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Armed Forces in the Arab World: A comparative historical analysis of the role of the military in the Arab Spring

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Armed Forces in the Arab World

A comparative historical analysis of the role of the military in the Arab Spring

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Abbreviations

CHA	Comparative Historical Analysis
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MSSD	Most Similar System Design
NDP	National Democratic Party (Egypt)
SCAF	Supreme Council of Armed Forces
US	United States

Introduction

Context

On the 23rd of November 2014, the first free and fair parliamentary elections were held in Tunisia since the country gained independence in 1956. Today, Tunisia is considered to be the youngest democracy of the world, as well as the first Arab country that is classified as a free country according to Freedom House (2015) rankings. Au contraire, Egypt was just recovering in 2014 from a coup d'état led by the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. This coup led to the resignation of President Morsi, followed by new presidential elections in the same year. Nevertheless, since el-Sisi was the winning candidate, becoming the new authoritarian president of Egypt, one could question the fairness of these elections.

Although both Tunisia and Egypt have been subject to the Arab Spring one finds entirely different outcomes in both countries. Given the similarity¹ between the countries with respect to culture, history, economy and politics, and the presence of similar conditions for mobilization, one might wonder how this revolution played out differently in each country.² Even though the success of a revolution depends on favorable political, economic and social preconditions, the support of the armed forces is an overarching prerequisite. Interestingly, whereas the army refrained from politics in the case of Tunisia – contributing to the establishment of a contested democracy, the Egyptian armed forces dominated the regime transition, which ended with a military coup that established the authoritarian military regime in Egypt today. Since hardly any revolution can succeed without the support of a country's armed forces, this thesis will examine the role of the armed forces during and after the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia.

This research will combine the thought-provoking thesis of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) on inclusive and extractive institutions with Barany's (2016) study on the military's importance for the success of a revolution. Then, the thesis will build on Stepan's (2012) premise that the nature of civil-military relations influences the transition to inclusive institutions. Consequently, this thesis will consider the Arab Spring to be a critical juncture and take the military as an explanatory variable. It will discuss how the institutional set-up of the military shaped civil-military relations. Then, the research will examine the military's response to the Arab Spring, as well as the path both countries were set on posterior to the Arab Spring. Therefore, the following research question will be examined: "Why did the

¹ This will be elaborated on in chapter two.

² For the Arab Spring: all countries involved have different outcomes.

Arab Spring lead to the rise of inclusive institutions in Tunisia, and the strengthening of extractive institutions in Egypt?'. As a result of this research' emphasis on the history, encompassing culture and politics of each country as well, an interdisciplinary approach towards the role of the military institution will be taken, shedding light on the civil-military relations that influenced the course of the Arab Spring. Ultimately, this thesis aims to show that a historical approach to contemporary political analysis enables one to understand the course of the Arab Spring better.

Methodology and Research Design

This thesis will collect data in a combination of secondary and primary sources. Considering that the matter at hand is inadequately researched, contrasting different contexts and subsequently deducing from primary and secondary sources enable one to shed light on the limits of general theories. Therefore, a Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA) is the most suitable methodology to conduct this research. CHA enables social scientists to examine and shed light on complicated and relevant social issues by applying theory to cases exposed to diverse circumstances, to test the theoretical propositions (Lange, 2013, p. 2).

The two countries have been selected based on the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD). Following the MSSD, the cases share many important characteristics. Nevertheless, they differ in the phenomenon the research seeks to assess (Anckar, 2008, p. 389). The case selection is thus based on similar independent variables, to control for a wide variety of factors. First, both Tunisia and Egypt were subjected to the Arab Spring. Second, the countries have a shared history, in particular resulting from being former European colonies, shaping both countries' path after gaining their independence. Third, both countries were under authoritarian rule since their independence. Fourth, concerning their economic situation, both countries have been classified as lower middle-income countries for the last decade (World Bank, 2019). Fifth, both countries have a similar Human Development Index, rated between 0.700 – 0.799 (Human Development Index Report, 2019). Last, both Tunisia and Egypt are Arab countries as well as majority Muslim countries. Yet, the selected cases do vary with respect to the military institution. This independent variable will help us explain the variation in our dependent variable, namely the transition to inclusive institutions. In this case, the Arab Spring contributed to the rise of inclusive institutions in Tunisia, and the strengthening of extractive institutions in Egypt.

Outline of Chapters

This thesis contains five chapters. It will start off with a theoretical framework, discussing inclusive institutions, critical junctures, the role of the military institutions and the Arab Spring. The second chapter covers the first case study on Tunisia. Subsequently, the third chapter will cover the case study on Egypt. In the final chapter, a comparison between Tunisia and Egypt will be provided to answer this thesis' research question. Ultimately, the thesis will finish off with a conclusion in which the main findings of the research will be discussed.

Chapter 1: Critical Junctures and Armed Forces in the MENA Region

Theoretical Framework

1.1 On Inclusive Institutions

For Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), inclusive institutions need to meet two requirements. First, political power must be centralized. If a state is not centralized, there will be disorder which is a disadvantageous environment for investment and innovation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 80). Second, institutions need to be pluralistic as well as accountable. Pluralistic institutions allocate power in society, and subject it to constraints, meaning that the political power lies in the hands of a plurality of groups (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 80). Moreover, according to Acemoglu and Robinson, political and economic institutions have a synergistic relationship, meaning that extractive economic institutions naturally follow extractive political institutions (2012, p. 81). Further, extractive political institutions consolidate power in the hands of the elite who have no restrictions to exercise their power. Consequently, the economic institutions are often formed in such a way that the elite can benefit most and extract resources from the rest of society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 81). Another interesting insight offered by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) is the virtuous and vicious cycle. Whereas a virtuous cycle co-occurs with inclusive institutions, creating positive feedback expanding and strengthening inclusive institutions, a vicious cycle co-occurs with extractive institutions, generating negative feedback loops impeding progress (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, pp. 364-431).

Similarly, Rossignoli and Balestri (2018) identify inclusive institutions as the “...the rules, procedures and norms that not only maximize participation in decision-making but make it more rewarding for the public decision and benefit, by including more people in the political and economic life” (p. 217). Rossignoli and Balestri (2018) thus mainly shed light on the pluralistic requirement as follows from the definition of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). Additionally, Rossignoli and Balestri (2018) eloquently explain how a democratic regime implies the achievement of extensive participation by the public, entailing that democratization is closely connected to enhanced institutional inclusiveness (p. 217).

1.2 On Critical Junctures

Whereas the previous paragraph elaborated on the importance of inclusive institutions, this paragraph explains how a transition to inclusive institutions can take place. For this, the thesis will utilize the concept of critical junctures. Critical junctures are nothing new and

have been used over the years in order to explain institutional changes and outcomes (Marzo, 2019, p. 918). According to Pierson (2004), a political juncture can be considered to be “critical” because they involve inexorable institutional arrangements (p. 134). Following this line of thought, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) also explain that shifts from extractive to inclusive institutions can take place once critical junctures happen and succeed. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) identify critical junctures as “...a major event or confluence of factors disturbing the existing economic or political balance in society” (p. 101). On the other hand, Brady and Collier (2010) define a critical juncture as “... a specific historical period in which particular political choices, or the emergence of a particular historical alternative, strongly predispose a given case to follow one path of change, and not others. The critical juncture can alternatively be viewed as involving a high degree of agency, or strong structural determinism” (p. 323). Similar to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Brady and Collier (2010) thus emphasize the double-edged sword aspect of critical junctures. Whereas critical junctures can break the cycle of extractive institutions and give rise to inclusive institutions – what Brady and Collier (2010) refer to as agency – they can also backlash and strengthen the emergence of extractive institutions. The latter can be seen as a form of structural determinism (pp. 323-324).

