

Master Thesis

Julius Felix Gmeinwieser

S2898268

Universiteit Leiden

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**Title: Strategic Reactions on Migration and Integration Policies by Established Parties -
a Case Study of Germany**

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First Reader: Dr Tom Louwense

Second Reader: Dr Tim Mickler

Abstract

In this paper, I observe policy changes by established parties which react strategically to new right challengers with a hard stance on migration/integration policies. By assessing parliamentary speech data in a quantitative text analysis with Wordscores in combination with a manual content analysis, I contribute to the ongoing debate of how and when mainstream parties change their positions on the migration/integration dimension. I focus on Germany from 2011 – 2018 to evaluate the effect of the new right challenger “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) which became successful in the light of the so called ‘refugee crisis’. Both the quantitative text analysis and the manual content analysis find no effect for established parties before the AfD entered the parliament and observe a clear adversarial strategy of left Parties when the AfD entered parliament.

Keywords: radical right parties, populist radical right parties, migration, integration, Wordscores, Germany, AfD

Introduction

“Since the 1960s, political systems around the world have undergone a revolution.”

Meguid (2005: 347)

This quote from Meguid underlines the importance of a turning point in political history for western democracies which emerged from the rise of left parties in the 1970s (Inglehart 1971) and the following emergence of new radical right parties (RRPs) (Ignazi 1992). New left parties address issues of environmental protectionism and nuclear demobilization. The emergence of RRP relates to a new conflict dimension, resulting from globalization, between society's 'losers' and 'winners' (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). RRP criticize issues of denationalization by highlighting problems regarding integration and migration, making them the issue owners of migration/integration related policies. This helped RRP to successfully enter parliaments. Some RRP, like the SVP in Switzerland, the ÖVP in Austria, or the Lega in Italy, entered government and, got the possibility to pass bills (Kriesi 2014). However, Mudde expects RRP to influence policies also “through their impact on other parties far more than through direct policy impact” (2007: 282-3).

According to Mudde (2007), established parties shift their policy position towards the new challengers to compete for voters attracted by the competitors. In contrast, mainstream parties can also apply an adversarial shift in the opposite direction of the challenger, or simply dismiss the new competitor which would lead to no effect on their policies (Downs 2001, Meguid 2005).

Existing research provides evidence for all these strategies. Some authors find differences in established parties' strategies by comparing different countries (Akkerman 2012, Heinze 2018). Others highlight the importance of party families when it comes to the question of which party chooses which tactic (Bale et al. 2010). In the light of this, some suggest that mainstream right and liberal parties are more likely to move their positions towards new right

challengers than center-left parties (Akkerman 2015, Han 2015). Others find support for accommodative strategies of the mainstream left and mainstream right parties when these parties face RRP (Abou-Chadi & Krause 2018, Van Spanje 2010). There are also contradictory findings for countries, such as Germany, depending on data and methods (Atzpodien 2020, Kortmann & Strecker 2019).

I add to the existing literature by observing the actions of established parties after the establishment of new challengers and before and after the new rival enters parliament. I argue that parties start to think about strategic options of how to react to the new challenger before it enters parliament. By adjusting policies before the new challenger is successful, established parties avoid a long-term confrontation. This assumption derives from the *legitimization effect*, which refers to the following mechanism. For voters, the success of a radical party indicates that a certain share of society supports the new challenger. The recognized support of society and the challenger's success make voters perceive radical views as socially more acceptable. Consequently, voters might declare their position more openly towards the radical challenger (Bursztyrn et al. 2017, Tankard & Paluck 2016). Therefore, when radical parties enter parliament, voters become more polarized. For established parties, a more polarized system would also mean a higher chance of losing voters. To prevent this, existing parties might shift their policies before the new radical challenger enters parliament.

Considering that some parties react to electorally successful challengers (Han 2015) but would also have an incentive to change their policies before the new opponent becomes successful, the following research question arises: Do established parties react to new competitors before the new challenger successfully enters parliament or afterward?

In this paper, I conduct a case study of Germany because of its post-war history and the emergence of the formerly unsuccessful party Alternative for Germany (AfD), which

transformed from a Eurosceptic party to a populist radical right party (PRRP) in the light of the ‘refugee crisis’¹ in 2015. During this time, the AfD became increasingly successful on the state level. The AfD is the first party located on the right side of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) to join parliament after 60 years (Dilling 2015).

To analyze the case of Germany, I identify party positions expressed in parliamentary speeches through which short time shifts can be analyzed to observe the (possible) adjusted parliamentary behavior of established parties. I find support that established parties do not react before the new challenger becomes successful and left parties react with an adversarial strategy when the new rival enters parliament.

Next, I explore a theoretical framework and consider which strategies parties adopt to react towards new competitors. Subsequently, I explain my research design, the case selection, and methods. Finally, I present my results and highlight the limitations of the findings.

Theory and Concepts

For the theoretical explanation, Downs (1957) provides the basic framework. He describes a one-dimensional moving platform defined by left and right ideological issues. On this scale, parties place themselves by specific policies, considering the economic trade-off of their position for the highest-possible voter approval.

This analysis focusses on the one-dimensional space regarding migration/integration issues. In many European countries, migration/integration policies are important because party competition shifted away from the classical dominant economic distribution dimension to the migration/integration dimension (Franzmann 2019, Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). As RRP address

¹ I use quotation marks for the term ‘refugee crisis’ because crisis refers to a negative attitude which stands in contrast to a scientific neutral perspective.

the migration/integration policies by mobilizing voters with anti-migration/integration sentiments, they hinder mainstream parties to further ignore the issue of migration/integration (Lutz 2019). This can result in strategic moves of established parties to contest for voters, for instance by adopting more repressive positions on migration/integration (a typical right attitude) or more liberal positions on migration (a typical left attitude). They do so to avoid further electoral losses (Meguid 2005).

I consider various potential strategies for policy reactions of the mainstream parties, which derives from Meguid (2005). Table 1 displays these strategies.

Table 1

Possible strategic actions according to Meguid (2005)

Strategy	Position Taking	Effect
Accommodative Strategy	Mainstream parties move towards the RRP	Contagion
	RRPs moves towards the center	Mainstreaming
Adversarial Strategy	Positions drift apart	Polarization
Dismissive Strategy	No position change	No effect

In the analysis, I consider the probability of these different strategies dependent on two different aspects of political strategy: established parties' distance to the new challenger in terms of policy and electoral overlap.

Next, I assess the four strategies in detail and derive one hypothesis for each of them by emphasizing how the latter two aspects can influence parties to act.

Contagion

One accommodative strategy of mainstream parties is to move towards the RRP on the policy dimension. For a contagion effect, the mainstream party will position itself between its old and the RRP's position to pull voters to their side who feel attracted by the RRP challenger. The

contagion effect is very prominent in the literature, which mostly finds support for the contagious effect on established parties' positions on migration/integration policies (Bale et al. 2010, Carvalho 2016, Jankowski et al. 2019). Generally, there is consensus that political parties react to the electoral success of RRP (Adams & Somer-Topcu 2009, Williams 2018) but with a limited number of strategies (Meguid 2005, Bale et al. 2010, Heinze 2018). By moving strategically towards RRP, mainstream parties might be able to modify issue ownership and gain back votes from the challenger.

However, there are also contradictory findings that weaken the strength of this argument (Mudde 2013, Abou-Chadi & Wagner 2020). There are some reasons why an accommodative strategy would make less sense for parties. Generally, politicians are reliant on the partisan core voters (e.g. party activists) of their party. If the core voters do not change their opinion in the same way as the party does, the party will lose a broad activist basis which usually engages in election campaigns. Sudden reactions on sociocultural issues may be risky because voters could perceive the party to be following political expediency rather than the normative 'right' principles (Tavits 2007). Also, a contagion strategy may be unfavorable for parties because of the stigmatization of RRP in country-specific contexts (Berbair et al. 2015).

Nonetheless, when parties are already close to a new competitor, a further move towards the RRP is more likely because the position is already familiar to their voters (Schmiedtke & Zaslove 2014). Reconsidering the Downsian model, voters on the right are most likely to feel attracted by new right challengers. Therefore, established right parties (conservatives, liberals) should be more concerned about losing voters than mainstream left parties if they compete with right challengers (Downs 1957). Hence, I expect established right parties to be likely to shift their position to the right. Established right parties may switch their position before the rival can join parliament because they would be most vulnerable to a further polarization of their

voters, considering their close position to the new challenger (Bursztyn et al. 2017, Tankard & Paluck 2016). This leads to my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 If a party is close to the new right challenger in policy terms and has an electoral overlap, it is more likely to move towards the new right challenger on the migration/integration policy dimension before the new party enters parliament.

