupies constitutes my fourth reason to focus on this country, as its state of affairs certainly influences Latin America and the rest of the world. Relatedly, Rio de Janeiro constitutes an emblematic case of urban violence as has been observed in many Latin American cities (Richmond, 2019).

Research variables

My theoretical argument consists of two stages: first, the impact of militarization of security on state capacity; second, the effect of state capacity on democracy. As this is an in-depth single case study, the following considerations on data extraction will be executed on a subnational level.

My first independent variable will be the level of militarization considered as direct participation of the armed forces in internal crime fighting operations. Data on this matter comes from academic and newspaper articles, statistics from the Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, as well as official publications from the Brazilian government.

State capacity has a role of dependent variable in the first level and independent variable in the second. Following Soifer's (2012) work on state capacity in contemporary Latin America, it is defined and measured in three areas: security, administration, and extraction. These data is obtained from Brazilian official sources, document analysis, and newspaper articles. Regarding democracy, I will primarily focus on accountability, respect for human rights, corruption, and public trust in democratic institutions.

CHAPTER 2

Militarization of Security in Rio de Janeiro

As declared by former Minister of Defense, Raul Jungmann, Brazil's armed forces "do not possess classic military attributes" (The Economist, 2017). Between 1964 and 1985, the country, as many others in the region, experienced a military dictatorship. The end of this twenty-one-year period did not mark a complete recoil by the armed forces from the internal order.

The role of the military in Brazil's internal order has taken many forms: paving highways; investigating cases of irregularities in public administration, providing security for the president; managing the Civil Defense, in charge of disasters such as floods and droughts; as part of the National Traffic System and the National Antidrug Secretariat; in anti-smuggling operations; protecting or guarding national strikes, demonstrations and occupations; providing security for large-scale events such as the 1992 UN Earth Summit, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and the 2016 Olympic Games; occupying the favelas in Rio de Janeiro on several occasions since the 1990s.

Regarding their role as part of the public security system, De Souza (2015) proposes that militarization in Brazil can be summarized in six points: new contemporary configuration in which war incorporates elements of risk society; the Armed Forces assume roles in everyday policing; the Armed Forces penetrate the internal organization of police and security; the structure and organization of the police remain under the military model, logic and discipline; the model of war and combat is adopted as general operational logic; and an aesthetic of war is confused with security, placing the violent death of the opponent as a necessary and manageable result.

Opinion polls show that the military emerged from the dictatorship without being perceived to be as violent or corrupt compared with other countries in the region. Still today, the army is one of

the most trusted institutions among Brazilians according to data from the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics. Furthermore, many believe it can solve urban insecurity, and is perceived to be less corrupt than the police, which is, por its part, seen to be operating under a culture of impunity (Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014). On the contrary, less trusted institutions include Political Parties, National Congress, the President and local Government, and the electoral system (IBOPE, December 2020). This lack of trust towards political parties ranks the highest in the continent. Likewise, Brazil is the American country in which citizens distrust their communities the most (IADB, 2018).

The public support enjoyed by the armed forces is further reinforced by a rhetoric marked by calls to tough-on-crime approaches, and war-related talk, such as the so-called "War on drugs". Since the early 2000s, war doctrines have evolved to incorporate the emergence of asymmetric wars, in which two groups with significant difference in power or tactics face each other. According to De Souza, Serra & Battibugli (2019), this change has approximated the traditional war doctrine based on destruction, occupation, and pacification to a status of permanent war, in which there is an internal enemy that is loosely identified. Additionally, it is not established what winning this war on drugs looks like, further extending it in time. This war rhetoric gives legitimacy to militarization, is more permissive of human rights violations that may occur in the process, and prevents structural changes from being implemented by concentrating efforts and budget (De Souza, 2015; Zaverucha, 2000).

