Examining the post- Cold War Hellenic National Security Policy: a governance perspective analysis

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Abstract

This thesis examines to what extent security governance (SG) applies as analytical framework for the post-Cold War Hellenic National Security Policy (HNSP). The HNSP, originally set up for defence in the event of an external attack, is now transforming into a multifaceted field that integrates external policy and diplomacy, internal crisis and disaster management, alongside a plethora of non-traditional security actors. Does this transition of the HNSP along this process reflect to the security governance paradigm? The thesis at hand does not pose a normative argument for or against it. It rather examines, how modern states adapt to the new norm in security thinking and practice. Findings suggests that modern states, inevitably engage into a certain level of governance in their security affairs, one that imitates the SG theory provided by Elke Krahmann (2003). Future researchers may use this thesis as a framework analysis model for other countries or as a basis for a deeper analysis in more specific topics of the HNSP. The thesis concludes by advising the Hellenic Government to ensure proactiveness during its synchronization process with the SG concept via the promotion of a meaningful institutional security sector reform and the cultivation of a security culture.

Key words: security governance, post- Cold War security, Hellenic National Security Policy, non-traditional security

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A. Introduction

For centuries the accepted international norm wanted nation-states to uphold a dominant role in the field of security. Nowadays, organized units varying from warlords, guerillas, terrorists, mercenaries, militias or even charities, think tanks and NGOs possess an ever-growing role in security affairs worldwide. This development has not only led to the erosion of state monopoly in security, but has paved the way for a wider debate regarding the institutional capacity of security policies around the globe. The debate is feeding on the emergence of non-traditional security threats that render more and more states unable to safeguard their social, political, economic, cultural and military structures, thus, affecting the survival of their citizens. This has significant implications for the governance and practice of security policy, both in national and international level (Brayton, 2002).

The new dilemmas highlighted the necessity to depart from the traditional security (TS) thinking, narrowed to military, political and diplomatic affairs. This knowledge gap was covered by the security governance (SG) concept, first emerged as a formula that explains new practices by which western states address NTS threats (Christou et al., 2010; Hollis, 2010; Kirchner, 2006; Kirchner & Sperling. 2007; Webber et al. 2004). Security governance entails the interactions of both public and private actors in formal or informal institutionalized settings (Webber et al., 2004). Despite the fact that states remain at the core of such interactions, national governments have shown an increasing will to rely upon these new 'heterarchical' arrangements (Krahmann, 2003, p. 6). Thereby, states have moved away from their historical primacy in security affairs. That being said, contemporary security policies are characterized by the proliferation of functionally specialized security agencies, the fragmentation of alliances and the use of private security providers. This development marks the transition from government to governance.

Governance first arose as a domestic policy concept, relevant to social security and health. Then it appeared in 'softer' sectors of international relations, leading to a spillover to the security and defence sector. This spillover was led by practitioners, initially in Europe, in early 2000s, who transferred the approaches on policy making and implementation they had used elsewhere into the security field (Webber et. al. 2004). These approaches were transferred for a plethora of reasons. The most notable is the end of the Cold War, spreading insecurity over non-state threats and alerting many states to review their national security policies. Added to the end of bipolarity, terrorism, transnational crime, illegal migration, religious conflict, food and energy safety, natural disaster and environmental degradation have entered the security sphere as non-traditional security (NTS) elements, 'broadening' or 'updating' the concept of security and calling for a holistic approach (Xiaofeng & Danzi, 2011).

According to Krahmann, SG changes *"the way in which security is defined…, by whom security policies are made and how they are implemented"* (Krahmann, 2003, p. 9). That being said, SG has emerged as a new security paradigm, an analytical framework able to explain the multi-actor integration in the security field, as well as the modernization of traditional security actors in the post- Cold War era. Indicatively, over the past three decades the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has transformed into an extra-regional security provider and crisis manager, departing from its original role as an institutional instrument for collective security (Webber et al., 2004, pp. 9-14). Similarly, the European Union (EU), has expanded its policy mandate over to the security sphere, emerging as a regional security provider and conflict mediator via the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Weiss & Dalferth, 2009).

