Ending the hunger games? FOOD SECURITY AS A GLOBAL NORM
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ENDING THE HUNGER GAMES?

FOOD SECURITY AS A GLOBAL NORM

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MA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: GLOBAL CONFLICT IN THE MODERN ERA

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PREFACE

In 2019 I was an intern at the Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN-organisations of Food and Agriculture in Rome. I focused on the International Fund for Agricultural Development, but was also involved with dealings at the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Food Programme. I supported the deputy Ambassador in preparing UN-meetings by analysing and summarising (policy) documents, drafting speaking points and writing reports on all meetings occurring at IFAD and large meetings at FAO and WFP.

It was during my time in Rome that I was first introduced to the concept of food security and its link to conflict. I worked on the execution of a side event and photo exhibition The Netherlands co-organised with Switzerland and had to implement the Dutch priorities into all preparatory work for major meetings. In the context of the Permanent Representation, I attended meetings in which Dutch policy on food security was drafted, altered and decided on and consulted policy officers in The Hague (the Dutch seat of government) on the Dutch commitments on food security. The Netherlands gave great priority to better engagement within the UNSC and the 'Rome-based agencies' (of Food and Agriculture) with the link between food security and conflict and therefore much of my work as an intern was dominated by this link. During my internship I came up with the idea of exploring the link between conflict and food security further by analysing the UNSC's engagement with food security in my master thesis.

CHAPTER 1 – SETTING THE STAGE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Sigrid Kaag, stated in an address to the United Nations (UN) Security Council in March 2018 that "hunger is the most avoidable of disasters. Starvation is the most heinous method of warfare. It is upon us to ensure that starvation of civilians will become a crime of the past – a practice both forbidden and punishable" (Kaag August 2018, 1).

On 24 May 2018 the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2417 unanimously. The resolution draws attention to the link between conflict and hunger, condemns starvation as a method of warfare as a war crime and underpins the importance of humanitarian aid to civilians in conflict situations, condemning the denial of access for humanitarian personnel (SC13354 2018, 1). The resolution was part of a broader effort to ensure 'the protection of civilians' (Zappalà 2018, 885). This concept allows the Security Council to work on a number of thematic issues and adopt resolutions to tackle them, food insecurity being one of them. Examples of these resolutions are focused on protecting journalists, protecting women and children and protecting health care workers and clinics.

In 2020 the UN World Food Programme (WFP) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize "for its efforts to combat hunger, for its contribution to bettering conditions for peace in conflict-affected areas and for acting as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict".[1]

These two events are significant because they establish a link between conflict and hunger, or food insecurity[2]. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the UN World Food Programme (WFP) both state that reaching Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 2, achieving zero hunger in 2030, is facing a setback (FAO 2020, viii). After years of steady decline of hunger in the world, the last few years have produced a rise in hungry people. Major

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[1] https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2020/wfp/facts/

[2] Hunger and food insecurity are often used interchangeably, though this is not entirely correct. FAO states that "hunger is an uncomfortable or painful physical sensation caused by insufficient consumption of dietary energy" and that "a person is food insecure when they lack regular access to enough safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development and an active and healthy life". When someone is severely food insecure, they have most likely experienced hunger. http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/

new famines occurred (and are occurring) in Somalia, South Sudan, Nigeria and Yemen. These four famines share one important factor: conflict. Conflict has led to 'man-made famine' in all of these, and other, cases. The term 'man-made famine' is coined to stress that these famines are the product of people harming other people, not natural disasters for example.

Conflict can affect food security in different ways. Indiscriminate bombings can destroy food sources or food distribution locations, like farmlands or marketplaces. The same counts for the deliberate burning down of entire villages, destroying the villager's opportunity to buy or grow food. The access for humanitarian aid to a population can be deliberately denied, causing lack of food security and hunger among a people. Access to food can even be denied to (part of) the population entirely, using food security as a method of warfare. The link between conflict and food security works the other way around as well: in food insecure regions the chance of an outbreak of conflict is higher.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT, RESEARCH QUESTION & CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE

The link between conflict and food security has become a more visible security theme over the last few years. The two events described above point towards food security becoming a global norm in the security realm[3]. Security in these cases, is seen as a concept beyond the realist and traditionalist definitions of security and conflict, which entail a state-centred outlook on security. Food security[4] is in these instances seen as a part of human security, which has an individual-centred outlook on security.

Academic literature has explored the link between conflict and food security to an ever-greater extent in the last few years. Furthermore, the broadening of the concept of security beyond a traditionalist, realist view has also been explored. An overview of this literature will be provided in chapter 2. However, current research is not yet conclusive on the extent to which food security has increasingly been given centre stage in international issues and challenges, or whether food security has become an accepted part of the responsibility of actors mandated with maintaining global peace and stability, such as the UNSC. The Security Council's main

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[3] A 'Norm' will be defined in this thesis as a generally accepted standard of behaviour for actors with a given identity

[4] 'Food security' can be defined as follows: "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life". FAO "Policy Brief on Food Security", June 2006, Issue 2
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/faoitaly/documents/pdf/pdf_Food_Security_Cocept_Note.pdf

responsibility is peace and international security. Since food security and conflict are linked, the UNSC could help prevent famine from ever occurring again.

The adoption of UNSC Resolution 2417 and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize indicate that the international community (is starting to) accept food security as an important norm and that food security is therefore becoming an accepted part of the responsibility of the UNSC. Academic literature has not yet analysed food security in the context of norm theory. This is a gap because the use of the norm life cycle theory can provide insight into the process of norm constitution and help to analyse it, therefore the norm life cycle theory will be used as a theoretical framework to answer the following research question:

Can food security be considered a global norm?

This thesis will focus further by using the UNSC as a case study, since it is regarded as the pre-eminent global body when it comes to maintaining global security, and analysing whether preventing hunger has become an accepted part of the responsibility of the UNSC.

1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

As Chapter 3 will be entirely devoted to the theoretical framework, this section will only briefly introduce norm lifecycle theory. Norm lifecycle theory analyses how a norm becomes generally accepted or not accepted; its life cycle. It explores the actors involved in pushing an issue to become a norm, the norm entrepreneurs, and which strategies they use to promote the issue, whether or not a norm reaches a tipping point to be accepted by a majority and how a norm can become internalised into the behaviour of actors, communities or populations.

This thesis will consist of qualitative research, looking to descriptively explore the life cycle of food security as a global norm. To limit the scope of this thesis, I will focus my research through a case study of the UNSC, looking at whether it has become accepted that the UNSC, as part of its mandate to maintain global peace and security, also has a responsibility to address food security. Primary source analysis will include UN documents, UNSC meeting transcripts, transcripts of speeches made by UN officials, transcripts of speeches made by international politicians of relevant member states and reports and briefing papers by relevant member states, briefing papers of side events organised by UN member states and letters to Dutch parliament justifying Foreign Affair's policy commitments at the UN, all in the context of the UNSC. I will use content analysis to analyse the three stages of norm life cycle theory and explore if

food security can be considered a global norm within the context of my case study, the UNSC. Furthermore, the thesis will analyse global reports written by FAO and WFP, in the context of the concept of food security.

1.4 (DE)LIMITATIONS AND OUTLINE

The timeframe of this thesis will cover primary source analysis from 2017, in which the UNSC started to engage with the concept of food security, to present day. This choice was made because in 2017 famines in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen sparked the interest in the link between food security and conflict within the context of the UNSC, making political agendas more sensitive to this relationship.

Due to the scope of this thesis, I have decided to focus on the UNSC as a case study. One could argue that the UNSC consists of only 15 members, 5 permanent members and 10 rotating members, and is therefore not the ultimate representation of the global community. Future research could look into other global arenas engaging with food security to complement this research and decrease the gaps in the literature on food security. I have focused my primary analysis on UN agencies, offices, funds and programmes and UN member states, all in the context of the UNSC, because they are more prevalent as actors within the framework of norm life cycle theory than NGOs. NGOs do engage with the subject of food security, albeit with a more technical focus generally directed at UN-agencies like FAO, WFP and IFAD. Further research could look into the (smaller) role that NGOs have played in promoting food security as a global norm and thus decrease gaps in the literature on food security.