As expressed by De Souza (2015), military and police competencies are not well defined in Brazil, with a police model that is strongly tied to the defense of the state, instead of that of the citizen. This "hybrid model" allows for the coexistence of a civilian, investigative police, and a military, preventive police. He identifies in Brazil two interconnected tendencies: police militarization and

armed forces "policialization" (De Souza, Serra & Battibugli, 2019). The relationship between the Brazilian armed forces and the police is bilateral: training and organization of one influence the other (Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014). As reported by The Economist (July 2017), during 2016 soldiers spent nearly a hundred days patrolling city streets, double the number from the previous nine years combined.

Because Brazil is a federal republic, the twenty-six states and one federal district that compose it have financial, administrative, and political autonomy. Accordingly, they can establish their own rules for public institutions and policies (De Souza, Serra & Battibugli, 2019).

Rio de Janeiro has been a major scenario in which a broad spectrum of militarized to non-militarized efforts have been implemented. Since 1994, every Brazilian president has deployed the military to address crime in the city. The prominent role of drug related violence can be traced back to the 1980s, when the cocaine boom met with criminal organizations (most notably the Comando Vermelho drug syndicate) exerting territorial control and concentrating in the city's favelas (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016; Lessing, 2017). As the drug market expanded, increased profit translated into competition between armed groups, who militarized and used high-powered weaponry (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). As violence escalated, so did homicide rates.

Favelas have been described as "zones of exclusion" where state authority is practically absent (Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2019). They have been the scenario of what Lessing (2017) calls "urban armed conflict": a quarter-century of escalating cartel-state conflict marked by confrontation between police institutions combining brutal repression with corruption, and drug syndicates that respond to state repression with more violence.

The Military Police plays a central role in the fight against organized crime in Rio de Janeiro. One of the main state responses enacted towards violence in the city has been a militarized strategy resting on two main interventions: "contention" or "encirclements" that consisted of isolating a favela so that drug sales would be interrupted; and police "incursions", where the police would invade the areas where drug dealers were established to challenge their territorial dominance, albeit only temporarily. These actions, also dubbed "occupations", happened under displays of military force, using heavy gunfire and armored vehicles ("*caveirões*"). The *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* (BOPE, Special Operations Forces), part of Rio's *Policía Militar*, played a prominent role. A few days after they left the favelas, business returned to usual (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016).

These interventions would interrupt daily routines, where favela residents would see their rights effectively suspended by the use of arbitrary stop-and-search, house raids, beatings, and torture (Richmond, 2019; Visconti, 2020). Moreover, the police is seen as marred by impunity (De Souza, 2000), as deaths at the hand of police officers were rarely prosecuted (Richmond, 2019). A 2013 official investigation found Rio's Military Police to be the most corrupt in the country (O Globo, April 2013), and exchanges of weekly or monthly bribes (*"arregos")* paid by incumbent drug syndicates to local police battalions in exchange for non-enforcement have been well documented (Lessing, 2017). Civilian victims were accepted as collateral damage, as were human rights violations, including summary executions (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). In 2017, a Datafolha survey found that 19% of respondents agreed with the statement that "it is normal for some innocents to die so that the war on traffic is successful". The incentive towards violence was often very explicit: a former governor of Rio de Janeiro, Marcello Alencar, decided to implement a "bravery bonus" given to officers who engaged in violent confrontations (Visconti, 2020).

These aspects of law enforcement in Rio de Janeiro are tightly connected to a phenomenon occurring in the city. Along with traffickers, another kind of armed groups that occupy the favelas and exercise territorial control are the militias. They gained prominence in the 2000s following their expansion and control of territories previously held by drug dealers (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). These groups are mainly composed of off-duty police officers (albeit also including prison agents, firemen, and members of the navy or army) that, under the pretense of fighting against drug dealers, extort local business and residents by imposing "protection taxes" and creating coercive monopolies on commodities and services (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). According to Cano and Ribeiro (2016), their expansion was often supported by police units in the area, and some militias were commanded by police officers who had previously been on the dealers' payroll. Their association with law enforcement has also had the consequence of halting aggressive police operations aimed at retaking territorial control from militias, a stark contrast with favelas that are dominated by drug dealers. Furthermore, some militias continue to either sell drugs or allow it to continue, and have implanted a brutal social order frequently plagued with expulsions, torture, and summary executions (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016).