However, in the current academic discourse the actual application of the security governance concept to a national context is rarely a matter of open discussion. There is limited knowledge about the interaction of nation-states with the new security thinking and practice. This under-examined interaction generates a series of questions such as: How is the functional scope of contemporary security policies being transformed in accordance with the new security paradigm? How is the distribution of resources being affected? How do national interests and norms interact with the dictations of SG? What is the impact of the SG fragmentation to the decision making process and policy implementation? The aforementioned questions correspond to the dimensions provided

by Krahmann's *"security governance theory"* (Krahmann, 2003), which shall be further explained in the second chapter. Contributing to the detected knowledge gap, in this study, SG is deployed to explain the process of synchronization of national security policies with the post- Cold War security agenda.

The thesis at hand examines the application of the security governance concept in a national security policy context. This is realized via the conduct of a single case study analysis of the post- Cold War Hellenic National Security Policy (HNSP). In this regard the research question formulates as follows: *To what extent does the security governance framework apply to the development of the post- Cold War Hellenic National Security Policy?*

The purpose of this study is to take the post- Cold War HNSP as a case of security governance in order to provide an overview of how states respond and adapt to the dictations of the SG paradigm. The analysis shall shed light upon the agents that push towards governance, as well as the factors that underline the necessity of a centralized model of government. The time factor is determined by the most influential event of contemporary international affairs, the end of the Cold War. As mentioned earlier, the end of bipolarity revolutionized the international security domain, serving as breeding ground for the ideation of the central theory of the present research. Hence, to ensure validity and feasibility, the study is chronically confined to the last three decades (1990-2020).

The societal and scientific relevance of the study is of high value for the security field and the social studies in general. The present research does not only acknowledge the spillover of governance in all walks of global politics, but it elevates governance as a core element of a "high-politics" matter, that of national security policy. This research initiative is explored via a "most-likely" case study, provided by a developed country of the western world, that of the Hellenic National Security Policy. The latter, is forged by western theory and practice, constituting an integral part of the western security nexus. Hence, the examination of its development shall provide valid inferences regarding the impact of governance. Nevertheless, it is essential to underline that the selection of the designated case study does not constitute "cherry picking". Quite the contrary, the Greek security environment presents a series of peculiarities –analyzed in Chapter 4- that challenge the application of governance in the HNSP context. In this

respect, the examination of the development of the HNSP under the scope of the SG framework, presents valuable findings regarding the level adaptability of nation-states to the new security norm both within and outside of the western world, increasing the social and scientific relevance of the research.

Before the conclusion of this, first, chapter, it is to be noted that the thesis does not make a normative argument for or against the security governance theory and practice. This aspect is left for future researchers to examine. The study's empirical findings rather depict the process of synchronization of the HNSP with the SG paradigm, leading to significant conclusions and implications for the former.

B. Theoretical Framework

B.1 The theoretical shift from government to governance

The term government, as coined by the Anglo-American political theory, is used to describe the formal state institutions and their monopoly of legitimate violence. Government's defining characteristic is *"its ability to make decisions and its capacity to enforce them"* (Stoker, 2002, p.17). Particularly, government refers to all the formal and institutional processes that operate in a national level in order to sustain public order and enhance collective action. The term governance incarnates a shifting pattern in governing styles. It signifies *"a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or the new method by which society is governed"* (Rhodes, 1996, pp. 652-653). Similarly, the outputs of governance focus on ordered rule and collective action. Therefore, the difference is located in the process and not in the results.

According to Stoker, there is a baseline agreement of the scholars that governance entails the development of governing styles with blurred boundaries between and within the public and private sphere (Stoker, 2002). The rationale behind this new style of government lies upon the creation of a structure which cannot be

externally imposed. This ‘new order’ neither rests on recourse to national authority, nor can be sanctioned by the government. It is the outcome of the interaction of a multiplicity of actors that partake in governing (Stoker, 2002).

Interestingly, governance has infiltrated the practitioner and academic settings in an attempt to apprehend this shift in thinking and in working styles. In Western democracies, governance has entered the policy arena, recognizing the intertwined nature of public and private sector in managing the affairs of the nation state (Stoker, 2002). However, governance is more than a new set of managerial tools used in public policy implementation. It is the emerging dominant model in directing public affairs (Osborne, 2006).

According to Osborne, the hegemony of Public Administration (PA) was interrupted by the emergence of the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) theory in the late nineteenth century. The latter, served as a herald for what is now called the ‘New Public Governance’ (NPG) (Osborne, 2006, p. 377). In this transition some of the defining traits of PA subordinated to those of NPM. The focus shifted away from the dominance of the ‘rule of law’ and the administering guidelines to the lessons provided by the private sector management and to entrepreneurial leadership within public organizations. Similarly, the commitment to steadily increasing budgeting was replaced by the disaggregation of public services to their core elements, emphasizing on cost management, based upon inputs and output control and evaluation. At the same time, the hegemony of professionals in the public service delivery chain was set aside by the growth of markets, competition and contracts for the allocation of resources and service delivery within the public sector (Osborne, 2006, pp. 378-379).

