Migration and integration discourse in Dutch politics.

The impact of the European refugee-crisis of 2015 on the migration and integration discourse in Dutch parliamentary debates.

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Abstract

This thesis delves into how the so-called 'European refugee crisis' of 2015 impacted the parliamentary migration and integration discourse in the Netherlands. The study focuses on the eleven parties in the Second Chamber of the Netherlands during the Cabinet Rutte-Asscher (2012-2017).

The expected changes in the Dutch parliamentary discourse are the use of the 'frame of reason' to bring together contrary discourses and the criminalization of refugees by left-wing parties. This thesis remains open to other changes in discourse by using a grounded theory approach to discourse analysis. In this way, the migration and integration discourse can be studied in an open-minded and differentiated way.

This thesis shows that most elements of the 'frame of reason' were used during the refugee crisis and that a separation of left-wing parties occurred in which some left-wing parties started to criminalize refugees. In line with Waerniers & Hustinx (2019), a conditionality of residence rights and citizenship for different types of migrants emerged in the debate. Mair's (2009) concepts of responsiveness and responsibility were used to offer a possible explanation for the shifts in the discourse of the parties in government.

Keywords: refugee crisis, migration, integration, Dutch parliamentary discourse, grounded theory

Introduction

From 2014 to 2016, massive asylum-seeking and migrant flows from countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan to Europe, also known as the 'refugee crisis' took place (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018, p. 1; Triandafyllidou, 2018, pp. 1-4). This thesis aims to see how the refugee crisis impacted the parliamentary migration and integration discourse in the Netherlands.

Previous studies suggest that two changes in discourse happened during the refugee crisis. First, in most Western European countries, including the Netherlands, mainstream parties adopted a more radical right migration and integration discourse (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018, p. 7; Lucassen, 2018, p. 19). This discursive shift of mainstream parties is closely associated with the mediatization of migration and integration politics. Mediatization is 'the process whereby politics become increasingly dependent on both mass media and other facets of mediated practices, most recently via social/online media' (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018, pp. 6-7). The mediatization of the migration and integration discourse helped mainstream parties to legitimize changing politics and policies of immigration and asylum, allegedly under the pressure of the refugee crisis, while keeping it a moderate image (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018, pp. 6-7). Second, in several European countries, left and right parties were brought closer together by adopting a frame of 'reason' characterized by a call for finding a responsible and effective way to deal with the refugee crisis (Triandafyllidou, 2018, pp. 1 & 21-22).[1] This frame introduced a way to justify an upper limit of refugees entering the country without endorsing anti-immigration positions (p. 19).

While most studies focus on the discourse in both the media and politics (Krzyżanowski, 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2018; Žúborová & Borárosová, 2017; Krzyżanowski, 2018; Hagelund, 2020; Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019; Colombo, 2018; Holmes & Casteñada, 2016), this thesis

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[1] Greece, Italy, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Poland, Austria, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

focuses only on the parliamentary discourse.[2] By looking at the parliamentary discourse, an encompassing picture of all political parties' migration and integration discourse (not just the issue owners) before, during and after the refugee crisis can be formed. Concepts that have been explored in other countries, such as the frame of reason (Triandafyllidou, 2018), humanization of refugees (Kirkwood, 2017) and different categories of immigrants (Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019), are applied to the Netherlands in this thesis. The research question is: how did the refugee crisis impact the Dutch political migration and integration discourse in parliament?

Theory

Following Waerniers and Hustinx (2019, pp. 271-272), I assume that the debates on migration and integration are entangled and influence each other to such an extent that it makes sense to combine the analysis of these debates. The migration and integration debate has become increasingly important in Western-European politics (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2018, p. 5; Van Heerden et al., 2014; Van der Brug et al., 2009, p. 10; Krzyżanowski et al., 2018, p. 5; De Vries, 2018, p. 1550; Alonso & Da Fonseca, 2011, p. 880; Dalton, 2018, p. 13). Apart from the increased salience of migration and integration topics, the debate also changed in content and tone.

Historical overview

It is essential to discuss the historical background of the integration and migration discourse to properly understand the discourse around the refugee crisis in the 2010s.

In the 1990s, integration and migration issues became increasingly salient to parties (Van Heerden et al., 2014; Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, p. 96). Parties started to move away from multiculturalism as the dominant political discourse. Integration was no longer seen as a

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[2] Kirkwood (2017) does study the parliamentary discourse, but he does this in the United Kingdom, focusing on the concept of humanization.

group process that the government controlled but as an individual responsibility to integrate into society successfully (Sleegers, 2007, p. 19; Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, p. 93). Although a strict integration and migration discourse focused on cultural issues, like the incompatibility of Islam with the Dutch culture, was part of the debate, this discourse was not dominant (Sleegers, 2007, p. 21; Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, p. 93). The dominant integration discourse still focused on socio-economic integration (Sleegers, 2007, p. 19).

In the early 2000s, a cultural discourse focusing on Dutch national identity, norms, values and traditions, and discomfort towards especially Muslim migrants became central to the debate (Van Heerden et al., 2014; Sleegers, 2007, p. 9; Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, p. 94; Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, pp. 239-240; Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 76).

> "A political discourse emerged that claimed a 'clash of civilisations' within Dutch society. []
> The clash of civilisations discourse drew attention to social-cultural differences between ethnic
> minorities and natives, thereby constructing a dichotomy between 'them' and 'us' and, in
> particular, between Islam and the West (Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, p. 94)."

In this context, the discourse of integration of parties on the right became one of assimilation. The preservation of identities other than the Dutch identity was seen as impossible (Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, p. 95; Sleegers, 2007, p. 67). This change of discourse was accompanied by a change in the tone of the debate; migration was discussed in terms of dichotomies and problems, and (some) politicians did not shy away from hurtful terms (Sleegers, 2007, p. 63). Especially left-wing parties differed from this discourse by taking progressive pluralist positions (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 99). The PvdA continued to focus on the socio-economic integration of migrants. D66, GroenLinks and SP were critical of the monocultural stances of the right and took more moderate positions on integration and migration (Van Heerden et al., 2014, pp. 132-133). However, since the 2000s, the political right (VVD, CDA, PVV) kept ownership of the anti-immigration issues (Van Heerden et al., 2014, p. 133).

After the murder of Fortuyn in 2002, Geert Wilders and his freedom party continued to play into the discomfort with migration, failed integration and Islam that, in his eyes, the Leftist establishment had caused (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 96; Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, pp. 239-240). The inferiority of non-western cultures and their lack of liberal values, the dangers of diversity to the Dutch society and criticism of politically correct language and multiculturalism of the political left became part of the anti-immigration discourse (Sleegers, 2007, p. 53; Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 74 & 91; Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, p. 94). Anti-Islam discourse and problems with the integration of minorities were integrated into the dominant migration- and integration discourse (Tecmen, 2020, p. 12).

Two changes have occurred in the discourse since the beginning of the 2000s. First, the idea that citizenship is connected to undivided loyalty to the Netherlands became an important element of the integration discourse. Dual citizenship, and therefore dual loyalties, was considered an obstacle to integration (Tecmen, 2020, p. 2; Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, p. 95). Second, the responsibility for terrorism was shifted from society as a whole to Muslim communities (Tecmen, 2020, p. 13). Because of external events like 9/11, Islamist countries and Muslim migrants were associated with terrorism and seen as security threats and a suspect community (Lucassen, 2018, p. 22; Tecmen, 2020, p. 9 & p. 22). The association of Muslims and terrorism enlarged the discursive differences between 'us' and 'them' and emphasized the 'otherness' of Muslim minorities and migrants. When the intensification of terrorism in Europe (among other attacks, the murder of twelve journalists of the Charlie Hebdo weekly) coincided with an increase in asylum seekers coming to Europe, not only Muslims but asylum seekers also often became linked with terrorism in the migration discourse (Lucassen, 2018, p. 12). A fear arose that Islamist terrorists "might be hiding among the refugees" (Lucassen, 2018, p. 11). Over the years, migration and integration were continuously framed along the lines of risk, danger, crime, and terrorism, i.e., terrorism and migration were framed as one

single problem (Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, p. 4). This contributed to the criminalization of migration and (primarily Muslim) migrants (Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, pp. 234-235). Even though the anti-immigration discourse of the right remains dominant, there are calls from left parties against the 'hardening' of the migration debate and for more inclusive migration policies (Van der Brug et al., 2009, p. 20; Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, pp. 93-95; Lucassen, 2017, p. 19).

The criminalization of migration not only emphasized the "otherness" and danger of migrants in general but also introduced a differentiation of deserving and undeserving migrants in the public and political discourse (Holmes & Castañeda, 2016, p. 13).

> "Undeserving immigrants are portrayed as a threat to national security, the welfare state and national identity. Deserving refugees are generally represented as victims of severe conditions in their home countries or of human trafficking (Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019, p. 271)."

The differentiation of deserving and undeserving migrants is a continuum; there are migrants groups that are deserving of all rights, entitlements, participation and belonging that citizens have, groups that deserve some or most of this and groups that are undeserving (Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019, p. 271; Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, p. 230). The classification is not necessarily agreed upon; one migrant group can be classified as deserving and undeserving at the same time by different actors (Kirkwood, 2017, p. 119).

Multi-dimensionality
Especially on party positions, migration is often portrayed one-dimensionally: policies or attitudes towards migration are either restrictive and exclusive or non-restrictive and inclusive (De Vries, 2018, pp. 1548-1549; Kriesi, 2006, p. 933; Lefkofridi et al., 2014, p. 72 & 85; Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009, pp. 317-318; Van Heerden et al., 2014, p. 125).[3] De Haas et al.

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[3] Van Heerden et al. (2014) did divide the migration debate in immigration and integration, but only differentiated integration in cultural, legal and socio-economic aspects. Immigration issues were still

(2018, pp. 328-331) have shown that by looking at migration policies in a multi-dimensional way, trends in migration policies can be shown in more detail. In research about migration discourse, comparable multi-dimensional approaches also resulted in a more detailed picture of the migration- and integration debate. Van der Brug et al. (2009) studied the discourse in party programs multi-dimensionally. In the integration debate, migrants were differentiated by their cultural and religious background and issues in social-economic, cultural and legal issues (pp. 11-13). In the migration debate, types of migrants were differentiated based on their status (for example, guest worker or asylum seeker).

Another way to differentiate in the migration and integration debate is by using frames (Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007; Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019). Waerniers and Hustinx (2019) differentiated political discourses in Belgian policy documents. They aimed to differentiate beyond the categories of deserving and undeserving migrants (Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019, p. 271). They found four frames and migrant categories within those frames that can exist simultaneously. The dominant frame regarding migration in Belgium since around 2010 describes migration as a crisis. This frame reduces migration to a crisis of management of migration flows. It proposes clear solutions to the crisis like reducing the inflow of asylum seekers, having a solid return policy, adjusting shelter capacity and addressing fraud and abuse by migrants (pp. 274-275). Within this management crisis frame, migrants are seen either as profiteers who try to exploit the benefits of the welfare state or as criminals who do not deserve formal citizenship (p. 276). The second frame in migration policy discourse is that Belgian migration policies are dependent on international agreements

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measured unidimensionally: "On immigration issues, parties can either be in favour of more generous (pro) or more restrictive (con) acceptance policies, depending on the number and types of immigrants they would like to welcome in the Netherlands (Van Heerden et al., 2014, p. 125)."

concerning human rights and asylum. (p. 276). Within this frame, migrants are seen as victims who need protection (p. 277). The third frame is found in the context of integration.