An analysis conducted by Lessing (2017) shows that the main source of drug violence in Rio de Janeiro between 2007 and 2011 were cartel-police clashes and that half of them were directly preceded by police action, almost always under the form of a police incursion into a favela seeking to capture traffickers and drugs. Drug traffickers have been willing to face Rio's Police, the elite BOPE, and the armed forces.

CHAPTER 3

Law and Order Guarantee Operations

With the end of the Cold War and the lack of external conflict, the Brazilian army turned increasingly towards domestic affairs (Zaverucha, 2000). The current Brazilian Federal Constitution, into effect since 1988, gives the armed forces an internal security role. Its article 142 gives the military responsibility as "guarantee of the constitutional powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order". This "constitutional orientation toward internal matters" (Zaverucha, 2000) has led Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen (2014) to affirm that, after the end of military rule in 1985, the security apparatus is one institution that has not democratized.

Furthermore, the 1991 Complementary Law 67 allows for federal troops to intervene in internal matters by request of the president of the republic once other means of maintaining public order have been exhausted. In 2010, former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva signed a law that gave the armed forces police powers in border areas (G1 Globo, August 2010).

Law and Order Guarantee operations (*Garantia da lei e da Ordem*, GLOs) are executed by express order of the President of the Republic in situations of serious disturbance, where traditional public security forces have been exhausted. Regulated by article 142 of the 1988 Federal Constitution, the 1999 Complementary Law 97, and the 2001 decree 3897, GLOs provisionally allow the armed forces to act with police power until normalcy has been re-established. These actions are limited spatially and temporarily, with the aim of preserving public order, the integrity of the population, and guaranteeing the proper functioning of institutions.

Figure 1, below, shows the number of GLO operations executed in Brazil since 1992, classified by the motive for which they were called upon.

Type of Operation	Quantity	Percentage
Urban Violence	23	16.2%
Military Police Strike	26	18.3%
Voting and Counting Guarantee	22	15.5%
Events	39	27.5%
Other	32	22.5%
Total	142	100

Figure 1 : GLO Operations classified by type. 1992 - 2020
Data source: https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/arquivos/exercicios_e_operacoes/glo/1.metodologiaa_dea_estudo.pdf

With the use of Article 142, the exception has increasingly become the rule, naturalizing the intervention of the armed forces in the maintenance of law and order without accounting for its actions to the state (Zaverucha, 2000). This could be encouraging repression in insecure urban communities where militarized approaches are counter-productive, as well as spreading norms that tolerate and promote the use of force to bring about peace (Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014). According to such characterizations, the use of GLOs is replacing a weakened state presence with an overwhelming force, very often accompanied by a lack of accountability, contrary to what is expected of a democracy.

Historical inequalities have influenced the way in which the use of force has been implemented throughout the country. Figure 2 focuses on GLO operations addressing urban violence. Since 1994, ten of the twenty-three instances took place in Rio de Janeiro – 43.5%. For comparison, the four states that received GLOs the second largest number of times had two each.



Figure 2: GLO Operations Addressing Urban Violence, by year and location.
Data Source: https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/arquivos/exercicios_e_operacoes/glo/5.tabelasa_gloa_graficoa_pora_anoa_barrasa_maia_20.pdf

GLOs in Rio de Janeiro were inscribed in a so-called "war on drugs" that has not been effective at maiming organized crime, with analysts arguing that it has intensified violence (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016, Lessing, 2017).

This form of militarization, in which the army enters a favela, stays for a limited time, and leaves, can be counterproductive by not addressing the root causes of violence and insecurity and only temporarily curbing violence. As De Souza (2015) highlights, Brazil has invested more resources in instruments of pointed intervention or at times of specific crises, in which the definition, identity, legal status, and control forms are ambivalent. This way, the use of force may be obstructing democratic consolidation (Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014). Moreover, the fact that the military has been repeatedly deployed to Rio's favelas would hint to the inadequacy of the frequent use of GLOs. Its inability to curb urban violence in the long run, in this light, seems logical, as it

is something for which these instruments were not created. According to information found on the Ministry of Defense's website, they assess that the mean of five GLOs per year since they were first enacted shows an "excessive use of the armed forces, which should be the State's last resort, considering that their main goal is the defense of the Nation". Likewise, Eduardo Villas Bôas, commander of the Armed Forces, publicly expressed his concern about the frequency with which the military has been used for public security reasons under GLO operations (BBC, February 2018).