The strength of the NPM lies upon its ability to address complexities by not perceiving public policy as a ‘black box’. However, NPM has been largely criticized and deemed limited, unable to stand in an increasingly pluralistic world (Rhodes, 1997; Osborne, 2006). Osborne suggests that a more holistic theory is needed. One that moves beyond the clash between administration and management, allowing an integrated approach both to the study and practice. This gap may be covered by the New Public Governance theory (NPG) (Osborne, 2006).

NPG is not an integral part to the PA, nor is it to the NPM. It seeks to understand the development of public policy in the context of a ‘plural’ and ‘pluralist state’

(Osborne, 2006, p. 381). NPG goes beyond the vertically integrated nature of the PA that ensures accountability for the utilization of public money, basing its value explicitly on public sector ethos. NPG exceeds the limits of the NPM market-place approach, where inter-organizational competition holds the key for governance mechanism. New Public Governance puts forward a plural state, where a plethora of intertwined actors contribute to public services delivery and a pluralist state where the policy making system is being informed by multiple processes. The emphasis is pointed towards inter-organizational relationships and the governance of processes. The former are valued for their endurance (trust, relational capital, relational contracts), while the latter stresses service effectiveness and outcomes (Osborne, 2006, p. 384).

From a theoretical perspective, according to Osborne, NPG has the potential to support the analysis and evaluation of public policy development. However, reiterating to Stoker, governance is no use for the conduct of a causal analysis. Nor does it constitute a normative theory. Its value rests in its capacity to provide an organizing framework for understanding the changes in governing processes. According to Stoker *"the governance perspective works if it helps us identify important question, although it does claim to identify a number of useful answers"* (Stoker, 2002, p.18)

B.2 The emergence of governance in the security field after the end of the Cold War

The end of the cold war brought dramatic changes to the international security system. The dissolution of the bipolar structure owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact paved the way for the emergence of a series of bilateral and multilateral security institutions (Krahmann, 2003). These new structures do not strictly rotate around state authorities, but they operate under regional, subregional, national or subnational scopes, while their formation is not necessarily composed by public officials. An increasing range of private actors including inter alia charities, non-governmental organizations, independent think tanks and other private security providers have shifted the focus of security policy away from the state-based doctrine and towards a complex system of functionally divergent networks that involve public and private security actors (Krahmann, 2005). This evolution, however, is not to be translated as the end of the nation-state as we know it. States retain their central role in

the field of international security. What has changed since the end of the Cold War is the heavy reliance of governments and international organizations on the cooperation and resources of private security providers (Lilly, 2000).

Krahmann (2003), focuses on four factors that have shaped the mosaic of contemporary international security system. The first one, as mentioned above, focuses on the role of the newly founded security institutions. These "security assemblages" (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009, p.5) are constructed to serve specific security needs, built upon the foundations of geographic proximity, shared culture and identity. The Visegrád Group (1991), the Baltic Cooperation Council (1992) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 1995) are only a few of examples of the changes that the end of bipolarity brought about. The formation of such security initiatives depicts the realization of smaller states that their interests are no longer protected by either superpower. So, in the purpose of ensuring their survival they had to align their interests with countries that sought for similar objectives. According to Adler and Barnett (1998), the formation of such a pluralistic security community is based upon *"regions of states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change"* (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p.30). Despite the fact that these alliances were formed within the existing security structures, either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU) among others, they did not undermine basic cohesion of the global security community, but they increasingly opt for divergent security policies both in national and international level (Krahmann, 2003).

The second factor Krahmann notices is that these new institutional arrangements are placed to confront localized or non-traditional security issues, rendering them more flexible and fluid than international security regimes[1]. Steaming from particular interests, their resources are allocated to confront specific security problems, such as but not limited to military training, surveillance or research and development. For instance, in Europe, several states sought for closer collaboration with neighboring countries in an effort to fortify their position in the fragile post-Cold War security environment. The Greek-Cypriot Joint Defense Area Doctrine (1994), the

[1] Security regimes are defined by Krasner as *"sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge"* in the security field (Krasner, 1983, p.2)

Belgian – Dutch deployable naval force (1995) and the Danish, German and Polish trilateral cooperation (1999), are some of the most notable examples.