> "[] this frame problematizes the economic participation of immigrants in society and focuses on cultural differences, which are supposed to be remedied through the efforts that immigrants make to integrate in order to attain 'full citizenship' and social cohesion (Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019, p. 279)."

Within this frame, migrants are seen as probationary-citizen immigrants, who are in a 'trial period' in which they must prove that they have earned citizenship with good behavior or as virtual- citizen immigrants, who are (naturalized) descendants of immigrants but are not regarded as 'full' citizens (pp. 279-280). The fourth frame is that of residence without the perspective of citizenship (p. 280). Within this frame, migrants are seen as unauthorized. Their residence is illegal, and the efforts they make to integrate are not recognized (p. 280).

This thesis takes a multi-dimensional approach to migration- and integration discourse. It looks beyond migration and integration as singular issues and differentiates types of migrants.

Expectations

In the next section, the expected impact of the refugee crisis on the political integration and migration discourse is discussed. We know that external events influence the salience and framing of issues on the political agenda (Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007; Sleegers, 2007; Van Aelst, 2014, p. 236; Lucassen, 2018, pp. 11-12; Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, p. 4). External events can be from inside the political arena, like parliamentary elections that change the composition of governments, or from outside of politics (Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007, p. 299). Examples of external events from outside of politics that fueled a shift in parliamentary (and media) discourse are 9/11, the bombings in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 and the murders of Van Gogh and Fortuyn (Sleegers, 2007, pp. 52-53; Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, p. 4 & 281; Lucassen, 2018, pp. 11-16; Tecmen, 2020, p. 9 & 12;

Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007, pp. 295 & 304; Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019, p. 299; Lucassen & Lucassen, 2018, p. 218 & 273).

The expectation is that the refugee crisis, as an external event from outside of politics, affected the discourse on migration and integration in at least two ways. First, following Triandafyllidou (2018), it is expected that frames of restrictive parties and non-restrictive parties are brought together by adopting a frame of 'reason', that is characterized by a call for finding a responsible and effective way to deal with the refugee crisis (pp. 21-22).

According to Triandafyllidou, parties with a non-restrictive position see war, conflict and violence as causes of migration flows to Europe (Triandafyllidou, 2018, pp. 16-17). Asylum seekers are considered victims and deprived of agency (p. 16). The government has a responsibility to take care of them. Showing vulnerable peoples' tragic life stories makes it possible to see asylum seekers as human beings (Kirkwood, 2017, pp. 116-118). Asylum seekers are humanized by portraying them in a way that encourages empathy and makes them look similar to us (p. 117).

In contrast, parties that take a restrictive position see the flow of refugees as a threat. Refugees are compared to a natural disaster: 'they are unpredictable, they fall upon one unexpectedly and cannot be managed' (Triandafyllidou, 2018, p. 17). Strategies of "us" versus "them" are used to oppose the natives (Europeans) to the newcomers (refugees). This opposition is enhanced by the logic of a zero-sum game: "what refugees achieve comes at the expense of the natives who welcome them" (p. 18). The newcomers are undeserving of protection and rights because they are seen as bogus and economic migrants (p. 17).

The frame of reason can bring together these different frames. Rationality and efficiency in managing the crisis are at the center of this frame (p. 18). This frame introduces a way to justify an upper limit of refugees entering the country without endorsing anti-immigration

positions (p. 19). Using public order and security to justify restricting the flow of refugees, non-restrictive parties can still be solitary with refugees and frame them as deserving while having a responsible attitude to solving the crisis (pp. 19-21). Restrictive parties can also use this frame because they can claim that the refugees are a threat to Europe or the country while also being rational and efficient in solving the crisis (pp. 19-22).

It is expected that parties will use the frame of reason during and after the crisis because the stances of non-restrictive and restrictive parties are so far apart that parties will only be able to connect by discussing the management of the refugee crisis constructively. Parties can find common ground using this frame because this frame limits solidarity with refugees by rationality. By agreeing that the refugee crisis should be solved efficiently and responsibly, ideological stances are placed in the background of the discussion, and ways to deal with the crisis can be discussed while parties still disagree on how they view migration (Triandafyllidou, 2018).

Second, it is expected that before the refugee crisis, predominantly parties on the right discuss the criminalization of refugees. Whereas during and after the refugee crisis, the criminalization of refugees is discussed by parties on both the left and right. Given the diversity of left-wing parties in the Netherlands, a separation may occur between parties that remain inclusive and non-restrictive and parties that are slowly starting to see migration as a problem.

Based on the campaign for the parliamentary elections of 2017, during which GL and D66 focused on "sustainability, inclusion and an overall international outlook", it is expected that they keep their inclusive and non-restrictive discourse (De Vries, 2018 p. 1543). Connecting criminality and terrorism to victims of war does not fit this discourse.

Other left-wing parties could start to criminalize refugees during the refugee crisis. One possible explanation for left parties to adopt a more restrictive position, like criminalizing refugees, is to cater to left-authoritarian voters. These are citizens "who blend left-wing economic with traditional/authoritarian socio-cultural views" (Lefkofridi et al., 2014, p.66). Left-wing parties could appeal to those voters more by moving away from a fully inclusive and non-restrictive integration and migration discourse. The influence of the media would not likely explain the criminalization of refugees. Although media attention to asylum seekers increased, including negative depictions of refugees relating them to increased crime rates, the use of the crime narrative did not increase during the refugee crisis (Lucassen, 2015, p. 8; Hameleers, 2019; Heidenreich et al., 2019, p. 173).

Methods

This study is exploratory. A grounded theory approach to discourse analysis is used to study if the migration- and integration discourse changed during and after the refugee crisis and how the refugee crisis contributed to this change. Language-in-use is studied to see what the debates look like, how different discourses shape the debates and understand patterns and relationships in the migration and integration debates (Charmaz, 2014, p. 53; Starks & Brown Trinidad, p. 2007, p. 1374). To get insight into the discourse before, during, and after the refugee crisis, broad questions are asked: what is discussed in the debate? How are these subjects thematized and framed? Are there power and ideological contradictions? What is the place of parties in this context? How do parties interact? How do parties use discourse(s) in debates? And did the discourse change during the refugee crisis? The structured yet flexible and iterative process of grounded theory research is suitable for looking at party discourse in the migration- and integration debate with fresh eyes (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 1-3). While prior expectations are set, other changes in the discourse during the refugee crisis can still be

analyzed. The findings of this research will be specific to the migration and integration context; they cannot be applied to other debates, countries or crises.

The Netherlands is selected as the country case for this analysis because the country is a frontrunner of increased attention for migration issues and changed migration discourse in Western Europe (Van Houdt et al., 2011, p. 418; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007, p. 295). The Netherlands also has a fragmented party system (Van Heerden et al., 2014, p. 121) with a low threshold for parties to enter the Second Chamber (De Vries, 2018, pp. 1561-1562). As a result, different types of parties with different orientations can be examined, which possibly use a different discourse.

The party discourse in the migration and integration debate of the eleven parties in the Second Chamber during the Cabinet Rutte II (5-11-2012 to 17-03-2017) are studied (Rijksoverheid, n.d.; PDC, n.d.).[4] It was in this period that the refugee crisis started, peaked and ended (CBS, n.d.; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2018, p. 7). Focusing on the Cabinet of Rutte II ensures that the possible changes in the parliamentary discourse only result from the refugee crisis and its effect on society and not from external events inside politics, like elections. However, external events from outside of politics, like the terrorist attacks throughout Europe, do influence the integration and migration discourses.

This study uses existing data, namely the textual documentation of parliamentary debates (Charmaz, 2014, p. 46). Migration and integration discourses are studied in the context of

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[4] People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)
Labour Party (PvdA)
Party for Freedom (PVV)
Socialist Party (SP)
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)
Democrats 66 (D66)
Christian Union (CU)
GroenLinks ('Green Left') (GL)
Reformed Political Party (SGP)
Party for the Animals (PvdD)
50PLUS

plenary parliamentary debates of the Second Chamber. These debates are suitable to study the migration- and integration discourse because plenary parliamentary debates have open access for all members of the Second Chamber. This means that all parties and groups can participate in these debates. Although in practice, one spokesperson, sometimes two, per party will take the floor in each debate. Another reason parliamentary debates are suitable to study the discourse is that politicians fulfill their role as representatives in this setting because they speak in their professional role in parliamentary debates (Mair, 2009). The parliamentary debates are studied in written form with textual analysis (Charmaz, 2014, p. 49).

The website 'officiële bekendmakingen' was used to access the transcripts of the debates.[5] For both migration and integration, one debate before the refugee crisis, one debate during and one debate after the refugee crisis was studied. In this way, the course of the debate and the reasons for the possible changes in the discourse can be studied.

The budget debates are used to study the discourse on migration and integration (see table 1). In the debates about the budget of safety and justice, and social affairs and employment, general migration and integration issues are discussed. These debates are suitable to study the migration and integration discourse because contrary to other debates (see appendix E), they are comparable over time, they go beyond the mere filing of motions, and migration and integration are discussed separately from specific events that could influence the findings. The financial feasibility of plans will be a reoccurring theme because of this choice of debates. A downside to studying the budgetary debates is that in some instances, comprehensive and in-depth debates about migration and integration can be cut short because these debates aim to discuss the budget.

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[5] https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl

Table 1

Selection of debates

	before	during	after
integration	Handelingen II 2013/14, 31, item 33	Handelingen II 2015/16, 31, item 26	Handelingen II 2016/17, 31, item 27
	Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item 11	Handelingen II 2015/16, 32, item 14	Handelingen II 2016/17, 32, item 7
migration	Handelingen II 2013/14, 26, item 6	Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 3	Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9
	Handelingen II 2013/14, 26, item 3	Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 6	Handelingen II 2016/17, 30, item 12
	Handelingen II 2013/14, 27, item 9	Handelingen II 2015/16, 30, item 16	Handelingen II 2016/17, 30, item 7
	Handelingen II 2013/14, 27, item 6		

The process of data analysis is emergent and ongoing (Goulding, 2009, pp. 382-383). During the research process, memos ("ideas which have been noted") are collected. Memos are written so that ideas can always be revisited (Goulding, 2009, p. 383). In addition to memos, themes and codes are used to structure the data analysis. During the stages of coding, constant comparison is a fundamental feature. Constant comparison means that the researcher is engaging with the data simultaneously as the data is collected. It is a process in which the researcher looks for emerging patterns and themes (Goulding, 2009, p. 383). The coding comprises three iterative stages. The first stage is open coding. In this initial coding stage, data is broken down into separate pieces, creating a large number of codes (see appendix B).