This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 will consist of a literature review divided into two parts: first, it will explore literature on the link between conflict and hunger and second, it will explore food security in wider context, studying human security and international law. Chapter 3 will set out the methodology and theoretical framework of this thesis. Chapters 4 and 5 will set out the three stages of the norm life cycle framework against the development of food security as a global norm. Lastly, Chapter 6 will end this thesis with a conclusion.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 THE LINK BETWEEN CONFLICT AND FOOD SECURITY

This literature review will define and dive deeper into academic literature on food security, look into literature on the link between conflict and hunger and place food security in the broader context of security literature by looking at the link between food security and human security and place food security in the context of international law.

2.1.1 DEFINING FOOD SECURITY

2.1.1.1 FOUR PILLARS OF FOOD SECURITY

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and UNICEF define four pillars of food security: availability, access, utilization and stability (2018, 159). Availability concerns the actual presence of food and the necessary calorie intake at the individual and national level. If food is available, the question is if households and individuals actually have access to the food. This access involves infrastructure for bringing food to market and access to market for the population. The utilization pillar concerns the nutritional status of individuals. It involves good feeding practices, preparation of food, dietary diversity and the distribution of food within a household. Lastly, stability refers to the stability of the food system as a whole. Issues with stability can include food price fluctuations, a national dependency on food imports, or the lack of irrigation systems in the agricultural sector (Martin-Shields and Stojetz 2019, 151). Instability of the food system can create short-, medium- and long-term food insecurity.

2.1.1.2 CHRONIC AND ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Food insecurity can occur in two different ways: chronic food insecurity and acute food insecurity. Chronic food insecurity lasts over long periods of time and has structural causes. Often extreme poverty lies at the root of chronic food insecurity, which can signify both a qualitative and a quantitative lack of safe, nutritious food (Brinkman and Hendrix 2010, 4 and FAO et al 2018, 157).

Acute food insecurity is a concept which relates to temporary or area specific gaps in the access to or the availability of food (Brinkman and Hendrix 2010, 4). Acute food insecurity requires short term interventions to prevent threats to the lives or livelihoods of individuals and households (FAO et al 2018, 156). It can be caused by a large scope of factors, such as price

fluctuations, economic recessions, draughts or floods, political turmoil and breakdowns in delivery systems (Brinkman and Hendrix 2010, 4).

2.1.2 FOOD REGIMES THEORY

The role of states and international cooperation is a crucial aspect for making an analysis of UN contributions to break the link between conflict and hunger. The concept of food regimes is used to study the role of states in the food system. Harriet Friedmann defines food regime as a "rule governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale" (1993, 30-31). Matias Margulis describes food regimes as a global policy where food security is an issue area that requires international cooperation (2008, 55).

Academics have defined three food regimes since the 1870s. The first food regime starts around 1870 and centres around the British Empire and mainland Europe. It entails agreements made between European nations and the British government and financial sector to subsidise industrial wages. The second food regime covers the period from the second World War to the end of the Cold War in 1989. During this period, the international community coined the belief that hunger could be eradicated by advancing agricultural science (Margulis 2013, 55).

During the second food regime the United States shaped the international food system by industrialisation and the use of exports to subsidise international development and domestic consumption (Leach et al 2020, 6). The regime marked the start of the conviction that the fight against hunger is the international community's collective responsibility and thus the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation was founded in 1945, later joined by the World Food Programme (1961) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (1974). It was also in this regime that the four pillars of food security were defined, and food security policies were reformed towards a more multidisciplinary outlook on food interventions (Margulis 2013, 55-56).

The third food regime started in the 1990s and revolves around the emergence of international trade. Leach et al. refer to this period as 'the corporate food regime' (2020, 6), whereas Margulis terms it 'regime complex for food security' (2013, 57). Central to this regime is the upcoming influence of the agri-food business and world trade liberalisation, sometimes at the expense of member state government's influence. Apart from this upcoming corporate influence, the overlapping of international food security, international trade and human rights regimes is the key to the third food regime (Margulis 2013, 57).

The founding of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 is the main reason for the upcoming influence of international trade. Its binding rules and strong dispute settlement have brought food security policy under international law, thus significantly changing the food regime (Margulis 2013, 58). Leach et al. describe this development as a change in the role of states in the food regime towards a neoliberal model of value chain development (2020, 6). The WTO restricts state-interference such as trade tariffs that could lead to a distortion of the market, essentially believing that agricultural liberalisation and the international food trade that comes with it, is the key to achieving SDG 2 (Margulis 2013, 58).

The influence of human rights on the third food regime is key to this research because it involves the human right to food. The World Food Summit of 1996 defined outliers and the state obligations concerning this right, making it an accepted international norm (Margulis 2013, 58). FAO 's rights to food initiatives seek to integrate political, economic and right-to-food norms in order to monitor and improve government's progress to protect the human right to food, eventually seeking to empower these norms with legislature and financial investment (Messer and Cohen 2015, 217). The Human Rights Council is monitoring the number of violations of this right, as well as the state response to such violations. This leads to a higher reputational cost in the international community if the human right to food is not adhered to.

2.1.3 CONFLICT TYPES RELEVANT TO FOOD SECURITY

2.1.3.1 CIVIL CONFLICT

Hendrix and Brinkman define civil conflict as "an armed conflict between the state and an opposition group that aims to take power over the central government or in a region, or to change government policies", stating that this form of conflict is almost exclusive to developing countries that have a high level of food insecurity among the population (2013, 3).

Food insecurity can motivate participating in civil conflict at the individual level due to the tempting offer of food and shelter that opposition groups, as well as the national army, can provide for individuals (Hendrix and Brinkman 2013, 4). Brinkman and Hendrix suggest that the beforementioned incentives of food and shelter actually explain participation better than any political convictions or grievances (2010, 3). Furthermore, acute food insecurity can result in social grievances, thus creating motive at group level for rebellion. The chances for this are especially likely in societies marked by high inequality across ethnic or religious groups (Hendrix and Brinkman 2013, 3). Additionally, varying levels of food security within a society

should be factored in as well when looking at group level incentives for civil conflict. Groups that are suffering from the most extreme forms of food insecurity are less likely to engage in conflict, than groups suffering from relative deprivation (Brinkman and Hendrix 2010, 4). This is due to the fact that the individuals suffering from the most extreme cases of food insecurity generally do not have the physical power to fight.

2.1.3.2 COMMUNAL CONFLICT

Hendrix and Brinkman define communal conflict as "conflict between two or more distinct communities that neither targets nor directly involves the state", stating that it involves "episodic, rather than sustained campaigns" (2013, 6). Communal conflicts can escalate into civil war, like in Darfur, and are specifically common to areas where agricultural land and water or irrigation are scarce (Brinkman and Hendrix, 6). A typical example of communal conflict is the conflict between pastoralists and sedentary farmers in the marginal lands of the Sahel. However, communal conflict may also be caused in highly populated areas where the population strain can create immense pressure on the productivity of agricultural lands (Hendrix and Brinkman, 7).

Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa state that a decrease in poor nutritional status results in a decline of the likelihood of smaller armed conflict, meaning that nutritional status and conflict are positively associated with one another (2008, 517). A 5-percentage point decrease in hunger contributes to a 2,5-3,0 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of the outbreak of armed conflict (Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa 2008, 519).

2.1.3.3 FOOD PRICE SHOCKS AND CONFLICT

The third type of conflict that is linked to food security is the political or civil unrest that arises after food price shocks. Weinberg and Bakker found that social unrest is correlated to food price indexes. When food prices are high, and therefore more people food insecure, social unrest is more prevalent than in times when food prices are stable. A larger price increase indicates a larger increase in social unrest (Weinberg and Bakker 2015, 320). Rising food prices can cause food riots, especially in urbanised areas. Usually, these rising food prices are associated with food import prices. In these cases, globally rising food prices can cause shortages, particularly in developing countries (Koren and Bagozzi 2016, 1000).