Although often enacted in the name of enhancing state capacity, two elements used to measure it could evidence that the opposite is true: GLOs have been unable to decrease violence after the armed forces have left the area, and the private security market has expanded in the city. As private security grows and public security militarizes, indexes of human rights violations deteriorate, along with the social vulnerability among the youth (De Souza, 2015). Democracy could therefore be suffering along with state capacity.

A 2017 survey conducted by Folha de Sao Paulo showed that 83% of Rio's inhabitants support the use of the military in the fight against local violence, with only 15% opposing it. However, when asked about their efficiency, 52% said the armed forces had not changed the situation at all, 44% that it had improved, and 2% that it had turned worse (Folha de Sao Paulo, October 2017). These results are interesting in that, even though the majority of respondents do not believe they have been successful, they still support the use of the armed forces against criminal violence. This could be because they do not see an alternative (considering how residents mistrust the police and political institutions, this is likely) or related to Visconti's (2020) argument that crime victimization leads to stronger backing of tough-on-crime approaches.

Operation Rio

The first GLO was called Operation Rio. In 1994, as the city was undergoing a "wave of violence", President Itamar Franco asked the governor to accept the army's deployment to the city. With a level of public support rounding 80%, two thousand effectives from the armed forces came into Rio de Janeiro to occupy the city's marginal areas (Deutsche Welle, February 2018).

In November of that same year, the journal Folha de Sao Paulo explained that the main idea of the operation was to signal to the local population that the state was present, in the hope that this would help reduce crime. This, along with the previously stated characterization of favelas as "zones of exclusion", shows that these were areas where state capacity was exceptionally low, which the government aimed at reverting with a highly militarized approach. This same article summarized the operation as having had "few effective results and a lot of abuse of authority" (Folha de Sao Paulo, November 1994).

It goes on by saying: "This salutary caution of the armed forces, however, does not justify or mitigate the abuses committed by the military. The state of defense, which restricts individual rights and guarantees, has not been declared. Thus, arrests and house searches can only be carried out either in flagrante delicto or with judicial authorization. The Coordination Center for Combating Organized Crime Operations (CCOCCO), bypassing the clear constitutional text, ignored these two conditions and searched houses without showing a court order and detained people just because they were undocumented. OAB was also denied access to those arrested. These procedures are not compatible with the democratic regime."

Moreover, they point to how, only hours after the army had left the city, marking the end of Operation Rio, drug trafficking was already present again in the city. 1994 saw homicide rates in the city following the upward trend already present since 1992 (IPEA).

Regarding the same operation, journal O Globo had, on November 2nd, 1994, printed the following headline: "Army announces cleaning operation in Rio police". Twenty-four years later, in 2018, the same news outlet printed a similar headline anticipating another GLO operation to be deployed to the city: "Combating police corruption will be a priority of the intervention" (The Intercept, February 2018). The problem of police corruption, it seemed, had not been successfully addressed by calling upon the armed forces.

After Operation Rio ended, nine more GLOs were sent to Rio de Janeiro, one of which, dubbed Operation Rio II, immediately followed, showing that state governors still considered favelas to be outside of their control. This specific highly militarized mechanism had not successfully increased state capacity in these areas in the long term.

It is worth mentioning that 1994 saw Brazil celebrate presidential elections and Rio de Janeiro local elections, which could mean that Operation Rio might have had a political motive behind it by using a populist tough-on-crime measure which, as shown before, has high support among the general population.