The second stage is axial coding. In this stage, properties and dimensions of codes and categories are specified (Goulding, 2009, p. 383). The goal of axial coding is to "sort,

synthesize, and organize large amounts of data and reassemble them in new ways after open coding" (Charmaz, 2014, p. 147).

In the last stage of coding, selective coding, the relation between codes is conceptualized (see appendix C and D). The data is made coherent and comprehensible (Charmaz, 2014, p. 151). This analytic story is then moved into a theoretical direction and integrated with existing theories (Goulding, 2009, p. 383; Charmaz, 2014, p. 150).

Instead of having a pre-defined codebook, coding is an ongoing and iterative process in grounded theory. Therefore it will not be possible to test for inter-coder reliability. Instead of inter-coder reliability to evaluate the quality of this thesis, transparency will be used. Transparency is divided into three categories. Data transparency means giving access to the data that is used and providing illustrative quotes from sources, transcripts and primary documents (Tucker, 2016, p. 430). Analytic transparency shows the author's interpretive process of the data. A description of the coding process and illustrations of how relevant codes were developed need to be provided. If any software is used in coding, this needs to be described (Tucker, 2016, p. 430). For this thesis Atlas.ti is used in the coding process. Production transparency explains what data, evidence, analysis and methods are used and might be left out in the process. Negative cases and alternative schemas should part of this explanation (Tucker, 2016, p. 429).

Findings

In this section, the most significant discourse elements of the migration and integration debates and changes therein are addressed. First, the two dominant discourses in the debates and their essential aspects are discussed. Second, the changes in the discourse of the VVD and PvdA as coalition parties in relation to the concepts of responsiveness and responsibility are

discussed. Third, the expected changes are discussed. Finally, a concept that emerged from the analysis is addressed; the conditionality of rights.

Non-restrictive/inclusive discourse

SP, GL, CU, PvdA and D66 are parties with an inclusive and non-restrictive discourse. Humane treatment of migrants and asylum seekers is central is this discourse. Humane treatment is described as a right to fulfillment of basic needs and dignified existence (Q1).[6]

The refugee crisis is seen as a humanitarian crisis that came about because of war, oppression and violence, which broad about a refugee flow to the European Union. Within this context, asylum seekers are seen as human beings who are victims of their situation (Q2). Humanization is used to portray them as such.[7] With passive language, agency is often stripped away from asylum seekers (Q3), making the government responsible for taking care of them (Triandafyllidou, 2018, p. 16).

During and after the refugee crisis, D66 and PvdA added stricter positions to their migration discourse, like the need for border controls to find criminals hiding in the refugee flows and bringing them to justice (Q4 & Q5). By framing refugees along the lines of crime and danger and using language out of the context of criminal law (for example, "bring to justice"), they connect refugees with criminality (Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, pp. 203 & 235). In contrast, SP, CU and GL still use a non-restrictive discourse during and after the crisis. They focus more on international solidarity to provide humane asylum (Q6). For example, GL wants to take in asylum seekers from Greece (Q7).

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[6] Q1 refers to quote one, which can be found in Appendix A, including the full reference.
[7] For example, SP humanizes the asylum seeker Renata. Renata was an eight-year-old girl who died of leukemia because she was not given the care she needed until she was given a residence permit. By this time, she was too sick to be treated and died (NOS, 2015).

SP, GL, CU, PvdA and D66 use inclusive discourse. They see minorities as part of Dutch society (Q8). Structural societal problems like discrimination need to be counteracted by the government. Most parties do not see the internalization of 'Dutch core values' as a requirement for integration, except for the PvdA. This could be related to their participation in government. Before the crisis, PvdA does not mention core values as part of integration. However, VVD does so implicitly by addressing the need to uphold the rule of law, participate in society and ban face-covering clothing (Q9) and Minister Asscher mentions individual freedom as core value (Q10). This could be why PvdA starts to see freedom, equality and self-determination as core values during the crisis (Q11).

Exclusive/restrictive discourse

VVD and PVV are parties with an exclusive and restrictive discourse. They refer to irregular migration as a crisis (Q12). Before the refugee crisis, the VVD does this implicitly by talking about 'treating the symptoms or the cause' of migration problems (Q13). During and after the crisis, VVD refers to irregular migration as a crisis explicitly (Q14).

The central measures in the management of the refugee crisis are similar to those that Waerniers and Hustinx (2019, pp. 274-275) describe. First, the inflow of asylum seekers to the Netherlands should be reduced by making asylum centers in the region of the conflict or hotspots in Europe (Q15 & Q16). A focus lies on how many asylum seekers are allowed to enter. In this way, asylum seekers are seen as a statistic (Q17). Second, a solid return policy is essential. PVV and VVD want to offer austere asylum because they think that austere asylum makes for higher return rates (Q18 & Q19). Within the context of return, asylum seekers are seen as troublesome because they hinder a swift return by purposely losing their identification documents, using human traffickers to get to the EU, and frustrating the return process (Q20 & Q21). Third, addressing fraud by asylum seekers is needed to prevent that criminals hiding in the refugee flows and 'economic asylum seekers' who want to profit from our welfare

system enter the Netherlands. In this way, restrictive parties differentiate between 'real' and 'fake' refugees who are profiteers or criminals (Q22).

Migration is seen as a threat, possibly because migration is considered a crisis. The imminence of this threat is communicated by using language out of a crisis context, for example:

> "[] an asylum tsunami that is unparalleled [] (Q23)"

VVD mainly sees migration as a threat to safety (Q24). PVV sees migration as a threat to safety as well as welfare and social cohesion (Q25). PVV thinks that the migration of specifically Muslim migrants poses a threat to the Western culture and liberal values of the Netherlands (Q26).

VVD takes a strict and conditional approach to integration. The party says that having a job is the most crucial part of integration (Q27). Although VVD claims that socio-economic integration is most important, the party also significantly focuses on cultural integration. Minorities need to integrate to follow the rule of law and respect the freedoms present in the Netherlands. At the same time, it seems that those freedoms are not for the minorities:

> "Secondly, clothing covering the face is prohibited in education, care, public transport and government buildings. [] In short, more is expected of the newcomers in the coming years to be able to participate fully in Dutch society and to integrate successfully (Q28)."

VVD explicitly states that the party aims for integration, not assimilation (Q29). However, the VVD's commitment to the adaptation of migrants sometimes hints at an assimilationist approach (Q30).

In contrast, integration is a threat to the employment of Dutch people and society's values for the PVV. In this context, 'Dutch' is exclusive; only white and autochthonous people are considered Dutch and part of 'us'. Others (minorities) threaten us; they are seen as dangerous

and criminal groups with group liability (Q31). Especially Muslims are seen as dangerous because Islam incites violence and goes against liberal values and freedoms, according to PVV.

Instead of aiming for integration, PVV aims for assimilation (Q32) by internalizing the Dutch core values, explained as Jewish/Christian and humanistic traditions. PVV does not see societal issues such as discrimination and racism as obstacles to integration. These are excuses for minorities not to integrate. The real obstacles to integration are cultural relativism, multiculturalism and the political left that facilitated these ideas with their soft approach to integration (Q33 & Q34). PVV sees judiciary measures like preventive and administrative detention as a solution to integration problems and radicalization:

> "The PVV is therefore again calling for hard and necessary measures today: mobile police posts in the neighborhood, police with dogs, curfews, home and neighborhood evictions, much heavier punishments and deportation of criminal foreigners, and the denaturalization of criminals with a double nationality (Q35)."

After the refugee crisis, the idea that migrants need to earn their right of residence and citizenship is integrated into the discourse of the political right. The government is not responsible for helping them integrate. If migrants fail to integrate or commit criminal acts, they lose their chance to get the right of residence or citizenship. Therefore, the right of residence and citizenship are conditional (Q36). Part of this conditionality is that newcomers can only become Dutch if they adjust to the Dutch norms and values. This hints at assimilation; only when newcomers put their culture and values aside and internalize the Dutch core values can they become Dutch (Q37).

What stands out is that VVD's discourse has become increasingly restrictive. VVD incorporated the tough language of the PVV in their discourse throughout the refugee crisis. VVD started to connect multiculturalism and the adjustment of society to minorities and

migrants with left parties (Q38). This hints to the rhetoric of the PVV that the political left caused integration problems with a soft and multiculturalist approach. Just like the PVV, VVD sees multiculturalism and cultural relativism as an obstacle to integration after the crisis (Q39 & Q40). The most explicit change towards the PVV discourse is the incorporation of the silent majority and the unjust victimization of minorities that threaten the Dutch society:

> "In short: in a resilient society, both the minority and the majority must realize what a beautiful country we live in. Minorities should not scream bloody murder about how bad it all is here, but the silent majority should not be pushed aside either. It should certainly not give up her values (Q41)."

Position of Parties in Government

VVD and PvdA do not share discourse on migration and integration for the most part, but they have to find a way to work together on this salient issue responsibly. The concepts of responsibility and responsiveness could offer an explanation for the (shifts in) discourse of the coalition parties.

A possible reason for the restrictive and exclusive discourse of the VVD is that it aims to be responsive to voters with restrictive and exclusive views on migration and integration.[8] Left parties, including the PvdA, accuse the VVD of pleasing the PVV voters:

> "The only answer to that could be that the VVD is competing electorally with the PVV. The VVD is feeding the gut of a group of people. You would expect the VVD not to do that (Q42)."

State Secretary Dijkhoff (VVD) brings together the restrictive and exclusive discourse of the VVD with a responsible discourse of a party in government (Mair, 2009, p. 11). The

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[8] When a party is responsive, the party represents, which presupposes listening to and voicing citizens' opinions in the policy-making process (Lefkofridi & Nezi, 2020, p. 334).

responsibility of government that the VVD sees for itself is reflected in the humanitarian duty to provide shelter for refugees and how this relates to the duty to protect the Dutch people, and the reference to international organizations and laws that provide a framework in which the coalition must govern (Lefkofridi & Nezi, 2020, p. 336; Mair, 2009, p. 14) (Q43).

PvdA has a more responsible attitude to migration. The party is looking for practical solutions to the refugee crisis as a technocratic problem (Q44). Before the crisis, PvdA tried to combine its responsible attitude with a responsive attitude by emphasizing the humanity of the coalitions' policies. Opposition parties noticed PvdA's struggle and criticized the party for not having one clear vision on migration issues. During and after the crisis, PvdA barely mentioned migration in their contribution, it discussed integration issues instead (Q45). When PvdA did go into migration issues, they stressed their responsibility to be solution-oriented as a coalition party (Q46). A possible explanation for this is that the party tried to solve tensions between their manifesto and the program for government.[9]

Contrary to migration issues, PvdA is responsive to integration issues and openly disagrees with VVD (Q47). The party is responsive by standing by the position to fight discrimination to further integration and counteract radicalization by pedagogical measures.