Mainstreaming

Mainstreaming is second form of the accommodative strategy. It refers to the tactical possibility of RRP moving towards the center to attract more voters. RRP can try to increase the chance of becoming a government party, which is the final goal for RRP, by becoming more compatible with mainstream parties' positions in the center (Akkerman et al. 2016, Herman & Muldoon 2019). There is evidence for this tactical approach from East-European RRP, the French National Front, and the Swiss People's Party (Akkerman et al. 2016, Pirro 2015). Rather than moving their policy positions, RRP might speak with mainstream rhetoric (Wagner and Meyer 2017, Rydgren 2004). However, since this paper focusses on the reactions of established parties towards RRP before they enter parliament, a possible mainstreaming effect of RRP is beyond the scope of this study.

Polarization

Established parties can also oppose the new challenger with an adversarial strategy. In the course of this, established parties diverge their position from the RRP by confrontation (Meguid 2005). Existing literature on adversarial strategies is rather limited. The only finding that explicitly supports adversarial strategies supports that different parties use this tactic across several federal states in Germany (Atzpodien 2020). A polarization on socio-cultural topics can help mainstream parties to highlight specific advantages of migration such as counterbalancing

the shortage of skilled workers or negative demographic developments. Thereby, they can draw back voters' attention to the socio-economic policy dimension as it is the main conflict line for party competition (Kitschelt 2018). When a part of society stigmatizes RRP, the adversarial strategy can also help to signify that parties are aware of the issue but favor a humanitarian approach, in contrast to RRP (Atzpodien 2020).

Parties, which already address humanitarian values on migration/integration policies, would be likely to shift their position further towards the left because they rather emphasize human rights compared to center mainstream parties that approach migration/integration policies from an economic perspective (Akkerman 2015). Left-niche parties, especially green parties, usually hold very open multicultural positions and favor a humanitarian approach (Akkerman 2015, Kriesi et al. 2006). As their core voters are ideologically positioned on the far left (Kriesi et al. 2006), these parties are most likely to lose electoral support by shifting to the right. However, by showing off an adversarial strategy before the RRP enters parliament, they can demonstrate that they are aware of the migration/integration issue and distinguish themselves from their opponents. However, left-niche parties are most likely to react after the new challenger was electorally successful because they the new challenger does not directly pressure them (Han 2015). Consequently, I expect left niche-parties with humanitarian positions to employ an adversarial strategy after the new challenger was successful which leads to the second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 If a party is distant to the new right challenger in policy terms and has no electoral overlap, it is likely to shift its position on migration/integration further to the left after the new challenger becomes electorally successful by entering parliament.

Considering the adversarial strategies leading to further left positions of existing parties in the parliament after the emergence of the RRP on the right, this strategy would lead to a more polarized party system.

No effect

Finally, established parties can apply a dismissive strategy towards the RRP which is determined by no position change of the established parties (Meguid 2005). But why would established parties not change their position if high-issue salience and the new challenger on the right exert pressure? Some literature suggests that scholars overestimate the effect of RRP on MPs' position on migration/integration topics (Akkerman 2015, Bale et al. 2010, Kortmann & Stecker 2019). One explanation is that established parties would prefer to wait out the scenario as they do not perceive enough pressure to react. They would wait and observe the effect of the RRP in parliament and hope that support for the RRP diminishes (Atzpodien 2020). Another possibility would be that MPs try to shift back citizens' attention to the socio-economic dimension, which is more important for party competition. This would involve no change in migration/integration policies (Kitschelt 2018). Indeed, while other parties' policies might shift, showing off (ideological) consistency can also pay off in terms of electoral support for center-left mainstream parties (Bale et al. 2010).

Parties torn between a polarizing move and an accommodative strategy might not act at all in the end. On the one hand, an accommodative strategy could cost parties the basis of their voters as some parties endorse a cosmopolitan world view which stands in contrast to the stigmatization of foreigners. On the other hand, an adversarial strategy might be too risky, considering that some of these parties have working middle class supporters, whose jobs might be at risk when cheap labor forces enter the market through open borders (Akkerman 2015). Therefore, none of the former two strategies would certainly pay off for the parties, which stress a cosmopolitan worldview but whose voters basis belong to the middle class. Hence, I expect

no effect on these parties' positions because they are torn between the latter two incentives. This would be independent from the new challenger's success because the contradictory incentives remain unchanged independent of the RRP's presence in parliament. Deriving from that, I articulate the third and last hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3 If a party takes a moderately distant position to the RRP in policy terms and has some electoral overlap, it is less likely to move its position before or after the RRP enters parliament.

Research Design

In this paper, I examine to what extent overlapping electorates and policy distances between established parties and new challengers (independent variables) can explain yearly strategic policy changes on migration/integration (dependent variable). I measure the political position of parties as part of their member's speeches in the parliamentary debate with the quantitative text analysis tool *Wordscores* by Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003). I compare the resulting party positions from 2013 to 2018 in a descriptive approach and see which of the theoretic expectations apply. To strengthen the descriptive analysis' results, I test the validity of the findings with the following approaches. First, I observe whether parties changed their orientation in general or only on the migration/integration dimension. Second, I use manual content analysis to identify if parties adjust their policies in debates and how they respond directly to the new challenger in debates. These two validation approaches serve as robustness checks for the descriptive analysis of the partisan positions.

Case Selection

Germany is a most suitable case because of its political post-war history and because Germany's first successful radical-right challenger transformed from a Eurosceptic party to a populist

radical right party (PRRP) during the ‘refugee crisis’ (Franzmann 2016, Franzmann 2018, Korsch 2016). As Germany is one of the few European countries that did not experience a successful RRP before the 2017 elections, an observation of mainstream parties’ reaction during the salience increasing ‘refugee crisis’ (see Figure 1) is particularly interesting because the public attention made it difficult for established parties to react to the increasingly successful AfD (Arzheimer 2019, Odmalm & Super 2014).

I observe policy reactions on the federal level because the political debates on the federal level shape the underlying level of state politics by the so-called *Politikverflechtungen* (Policy Interrelations) (Jeffery 1999, Scharpf 1989, Scharpf 1999). In this section, I provide a short summary of Germany’s past integration and migration policies and explain the rise of the AfD.

In Germany, migration/integration related debates were neglected by politicians although the topic was recurrently relevant (Green 2006). An informal “gentlemen’s agreement” existed since all parties were aware of the risk of addressing the rather unpopular policy field of migration/integration, which results in possibly high electoral costs. This leads to a partisan consensus of not claiming issue ownership for the migration/integration debate (Givens und Luedtke 2005; Kortmann und Stecker 2017).

Being aware of the previously neglected topic, *the Union* (CDU/CSU) tried to gain issue ownership of migration/integration-related topics in 2008. This attempt was unsuccessful because the CDU/CSU’s supporters relate to the social Christian ethos and the business sector is in demand of skilled workers (Boswell & Hough 2008).

In contrast to German mainstream parties, the AfD successfully claimed ownership of the issues of migration/integration (Franzmann 2019). Although being unsuccessful in its first federal elections with a Eurosceptic focus in 2013, the AfD did not sink into the depth.

What helped the AfD to become more popular was the turn to migration/integration-related issues. Especially in the east of Germany, the so-called PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident) movement helped to gain votes for the AfD (Franzmann 2019). Within three months, PEGIDA grew quickly from 350 to 25,000 participants in its weekly protests against the government's migration/integration policies after it started in autumn 2014. During this time, members of the AfD claimed that their party was the political basis for PEGIDA (Korsch 2016). Leading figures of the AfD, for example, the spokeswoman and leading candidate for the state elections in Saxony, Frauke Petry, as well as the candidate for the state election in Thuringia, Björn Höcke, officially declared that the AfD supports more anti-migration/integration-related topics. This resulted in the AfD's first successful entry into state parliaments in east German state parliaments in 2014 with up to 20% in local elections (Boulila & Carri 2017). Following these first successes, the far-right faction of the party formalized and called itself *Der Flügel* (the wing) in Spring 2015. *Der Flügel* aimed to shift the party further to the right and continued to orientate towards anti-migration/integration issues. Resulting from that, the initial conservative liberal and rather eurosceptic founders tried to reacquire control of the party in summer 2015. Since they were unsuccessful, the economic-liberal faction left the AfD and founded the Liberal-Conservative Reformers party (LKR). This enabled the remaining right-wing party elite to change the party program in 2016, which is the basis for its categorization as a PRPP (Franzmann 2018).