Since critical junctures coincide with a distinctive institutional set-up of a country, one needs to take path dependency into account. Brady and Collier (2010) as well as Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) assign importance to path dependence as a causal mechanism when considering critical junctures. Brady and Collier (2010) define path dependence as “...a pattern of causation in which events or processes at one point in time strongly constrain subsequent events or processes” (p. 343). Path dependence is important as it could explain why similar conditions leading to the outbreak of a critical juncture can lead to a myriad of outcomes. It means that the same critical juncture affecting different countries – each country on its unique path – can lead to different paths. Although this contribution enriches our knowledge vis-à-vis the transition to inclusive institutions, it makes one also wonder whether some countries are condemned to never make this transition as a result of path dependency.

1.3 On the Arab Spring as a Critical Juncture

Prior to 2010, scholars of democratization and revolution avoided the MENA region (Holmes, 2019, p. 7). However, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2010, the tables are turned. The Arab Spring involved revolutions that were constitutional in their inception, aimed at implementing greater institutional change and improving the relationship between

the state and the citizens by calling for personal dignity and a more responsive government (Butenshon, 2015, p. 114). Consequently, the Arab Spring can be considered to be a critical juncture as it was a revolution that caused a disruption of the old extractive economic and political institutions and called for the installment of new inclusive institutions.

Whereas in Tunisia and Egypt the regimes were toppled with a nonviolent approach, the protests that had spread to Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria were more violent (Massoud et al., 2019, p. 429). When considering the aftermaths of the Arab Spring today, one finds a contested democracy in Tunisia, a military authoritarian regime. Although the Arab Spring played out differently in each country, many scholars argue that all countries shared a common foundation that led to the outbreak of these revolutions in the first place (Arjomand, 2015, p. 54). So far, scholars have mainly shed light on political, economic and social grievances that contributed to the eruption of the Arab Spring. While certain factors such as high unemployment rates, rising food prices, a youth bulge, cuts in subsidies, corruption and lack of freedom undeniably contribute to rising dissatisfaction in a certain country and thus increase the possibility of the outbreak of a revolution, they do not help one understand the different outcomes in each country.

1.4 On the Role of the Military in State Building and Civil-Military Relations

Given the importance of a ‘successful’ critical juncture for the transition to inclusive institutions, the military – that is said to be critical for the outcome of a revolution – has not found a place in current literature so far. Yet, the military has been researched various times in relation to state building and institutionalization. Michael Roberts (1950) proposed the military revolution hypothesis, which connected a change in military strategy to European state building. More specifically, Roberts (1950) claimed that some major changes in the military strategy of European countries in the 16th and 17th century brought about lasting changes for the state and its society, such as the restructuring of institutions. Nevertheless, Roberts’ thought-provoking hypothesis vis-à-vis the role of the military still appears to be specific to European state building, meaning that the military revolution does not apply to the extra Western world (Barua, 2013, p. 2).

When considering the role of the armed forces in state building in post-colonial societies, many differences between military institutions and civil-military relations stem from the aftermath of the achievement of independence (Willis, 2012, p. 82). Following the extensive militarization of the so-called Third World since the 1950s, many scholars adhering to the modernity theory argued that the military would have an important and positive role on

the political development of a country (Tilly, 1990, p. 217; Daalder, 1962). Similarly, Halpern (1963) argued that the armed forces could serve as the vanguards of socioeconomic and political development of a state. However, Huntington (1968) claimed that the military institution simply became the most powerful institution in the Third World as a result of the weak political institutions, since the latter need the help of the military to ensure their interest (pp. 192-264).

When studying the role of the military institution in critical junctures, Barany (2016) explains that the outcome depends on whether the military institution decides to remain loyal to the regime in power or side with the people and stand up against the regime. Barany (2016) claims that “No institution matters more to a state’s survival than its military, and no revolution within a state can succeed without the support or at least the acquiescence of its armed forces” (Barany, 2011, p. 24). Barany (2016) delves deeper by considering four spheres that influence the response of the military institution: the military itself, the state, society and external factors (p. 35).³ Each sphere is subdivided in different points. Military factors entail the attributes, conditions and composition of the militia. This will be assessed by considering the internal cohesion of the militia, whether the armed forces consist of professional soldiers or conscript, the army’s perception of the regime’s legitimacy and the army’s past conduct toward society (Barany, 2016, pp. 24-30). Differently, state factors encompass the state’s treatment and direction to the armed forces (Barany, 2016, pp. 30-35). This factor will be assessed by examining the regime’s treatment of the military and the directions of the regime to the military. Society factors focus on the society-army relationship, as well as the nature of the critical juncture. This will be measured by the composition, size and popularity of the uprising, as well as the degree of fraternization (Barany, 2016, pp. 35-37). Finally, external factors refer to the international environment and relations of a country. These last factors will be assessed by gauging the potential for foreign intervention, the foreign affairs of the country at hand, revolutionary diffusion as well as foreign exposure of military officers (Barany, 2016, pp. 37-39). Whereas Barany (2016) provides one with an excellent understanding of the military’s importance for the success of a critical juncture, he fails to discuss how the military influences the aftermath of a ‘successful’ critical juncture. For this, Crony explains that there is a need to consider the historical context carefully, which established the previous regime and the civil-military relations in the first place (p. 2).

³ Appendix I contains a comprehensive description and definition of all factors used for his research.

Concerning civil-military relations, Huntington (1957) claims that a professional military institution is politically neutral and thus excluded from politics. This way, the military institution is subjected to civilian control, meaning that "...the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by a civilian authority" (Huntington, 1957, p. 27). This entails that the military needs to serve the state while being compatible with the political objectives of the state. Moreover, civilian control can be divided in subjective and objective civilian control. On the one hand, "subjective civilian control refers to civilianizing the army, making them the mirror of the state" (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). Subjective civilian control is thus identified with the specific interests of a powerful civilian group (Huntington, 1957, p. 80). On the other hand, "objective civilian control refers to the militarization of the military, making them the tool of the state" (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). An enlightening contribution to civil-military relations is offered by Stepan (2012), who argued that the nature of civil-military relations shape democratic transitions (p. 94). According to Stepan (2012), the chances for the rise of successful inclusive institutions are enhanced if there is no propensity for civilians to relinquish the right to rule to the military (p. 94). The latter refers to civilian control, as explained by Huntington (1957).

Following the theory, this research will embed Barany's (2016) hypothesis on the importance of the military for the outcome of a revolution and Stepan's (2012) premise on the nature of civil-military relations for the transition to inclusive institutions in the historical context of both countries. Although in both Tunisia and Egypt the military contributed to the success of the revolution⁴, civilian control in Tunisia and the lack thereof in Egypt led to the rise of inclusive institutions in the former, and the strengthening of extractive institutions in the latter.

⁴ The success of the revolution in this case refers to the fall of the regime.

Chapter 2: Tunisia

Historical Background of the Military Institution

While in many postcolonial societies the military started to play a prominent role in domestic politics after having gained independence, Tunisia was an exception to this pattern (Willis, 2012, 81). Three critical factors shaped the apolitical military in Tunisia: the creation of the Republic of Tunisia establishing the civil-military relations, the security environment in the Maghreb and the regime's suspicion of the possibility of a military coup in southern Tunisia.

As a French colony, Tunisia did not have an active army (Bonhomme, 2018). Yet, with the establishment of the Republic of Tunisia under president Bourguiba, the state military was also created. Although the rural anti-colonial militia, *fellaghas*, played an essential role in the achievement of independence, they were deliberately excluded from the new state military (Willis, 2012, p. 86). Since Bourguiba decided that the military institution would be formally excluded from politics, the new military mainly consisted of former members of the French colonial army to ensure an apolitical ethos (Willis, 2012, p. 86). As a result, the balance of power between the military and civilians was entrenched in the hands of the civilians. Bourguiba's point of view for the institutional separation between the military and the country's new political structures was borne out by the experiences of other Arab states (Willis, 2012, pp. 87-88). There he saw that the military intermeddled in politics at the cost of other politicians and posed a significant threat to the well-being of the state (Willis, 2012, p. 86). When Bourguiba's fears were confirmed by two failed attempts with the help of the military to oust him in 1957 and 1962, Bourguiba stated in a speech in 1965 that "Members of the military are not free to have political opinions like other citizens," as they "...can use their weapons to impose solutions of their choosing" (Willis, 2012, p. 86). Subsequently, even the ministers of defense were replaced by civilian politicians, confirming the exclusion of the military from the party and the cabinet.