The third observation revolves around the stance held by traditional security regimes, who serve as key agents of understanding the evolution of the international security architecture. Namely NATO and to some extent the EU. Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO did not only survive, but it expanded its functional and geographical scope, by strengthening its multilateral and unilateral institutional arrangements with countries of the former Soviet Union, through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the 'Partnership for Peace' initiative (1994). In the same vain, NATO's new concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) was created to encourage ad hoc collaboration among states in international security missions (Krahmann, 2005). Similarly, the EU developed its own mechanisms of action in field of defence, crisis management and peacekeeping interventions, formulating the European Security and Defence Identity (1996) which served as basis for the European Security and Defence Policy (1999, called CSDP from 2009). The 'Operation Concordia' in North Macedonia (FYROM) and the 'Operation Artemis' in Congo, both in 2003, serve as examples of the EU external security action.

The fourth factor concentrates on the growing reliance of the transatlantic security mosaic on private actors. According to Mandel, the post-Cold War proliferation of private security providers is an outcome of the continued reluctance to intervene by the international community, the military downsizing, the low supply of skilled military personnel and the high demand for the knowledge and expertise to deal with unconventional threats (Mandel, 2001). In this regard, the abovementioned institutionalized security settings turned to private actors for the purpose of maximizing resources and expertise in order to deal more efficiently with a series of military and non-military threats (Mandel, 2002). Although, the impact of private actors is not comparable with that of states, their growing role in the governance of global security is recognized by the traditional security actors (NATO, EU), calling for the enhancement of civil-military cooperation in a national level (NATO, 2000; EU, 2018).

According to Krahmann (2003; 2005), the factors presented above signify a gradual transition from the centralized security policy of the Cold War era to a fragmented

multilayered security arrangements system, in which public and private actors co-exist and collaborate.

B.3 The security governance paradigm

The security governance theory provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of the changes in the security field, indicating how the element of governance may be utilized to comprehend this evolution and the problems arising from it (Krahmann, 2005, p. 250). The theory is deconstructed in seven distinct dimensions that will serve as operational variables for the analysis chapter. These include geography, functional scope, the distribution of resources, interests, norms, decision making and policy implementation (Krahmann, 2003, p.11):

"Government" and "Security Governance" as ideal types

Dimensions	Government	Security governance
Geographical scope	State Regional	Sub-national State Regional Global
Functional scope	Military	Military Political Social Environmental
Distribution of resources	Centralized in states and NATO/ WTO	Fragmented among public and Private actors at different levels: firms, charities, NGOs, states, UN, NATO, EU, OSCE
Interests	Common	Differentiated
Norms	Sovereignty 'One for all, all for one' Ideological priorities	Limited sovereignty 'Coalitions of the willing' Cost-efficiency
Decision making	Centralized Consensus Formal equality	Fragmented Negotiation Inequality
Implementation	Centralized Authoritative	Fragmented Voluntary

Figure 1 Krahmann (2005, p. 251)

The geographical scope refers to the fragmentation of policy-making arrangements that used to have the state as a point of reference. In this regard, according

to Krahmann, *"fragmentation can appear in three forms; 'downwards' to local or regional level, 'upwards' to macro-regional or global level or 'sideways' to private and voluntary actors"* (Krahmann, 2003, p.11). In the national security policy context, this dimension suggests the involvement of sub-national, or even global actors that do not always belong to the public sphere.

The functional scope attests to the deepening of the concept of security from state to human. Human security revolves around non-military threats such as global health and environmental security. The emergence of NTS issues combined with the lack of expertise and resources by nation-states makes room for the functional specialization of several private actors (Krahmann, 2003, p. 14).

The distribution of resources dimension refers to the fragmentation of budgetary expenses to private actors and international organizations. (Krahmann, 2003, p. 14). States find it progressively more efficient, both in terms of cost and expertise, to outsource responsibilities in non-traditional security areas, in order to safeguard their national security.

The interest dimension illustrates the hesitation of states to actively engage into international security when their vital interests are not directly affected. In this view, *"regional, global and non-traditional security interests are defended by a number of agents and institutions"* (Krahmann, 2003, p.15). However, national defence remains as a core interest protected by national authorities. The latter, are called to assess whether the binding interests -deriving from international participation and cooperation- can maintain a strong external-balancing capacity.