While the AfD competed for programmatic decisions internally in Summer 2015, the 'refugee crisis' hit the European continent. German Chancellor Angela Merkel opened the borders for refugees and established the *Willkommenskultur* (welcome culture). It opened a window of opportunity on the right for the AfD which the party used to claim issue ownership of the crisis (Franzmann 2019). Indeed, the CDU/CSU was aware of the open flank as a consequence of the

short-term successful Republican Party in the 1990s and the attempt to gain issue ownership in 2008 (Boswell & Hough 2008).

Generally, the continuing change of the AfD and the lack of data during the first years made it hard to determine which party family the AfD belongs to. The AfD is now widely considered as a PRRP (Berbair et al. 2015, Berning 2017, Lewandowsky 2015). PRRPs address nativism, authoritarianism, and contrast to RRP also populism, which refers to a conflict of the peoples' *volunté general* (general will) with political elite's behavior, as core issues (Mudde 2017). Although PRRPs employ more anti-system attitudes due to their populism component, established parties do not make a difference in their competitive behavior towards PRRPs as a subcategory of RRP (Abedi 2004, Arzheimer 2019, Atzpodien 2020). Hence, PRRPs parties can be treated equally to RRP when it comes to strategic interactions with mainstream parties. Traditionally, mainstream parties emphasize economic-related issues on a left-right dimension and are loyal to the political system (Abedi 2004).

Methodology

The main method is a descriptive comparison of parties' positions over time to observe possible ideological changes. The measurement itself is based on *Wordscores*, an automated text analysis method by Laver et al. (2003)². *Wordscores* computes party positions on a one-dimensional policy space. Like other policy positioning methods such as the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) or the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), which also determine policy positions of parties, *Wordscores* uses an a priori approach to calculate party positions (Laver et al. 2003). It uses existing policy positions for a specific text (anchor text) to calculate a specific score for each word (wordscore) based on the frequencies of each word in each text

² The initially planned method of Wordfish did not deliver reliable results: Wordfish seemed to determine government vs. opposition differences in party positions. E.g, Wordfish calculated the AfD's position close to the Left.

and the policy positions addressed to the texts in which the word occurs. As a precondition, a specific discourse dimension, as well as actors' positions on this dimension, needs to be identified. In a second step, the score for each word is used to infer new policy positions for a new, 'virgin' text. I analyze the resulting policy positions with a descriptive approach. A shift of a party's position to the left indicates an adversarial strategy, a shift to the right an accommodative strategy. No effect would be visible if parties do not move at all or only shift back and forth within a negligible range.

As I want to observe the policy movements on the migration/integration dimension only, the comparison with another policy dimension shall exclude the possibility of a party's general position movement on all dimensions. The social economic left/right dimension would be suitable for this comparison because it is typically not decisive for possible AfD voters (Havertz 2020). Also, the AfD's position remains indifferent between a neoliberal and a social populist position (Wurthmann et al. 2020). I use the same descriptive approach, also based on a *Wordscores* analysis, to analyze the shift in economic policies.

To triangulate the results of the quantitative text analysis, I further apply a qualitative approach using manual content analysis of the parliamentary debates. Thereby, I observe how mainstream parties' MPs react to the RPPR in parliamentary debates and shift their policies accordingly. For the manual content analysis, I divide the analysis into two periods, one for the 2013 – 2016 legislative period and one for the following legislative period (2017 – 2018). Since I assume three main strategies that parties are likely to execute, I categorize possible debate responses accordingly. For no effects, MPs could just ignore the AfD's arguments, try to shift salience back to the social-economic policy dimension, or continue to underline their existing position on migration/integration-related topics. For the adversarial strategy, I would expect strong counterarguments or aspersions towards the AfD. Another option for an adversarial behavior would be a more negative statement towards a new migration/integration policy, that has not

been addressed in a party's manifesto, compared to existing policies in established parties' manifestos. If there is a contagious effect, MP's party members would address the AfD's arguments with respect and state that they have (partially) a point. The final codebook is attached in the Appendix (Appendix I).

For each of the two periods, I analyze three parliamentary debates by hand plus all direct mentions of the AfD by other parties before the PRRP entered parliament. A list of all analyzed debates plus the corresponding dates is available in the appendix (Appendix II). For the interpretation of the results, I display each strategy's share of the total coded formulations for each party in each period. For instance, an increasing number of adversarial comments would support the hypothesis of an adversarial strategy.

Data Selection and Operationalization

Considering the independent variables, I operationalize German established parties accordingly. The Christian conservative CDU/CSU party and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) positioned themselves on the right side of the party spectrum. Consequently, I expect them to shift towards the AfD, as described in Hypothesis 1. *Die Linke* (The Left) and *B90/Die Grünen* (The Greens) are left niche parties (Kriesi et al. 2006): They position themselves distant to the AfD with a humanitarian approach and share no electoral overlap. This makes them most likely to act accordingly to Hypothesis 2. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) are moderately distant to the AfD and their middle-class supporters, vulnerable to cheap labor forces due to immigration, makes them share some electoral overlap (Akkerman 2015). This corresponds to Hypothesis 3.

For parliamentary speech data, I use the second version of the Parlspeech data by Rauh & Schwalbach (2020). This data provides the unique possibility to measure party position continuously, which allows me to observe when exactly positions changed. Other data, e.g., the

Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), only measures the ideological position every few years, notably when there is a federal election. I operationalize each party's position for each year by the position reflected in their parliamentary speeches on migration/integration issues.

For the AfD, only two years of parliamentary speech data is available. The party entered the Bundestag in 2017 and, ideally, I would continue the analysis until 2021 but the Parlspeech dataset includes data only until the end of 2018. Still, 15 months is sufficient to observe any effect of the AfD after its entry in parliament. As the focus lies on the behavior of established parties towards the AfD's emergence, I can observe strategic movements without the presence of the AfD before it entered parliament.

As explained above, I execute the analysis with *Wordscores* (Laver et al. 2003). For the a priori policy positions connected to the anchor texts, I take the mean values of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey's (CHES) (Bakker et al. 2020) variables "Multiculturalism" and "IMMIGRATE_POLICY" to operationalize the parties' position on migration and integration-related multiculturalism³. For both, low values stand for a left (liberal policy on migration/multiculturalism) position whereas high values indicate a right (restrictive policy on migration/multiculturalism). I separate each party for every legislative period in which the party is in parliament and assign the corresponding CHES' value to the related parties' speeches. This approach has been successfully conducted by Atzpodien (2020) before. Using debates as anchor text for analyzing debates yields the advantage that all words are useable in the analysis. In comparison, using manifestos as anchor texts would ignore around 32,000 words because words used in speeches and manifestos differ. Hence, some words are not present in both manifesto and debate texts which makes the calculations of *Wordscores* less accurate. For the observation

³ In an earlier version of this paper, I used the CMP's variable "607: Multiculturalism positive" which biased the results as the scope of which parties addressed multiculturalism was not comparable; a combination with the multiculturalism negative variable was not feasible because most parties did not address multiculturalism with a negative attitude in their manifestos which lead to non-distinguishable positions.

on economic policy behavior, I conduct the same analysis with CHES' left-right variable "ECOLR" for the anchor text (Bakker et al. 2020), whereas low values stand for left (active role of the government) and high values for right (free market) positions.

I display the position of each party and year, starting each period in October as this is the month when new legislature periods begin. The analysis starts two years before the establishment of the AfD in 2011 and continues until 2018. This setup enables me to start new observations directly after federal elections and provides enough time to observe policy positions before the AfD emerged. Since the last observations of 2018 would have been rather short with three months only (start of the period in October and end of the data in December), I divide the whole period after the 2017 elections into two equally long periods of seven and a half months each which enables me to get a sufficient amount of data for the last two periods.

Usually, the two dimensions of migration and integration are treated separately as the underlying argumentation logic by politicians is different (Givens & Luedtke 2005). For Germany, however, there are strong interdependencies of migration and integration when it comes to party competition (Gestmann & Hilz 2017). Hence, I treat the latter two as a unified policy dimension. The migration/integration dimension is particularly important because the issue ownership of this policy field supported the rise of the AfD as described in the case selection (Franzmann 2019).