Consequently, Bourguiba restricted the military through controlling its finances, banning the military from founding or joining political parties, and even withholding their right to vote (Hills, 2016, p. 67). On paper, the sole purpose of the military was to safeguard and defend national territory from external attacks, as well as maintaining order during national crises (Hills, 2016, p. 67; Jebnoun, 2014, p. 299). However, in practice Bourguiba even undermined the military in the aforementioned tasks by setting limits to the size of the military and its funds. Bourguiba declared that these tasks could be completed by other forces

⁵ A guerrilla soldier or rebel fighting for independence (translated by author).

than the military, which led to the installment of a powerful internal security apparatus (Willis, 2012, p. 87). With respect to defending national territory, it even came to the point that Bourguiba put his trust in the former colonizer, France, to assist in the defense over the national military institution (Willis, 2012, p. 87).

Second, concerning the security environment in the Maghreb, Tunisia mainly feared internal threats in contrast to other MENA countries. Essentially, the Maghreb region was not directly subjected to the intensified Cold War political climate. As a result, Tunisia had friendly relations with the surrounding countries and with the West; the Tunisian army was even trained by the French and the Americans. Accordingly, in postcolonial Tunisian history one can only pinpoint two events in which the Tunisian national army was called to restore internal order, in 1978 and 1984, when the internal security forces proved incapable of dealing with such big popular demonstrations (Barany, 2011, p. 27). Yet, the armed forces detested taking such ‘police tasks’ upon them, as this is a waste of the army’s resources and – according to the army – merely a result of poor decision-making of the regime. Combined with a lack of direction to their role in assuring national security, distrust began to grow between the members of the armed forces and the Interior Ministry (Jebnoun, 2014, p. 300).

Last, the fear of internal threats was mainly rooted in the southern resentments against the regime. Even though Tunisian society is very homogenous, politically speaking it is divided between Secular and Islamist Tunisians. This divide is geographically also present, since most Seculars – who also supported the Bourguiba and the Ben Ali regime – tend to live in prosperous coastal cities. In contrast, the marginalized Islamist Tunisians tend to reside in the more impoverished areas in southern Tunisia (Ware, 1985, p. 12). When considering the division of the armed forces, generally the officer corps and other senior positions are filled by Tunisians from the Sahel (Barany, 2016, p. 136). Au contraire, the subordinate and middle ranks are recruited from the more deprived regions (Ware, 1985, p. 13). Since the southern regions were poorer, the regime mainly feared internal threats from this area. Combined with the fact that a major part of the military ranks originated from the same area, the regime had to find a balance between granting the military too much authority and disregarding it completely.

Subsequently, even when the Medical-Constitutional Coup took place, which was led by Major General Habib Ammar, the commander of the National Guard, the military leadership was not notified until it was a *fait accompli* (Jebnoun, 2014, p. 301). Some argued that this was a result of Ben Ali’s experience in the military and his fear that the military would halt the coup (Jebnoun, 2014, p. 301). Not surprisingly, with Ben Ali in power, the

exclusion of the military from politics continued. Since Tunisia was a police state at this point and Ben Ali himself had a security mentality, security agencies overshadowed the national armed forces. These security agencies were politically more influential and received more funding (Barany, 2011, p. 27). Ben Ali also founded the National Security Council, which was supposed to devise defense policies to safeguard Tunisia's internal and external security (Jebnoun, 2014, p. 301). Interestingly, the army was also excluded from participating in this Council. However, by pouring all funding into the security forces, Ben Ali also indirectly put himself at a disadvantage. The military did not trust him, nor did they receive sufficient funding to upgrade their military equipment in the case that they needed to take action (Jebnoun, 2014, p. 302). As will be discussed in the following paragraphs, the regime's neglect of the military turned out to be fatal for Ben Ali (Hill, 2016, p. 82).

Factors Influencing the Military's Response in the Arab Spring

Military Factors

Due to the apolitical nature of the Tunisian military and the dominance of the security forces, the state military was not involved in the uprisings (Barany, 2011, p. 26). Despite the homogeneity regarding ethnicity, religion and tribalism – on which it scores 0 as one can see in table 1A – there exists a divide in political preferences. This division is mainly between Secularist – both Bourguiba and Ben Ali were secularists – and Islamist Tunisians (Ware, 1985, p. 12). However, this divide between officer corps and other senior positions filled by Tunisians from predominant Secularist regions while the middle ranks are recruited from the prevalent Islamist regions does not harm the internal unity and cohesion. In contrast, the military is seen as a national institution (Barany, 2016, p. 136). This is also a result of a strong sense of national identity among Tunisians (Arjomand, 2015, p. 68). Moreover, the army is also based on a conscript system, which strengthens the army's unity and internal cohesion (Baranay, 2016, p. 47). Similarly, no divisions between officers nor between elite and regular units hampered the military institution (See table 1A). However, the split between the army and security forces was very much present (See table 1A). In addition to receiving more funding and having a more politically influential role, the security and intelligence apparatus outnumbered the military institution as well: whereas the military comprised 35.000 soldiers, the security forces comprised between 130.000 and 150.000 men (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 22).

With the wave of unrest continuing longer than Ben Ali and his advisors anticipated, Ben Ali urged the police as well as the security forces to keep the protesters in check (Barany, 2011, p. 26). As soon as Ben Ali realized that the regime could not adequately defend itself against the Arab spring with only the police and security forces, he unleashed mobs and his Presidential Guard (Barany, 2011, p. 26). Simultaneously, he also asked the General of the national army, Rachid Ammar, to prepare the national troops to back the regime. However, due to the lack of support for the regime, General Ammar did not comply and denied the regime the support of the army. General Ammar decided to maintain internal unity of the armed forces and prioritize this over supporting the regime. In addition, most conscript are from the more economically depressed areas, and thus share the grievances of the protesters (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 22). Moreover, unlike the security forces, the national armed forces did not have any interest in sustaining the regime as they did not benefit in any way from the corrupt system (Barany, 2011, p. 31).

Table 1: Interpretation of Numbers

Scale	Meaning
0	Irrelevant
1	Of trivial importance
2	Of little importance
3	Somewhat important
4	Quite important
5	Very important
6	Decisive

Source: Barany, 2016

Table 1A: Military Factors Affecting the Army's Response in Tunisia

Armed Forces' Internal Cohesion	2
A. Ethnic/ religious/ tribal splits	0
B. Generational divisions	1
C. Divisions between officers	0
D. Divisions between elite vs regular units	0
E. Splits between army and other branches of security services	5
F. Sociopolitical divisions	0
Professional Soldiers vs Conscripts	5
General's Perception of Regime Legitimacy	5
Army's Past Conduct toward Society	2
Total	20

Source: Barany, 2016

State Factors

The regime's favoring of the security forces did not benefit its relationship with the military institution (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 21). As mentioned before, the regime restricted the military

by controlling its finances, also shown by their military equipment (See table 1B). In addition, the missions that the military was assigned were perceived as ‘police tasks’, such as suppressing protests. Generally speaking, regimes that order such tasks from their military, are more likely to lose their generals’ loyalty (Barany, 2016, p. 32). Moreover, the national armed forces resented the privileged security forces and National Guard that also overshadowed them (Barany, 2016, p. 137). When considering this in light of the uprisings, one finds that the military was left out and did not receive any orders at this point, even though the demonstrations spread rapidly across the country (See table 1B, point 2). This only happened as soon as Ben Ali realized that the security and intelligence forces were unable to respond to the evolving situation adequately. As a result, there was a need for the security and armed forces to suddenly cooperate and quickly respond. However, the lack of cohesion between the national armed forces and the politically influential security forces impeded the efficiency of the response of the regime, undermining its authority (Hill, 2016, p. 67; Barany, 2016, p. 131).