As exemplified by Operation Rio, GLO's highly militarized approach to urban violence is not particularly successful in enhancing state capacity in the long run, as violence and drug trafficking return to the occupied territory once the armed forces have left the site. Additionally, it has the

potential of undermining the rule of law by increasing unaccountability, abuses of authority, human rights violations and ignoring the due process. Lastly, an instrument that was conceived as an exceptional measure was too often the preferred response. As The Economist (July 2017) published, over-reliance on the army is unhealthy for a democracy.

CHAPTER 4

Pacification

The *Pacificação* (Pacification) plan was implemented in 2008 in Rio de Janeiro with the objective of regaining territory from organized criminal organizations. The *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* (Pacification Police Units, UPPs) consist of groups of police officers permanently stationed in certain favelas, who also seek the entry or expansion of public services and private businesses into de area, the formalization of economic activities and urban services, and a closer integration between the favelas and the rest of the city (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). In other words, the project aimed at augmenting state capacity in areas where it was maimed. Conceived on the model of community-oriented policing, they were seen as an alternative to more militarized approaches (Magaloni et al, 2020). However, some analysts frame this strategy under the counterinsurgency paradigm applied to places of chronic urban insecurity (Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014). In this light, UPPs are still part of a militarized approach, but a "softer" kind, as further detailed below.

The strategy of Pacification has consisted of four phases:

1. Preliminary announcement of an upcoming Pacification in a specific favela. The precise date is not communicated, but the time frame between announcement and execution is large enough to allow for the fleeing of traffickers.
2. Favela occupation with force. Usually done by the BOPE, with the armed forces for support.
3. BOPE forces stay for close to a month, continuing their search for arms and drugs, and deterring traffickers. In the meantime, a UPP unit is installed. These UPP units are composed of new recruits specifically trained for the job in community-policing fashion.

In some favelas, Pacification also includes a "Social UPP" to bring social programs to the area.

4. BOPE forces leaves the community, while the UPP stays in place.

Partly abandoning the logic of "winning" the war on drugs, the Pacification plan sought to retake control of the territory dominated by drug dealers and reduce violence. Regarding this last point, it showed initial progress. Between 2008 and 2012, homicide and robbery rates in Rio de Janeiro declined, a trend that was even more pronounced in areas where UPPs were installed (UNODC, 2014).



Figure 3: Trend in homicides in Rio de Janeiro and UPP areas (2007-2012). Source: UNODC. Retrieved from: https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf

Lessing (2017) calls the initial phase (2008-2010) of the Pacification program "highly successful" and argues that this is due to its level of conditionality. While militarized and outright repressive approaches are unconditional (that is, crackdowns would take place no matter what and against

every group), Pacification presents two conditional aspects: first, by announcing the occupation in advance, it gives traffickers the option to either flee or disarm and merge with local population; second, by having the stated goal of ending violence attached to trafficking and not trafficking itself, arrests and interdiction of dealing were not a priority, thus presenting dealers with the incentive of adopting a non-violent approach to trafficking.

Research conducted on Pacification between 2008 and 2017 concluded that territories where UPPs were installed had seen mixed results: the number of police fatal shootings was reduced by more than 40%; in 60% of the territories, the UPP effectively reduced common crimes such as homicides, extortions, and burglaries, all the while gaining community acceptance; in the remaining 40%, UPPs deteriorated public security and failed to gain legitimacy (Magaloni et al, 2020). Varying from one UPP to the next is also the level of security expressed by its citizens. While some still experience violent clashes and shootouts between drug dealers and the police, others continue to be the scenario of drug trafficking but with a lower incidence of violence, and lastly, some of them have incorporated the police into their daily routines and enjoy a higher perception of security (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). Permanent police presence seems to have discouraged territorial disputes, which were often one of the prominent causes of lethal violence. According to these numbers, the less militarized project of Pacification was to a large extent successful in establishing permanent state presence, a presence that in turn managed to reduce violence and gain acceptance among residents that had long been weary of the state. This is a stark contrast with the pointed, highly militarized interventions of GLOs.