To identify the dimension in the Parlspeech dataset, I select the relevant speeches based on keywords. If the debates' *agendas* contain any mentions of the words in Table 2, I include them in the migration/integration analysis. The basis for the word list derives from Akkerman's (2015) classification of the migration/integration policy dimension. Sometimes, debates cannot be identified via the agenda variable due to an insufficient description (e.g., an "*Aktuelle*

Stunde” or *“Fragestunde*”). In these cases, I include speeches in the migration/integration dimension, if a minimum of two of the word stems in Table 2 are mentioned in the speech itself. If none of the latter two circumstances apply, I ignore the speeches for the analysis.

Table 2

Word stems for the identification of the migration/integration policy-dimension

Word stems
Asyl, Flüchtling, Flucht, Religion, Migration, Integration, Einwand, Ausländer, Immigration, Flucht, Staatsbürger, Familienzusammenführung

To validate this approach, I select a random sample of 200 from all debates and coded by hand whether they addressed migration/integration-issues. Comparison of the keyword-based selection and the hand-coded selection reveal that only 1.5% of the 200 speeches were wrongly ex- or included by the keyword-based selection. Two speeches were included accidentally because they were about intra-Germany refugees who entered West-Germany before its reunification in 1989. One speech was missed by the code as it dealt with the consequences of the New Year’s Eve in Cologne⁴, without mentioning any migration/integration terms. The small number of wrongly assigned speeches indicates that the identification approach based on keywords for the migration/integration policy dimension delivers reliable and valid results.


In Figure 1, we can see the share of migration/integration-related debates in contrast to the whole amount of debates. The Bundestag discussed most migration/integration-related topics during the height of the refugee crisis. I exclude speeches of the neutral parliamentary presidents and high public officials, such as state secretaries, because they do not necessarily resemble their party’s position. I adjust the debate data in line with the classic recommendations

⁴ During New Year’s Eve in Cologne 2016, people were attacked, rubbed, and sexually assaulted by a crowd of people which looked alike asylum seekers/migrants according to victims. Resulting from that, there was a huge debate about German citizens’ safety in the media, for more information see Boulila and Carri (2017).

of Laver et al. (2003). To execute the analysis and modify, I use the statistical software package of R. Specific information for the R-analysis (Appendix III) as well as the R-code (Appendix IV) are in the Appendix and all replication data is available upon request. The resulting data set contains 1,891 different speeches related to the migration/integration dimension.

Figure 1

The proportion of migration/integration-related speeches of all parliamentary speeches in each year



Results


In this section, I interpret the results of the analyses and discuss the implications for the hypotheses. I begin with the quantitative content analysis with *Wordscores* and then turn to the manual content analysis.

Wordscores Analysis

The estimated party positions on the migration/integration dimension based on the quantitative content analysis with *Wordscores* are displayed in Figure 2. Low values indicate a left position whereas high values stand for right positions. The light-colored background corridors resemble the uncertainty margins (or confidence intervals) for each position. For parties with a smaller seat share and less speaking time, fewer speeches are available which raises the possibility of a divergent position because of less available data. The close position of all parties in Figure 2 does not resemble close policy positions but is a consequence of *Wordscores*⁵ (Laver et al. 2003). The changing relative distance is still usable for observing parties' policy shifts.

Figure 2

Wordscores analysis party movements on migration/integration policies from 2011 – 2018



For the start of the analysis, the CDU/CSU takes the rightest position (5.02), followed by the

⁵ I included a rescaling argument in the *Wordscore*'s predict function which led to unfavorable high estimate margins (see Appendix V).

SPD (4.74), the FDP (4.72), the Left (4.46) and the Greens (4.28). Generally, these positions stand in line with the expectations of Krisi et al. (2006).

In 2013, all parties move towards the center and adjust their positions only within minor changes from 2013 – 2016 which indicate dismissive strategies towards the AfD. In 2017, the CDU/CSU moves towards the right from 4.84 in 2016 to 5.1 in 2017. The FDP also takes a righter position from 2017 – 2018 than from 2011 – 2012 and is positioned closer to CDU/CSU than to the SPD. The SPD moves to the right from 4.62 in 2016 to 4.66 in 2017 and 4.71 in 2018. The Left and the Greens both move towards the left in the 2017 – 2018 period. According to these observations, the following implications can be derived for the test of the hypotheses.

The CDU/CSU faction does not shift towards the right before the AfD's electoral success in 2017 but afterward. Consequently, I reject Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2 refers to a possible shift of *B90/Die Grünen* and *Die Linke* to the left after the AfD's entry in parliaments. The *Wordscores* results indicate support for Hypothesis 2 as both parties shift to the left in 2017 although they slightly shift back in 2018.


Hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed. Although the SPD moves only slightly back and forth without a major shift from 2012 – 2016, the party takes more right positions from 2017 - 2018. However, concerns about impact of the CDU/CSU on these positions may be raised as the SPD was the junior coalition partner of the CDU/CSU. Also, the SPD's position can be reflected critically as we will see in the manual content analysis.

The *Wordscores* results and the descriptive analysis indicate a rejection for two of the three hypotheses, which needs to be further validated by the manual content analysis. Before I turn

towards those, I interpret parties' movements on the economic-policy-dimension (Figure 3), to control for the possibility of a general policy change.

Figure 3

Wordscores analysis party movements on economic policies from 2011 – 2018



The behavior of parties on the economic policy dimension holds similarities and differences compared to the migration/integration-dimension. All parties change their positions within minor variances from 2013 - 2016. Besides this similarity, there are major differences for all parties.

The CDU/CSU does not shift towards the right in 2012 and back towards the left in 2013 as on the migration/integration dimension. The shift towards the right in 2017 by 0.1 is smaller compared to the migration/integration (by 0.26). The FDP is located very close on the left of the SPD in 2011 and 2012 and moves in between the SPD and CDU/CSU from 2017 – 2018 on the migration/integration dimension. In contrast, the FDP takes a position on the right

of the CDU/CSU from 2011 – 2012 and on the right of the AfD from 2017 – 2018. The SPD moves to the left in 2013 on migration/integration issues but to the right on economic issues for the same year. The Greens’ positions remain relatively stable within minor shifts on economic issues but move most in 2013 to the right and back to the left in 2017. The Left does not move significantly from 2013 – 2016. For the same period, it moves slightly back and forth on economic issues. Also, it does not move as much to the left on economic issues (by 0.09) as on migration/integration policies (by 0.21).

These differences indicate that the policy shifts on the migration/integration-dimension happened independently from parties’ general policy adjustments. Next, I conduct a manual content analysis to control whether the results of the *Wordscores* analysis hold.

Manual Content Analysis

Table 3 displays the proportion of each parties’ statements for all three strategies from 2013 - 2016 (17 – 18) and from 2017 - 2018 (17 – 18) based on manual content analysis.

Table 3

Parties’ different strategies shown in proportion to all coded statements from 2013 – 2016 (13 – 16) and 2017 – 2018 (17 – 18)

Strategy	CDU/CSU		FDP		SPD		The Greens		The Lefts	
	13 - 16	17 - 18	13 - 16	17 - 18	13 - 16	17 - 18	13 - 16	17 - 18	13 - 16	17 - 18
Accommodative	14%	5%	--	13%	5%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Adversarial	9%	18%	--	40%	9%	28%	7%	50%	14%	29%
Dismissive	76%	76%	--	47%	86%	68%	93%	50%	85%	70%
N*	72	38	--	15	42	25	29	20	35	17

*Note: All figures rounded to full numbers; *total number of coded statements for each party in each period*

For the 2013 - 2016 period, all parties employ the highest share of statements for the dismissive strategy by highlighting their existing policies. These range from 76% (CDU/CSU, both periods) to 92% (*B90/Die Grünen*, 2013 - 2016). Adversarial statements remain between 7%

(*B90/Die Grünen*) and 14% (*Die Linke*) for the 2013 - 2016 period, which are on a low level compared to the 2017 - 2018 period. The prevailing share of dismissive phrases indicates support for the *Wordscores*' analysis finding of no effect on party's policy position for 2013 - 2016. While *B90/Die Grünen* and the Left do not use accommodative phrases in their speeches in both periods, the SPD's share of accommodative phrases is lower (5% and 4%) than the CDU/CSU's share (14% and 9%). Next, I relate these figures to the hypotheses.