Despite being neglected by the regime, the Tunisian military was ranked as one of the most professional forces of the Arab World (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 21). In contrast to the regime and its security forces, the military institution was free of corruption and cronyism (Lutterbeck, 2011, p. 21). Consequently, when Ben Ali turned to the military as a last resort for his survival, he was doomed. Unlike the security and intelligence apparatus, the military did not have any interest in the survival of the regime as a result of its deprived status and contempt for the corruption under Ben Ali (Barany, 2016, p. 137). According to some news sources, General Ammar even told Ben Ali to leave because “...the army is the guarantor of the revolution” (Barany, 2016, p. 137; Le Monde, 2011).

Table 1B: State Factors Affecting the Army’s Response in Tunisia

Regime’s Treatment of the Military	4
A. Taking care of the personnel’s material welfare	3
B. Taking care of the army	2
C. Appropriateness of missions	3
D. The general’s professional autonomy and decision-making authority	2
E. Fairness in top appointments	1
F. The military’s prestige and public esteem	3
Regime Directions to the Military	1
Total	19

Source: Barany, 2016

Societal Factors

With the demonstrations spreading rapidly across Tunisia, more and more people began to participate in the protests (See table 1C). Given the violence unleashed upon the demonstrators by the regime's marionettes, Ben Ali's appeasing speeches to the public were counterproductive (Barany, 2016, p. 137). Even though the demonstrations were initially very peaceful, the public did not appreciate the brutal responses of Ben Ali's security apparatus (Barany, 2016, p. 137). Yet, given the clear institutional separation between the military and the politically influential security forces, the Tunisian population continued to perceive the national armed forces positively in light of the uprisings. The armed forces were not associated with the corrupt regime (Barany, 2016, pp. 137-138).

Moreover, the popularity of the uprising is unquestionable. What initially seemed to be an auspicious change after Bourguiba, developed into a corrupt competitive authoritarian system with Ben Ali serving five consecutive five-year terms in total (See table 1C). In addition, after approximately 25 years, there was no hope for positive political succession, as there were also rumors that the wife of Ben Ali, Laila, had her eyes on the presidency (Barany, 2016, p. 138). Since the primary purpose of the uprising was the call for inclusive institutions, benefitting the interests of the greater mass of society rather than merely the elite, the uprising got immense support from the population, as well as from the military institution (Arjomand, 2015, p. 54).

Table 1C: Societal Factors Affecting the Army's Response in Tunisia

Size, Composition and Nature of Protests	5
Popularity of the Uprising	3
Fraternization	2
Total	10

Source: Barany, 2016

External Factors

Tunisia has had strong links with the West since its independence (Hill, 2016, 51). Initially, Ben Ali was able to seize power in 1987 and oust Bourguiba by portraying his regime as a modernizing and democratizing force in contrast to the administration under Bourguiba (Hill, 2016, 48). Although the international environment was well-aware of the dark reality, Ben Ali also deterred international partners with the Islamic alternative that would take over the country if they would not support his regime (Jebnoun, 2014). With the outbreak of the uprisings, France's initial response was to contribute to the regime's survival (Willis, 2012, p. 333). However, with the intensification of the protests, and word getting out to the international community, France could not afford to back a dictator any longer (Willis, 2012,

p. 333). Moreover, as a result of the favorable relationship with the West, Ben Ali sent military officers to France and the United States (US) for training. Accordingly, army officers were exposed to the interpretation of civil-military relations in the West (See table 1D; Barany, 2016, p. 138).

Table 1D: External Factors Affecting the Army's Response in Tunisia

Potential for Foreign Intervention	0
Foreign Affairs	0
Revolutionary Diffusion	0
Foreign Exposure of Military Officers	2
Total	2

Source: Barany, 2016

The Role of the Armed Forces Posterior to the Arab Spring

With the overthrow of Ben Ali the 14th of January 2011, the military had the opportunity to interfere in Tunisian politics (Arjomand, 2015, p. 68). After all, the people held them in high esteem since they chose the side of the insurrectionists and turned their back to the regime. Yet, the national armed forces remained apolitical. Two reasons can be identified for this decision. First, due to the apolitical nature of the military since the establishment of the Republic of Tunisia, it was only natural for both the civilians and the military to maintain the institution's exclusion from politics. This also follows Stepan's (2012) premise that the less civilians are inclined to relinquish their power to the military, the better the chances are for transitioning to inclusive institutions. Second, as a result of aforementioned traditional civil-military relations, Tunisia has never had a 'military strongman'. Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali kept the military small and excluded from politics. Thus, the military continued to fulfil its role in protecting Tunisia from external threats – mainly with the many Libyan refugees as a result of the Arab Spring. Additionally, it safeguarded internal security during the power vacuum, by taking upon them police tasks since the people distrusted the police after its betrayal during the uprising (Stepan, 2012, p. 95).

Consequently, following Article 57 of the constitution, former president of the parliament Fouad Mebazaa was assigned interim presidency on January 15th, 2011 (Arjomand, 2015, p. 168). Simultaneously, the Constituent Assembly of Tunisia was created to revise the constitution and prepare Tunisia for its new democratic path. In December 2011, Marzouki was elected by this body as the new interim president ("Tunisian activist", 2011). The Constituent Assembly was also occupied with the preparations for the first nationwide democratic elections, that eventually took place in 2014, with Essebsi becoming president.

Thus, Tunisia finds itself in a virtuous cycle, generating positive feedback loops ensuring that inclusive institutions persist.

Chapter 3: Egypt

The Armed Forces and Civil-Military Relations

Since the 19th century, the Egyptian army was a driving force behind the emergence of a new social and political system (Ralston, 1990, p. 79). When considering Egyptian politics today, the military still appears to be at the forefront. Yet, two factors shaped contemporary Egyptian armed forces. First, the crucial role of the military in the establishment of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Second, external threats formed the military institution, in particular since Egypt was involved in the Cold War.

Egypt has been under British control since the beginning of the 20th century (Bishku, 2013, p. 57). Britain granted Egypt full independence with the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. However, in reality a puppet government with king Faruk at the forefront, backed by the British authorities, was installed (Bishku, 2013, p. 58). As a result of this, anti-imperialist movements began to form, some of them wishing to build an Islamic State, and others who preferred a republic. Despite their different views of a new Egypt, the two parties cooperated. Consequently, King Faruk was overthrown in 1952 with a military coup. The new republic was led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, who owed his position to the armed forces (Ashour, 2015, p. 10). As a result, Egypt is the example of a post-colonial society in which the military maintained its crucial role since its independence (Holmes, 2019, p. 19). In addition, similar to other postcolonial societies, Egypt inherited the colonial institutions that were in place. Many of the military leaders had served in the armies that were run by the British authorities. Therefore, the creation of a powerful military can be considered to be a legacy of the colonial period.

Second, the fear that Egypt was in danger loomed large. The end of the colonial subjugation did not mean the end of foreign intervention. Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 led to another crisis with the invasion of British, French and Israeli forces. This fear combined with Egypt's involvement in the Israeli-Palestine conflict, triggered the militarization of the Egyptian armed forces. Moreover, Egypt gained the support of the Soviet Union, which supplied military aid to Nasser as well (Ambrose, 2010, p. 58). These events all contributed to Egypt challenging the main objectives⁶ of the US in the MENA region during the Cold War. As a result, the Egypt-US relationship was antagonistic under Nasser.

⁶ The three main objectives were: containment towards the Soviet Union, securing the oil-supply and protecting the survival of Israel.

