



Universiteit  
Leiden  
The Netherlands

## **To what extent do economic sanctions effectively change the attitudes of sanctioned governments? Comparing the cases of Russia and Iran.**

Kharitonov, Dmitrii

### **Citation**

Kharitonov, D. (2020). *To what extent do economic sanctions effectively change the attitudes of sanctioned governments?: Comparing the cases of Russia and Iran.*

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master thesis in the Leiden University Student Repository](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3213385>

**Note:** To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

**To what extent do economic sanctions effectively change the attitudes of sanctioned governments? Comparing the cases of Russia and Iran.**

Bachelor Thesis

Name: Dmitrii Kharitonov

Student Number: s2000792

Bachelor Project: 13, International Cooperation and the Design of Global Economic Institutions

Supervisor: Dr. Michael Sampson

Word count: 7895

# Table of Contents

<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>Problem Statement</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>Research Question &amp; Hypotheses</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Literature Review &amp; Conceptualisation</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Methodology</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Variables</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Method of analysis</b> .....	<b>10</b>
<b>Results &amp; Analysis</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>Economic Sanctions on Russia</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>The Impact of ESs on Russia</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>Economic Sanctions on Iran</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>The Impact of ESs on Iran</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>Multilateral and Unilateral Application of Economic Sanction</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>Discourse analysis, part 1.1</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>Discourse analysis, part 1.2</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>Discourse analysis, part 2.1</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>Discourse analysis, part 2.2</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>Analysis of the Gravity of Unilateral and Multilateral Sanctions</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>Conclusion &amp; Discussion</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>Discussion</b> .....	<b>25</b>
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>27</b>

# Introduction

Wars threaten the interests of both developing and industrial states across the world. Therefore, all nations are mandated with the responsibilities of preventing regional conflicts before they escalate. Nevertheless, the use of force does not provide a sufficient remedy for coercion. The support of the U.S. is perceived as most significant to the success of global military operations due to its superpower capacity. However, ever since the Vietnam War, the U.S. public has become gradually unwilling to advocate for overseas military deployments that may result in massive casualties. The public feeling will possibly impede most applications of the U.S. forces to damp down regional conflicts. Therefore, economic sanctions have become the most plausible alternative that key players such as the U.S. have adopted to suppress escalation of wars, especially on Russia and Iran. They have become a widely used practice and a substitute for military activities as an approach of compelling states to adjust their behavior and their attitude towards questionable policies. Comparatively, economic sanctions continue to face several debates about their effectiveness as a tool of coercion. The cases of Russia and Iran are suitable examples because of several penalties imposed on them. Russia, for instance, was sanctioned for its aggression against neighbouring Ukraine, while Iran faced a similar punishment for developing a nuclear weapons program. Therefore, this research intends to answer to what extent do economic sanctions effectively change the attitudes of sanctioned governments, by comparing the cases of Russia and Iran?

## Problem statement

Despite their widespread adoption, particularly by the U.S. and EU, the use of economic sanctions elicits a significant debate concerning their effectiveness as the tool of coercion. According to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who served as the British Ambassador to the UN between 1998 to 2003, it is difficult to persuade a hard regime with words alone in a modern legitimacy-oriented world (Marcus, 2010). In a nutshell, negotiation alone is not enough without the incorporation of concrete action that can be initiated either as a punishment or a threat for failing to heed the required advice. Furthermore, there are two approaches where economic sanctions are applied: the unilateral and multilateral. Establishing which between the two serves as a more effective way of realising the objectives of the ESs will have an important implication for international economic institutions.

## **Research Question & Hypotheses**

The study aims to demonstrate whether economic sanctions affect the attitude of the sanctioned governments towards the policies they are sanctioned for. It is important as the first step to coerce a state to change its policy is to make sure their attitude towards that policy has changed. therefore, the research question is:

*RQ: To what extent has the imposition of economic sanctions affected the attitudes of Iran's and Russia's government towards pursued policies?*

Besides, the findings will significantly address the ongoing argument concerning the effectiveness of ESs as an alternative to the military strategy in affecting states' behaviour. Several states still hold that words alone cannot change the foreign policy of hard regimes, which place much confidence in the military efficiency. Nevertheless, if the outcomes offer contradictory findings, then the vital global players such as the U.S. and the EU can continue to uphold the application of the ESs. Moreover, the results aim at solving the existing puzzle concerning unilateral and multilateral dimensions of ESs applications. The evidence for the higher effectiveness of the latter will serve as an important implication for international economic institutions in coordinating the impositions of ESs. The null hypotheses of this thesis are as follows:

*H1: Economic sanctions are ineffective in changing the states' attitude towards foreign policy.*

*H2: Multilateral application of economic sanction is as ineffective as the unilateral approach.*

## **Literature Review & Conceptualisation**

Economic sanctions (ESs) refer to the intentional government action to impose an economic damage vis-à-vis the target state, with an intention of altering a strategic decision of a state (Gould-Davies, 2020). Sanctions serve as a tool of foreign policy which differs from the usual protectionist barriers as instituted for domestic financial purposes. The use of ESs has become a

progressively vital option in economic diplomacy since these conflict-resolution tools enable the nations to exert force on other states by making good use of the financial drawbacks (Lohmann, 2018). The popularity of ESs depicts the idea that such option serves as a low-cost substitute to war when diplomacy fails, especially since the financial and reputational costs of military warfare have drastically increased (Figuerola, 2015). In addition, as the increasing wartime know-how progresses and mass destruction weapons avail a considerable menace, it has become increasingly common to consider embracing other statecraft tactics, such as ESs. Nevertheless, the capabilities of ESs are restricted by the doubt cast on their effectiveness to change the attitudes of sanctioned governments.

In 2018, an article in Politico came out with a loud headline stating, 'Europe's sanctions on Russia are not working' (Mikhelidze & Tocci, 2018). It was published not long after a naval clash between Russia and Ukraine in the Azov sea, an event that the authors saw as yet another proof that economic sanctions imposed on Russia are not achieving the intended goal. The authors argue that economic sanctions against Russia did not serve their purpose and that Europe needs to take a different approach to impact Russia's policy.

An article by Gould-Davies (2020) aims to examine the policy effects caused by sanctions on Russia. The analysis is quite shallow and not precise, concluding that sanctions were not effective because they 'failed to achieve even the more limited goal of reaching a political settlement to end conflict in eastern Ukraine'. However, the scholar admits that 'at key moments (the sanctions) probably deterred military escalation in Ukraine' (Gould-Davies, 2020, p. 22). A similar conclusion is reached by Andrew Chatzky (2019), who weighs different arguments whether sanctions have had an impact on Putin's tactics in foreign policy. He argues that sanctions could have dissuaded Russia from even more aggressive action in Ukraine but suggest sanctions may have actually backfired by boosting elite support for Putin. Both authors acknowledge that further research is necessary to solve the debate.