The CDU/CSU devotes 19% of all coded statements to adversarial comments in comparison to 9% in the previous period. This stands in contrast to their turn towards the right in the manual content analysis. Also, the CDU/CSU uses the highest share of accommodative phrases of all parties in the 2013 – 2018 period (14%). The comparable frequent use of accommodative statements from 2013 - 2016 might be explained by the tightening regulations for refugee deportation and faster asylum procedure. These resulted from the New Year's Eve events in Cologne and the following debate about Germany's intrastate security. For instance, the government lowered medical standards for refugees' home countries to be able to deport asylum seekers to their home country who previously experienced health problems:

“However, the high standard of medical care in Germany does not have to be met. ... The medical standards in the countries of origin must be such that people can also be well cared for after their return. However, we cannot and will not guarantee equality with German standards. That is honest, and it is also appropriate.”

*Thomas de Maizière, Minister of the Interior, in the Asylpaket II debate
on the 19.02.2016, translated by the author*

The high use of accommodative statements for 2013 – 2016 would stand in line with Hypothesis 1. Still, Hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed because of the contradictory findings with the *Wordscores* analysis.

For the FDP, data availability is rather limited. I do not have data for a direct comparison with the previous period as the FDP was not in parliament for the 2013 – 2016 period. The high share of adversarial statements (40%) does not match with the positioning between the CDU/CSU and the AfD in the *Wordscores* analysis. The manual content analysis reveals that the FDP speeches comment less direct on migration/integration policies but often state criticism about the general government style or other parties' behavior in the parliamentary arena. The frequently used off-topic comments may account for the small number of coded statements (15) and indicate an aggressive oppositional behavior which may also point to more adversarial statements in general.

The SPD's probability to express an adversarial statement is three times higher from 2017 - 2018 (28%) than in the previous period (9%). The high share of adversarial statements suggests a policy shift towards the left and an adversarial strategy. This is supported by comparison with the Left, who similarly to the SPD express 29% of their statements in an adversarial way and move further to the left in 2017 in the *Wordscores* analysis. In contrast, the SPD's *Wordscores* positions moves towards the right in the same period. The divergent findings indicate some doubt for the SPD's position in the *Wordscores* analysis. Although the opposite findings indicate some support for each incentive mentioned in Hypothesis 3, I reject it because in contrast to its expectation an effect was visible in both analyses in the 2017 – 2018 period.

B90/Die Grünen express the most adversarial statements (50%) in the 2013 - 2016 period. Compared to their 7% of adversarial statements in the previous period, this extreme value underlines the shift towards the left on the migration/integration-dimension which was also found in the *Wordscores* analysis.

The Left's 29% of adversarial statements in the 2017 – 2018 period supports their move to the left because the adversarial share more than doubled compared to the previous period (14%).

Most interestingly, parties never directly mentioned or referred to the new challenger AfD in all debates coded for the 2013 - 2016 period. Therefore, I searched specifically for statements concerning the AfD to gain a deeper understanding of how the established parties relate to the new opponent while it was not electorally successful on the federal level. In total, the AfD was only mentioned 28 times by MPs in all of the 1,891 speeches on migration/integration debates. The CDU/CSU faction referred to the AfD only two times. As the CDU/CSU holds the highest number of speeches, the low number of mentions underlines its dismissive strategy towards the AfD from 2013 - 2016. However, what all direct references have in common is a cautionary and negative attitude towards the AfD, for example:

“We must stand together against the inflammation and agitators at AfD and PEGIDA, who only sow hatred and mistrust, create new problems and prevent real solutions.”

Ralph Lenkert, MP of Die Linke, in the debate “diversity strengthens science - creating study opportunities for refugees”, on the 15.11.2015, translated by the author

Negative mentions of the new challenger indicates an adversarial strategy. Since parties mentioned the AfD in only 1.58% of all speeches, the dismissive attitude towards the AfD overweighs for the 2013 – 2016 period. This is in line with the findings of the *Wordscores* analysis and with the manual content analysis.

In sum, the findings of the manual content analysis provide support for the results of the *Wordscores* analysis, particularly for the Left, and the Greens but not for the SPD and

CDU/CSU. I do not have enough reference values for the FDP's behavior to derive more affirmative or disproving assumptions for its behavior. However, the manual content analysis supports the rejection of Hypothesis 1 and 3 and supports the confirmation of Hypothesis 2. The divergent findings for the SPD and CDU/CSU indicate that the *Wordscores* analysis may have under- or overestimated the positions for the two parties which leads us to the limitations.

Limitations

The observation of parties' different strategies stands in contrast to some existing literature. Some authors find no effect when RRP's enter parliament (Akkermann 2015, Kortmann & Stecker 2019). Others underline the use of an accommodative strategies for both established right and left parties (Van Spanje 2010, Abou-Chadi & Krause 2018). Besides Atzpodien's (2020) analysis on the German state level, this is the only analysis that observes an adversarial strategy of established parties.

As the previous section of this paper indicated, the *Wordscores* analysis might not determine all parties' policy positions accurately. There are some reasons that might account for the differences between the *Wordscores* analysis and the manual content analysis.

Although the value ('wordscore') for each word, which the calculation of virgin texts is based upon, remains stable over time, the emergence of new debate-specific words can influence the results. As the new words are not included in previous texts for the analysis but might hold extreme values due to their specific new meaning, the new words can influence the results. Especially when a high number of new words enters the dataset, it can be reinforcing the policy position which was addressed in the anchor text through the a priori approach.

Also, the *Wordscores* depend on the a-priori input of the anchor texts for the reference values. Since I assigned reference scores to all legislative speeches of a party in a parliamentary term

and used the resulting *Wordscores* to calculate annual policy positions, it might explain why results follow the development of the reference scores for the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, and The Left. However, for the Greens, the CHES data's reference values resemble the opposite development compared to the *Wordscores* results. The Greens move to the left in the 2013 – 2016 period followed by a shift back to the right in 2017 – 2021 period the opposite is observable in this paper's *Wordscores* analysis (Bakker et al. 2020). This observation adds some robustness to the results of the *Wordscores* analysis.

Moreover, the algorithm of *Wordscores* is also not able to detect rhetorical figures such as irony which is only understandable for human readers who can refer to the context of the previous content. For instance, hyperboles can be stated to show that a specific argument may be perceived as absurd or laughable. In the manual content analysis, I coded some of these rhetorical figures accordingly. For instance, the Left described the typical right incidents in the country: "Refugees are also unwanted in this country. They are harassed. They have no inalienable rights. They are crammed into camps and banned from working and moving around. All of this is not in accordance with the Basic Law" (Dietmar Bartsch, 11.06.2014, translated by the author). Only in the last sentence, the party expresses its dissent but the word usage of the sentences before is most likely to contribute to the right position in the *Wordscores* analysis.

Also, the theoretical expectation, formulated in hypothesis 1, that parties shift before the new challenger's electoral success may not be applicable. Parties might not shift their position during legislative periods because they want to demonstrate coherence and continuity which can help to attract voters (Kam 2009). They might prefer to shift their positions only in the light of elections. Both *Wordscores* analyses support this argument as one can observe the biggest policy shifts happening after a new parliament is elected in 2013 and 2017.

What can distort the analysis's results in the light of the party leader's decision influence is the selection of who speaks in parliamentary debates. As party leaders want to demonstrate cohesion (ibid.), they will not allow deviant backbenchers to express dissent during public debates, which Proksch and Slapin (2012) find evidence for in the German case. This means that MPs' speeches may not reflect the true party's position which could lead to a biased analysis. A party's true position would be reflected if all members' positions would be reflected equally in parliamentary speeches.

Lastly, for the finding of the adversarial strategy after the AfD enters parliament, one must consider that the observed time frame was comparable short with only 15 months in total. Parties might adjust their positions in the long run which will need further attention of scholars.

Conclusion

The analysis in this paper consists of a quantitative content analysis using *Wordscores* in conjunction with a manual content analysis which observed policy reactions of established parties towards the new challenger AfD on the migration/integration dimension from 2011 - 2018. Besides the limitations explained above, the results of this paper indicate that established parties do not shift their position before the new challenger becomes successful and that left parties employ an adversarial strategy. This contributes to two research areas concerning established parties' strategic behavior towards RRP. First, the results support that party families are an important factor for established parties' strategic decisions (Akkerman 2012, 2015, Han 2015). Second, the results show that established parties did not react during the period when the AfD became increasingly successful in state elections before 2017 but only when it was successfully entering the federal parliament in 2017. This finding also relates to Han's (2015) conclusion that parties only react to successful challengers. More specifically, the

challengers need to be successful on the same level of competition, which established parties compete for, to make them change their position.