The normative dimension refers to the abolition of principles such as sovereignty and ideology in shaping security policy. These are gradually being replaced by liberal approaches such as limited sovereignty and cost-efficiency (Krahmann, 2003, pp. 15-16). In this regard, formerly nationalized services, such as policing, surveillance and border patrol among others, are being privatized.

The decision making dimension refers to the transition from centralized hierarchical decisions, to decisions taken through horizontal coordination and negotiation (Krahmann, 2003, p. 16). Within a national security policy setting the progressive institutionalization of the decision-making process among various groups of people, that represent both public and private interests, has rendered policy shaping

to the hands of the most persuasive, rather to those of the higher official in the chain of command.

Krahmann suggests that policy implementation is a reflection of the policy preferences of the main resource providers (Krahmann, 2003, pp.16-17). In the national security policy setting, the policy implementation is not a centralized and authoritative process, as non-public actors serve both as resource providers and executive branches, shifting policy implementation towards the private and voluntary sphere.

B.4 A conceptual framework for the development of the security governance theory in the HNSP context

After mapping the seven dimensions of the theory in a general sense, it is essential to arrive at a more focused approach as the basis for our study.

A working hypothesis, regarding the designated case study, has been assigned to each of the seven dimensions of the security governance concept. The hypotheses formulate as follows:

1. *From a **geographical** standpoint, the HNSP governance extends beyond state and region, incorporating sub-national and global actors that do not solely belong to the public sphere.*
2. *The HNSP accounts for political, social and environmental risks, embracing a broad **functional** scope that does not purely concentrate on military affairs.*
3. *Under the umbrella of the HNSP, the **distribution of resources** is fragmented among public and private actors and not centralized in state authorities.*
4. *The **interests** being served by the agents of the HNSP are not common, but differentiated.*
5. *The HNSP does not prioritize ideological **norms** and appears to be flexible in limiting its sovereignty for the purpose of increasing cost-efficiency.*
6. *The **decision making process** for matters concerning the HNSP is a fragmented process that is open to negotiations, rather than a centralized process that entails consensus.*

7. *The **implementation** of the HNSP takes place in a fragmented and voluntary basis and it is not a centralized and authoritative process.*

The examination of the seven security governance hypotheses in the context of the HNSP constitutes the main body of analysis of the present research. Depending on the empirical support, received by each hypothesis, the latter shall be confirmed or rejected. The collective result shall provide an answer to the research question posed regarding the extent to which the security governance framework applies to the development of the post-Cold War Hellenic National Security Policy and may offer explanations for the development of the HNSP in its regional context; thereby deepening the governance framework as offered by Krahmann (2003).

In a general sense the first two dimensions seem to represent the external need for change as geography no longer poses an obstacle for the expansion of threats, calling for non-traditional solutions. The third and fourth dimension is indicative to the internal change of the national security planning, showcasing the role and the intentions of stakeholders based upon their accumulated resources and interests. The fifth dimension describes the change in the contemporary values of national security planning, focusing on defence expenditure. The last two dimensions appear to combine the abovementioned elements, demonstrating how they interact in the administrative and executive process.

C. Research Outline

C.1 Research Approach

The research at hand investigates the effect of the independent variable, namely the security governance paradigm, on the dependent variable, which is the governance of the Hellenic National Security Policy. It is contextualized to a single case study and is chronically confined to the last three decades (1990-2020). The deployment of the

security governance concept emerges as a prerequisite to explain the events that push towards the reformation of national security policies in the post-Cold War era.



Figure 2 The contextual map of the research

In order to test the proposed hypotheses regarding the reliance of the HNSP shaping on a fragmented governance approach, this research deploys a qualitative single case study analysis. The independent variable (SG) is operationalized via the use of the seven dimensions provided by the security governance theory (Krahmann, 2003) (see figure 2 above), while the governance aspect of the HNSP serves as the dependent

variable. The operationalized dimensions of the SG theory constitute the tools for the examination of the set hypothesis. Depending on the empirical support they receive, the judgement of the hypothesis shall be determined.

The present research operates in a within-case level of analysis. It is focused on the causal process and not the causal effect of security governance in the context of HNSP (Rohlfing, 2012, p.12). That is to say, the study does not examine the reasons behind the rise of governance in the context of HNSP. The research de facto acknowledges governance as part of any contemporary western national security policy, including the Greek. The focal point of the research is the examination of this transition from government to governance, in order to assess whether the HNSP is moving in parallel with the SG paradigm, as provided by Krahmann.