Before the refugee crisis, Minister Asscher (PvdA) was responsive to the electorate at large (not only PvdA voters); he brought together the restrictive and exclusive discourse of the VVD with the non-restrictive and inclusive discourse of PvdA (Lefkofridi & Nezi, 2020, p.

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[9] Humane treatment of asylum seekers is part of PvdA's party program, whereas this is not mentioned in the coalition agreement (PvdA, 2012, p. 34; Coalition Agreement, 2012, p. 30). Asylum in the region is not mentioned in PvdA's party program, whereas asylum in the region is a part of the coalition agreement (PvdA, 2012, p. 34; Coalition Agreement, 2012, pp. 30-31). PvdA is against the ban on face-covering clothing, but a goal in the coalition agreement is to ban and punish face-covering clothing in education, health care, public transport and buildings (PvdA, 2012, p. 32; Coalition Agreement, 2012, p. 32). Contrary to the PvdA, VVD is for as much asylum in the region as possible and banning face-covering clothing (VVD, 2012, p. 49 & 52). The list above is not exhaustive; these are examples of tensions between PvdA's party program and the coalition agreement.

336). After the crisis, Minister Asscher does not bridge the discourses of VVD and PvdA but points out the differences between the discourse of the VVD and that of the Cabinet (Q48). This shift could be related to VVD's more restrictive discourse on integration.

Expected Changes: Frame of Reason and Criminalization of Refugees

Frame of reason

There are several aspects of the discourse during and after the refugee crisis that indicate the use of the 'frame of reason'. First, the need for public order and security are used to support restrictive measures. Primarily coalition parties use this rhetoric. Realism is used to support or defend these decisions or attitudes:

> "The fact that we had no control over the numbers of asylum seekers arriving here and their background made us feel unsafe. As a result, support for the reception of asylum seekers has declined. That doesn't make us racist or heartless, as I said before, but it makes us realistic (Q49)."

A second aspect that indicates the use of the frame of reason is the focus on practical policies and solutions. This attitude can be found with parties both in coalition and opposition. Parties are solution-oriented and focus on practical issues, for example, how LGBTQIA* people can feel and be safe in asylum centers and how the reception of asylum seekers is organized in the Netherlands. Ideologies and beliefs are not at the forefront of the discussion (Q50).

The focus on practical solutions for the consequences of the refugee crisis can be found, especially with PvdA. The PvdA approaches the refugee crisis as a situation for which technocratic and practical solutions must be sought. Ideological approaches are therefore not (or barely) part of the discourse:

"As the PvdA, we want to arrange it as well as possible. We have done the same for the past four years. Sometimes that just means that you don't get to worked up about your principles, but arrange it as well as possible (Q51)."

The focus on practical solutions does not mean that ideology plays no role in the debates. Both non-restrictive and inclusive discourses and restrictive and exclusive discourses are still part of the debate. For example, non-restrictive parties want the Netherlands to take in refugees from Greece to provide humane asylum, as they live in horrible conditions now.

The following aspect of the frame of reason was not found: non-restrictive parties that aim for international solidarity in dealing with the refugee crisis while prioritizing the restriction of the influx of asylum seekers with controls at the borders. Most non-restrictive parties do think that border controls are important. However, border controls are not meant to reduce the influx of asylum seekers but to ensure that criminals and people smugglers can be stopped at the borders (Q52). In other words, the influx of asylum seekers is not seen as a problem, but the way the government deals with the more significant influx is (Q53). In contrast to the restrictive parties, left-wing parties want to make sure that refugees can still apply for asylum (Q54). SP even criticizes the fact that the government tries to decrease the influx of asylum seekers to the Netherlands (Q55).

Criminalization of refugees

The criminalization of refugees became more widespread during and after the refugee crisis. Before the crisis, mainly parties on the political right framed refugees along the lines of criminality and terrorism (Q56). During and after the refugee crisis, parties on the political left (mainly PvdA and D66) started to relate criminality to refugees as well:

"It is critical that we ensure that people who come along with the asylum flow when they really have the most horrible things on their conscience are picked from that stream of asylum, tracked down, prosecuted and brought to justice (Q57)."

However, only right-wing parties (mainly PVV) link the criminalization of refugees to the terrorist attacks that took place in Europe:

> "I have a question about security. The State Secretary has always said that it is unlikely that terrorists hitch a ride with the flow of refugees. How does the Secretary of State look back on the fact that at least two of the perpetrators of the horrific attacks in Paris entered Europe in this way (Q58)?"

Criminalization is not only linked to migration and refugees flows; PVV and VVD also use the same line of reasoning on (primarily Muslim) minorities:

> "The consequences of this disastrous policy are visible to this day. Consider the enormous overrepresentation of non-Western immigrants in social assistance benefits, school dropout rates and crime, but certainly also language deficiencies and views that clash with Western core values, or the fact that young people from the Netherlands even voluntarily join jihadist organizations in the Middle –East (Q59)."

Emerged Change: the Conditionality of rights

A concept that emerged in the debates is the conditionality of rights. This means that citizenship and the right of residence cannot be obtained solely by residing in the Netherlands but must be earned. Rights and citizenship are conditional for several types of migrants. For probationary citizens, residence rights or citizenship conditions are good behavior (no criminality) and economic and cultural integration (i.e., getting a job, internalizing the Dutch core values). When integration is not successful, they must return to their (parents') country of origin, or they do not get access to governmental services (Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019, pp. 279-280) (Q60).

Even though virtual citizen immigrants are formally Dutch, there also is a conditionality to their rights. According to the VVD and PVV, they need to work hard in school, make an effort to succeed in life and fight the discrimination aimed at them to be considered integrated

and "fully" Dutch. The added condition of committing to Dutch core values makes it impossible to integrate for (primarily Muslim) minorities and migrants who do not have a 'traditionally Dutch' religion or way of life. Even when minorities who are formally Dutch integrate socio-economically, they are still not part of those who are considered "fully" Dutch. This becomes evident when they commit criminal acts. The crime is not interpreted as simply breaking the law, like it would be with "fully" Dutch people, but as actively opposing the Dutch culture. An ultimate punishment for this could be deportation to their (parents') country of origin:

> "Even those who were born here, but who choose not to be Dutch, must obey the law. If they fail to do so and commit a serious crime, they can leave the country as far as the VVD is concerned (Q61)."

In this way, the conditionality of rights creates inequality in society between people who are considered "fully" Dutch (us) and people who are only formally Dutch (them). Whenever virtual citizens immigrants do something illegal or something outside of the norm, their integration has failed. The same thing would not say anything about the integration of a "fully" Dutch person. Therefore, even as a formally Dutch person, inclusion and being considered "fully" Dutch can only be achieved by cultural integration. This hints at assimilation.

The conditionality of rights is mainly found in the political right. However, minister Asscher also sees effort as a condition for equal treatment (Q62). In contrast, left parties go against the inequality and exclusion of migrants and minorities that the conditionality of rights brings. They see minorities as "fully" Dutch:

> "[] shouldn't the standard also be that children born and raised here are just Dutch, with all the rights and obligations that go with it (Q63)?"

The conditionality of rights affects unauthorized migrants differently; if they meet the conditions for integration that apply to probationary citizens and virtual-citizen immigrants, they still cannot claim residence rights or citizenship because of their legal status. Even when unauthorized migrants meet all or most of the integration requirements, they still need to return to their (parents') country of origin. Mainly left parties want to make sure that unauthorized migrants who meet every integration requirement can stay through a children's or general pardon. The personalization and humanization that are used to portray refugees are used for this group as well (Q64).

The fact that restrictive parties argue that these culturally well-integrated people should return to their (parents') country of origin underlines the idea of Waerniers and Hustinx (2019, p. 285) that the process of integration is a labyrinth that enables inequality and exclusion. People who are seen as the 'other' (whether they meet the integration requirement or not) are not seen as "fully" Dutch.

Discussion and Conclusion

This thesis asked how the refugee crisis impacted the Dutch political migration and integration discourse in parliament. In line with Triandafyllidou (2018, pp. 16-19), an exclusive and restrictive discourse of right-wing parties and an inclusive and non-restrictive discourse of left-wing parties were found in the debates. During the crisis, VVD moved towards a more restrictive and assimilationist discourse by incorporating logic and concepts of the PVV. A separation occurred between left-wing parties during the crisis. SP, CU and GL remained inclusive and non-restrictive and emphasized the need for international solidarity to provide humane asylum. In contrast, PvdA and D66 added restrictive elements like the need for border controls and the criminalization of refugees to their discourse during and after the refugee crisis. The criminalization of refugees goes against the expectation that D66's discourse would remain inclusive and non-restrictive. It also does not match De Vries's (2018,

p. 1561) findings that D66 differentiates itself based on its' pro-immigration and pro-EU stances.

The concepts of responsibility and responsiveness offer possible explanations for the (shifts in) discourse of PvdA and VVD. A possible reason for the restrictive and exclusive shift of the VVD is that the party aims to be responsive to voters with restrictive and exclusive views on migration and integration. The responsibility of government that the VVD sees for itself is reflected in the humanitarian duty to provide shelter for refugees and how this relates to the duty to protect the Dutch people, and in the references to international organizations and laws that provide a framework in which the coalition must govern. The responsibility of government could be a possible reason why PvdA says little about migration in its' contribution during and after the crisis. In this way, the party could try to solve tensions between their manifesto and the program for government. In contrast, on integration issues, the party is responsive to left-wing voters by standing by the position to counteract discrimination to further integration and act against radicalization using pedagogical measures.

In line with Triandafyllidou's (2018, pp. 16-18) findings, the analysis found that both left-wing and right-wing parties started using elements of the 'frame of reason' during the refugee crisis. Public order and security were used to support restrictive measures, and parties focused on practical policies and solutions instead of principles and ideology. However, contrary to Triandafyllidou (2018, p. 20), although most non-restrictive parties did think that border controls are important to stop human traffickers, they did not want to use border controls to reduce the influx of asylum seekers. As Triandafyllidou (2018, p. 22) discussed, in other European countries, the frame of reason is used during the refugee crisis to "prepare the ground for decisions to be taken", "justify decisions already taken", and "accuse the

government of not taking action". Future work could address how the frame of reason is used in the Dutch parliamentary discourse.