While the military institution played a prominent role during the 1950s and 1960s, its political importance began to decline in the 1970s (Harb, 2013). According to Nasser, the political involvement of the military had undermined its efficiency on the battle ground (Cook, 2007, p. 63). Egypt's defeat against Israel in 1967, is commonly considered as the event that stimulated demilitarization of Egyptian politics (Cook, 2007, p. 63). Consequently, Nasser claimed that there is a need to reconstruct the armed forces into an effective fighting force, to fulfil its primary task – protecting Egypt from internal and external threats⁷ (Cook, 2007, p. 63). The military institution accepted a subordinate role in the political system (Harb, 2003). In return, the military gained prominence as an economic actor (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 36).

After the passing of Nasser, Anwar Sadat seized power in 1970. Under Sadat, a diplomatic shift took place, this time in favor of the US. The first step towards reconciliation with the US was the expulsion of Russian soldiers in 1972. This meant that Egypt was turning away from the East and moving towards the West (Holmes, 2019, p. 20). The second step was the signing of the Camp David Accords⁸ (Bishku, 2013, p. 58). This peace agreement between Israel and Egypt made Egypt fall within the US' sphere of influence as well as a non-NATO ally. Moreover, the US became the main supporter of the Egyptian military, providing \$2 billion annually in aid, as well as training to the Egyptian military (Holmes, 2019, p. 20). As a result, the professionalization of the armed forces continued, leading to the military institution gaining political prominence again. However, this time, the army's role changed from direct ruler to an "arbitrary army," meaning that the military influenced politics behind the scenes (Perlmutter, 1981, pp. 10-38).

In 1981, Hosni Mubarak seized power after the assassination of Sadat (Vatikiotis, 1991, pp. 438-439). Mubarak managed to rule until the outbreak of the Arab Spring by rigging elections continuously (Cole, 2013, p. 74). Mubarak knew that only the military could remove him from power, thus he sought to counter-weight its power by installing security forces. Simultaneously, Mubarak knew that he did not have sufficient public legitimacy, therefore he relied on the military since this institution did have public legitimacy (Mumtaz, 2011). This was done by assuring its loyalty through extensive military spending (Cole, 2013, p. 74). Egypt continued to be ruled by a close elite, consisting of Mubarak, the ruling party NDP, security forces and the military (Mumtaz, 2011; Shahin, 2012, p. 51).

⁷ In this case, Egyptian land was confiscated as a result of the defeat.

⁸ The Camp David Accords took place after a failed attempt to win land – that was confiscated following Nasser's defeat in the Six Day War – back.

Factors Influencing the Military's Response in the Arab Spring

Military Factors

Although the Egyptian population is rather homogenous, Egypt is home to a sizeable Coptic Christian minority (Bishku, 2013, p. 58). Yet, since most Christians tend to not pursue a career in the military – one could argue that this a result of the glass ceiling that prevents them from advancement within the military – there is no Muslim-Christian tension that creates division within the military (Barany, 2016, p. 139). Consequently, the Egyptian army is a cohesive organization with no ethnoreligious divisions (See table 2A). However, concerning generational divisions, there is some tension between junior and senior officers, as senior officers are privileged and dominant compared to junior officers (See table 2A; Barany, 2016, p. 139). The senior positions are also known for having a prominent position in the political system with decision-making authority (Cook, 2007, p. 63).

The Egyptian army comprises a very national institution, as it is based on a system of conscription, of which the conscripts represent every region of the country (See table 2A). Conscription was already introduced under Muhammad Ali in the nineteenth century, to ensure homogenization and nationalization of the army (Cronin, 2014, p. 33).⁹ In addition, as the military is considered to be the protector of Egypt, as well as having upheld the illusion that the army and the people are 'one', the Egyptian army can mobilize the entire population in the name of nationalism (Holmes, 2019, p. 20). Moreover, conscription strengthens the army's unity and internal cohesion which is one of the most important components of the army's institutional interests (Barany, 2016, p. 47).

Yet, many scholars have questioned the professionalization of the Egyptian armed forces. Although it presents itself as a strong and professional force, it is bloated and based on Mubarak's patronage system (Barany, 2016, p. 140). As a result, it took the Egyptian armed forces a longer time to decide whether they would back the uprisings (See table 2A; Barany, 2011, p. 27). While the upper rank of the military sought to advance its position in the government, other soldiers helped the security forces to detain the protesters. However, when Mubarak ordered severe violence to be unleashed on the protestors, the military sided with the people and distanced itself from the regime (Barany, 2011, p. 32). This decision of Mubarak also was a confirmation of the loss of legitimacy (See table 2A). Moreover, the military leadership feared dispute as well as defection as a result of the generational divisions

⁹ Whereas at Muhammad Ali's time the Egyptian peasantry was forced to provide manpower for the army, today the duration of conscription depends on your level of education. For those with no education, conscription is for three years. Au contraire, those with only secondary education need to serve for one year (Barany, 2016, 139).

(Azzam, 2012, p. 3). The military generals decided that Mubarak had failed, and that the continuation of violence would damage the legitimacy of the military (Barany, 2011, p. 32).

Table 1: Interpretation of Numbers

Scale	Meaning
0	Irrelevant
1	Of trivial importance
2	Of little importance
3	Somewhat important
4	Quite important
5	Very important
6	Decisive

Source: Barany, 2016

Table 2A: Military Factors Affecting the Army's Response in Egypt

Armed Forces' Internal Cohesion	2
A. Ethnic/ religious/ tribal splits	0
B. Generational divisions	3
C. Divisions between officers	1
D. Divisions between elite vs regular units	2
E. Splits between army and other branches of security services	3
F. Sociopolitical divisions	0
Professional Soldiers vs Conscripts	5
General's Perception of Regime Legitimacy	4
Army's Past Conduct toward Society	2
Total	22

Source: Barany, 2016

State Factors

As discussed before in the historical background, the Arab Republic of Egypt was created by the military establishment. Consequently, the armed forces preserved a key pillar of the political system (See table 2B). Having obtained economic prominence in return for political disengagement in the 1970s – although this rapidly turned around again after the diplomatic shift with the US at the end of the 1970s – the armed forces have a substantial amount of political, economic, and social power under the regime (Holmes, 2019, p. 20). Owning approximately eighty-seven percent of Egypt's land and over one-third of state businesses and filling top state positions with ex-military officers, the armed forces' response to the uprisings came as a surprise (See table 2B).

However, one can identify the following reasons for the army's response. First, the putative successor, Gamal Mubarak, was loathed by the military. Gamel Mubarak, Hosni Mubarak's son, exploited his family's status to achieve economic success with his faction called "State entrepreneurs". In addition, Gamel would also become the first Egyptian

president without any military background (Holmes, 2019, p. 49). Given the regime's importance for the military's position in society as well as their stake in Egypt's economy¹⁰, Gamel was seen as a threat (Barany, 2016, p. 141). Second, in light of the rising youth unemployment, the armed forces feared youth alienation going hand in hand with the rise of Islamist radicalism (Barany, 2016, p. 141). This fear stemmed from the regime's and armed forces' rising prominence as they had turned their back to the Islamists in the 1950s. The third reason concerns the armed forces' aversion of the privileged security forces, similar to Tunisia's case (Barany, 2016, p. 141). And fourth, the most obvious reason that follows from the conscription system of the military: the conscripts have so many ties to the population at large that the majority of soldiers would never follow the order to shoot fellow Egyptians (Barany, 2016, p. 141).

Table 2B: State Factors Affecting the Army's Response in Egypt

Regime's Treatment of the Military	3
A. Taking care of the personnel's material welfare	2
B. Taking care of the army	3
C. Appropriateness of missions	4
D. The general's professional autonomy and decision-making authority	2
E. Fairness in top appointments	1
F. The military's prestige and public esteem	3
Regime Directions to the Military	2
Total	20

Source: Barany, 2016

Societal Factors

As the composition and nature of the protest expanded as a result of social networks and television, an increasing amount of people representing all segments of society joined the protests each day (See table 2C: Cottle, 2011, p. 648). According to a member of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), almost 15 million demonstrators participated (Shahin, 2012, p. 48).