For the contextualization of this research, to ensure feasibility, alongside maximizing its validity and usefulness for future researchers, the study is narrowed down to the examination of the post- Cold War Hellenic National Security Policy as a single case study. The HNSP constitutes a distinctive case study, as Greece, while being the easternmost western country, has long been an integral part of the western security nexus. Also, the chronological restriction to the post- Cold War era (1990-), adds to the feasibility of the research, while it establishes relevance with the shift of security thinking and practice, in early 2000s. Hence, the examination of the evolution of the post-Cold War HNSP under the scope of SG framework promises valid inferences regarding the level adaptability of nation-states to the new security paradigm both within and outside of the western world.

Furthermore, the case selection lies upon the strong theoretical framework provided by Krahmann (2003). According to Rohlfing, the selected case qualifies as typical, given that the rationale behind its operationalization is to test for specific hypotheses based on the given research outcome (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 77). What is more, the selected theory-based case is characterized as “most-likely” given that it presents a high probability of confirming the matter under examination (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 84). However, a potential failure of this most-likely case shall provide valuable learnings regarding the research question posed (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 85).

On a last note, comparing and contrasting two different security policies would weaken this research given the lack of continuity and uniformity. In other words,

examining the impact of the SG paradigm under the scope of –initially- different security objectives, would lead to abstract conclusions, given the divergence of the point of departure. Whereas, deepening the focus on a single national security policy with the distinctive characteristics of the HNSP increases the validity and applicability of the research.

C.2 Data Collection and Analysis

The hypotheses testing process calls for the gathering of information regarding evolution of governance in the context of the Hellenic National Security Policy. The primary data collected derive from the digital library of the Hellenic Government and constitute official documentation regarding all actions taken in the field of national security. In addition, secondary data derive from field research at the libraries of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, and desk research using open online sources, Leiden University's online library, and the researcher's library.

The documents that are to be analyzed include resolutions, laws, decrees, regulations, speeches, reports, maps, reviews, open access publications and meeting records. Given that they constitute official documents, their reliability and validity is irrefutable. The examination of these documents shall assist in testing the hypotheses set, shedding light to the governance aspect of the HNSP.

The research method chosen to investigate the selected case study is qualitative content analysis. This method shall provide replicable and valid inferences from the gathered data, assisting in the summarization of governance patterns within the selected case. By doing so, it is possible to deeply examine the evolution of the HNSP and determine its compatibility with the security governance paradigm, based upon the results of hypotheses testing.

The gathered qualitative data are to be coded. The codes are developed in a deductive manner, based upon the security governance theory. It is important to note that there is no predetermined correlation between the obtained data and the theory. The

code definitions as presented above (see p. 16) correspond to the dimensions of the SG theory which are to be operationalized. The seven coding categories, as presented in figure 2, serve as focal points for the examination of the data. The collected data are to be coded based upon their applicability to the selected coding category. This classification shall enlighten the hypotheses testing process, which in turn shall allow the description of the relation between the post- Cold War HNSP and the SG concept.

C.3 Limitations

There are two obstacles this research may face. The first one is objectivity, regarding the degree of neutrality of the research. The second one is generalizability, entailing the applicability of the conclusions of the research in other cases.

In terms of objectivity, arguably, the method of content analysis, although it ensures the objectivity and systematicity of the research, it may lead to oversimplification. In this research, this obstacle shall be avoided. The operationalization of specific sub-variables that correspond to the theory facilitate the identification of the specific data needed to answer the research question posed. This ensured the applicability of the data that are to be scrutinized through the lenses of the theory and triangulated in the process of hypotheses testing.

In terms of generalizability, given that the selected theory-based case study is characterized as "most-likely" the potential confirmation or rejection of the hypotheses in the case at hand, does not validate the level of application of SG in every other case (Rohlfing, 2012, p. 202). That is to say, every national security policy is characterized by a different level of governance, which may be present in different variables of the same theory. This leads to a different security governance model. Hence, the limited generalizability of the present research. Although, as stated in Chapter 2, the constantly emerging SG practice is accompanied by limited academic discussion of SG theory in the national security policy context. Hence, the present research deals with the problem of limited generalizability, by serving either as a basis for the examination of future -national security based- cases, or as a valid comparative case study.