Hendrix and Brinkman argue that social unrest in urban areas is a concern especially for authorities in developing countries, where policy concerns of urbanites can more easily lead to

the toppling of a regime than those of the rural population (2013, 7). This fact can cause disproportionate top-down food interventions that favour the urban population over the rural populace. Hendrix and Haggard conclude from this line of thinking that urban unrest is actually more prevalent in democracies than in autocracies, because democratic governments are less likely to favour the urban population as much as autocratic regimes do (2015, 145).

2.1.3.4 FOOD PRODUCTION AND CONFLICT

The last conflict type that is relevant to the link between conflict and food security is conflict that arises from food production factors. In developing countries agriculture is often the largest economic sector, providing job opportunities and sustaining the livelihoods of the majority of households (FAO 2019, 4). Decreases in food production therefore causes a decrease in labour demand, leaving many men and women without income consequently making participation in social unrest or conflict more attractive (Martin-Shields and Stojetz 2019, 157). Furthermore, Martin-Shields and Stojetz argue that lower agricultural productivity causes an increase in social grievances such as "increasing destitution, famine, distress, migration or aggravated social inequalities" (2019, 158).

Koren and Bagozzi contend that the high reliance of rural households in developing countries on locally produced foodstuffs makes the likeliness of conflict due to production issues in these remote areas larger than the likeliness of conflict due to price fluctuations (2016, 1002). Lack of infrastructure in these areas is a part of these households' reliance on locally produced foods and is what makes them more vulnerable to food insecurity. Koren and Bagozzi argue that the likeliness of conflict in this area "*as a result* of food insecurity" is much higher than in urban areas (2016, 1002).

2.2 FOOD SECURITY IN A BROADER CONTEXT

To analyse whether food security can be understood as a constituting norm, it is important to look at the context in which food security can be placed. The following section will explore the concept of human security and its relevance to food security.

Since the 1990s, the UN have concerned themselves with an ever-broadening range of issues in the context of international security. UN engagement with themes like protection of civilians, women's rights, refugee flows and discrimination, have led to an increased scholarly interest into the human security studies realm. What defines and constitutes human security is still a

topic of debate amongst security scholars. Some specific human security issues have been explored deeply in academic literature, whereas others have been under-researched (Hampson 2012, 279). An important aspect of human security is that is shifts the focus of the referent: it looks beyond the security of the state to include individuals and explore what constitutes a safe life for people (Nzayisenga et al. 2016, 280). Food security is part of human security because it does exactly this. There are a number of relevant aspects of human security, worth discussing when looking at the broader context in which to place food security. The first aspect concerns the individual versus the state in security thinking. The second involves the utility of human security. The third relevant aspect is the international law perspective on food security.

2.2.1 SHIFTING FOCUS FROM THE STATE TO THE INDIVIDUAL

Sheperd sets out why a realist, state-centric approach to food security is problematic. State-centric security tends to focus on securing the interests of those in power; the security elites. These elites tend to easily overlook hunger as a security threat, since it usually is not a threat that affects them. A prioritisation of hunger would include a shift toward the poor and marginalised and could potentially threaten "institutional arrangements that underpin existing power structures" (Sheperd 2012, 201). Since hunger is an existential threat to the security of inhabitants of the state – and therefore an existential threat to the state itself – a state-centric approach to food security is not adequate to address the food insecurity of the periphery.

As stated above, a human security approach shifts the object of international security from protecting the state to protecting individual people. Nzayisenga et al. argue this creates a more holistic view of security, that allows for the inclusion of the politically marginalised. Instead of focusing what constitutes a threat for the state, or the power-holder, this view focuses on what constitutes a threat for individuals. Looking at the concept of security from the bottom up, "can help reduce the asymmetry in the relationship between 'the local' and power-holders, allowing the former to critique the latter" (Nzayisenga et al. 2016, 280).

According to Hampson, the shift of focus is based in the classically liberal assumption of the basic individual rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness", connected to the state's obligation to ensure and protect these rights (Hampson 2012, 281). In classical liberal internationalism, achieving international security depends on international institutions, their stability and their ability to address threats from outside their environment. The concept of human security is a shift away from this liberal ideology because it considers the wellbeing and sense of security of individuals as "critical to international security, and that international order

cannot rest solely on the sovereignty and viability of states" (Hampson 2012, 282). Global challenges should therefore focus on tackling issues that threaten the safety of individuals, to create international order and security.

The shift from a state-centric approach to a focus on individuals is of importance to the concept of food security. Ayala and Meier point out that the international (re)commitment to human rights in the 1990s created the political space to tackle food security as being central to individual dignity (2017, 10). Maslow's pyramid is a clear explanation for this reasoning: food is a basic need, that precedes all other needs in order to achieve self-actualisation (Maslow 1954, 236). In 1999 the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR) issued General Comments to provide the international community with a clear interpretation of the right to adequate food. The wording of General Comment 12 clearly focusses on an individual approach to (food) security: "The right to adequate food is realized when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement" (UNCESR 1999, 2).

2.2.2 THE UTILITY OF HUMAN SECURITY

The conceiving of analytical concepts in international relations has a dual purpose. First, concepts and theories are used as a theoretical tool to analyse the world around us. Second, these concepts and theories can be used in a more practical manner: as a policy mandate. Owen argues that the theoretical success of political realism can actually be attained to the fact that theory manifested alongside policy execution (2004, 377).

The globalisation of international policy forces governments to look at a wider scope of problems their people face; political stability and foreign army invasions no longer suffice. Human security can be explained as the underlying rationale of a policy shift (Owen 2004, 377). In practise, human security can be used as a tool to link the overlapping policy fields of humanitarian relief, development aid, human rights promotion and conflict resolution. A lack of policy coordination between these fields, can in the best-case lead to reinventing the wheel and in the worst case it can be counterproductive to their goals (Uvin 2001, 185-186). Policy coordination is relevant to the realm of food security as well, as food security involves all policy fields mentioned above.

Among scholars there has been discussion on whether to define and utilise the concept of human security in a broad or in a narrow sense. Supporters of the narrow definition like Krause, Mack and Macfarlane argue that the failure to recognise violence committed by the state against its own citizens, is traditional security thinking's greatest flaw. This counts especially for the modern era, where 95% of all wars are of an intra-state nature, instead of inter-state (Owen 2004, 375). These scholars advocate a narrow, conceptually clear definition that focuses human security on safety from violent threats.

Supporters of a broad definition like Alkire, Hampson and Nzayisenga et al. argue that shifting focus to the individual unavoidably means looking at issues like poverty, environmental disasters, disease and hunger. The broad definition scholars advocate that "human security should be widely constructed to include economic, environmental, social, and other forms of harm to the overall livelihood and wellbeing of individuals" (Hampson 2012, 381). Food security would clearly be included in the broad definition of human security, rather than the narrow definition. Furthermore, supporters of the broad definition of human security argue that the ability of social institutions to deal with these insecurities should be studied too, since mitigating human insecurity means addressing society's ability to cope with threats as well as the threats themselves (Owen 2004, 376).

2.2.3 FOOD SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The way in which the right to food[5] is codified in international law has evolved considerably over the last 70 years. The human right to food was first formalised in the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966. Article 11 recognises "the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger" and includes specific obligations "to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need" (UN ICESR 1966, 4). Special Conventions added security obligations developed to address the right to food security of women, with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1979, and children, with the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989.

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[5] The right to food is linked to, but not the same as food security. The right to food "pointed the way towards the possibility of a rights-based approach to food security. Currently over 40 countries have the right to food enshrined in their constitution and FAO estimates that the right to food could be judicial in some 54 countries". FAO "Policy Brief on Food Security", June 2006, Issue 2
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/faoitaly/documents/pdf/pdf_Food_Security_Cocept_Note.pdf

The women's convention codifies the right to adequate nutrition, the children's convention codifies a government obligation to fight malnutrition (Ayala and Meier 2017, 9).