Another concept in the integration and migration discourse emerged from the analysis; the conditionality of rights. The conditionality of rights is mainly found in the discourse of right-wing parties. For probationary citizens, there is a conditionality tied to residence rights and citizenship. Residing in the Netherlands is not enough to obtain residence rights or citizenship; probationary citizens need to show good behavior and economic and cultural integration. For virtual-citizen immigrants, there is a conditionality tied to inclusion into society. Especially the condition of commitment to Dutch core values makes it impossible to integrate for minorities and migrants who do not have 'traditionally Dutch' core values. The conditionality of rights for formal citizens shows that there is a difference between formal integration and "full" integration and that inclusion into society can only be achieved by adopting Dutch cultural values. The need to adopt cultural values in order to be included in society hints at an assimilationist approach. The conditions for integration that apply to probationary citizens and virtual-citizen immigrants do not give unauthorized migrants a claim to residence right or citizenship; if they are "fully" integrated, this is not recognized. The conditionality as described above questions the possibility of migrants and minorities to be considered "full" citizens because formal citizens are denied "full" citizenship unless they adopt Dutch values, whereas "full" integration of unauthorized migrants is not recognized. This matches Waerniers and Hustinx's (2019, p. 285) conclusion that "citizenship of former immigrants is perpetually in question". Future research could explore further if and how different (left-wing) parties use the conditionality of rights in the migration and integration context. More broadly, the use of conditionality in policy documents and media could be examined.

Future studies could discuss how the discussion about closing the (Dutch and European) borders in the context of the refugee crisis relates to the discussion about closing the borders in the Corona crisis. Do these external events influence the discourse differently?

This thesis has some limitations. First, the analysis of the discourse after the refugee crisis is in 2016. Although the peak of the refugee crisis was behind us at this time, the refugee flows and the consequences of the crisis were still relevant and a part of the debates. Further changes in the migration and integration discourse took place later when the refugee crisis was further behind us. Future studies could analyze the discourse after the refugee crisis later in time. Second, the selection of debates could have influenced the discourse. Salient issues that are discussed in separate debates possibly are not explored enough. Also, the financial feasibility of plans concerning integration and migration are more at the forefront of the budget debates than in other debates. Despite these limitations, I believe that this thesis has offered important insights into the influence of the refugee crisis on the parliamentary integration and migration discourse in the Netherlands.

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Appendix A: Quotes

1. "[] no one, not even an asylum seeker who has exhausted all legal remedies, may be thrown out. Everyone has the right to a dignified existence []." - Voordewind (CU)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 26, item, p. 32

2. "Perhaps it would be better if the VVD wants to prevent people having to flee from war and oppression, not to do business with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar and to no longer supply weapons, so that no bombs can be thrown, so that people don't have to flee. Perhaps it would be a good idea to bomb Syria less and look for a solution so that people can stay in their country. It may also be an idea that the VVD adheres to human rights and closes fewer deals with a regime like that of Turkey. These are all suggestions that can prevent people from having to flee." – Karabulut (SP)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 31, item 26, p. 27

3. "We are currently confronted in the Netherlands with the arrival of a large group of refugees from another part of the world, where an unparalleled humanitarian tragedy is taking place, where people have become adrift and where people have sometimes been received under appalling conditions in the region." - Asscher (Minister of Social Affairs and Employment)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 32, item 14, p. 20

4. "War criminals who hitch a ride in a stream of refugees: people are concerned about this. I'm not here to scare people, but I do think we should do everything we can to filter those people out." - Sjoerdsma (D66)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 47

5. "I have a question about a proposal my party recently made with regard to tackling human traffickers. This proposal entails ensuring that European border security is put in order." - Sjoerdsma (D66)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 3, p. 17

6. "The government here applauds the lower influx in recent months, while I wish we would pay a little more attention to international solidarity." - Gesthuizen (SP)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 3

7. "Mr Azmani just said: we are so much better off. But what about those refugees who are stuck in Greece, who, despite the fact that the Netherlands has promised to receive 4,000 people, are still stuck? We only took care of half of the people we were supposed to take in. Mr Azmani says: we are so much better off. I would like to hear from him if he is also talking about the refugees." – Voortman (GL)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 19

8. "This cabinet has done everything it can to create an image of the Netherlands in which there is conditional Dutch citizenship and unconditional Dutch citizenship. A hooligan with Frisian roots is just a rotten kid, but he is our rotten kid. But the troublemaker with a family history in the Rif Mountains simply has to go back to his own country. Does the minister have any idea how damaging this is to social cohesion and community spirit? Let us stop conditional Dutch citizenship and no longer link integration to the right of residence." - Van Meenen (D66)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 31, item 27, p. 52

9. "Migrants have not only rights but also obligations, just like any other citizen in this country. We live in a democratic constitutional state, in which everyone has to comply with laws and regulations. [] We also expect all newcomers to help make society possible. That doesn't mean you have to sit on the couch at home, only be in your own community, or kick out trash on the street. No, mastering the Dutch language, gaining knowledge of Dutch society and doing paid work are the ingredients of successful integration into Dutch society. [] Second, face coverings are banned in education, healthcare, public transportation and government buildings. The police can also order that the face-covering clothing be removed in public places." – Potters (VVD)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item 11, p. 48

10. "It concerns individual freedoms that are part of the Dutch core values." – Asscher (Minister)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item 11, p. 22

11. "We do not build a wall around the Netherlands, but we expect everyone to do their best to belong, to be part of our society and to want to be part of it, with the associated

values that we naturally have, such as freedom, equality and self-determination. We do not accept that those values are violated." – Kerstens (PvdA)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 31, item 26, p. 44

12. "The Netherlands can no longer cope with the ongoing asylum disaster." - Fritsma (PVV)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 30, item 16, p. 27

13. "This concerns on the one hand the treatment of symptoms and on the other hand the aspect that should be used more to deal with the cause of symptoms." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 27, item 9, p. 5

14. "As far as the migration crisis is concerned, it is an illusion to think that the Netherlands alone can keep it in its own hands." – Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 3, p. 19

15. "They are making a very commendable effort, but as far as the VVD is concerned, everything must be done to stop the uncontrolled influx of migrants to Europe. As the VVD has been and will continue to advocate since March this year, creating sustainable reception in the region and the conclusion of treaties with third countries to that end are and will remain absolute top priorities until the influx is under control." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 3, p. 17

16. "These costs are unacceptable for the PVV because we have to stop receiving asylum seekers. They can be accommodated in their own region." - Fritsma (PVV)

Act II 2015/16, 29, item 6, p. 18

17. "According to the CBS, the asylum influx reached a peak of no less than 56,940 last year." - De Graaf (PVV)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 42

18. "I am not asking why the return rates have been lowered. I will indicate the possible causes of this myself. I mention the false hope, the expectations that are made." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 26, item 3, p. 18

19. "In the meantime, the VVD argues for austere facilities, which makes it less attractive for asylum seekers to travel to the Netherlands."

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 3, p. 17

20. "It is a fact that foreign nationals discard identity papers during the flight in order to conceal their identity. That makes the return difficult." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen 2013/14, 26, item 3, p. 19

21. "No matter how well the Netherlands does its best, if a foreign national gets frustrated and does not cooperate, and the country of origin does not cooperate in forced return, we are left empty-handed" - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen 2013/14, 26, item 3, p. 18

22. "The VVD is committed to a strict and fair migration policy that allows genuine refugees looking for a safe haven, that welcomes people who can contribute to the Netherlands, that prevents underprivileged fortune seekers and criminals and thus retains support." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 26, item 3, p. 26

23. Handelingen II 2015/16, 30, item 16, p. 4
24. "In the meantime, closer to home, but no less important, we need to step up border controls, in light of our own security." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 3, p. 17

25. "Mass immigration and the maintenance of a welfare state do not go together. Mass immigration creates alienation. Mass immigration causes a loss of mutual trust in the street, in the neighborhood, in the city and in the country. Mass immigration leads to higher healthcare costs, more crime, the robbery of benefit funds, massive abuse of benefits, insecurity, degeneration, ideological-religious riots in and between schools and ultimately instability. People have lost each other. They are confronted with unfamiliarity and aggression and, above all, they feel displaced in their own country." - De Graaf (PVV)

Handelingen 2013/14, 31, item 33, p. 13

26. ."[] the growing Islamization with violence against women through marriage and honor killings, violence and aggression against Jews and gays, the dislike of the West and now even jihadists who travel from our country to kill elsewhere in the name of Islam []" - Van Klaveren (PVV)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item 11, p. 51

27. "What the VVD is all about is that work really is the ultimate form of integration." - Potters, VVD

Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item 11, p. 49

28. Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item 11, p. 48
29. "We are going for integration." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item 11, p. 24

30. "For the VVD it is certain: it is the newcomer who has to adapt and not society." – Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 31, item 27, p. 18

31. "The first point concerned, among other things, young people in neighborhoods who molest, abuse, threaten and so on. That distinction must be equally clear. [] The other point is about young people, as I just mentioned. This concerns group liability and minimum sentences." - Van Klaveren (PVV)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item 11, p. 20

32. "[] I would like to receive an answer to the question I have asked why the minister is not committed to assimilation. After all, we have seen that integration has failed in recent decades." - Van Klaveren (PVV)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item, 11, p. 24

33. "The mass immigration that has just been mentioned and the decades-long poisoning of our country by cultural relativism are leading to the inevitable integration disaster that we face today." - Van Klaveren (PVV)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 31, item 33, p. 17

34. "The soft approach has failed time and time again. The problems keep growing. It is time to wake up from the multicultural dream that everything will be all right, and to focus hard on repression." - Van Klaveren (PVV)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 31, item 33, p. 18

35. Handelingen II 2013/14, 31, item 33, p. 17
36. "The VVD thinks we should be clear to newcomers. When people do not want to integrate and participate, this cannot be without consequences. In my contribution in the first term, I already indicated to the Minister that there may be more options than just revoking the right of residence when it is legally impossible to actually attach consequences to it. Those who turn their backs on the beautiful society that we have in the Netherlands deserve to see the back of this society turned towards them. You can, for example, attach consequences to benefits and provisions." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 32, item 7, p. 44

37. "If you embrace our freedoms, you belong. Then you become part of us, of the Netherlands."