D. Empirical Design - Analysis

D.1 The defining factors of the Hellenic National Security Policy

Greece is geographically located in a crucial geo-political region that constitutes the heart of the crossroad between Europe, Africa and Asia. Its geographic composition consists of mountainous mainland and a long coastline with a multitude of islands and islets. From a geo-strategic point, the Greek insular complex of the Aegean Sea facilitates the supervision of sea communication paths from the Black Sea and the Middle East to North Africa and the European South. These constitute energy 'routes' for the transportation of strategic raw materials to the West. The mainland and insular Greece accounts for the contact point of three continents, forming a unified and undivided defence area, which is of universal strategic importance and interest. Specifically, Crete, with its central location and aeronautical installations, serves as an outpost of western interests in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, operating as a control base for the sea communication lines passing across Suez and the Straits and the air communication lines across the Eastern Mediterranean (Militech, 2008).

The key location of Greece in the world map does not come without dire security needs. National Security is planned and developed in a particular strategic context that

constitutes the external envelope of the HNSP. The Greek National Strategy is briefly summarized in the following nine remarks and it is aimed towards (Militech, 2008):

- Safeguarding of the national sovereignty, independence and integrity against any threat;
- Supporting of national interests all over the globe;
- Endorsing Greece's European course;
- Underpinning Greece's role and the optimization of the benefits deriving from the participation in international organizations such as, but not limited to, the UN, the EU, NATO and OSCE;
- Strengthening the Hellenic stance in the Balkans, aiming to the gradual establishment of the country as a Balkan pillar for the EU;
- Ensuring the Greek active presence in the Balkan Sea and Eastern Mediterranean region;
- Supporting the development of an active and dynamic diplomacy in order to promote political security, partnership and peace in the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea;
- Endorsing the development of a multilateral financial, political, social and cultural cooperation in the Balkans and the wider Black Sea region aiming to preserve security, stability, financial and social growth;
- Highlighting the imperative role of the Greek State as a metropolitan center of Hellenism spread around the world.

In this context, the National Security Policy, being an integral part of the National Strategy, is called upon to serve the nation under the scope of the abovementioned objectives, as set by Greek government and its competent bodies. Particularly, the National Security Policy defines the way of employment of the national defence force, while it commands general defence affairs. It also maps the priorities and objectives, providing the necessary directions after taking into account the following variables: the internal and external environment, Greece's foreign relations and prospects, the present geo-political status, the national power sources, as well as the current and future threats against the security of the country (MILITECH, 2008).

The HNSP is guided by principles deriving from the Hellenic participation in a plethora of international treaties and agreements, the country's dedication to peace,

security and stability and the active participation and cooperation in the international setting for their consolidation. The peaceful policy of the country constitutes the fundamental principal of the HNSP, forging the latter as a mean for peaceful resolution of potential disputes and conflicts, yet an effective counter against threats of national security, given its political, financial and diplomatic toolkit. That being said, the key objectives of the HNSP are summarized in the following nine points (MILITECH, 2008):

- The preservation of peace and Greece's territorial integrity, national independence and safety of the population from internal or external threats;
- The safeguard of the Cypriot Hellenism's safety and the protection of Greek minorities abroad;
- The assurance of national security and defence means in order to establish sovereignty on land, in the air and at the Greek territorial waters;
- The provision of the capability for the conduct of land, sea and air strategic transportation;
- The promotion of regional stability, the de-escalation of neighboring conflicts and the establishment of balance in military means;
- The advancement of cooperative and friendly relations with neighboring states in the zone of national geo-political interest, from North Africa and Middle East to the Black Sea, Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean;
- The maximization of benefits deriving from international participation (UN, NATO, OSCE, EU), while respecting national obligations towards other parties;
- The contribution to the growth of national economy, especially via the domestic defence industry and the implementation of defence research and development programmes;
- The enhancement of the civilian sense of security by strengthening the unity and solidarity among people and national security actors.

Under this scope, the Greek security policy has evolved over the years accounting for a series of endogenous and exogenous factors that are influencing policy making on a national basis. Namely, the progressive Europeanization of the Hellenic foreign policy, the constant instability of the Greek-Turkish relations and the prevailing role of personalities in the decision making process. But most importantly the lack of an institutional body able to provide proactive assessments regarding a wide range of

security issues and coordinate internal and external crisis management mechanisms (Liaropoulos, 2008).

D.2 Introduction to the post-Cold war Greek National Security Environment

D.2.1 The 1990s

The dramatic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War somewhat justify its characterization as the "End of History"[2]. Although, history, certainly, did not end, a revolution was brought into the international security agenda, adding new phenomena and altering old ones. In this context, Greece was called upon to reprioritize its foreign policy and defence objectives so as to correspond to the emerging security needs of a fluid international environment where change was the only constant.