As mentioned previously, the UN CESCR added to the codification of food security in 1999 with a series of General Comments. The General Comments link the right to food with nutrition and health, creating an interdependent and interrelated disciplinary. As discussed earlier, it is the human security lens that calls for an interdisciplinary policy approach. The way in which food security has been codified in international law since the 1990s allows for interconnected policy development (Ayala and Meier 2017, 11). The General Comments outline which obligations governments have internationally and how they should implement the right to food at national level. Furthermore, the comments set out the basic premises and what constitutes violations of the right. Two of the four pillars described in the first section of this literature review, availability and access, are codified in the General Comments (Mechlem 2004, 638).

2.3 CONCLUSION

Academic literature has clearly defined food security. Food security consists of four pillars: availability, access, utilization and stability. The international community is currently in the third food regime, the mechanisms used to study the role of states in the food system, which focuses on the overlapping of international food security, international trade and human rights regimes. The human right to food is a clearly accepted international norm, with FAO's right to food initiatives seeking to integrate political, economic and security norms. The right to food was codified in international law in the 1990s, with a focus on an interdisciplinary policy approach.

Furthermore, the link between conflict and food security has been extensively discussed in academic literature. Food insecurity influences civil conflict because hunger can motivate participating in civil conflict at the individual level due to the tempting offer of food and shelter that warring parties (both national armies or opposition groups) provide. Communal conflict often occurs in areas where agricultural land and water or irrigation, and with those the ability to produce food, are scarce. Food price shocks have the tendency to create unrest and potentially conflict. Lastly, decreases in food production therefore causes a decrease in labour demand, leaving many men and women without income consequently making participation in social unrest or conflict more attractive.

Since the 1990s security studies has shifted its focus from a classical state-centred approach to security, towards an individual-based approach: human security. Food security is a part of human security due to its focus on the need for food security of the individual, with the international (re)commitment to human rights in the 1990s (defined as the third food regime in chapter 2.1.2 and above) created the political space to tackle food security as being central to individual dignity. This shift has forced governments to look at a wider scope of problems their citizens face, food security being one of them.

Gaps in the literature include the lack of research into the norm life cycle theory of food security and the lack of research into whether food security has become an accepted part of the responsibility of actors mandated with maintaining global peace and stability, such as the UNSC. The academic literature analysed above will serve as the broader context into which my case study of the UNSC is placed. This case study will therefore complement the current literature on food security because norms life cycle theory has not been used before to analyse food security as a global norm. The following chapter will dive deeper into how my thesis will contribute to fill these gaps in academic literature.

CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH DESIGN AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 METHODOLOGY

I refer back to chapter 1.3 and 1.4 in which I have described important aspects of my methodology. I will use this section to dive deeper into justification of my primary source analysis.

To analyse if food security can be considered a global norm, this thesis will focus further by using the UNSC as a case study, since it is regarded as the pre-eminent global body when it comes to maintaining global security. I will analyse whether it has become accepted that the UNSC, as part of its mandate to maintain global peace and security, also has a responsibility to address food security. The UNSC is an arena where different interests of member states come together. For the sake of diplomacy, interventions are often layered and both show and hide conflicts of interest and power relations. I will use a content analysis approach to uncover these different conflicts and relations.

Since UN-agencies, offices, funds and programmes are important norm entrepreneurs of UNSC engagement with food security, I will look into how relevant UN- agencies, offices, funds and programmes have contributed to the creation of the link between conflict and hunger and promoted UNSC engagement with food security.

Since certain member states are important actors in the promotion of food security as a global norm, I will analyse which member states have adopted the norm (and which have not). The Netherlands and Switzerland are member states who act as norm catalysts and will therefore be the focus when analysing member states within the framework of norm life cycle theory. Academic literature has not explored norm life cycle theory in relation to food security so far. The focus on The Netherlands and Switzerland has therefore been derived from my own observation, based on primary sources.[6]

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[6] Primary source analysis shows that The Netherlands and Switzerland table UNSC engagement with food security more than others countries. The Netherlands and Switzerland have dedicated 2017 to co-organize several events in multiple countries to promote UNSC engagement with food security and the Netherlands has set out further UNSC engagement with food security as one of its goals of their presidency of the UNSC in 2018. In 2019 I have interned at the Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherland to the UN-organisations of Food and Agriculture and seen with my own eyes the prioritisation that The Netherlands and Switzerland give to UNSC engagement with food security, their cooperation to achieve this engagement and their role as norm catalysts in the UN-arena.

3.2 NORM LIFECYCLE THEORY BY FINNEMORE AND SIKKINK

This thesis will use Finnemore and Sikkink's norms life cycle theory as a theoretical framework to analyse if food security can be considered a global norm. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norm influence can be analysed along the lines of three stages: norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation. They state that a threshold or 'tipping point' separates the first and second stage, at "which a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm" (1998, 895). Norms do not necessarily complete the life cycle; in fact, many norms fail to reach the tipping point to mass adoption. Different actors and motives characterise each stage of the lifecycle.

3.2.1 NORM EMERGENCE

Norm emergence is led by 'norm entrepreneurs', who try to persuade a large number of state actors, or 'critical mass of states' as Finnemore and Sikkink term them, to adopt a certain norm. These norm entrepreneurs are often principled champions of ideal behaviour within their community. They draw attention to a certain issue, or even create them by formulating specific semantics to describe the problem (1998, 897). This is critical for the broader mass to be able to talk about the issue and therefore paramount to the success of norm adoption. What makes this stage difficult is that norms do not emerge in vacuum, new norms often contradict existing norms. Therefore, norm entrepreneurs often have to go to great lengths to convince the general public of their new idea of appropriateness. Finnemore and Sikkink give the example of the suffragettes who had to resort to inappropriate actions like going on hunger strikes, damaging government property and refusing to pay taxes to bring across their new idea of appropriateness (1998, 879).

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are often established to bring about norm change, or norm emergence. Examples are NGOs such as Greenpeace, the Red Cross and Solidaridad. Another form of a norm entrepreneur is one that comes from "standing international organizations that have purposes and agendas other than simply promoting one specific norm" (1998, 899). UN agencies, offices, funds and programmes are a perfect example of this. Their expertise in specific fields, together with their structural features that shape information exchange in the international community make them a well-suited norm entrepreneur. Finnemore and Sikkink describe studies stating that the way in which researchers and bureaucrats in UN-organisations are trained actually helps the promotion of new norms within these standing organisations (1998, 899). What makes UN organisations successful as norm

entrepreneurs is their visibility and network through daily contact with high diplomats of nearly all states. UN bureaucrats especially have leverage over smaller and developing states.

UN-organisations can help create the tipping point mentioned above by creating international rules, codifying what a norm is and what constitutes violation of the norm. However, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that "institutionalization is not a necessary condition for a norm cascade, and institutionalization may follow, rather than precede, the initiation of a norm cascade" (1998, 900). This tipping point is achieved when a 'critical mass' of states adopt the new norm. Finnemore and Sikkink propose two hypotheses of what constitutes such a critical mass: first they suggest that norm tipping seldomly occurs before one-third of the states participating in a system adopt the new norm and second that the 'relevant' states should adopt the new norm, meaning those states "without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised" (1998, 901). An example of such a state is one of high moral stature that other states look up to. It is important to note that unanimity is not necessary to achieve a tipping point in the norm life cycle.

3.2.2 NORM CASCADE

In the first stage of norm life cycle theory, domestic pressure is almost always needed for states to adopt the new norm. In the second stage, after the tipping point, states might start to adopt the new norm without any internal pressure. This occurs when international influence becomes more important than domestic politics, a process described by Finnemore and Sikkink as a "an active process of international socialization intended to induce norm breakers to become norm followers" (1998, 902). International socialisation occurs through three ways: emulation of heroes, praise for confirmative behaviour and ridicule for deviating from the norm. Diplomatic sanctions or censure can be imposed upon norm violators and incentives can be put in place for norm followers. What happens at this stage is that norm compliance can become part of the identity of a certain (international system), building peer pressure on other states in the system to adopt the new norm.