Residents living in two favelas with UPPs (Macacos and Cidade de Deus) expressed their content with the end of shootouts and the absence of curfews, free access and certain reduction in the stigma related to living in these areas. However, they continued to show a deep mistrust towards

the police, mentioned cases of police abuse, and conflicts regarding the regulation of leisure activities (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). Likewise, questions were raised regarding the extent to which the state had indeed augmented its presence on the ground and the use of repressive tactics with non-criminal populations within the favelas, with some residents observing that police presence seemed to have had upended the pre-existing social order between them and traffickers (Richmond, 2019). Richmond (2019) argues that, as the state tried to regain control of areas from which it was previously absent, it did not replace the regime dominated by traffickers, but rather merged with it, forming what he calls a "dual security assemblage". Even if state capacity was not fully restored, this would still evidence a higher state presence than previously had, albeit not a perfect one. In areas where distrust towards forces of the order runs deep, the ability to merge and form a new order could still be considered an improvement regarding the starting point.

Although some residents and researchers perceive the increase in petty crime in pacified favelas as a sign of failure (see, for example, Richmond, 2019), it is worth noting that the main intention of UPPs is to decrease violence attached to drug trafficking, something at which it seems to have shown promising results. Moreover, Cano and Ribeiro (2016) argue that this raise in petty crime is due to higher reporting to the police. This hypothesis is also supported by the UNODC regarding an augmentation in sexual assault reports within pacified favelas. If crime was increasingly being denounced in these territories, it would signal to an enhanced state presence and trust in social institutions, not the contrary.

Since they were first implemented, UPPs have drawn criticism from different angles. First, regarding the involvement of the army. While in theory their participation is limited to a supporting role in the second phase, stipulated to only last a specific period of time, they often continue to leave a significant force at the site. This way, it is argued, their presence may further increase

support for militarization among city dwellers. Second, in terms of what favelas were chosen to be pacified, and with what motive, as some believe that the true aim was to bring desirable urban areas under the control of the state, without there being a true concern for the wellbeing of favela citizens (Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 2014). This would be evidenced by the fact that the project focuses on favelas located in richer and more touristic parts of the city (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016; Richmond, 2019). Relatedly, UPPs were enacted in communities dominated by drug dealers, not those where militias were the dominating force, thus not addressing a source of violence tightly related to the forces of the order.

Furthermore, doubts remained about the effectiveness of this strategy in the long-term, as violence could move to other urban areas that remained abandoned by the state. In reality, this would hint at a success by Pacification: by fearing that violence was not visible because it was changing location, this criticism would recognize that violence in pacified communities was indeed waning. In such case, a possible solution would be to extend the program to the entire city, thus increasing state capacity throughout.

Another source of criticism was one of the ideas underlying this project: that the insecurity that existed in the favelas prevented public and private investment. Public investment had existed before UPPs, showing that this pacification strategy was not a prerequisite for some level of state presence in these areas (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). Although this may be true, and pacification might not be the only way for the state to increase its capacity in the favelas, this strategy does seem to have succeeded at paving the way for more social investment, at least in its initial phase. Libraries, cinemas, construction, and tourism, among others, did manage to enter these areas (Folha de Sao Paulo, November 2020).

Lastly, another source of disapproval related to the design of the policy itself. Very often, police officers were left alone in dealing with complex security issues, the root causes of which Pacification did not address (Magaloni et al, 2020). However, although it may not be sufficient to only re-enter long-neglected territory with public security personnel, the treatment of root causes could be something to be further determined in the long term. Augmenting state presence and investment in social programs could probably be considered the first stage in this process, as you cannot address the root causes of violence with an absent state.

Since 2012, the UPP project seems to have been showing some signs of exhaustion. The number of armed incidents increased, as did reports of police abuse, including some high-profile cases that damaged the legitimacy of the project (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). Confrontations between the police and traffickers went from 13 in 2011 to as much as 1555 in 2016 (Folha de Sao Paulo, August 2017). Research by the Public Security Institute (ISP) showed that, by 2017, there were still many areas in Rio de Janeiro that remained outside the state's control. This same year, the number of requests for gun permits largely increased in the state (Folha de Sao Paulo, September 2017).