On the other hand, a report from the International Center for Policy Studies (2019) claims despite the sanctions having been unable to change Russian policy yet, they nevertheless had a significant economic effect (p. 8). Since Russia was hurt economically, the report claims, then the sanctions did their goal in sending a message to Russia 'about the steep price to pay for further escalation' (ICPS, 2019, p. 42). Besides, it argues that sanctions 'can and should be strengthened' (ICPS, 2019, p. 44) to further increase economic impact that is supposed to trigger policy change.

Similarly, many scholars doubted the effectiveness of economic sanctions imposed on Iran, and in 2015 a framework for the Iran Nuclear Deal was signed, lifting the majority of sanctions and pursuing a more diplomatic approach to change Iran's behaviour. While the US government officials hailed the sanctions as the tool that allowed to bring Iran to the negotiation table, many scholars reject the idea that sanctions can be credited with this achievement. For example, Agnese Macaluso (2014) argued in her article that 'sanctions have not only been ineffective and harmed the Iranian population and the economy; they have also been counterproductive for interests of the sanctioning state' (p. 1). Besides, Dursun Peksen (2019) adds that, from the ethical standpoint of human suffering, sanctions against Iran can be considered ineffective.

A lot of literature, however, is dedicated to the effect that sanctions have on Iran's economy. Here, the common line of argument is that sanctions have undoubtedly had a strong negative impact on Iran's economic indicators. In his article, Benjamin Rhode (2019) analysed that economic sanctions imposed in 2018 drastically reduced Iran's oil exports, caused huge inflation, and reduced its GDP. Aside from the economic impacts, not enough attention has been given to the analysis of how Iran's attitude has changed towards their policy, as a result of these consequences.

There is a wide range of sources which analyse how economic sanctions negatively affected the economies of Russia and Iran. However, the knowledge gap that this literature fails to address, or addresses insufficiently, is whether the weakening of the target state's economy does indeed cause the government of that state to change its attitude towards the policy it was sanctioned for. This research deems it necessary to fill this knowledge gap by investigating whether sanctions have can change states' attitude. Besides, the research deems it necessary to look explicitly into the effects of the sanctions on the economies of both states before establishing whether these sanctions can have leverage on the attitudes of states.

It is also crucial to recognise the difference between unilateral and multilateral approaches to impose sanctions, where the former is represented in this thesis in the case of Iran, and the latter – in the case of Russia. The general line of argument in the academic literature holds that the unilateral approach, where only one state imposes the sanctions towards a target state, is more effective than the multilateral approach, where a group of states impose sanctions against another state (Miers & Morgan, 2002). The empirical academic research finds that multilateral application of sanctions is not as effective due to 1) the collective action problem that states face

when trying to create cooperation between members (Kaempfer & Lowengerg, 1999), and also because 2) the multilateral sanctions are valued higher than unilateral sanctions by the voters in the punishing state, leading to a bigger domestic audience benefit for the political leader (Walentek, 2019). This research challenges the conventional view that multilateral sanctions are less effective than unilateral due to the assumptions that the empirical literature that supports such claim is outdated in light of the progress that international institutions made in facilitating cooperated impositions of economic sanctions. The cases of Iran and Russia are the two most recent cases that shall serve as a support for this hypothesis.

## **Methodology**

The Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) was preferred for the research due to the underlying political and economic aspects within Russia and Iran. The most similar method is the most common to ‘small-N’ research problems, especially in political science. This technique is based on selecting countries that share many theoretically important features but differ in one crucial variable (Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 219). If one aspect is dissimilar between the circumstances, and the result is different, the cause of the problem is established.

MSSD strategy works better where the study intends to uncover causal relationships or conditions related to particular developmental pathways. Countries in the MSSD are selected based on the similarities in all respects except in respect of the specific factor. MSSD manipulates the independent variables through the final case selection that neutralizes several, but not all explanatory variables. The manipulation process is done through the purposeful variety of cases that, in several ways, are very similar but differ in the one critical variable.

### **Variables**

Russia and Iran have several similarities which make the application of MSSD appropriate. These similarities and the manipulated independent variables play a crucial role in explaining the degree of effectiveness of economic sanctions. The table below shows some of the most similar aspects between Iran and Russia (Lor, 2011).



Potential impacts	Russia	Iran
Reduced GDP	Yes	Yes
Increased rate of unemployment	Yes	Yes
Increased the number of individuals living below poverty line	Yes	Yes
Devalued the national currency	Yes	Yes
General impact on economy	Great	Modest

*Table 1: Impact of sanctions on Russia (Tyll et al., 2018) and Iran (Mazumdaru, 2019)*

As illustrated in the table above, the imposition of economic sanction in the cases of Russia and Iran acts as an independent variable that impacts the economic level of the aforementioned countries, although in different degrees. However, the sanctions are imposed in multilateral and unilateral dimensions, with each having a varying degree of economic impact. Either multilateral or unilateral dimension is viewed as a dependent variable which leads to a difference in the indicators. By incorporating the nations with close similarities in respect with each other's characteristics, in this case, the reliance on oil, and drop in the economy, it is possible to control for the influence of economic sanction as the primary variable. With all factors constant, there is a relationship between the imposed ESs and the state of the economy in both Russia and Iran. Table 2 compares the severity of the impacts of the sanctions on both countries' economies:

Variables	Russia	Iran	Comments
GDP per capita	Shrank by 15% between 2014 and 2015 (Havlik, 2019)	Shrank by 4.8% in 2018 after the sanctions reintroduction (BBC News, 2019)	There is a considerable gap indicating that Russia was considerably hit as compared to Iran.
Unemployment rate	Below 6%	Rose from 14.5% in 2018 to 16.8% in 2019 (BBC News, 2019)	The rate of unemployment is much higher in Iran.
Poverty	18.4 million or 12.6% of the	12.8 million or 16% of the	The poverty figures are high in both countries.

	Russians live below poverty line as of 2018 (Ryumin, 2019).	Iranians live below poverty line as of 2015 (Khoshnood, 2019)	
--	---	---	--

Table 2: Differences in economic impact




Figure 1: Economic effect of sanctions on Iran (specifically 2018-2019) (BBC News, 2019)




Figure 2: Economic effect of sanctions on Russia (specifically 2015) (Macrotrends, n.d.)