Finnemore and Sikkink provide three reasons that states would cave to such peer pressure: legitimation, conformity and esteem. When complying to the new norm, states receive international legitimation to partake in the (international) system. Furthermore, international legitimation increasingly provides governments with domestic legitimation and there with the ability to stay in power (1998, 903). Conformity describes that relatively simple social proof that states 'belong' within the (international) system. The reasoning behind this is mainly the

psychological need to be part of a larger group. Esteem is a combination between the latter two reasons: it suggests that state leaders comply to a norm because they want others to 'have a good opinion of them'. Finnemore and Sikkink give the example of states complying with norms that are associated with liberalism because being a liberal democratic state is perceived as being part of their identity and therefore something in which they take pride (1998, 904).

3.2.3 NORM INTERNALISATION

The last stage of the norm lifecycle theory is the internalisation of a norm. This means one is so accustomed to a norm that it is complied with automatically and almost 'taken for granted'. According to Finnemore and Sikkink this makes the norm "both extremely powerful (because behaviour according to the norm is not questioned) and hard to discern (because actors do not seriously consider or discuss whether to conform)" (1998, 904). This means political debate on such a norm is virtually non-existent. Professional education is a relevant contributor to internalisation, because employees are taught which norms to value above others. Since employees of international organisations, especially UN-bureaucrats, are increasingly professionally trained, norm biases and internalisation are reflected increasingly in their policy making.

CHAPTER 4 - NORM EMERGENCE: PUTTING FOOD SECURITY ON THE AGENDA

Finnemore and Sikkink describe norm entrepreneurs as actors usually comprised of Non-Governmental Organisations, individuals or international institutions. Thorhallsson argues that norm entrepreneurs might just as well be state actors (2012, 135-160). When examining the norm entrepreneurs promoting food security in relation to conflict as a global norm, it appears that both the UN system, consisting of UN agencies, offices, funds and programmes (international institutions) and the Netherlands, in cooperation with Switzerland, (states) have been promoting the inclusion of food security in relation to conflict at the UNSC.

4.1 THE UN SYSTEM AS NORM ENTREPRENEUR OF FOOD SECURTY IN THE UNSC

On 22 February 2017, a press conference was held after the issuance of a letter by the Secretary-General to UNSC members on the humanitarian crises in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. This press conference was the first occasion in which food security was tabled within the UNSC and is therefore an important document to analyse when answering te research question. The table was headed by high-level representatives of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), WFP, the FAO Liaison Office in New York and UNICEF (United Nation Secretary General 2017, 1). Secretary-General Antonio Guterres delivered the main address in which he stressed that the famines about to occur in the four countries under discussion, are clearly caused by conflict. The Secretary-General continued his address to call for more action to "prevent and resolve" conflict and conflict-induced famine (United Nation Secretary General 2017, 1). Following the Secretary-General's address, the UNDP and WFP delivered statements reiterating the link between conflict and famine in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen and the need for immediate action to prevent catastrophe. The UNDP official pleaded for a "joined-up approach" on tackling the approaching famines in the four conflict-stricken countries (United Nation Secretary General 2017, 1).

During the question-and-answer section of the press conference the Secretary-General continuously came back to the link between conflict and food security in the four countries discussed. For example, when answering a question from the UN Correspondents Association on why famine is now recurring, when everyone thought that it was a problem of the 1990s, the Secretary General replied: "these things are repeating themselves, and I believe there are

two very important factors that explain why they are repeating themselves. One is conflict, and conflict is, of course, having devastating humanitarian consequences" (United Nation Secretary General 2017, 1). And later, when answering a question from Al Jazeera on increasing humanitarian needs worldwide, the Secretary General replied: "multiplication of conflicts that became particularly dramatic from the point of view of access. So, we are facing now in this regard a situation in which either we act now or we will have a devastating situation of famine widespread in several parts of Africa and in Yemen" (United Nation Secretary General 2017, 1).

Later in the press conference, a BBC Afrique reporter posed the following question in French, I have translated it for the purpose of this thesis: "*Conflicts are one of the causes of the humanitarian crises you are talking about today. One of the priorities of the United Nations is to protect civilians, just as it was in Libya. When will there be a resolution or an international commitment [...]?*" (United Nation Secretary General 2017, 1). The Secretary-General acknowledged what the reporter stated and agreed that action should be taken to combine international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, stating this was "one of the questions that I have just discussed in Addis [Ababa] during the African Union summit and with the South Sudanese authorities, and with IGAD [Intergovernmental Authority for Development] and the African Union" (United Nation Secretary General 2017, 1).

As we can see by the example given above, in this joint UN press conference several representatives of UN agencies, offices, funds and programmes stressed the link between conflict and food security and the need to take action on this topic. On 16 June 2017, the topic was discussed in an Arria-Formula[7] meeting by the UNSC, organised specifically in response

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[7] "During the March 1992 Council presidency of Venezuela, Ambassador Diego Arria was contacted by Fra Joko Zovko, a Croatian priest who was eager to convey an eyewitness account of the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina to members of the Council. Not being able to find a formal way to hold a meeting, Arria decided to invite Council members to meet with Fra Joko in the UN delegates lounge. This experience gave Arria the idea of institutionalising this innovative informal meeting format which came to be known as the "Arria-formula". With the concurrence of Council members, subsequent Arria meetings moved from the delegates lounge to a UN conference room in the basement and were supported by simultaneous interpretation. More recently, many Arria meetings have been held in large UN conference rooms. An informal non-paper prepared by the Secretariat in October 2002 described the format as "very informal, confidential gatherings which enable Security Council members to have a frank and private exchange of views, within a flexible procedural framework, with persons whom the inviting member or members of the Council (who also act as the facilitators or conveners) believe it would be beneficial to hear and/or to whom they may wish to convey a message. They provide interested Council members an opportunity to engage in a direct dialogue with high representatives of Governments and international organizations—often at the latter's request—as well as non-State parties, on matters with which they are concerned and which fall within the purview of responsibility of the Security Council." Starting in 2017, member states not on the Council occasionally joined Council members in organising Arria-formula meetings". UN Security Council Working Methods, posted 16 December 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/arria-formula-meetings.php

to the February letter and press conference mentioned above and the visits to all four countries by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) head (What's in Blue 2017, 1). At the meeting, Amina Mohammed Deputy Secretary-General stressed again the connection between conflict and food security and the need to take effective action on this (Zappala 2019, 882).

Two months after this meeting, during which negotiations took place, the President of the UNSC issued an official presidential statement on behalf of the Council. The adoption of a presidential statement requires the approval, or non-opposition, of all UNSC members. Usually, the text in the statement is heavily negotiated, even though the document is not considered to be binding per se (Zappala 2019, 882). The statements confirm the link between conflict and food security: "The Security Council also emphasises with deep concern that ongoing conflicts and violence have devastating humanitarian consequences […] and are therefore a major cause of famine in the situations above" (UNSC 2017, 1). The Security Council takes a first step towards integrating food security into the security realm by requesting "the Secretary-General to continue to provide information on […] the risk of famine […] as part of his regular comprehensive reporting" (UNSC 2017, 2). This willingness is underlined by the concrete request for an oral briefing and providing a date for it: "In light of the unprecedented threat of famine in conflict-affected Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and northeast Nigeria, the Security Council further requests the Secretary-General to provide an oral briefing, during the month of October 2017" (UNSC 2017, 2). Furthermore, the presidential statement hints towards the creation of an early warning mechanism incorporating food security into the security realm, although no details are specified: "The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to provide early warning when a conflict […] risks leading to an outbreak of famine" (UNSC 2017, 2). The statement ends on the following note: "The Security Council expresses its readiness to continue to support the Secretary-General's call to action to avert famine in conflict-affected countries and commits to engage constructively on the Secretary-General's specific recommendations" (UNSC 2017, 2).