When the military ceased to use force against the protesters and began to support the uprisings, the protesters' confidence in the military was rebuilt (Holmes, 2019, pp. 68-73). This transition went quite smoothly, as the military had always played a political role in the background, and was never directly associated with Mubarak, the NDP nor the government (Cook, 2011, p. 286). Consequently, soldiers received flowers and were asked to take pictures with the people, while shouting "The people and the army are one hand!" as well as other chants that confirmed the military's protection to the people (See table 2C; Barany,

¹⁰ The economic system and the liberal economic reforms in 1970's because of their political setback

2016, p. 142). Thus, the soldiers were well-received by the people, which put the men on the front lines at odds with those in charge at headquarters (Cook, 2011, p. 287).

Table 2C: Societal Factors Affecting the Army's Response in Egypt

Size, Composition and Nature of Protests	5
Popularity of the Uprising	3
Fraternization	4
Total	12

Source: Barany, 2016

External Factors

Although there was no real potential for foreign intervention, one would have expected the US to manipulate the situation in Egypt, since both the Egyptian regime and the armed forces had strong ties with the US (See table 2D). Until the outbreak of the Arab Spring, all US administrations have turned a blind eye to Egypt's dictatorship – choosing stability and a secure US ally in the region over any kind of political change. Thus, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring in Egypt, *prima facie*, Obama wanted to support the protesters fighting for freedom. Nevertheless, supporting them would also mean putting the US at risk, as it would send out the message to other autocratic allies that the US abandons its 'friends' quite rapidly (Lizza, 2011). Moreover, strategically speaking, the US also believed that it could jeopardize Egypt's collaboration on important regional issues connected to Israel and terrorism (Lizza, 2011). Additionally, the US also knew that the Egyptian constitution includes a clause stating that a new presidential election should take place within sixty days. Given the constraints concerning freedom of association under Mubarak, no successful political parties could form within these sixty days, and it would end with Islamists seizing power in Egypt, perhaps US' main fear (Lizza, 2011). However, as the revolution developed negatively for Mubarak, and Mubarak requested the military to fire at the protesters, the Obama administration concluded that Mubarak was no longer a strategic asset to support (Barany, 2016, 142). Consequently, Obama communicated the US' distrust in Mubarak to the Egyptian generals – specifically asking them not to fire at the protestors (Lizza, 2011). That was a decisive factor for the Egyptian military, since it received the confirmation that whatever credit Mubarak's regime still had, was shattered, even in the eyes of the US (See table 2D).

In addition, as mentioned before, the revolution in Tunisia was an inspiration for the protesters, since everything was broadcasted on television as well as social media. For the army generals, this meant a continuous confrontation with the new developments taking place in Tunisia, mainly benefitting the protesters. As soon as Ben Ali's fall reached the generals,

they were shaken (Barany, 2016, p. 142). Following the rationale that army officers confronted with a nearby regime topple are more prone to support the revolution, it did not take long before the officers turned their back to Mubarak (Barany, 2016, p. 142). The overthrow of Ben Ali thus contributed to the success of the Egyptian uprising (See table 2D; Cole, 2013, p. 76). Regarding exposure of military officers, not many Egyptian officers received education in the Western world (See table 2D). According to Barany, no Arab military is more closed to the outside world than the Egyptian army (2016, p. 142). In fact, Egyptian officers are prohibited to have any contact with officers being trained in the US (Barany, 2016, p. 142).

Table 2D: External Factors Affecting the Army's Response in Egypt

Potential for Foreign Intervention	0
Foreign Affairs	3
Revolutionary Diffusion	3
Foreign Exposure of Military Officers	1
Total	7

Source: Barany, 2016

The Role of the Armed Forces Posterior to the Arab Spring

Even though the Egyptian military safeguarded the success of the revolution leading to the resignation of Mubarak, it did not lead to a successful transition to inclusive institutions. Two reasons can be identified for this. Based on the historical background and Egypt's civil-military relations, one finds that the military played an important political role, therefore being an influential power. This aspect mainly had to do with the fact that the military was known as the guardian of Egypt's independence (Azzam, 2012, p. 2). Moreover, military men have always held the presidency (Stepan, 2012, p. 94). As a result, there was no "civilian control", as defined by Huntington (1958). Consequently, when referring back to Stepan's (2012) premise that the less civilians are inclined to relinquish their power to the military, the better the chances are for transitioning to inclusive institutions, one finds the contrary applicable to Egypt. Here, civilians have always been inclined to relinquish power to the military. Second, due to the nature of the civil-military relations and the military siding with the protesters, civilians did not question the intentions of the military (Barany, 2011, p. 32). Thus, a great amount of power was put in the hands of the military, although it did not prioritize a successful transition to inclusive institutions, as follows from patterns posterior to the uprisings.

As soon as Mubarak resigned on the 10th of February 2011, the SCAF took control of the country (Barany, 2011, p. 32). The power vacuum was thus non-existent, since the power

was handed from Mubarak to the chairman of the SCAF, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who directly became the interim head of state. The new regime was therefore established by the military (Arjomand, 2015, p. 15). Subsequently, it was decided that elections will take place and a new constitution will be crafted (Arjomand, 2015, p. 15). With Morsi becoming the first democratically elected president in 2012, it appeared as if Egypt was headed towards the direction of the establishment of inclusive institutions. However, given that Morsi was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood – the Islamists that have been excluded since Egypt’s independence – this was in vain, and Morsi was deposed by a military coup led by General el-Sisi in 2013 (Sirgany & Yan, 2015). The coup was justified by claiming that the military would “...affirm the continuation of a peaceful popular pressure in all parts of the republic until the demands of the Egyptian revolution and the demands of all the Egyptians are attained”¹¹ (Kandil, 2012). Consequently, general el-Sisi won the following “elections”. Thus, Egypt exemplifies the vicious cycle as identified by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), which continuously generates negative feedback loops and prevents progress. In this case, the military continues to exploit its role as Egypt’s guardian, by stating that it is acting for the greater good, when it is essentially impeding the rise of inclusive institutions.

¹¹ Translated by author.

Chapter 4: Tunisia versus Egypt

Institutional Patterns and Civil-Military Relations

Both case studies showed a different pattern for military involvement and civil-military relations. Whereas the Arab Republic of Egypt owed its creation to the military, a state military was only established with the establishment of the Republic of Tunisia. For both cases, this left lasting consequences on the civil-military relations. For instance, both Tunisia and Egypt were governed through coup-proof techniques; however, each country devised this differently (Holmes, 2019, p. 73). In Tunisia, this took the form of the exclusion of the military from politics. As a result, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali refused to include the military into the structures of the ruling party. In contrast, the military in Egypt played a very prominent political, social and economic role, therefore being much more influential. Additionally, since the military was part of the regime, the regime did not per se fear the military as the *status quo* was also beneficial for them. Huntington's "civilian control" can only be found in Tunisia and not in Egypt.

Response to the Arab Spring

Yet, with the outbreak of the Arab Spring, both military institutions responded similarly and turned their back to the regime. For Tunisia, this does not come as a surprise since the military had little to lose with the fall of the regime. Moreover, Ben Ali's disregard for the military institution, contributing to rising dissatisfaction of the military with Ben Ali's regime, combined with the conscript system and the nature and composition of the protests, explain the military's decision to support the uprising (See table 3A, 3B, 3C). Differently, the importance of the role of the military for the establishment of the Republic of Egypt results in its privileged and influential position. Thus, the military's decision to side with the demonstrators was unexpected. However, having considered all four factors more in-depth (See table 3A, 3B, 3C), the decision does not seem unpredictable anymore, but rather reasonable. Possible explanations for this are the loss of political influence, the military's dissatisfaction with Mubarak's regime, Mubarak's son as the predecessor, the military's composition of conscripts who were unwilling to shoot at fellow citizens as well as the relationship with the US (Barany, 2016, p. 164).