Moreover, the results provide room for future research. The reasons for the indifferent findings for the CDU/CSU and for the SPD need further attention. The CDU/CSU's adversarial strategy observed in the manual content analysis, remain mostly unclear. While left parties may want to show off an adversarial strategy to provide a clear moral choice for their voters, conservative parties usually have little incentive to move towards the left. One possible explanation could be that German established parties do not want to shift their positions to the right as far-right positions experience stigmatization due to Germany's history concerning right parties.

For the SPD it also might be of interest for future research, how and why the Social Democrats adjusted their position. Did the CDU/CSU pressure the SPD to adjust their positions towards the right during the coalition negotiations? Or was there an internal debate about how to deal with the AfD that explicitly decided to slightly adjust the migration/integration positions to the right but still oppose the AfD during speeches? This explanation would stand in line with the SPD's contradictory incentives for position changing as expressed in Hypothesis 3.

For both latter two cases, the specific circumstances how and why these two parties decided to change their positions could be investigated by expert interviews.

The successful rise of the AfD due to the issue ownership of the 'refugee crisis' in combination with the established parties' reactions found in this paper underlines the trend of European politics to shift away from the classic dominant economic and cultural left-right dimension (Kriesi et al. 2008, Franzmann 2019). The future will show if there might be other cases where established parties react with an adversarial strategy. We will also see if the established parties in the German case continue with their present strategies or might change their strategy in the

long run and cooperate. No matter which strategy parties decide to employ, the resulting policies will influence the lives of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers.

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Appendix

Appendix I

Coding Structures for the manual content analysis.

Strategy	Defintion for parliamentary speeche	Reaction examples	Coding rules
Accomodative	Mainstream parties' MPs express approval for RRP's positions, e.g. by declaring a similiar statement like the RRP	"The RRP has a point in ..."	A positive attitude towards RRP's positions or similiar content in speeches, expressed by the mainstream parties' MPs
		"What we have to take into account is what the RRP mentioned"	more restrictive requierement for migration/integration than in manifesto
Adversarial	Mainstream parties' MPs highlight disconsent and opposite opinions to the RRP's positions	"The RRP's argument deserves further attention."	Adding a negative opinion/claim towards migration/integration on a new set of laws that were not mentioned in the party's manifesto
		"What the RRP said is not true!"	A opposite opinion of mainstream parties' MPs towards the RRP's MPs Directly confronting the RRP; directly negatively referencing the RRP
		"We need to help more refugees by providing them ..."	Adding a positive opinion/claim towards migration/integration on a new set of laws that were not mentioned in the party's manifesto
		"The parliamentary actions/statements by the RRP are contradictory and not in line with the parliemetary rules"	interrupting exclamation during AfD speeches (?)
Dismissive	Mainsteam parties' MPs do not pay attention to the RRP's argument, they rather stress arguments of the socio-economic dimension	"I do not allow questions from the AfD"	underlining that weak individuals are dependent on legislative frame and that these individuals will suffer more if a certain law is passed
		"Migration can be a useful tool to get skilled workers or to balance the demographic change"	sticking to party manifesto; expressing references to the manifesto
		"We believe in the idea of ..." (same as in manifesto)	Stressing socio-economic advantages of immigration rather than problematic situations of the refugee crisis

Note: Besides purely text answers, other variables that are important for the analysis and will be coded are, e.g., type of debate, speaker's party affiliation, date of debate, for further information see replication data and see Table of all Debates (Appendix II)

Appendix II

Table of all debates analyzed in the manual content analysis including corresponding debates

Date	Debate
17.01.14	Antrag der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Jan Korte, Katrin Kunert, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE: Das Massensterben an den EU-Außengrenzen beenden – Für eine offene, solidarische und humane Flüchtlingspolitik der Europäischen Union Drucksache 18/288
19.02.16	Erste Beratung des von den Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD eingebrachten Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Einführung beschleunigter Asylverfahren Drucksache 18/7538
01.06.17	Bericht des Innenausschusses gemäß § 62 Absatz 2 der Geschäftsordnung – zu dem von den Abgeordneten Luise Amtsberg, Volker Beck (Köln), Dr. Franziska Brantner, weiteren Abgeordneten und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN eingebrachten Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Aufenthaltsgesetzes (Familiennachzug für subsidiär Geschützte)
01.02.18	Zweite und dritte Beratung des von der Fraktion der CDU/CSU eingebrachten Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Verlängerung der Aussetzung des Familiennachzugs zu subsidiär Schutzberechtigten Drucksachen 19/439, 19/586, 19/595
01.02.18	Antrag der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN zu dem Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Rates zur Einführung eines gemeinsamen Verfahrens zur Gewährung internationalen Schutzes in der Union und zur Aufhebung der Richtlinie 2013/32/EU – KOM (2016) 467 endg. – und hier zu den diesbezüglichen Kompromissvorschlägen der Präsidentschaft vom 15. November 2017 betreffend die Artikel 44 bis 50 des Vorschlages (Ratsdok. 14098/17) – hier: Stellungnahme zur Berücksichtigung durch die Bundesregierung nach Artikel 23 Absatz 3 Satz 2 des Grundgesetzes – Sicherung menschen- und grundrechtlicher Standards bei der Reform des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (Qualifikation sicherer Herkunft- und Drittstaaten) Drucksache 19/244
29.11.18	Umsetzung des Global Compact for Migration – Globale Standards für die Rechte von Migrantinnen und Migranten stärken Drucksachen 19/5547, 19/6141

Appendix III

In line with the classic recommendations of Laver et al. (2003), I exclude infrequently used words, semicolons, punctuation marks, symbols and numbers from the analysis and set the argument “smooth” to Zero. The main R-packages used for the Analysis is Quanteda (Laver et al. 2018),

Appendix IV

R-Code

```
#####Wordscores Analysis of the Migration/Integration (MI) Dimension
```

```
# Purpose of the script:
```

```
# -Splitting the CorpBundestag data into the right time periods
```

```

# -Adjusting the Data for Economic Policies (EP) and Migration/Integration (MI) Policies
# -Using Debates as anchor texts, clustering one anchor for each party in each legislature
period
# -Analysing each different period for each party in each year for MI dimension
-Validating the results (?)
#
# Setup -----

rm(list = ls())

library(quanteda)
library(quanteda.textmodels)
library(quanteda.textplots)
library(tidyverse)
#library(view.table)

# Load Data -----

CorpBundestag <- readRDS("data/Corp_Bundestag_V2 (1).rds")

# preselect data -----

#time frame

BNDT <- CorpBundestag %>%

```

```

filter(chair == FALSE) %>%

filter(party %in% c("CDU/CSU", "SPD", "GRUENE", "PDS/LINKE", "FDP", "AfD")) %>%

dplyr::mutate(date = as.Date(date)) %>%

filter(date >= as.Date("2011-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2018-12-31")) %>%

dplyr::mutate(doc_id = 1:n())

#policy dimension Migration/Integration

regerkl <- "Regierungserklärung/Befragung der Bundesregierung/Aktuelle
Stunde/Fragestunde"

relevanttopic_MI <-
"Asyl/Flüchtling/Religion/Migration/Integration/Einwanderer/Ausländer/Immigration/Flucht/F
amilienzusammenführung/Staatsbürger"

BNDT_MI <- BNDT %>%

dplyr::mutate(

is_regerkl = str_detect(agenda, regerkl),

is_reltext = str_count(text, relevanttopic_MI) >= 2, # the words have to appear at least twice

is_relagenda = str_detect(agenda, relevanttopic_MI),

is_agendashort = is_regerkl & str_detect(agenda, paste0(

"(", regerkl, ")[space:]*$)/((", # if nothing comes after the regerkl term

regerkl, ")[space:]+Drucksache[:space:]*^[[:alpha:]]*[:space:]*$)" # or if there is just

numbers and graphs after it (e.g. drucksache)

))) %>%