It is clear that the efforts of UN agencies, offices, funds and programmes (international institutions) have acted as norm entrepreneurs and drew the UNSC member states' attention

toward the problems involving conflict and food security[8]. However, it is important to note that the text of a UNSC presidential statement is not binding and that the text was limited to the four conflict-stricken countries (Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen) in question. Nonetheless, the presidential statement is an indication that the UNSC member states were willing to engage with the issue of food security in connection to conflict and that they were encouraged to do so by the UN-system.

4.2 STATES AS NORM ENTREPRENEURS OF FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNSC

Traditional IR theory focuses on hard power as a means to distinguish who has a say about issues in the international arena. Quantitative factors like military power, economic power, population size and territory size are factors taken into account by traditional IR theorists when ascribing power to a certain state (Thorhallsson 2012, 135). Smaller states would under these theories be limited to either balance against powerful states or bandwagon with them and would therefore only have limited influence in setting the international agenda (Thorhallsson 2012, 145).

Since the five permanent members of the UNSC have to cooperate with the ten elected members of the UNSC and these elected members have the power to table any issue on the UNSC agenda according to rule 35 of the Charter, neo-liberal institutionalism "provides a better understanding of the role that small states play in the international system" (Thorhallsson 2012, 141). Provided that country delegations commit to careful preparation and are staffed by skilled diplomats, elected members do not have to be side-lined at all (Schrijver 2019, 1). Multiple examples illustrate this. In 2016 New Zealand guided the acceptance of UNSC Resolution 2334, condemning Israel's settlement policies (UNSC 2016, 1-3). In 2014 Australia and Luxembourg accomplished a compromise resolution on humanitarian aid for Syrians (UNSC 2014, 1-5). As early as 1965 the Netherlands guided the acceptance of UNSC Resolution 211 on the truce between India and Pakistan (UNSC 1965, 1-6). Davies and True argue that a state's willingness to wager its networking abilities and diplomatic apparatus and its capacity to seize political windows are important conditions for state-led norm entrepreneurism (2017, 704). Thorhallson elaborates on this a bit further by identifying three

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[8] NGOs have tabled food security in the UN-arena as well, though they focus more on technical issues around food security (generally directed at UN-agencies like FAO, WFP and IFAD) and less specifically on UNSC engagement with food security. A useful summary of the technical issues raised by NGOs can be found here: https://www.e-ir.info/2007/12/22/food-security-and-the-role-of-ngos/

factors: knowledge, diplomatic skills and initiatives (2012, 152). These factors coincide with Schrijver's provisions, mentioned above.

The election as non-permanent member of the UNSC requires an intense lobbying trajectory. In a letter to Dutch Parliament, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation wrote that "an intense campaign" paid off and that the Netherlands was chosen as non-permanent member of the UNSC with 184 out of 192 votes for the period January-December 2018 (Zijlstra and Kaag 2017, 1). In this letter they laid out their intention to use the non-permanent seat in the Council to focus on five broader themes: increasing engagement by the UNSC with citizens around the world by speaking with them, instead of only about them, preventing conflict through broader attention to underlying problems, giving international law a bigger role in counterterrorism activities, increasing political participation of women in conflict areas and strengthening European cooperation (Zijlstra and Kaag 2017, 1-4). UNSC engagement with food security falls within the theme of addressing the underlying problems of conflict. This engagement had already been a Dutch priority in 2017, when the lobbying trajectory for the non-permanent member seat took place (Schrijver 2019,1). Dutch engagement with food security parallels the increased attention paid to the link between conflict and food security by UN agencies, offices, funds and programmes in 2017, as described in the sub-chapter above.

In 2017 the Netherlands and Switzerland chaired the Group of Friends on Food Security and the Group of Friends on Protection of Civilians of the UN in New York and in this capacity hosted a discussion series on conflict and hunger. The discussion series consisted of three events organised "to achieve a better understanding of the links between conflict and hunger, and to identify potential courses of action for the international community to address and prevent hunger" and is summarised in a report commissioned by the Netherlands and Switzerland and written by the Humanitarian Policy Group (Humanitarian Policy Group 2017, i).

In the discussion series and its summarising report, the Netherlands and Switzerland set out a number of recommendations, categorised to different audiences: eight to the UN Security Council, six to UN member states and six to the UN system and relevant organisations. Recommendations in all three categories refer to food security being adopted as an issue in the UNSC. The Netherlands and Switzerland recommend the UNSC directly to "request the Secretariat that existing reporting mechanisms systematically include information on worrying

levels of food insecurity", "follow up on the 2017 Presidential Statement and step up efforts to address the interlinkage between hunger and conflict and provide a concrete UNSC framework of action" and "further strengthen the capacity of the Security Council to prevent and resolve situations of conflict and hunger" (Humanitarian Policy Group 2017, 1). The UN system is recommended to "use information on food insecurity and hunger as early warning indicators to alert […] the Security Council of escalations into or deepening of conflict", "support further evidence-based analysis on how food insecurity can lead to conflict" and "further strengthen the link between the Rome-based Agencies and the Committee on World Food Security with discussions in Geneva and New York" (Humanitarian Policy Group 2017, 2).

If member states supported scientific research into the link between conflict and food security, this would contribute to strengthened evidence and reference material to present to the UNSC. To formally and systematically include information on worrying food insecurity levels in the reporting mechanisms of the UNSC, as well as member states alerting the UNSC to early warning indicators of food insecurity, would mean food security would be tabled consistently and extensively in the Council whenever relevant. To further strengthen UNSC capacity would entail adopting a resolution linking food security as a thematic issue in the UNSC and would enable concrete actions to be taken whenever food insecurity issues arise in a given country. The Netherlands was clearly hoping to guide the acceptance of a resolution on UNSC engagement with food security during their year as non-permanent member of the UNSC. Overall, the Netherlands and Switzerland were clearly pressing UN member states to adopt food security as a norm within the UNSC during the course of 2017. Furthermore, the recommendation on strengthening the link between the Rome-based Agencies (FAO, WFP and IFAD) with the UNSC and the UN Human Rights Council, would mean an interdisciplinary approach and norm acceptance not only in the UNSC, but in the entire UN system. It is interesting to note the reference to the 2017 presidential statement, discussed extensively in the subchapter above.

It can be concluded that both the UN-system and certain UNSC member states have acted as norm entrepreneurs of food security. After bringing four famines in Nigeria, Somalia, South-Sudan and Yemen to the attention of the UNSC by means of an official letter, a press conference by the Secretary General of the UN and an Arria-formula meeting, UNSC member states negotiated for several months to draft a presidential statement, which requires the approval, or non-opposition, of all UNSC member states. The adoption of this presidential statement can be regarded as a success of the effort by UN- agencies, offices, funds and

programmes to bring food security to the attention of the UNSC. The Netherlands and Switzerland acted as norm entrepreneurs for food security alongside the UN-system. Both countries cooperated intensively in the course of 2017 to promote UNSC engagement with food security by organising several events in multiple countries. They continued to stress the importance of interdisciplinary engagement with food security, a concept covered in the chapter 2.2.2. of the literature review. The combined efforts of these norm entrepreneurs of food security laid the ground for the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2417, discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5 – NORM CASCADE AND INTERNALISATION

5.1 NORM CASCADE: UNSC RESOLUTION 2417

UNSC Meeting 8213 on the maintenance of international peace and security took place in March 2018 which Dutch Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Sigrid Kaag as President. I have chosen to analyse this document because this meeting was the last UNSC meeting before the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2417 during which all countries summarised their view on UNSC engagement with food security. Kaag opened the meeting by stressing the Dutch conviction that the UNSC should engage with food security (UNSC 2018a, 2 and 5-6). She stressed the importance for interdisciplinary engagement of FAO, WFP and UNSC: "The Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme and their partners have the means and technology to issue early warnings, which they regularly report on. In conflict situations, it is up to the Council to follow up with early action" and long-term, "continuous engagement by the Council" (UNSC 2018a, 6).