## **Method of analysis**

A discourse analysis was used in this research in order to examine the speeches of the presidents of Iran and Russia within the time frame of the years 2014-2020. A discourse analysis underlines a distinct model which is associated with the use of language in the context. The approach takes into account different theoretical and methodological aspects such as linguistics, philosophy, and sociology (Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 336). Conducting discourse analysis aligns with the qualitative and interpretive method of analysing texts. The interpretation is made based on both the contextual knowledge and details of the material. The process encompasses four significant steps (Luo, 2019). The first step involves defining the research question as well as selecting the content of the analysis. Specifically, the chosen content must provide the required answers for the problem. The second step entails establishing the social and historical setting in which the materials were produced. For instance, the historical context for speeches concerning how the stance of Russia and Iran has evolved concerning their foreign policy encompasses the imposition of ESs and the repercussions experienced by the two countries. The third step involves analysing the content established in the speech basing on the themes and patterns. The major issues for the current discourse analysis include the effectiveness of the ESs as well as the evolution of Russia's and Iranian attitudes towards aggression to Ukraine and the nuclear program, respectively. The fourth step concerns reviewing the results and drawing the conclusion. It focuses mainly on reflecting on the results to examine the functions and the meanings contained in the selected speeches within the period 2014-2020.

By critically analysing various statements, it is possible to tell how the attitude of the Russian government vis-à-vis Ukraine has evolved, and how the attitude of the Iranian government towards their nuclear program has evolved from 2014 to 2020, as the leading indicators. The speeches given by the leaders of Russia and Iran, Vladimir Putin and Hassan Rouhani, provide a constructivist analysis of the evolution of the two leaders' stances towards the policies in question. Hence, the underlying discourse analysis will mainly focus on the speeches made by both leaders from 2014 to 2020 with the primary objective of establishing the difference between the present and the previous stances of Russia's and Iran's government.

## **Results & Analysis**

### **Economic Sanctions on Russia**

The relationship between the US, the EU, and Russia have increasingly worsened over the past two decades due to the involvement of Russian government in the Ukrainian state affairs.

According to Harrell, Keatinge, Lain, and Rosenberg (2017), the imposition of the sanctions on the Russia was meant to deter its intervention in Ukraine. As explained by Chatzky (2019), the West had a goal of subjecting Moscow to punishment by compelling it to withdraw troops from Eastern Ukraine and to respect Ukrainian national borders. These sanctions were connected with the obligation to comply with the peace agreement reached in Minsk, Belarus, in early 2015. The sanctions imposed on Russia are focused on the financial services, energy, and defense industries (Fellows et al., 2014). The restrictions contained a variety of targeted sanctions, such as freezing of the assets, and travel bans on individual entities which have had a direct benefit from Russia's actions in Ukraine.

### **The Impact of ESs on Russia**

The ESs are viewed to have generally aggravated the macroeconomic difficulties Russia was already facing in light of the decrease in the oil prices that started in late 2014. Additionally, the collective impact of these ESs and a drop in the oil prices resulted in a considerable pressure on the Ruble value and led to a capital outflow increment. These ESs on the financial accessibility compelled the Russian government to utilize a section of its foreign exchange stashes to improve the status of the firms under sanctions (Closson, 2019). More devastating, the Central Bank of Russia was compelled to increase the interest rates instead of defending the Ruble in December 2014. Some of the evident impacts attributed to the fall in the Ruble value include the rise in the prices of imports. The research by Christie (2015) affirms that Russia's entry into a downturn, with -2.2% GDP growth for the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of 2015 was likened to the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of 2014. The estimates by Christie (2015) signify a decline in the real GDP in the order of 3%-3.5% for 2015 as well as the growth of around zero for 2016.

In terms of economic effect, various research findings imply that ESs have had a negative, but comparatively modest impact on the development of Russia. The alterations in the global oil prices have had a more remarkable effect on Russia's economic growth. The Russian economy

began to strengthen despite the sanctions due to the improvement in prices of oil. According to Congressional Research Services (2020), Russia has faced grave economic challenges in 2014 and 2015, which plunged the entire nation into a two-year recession that lasted for several years. The collapse of the investor sentiment led to a capital outflow, inflation, and a deterioration in the value of the Ruble. Other negative impacts were also felt in the widening of the budget deficit, thereby compelling the government to tap into reserves to stabilize the collapsing economy. According to the estimates of the Russian economists in 2015, the sanctions aimed to cut Russia's GDP by 2.4% by 2017. Nevertheless, the projected effects were set to cause a lesser impact of 3.3 times than the oil price shocks (Reid, 2019). Similarly, the estimates given by the IMF in August 2019 imply that the sanctions led the growth to deteriorate below the expectation by about 0.2% annually since 2014.

### **Economic Sanctions on Iran**

In the case of Iran, both the US and EU, together with the UN, imposed sanctions on various aspects of Iranian commercial and public life, including bans on investments in oil, gas and petrochemicals, exports of refined petroleum products, and business dealings with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Comply Advantage, n.d.). The principal goal of these sanctions is to prevent Iran from developing military nuclear capability as part of the Iranian nuclear program (BBC News, 2015). The United States' ESs have profoundly impacted the Iranian economic development. Nonetheless, the effects have resulted in lesser observable impacts on the Iranian quest of key premeditated goals, like its reinforcement for regional armed blocs and engagement in the development of weapons of mass destruction. The sanctions ensued because of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on May 8, 2018 (Davenport, 2020). Donald Trump cited that the negotiation facilitated by his predecessor was 'one-sided, awful and flawed to its core' (Landler, 2018). Trump claimed that JCPOA, which provided relief to the Iran's sanctions in exchange for limits on its nuclear program did not do enough to avert Iran's ballistic missiles or address its involvement with the armed groups in the Middle East. The sanctions were imposed as part of the maximum pressure campaign that reinstated all the U.S. sanctions.

## **The Impact of ESs on Iran**

Iran has generally encountered grave shock from its global economic separation. As explained by Rome (2019), the Iranian oil exports fell from 2.4 million barrels per day for the month of April 2018 to less than 500,000 in September 2019. As a result, Iran's economy entered a recession period with the level of inflation soaring up, and the currency losing its value by 60% against the dollar. The Trump administration flaunts these indicators as a proof of the sanctions' effectiveness. The question remains whether the sanctions and their consequences did convince the Iranian leadership to change its attitude towards pursued policies.