Essentially, one finds that in all respects Tunisia and Egypt score similarly. However, with regards to the external factors, one finds that Egypt scores much higher, meaning that the external factors were important and affected the response of the military. Two reasons can

be identified for this. The first point that Egypt scores 3 out of 6 is on foreign affairs (See table 3D). This aspect is because Egypt was directly affected by the Cold War. As a result, the US always kept a foot in the door and influenced the regime, as well as military relations. As mentioned in chapter 3, the US discussed with the military that they should not fire at protesters, and thus also not support the regime. The second reason that influenced the point ‘revolutionary diffusion,’ is a result of the ousting of Ben Ali (See table 3D). Since the Arab Spring began in Tunisia and had a spillover effect to Egypt, Egyptian generals kept following the course of the revolution in Tunisia. After the people overthrew Ben Ali, the Egyptian military feared the same outcome for Mubarak, and decided to take their distance from the regime to save their privileged position.

Table 3A: Military Factors Affecting the Army’s Response

Country	Tunisia	Egypt
Armed Forces’ Internal Cohesion	2	2
A. Ethnic/ religious/ tribal splits	0	0
B. Generational divisions	1	3
C. Divisions between officers	0	1
D. Divisions between elite vs regular units	0	2
E. Splits between army and other branches of security services	5	3
F. Sociopolitical divisions	0	0
Professional Soldiers vs Conscripts	5	5
General’s Perception of Regime Legitimacy	5	4
Army’s Past Conduct toward Society	2	2
Total	20	22

Source: Barany, 2016

Table 3B: State Factors Affecting the Army’s Response

Country	Tunisia	Egypt
Regime’s Treatment of the Military	4	3
A. Taking care of the personnel’s material welfare	3	2
B. Taking care of the army	2	3
C. Appropriateness of missions	3	4
D. The general’s professional autonomy and decision-making authority	2	2
E. Fairness in top appointments	1	1
F. The military’s prestige and public esteem	3	3
Regime Directions to the Military	1	2
Total	19	20

Source: Barany, 2016

Table 3C: Societal Factors Affecting the Army’s Response

Country	Tunisia	Egypt
Size, Composition and Nature of Protests	5	5
Popularity of the Uprising	3	3
Fraternization	2	4
Total	10	12

Source: Barany, 2016

Table 3D: External Factors Affecting the Army's Response

Country	Tunisia	Egypt
Potential for Foreign Intervention	0	0
Foreign Affairs	0	3
Revolutionary Diffusion	0	3
Foreign Exposure of Military Officers	2	1
Total	2	7

Source: Barany, 2016

Arab Spring and the Transition to Inclusive Institutions

Although both military institutions backed the protests, contributing in both cases to the overthrow of the regime, one finds completely different outcomes in each country. Following from this research, this is a path dependent pattern. On the one hand, Tunisia's first constitution already established the exclusion of the military from politics, which influenced the civil-military relations one finds in Tunisia today. Consequently, due to the apolitical military, civilians are not inclined to relinquish their power to the military in Tunisia, providing the institutional potential for the transition to inclusive institutions. The apolitical army encouraged civilians to use the window of opportunity offered by the Arab Spring to vest inclusive institutions, starting a virtuous circle. On the other hand, there was no strict division between the army and politics in the case of Egypt. To the contrary, the military was considered to be the protector of Egypt and played an influential political, social and economic role. Given these civil-military relations, the military institution continued to play a prominent role even after the overthrow of Mubarak. The legacy of the Egyptian military undermined the transition to inclusive institutions. Hence, this vicious circle continues to prevent progress in Egypt.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

To conclude, this research considered how the institutional heritage of the role of the military shaped civil-military relations. Then, the research examined the armed forces' response to the Arab Spring, as well as the path both countries were set on posterior to the Arab Spring.

Therefore, by taking the military as an explanatory variable, the following research question was examined: "Why did the Arab Spring lead to the rise of inclusive institutions in Tunisia, and the strengthening of extractive institutions in Egypt?". Taking Acemoglu and Robinson's (2012) supposition with respect to the importance of critical junctures for the transition to inclusive institutions, as well as Stepan's (2012) premise that the less civilians are inclined to relinquish their power to the military, the better the chances are for transitioning to inclusive institutions, this thesis examined two cases that demonstrate the two sides of the same coin.

The research showed that the different set-up of the military institution explains the different outcome of the same critical juncture. The apolitical military offered the institutional potential for Tunisia to make a smooth transition to inclusive institutions. The apolitical army encouraged civilians to use the window of opportunity provided by the Arab Spring to vest inclusive institutions, starting a virtuous circle. Au contraire, the politically involved and influential Egyptian military took power in their hands after the overthrow of Mubarak. The legacy of the Egyptian military undermined the transition to inclusive institutions. This vicious circle continues to prevent progress in Egypt. Thus, the research confirms Stepan's (2012) premise that the less inclined civilians are to relinquish power to the military institution, the better the chances are for transitioning to inclusive institutions.

Comparative historical analysis was a suitable method for this research, since it enabled theory testing. What one can take away from this research, is the importance of the military's institutional heritage for the outcome of a critical juncture. Yet, in order to broaden our understanding of the military's role in critical junctures and the transition to inclusive institutions, upcoming studies could consider a larger sample of countries to increase generalizability. Given the diverse outcome of all MENA countries that have been subjected to the Arab Spring, enlarging the sample could shed light on other explanatory variables. Given the lack of research on the importance of the military for critical junctures, academia can benefit from further research on this topic.

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Appendix I

Each factor will be rated on a scale from 0 to 6 (see table 1), which refers to the importance of a certain factor affecting the army's response to a political juncture.

Table 1: Interpretation of Numbers

Scale	Meaning
0	Irrelevant
1	Of trivial importance
2	Of little importance
3	Somewhat important
4	Quite important
5	Very important
6	Decisive

Source: Barany, 2016

Table 1A, 2A and 3A: Military factors

- **The Armed Forces' Internal Cohesion** is dependent on subfactors A, B, C, D, E, F. Following from Barany's theory, the internal cohesion of a military institution greatly influences its response to a revolution (2016, 24). The more internally unified a military institution is, the more cohesive its response will be. In the case that it is internally not unified, defections within the military might hinder its response – whether that is supporting or not supporting the regime (Barany, 2016, 25).
 - *A. Ethnic/ religious/ tribal splits:* As a result of the fact that – particularly conscript – armies represent different factions of the population, there might be a possibility that the army's internal cohesion will be affected by ethnic, religious or tribal splits. This factor is mainly a threat to multiethnic and multireligious countries (Barany, 2016, 25). In some cases, someone's religious or ethnic identity can trump their national identity.
 - *B. Generational divisions:* In particular in the military institution, perspectives of young and older people can clash. The armed forces are a hierarchical organization, meaning that length of service, as well as age, can determine military men's rank, pay and responsibility (Barany, 2016, 26).
 - *C. Divisions between officers and NCOs/privates:* Non-commissioned officers and soldiers normally have different socioeconomic backgrounds than officers. Combined with the fact that some authoritarian leaders treat and reward their soldiers badly, leading to questionable loyalty (Barany, 2016, 26).