Her address was followed by a briefing by the Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator; and a briefing by Executive Director of WFP. Both stressed the urgency to act now: "The Security Council's main responsibility is peace and international security. In other words, the Council can help prevent famine from ever occurring again" and "I believe that the men and women in this Chamber, who are from various nations, may have differences on some issues, but should not have difference on all issues. Let us work together to end conflict. […] Until we do so, we will never solve world hunger, because hunger is directly related to conflict, and conflict is directly related to hunger" (UNSC 2018a, 3-5). Cote d'Ivoire, Peru, Ethiopia, Bolivia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Kuwait, Equatorial Guinea, the United States of America, Kazakhstan, Poland and France expressed their support in interventions made during the meeting (UNSC 2018a, 6-21). I will highlight several outspoken interventions below.

The United States stressed the link between conflict and hunger stating that the Security Council should act to "keep civilians from starving" (UNSC 2018a, 16). The Ambassador continued to argue that "The connection between these violations [of International Law in connection to aid and starvation] and threats to international peace and security is also undeniable, and an equally appropriate topic for the Council" (UNSC 2018a, 16). The United States went on to use even stronger discourse, connecting inaction with food insecurity, by

stating that the Council should take a "more serious approach" to breaking the cycle of conflict and hunger rather than "rather than waiting to act until a situation reaches a full-blown emergency" (UNSC 2018a, 17).

The strongest statement was made to conclude the United States' intervention: "If the Security Council is to live up to its mandate, we must be consistent, principled and strong in demanding that conflict should be no excuse for perpetuating hunger, and the prevention of such conflicts should be our highest goal" (UNSC 2018a, 17). The use of the word *prevention* is important here because it conveys that the UNSC should engage in thematic issues and early warning mechanisms. This discourse is strong and overt, clearly expressing US preference for the UNSC to engage with food security.

The United Kingdom used similar discourse expressing their support for UNSC engagement with food security. Firstly, the ambassador directly addressed the link between conflict and hunger: "Hunger does not need to be a product of war", then he continued the UK's support by expressing the wish to commit to this link: "I hope we can make that clear in future Council products. We must understand and acknowledge the true nature of the problem in order to take the necessary collective actions to break the deadly link between conflict and hunger" (UNSC 2018a, 12). Again, the discourse used is strong; addressing the link between conflict and hunger as "the true nature of the problem [of hunger]" and "deadly".

However, both China and The Russian Federation (hereafter referred to as Russia) were overt in their use of language denouncing the involvement of the UNSC in issues concerning food security. Russia started its intervention by stressing that conflict is "by no means" the only reason that hunger in the world is increasing and continued to state that they "see a clear desire on the part of some countries to entrench and promote the link between conflict and hunger both in the work of the Security Council and more generally" (UNSC 2018a, 13). Russia condemned this as problematic, because it "effectively pushes the key drivers of food insecurity […] into the background" (UNSC 2018a, 13). Russia was clearly not in favour of the UNSC engaging into the thematic issue of food security, but it chose to use discourse that stressed the importance of food security and argumentation that defends it.

In the next part of the intervention the Ambassador continued to state that "a focus on conflict favours strict compliance with the Security Council's mandate" and that they "have concluded that considering this issue [the link between conflict and hunger] generally cannot be productive". He defended this statement by arguing that "it is hardly likely that we in the

Security Council will be able to come up with some universal formula — a panacea, if you like — for solving the problem of food security in such circumstances" and concluded it by stating they "firmly maintain the position that the Security Council should consider problems of food security only in the context of specific country situations that pose a threat to international peace and security" (UNSC 2018a, 14). The rhetoric here is clear: Russia did not want the UNSC to broaden its mandate by engaging in food security as a thematic issue. The Federation saw commitment to this issue as a limitation to their interests. Russia used overt and strong language to indicate this.

Though China's intervention amounted to the same line of thought, it used more subtle discourse to convey so. China stated that "all United Nations organs should perform their respective functions and observe the division of labour while strengthening cooperation" and continued that "the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security issues, should focus its efforts on helping relevant countries and regions to respond to peace and security issues, while the World Food Programme and the United Nations humanitarian agencies should respond to the needs of Member States in a timely manner and actively carry out food aid and other humanitarian relief activities" (UNSC 2018a, 18). It is clear that China did not want the UNSC to engage in thematic issues, but it conveyed this covertly by stating the primary responsibility of the Council (peace and security), leaving food security to specialised UN bodies such as WFP.

The support shown by almost all member states present at this meeting, points towards a potential tipping point being reached with a critical mass of states showing support for UNSC engagement with food security. However, China and Russia were still reluctant to accept UNSC engagement with food security. The high-level political presence at the meeting combined with outspoken support was instrumental in preparing the groundwork for the adoption of Resolution 2417 (Zappala 2019, 885). This was taken as a starting point of intense negotiations led by The Netherlands, which eventually resulted in a pivot by China and Russia, clearing the way for adopting UNSC Resolution 2417 (Zappala 2019, 884).

UNSC meeting 8267 marked the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 2417 on Conflict and Hunger on the 24th of May, 2018[9]. The adoption of this resolution clearly marks a tipping point, because the 5 permanent members, important geo-political actors in the global community, and the 10 rotating members of the UNSC adopted the resolution unanimously: a

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[9] Switzerland did not attend this meeting, as it was not a rotating member of the UNSC at this time.

critical mass has adopted UNSC engagement with food security as a norm. After the vote was taken, four country representatives wished to make a statement: the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France and Russia. The Netherlands titled the resolution as a "landmark text" which "clearly acknowledges the fact that conflict can lead to increased food insecurity, and recognized the need to break the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity" (UNSC 2018b, 2). The Netherlands stressed the importance of early warning and the briefing to be conducted by the Secretary General "whenever situations occur where people are severely food insecure as a consequence of war" (UNSC 2018b, 2). The UK reiterated the importance of early warning and stated that it "look[s] forward to more regular reporting on conditions within the context of country-specific situations" (UNSC 2018b, 3). France did the same by stating: "Perhaps most importantly, the text makes it clear that the Council must be prepared to respond in order to prevent famine caused by conflict. In line with the resolution, we encourage the Secretary-General to be proactive in warning the Council about such conditions so that it can respond. In that regard, we look forward to more regular and continuous reporting on famine conditions within the context of country-specific situations" (UNSC 2018b, 3).

Even though the draft resolution was submitted by Côte d'Ivoire, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States; Russia gave particular credit to the Netherlands for coordinating and facilitating the negotiations and the eventual adoption of the resolution (UNSC 2018b, 3). The Russian delegate stated the following: "We have noted our partners' professionalism and constructive approach to problem-solving and finding consensus-based language for a number of delegations' most sensitive issues. We are grateful for their willingness to consider the priorities and concerns of all delegations during the course of a quite complex negotiation process, which has ultimately enabled us to achieve a balanced document supported by all Council members" (UNSC 2018b, 3). Here the effort by the Netherlands as norm entrepreneur, described in chapter 4, is once again displayed. The fact that Russia and China, who strongly opposed UNSC thematic engagement on food security, have in the end voted in favour of this resolution can be ascribed to the diplomatic skills of the Netherlands as norm entrepreneur, an important provision for UNSC non-permanent members to influence the UNSC, as described more elaborately in chapter 4.