The ESs regime of 2011-2015 is widely recognized with the augmenting Iranian readiness to consent to JCPOA. Hassan Rouhani's presidential win in 2013 was accredited partly to his stated devotion to obtain a sanction relief as well as putting an end to Iran's long global isolation. However, the long-term impacts are still unclear. According to the assessment provided by the intelligence community, it remains uncertain whether Iran still has plans of creating a nuclear weapon in the long run. The US government holds that its 'maximum pressure campaign' on Iran, developed mainly through ESs, will compel the latter to consider negotiating a revised JCPOA deal that will not only restrict its missile program, but also narrow the nuclear activities (Davenport, 2020). Nonetheless, Iran has rejected such discussions with the U.S., despite the JCPOA sanctions.

## **Multilateral and Unilateral Application of Economic Sanction**

The Russian and Iranian cases indicate that multilateral sanctions are more effective as compared to unilateral approach. There is a significant difference in terms of economic impact resulting from the Russian and Iranian sanctions. The sanctions on Iran are imposed on a unilateral dimension by the United States alone, while in Russia both the U.S. and the EU are involved. In particular, the U.S. failed to agree with the EU on the effectiveness of the JCPOA agreement through which Iran had consented to get its previous sanctions lifted (Nolt, 2017). On the other hand, Russia faced sanctions from the European Union in collaboration with its associates, including the U.S., Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and Norway. The economic impact suffered by Russia is enormous as compared to Iran.

The multilateral sanctions from the EU and its allies served as a driver that extensively devaluated the ruble, thereby weakening the Russian economy. The unilateral sanctions imposed by the US on Iran, although have crippled the Iranian economy, cannot compare in severity to that of Russia. According to Deutsche Welle (2020), the EU developed a mechanism that will enable European nations to trade with Iran, notwithstanding the U.S. sanctions. The move, though perceived as an attempt to show the goodwill towards Iran and sustain it in the 2015 nuclear deal, emphasises the failure of the American unilateral economic sanctions. It was announced by France, Germany and the UK that INSTEX was operational and available to all EU member states who would wish to join and buffer Iran from the U.S. sanctions. INSTEX functions as a diplomatic shield which allows the exchange of goods without involving direct transfers of money between Iran and EU firms. The move is viewed as an attempt by EU nations to show they are firm with their objective of alleviating the pain of sanctions on Iran to persuade Tehran to remain in the 2015 JCPOA. The diagram below illustrates how Iran is safeguarded from grave sanctions imposed by the US:



Figure 1: INSTEX (Six New European Nations Join Iran Barter System Opposed By U.S., 2019)

### Discourse analysis, part 1.1: Putin's 'Crimean Reunification Day' Addresses

The discourse analysis will consist of the two main parts: the first will analyse speeches given by Vladimir Putin and the second will analyse Hassan Rouhani's speeches, both within the time frame of 2014-2020. The individuals chosen are the top representatives of their respective states and therefore can be seen as reflective of their states' official stances. The time frame of 2014-2020 was chosen due to the fact that the year of 2014 saw the first imposition of sanctions

against Russia, and in Iran 2014 was the first year of the presidency of Hassan Rouhani. Besides, a fixed time frame would allow for a more accurate comparative analysis.

The first set of speeches of Putin that was analysed are the speeches given on the day Crimea was annexed from Ukraine, or in Russia's view - reunited with Russia, the 18<sup>th</sup> March. The two criteria the analysis focused on were Putin's references of the unity of Russia with the annexed Crimea, and the mentions of Ukraine in a hostile rhetoric. A system of coding was used to determine the words and phrases that indicated a reference to a certain criterion. For example, words such as 'we', 'Russian Crimean' or 'our common home' were associated with the first criteria, while 'Ukrainian aggression', 'ideological heirs of Bandera' or 'tyranny and poverty' were associated with the second criteria. The cumulative results can be seen in Table 3:

<b>Type of reference</b>	<b>Number of references</b>		
	<b>2014</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>
<b>Unity of Russia with Crimea</b>	28	19	6
<b>Hostility towards Ukraine</b>	13	4	1

*Table 3: 'Crimea Reunification Day' Speeches, 2014-2020.*

First and foremost, one can see that the references to both unity with Crimea and the notion of hostility towards Ukraine have decreased between 2014. Especially notable is the change in the hostility rhetoric, as one can see 14 references of such character in 2014, while in 2020 Putin only mentions it once.

The references to unity are accompanied with the pronouns 'we' and 'ours', emphasising the inseparability of Crimean from Russia and a strong determination to see the two united. These moods remain very much unchanged in 2014 and 2016, with the latter being the year when Putin announced the construction of the symbolic bridge that will unite Crimea with Russia, literally:



*'We were closer than ever over these days, supporting each other. These were sincere feelings of solidarity. It is at historic turning points such as these that a nation demonstrates its maturity and strength of spirit. The Russian people showed this maturity and strength through their united support for their compatriots' (Putin, 2014).*

*'We can achieve more now that we are together. I also congratulate you today on the major construction project to build the Kerch Strait Bridge. This is a much needed and important project that will be completed towards the end of 2018 and will become another symbol of our unity with Crimea and Sevastopol and a symbol of our possibilities' (Putin, 2016).*

In 2020, however, there is a considerably lower number of such patriotic references, and they generally lack the same enthusiasm as in the previous years. Instead of powerful phrases, Putin talks more constructively and with much less pathos. It may be due to the economic problems in Russia and Crimea that produce a demand for constructive decisions instead of beautiful talk of unity that no longer satisfies the Crimean population. However, it is apparent that Putin does not even consider the idea of letting go of Crimea and his attitude towards the annexation remains unchanged:

*'Now we will have a conversation about us, what we do, how we live and economic development' (Putin, 2020).*

### **Discourse analysis, part 1.2: Evolution of Russia's attitude towards Ukraine**

<b>Statement</b>	<b>Reference date</b>	<b>Connotation</b>
<i>'They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day' (Putin, 2014).</i>	March 18, 2014	Negative

<i>“We need friends, but we will not allow other nations to infringe our interests towards Crimea and we will decide as a country our destiny” (Putin, 2016).</i>	December 1, 2016	Somewhat negative
<i>‘We will proceed to positively follow our direction, just as we have always done’ (Coalson &amp; Schreck, 2018).</i>	March 1, 2018	Remains negative
<i>We shouldn’t paint our closest neighbor, this fraternal nation (...) in an unflattering light’ (Bennets, 2019).</i>	October 14, 2019	Somewhat positive