```

```

#filter(is_agendashort)

filter((is_relagenda | # if the keywords are in the agenda take it
        (!is_relagenda & is_agendashort & is_reltext))) # if not, only take it if its a
regierungserklärung and the keyword is in the text

# Filter for different parties and timeframes and prepare one document feature matrix (dfm)
as anchor text -----

party <- BNDT_MI %>%

dplyr::mutate(date = as.Date(date),
              period = case_when(
                date >= as.Date("2011-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2013-09-30") ~ "11-13",
                date >= as.Date("2013-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2017-09-30") ~ "13-17",
                date >= as.Date("2017-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2018-12-31") ~ "17-18",
                TRUE ~ "NA"
              )) %>%

group_by(party, period) %>%

summarise(text = str_c(text, collapse = " , ")) %>%

mutate(doc_id = str_c(party, period))

handcode <- tibble::tribble(
  ~doc_id, ~position,
  "AfD17-18", 9.92,
  "CDU/CSU11-13", 7.53,
  "CDU/CSU13-17", 6.24,
  "CDU/CSU17-18", 7.95,

```

```

"FDP11-13", 4.66,
"FDP17-18", 5.85,
"GRUENE11-13", 1.96,
"GRUENE13-17", 1.645,
"GRUENE17-18", 1.8,
"PDS/LINKE11-13", 3.42,
"PDS/LINKE13-17", 3.9,
"PDS/LINKE17-18", 2.73,
"SPD11-13", 5.16,
"SPD13-17", 3.75,
"SPD17-18", 4.2
)

handcode

party <- party %>%
  left_join(handcode, by = "doc_id")

corpus_debC <- corpus(party,
  docid_field = "doc_id",
  text_field = "text")

toks_debC <- tokens(corpus_debC, remove_punct = TRUE, remove_numbers = TRUE)

dfmat_debC <- dfm(toks_debC, tolower = TRUE, stem = TRUE) %>%

```

```

dfm_remove(pattern = stopwords("de"))

# Analysis for each party in each year -----

party_yearly <- BNDT_MI %>%

dplyr::mutate(date = as.Date(date),

              period = dplyr::case_when(

                date >= as.Date("2011-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2012-09-30") ~ "11",

                date >= as.Date("2012-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2013-09-30") ~ "12",

                date >= as.Date("2013-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2014-09-30") ~ "13",

                date >= as.Date("2014-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2015-09-30") ~ "14",

                date >= as.Date("2015-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2016-09-30") ~ "15",

                date >= as.Date("2016-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2017-09-30") ~ "16",

                date >= as.Date("2017-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2018-04-30") ~ "17",

                date >= as.Date("2018-05-01") & date <= as.Date("2018-12-31") ~ "18",

                TRUE ~ "NA"),

              year = lubridate::year(date),

              ) %>%

group_by(party, period) %>%

summarise(text = str_c(text, collapse = " , ")) %>%

mutate(doc_id = str_c(party, period))

corpus_ger_yearly <- corpus(party_yearly,

                             docid_field = "doc_id",

                             text_field = "text")

```



```
toks_ger_yearly <- tokens(corpus_ger_yearly, remove_punct = TRUE, remove_numbers =  
TRUE)
```

```
dfmat_ger_yearly <- dfm(toks_ger_yearly, tolower = TRUE, stem = TRUE) %>%  
dfm_remove(pattern = stopwords("de"))
```

```
dfm_1_trim <- dfm_trim(dfmat_ger_yearly,  
                  min_docfreq=2,  
                  min_termfreq=10)
```

```
tmod_1 <- textmodel_wordscores(dfmat_debC, y = corpus_debC$position, smooth = 0)  
head(tmod_1, n = 10)
```

```
pred_neu <- predict(tmod_1, se.fit = TRUE, newdata = dfmat_ger_yearly, force = FALSE)
```

```
textplot <- textplot_scale1d(pred_neu, groups = dfmat_ger_yearly@docvars$party)  
textplot
```

```
plot_pred <- textplot$data %>%  
  mutate(Year = str_extract(doclabels, "\\d+$") %>%  
    str_c(20, .) %>%  
    as.numeric()) %>%  
  rename(Party = groups)  
plot_pred %>% str()
```

```

fdp <- data.frame(
  doclabels = str_c("FDP", 13:16),
  theta = rep(NA, 4),
  lower = rep(NA, 4),
  upper = rep(NA, 4),
  Party = "FDP",
  Year = 2013:2016
)

plot_pred <- bind_rows(plot_pred, fdp)

```

```

# new ggplot -----

```

```

colours = c("SPD" = "red",
            "AfD" = "orange4",
            "CDU/CSU" = "black",
            "GRUENE" = "green3",
            "PDS/LINKE" = "violetred",
            "FDP" = "gold")

```

```

ggplot(data = plot_pred, aes(x = Year)) +
  geom_line(aes(y = theta, colour = Party), size=1.2) +

```

```

geom_point(aes(y = theta, colour = Party), size = 4)+
geom_ribbon(aes(ymin = lower, ymax = upper, fill = Party), alpha = 0.3) +
scale_colour_manual(values = colours) +
scale_fill_manual(values = colours) +
scale_x_time(labels = 2011:2018, breaks = 2011:2018,
             minor_breaks = 2011:2018) +
scale_y_continuous(breaks = c(-1.2, -1.3, -1.4, -1.5, -1.6, -1.7, -1.8) %>%
                  rev(),
                  labels = c(-1.2, -1.3, -1.4, -1.5, -1.6, -1.7, -1.8) %>%
                  rev() %>%
                  as.character()) +
theme_bw() +
theme(legend.position="bottom", panel.grid.major.x = element_line()) +
labs(x="Year", y="Policy Position")

### Analysis of Economic Policies (EP)

rm(list = ls())

library(quanteda)

library(quanteda.textmodels)

library(quanteda.textplots)

library(tidyverse)

#library(view.table)

# Load Data -----

CorpBundestag <- readRDS("data/Corp_Bundestag_V2 (1).rds")

```

```
# preselect data -----
```

```
#time frame
```

```
BNDT <- CorpBundestag %>%
```

```
  filter(chair == FALSE) %>%
```

```
  filter(party %in% c("CDU/CSU", "SPD", "GRUENE", "PDS/LINKE", "FDP", "AfD")) %>%
```

```
  dplyr::mutate(date = as.Date(date)) %>%
```

```
  filter(date >= as.Date("2011-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2018-12-31")) %>%
```

```
  dplyr::mutate(doc_id = 1:n())
```

```
regerkl <- "Regierungserklärung/Befragung der Bundesregierung/Aktuelle  
Stunde/Fragestunde"
```

```
relevanttopic_SP <- "sozial/Verteil/Hartz  
IV/rente/Ungleichheit/Stuer/Unterstützung/sicherung/Lebensstandard/Armut/Spitzensteuer"
```

```
BNDT_SP <- BNDT %>%
```

```
  dplyr::mutate(
```

```
    is_regerkl = str_detect(agenda, regerkl),
```

```
    is_reltext = str_count(text, relevanttopic_SP) >= 2, # the words have to appear at least twice
```

```
    is_relagenda = str_detect(agenda, relevanttopic_SP),
```

```
    is_agendashort = is_regerkl & str_detect(agenda, paste0(
```

```

"(", regerkl, ")[:space:]*$)/((", # if nothing comes after the regerkl term
regerkl, ")[:space:]+Drucksache[:space:]*^[[:alpha:]]*[:space:]*$)" # or if there is just
numbers and graphs after it (e.g. drucksache)

))) %>%

#filter(is_agendashort)

filter((is_relagenda | # if the keywords are in the agenda take it
(is_relagenda & is_agendashort & is_reltext))) # if not, only take it if its a
regierungserklärung and the keyword is in the text

# Filter for different parties and timeframes and prepare one document feature matrix (dfm)
as anchor text -----

party_SP <- BNDT_SP %>%

dplyr::mutate(date = as.Date(date),

period = case_when(

date >= as.Date("2011-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2013-09-30") ~ "11-13",

date >= as.Date("2013-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2017-09-30") ~ "13-17",

date >= as.Date("2017-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2018-12-31") ~ "17-18",

TRUE ~ "NA"

)) %>%

group_by(party, period) %>%

summarise(text = str_c(text, collapse = " , ")) %>%

mutate(doc_id = str_c(party, period))

handcode <- tibble::tribble(

~doc_id, ~position,

"AfD17-18", 7,