In 2020, the government decided to exclude police violence from its human rights report. Lately, these numbers had been on the rise. In 2016, 1009 cases of police violence were reported. In 2017, they had augmented by 30,7% to 1319 cases. The next year, the 1637 reported cases meant an increase of 24% (Folha, June 2020).

This decline can also be observed in the level of confidence expressed by Rio's population. In a survey conducted in 2017 among favela residents, the majority of respondents expressed that UPPs had not improved security in the city (62%), in the communities with UPPs (57%), nor its surroundings (56%). 70% of them thought the model needed adjustments. Perhaps more tellingly,

the number of people thinking the UPP project should be abandoned went from 9% in 2014 to 21% in 2017 (Folha de Sao Paulo, October 2017).

However, according to research conducted by the CESEC at the Candido Mendes University, in areas where UPPs were implemented, 60% of inhabitants want the program to continue, and cite increased access to public and private services, investment in infrastructure, job opportunities and social projects as their main attributes. Regina Chiaradia, President of the Botafogo neighbourhood association, expressed that the state should not "turn into an ostrich" and leave spaces unoccupied once again (Folha de Sao Paulo, August 2017).

Causes of decline

Many causes were identified for the decline experienced by Pacification starting in 2012. From the beginning, and although supported by the elite, the paradigm shift towards community-policing was met with resistance within the police (Cano & Ribeiro, 2016). However, it was around 2012, when UPPs started to show a "spillover effect" (crime moved outside the favelas into the rest of the city) that support for this system among the general population suffered. As approval ebbed, the state governor shifted towards a more militarized approach. This change has been identified as a source of more police killings (Richmond, 2019).

In 2016, Rio de Janeiro declared a state of financial calamity. In 2015, investment in UPPs stalled, and out of the one million reais that were planned, zero were spent. Many social programs shut down (Piaui, December 2018). As the city's financial crisis escalated, criminality raised, and the number of policemen sent to favelas diminished. In 2017, three thousand UPP police officers (around 30% of the total) would be redistributed throughout the state (Folha de Sao Paulo, August

2017). This process of personnel reallocation was further reinforced by the federal intervention in 2018 (Piaui, 2018).

Complexo de Alemão

The Complexo de Alemão might better serve to illustrate the change in paradigm that the Pacification program sought to implement. In 2007, this favela, considered a Comando Vermelho stronghold, was the site of what officials called the biggest joint operation between the police and federal forces. Sieged by 1300 troops for a month – during which traffickers were openly carrying arms and challenging soldiers –, it was subsequently invaded. The operation left nineteen civilians dead, some arms seized, no arrests, criticism from human rights organizations and the United Nations, and the favela still under control of the CV. 2007 is considered a high point of cartel-state conflict, with a record 1300 civilians killed in armed confrontations with the police (Lessing, 2017).

Three years later, in 2010, a different kind of invasion took place. This time, it was part of the Pacification, two years after the program was first put in place in Rio de Janeiro and had shown promising signs. Many analysts feared that traffickers had been fleeing to the Complexo de Alemão as more and more UPPs were installed elsewhere. However, the occupation took place with close to no resistance, causing only three casualties, and the state was able to establish its control in the area for the first time in a generation (Lessing, 2017). In a cinematographic scene that would be displayed throughout the country, as the 2500 policemen and soldiers retook the favela, they raised the Brazilian flag on top of the mountain (Folha de Sao Paulo, November 2020).

Even though there is a stark contrast between the two scenes, this is not to say that Pacification marked the beginning of an idyllic reality within the favela. The zone also helps illustrate the shortcomings of the project. Four UPPs were installed in the Complexo de Alemão and, during the first two years after the occupation, several public and social services, private investments, and tourism started flowing. As a journalist summarized it best, "even a *telenovela* was filmed there" (Folha de Sao Paulo, November 2020). Today, ten years later, most services shut down, public libraries have been closed and often converted into *bocas de fumo* (drug selling points), police corruption and trafficking are again rampant, and the favela's access routes are again interrupted by iron blocks installed to prevent the Military Police's *caveirões* from entering (Folha de Sao Paulo, November 2020). The state, it seems, has once again lost control of its territory.