*Table 4: Putin’s comments regarding Ukraine.*

The discourse analysis of various speeches of Putin regarding Ukraine and its government reveals that his attitude towards it has slightly changed from negative in 2014 to somewhat neutral in 2019/2020. It is necessary to also note that Putin was reluctant to make public statements about Ukraine after around 2016, for no particular reason. Bennets (2019) claims that the reasons behind Putin’s gradual toning down of rhetoric towards Ukraine is due to the cancellation of the plans to annex Eastern Ukraine and prepare his own population for the reintegration of that region back to Ukraine. Therefore, the somewhat positive remarks that Putin started to make more often can be aimed at demonstrating that Ukraine is not an antagonist it used to be. The potential indicator of the reduction in Russia’s involvement in Ukraine affairs is the gradual decrease in the battle-related deaths in Eastern Ukraine, as mentioned in the graph below. The lowering intensity of the conflict may correspond to the slight change of Putin’s rhetoric towards Ukraine and the reconsideration of his policy on the annexation of further parts of Ukraine, as Bennets (2019) has suggested.




Figure 3: Battle-related deaths (number of people) – Ukraine (The World Bank, 2020)

However, Putin continues to prioritise the possession of Crimea over the peaceful partnership with Ukraine, which can be seen in the following quote: ‘*We need friends, but we will not allow other nations to infringe our interests towards Crimea.*’ It highlights that regardless of the mild change in attitude, Russia does not consider returning Crimea back to Ukraine. The other quote from 2018 confirms Russia’s adherence to its policy.

### Discourse analysis, part 2.1: Hassan Rouhani UN Speeches

In order to examine the change in attitude of the Iranian government towards their nuclear proliferation program, one shall begin by looking at President Rouhani’s speeches at the UN General Assembly. The coded words indicate either a reference to the nuclear program/weapons or to the accusations of Iran’s adversaries. One shall see the latter as important because parallels can be drawn between aggressive rhetoric and a reference to nuclear proliferation. The first chosen speech is from 2014, when Iran was under the US’ and EU’s sanctions and the talks about PCPA were just beginning to take place. The second speech is from 2016, when the treaty was enacted and the dialogue between the West and Iran was in a peak form. However, the 2018 speech was accompanied by the US’ unilateral decision to abandon the nuclear treaty, and the consequences of such decision are seen in the change of Rouhani’s rhetoric, such as an increased number of nuclear program references, as well as furious accusations of Iran’s main adversaries, such as the USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia:

Type of reference	Number of references		
	2014	2016	2018
<b>Nuclear program</b>	0	3	4
<b>Blaming adversaries</b>	3	2	9

Table 5: Rouhani's speeches at the UNGA, 2014-2018

The speech in 2014 does not contain much talk on the topic of nuclear weapons, and not too many accusations are addressed to Iran's enemy states. This is because much of the speech is dedicated to the condemnation of terrorism, the topic that was so relevant in the year 2014. In 2016, Rouhani mentions the idea of nuclear weapons three times in light of the JCPOA treaty, and his rhetoric is very much optimistic:

*'The experience acquired through dialogue between Iran and the group of 5+1 and the fruition of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are indicative of the success that we could achieve through moderation, constructive interaction and the promotion of dialogue; a policy that brought a long, complicated and unnecessary crisis to an end by adopting a win-win approach'* (Rouhani, 2016).

Paradoxically, and perhaps in contrast to the Russian case, the arrival back to the sanctions regime in 2018 has increased the Iranian rhetoric of nuclear proliferation, this time in a much more negative light, and even such an official public appearance like the UNGA speech proves it. Of course, the discourse about nuclear proliferation is discussed in the frame of peaceful purposes, specifically the energy that it can produce (Mottus, 2019):

*'We consider nuclear knowledge an imperative and nuclear weapons prohibited'* (Rouhani, 2018).

Evidently, one can also perceive such statement as a declaration of the continuation of nuclear proliferation efforts. Besides, Rouhani often attacks Iran’s enemy states in the 2018 speech, calling Israel a ‘Zionist regime’, thus projecting his fury and dissatisfaction. Rouhani also acknowledges that the unilateral sanctions of the US are not effective and hints that will not change Iran’s attitude towards the policies in question:

*‘Unlawful unilateral sanctions in themselves constitute a form of economic terrorism and a breach of the ‘Right to Development.’ The economic war that the United States has initiated under the rubric of new sanctions not only targets the Iranian people but also entails harmful repercussions for the people of other countries’ (Rouhani, 2018).*

**Discourse analysis, part 2.2: Evolution of Iran’s attitude toward its nuclear program**

Statements	Reference date	Position
<i>‘Iran will show positive responses if both the U.S and EU move within the format of the law and in line with the rights of common Iranian interest and mutual respect’ (Jafari, Hosseini, &amp; Emamjomehzadeh, 2018).</i>	February 11, 2014	Not willing to give in to the pressure caused by the sanctions.
<i>‘The oppressive sanctions imposed on the Iranian government align with the strategic mistake against the moderate and autonomous nation under the present sensitive situation in our nation. We have engaged in the most transparent dialogue to establish confidence concerning Iran’s peaceful nuclear program’ (Rouhani, 2014).</i>	September 25, 2014	Determined to continue the nuclear program, despite sanctions.

<p><i>'This deal confirmed the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program through devising confidence-building mechanisms, closing the so-called 'possible military dimension' file and reinstating Iran's right to develop a peaceful nuclear program' (Rouhani, 2016).</i></p>	<p>September 22, 2016</p>	<p>Positive attitude towards the nuclear deal. However, determination to continue with the nuclear program persists.</p>
<p><i>'They have imposed sanctions really against themselves, and they now feel betrayed. We were not deceived, nor did we cheat or deceive anyone. We have ourselves committed to our nuclear program' (Radio Farda, 2017).</i></p>	<p>September 20, 2017</p>	<p>Has not changed its stance concerning the nuclear program, commitment pertains.</p>
<p><i>'Surrender is not permissible, and our nation and constitution will not permit it' (Rouhani, 2019).</i></p>	<p>July 24, 2019</p>	<p>The sanctions will not make Iran give up their plans.</p>
<p><i>'Our response to any negotiation under sanction is negative' (Rouhani, 2019).</i> <i>'We have resisted the most merciless economic terrorism' (Rouhani, 2019).</i></p>	<p>September 25, 2019</p>	<p>Sanctions are disregarded as a tool of compellence against Iran.</p>
<p><i>'The U.S soldier in danger today; the EU soldier may be in the same threat tomorrow' (Yee, 2020).</i> <i>'If you take a wrong move you will suffer' (Yee, 2020).</i></p>	<p>January 15, 2020</p>	<p>Threatening enemies / aggressive position</p>

Table 6: Rouhani's comments regarding nuclear weapons.