- *D. Division between elite vs regular units:* In particular authoritarian regimes tend to install branches of special service to control and overshadow the armed forces. Such elite units also tend to receive higher pay and better equipment. The instalment of elite units also signifies distrust from the regime's part towards the regular units (Barany, 2016, 27).
- *E. Splits between army and other branches of security services:* Some authoritarian regimes install security and intelligence services. This action may lead to interservice hostility between the military institution and these services, in particular, when the latter are more politically involved (Barany, 2016, 27). The difference between these secret services and the abovementioned elite units is that the latter are inside the military institutions, whereas the security services are a body on their own.
- *F. Sociopolitical divisions:* Even though the military institution applies techniques to create common bonds among their men regardless of their ranking, class or background, sociopolitical divisions might continue to exist, undermining the internal cohesion of the institution (Barany, 2016, 28-29).
- **Professional soldiers vs conscripts:** When an army mainly consists of volunteers, it means that the soldiers are self-selected and “embrace the military's ethos, hierarchical nature, discipline, regimented life and conservative values” (Barany, 2016, 29). In contrast, when the military primarily consists of conscripts – assuming this is a fair process – it is supposed to represent all segments of society. This also entails that conscripts are more likely to commiserate with the people and support the revolution (Barany, 2016, 29).
- **The general's perception of regime legitimacy:** What do the generals and higher ranks of the military think of the regime? As one might suspect, regimes that are perceived as weak and unpopular by society are also less likely to receive support from the military at the time of revolution. Legitimacy plays an important role here: if the people accept the authority of the regime, the generals are more likely to counter the revolution and stand by the regime (Barany, 2016, 30).
- **Army's past conduct toward society:** How is the relationship between society and the military institution? For this, one needs to consider the past conduct of the military towards society. Did the military also engage in malicious practices towards society, such as human rights abuses? If this is the case, the military is more likely to take the side of the regime (Barany, 2016, 30).

Table 3A: Military Factors Affecting the Army's Response

Country	Tunisia	Egypt
Armed Forces' Internal Cohesion	2	2
A. Ethnic/ religious/ tribal splits	0	0
B. Generational divisions	1	3
C. Divisions between officers	0	1
D. Divisions between elite vs regular units	0	2
E. Splits between army and other branches of security services	5	3
F. Sociopolitical divisions	0	0
Professional Soldiers vs Conscripts	5	5
General's Perception of Regime Legitimacy	5	4
Army's Past Conduct toward Society	2	2
Total	20	22

Source: Barany, 2016

Table 1B, 2B and 3B: State factors

- **Regime's treatment of the military:** Simply put: "...if the regime treats the armed forces well, the generals are likely to remain loyal during a revolution" (Barany, 2016, 31).
 - *Taking care of the personnel's material welfare:* This point considers the benefits and pay for the military: if the military thinks it is being credited enough for its tasks, it is more likely to support the regime (Barany, 2016, 31).
 - *Taking care of the army:* This factor takes into account how well the regime provides for the military institution with respect to facilities and equipment (Barany, 2016, 31). If the regime supplies the military sufficiently, the military is more likely to back the regime.
 - *Appropriateness of mission:* Regimes that assign the military occasionally "police" tasks or use soldiers as a source of "cheap labor", are more likely to lose the respect and loyalty of the military, since the military considers its professional task to be protecting the state from external threats (Barany, 2016, 32). Moreover, when the military becomes involved in uncalled-for wars, is defeated at the cost of many losses, the military also tends to lose trust in the regime.
 - *The general's professional autonomy and decision-making authority:* How is the regime involved in military matters? Here is where Huntington's concepts come into play again: when it is subjective control, the military is closely watched and does not have much space to take decisions on its own (Barany, 2016, 33). In contrast, under objective control, the army enjoys autonomy with

respect to military matters. As a result, with the outbreak of a revolution, an army under subjective control has less room to decide how to respond.

- *Fairness in top appointments:* It is crucial that the armed forces have a say in the process of appointments, and that these decisions – even if civilian government leaders influence the decision as well – are discussed with the military. Undiplomatic decision-making from top-down without justification of their choice can contribute to a split in the military leadership’s allegiance (Barany, 2016, 34).
- *The military’s prestige and public esteem:* This point focuses on whether the regime encourages the public to respect and admire the military (Barany, 2016, 34). The military institution is more likely to ally with the regime if the regime praises the military to the public and stresses the importance of this institution for the whole country. If the military is being neglected and underappreciated, it is more likely to not support the regime and take matters in their own hands.
- **Regime directions to the military:** The regime’s directions to the military influence its response to the outbreak of revolutions: it leads to either clear or confused leadership. When generals do not receive clear orders and are left in the dark, the military’s response is more likely to have a negative outcome for the regime (Barany, 2016, 35).

Table 3B: State Factors Affecting the Army’s Response

Country	Tunisia	Egypt
Regime’s Treatment of the Military	4	3
A. Taking care of the personnel’s material welfare	3	2
B. Taking care of the army	2	3
C. Appropriateness of missions	3	4
D. The general’s professional autonomy and decision-making authority	2	2
E. Fairness in top appointments	1	1
F. The military’s prestige and public esteem	3	3
Regime Directions to the Military	1	2
Total	19	20

Source: Barany, 2016

Table 1C, 2C and 3C: Societal factors

- **Size, composition and nature of protests:** Generally speaking, the army will only be deployed by the regime in mass demonstrations. The way the military responds is dependent on the composition as well: is there an ethnoreligious divide between the

protesters and the army? Then the army might be more prone not to support the protesters. Similarly, if the nature of the protests is violent, the army is more likely to also respond with violence (Barany, 2016, 36).

- **Popularity of the uprising:** Concerning the popularity of the uprising, the military is more willing to support a revolution that enjoys extensive societal support (Barany, 2016, 36). In contrast, it is unlikely that the military will support a revolution that only represents a small segment of society. Moreover, the popularity of the revolution amongst military men depends on whether they – in particular military leaders – will be affected by the fall of the regime. If the military has a history of abusive behavior towards the people; for instance, they might be charged for this with the instalment of a new regime.
- **Fraternization:** In many cases insurrectionists appeal to the military through fraternization (Barany, 2016, 37). Such practices entail information campaigns, and promises of favorable policies for the military with the achievement of a regime change (Barany, 2016, 37). In particular for NOC's lower ranking officers, this can be very appealing as they are paid less and tend to be mistreated more often (Barany, 2016, 37).

Table 3C: Societal Factors Affecting the Army's Response

Country	Tunisia	Egypt
Size, Composition and Nature of Protests	5	5
Popularity of the Uprising	3	3
Fraternization	2	4
Total	10	12

Source: Barany, 2016

Table 1D, 2D and 3D: External factors

- **Potential for foreign intervention:** This point covers for two potential turn of events. First, is it essential to establish whether there are external powers that might intervene. Second, if foreign powers will intervene: which side will they take? If foreign intervention will most likely support the regime, the military institution might respond differently. Generally speaking, foreign intervention is not a consideration, this also has to do with the international regulations (Barany, 2016, 37-38). Yet, history shows otherwise.

- **Foreign affairs:** The relations of a state with foreign state might also influence the response of the army. Perhaps the army is funded by foreign states, hence feeling the need to respond the way the foreign power wants them to respond (Barany, 2016, 37).
- **Revolutionary diffusion:** This point has to do with the domino effect of some revolutions: history has shown that some revolutions have a spillover effect to other countries. It is striking that the military can consider the “earlier” cases and decide – based on the course of that revolution – how to respond. If military officers just saw how another regime exposed to a similar revolution was toppled, the military might be more prone to support the revolution. Differently, if other dictators have fallen, and take the rest of their apparatus with them in their fall, the military might be stimulated to suppress the uprising in order to safe itself.
- **Foreign exposure of military officers:** Exposure to foreign military training influences the political values attained by members of the military. For instance, officers trained by foreign officers in democratic states will be exposed to principles and practices of democratic civil-military relations (Barany, 2016, 39). It might influence their reaction during a juncture, perhaps increasing their understanding for protesters advocating for democracy.

Table 3D: External Factors Affecting the Army’s Response

Country	Tunisia	Egypt
Potential for Foreign Intervention	0	0
Foreign Affairs	0	3
Revolutionary Diffusion	0	3
Foreign Exposure of Military Officers	2	1
Total	2	7

Source: Barany, 2016