UNSC Meeting 8379 on the conflict in Yemen took place in October 2018. The conflict in Yemen was the first country-situation in which Resolution 2417 is regularly referred to in UNSC meetings and is therefore an important document to analyse (Blok 2018, 4). Mark

Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator was invited to participate in the meeting and commenced it with a briefing on the situation in Yemen. He clearly framed his briefing in the context of Resolution 2417 on conflict and hunger, stating: "in line with our obligations under the Council's resolution, my briefing today focuses on the risk of famine" and "my assessment and advice to the Council is that there is now a clear and present danger of an imminent and great big famine engulfing Yemen" (UNSC 2018c, 2). The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden and Bolivia all referred to the importance of early warning by the UN and the obligation of the Secretary General to brief to the UNSC whenever a situation of food insecurity in armed conflict context occurs (UNSC 2018c, 4, 8, 12, 16). With this, these four countries stressed the importance of compliance with UNSC Resolution 2417 and therefore compliance to the new food security norm in the UNSC. The country representative from the Netherlands dedicated one third of his speech to the link between conflict and food security, stressing its role as a norm entrepreneur: "When the Council recognized the need to break the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food security with the adoption of resolution 2417 (2018), it also committed itself to action. The Council committed itself to addressing those mad-made crises by enforcing man-made solutions. The parties to the conflict must take immediate steps and it is up to the international community, including the Council, to make sure that they follow through. […] The parties must shoulder their responsibility. If not, the Council, bearing in mind its commitment laid down in resolution 2417 (2018), must consider further steps." (UNSC 2018c, 8-9). Both Poland and Sweden repeated the importance of UNSC action (UNSC 2018c, 10, 13).

In the interventions made during UNSC meeting 8379, several countries expressed praise for confirmative behaviour and/or disapproval for deviating from the new norm. This is a characteristic of the norm cascade stage of the norms life cycle theory. Mark Lowcock, The United Kingdom, Kuwait, The Netherlands, Russia, Ethiopia, Sweden, The United States and Bolivia all expressed their compliments and praise to the Special Envoy who works to mitigate the conflict and food security crisis in Yemen (UNSC 2018c, 5,6,9,10,11,13,15,16). At the same time, they condemned the violation of UNSC Resolution 2417 and the new food security norm. The United States representative, for example, stated: "The parties must adhere to their obligations under international law and recognize that damage to ports and other civilian infrastructure will further drive food insecurity. In that regard, we urge parties to consider all possible measures to further mitigate and reduce unnecessary suffering from the conflict" (UNSC 2018c, 15). The representative of the Netherlands expressed disapproval for deviating

from the norms and even suggests possible action against norm violators: "The parties must shoulder their responsibility. If not, the Council, bearing in mind its commitment laid down in resolution 2417 (2018), must consider further steps" (UNSC 2018c, 9). The Netherlands, as one of the norm entrepreneurs of food security, takes norm violation seriously and is researching steps to take (diplomatic) sanctions on actors who do not comply with the norm (Kaag 2019, 4).

5.2 NORM INTERNALISATION

The last stage of norm life cycle theory is norm internalisation: the complete acceptance of a norm. In case of norm internalisation, member states would be so accustomed to a norm that it is complied with automatically and almost taken for granted. Codification of the norm in international law is a characteristic of norm internalisation. In the context of the UNSC case study, norm internalisation would mean UNSC engagement with food security without political discussion.

Switzerland, also norm entrepreneur of food security, is proposing to adopt starvation as a war crime in a non-international armed conflict in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Kaag 2019,4). This reflects Switzerland's effort to further codify food security in the international security realm. The Netherlands supports this effort, but it is unlikely that such an amendment will be made soon (Kaag 2019, 3-4). This is mainly due to the reluctance of Russia and China to adopt food security into the UNSC's mandate, as mentioned in chapter 5.1. Both countries will likely be even more reluctant to adopt starvation as a war crime in the statutes of the International Criminal Court (Kaag 2019, 4). The Chinese and Russian reluctance to adopt the norm.

UNSC engagement with food security is still debated regularly within the UNSC, as the interventions in UNSC meeting 8379 show, and it is not yet common practise for norm violators to be sanctioned or corrected by the UNSC. The fact that The Netherlands is researching ways to impose consequences to non-compliance with UNSC Resolution 2417 and that Switzerland has difficulties finding support for their proposed statute amendment proves that food security is not yet an internalised norm within the global community, or more specifically to this case study, within the UNSC.

It can be concluded that international socialisation with the new food security norm is occurring and that food security is continuously being discussed within the context of the UNSC. During

UNSC meetings, almost all country delegates express their praise for upholding the new food security norm and their disapproval for norm violation. Furthermore, there are several countries trying to impose (diplomatic) sanctions on norm violators. These are all signs of the norm cascade stage of norm life cycle theory. The presence of contestation and political discussion on the new food security norm, however, prove that norm internalisation has not yet occurred. Final conclusions will be drawn in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION

International institutions like the United Nations can only stay relevant if they adapt themselves to the ever-changing norms and values in the world, or even better if they contribute to and shape these changing norms. The academic literature shows how the theoretical framework in which international relations occur and the discourse that the international community and the United Nations employ have changed drastically over the course of history. Different approaches or food-regimes have occurred, from colonial times and structures, to the post WW II belief during the Cold War, that hunger could and should be eradicated with agricultural science (the green revolution). Most relevant for this thesis is the so-called third food regime, that emerged in the 1990s, where international food security starts to overlap with international trade and human rights regimes. It is during this food regime that the UNSC becomes a relevant actor in the realm of food security.

Academic literature stipulates different types of food security-conflict relations as they occur in civil and communal conflicts, or come to existence when price shocks are cause or result of conflicts. More broadly, academic literature shows how from a world where security was seen in a traditional realist perspective - where only state-security was considered relevant - the international community adapted to consider human security - a more individual approach to security, like food security - as determining the state of security in the world. This of course had consequences for the United Nations in general and more specifically the Security Council, as the pre-eminent global body when it comes to maintaining international peace and security. Whether food security has become an accepted part of the responsibility of the UNSC is therefore a reflection of food security becoming an accepted part of the responsibility of actors mandated with maintaining global peace and stability.

A new analytical approach to the emergence of food security as a norm is the use of the norm life cycle theory in this thesis. This theory enables us to analyse and differentiate in detail between several stages of a norm life cycle and so helps to come to conclusions on where and in which stage the norm acceptance of food security is.

 The first stage of norm life cycle theory entails norm emergence, where norm entrepreneurs promote the acceptance of a new norm, in this case UNSC engagement with food security. There are two important norm entrepreneurs in this case study: UN agencies, offices, funds and programmes (Finnemore and Sikkink describe these type of entrepreneurs as international

institutions) and UNSC member states, specifically The Netherlands and Switzerland. The UN agencies, offices, funds and programmes drew the attention of the UNSC to food security in 2017 and pressed for action with their research, letters, press conference and Arria-formula meeting, creating an urgency for the UNSC to engage with food security. The Netherlands and Switzerland simultaneously worked as norm entrepreneurs by promoting UNSC engagement with food security, organising several events stressing the importance of this, circulating research in the form of policy papers and even setting UNSC engagement as a key priority of their UNSC presidency (in case of The Netherlands).

The tipping point of food security as a global norm was reached with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2417, where all members of the UNSC voted in favour of the resolution. The geo-political importance of the permanent five UNSC members can be considered a critical mass of states as described by Finnemore and Sikkink and food security as a norm has therefore reached the second stage of norm life cycle theory: norm cascade. Further engagement with the topic is continuously occurring in the context of UNSC meetings and further efforts by The Netherlands and Switzerland to codify the new food security norm in international law and to research possible sanctions for norm violators, these are further indicators that food security as a norm is currently in the norm cascade stage. UNSC engagement with food security is still debated fervently in a political context and the likeliness of a swift codification of the norm is very little. This indicates that food security as a norm is not yet complied with automatically and therefore the last stage of the norm life cycle theory, norm internalization, has not yet occurred.

Taking all these findings into account, an answer to my research question - can food security be considered a global norm - can be formulated. Food security has indeed been accepted as a global norm because the first two stages of the norm life cycle theory, norm emergence and norm cascade have occurred and a tipping point, in which a critical mass of states accept the norm, has been reached. Food security as a global norm has not been internalised however; a stage that could possibly be reached if the UNSC imposes sanctions on non-compliance with the norm or further codification occurs. Norms life cycle theory has added to the academic literature on food security because it permits an analytical differentiation to the question in which extend food security can be considered a global norm. Future research could look into other global arenas engaging with food security, to have a more inclusive scope of the international community and into the role that NGOs have played in promoting food security as a global norm.

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