The discourse analysis of Rouhani's speeches from 2014 to 2020 reveals that his rhetoric towards nuclear proliferation has generally remained unchanged in the given time frame. The second quote from 2014, '*Iran's peaceful nuclear program*' emphasises Iran's firm stance to continue with the program, referring to its nonaggressive purposes. The two statements from his speech in 2014 show Iran's position when both the U.S. and EU sanctions are in place – Iran is willing to cooperate on the premises that their requirements and demands are fulfilled. Therefore, one can say that the penalties reintroduced on Iran by the U.S. in 2018 are doomed to fail since the latter withdrew itself from the JCPOA deal, which has the benefit of the Iranians at hand (Jafari, Hosseini, & Emamjomehzadeh, 2018).

Observing Rouhani's 2016 speech, one can conclude that the multilateral ESs imposed on Iran before 2016 have compelled the country to adopt a peaceful nuclear program that meets the international standards set out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In his speech, the president has enthusiastically indicated that they have pursued the nuclear accord, in which the country limits its sensitive nuclear activities and allows international inspectors from IAEA to monitor their nuclear programs. It can therefore be noted that despite refusing to completely relinquish their nuclear programs, Iran has agreed to a number of concessions that could potentially reduce the danger of their nuclear program.

The 2017 speech of Rouhani highlights Iran's solidified determination to continue with the nuclear efforts. Moreover, Rouhani appeals to the national dignity and says that sanctions will not coerce it and that '*surrender is not permissible*' – such military rhetoric likely implies that the sanctions will not impede Iran's nuclear proliferation, as it will signify surrender. This is reiterated bluntly by Rouhani in 2019:

*'Our response to any negotiation under sanction is negative'*

Finally, the speech of 2020, given in light of the recent attack on the Iranian base in Iraq that killed the Iranian general Qassim Suleimani (Crowley, 2020), hence the highly aggressive tone. It gives a strong implication that Iran is ready to tackle the U.S in the battle by increasing nuclear capabilities. The statement indicates that Iran's stance towards proceeding with its nuclear program is still in place. Besides, they threaten the EU in case it decides to divert from the JCPOA treaty as well.

## **Analysis of the Gravity of Unilateral and Multilateral Sanctions**

The comparison of the cases of Russia and Iran give an impression that unilateral sanctions have a relatively lower severity as compared to multilateral sanctions. In his 2018 speech, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo articulated that the U.S. was imposing a historic ban on Iran (Bakeer, 2018). These sanctions were to target most critical sectors such as trade in gold and other precious stones, as well as the oil and finance industry. However, the U.S. seems to have not achieved its goal because the unilateral sanctions have offered a wide margin for Iran to seek alternatives channels of distribution elsewhere. According to the U.S. projections, the sanctions were supposed to cripple the Iranian economy profoundly. However, there have been no major signs of this effect, especially considering Iran's formation of 'resistance economy' over the years under the sanctions regime (Khan, 2019). Opportunities brought by the formation of INSTEX as well as the expansion into Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq contribute to the stabilisations of Iranian economy, thereby suppressing the impact of unilateral economic sanctions.

The formation of INSTEX complicates the efforts of the U.S. in compelling Iran into reconsidering the JCPOA nuclear deal. Most of the EU nations with the inclusion of Germany, France and Britain hold that INSTEX is the only way of saving the JCPOA treaty, which may prevent Tehran from acquiring the nuclear bomb. It was announced in March 2020 that INSTEX had facilitated the first transaction, which enabled the export of medical goods from Europe to Iran, thereby circumventing the U.S. sanctions (Brzozowski, 2020). The sealing of the first transaction indicates that the players are devoted to ensuring a viable long-term solution for lawful trade between Iran and Europe as part of the growing effort to sustain the JCPOA deal. The increase in the number of players with Finland, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Belgium joining INSTEX signifies to Iran that there is a silver lining ahead and also foreshadows the failure of U.S. sanctions.

INSTEX is regarded as the resilience mechanism established by the EU against the secondary sanctions. It serves as a deterrent measure that reduces the impact of the U.S. secondary sanctions on Iran's security as well as the commercial interests. One of the evidence which points out to the possible failure of U.S. unilateral sanctions is its inability to divide the EU member states. Various policies of the U.S. have failed to affect the calculations of major EU firms and banks (Geranmayeh, 2019). Besides, the majority of the EU member states are



devoting significantly more resources than they previously did as a way of averting the U.S. secondary sanctions. Unilateral sanctions are therefore weak in attaining the required goals.

On the other hand, multilateral sanctions are more severe as compared to unilateral sanctions. One of the aspects which is clearly shown in Table 1 is the vast difference between the Russian and Iranian GDP change due to the imposition of economic sanctions. For example, the Russian GDP shrank by 15% between 2014 and 2015 due to multilateral sanctions enforced by the U.S. and EU jointly. On the other hand, the Iranian GDP shrank by 4.8% in 2018 after the imposition of the U.S. sanctions. The multilateral sanctions subjected Russia to several financial difficulties in 2014 and 2015 with the inclusion of rapid depreciation of the ruble, domestic budgetary pressures, and exclusion from the global capital markets. The sanctions made its economic growth to drop to 0.7% in 2014 before contracting sharply by 3.7% in 2015. According to IMF estimates in 2014 and 2015, the EU and the U.S. sanctions in reaction to the conflict in Ukraine and Russia's offsetting ban on the agricultural imports reduced productivity by as much as 1.5% over the short period (Havlik, 2019). The extreme economic impacts felt by Russia indicates that multilateral sanctions are more severe and somewhat active as compared to unilateral sanction.