Handelingen II 2015/16, 31, item 27, p. 18

38. "When we admit newcomers, they have to adapt to our society and not the other way around. Does the minister agree with me? Or is the Minister of Integration more of the left-wing school that believes that integration should come from two sides, that the receiving society should also be prepared to make concessions?" - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 31, item 27, p. 18

39. "With all due respect, I am shocked that such cultural relativism can be detected in Mr Van Meenen, while we should cherish and propagate much more what we have, precisely in the interest of integration and acceptance of newcomers. We have to show what we are so good at and so great at. That also means discussing our traditions." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 32, item 7, p. 44

40. "When we talk about newcomers, I think it is important that we as a host society stand for our core values. If we are not clear to newcomers about the society they end up in, it is not clear to migrants what their contribution should be and what this means to

them. We have made mistakes in the past, with integration policies aimed at preserving our own culture and identity that we have had for a long time." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 32, item 7, p. 44

41. Handelingen II 2016/17, 31, item 27, p. 24
42. Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 16
43. "We do this, of course, because as a country we have a humanitarian duty to ensure that people who are unsafe because of war, persecution and who are fleeing human rights violations must be able to find a safe place. [] That is why the cabinet certainly feels the duty and the noble honor, also in a European context, to work to stem the influx and to find alternatives that offer people safety, but not all here." - Dijkhoff (State Secretary)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 30, item 16, p. 1

44. "We are always in favor of a pragmatic solution. I understand there will be a hearing on how to fix these issues soon. A counselor, someone people know not to judge them for being who they are, can be one of the solutions." - Marcouch (PvdA)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 6, p. 15

45. "I understand that the Labor Party's input on the "asylum" part consists of one sentence and one question." - Voortman (GL)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 34

46. "As the PvdA, we want to arrange it as well as possible. We have done the same for the past four years. Sometimes that just means that you don't get to worked up about your principles, but arrange it as well as possible." - Recourt (PvdA)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 35

47. "I have often heard Mr Azmani say how proud he is that we are so strict in our admission policy. That is also possible, but this is about integration and about people who are allowed to be here. I hear my colleague Azmani tell a story that is a bit unfair. He suggests that refugees would not want to integrate." - Marcouch (PvdA)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 31, item 27, p. 17

48. "When Mr Van Meenen ends his forced interruption by asking me to take responsibility for the VVD election program, we are far from home. I am responsible for many things, but not explicitly for the VVD election program. I don't wish to be either. I stand for cabinet policy, explicitly with regard to Dutch values, that we welcome people here and tell them in what kind of country they can find their future." - Asscher (Minister)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 32, item 7, p. 29

49. Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 17
50. "I am not going to interrupt Mr Azmani ideologically, because we are diametrically opposed. However, I do have a question with which I want to continue on the interruptions of the ChristenUnie, D66 and CDA."

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 3, p. 21

51. Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 35
52. "In addition, Europe must jointly guard the external borders and further develop a tough approach to people smugglers." - Recourt (PvdA)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 6, p. 2

53. "The refugee problem is referred to by many as a crisis. Yes, it is true, this is a crisis, but it is above all a political crisis. In 2015, the cabinet was taken by surprise by the influx of asylum seekers. The cabinet was not prepared for this influx of asylum seekers."

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 6, p. 20

54. "There are also talks about a kind of asylum quota. I would like to receive a clear response from the Secretary of State. Is and will it remain the case that every refugee should always have the opportunity to apply for asylum?" - Voordewind (CU)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 29, item 6, p. 22

55. "The government here applauds the lower influx in recent months, while I wish we would pay a little more attention to international solidarity." - Gesthuizen (SP)

Handelingen II 2016/17, 29, item 9, p. 3

56. "The VVD is committed to a strict and fair migration policy that allows genuine refugees looking for a safe haven, that welcomes people who can contribute to the

Netherlands, that prevents underprivileged fortune seekers and criminals and thus retains support." - Azmani (VVD)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 26, item 3, p. 26

57. Handelingen II 2016/17, 30, item 7, p. 34

58. Handelingen II 2015/16, 30, item 16, p. 11

59. Handelingen II 2015/16, 31, item 26, p. 70

60. "Enforce acceptance of our Western standards, values and culture. For example, only entitle people from outside to social security if they have worked here for ten years and have not committed a crime for ten years. Make sure that people contribute to the further construction of the Netherlands in a culture where freedom is paramount and where hatred towards dissenters, women, gays, et cetera does not belong. Why does the minister give integration as a gift to asylum seekers who pass the integration course within the set term?" - De Graaf (PVV)

Handelingen II 2015/16, 31, item 26, p. 52

61. Handelingen II 2015/16, 30, item 16, p. 21

62. "Let's face it. You should expect young people to finish school, to do their best, to present themselves properly, to work on their CV and not to give up, even when it is difficult at times. But if they have all done that and so they have done their best, they also deserve a fair chance and equal treatment." - Asscher (Minister)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 32, item 11, p. 23

63. Handelingen II 2015/16, 31, item 26, p. 7

64. "Dennis, originally from Burundi, is part of that group. He was born in the Netherlands. He went to school in the Netherlands." – Voordewind (CU)

Handelingen II 2013/14, 26, item 6, p. 34

Appendix B: Code list

Code	Description	Grounded
(labor) migration good for economy	Migration or labor migration is good for the economy.	12
assimilation	Minorities or migrants need to assimilate. This code is used only when assimilation is mentioned explicitly.	6
call for co-operation		2
call for reflection		1
citizenship	About what citizenship should look like, what values citizens should have and the rights and obligations that come with citizenship.	6
conditional rights	Minorities and migrants deserve rights in return for effort, good behavior etc. Citizenship or other rights are conditional. Having rights is not self-evident just because you are human, they are related to good behavior and effort. This touches on the right to have rights as Arendt sees it: human rights are not connected to humanity but to being part of a community.	27
core values as integration solution	Core values are seen as part of the integration process or as a way to improve integration of minorities and migrants.	18
core values not integration solution	Core values are not seen as part of the integration process or as a way to improve integration of minorities and migrants.	4
creative language/words	Creative language refers to: - use of made up words - play with words	133

	- use of (very) informal language - use of metaphors - repetition as stylistic tool - rhetorical question The list above can be used to express restrictive or negative views on migration but this is not a necessity.	
crisis language	Language that is used in a crisis setting, for example natural disasters, war or attacks. Examples are 'tsunami of migrants', 'code red' and 'great danger'. The use of crisis language can be more subtle, for example the reference to cause- and symptom control. This coded is based on the comparison of refugees as natural disaster that fall on society that Triandafyllidiou (2018, pp. 16-17) makes. However this code used broader than the metaphor of natural disasters and does not necessarily only refer to refugees.	33
criticism Dutch people	Dutch people are counteracting integration.	1
criticism EU	Criticism on how the EU deals with the refugee flows.	20
criticism on 'cultuurrelativisme'		8
criticism on PC	PC = political correctness. This code is used when the political correctness of politicians or of politics in general is criticized. This code is based on what Lucassen & Lucassen (2015, p. 96) say about political correctness in the Netherlands: "Whoever wants to understand the rather sudden "pessimistic turn" in the Dutch immigration and	7

integration debate should take note of two things. First of all, there is the timing—the unanticipated effects of a strong normative political correctness caused by the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, buttressed by a typical Dutch version of an ethical revolution and nourished by guilty feelings about the mass deportation of Jews and Dutch war crimes during the decolonization of Indonesia. This ethical revolution was an international phenomenon and led to a broadly shared political correctness, ensuring that racism and discrimination were taboo subjects, and it seems to have been particularly strong in the Netherlands. When the Netherlands turned into an immigration country due to the settlement of large numbers of colonial migrants from Suriname and former guest workers and their families from Morocco and Turkey, discussing, let alone criticizing, social and cultural problems linked to this immigration was considered by many as playing into the hands of the extreme Right. This belief was so strong and widespread that, notwithstanding the "bad timing" of the immigration during a long period of economic recession and the social problems that went with it, immigration and integration were not politicized, and discontent among the population was considered to be an

	expression of racist gut feelings. Once this political correctness evaporated, starting with the Rushdie affair in 1989 and ending with Scheffer's essay "The Multicultural Drama" in 2000, the counterreaction was even more intense." The discourse about integration was characterized by tolerance towards ethnic minorities and caution concerning the demands that may be made of them (Sleegers, 2007, p. 17). There was a culture of avoidance about the influence of migrant minority groups on national identity: "Mentioning the impact that immigration and minorities would have on national identity often led to accusations of discrimination, racism or even fascism" (Scholten & Holzhacker, 2009, pp. 90-91). In this culture of political correctness, minorities could not be criticized. (PC is connected to 'left as a culprit' and 'left caused m/i problems')	
criticism reliance on EU and third countries		2
debate	This code is used when it discussed is how integration and migration topics should be discussed in politics and society as well as who should discuss these topics in which capacity and manner.	39
decoupling crime and migration	This code is used when the connection of migration/integration and risk, danger, crime and terrorism is criticized or denied.	11

decoupling immigration detention and return	This code is used when the connection is denied that immigration detention leads to fast(er) return of rejected asylum seekers.	1
decoupling integration and right of residence/citizenship/inclusion	This code is used when integration is not conditional for the right of residence, citizenship or inclusion in society.	2
decoupling repection/influx and return	This code is used when no connection is seen between how migrants/asylum are received in society, what is communicated to them and how asylum centers look, and the willingness of migrants/asylum seekers to return.	3
defining core values	This code is used when a speaker defines core values.	37
deliberative tone	This code is used when a party has a deliberative tone towards another party.	48
differentiation migrants	This code is used when migrants are differentiated.	165
downplaying problems minorities/migrants	This code is used when problems of minorities and migrants are downplayed.	3
Dutch as victims	The Dutch are victims of migration and integration problems. They feel displaced the Netherlands, their own country or have become minorities in the Netherlands, often in the big cities. Part of this narrative is the threat that comes from migration.	36
Dutch as white, autochtoon	This code is used when 'Dutch' refers only to white and autochthones Dutch people, is often implicitly stated. Example: differentiation Dutch or the people from minorities or referring to 'the people'.	14
Dutch helpful to integration	This code is used when Dutch people are seen as helpful for integration.	2

Employers responsible for integration	This code is used when employers are held responsible for integration or inclusion of minorities and migrants.	16
fake refugee	This code is used when a reference is made to the existence of 'real' and 'fake' refugees. Real refugees are people who fled from war and fake refugees are 'profiteers' of the refugee flows or 'economic migrants'.	27
for humane treatment migrants	Humane treatment of migrants, mostly asylum seekers, is important.	36
foreign interference	This code is used when a party thinks that there is foreign interference in the form of money or ideas from other countries, mostly from Muslim countries in Dutch mosques.	26
government responsible for integration	The government is responsible for the integration of minorities or migrants.	69
government responsible for return	The government is responsible for the return of rejected asylum seekers.	1
humanitarian duty	The Netherlands has a humanitarian duty to take in and take care of asylum seekers.	11
individual responsible for integration	The individual is responsible for the integration of minorities or migrants.	39
integration is failing	This code is used when a reference is made to failing integration, in the sense that that is happening, has happened or how integration has failed.	23
integration with rule of law	Integration should happen with the rule of law. This either means that those who integrate need to follow the rule of law or that the rule of law is there to protect those who integrate as well.	9

international obligations	This code is used when international obligations or laws are referred to.	12
international solidarity	This code is used when international solidarity is referred to. !Not coded when implicit!	4
Islam and liberal values incompatible	This code is used when the incompatibility of Islam and liberal values is implied or stated.	2
Islam as threat	This code is used when Muslims or the (radical) Islam are portrayed as a threat to, for example, safety or welfare.	45
judiciary measures as integration solutions	This code is used when a solution to integration problems is proposed that involves a judge or judiciary measures like detention. This relates to the criminalization of migration.	10
judiciary measures as migration solutions	This code is used when a solution to migration problems is proposed that involves a judge or judiciary measures like deportation. This relates to the criminalization of migration.	8
labor migrants as victims	This code is used when labor migrants are portrayed as victims.	3
labor migration as threat	Labor migration is a threat to, for example, welfare of the Netherlands.	15
left as culprit	Left parties or other left organizations (like the media) are held responsible for problems in society. This line of thinking is not limited to migration and integration problems. This code sees 'the left' as culprit in a broader sense. 23-5-2021 12:19:26, merged with 'left caused m/i problems'	19