```

```
"CDU/CSU11-13", 5.75,  
"CDU/CSU13-17", 6,  
"CDU/CSU17-18", 6.14,  
"FDP11-13", 8.18,  
"FDP17-18", 7.9,  
"GRUENE11-13", 3.87,  
"GRUENE13-17", 3.5,  
"GRUENE17-18", 3.8,  
"PDS/LINKE11-13", 1,  
"PDS/LINKE13-17", 1.25,  
"PDS/LINKE17-18", 1.28,  
"SPD11-13", 3,  
"SPD13-17", 3.5,  
"SPD17-18", 3.71  
)  
  
handcode  
  
party_SP <- party_SP %>%  
  left_join(handcode, by = "doc_id")
```

```
corpus_SP <- corpus(party_SP,  
  docid_field = "doc_id",  
  text_field = "text")
```

```
toks_SP <- tokens(corpus_SP, remove_punct = TRUE, remove_numbers = TRUE)
```

```

dfmat_SP <- dfm(toks_SP, tolower = TRUE, stem = TRUE) %>%
  dfm_remove(pattern = stopwords("de"))

# Analysis for each party in each year -----

party_yearly_SP <- BNDT_SP %>%
  dplyr::mutate(date = as.Date(date),
    period = dplyr::case_when(
      date >= as.Date("2011-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2012-09-30") ~ "11",
      date >= as.Date("2012-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2013-09-30") ~ "12",
      date >= as.Date("2013-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2014-09-30") ~ "13",
      date >= as.Date("2014-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2015-09-30") ~ "14",
      date >= as.Date("2015-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2016-09-30") ~ "15",
      date >= as.Date("2016-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2017-09-30") ~ "16",
      date >= as.Date("2017-10-01") & date <= as.Date("2018-04-30") ~ "17",
      date >= as.Date("2018-05-01") & date <= as.Date("2018-12-31") ~ "18",
      TRUE ~ "NA"),
    year = lubridate::year(date),
  ) %>%
  group_by(party, period) %>%
  summarise(text = str_c(text, collapse = " , ")) %>%
  mutate(doc_id = str_c(party, period))

corpus_ger_SP <- corpus(party_yearly_SP,
  docid_field = "doc_id",

```

```

text_field = "text")

toks_ger_SP <- tokens(corpus_ger_SP, remove_punct = TRUE, remove_numbers = TRUE)

dfmat_ger_SP <- dfm(toks_ger_SP, tolower = TRUE, stem = TRUE) %>%
  dfm_remove(pattern = stopwords("de"))

tmod_SP <- textmodel_wordscores(dfmat_SP, y = corpus_SP$position, smooth = 0)

pred_SP <- predict(tmod_SP, se.fit = TRUE, newdata = dfmat_ger_SP, force = FALSE)

textplot_scale1d(pred_SP, groups = dfmat_ger_SP@docvars$party, highlighted_color = red)

textplot_SP <- textplot_scale1d(pred_SP, groups = dfmat_ger_SP@docvars$party)

plot_pred <- textplot_SP$data %>%
  mutate(Year = str_extract(doclabels, "\\d+$") %>%
    str_c(20, .) %>%
    as.numeric()) %>%
  rename(Party = groups)
plot_pred %>% str()

fdp_SP <- data.frame(
  doclabels = str_c("FDP", 13:16),

```



```

theta = rep(NA, 4),
lower = rep(NA, 4),
upper = rep(NA, 4),
Party = "FDP",
Year = 2013:2016

)

plot_pred_SP <- bind_rows(plot_pred, fdp_SP)

# new ggplot -----
colours = c("SPD" = "red",
            "AfD" = "orange4",
            "CDU/CSU" = "black",
            "GRUENE" = "green3",
            "PDS/LINKE" = "violetred",
            "FDP" = "gold")

ggplot(data = plot_pred_SP, aes(x = Year)) +
  geom_line(aes(y = theta, colour = Party), size=1.2) +
  geom_point(aes(y = theta, colour = Party), size = 4)+
  geom_ribbon(aes(ymin = lower, ymax = upper, fill = Party), alpha = 0.5) +
  scale_colour_manual(values = colours) +

```

```

scale_fill_manual(values = colours) +
scale_x_time(labels = 2011:2018, breaks = 2011:2018,
             minor_breaks = 2011:2018) +
scale_y_continuous(breaks = c(-18, -17, -16, -15, -14, -13) %>%
                  rev(),
                  labels = c(-18, -17, -16, -15, -14, -13) %>%
                  rev() %>%
                  as.character()) +
theme_bw() +
theme(legend.position="bottom", panel.grid.major.x = element_line()) +
labs(x="Year", y="Policy Position")

```

###Validating the MI-dimension selection mechanism

```
rm(list = ls())
```

```
library(quanteda)
```

```
library(quanteda.textmodels)
```

```
library(quanteda.textplots)
```

```
library(tidyverse)
```

```
#library(view.table)
```

```
# Load Data -----
```

```
CorpBundestag <- readRDS("data/Corp_Bundestag_V2 (1).rds")
```

```
# Reduce Dataframe -----
```

```

BNDT <- CorpBundestag %>%
  filter(chair == FALSE) %>%
  filter(party %in% c("CDU/CSU", "SPD", "GRUENE", "PDS/LINKE", "FDP", "AfD")) %>%
  dplyr::mutate(date = as.Date(date)) %>%
  filter(date >= as.Date("2011-04-01") & date <= as.Date("2018-12-31")) %>%
  dplyr::mutate(doc_id = 1:n())

tr(BNDT)

summary(BNDT)

nrow(BNDT)

# Preparing the Data for Migration/Integration Policy Analysis -----
-----

#creating values with relevant phrases for MI topics

regerkl <- "Regierungserklärung/Befragung der Bundesregierung/Aktuelle
Stunde/Fragestunde"

relevanttopic_MI <-
"Asyl/Flüchtling/Religion/Migration/Integration/Einwanderer/Ausländer/Immigration/Flucht/F
amilienzusammenführung/Staatsbürger"

```

###check if I can identify the Migration/Integration related speeches only

setting up a function for the identification code

MI_frame <- function(dataset){

out <- dataset %>%

dplyr::mutate(

is_regerkl = str_detect(agenda, regerkl),

is_reltext = str_count(text, relevanttopic_MI) >=2, # the words have to appear at least

twice

is_relagenda = str_detect(agenda, relevanttopic_MI),

is_agendashort = is_regerkl & str_detect(agenda, paste0(

"(", regerkl, ")[:space:]\$)|(", # if nothing comes after the regerkl term*

regerkl, ")[:space:]+Drucksache[:space:]^[[:alpha:]]*[:space:]*\$)" # or if there is just*

numbers and graphs after it (e.g. drucksache)

))) %>%

#filter(is_agendashort)

filter((is_relagenda | # if the keywords are in the agenda take it

(!is_relagenda & is_agendashort & is_reltext))) # if not, only take it if its a

regierungserklärung and the keyword is in the text

return(out)

}

##setting up random samples for 1) all debates and 2) high salient MI period

```

Sample_MI_HIGH <- BNDT %>%
  dplyr::filter(date >= as.Date("2015-07-01") & date <= as.Date("2016-09-30"))

#1
set.seed(30)

sample_BT <- BNDT %>%
  slice(sample(1:nrow(.), 100))

#2
set.seed(30)

Sample_MI_HIGH <- BNDT %>%
  dplyr::filter(date >= as.Date("2015-07-01") & date <= as.Date("2016-09-30")) %>%
  slice(sample(1:nrow(.), 100))

str_length(Sample_MI_HIGH$text) %>% max()

##exporting files for handcoding the debates' topics

sample_Agenda_Text <- data_frame(sample_BT$agenda, sample_BT$text)
writexl::write_xlsx(sample_Agenda_Text, "data/test_all.xlsx")

# -> 3 MI related speeches detected manually

Sample_MI_HIGH_Agenda_Text <- data_frame(Sample_MI_HIGH$agenda,
Sample_MI_HIGH$text)
writexl::write_xlsx(Sample_MI_HIGH_Agenda_Text, "data/test_salient_period.xlsx")

# -> 5 MI related speeches detected

```

##observe how many Migration debates identified by code

#1. all debates

sample_BT_MI <- MI_frame(sample_BT)

*# 4 instead of 3 related speeches detected -> 1% of all speeches was detected (partially) wrong,
reason: Flüchtling in context of intra german integration/reunification 1989*

#2. just high salient period

MI_High_randomsample <- MI_frame(Sample_MI_HIGH)

7 related speeches detected -> 100% overestimation

all in all 3 out of 200 wrongly assigned -> success rate of 98.5%

Appendix V

Wordscores analysis on migration/integration issues including rescaling argument