## **Conclusion & Discussion**

### **Conclusion**

The research has demonstrated that economic sanctions are partly effective in altering the state's attitude toward foreign policy, and that the multilateral application of economic sanction is more effective as compared to unilateral approach, thereby rejecting the both hypotheses. The Russian case study affirms that economic sanctions can indeed damage the economy of a target state to the extent where that state can be compelled to partially change its attitude towards the policy in question. The Iranian case study is more complicated, given Iran's relationship with sanctions dating back to 1979. However, the 2014-2020 time frame analysis affirms that the imposition of ESs did have an effect on Iran's attitude towards their nuclear program. The devastating impacts of ESs have forced the country to appreciate the role of JCPOA in promoting peace by embracing certain limitations to its nuclear program. However, the latter case remains a crucial indicator that such limitations were made on the efforts of multilateral sanctions that were in place until 2016 and led to the creation of JCPOA. The unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran by the U.S. after 2017 not only failed to compel Iran to give up their nuclear program, but on the

contrary, encouraged its leadership to scale up nuclear proliferation. In conclusion, the discourse analysis of Hassan Rouhani's speeches has demonstrated that Iran's attitude towards the policy has taken different directions throughout the 2014-2020 but has ultimately remained unchanged. Whereas, the analysis of Vladimir Putin's speeches has shown that Russia's attitude towards their foreign policy vis-à-vis Ukraine has changed modestly in the same time period.

The effectiveness of ESs is greater when enforced multilaterally. Russia faces a considerable economic impact as compared to Iran due to imposition of economic impact from the U.S. and the EU bloc combined. Russia's economic impact was gravely felt in terms of deterioration in the value of its ruble and the GDP value. Iran, on the other side, has not suffered the anticipated financial implications due to availability of loopholes. In particular, Iran has an opportunity to trade with Germany, France, and Britain through INSTEX. Iran enjoys these opportunities due to the lack of a common multilateral sanctions system that would prevent it from seeking alternative methods of trade. As compared to Russia, Iran has suffered less severity, thereby justifying that multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral.

## **Discussion**

The research concluded that economic sanctions did change Russia's attitude to some extent but did not change Iran's. One may object the former argument by claiming that Russia's change in attitude does not imply change in outcomes, since the war in Eastern Ukraine is ongoing and there are no prospects of Crimea to be returned to Ukraine. This is not the case. Firstly, while sanctions have not eliminated Russian military presence in Ukraine completely, they have symbolically changed course of Putin's rhetoric, thereby preventing further destabilisation in the region, and reaffirming international norms. Secondly, the sanctions did not entail the task of returning Crimea back from Russia in the first place, given the unfeasibility of such task.

Nevertheless, it is hard to disagree that the analysis of attitudes is only the first step in determining the effectiveness of ESs. The research does not imply that causal relationship will necessarily be established between attitudes and outcomes. Therefore, for further research it is recommended to investigate the effects of the sanctions in terms of concrete policy outcomes. For instance, in the cases of Russia and Iran this could be done by analysing the change in Russia's involvement in Ukraine or analysing the nuclear proliferation progress, respectively. It is also recommended to evaluate the role of 'resistance economy' in hedging against U.S.

sanctions after 2017 to establish it had an effect on the poor effectiveness record of the American unilateral sanctions.

The main limitation of this research is the limited focus on the discourse of both states' leaders. Therefore, in future research, it is recommended to analyse discourses of other government representatives, such as foreign ministers or foreign press secretaries, to allow for more accurate results and conclusions. Besides, the analysis uses a narrow and specific set of data, focusing on the speeches on the topic of Crimea and the topic of nuclear weapons, for Russia and Iran respectively. Perhaps the analysis of speeches made on other occasions might reveal different aspects of both leaders' positions towards the issues analysed, although one may doubt it would be significantly different. Another potential weakness is the translated transcripts based on which the analysis was conveyed. Although one shall not doubt the accuracy of the translations presented in this research, the misconceptions of certain words from the part of official translators cannot be excluded.

The research findings nevertheless leave an important implication for future research. Particularly, the conclusion about higher effectiveness of the multilateral way of imposing sanctions shall open discussion for the creation of an umbrella institution that can allow states to cooperate and facilitate the imposition of economic sanctions multilaterally. Such institution may not only enhance the precision of sanctions, but also allow for better communication between the punishing and the target state.

## Bibliography

- Bakeer, A. (2018, June 20). *Impending sanctions on Iran will make Turkey's energy imports more expensive and contribute to the devaluation of the lira*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/76644>
- BBC News. (2015, March 30). *Iran nuclear crisis: What are the sanctions?* BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15983302>
- BBC News. (2018, November 27). *Ukraine-Russia sea clash: Who controls the territorial waters around Crimea?* BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-46345317>
- BBC News. (2019, December). *Six charts that show how hard US sanctions have hit Iran*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48119109>
- Bennets, M. (2019, October 14). *Putin changes the channel on Ukraine*. Politico. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-president-vladimir-putin-changes-the-channel-on-ukraine-volodymyr-zelenskiy/>
- Brzozowski, A. (2020, March 31). *EU's INSTEX mechanism facilitates first transaction with pandemic-hit Iran*. Euractiv. Retrieved from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eus-instex-mechanism-facilitates-first-transaction-with-pandemic-hit-iran/>
- Chatzky, A. (2019, May 2). *Have Sanctions on Russia Changed Putin's Calculus?* *Council on the Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/have-sanctions-russia-changed-putins-calculus>
- Christie, E. H. (2015, July 13). *Sanctions after Crimea: Have they worked?* *NATO Review*. Retrieved from <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2015/07/13/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/index.html>
- Closson, S. (2019, January). *Diminishing Returns: How Effective Are Sanctions Against Russia?* *PONARS Eurasia*. Retrieved from

[http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm567\\_Closson\\_Jan2019\\_0.pdf](http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm567_Closson_Jan2019_0.pdf)

Coalson, R., & Schreck, C. (2018, March 1). *Putin's 'State Of The Nation' Speech: Annotated.*

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-state-of-nation-speech-annotated/29071013.html>

Comply Advantage. (n. d.) *Sanctioned Countries: Iran.* Comply Advantage. Retrieved from <https://complyadvantage.com/knowledgebase/iran/>

Crowley M. (2020, January 2). *U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander of Iranian Forces.* The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html>

Davenport, K. (2020, April). Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran. *Arms Control Association.* Retrieved from <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran>

Deutsche Welle. (2019, June 28). EU mechanism for trade with Iran 'now operational'. *Deutsche Welle.* Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/eu-mechanism-for-trade-with-iran-now-operational/a-49407662>

Figuerola, P. (2015, January 1). Economic Sanctions' Effectiveness in a World with Interdependent Networks and Powerful MNCs: The Role of Governance in the Target State. *College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania.* Retrieved from <https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1226&context=curej>

Fellows, S. L., Hansson, T. L., Lowell, M. J. (2014, October 3). Overview of the U.S. and EU Sanctions on Russia. *Reed Smith.* Retrieved from <https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2014/10/overview-of-the-us-and-eu-sanctions-on-russia>