	'left' = the political left. Mostly SP, GL, PvdA, PvdD and sometimes D66. The right claimed migration issues and falsely blamed the left for causing most migration/integration issues. This narrative was assumed by media as well. After the death of Fortuyn, Geert Wilders and his freedom party continued to play into the discomfort with migration, failed integration and the Islam that, in his eyes, the Leftist establishment had caused (Lucassen & Lucassen, 2015, p. 96; Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, pp. 239-240). The political right (VVD, CDA, PVV) kept ownership of the anti-immigration issues (Van Heerden et al., 2014, p. 133).	
linking crime and asylum	This code is used when asylum seekers specifically are framed along the lines of risk, danger, crime and terrorism (Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, p. 4). This refers to "crimmigration" or the criminalization of migration. This code is used for minorities and well as migrants.	21
linking crime and Islam	This code is used when Muslims, Islam or radical Islam is connected to criminal acts, criminality and terrorism.	22
linking crime and migration	This code is used when migration and integration are framed along the lines of risk, danger, crime and terrorism (Koulish & Van der Woude, 2020, p. 4). This refers to "crimmigration" or the criminalization	41

	of migration. This code is used for minorities and well as migrants.	
linking crime and return	This code is used when it is implicitly or explicitly stated that the criminality of minorities and migrants should result in the return to their country of origin.	9
linking immigration detention and return	This code is used when the connection is made between immigration detention and fast(er) return of rejected asylum seekers.	2
linking influx to reception	This code is used when the way asylum seekers are received in society (what asylum provisions are there, services asylum seekers have right to, etc.) is connected to the influx of asylum seekers. A possible connection is: when sober/austere asylum is offered, the influx of asylum seekers will decrease.	6
linking integration and right of residence/citizenship/inclusion	This code is used when integration is conditional for the right of residence, citizenship or inclusion in society.	18
linking integration to the labor market	This code is used when integration and integration requirements are connected to the labor market or labor migrants.	6
linking migration and development aid	This code is used when migration or asylum seekers flows are connected to development aid. A possible connection could be that when the Netherlands invests in development aid, migration flows to the EU can be reduced. Another possible connection is that countries where migrants or asylum seekers come from are punished by giving less development aid when they do not take their citizens back.	4

linking negative consequences integration/migration and free market	This code is used when the negative consequences of integration or migration are connected to the working of the free market. An example is that market forces had a negative effect on the quality of language courses.	4
linking negative consequences integration/migration and open borders	This code is used when the negative consequences of integration or migration are connected to having open borders. Closed borders are seen as a solution to those integration- and migration issues.	21
linking reception/influx to return	This code is used when a connection is seen between how migrants/asylum are received in society, what is communicated to them and how asylum centers look, and the willingness of migrants/asylum seekers to return. For example: no shelter for migrants (reception), leads to better return rates. Or: if there is a strict return policy, migrants will realize it does not bring anything to come to NL, so they will not come to NL (influx). This codes partly overlaps with 'linking influx to reception'.	9
linking right of residence/citizenship to integration	This code is used when the right of residence or citizenship in society is conditional for integration.	1
m/i in cultural domain	Integration or migration is discussed in a cultural context: - a reference to culture (Dutch or other) is made - a reference to 'core values' is made, also: core values are understood as liberal values	36

m/i in socio-economic domain	Integration or migration is discussed in a socio-economic context.	56
mass-immigration	This code is used when 'mass-immigration' is mentioned. Mass-immigration gives the idea that the influx of migrants is massive. → because 'massa' is structurally linked to migration, it seems like migration is getting out of hand, combine this with other negative views on migration and 'massa-immigratie' becomes negative and conveys a threat.	34
migrant as human being	Asylum seekers are portrayed as human beings, not as numbers, criminals, statistics, etc.	32
migrant as problem	Migrant as problem: not because of their actions, but because they are here.	11
migrant as statistic	Migrants, mostly asylum seekers, are discussed as statistic (not as humans or problems).	21
migrants as victims	Migrants, mostly asylum seekers or refugees, are seen as victims.	21
migration and welfare state incompatible		18
migration as a threat	This code is used when migration is seen as a threat to, for example, welfare, safety or societal unity.	56
minister criticism: Asscher (as minister) --> PVV		1
minister criticism: Asscher (Cabinet) --> Öztürk (Kuzu/Öztürk)		1
minister criticism: Asscher (Cabinet) --> SP		1

minister criticism: Asscher (Cabinet) --> Van Klaveren (PVV)		1
minister criticism: Asscher (Cabinet) --> Van Meenen (D66)		1
minorities as Dutch	This code is used when minorities are seen as Dutch or part of the Dutch society. They are not excluded.	11
minorities as group	The idea is that minorities are not individuals, but a group. This group has group responsibility: if an individual member of this group does something wrong, the entire group can be held responsible. groepsaansprakelijkheid (PVV)	4
minorities as individuals	Minorities are seen as individuals, this goes against the idea of group liability.	6
minorities as victims	Minorities are seen as victims of, for example, discrimination.	11
multiculturalism as threat	This code is used when multiculturalism is seen as a threat to, for example, Dutch culture or when multiculturalism is seen as something negative.	8
Muslim discrimination/Islamaphobia	This code is used when a party states that discrimination of Muslims and Islamophobia are present in the Netherlands. This is seen as something bad.	7
necessity for integration/solution for integration issues	This code is used when a party states what is needed for integration to succeed or how integration issues can be solved.	54

negative tone	Negative tone = speaking negatively about migration and/or integration. This can be recognized by i.e.: - dramatization (f.e. use of hyperbole) - negative adjectives This overlaps with creative language.	47
no foreign interference	This code is used when a party does not think that there is foreign interference in the form of money or ideas from other countries, mostly from Muslim countries in Dutch mosques.	3
obstacle to integration	This code is used when something is considered an obstacle to integration. For example: segregation, discrimination, racism, cutbacks or foreign governments.	39
opvang in de regio	This code is used when parties see asylum in the region of the conflict as a good approach to or solution for the refugee crisis or migration flows to the EU.	40
party criticism: Bontes/Van Klaveren --> Cabinet		1
party criticism: Bontes/Van Klaveren --> D66 & GL		1
party criticism: Bontes/Van Klaveren --> Opstelten (as minister)		1
party criticism: Bontes/Van Klaveren --> political elite		2
party criticism: Bontes/Van Klaveren --> PvdA		1
party criticism: Bontes/Van Klaveren --> VVD		5

party criticism: CDA --> Asscher (as minister)		2
party criticism: CDA --> cabinet		6
party criticism: CDA --> coalition		3
party criticism: CDA --> CU		1
party criticism: CDA --> Dijkhoff (as secretary of state)		7
party criticism: CDA --> government		3
party criticism: CDA --> Kuzu/Öztürk		2
party criticism: CDA --> PvdA		3
party criticism: CDA --> PVV		4
party criticism: CDA --> Teeven (as secretary of state)		2
party criticism: CDA --> VVD		13
party criticism: CU --> Asscher (as minister)		1
party criticism: CU --> Azmani (VVD)		2
party criticism: CU --> cabinet		2
party criticism: CU --> CDA		1
party criticism: CU --> coalition		1
party criticism: CU --> Dijkhoff (as secretary of state)		3
party criticism: CU --> Fritsma (PVV)		1
party criticism: CU --> Kuzu/Öztürk		1
party criticism: CU --> PvdA		1
party criticism: CU --> PVV		1

party criticism: CU --> PVV & VVD		1
party criticism: CU --> Teeven (as secretary of state)		2
party criticism: CU --> VVD		9
party criticism: CU ---> VVD		1
party criticism: D6 --> Teeven (as secretary of state)		1
party criticism: D66 --> Asscher (as minister)		11
party criticism: D66 --> Azmani (VVD)		3
party criticism: D66 --> Cabinet		8
party criticism: D66 --> CDA, VVD & PVV		1
party criticism: D66 --> coalition		3
party criticism: D66 --> Dijkhoff (as secretary of state)		10
party criticism: D66 --> PVV		2
party criticism: D66 --> Rutte (as prime-minister)		1
party criticism: D66 --> Teeven (as secretary of state)		1
party criticism: D66 --> VVD		14
party criticism: GL --> Asscher (as minister)		1
party criticism: GL --> Cabinet		3
party criticism: GL --> Dijkhoff (as secretary of state)		3
party criticism: GL --> PvdA		3
party criticism: GL --> VVD		8

party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> Asscher (as minister)		9
party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> Cabinet		1
party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> CDA		2
party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> coalition		1
party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> CU		2
party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> PvdA		7
party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> PVV		1
party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> SGP		3
party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> SP		1
party criticism: Kuzu/Öztürk --> VVD		7
party criticism: Monasch --> Asscher (as minister)		2
party criticism: PvdA --> Asscher (as minister)		1
party criticism: PvdA --> PVV		3
party criticism: PvdA --> SP		1
party criticism: PvdA --> VVD		2
party criticism: PVV --> all parties		2
party criticism: PVV --> Asscher (as minister)		8
party criticism: PVV --> Azmani (VVD)		1

party criticism: PVV --> Cabinet		28
party criticism: PVV --> CDA		2
party criticism: PVV --> CDA & VVD		1
party criticism: PVV --> CU		1
party criticism: PVV --> CU, PvdA, & D66		1
party criticism: PVV --> D66		3
party criticism: PVV --> D66, PvdA & SP		1
party criticism: PVV --> Dijkhoff (as secretary of state)		8
party criticism: PVV --> political elite	Part of populist rhetoric. The political elite is every party except PVV or politics in general.	11
party criticism: PVV --> PvdA		9
Party criticism: PVV --> SP		1
Party criticism: PVV --> Teeven (as secretary of state)		1
party criticism: PVV --> Timmersmans (as minister)		20
party criticism: PVV --> Voordewind (CU)		2
party criticism: PVV --> VVD		2
party criticism: PVV --> VVD & PvdA		16
party criticism: SGP --> government		2
party criticism: SP --> Asscher (as minister)		16
party criticism: SP --> Azmani (VVD)		2
party criticism: SP --> Cabinet		1

party criticism: SP --> coalition		2
party criticism: SP --> Dijkhoff (as secretary of state)		2
party criticism: SP --> Fritsma (PVV)		1
party criticism: SP --> government		5
party criticism: SP --> Kuzu/Öztürk		1
party criticism: SP --> PvdA		7
party criticism: SP --> PVV		5
party criticism: SP --> PVV & PvdA		1
party criticism: SP --> PVV & VVD		1
party criticism: SP --> PVV, PvdA & VVD		1
party criticism: SP --> Teeven (as secretary of state)		4
party criticism: SP --> VVD		15
party criticism: SP --> VVD & PvdA		1
party criticism: SP --> VVD, CDA & PVV		2
party criticism: VVD --> Asscher (as minister)		1
party criticism: VVD --> CDA		6
party criticism: VVD --> CU		2
party criticism: VVD --> D66		7
party criticism: VVD --> Dijkhoff (as sectretary of state)		1
party criticism: VVD --> Fritsma (PVV)		1

party criticism: VVD --> GL		2
party criticism: VVD --> Kuzu/Öztürk		1
party criticism: VVD --> PvdA		2
party criticism: VVD --> PVV		11
party criticism: VVD --> Schouw (D66)		1
party criticism: VVD --> SP		6
personal criticism: Azmani (VVD) --> Gesthuizen (SP)		1
personal criticism: Fritsma (PVV) --> Gesthuizen (SP)		1
personal criticism: Heerma (CDA) --> De Graaf (PVV)		1
personal criticism: Karabulut (SP) --> Potters (VVD)		1
personal criticism: Kerstens (PvdA) --> Karabulut (SP)		1
personal criticism: Öztürk (Kuzu/Öztürk) --> Asscher (as minister)		1
personal criticism: Öztürk (Kuzu/Öztürk) --> Azmani (VVD)		1
personal criticism: Potters (VVD) --> Karabulut (SP)		1
personal criticism: Sjoerdsma (D66) --> Azmani (VVD)		3
personalization	Personalization is the use of relatively detailed individual cases to show the consequences of a situation or policies. Personalization is part of humanization:	38