Although later marred by police corruption and abuse, as well as a lack of funding, Pacification showed promising signs between 2008 and 2012. By permanently deploying UPP forces, it showed that an alternative to militarization was possible, and indeed relatively successful towards its objectives: re-establishing state control of the territory and reducing violence. These two pillars of state capacity could be the starting point towards addressing the root causes of violence, thus attending to a long-neglected part of Rio de Janeiro's society and, with them, enhancing Brazilian democracy.

Conclusion

In February 2018, President Michel Temer approved a federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro. Under this measure, so far unprecedented, public security, ordinarily considered state competency, would be executed by the federal government. An appointed federal intervenor would be in charge of Rio de Janeiro's public security, controlling the Civil and Military Police, fire brigades, and the prison system until December 2018.

Although this tactic is not necessarily militarized, the person appointed for the position was Army General Walter Braga Netto, leader of the Eastern Military Command, thus substituting a civil authority for a military one. At the time that the intervention was approved by congress, the general declared that he had just received the mission, not having had any specific strategy planned nor discussed with the Senate (BBC, February 2018). In a measure dubbed "politically motivated" (Brasil de Fato, February 2018) and "much more drastic than a GLO" (BBC, February 2018), Brazil's political leadership was opting for a strong-arm policy without clear objectives or definitions, unknown even to the person who would be executing it.

Increasingly since the 1980s, the Brazilian state lost control of large portions of its territory in Rio de Janeiro. Ever since, it has aimed at re-establishing itself in these favelas by using what Lessing (2017) has described as a pendulum swinging from more to less unconditional repression, depending on the political orientation of the local government. Starting in 2008, with the implementation of the Pacification program, the paradigm switched from the logic of outright repression to a community-oriented approach.

Throughout this thesis, I have compared the effect that these two strategies have had on state capacity. Law and Order Guarantee Operations, the more extreme version of the repressive pendulum, aimed at regaining territorial control by pure display of force. After these pointed, limited in time and space interventions, there were reports of abuse of power, disregard for the rule of law and lack of accountability. Furthermore, this instrument, conceived as an exception, was used as anything but: in a twenty-three year period spanning from 1994 to 2017, ten GLOs were implemented in Rio de Janeiro. Although initially reducing criminal while stationed in the area, the situation returns to normal once the armed forces leave. Moreover, this initial decline could be characterized as mild, as cartel-state conflicts erupt throughout. As such, they did not succeed at curving violence in the city in the long run, nor at opening the door for other forms of state presence inside the favelas, thus neglecting the root causes of violence.

The Pacification program, whose UPPs consisted of recruits especially trained in community-policing, was an attempt in altering this trend. During its initial phase, it was successful in reducing criminal violence (most importantly cartel-state confrontations), in establishing permanent state presence (as opposed to the temporary one observed with GLOs), and opened the door for other forms of social investment by the state. Although later marred by corruption and legitimacy erosion, the project showed that a different approach to crime fighting was possible, and indeed relatively successful.

Displays of full force such as those of GLOs could further help normalize the war-rhetoric, where civilian deaths are seen as acceptable collateral damages, as are abuses of power and the overstepping of the rule of law, potentially having a direct impact on democratic quality.

Worthy of consideration is the fact that the use of the armed forces to combat crime receives more support among city dwellers than Pacification did. This could also signal to an increased normalization of the armed forces being deployed in the internal order, which could in turn render these strong-arm policies an even more effective populist policy. By continuing to use an exceptional mechanism, the system would be further delaying reforming civilian institutions – such as the Police – that are necessary for a healthy democracy but are currently deeply mistrusted and tarnished by corruption.

Although more research would be required to assess whether militarization has already had negative effects on democracy, this thesis demonstrates that it has the potential to do so by undermining state capacity. In addition, what this thesis shows that democracy, along with long-standing, structural social problems, cannot easily be improved with sparse, limited operations, but rather demands time, investment, and social compromise.

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