- Geranmayeh, E. (2019, June 25). *Meeting the challenge of secondary sanctions*. European Council of Foreign Relations. Retrieved from [https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/meeting\\_the\\_challenge\\_of\\_secondary\\_sanctions](https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/meeting_the_challenge_of_secondary_sanctions)
- Gould-Davies N. (2020). Russia, the West and Sanctions. *Survival*, 62(1), 7-28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1715060>
- Halperin S., & Heath O. (2017). Comparative Research. *Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills* (pp. 211-238). Oxford University Press.
- Halperin S., & Heath O. (2017). Textual analysis. *Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills* (pp. 335-361). Oxford University Press.
- Harrell, P. E., Keatinge, T., Lain, S., & Rosenberg, E. (2017). The Future Of Transatlantic Sanctions On Russia. *Center for a New American Security*. Retrieved from [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep06243.pdf?ab\\_segments=0%2Fbasic\\_SYC-5055%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A4c1fe485b13bce80bb770f300cf21f7a](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep06243.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-5055%2Ftest&refreqid=search%3A4c1fe485b13bce80bb770f300cf21f7a)
- Havlik, P. (2019, February 20). *EU-Russia sanctions exchange has had important economic and political consequences*. WIIW. Retrieved from <https://wiiw.ac.at/eu-russia-sanctions-exchange-has-had-important-economic-and-political-consequences-n-365.html>
- Iran GDP Per Capita 1960-2020*. (n.d.). Macrotrends. Retrieved from <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/IRN/iran/gdp-per-capita>
- Jafari, L., Hosseini, A. A., & Emamjomehzadeh, S. (2018). Discourse analysis of the moderate government's foreign policy in Iran. *Teorija in Praksa*, 55, 142-160. <https://www.fdv.uni-lj.si/docs/default-source/tip/diskurzivna-analiza-zmerne-vladne-zunanje-politike-v-iranu.pdf?sfvrsn=0>
- Kaempfer H., & Lowengerg A. (1999). Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(1), pp. 37-58. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600964?seq=1>

- Khan, S. (2019, September 7). *'Resistance economy' offers Iran no way out of US pressure*. The Arab Weekly. Retrieved from <https://theArabweekly.com/resistance-economy-offers-iran-no-way-out-us-pressure>
- Khoshnood, A. (2019, March 25). *Poverty in Iran: A Critical Analysis*. Willey Online Library. Retrieved from <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/mepo.12400>
- Landler, M. (2018, May 8). Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html>
- Lohmann S. (2018). Diplomats and the Use of Economic Sanctions. Volker Stanzel (Eds.), *New Realities in Foreign Affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st Century* (pp. 23-32). German Institute for International and Security Affairs. <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299501-23>
- Lor, P. (2011). Methodology in comparative studies. *International and Comparative Librarianship* (pp. 1-21). Retrieved from <https://pjlror.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/chapter-4-draft-2011-04-20.pdf>
- Luo, A. (2019, August 23). *What is discourse analysis?* Scribbr. Retrieved from <https://www.scribbr.com/methodology/discourse-analysis/>
- Marcus, J. (2010, July 26). *Analysis: Do economic sanctions work?* BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10742109>
- Mazumdar S. (2019, June 24). *How Trump's sanctions are crippling Iran's economy*. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/top-stories/s-9097>
- Miers, A., Morgan T. (2002). Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success: Can Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth? *International Interactions*, 28(2), pp.117-136. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620212099>
- Mottus, M. (2019, October 24). *Iran and the West: A Journey with Stopovers*. RKK ICDS. Retrieved from: <https://icds.ee/iran-and-the-west-a-journey-with-stopovers/>

- Nolt, J. H. (2017, September 4). Sanctions Inefficacy. *World Policy*. Retrieved from <http://worldpolicy.org/2017/09/14/sanctions-inefficacy/>
- Putin, V. (2014, March 18). *Address by President of the Russian Federation*. The Kremlin. Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>
- Putin, V. (2016, March 18). *Congratulations on the second anniversary of Crimea and Sevastopol's reunification with Russia*. The Kremlin. Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51535>
- Putin, V. (2020, March 18). *Meeting with public from Crimea and Sevastopol*. The Kremlin. Retrieved from: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63021>
- Radio Farda. (2017, September 20). Transcript: Speech of Hassan Rouhani To The United National General Assembly. *Radio Farda*. Retrieved from <https://en.radiofarda.com/a/transcript-of-hassan-rouhani-speech-to-un/28747418.html>
- Reid, L. J. (2019, August 21). The Effect of American and European Sanctions on Russia. *Coast Economic Consulting*. Retrieved from [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3439207](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3439207)
- Rome, H. (2019, November 5). Iran Is Doing Just Fine. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-11-05/iran-doing-just-fine>
- Rouhani, H. (2014, September 25). *Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Speech to UN General Assembly Transcript September 25, 2014*. Public Intelligence. Retrieved from: <https://publicintelligence.net/iran-un-speech-2014/>
- Rouhani, H. (2016, September 22). *Rouhani 1: Speech at the UN*. *The Iran Primer*. Retrieved from: <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/sep/22/rouhani-1-speech-united-nations>
- Rouhani, H. (2018, September 25). *Iran (Islamic Republic of)*. General Assembly of the United Nations. Retrieved from <https://gadebate.un.org/en/73/iran-islamic-republic>



- Rouhani, H. (2019, July 25). *Rouhani says Iran ready for 'respectful' negotiations*. Al-Monitor. Retrieved from: <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/iran-rouhani-talks-nuclear-deal.html>
- Ryumin, A. (2019, July 30). *21M Russians Live in Poverty, Official Data Says*. The Moscow Times. Retrieved from <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/07/30/21m-russians-live-in-poverty-official-data-says-a66618>
- The World Bank (2020). *Battle-related deaths (number of people) – Ukraine*. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.BTL.DETH?end=2018&locations=UA&start=2014&view=chart>
- Tyll, L., Pernica, K., & Arltová, M. (2018). The impact of economic sanctions on Russian economy and the RUB/USD exchange rate. *Journal of International Studies*, 11(1), 21-33. doi:10.14254/2071-8330.2018/11-1/2
- Walentek D. (2019). Instrumental or Symbolic? The Role of Multilateral Economics Sanctions. *Political Economy and Transnational Governance Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam*, pp. 1-47. <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/0e8b665c-1a05-4dfb-8d94-72522614a26f.pdf>
- Yee, V. (2020, January 15). *Iran's President Lashes Out at Europeans Over Crumbling Nuclear Deal*. The New York Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/world/middleeast/iran-europe-nuclear-deal.html>