	By portraying asylum seekers in a way that encourages empathy and make them look similar to us, asylum seekers are humanized. By showing their tragic life story of vulnerable people it is possible to see asylum seekers as human beings (Kirkwood, 2017, pp. 116-118).	
policing as solution to integration issues	This code is used when a solution to integration problems is proposed that involves a policing. This relates to the criminalization of migration.	6
policing as solution to migration issues	This code is used when a solution to migration problems is proposed that involves a policing, like border controls.	25
pro shelter asylum seekers NL	This code is used when parties are for providing asylum for asylum seekers in the Netherlands.	4
propagating core values	This code is used when parties mention the importance of core values as a way to make sure that newcomers are aware and proud of the Dutch values and that they internalize them.	31
radicalization as a threat	This code is used when radicalization (of extreme right or extreme Islam) is seen as a threat to, for example, safety.	6
realism	This code is used when realism is used as a way to defend opinions, beliefs, decisions or policies. This relates to the frame of reason. !Only coded when explicit!	4
reference to guest workers	This code is used when a reference to guest workers is made.	6

reproachful tone	Expressing reproach implicitly or explicitly. Aimed at someone. More implicit than criticism. Message: - you could have done more - why didn't you act? - why did you act like this? Related to negative tone and sometimes creative language.	95
responsibility asylum EU	This code is used when the responsibility for asylum lies with the EU.	29
responsibility asylum international	This code is used when the responsibility for asylum is international, countries outside of the EU.	16
responsibility asylum NL	This code is used when the responsibility for asylum lies with the Netherlands.	33
sarcasm	This code is used when a comment is sarcastic. This code relates to: negative tone and creative language. Sometimes they overlap.	16
secretary of state criticism: Dijkhoff (as secretary of state) --> parties in chamber		1
secretary of state criticism: Dijkhoff (as secretary of state) --> PVV		2
secretary of state criticism: Teeven (as secretary of state) --> PVV		2
secretary of state criticism: Teeven (as secretary of state) --> SP		1

|		
secretary of state criticism: Teeven (as secretary of state) --> Van Tongeren (GL)		1
society as a whole responsible for integration	Society as a whole is responsible for successful integration. Who are mentioned? Companies famous people white, autochthon the Netherlands as a whole politicians	18
sounding tough on migration	This refers to the use of language when talking about migration. Part of this is the importance of sounding in control of migration and another part of this discourse is that harsh measures against migration are taken. Sounding 'in control' of migration: measures to control migration, referring to controlling migration Sounding in control of migration is usually connected to return policy (deportation of migrants) and border policy (closing borders). Krzyżanowski et al., 2018, pp. 5-6 "It has thereby been argued that by politicizing and politically highlighting immigration, governments and other political actors would want to present themselves as "in control" of immigration, which they would ideologically view as a	36

certain "problem". As a result, however, that strongly negative framing of immigration would prevail within the political sphere under the overall heading that immigration must be "tackled". This would eventually have a very significant spillover effect onto other areas of the public sphere with, in particular, the media discourses often following political agendas' patterns of negative politicization."

Ususally connected with 'tough talk' on migration: sounding tough on migration: De Haas, Natter & Vezzoli, 2018, pp. 326-327. "Such data are however necessary to ascertain to what extent the idea of growing policy restrictiveness reflects a real policy trend or rather discourses of politicians who wish to sound "tough" on migration. Indeed, there is often a considerable gap between political discourses and the "policies on paper." Such a "discursive gap". Implies that enacted policies may be strongly watered-down versions of the "tough talk" of politicians promising to bring immigration down, to increase border patrols, and to "fight illegal migration." Some scholars have argued that such hard-line rhetoric is not primarily about limiting migration in practice, but mainly fulfills a symbolical function, in which "elected leaders and bureaucrats increasingly have turned to

	symbolic policy instruments to create an appearance of control". This could, for instance, imply that increased border controls or policies that specifically target undocumented migrants are not necessarily paralleled by policies which restrict the actual entry and stay rights given to migrants."	
sounding tough on integration	A plea for restrictive or harsh integration measures. Suggesting or being happy with the use of a 'hard approach' on integration.	28
troublesome COO	COO = country of origin This code is used when the country of origin of asylum seekers are not willing to help in the return process of asylum seekers.	11
troublesome migrant	Migrants or asylum seekers are portrayed as troublesome. Example: when they don't cooperate in the return process or when they are counteracting integration.	34
us/them language	This code is used when parties exclude minorities or migrants from the Dutch societies and in doing so creating an 'us' that are part of society and a 'them' who should not be part of society. This language contributes to 'othering'. !Not coded when implicit!	5
virtual citizen immigrant	This code is used when a party refers to the concept of virtual citizen immigrants: Virtual- citizen immigrants are (naturalized) descendants of immigrants	7

|		
	but are not regarded as 'full' citizens (Waerniers & Hustinx, 2019, pp. 279-280). <u>!Not coded when implicit!</u>	
zero-sum	Zero-sum refers an way of thinking in which there are limited resources. Every resource that is taken, cannot be used by someone else. In migration/integration context this means that if an immigrant gets a job in the Netherlands, this job is taken away from a Dutch person. This way of thinking is often accompanied by an us/them way of thinking in which migrants are 'othered'. Migration and migrants are seen as threats. Triandafyllidou, 2018, p. 18: "In conclusion, the threat frame mobilises both feelings of uncertainty and divisions within Europe. By contrast to the moralisation frame which refers to shared European values and to a common representation of us and them together, in solidarity and even empathy, the threat frame uses opposition to argue that this is a 'zero sum' game: what migrants / refugees 'achieve' comes at the expense of the natives who welcome them."	11

Appendix C: Relations Migration

For clarity, not every relation is shown in this figure.

Appendix D: Relations Integration

For clarity, not every relation is shown in this figure.

Appendix E: Debates

Migration/Integration	Date	Title	Speakers
migration	21-11-2012	Het debat naar aanleiding van een algemeen overleg op 21 november 2012 over de situatie rond het tentenkamp in Amsterdam Osdorp	8
migration	28-2-2013	Het debat naar aanleiding van een algemeen overleg op 14 februari 2013 over het vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	5
integration	5-3-2013	Het debat naar aanleiding van een algemeen overleg op 27 februari 2013 over integratieonderwerpen	8
migration	12-3-2013	Het debat over de Regeling langdurig verblijvende kinderen (19637, nr 1597)	9
migration	2-4-2013	Het debat naar aanleiding van een algemeen overleg op 13 maart 2013 over opvang, terugkeer en vreemdelingenbewaring	8
integration	4-4-2013	Het debat over "het Marokkanenprobleem"	8
migration	27-6-2013	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	7
integration	5-9-2013	Het bericht "In deel Schilderswijk is sharia wet"	12
migration	3-10-2013	Wijziging Vreemdelingenwet 2000	4
migration	15-10-2013	Vreemdelingenbeleid	7
integration	14-11-2013	Integratie-onderwerpen	6
migration	16-1-2014	Komst van Midden- en Oost-Europeanen	12
migration	13-2-2014	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	7

migration	10-4-2014	Opvang uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers	9
integration	14-5-2014	Gülenbeweging in Nederland	9
migration	15-5-2014	Instroom van asielzoekers	12
migration	15-5-2014	Instroom van asielzoekers	13
migration	4-6-2014	Aanpak illegale immigratie Europese	4
migration	10-6-2014	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	8
migration	10-6-2014	Onderzoeksrapport "Veiligheid van vreemdelingen" en suïcide Armeense asielzoeker	3
migration	19-6-2014	Asielbeleid in relatie tot antihomowetgeving	2
integration	26-6-2014	Inburgering	6
integration	3-7-2014	Integratieonderwerpen	6
i/m	4-9-2014	1F-beleid	4
migration	30-10-2014	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	5
integration	11-11-2014	Taaleis Wet werk en bijstand	9
integration	13-11-2014	Taaleis Wet werk en bijstand	8
migration	20-11-2014	opvang en terugkeer	7
integration	2-12-2014	Integratieonderwerpen	8

migration	26-3-2015	Instroom asielzoekers	15
migration	26-3-2015	Instroom asielzoekers	13
migration	8-4-2015	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	6
migration	8-4-2015	Opvang, terugkeer en vreemdelingenbewaring	6
migration	30-4-2015	Uitkomsten onderhandelingen inzake bed, bad en brood	16
migration	30-4-2015	Uitkomsten onderhandelingen inzake bed, bad en brood	16
integration	2-7-2015	Integratieonderwerpen	6
migration	7-10-2015	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	8
integration	29-10-2015	Integratieonderwerpen	6
migration	11-2-2016	Instroom van asielzoekers	16
migration	16-2-2016	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	10
migration	3-3-2016	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	10
integration	17-3-2016	Integratieonderwerpen	4
integration	25-5-2016	Invloed ultraorthodoxe moslims in	11
integration	2-6-2016	Inburgering	9
migration	21-6-2016	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	9

migration	28-9-2016	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	8
migration	1-11-2016	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	8
integration	2-11-2016	Integratieonderwerpen	8
migration	1-2-2017	Screening van asielzoekers	13
migration	14-2-2017	Vreemdelingen- en asielbeleid	9
integration	16-2-2017	Inburgering en integratie	7
integration	16-2-2017	Wet inburgering	11
migration	23-2-2017	Besluit vergoedingen rechtsbijstand 2000 en Besluit rechtsbijstand- en toevoegcriteria	3