The disintegration of former Yugoslavia, accompanied with border readjustment, rendered the Balkan Peninsula a highly unstable zone, generating political instability and ethnic tension. In the awakening of the last decade of the 20th century, Greece came up against an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, a major diplomatic dispute over the name of the Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, as per 2018 "North Macedonia") and the revival of Albanian nationalistic arrogations. The aforementioned geo-political setting served as breeding ground for the evolution of complex non-traditional security threats, emerging outside of the conventional military sphere. The world entered the post- Cold War era, where NTS threats such as transnational crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, migration, extremism, ethnic conflict, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and environmental degradation were dominating the international security agenda. The newly emerging threats underlined the incapacity of a unilateral national approach. Bilateral and multilateral approaches risen as a necessity for the safeguard of national security (Liaropoulos, 2008).

[2] As quoted by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his book *"The End of History and the Last Man"* (1992).

Nevertheless, Greek security policy did not change as dramatically as that of other European states. For decades, the Hellenic security agenda has been dominated by the Turkish threat rather that from Russia. In the post- Cold War era, the HNSP remains Turkocentric. After 1995 Greek-Turkish relations significantly deteriorated leading to a barrage of tensions. Specifically, in January 1996, the two countries were on the verge of war ought to a dispute over Imia/Kardak islets. Three years later, the tension was revived, after the Turkish discovery that Greeks had sheltered the Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan (Moustakis & Sheehan, 2000). Greece, in an attempt to balance the Turkish power in the Aegean, was obliged to spend a higher quota of its GDP on defence, than any other western ally. Particularly, in November 1996, the Hellenic government announced a five-year armament program of US$14 billion, corresponding to the Turkish US$31 billion ten-year program announced seven months earlier (Tsakonas, 1999). However, a short of 'détente' was achieved between the two countries after the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999, where Greece withdrew its veto, allowing Turkey to be granted with an EU membership candidate status. This foreign policy shift was based upon the rationale of Europeanization of the eastern neighbors, a process that –according to the Greek perspective- would narrow the Turkish nationalistic tendency and mitigate the geopolitical dispute (Tsakonas, 2001).

On the whole, the end of the Cold War brought about a unique challenge for the Greek policy-makers, as they had to formulate a holistic policy that accounts for the emerging NTS threats, aligns with the EU and NATO status of the country, corresponds to the ever-changing geopolitical context and deals with traditional security concerns (Moustakis & Sheehan, 2000; Liaropoulos, 2008).

D.2.2 The 2000s

At the beginning of the 21st century Greece's relations with Turkey continued to dominate the HNSP agenda. Though, the foreign policy maneuvering in the 1999 Helsinki Summit marked a starting point to gradually move away from the "Turkish obsession", aiming towards a multi-dimensional HNSP.

Greek participation to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) alongside its contribution to the European Rapid Reaction Force through the country's

significant engagement in Operation Concordia (North Macedonia, 2003), reiterated the Hellenic commitment to the European security nexus. Similarly, Greece had an active role in the EU and NATO enlargement. Bulgaria's and Albania's admission to NATO in 2004 and 2009, respectively, was largely assisted by the greek foreign policy officials, while paving the way for the Cypriot membership to the EU in 2004 is still considered as the one of the greatest successes of the Hellenic diplomacy.

The above-mentioned developments are strongly tied to the HNSP as they translate into actions aimed to fortify the Hellenic geopolitical entourage via the Europeanization or Atlantization of its neighbors. Furthermore, Greece establishes external balancing, through its NATO and EU membership, as a signature move in the HNSP disposal, used to deter external threats deriving from its fragile neighborhood (Dokos, 2007).

Simultaneously, the new security environment brought about the need for a security sector reform aiming to revitalize and ameliorate the internal balancing capacity. The identified threats to the Hellenic national security were renewed including: incompetent governance, corruption, ethnic and religious conflict, illegal migration, smuggling (contraband, drugs, arms, and humans), WMD proliferation, organized crime, natural resources shortage, and terrorism (Dokos, 2007). In the 00s, security in Greece was no longer just a military concern. The preservation of the HNSP was not solely a matter of the MoD and the MFA. Interior ministries such as environment, transport, finance, health and internal affairs had become an inextricable part of the HNSP given the blurred distinction between external and internal security following the emergence of non-traditional threats (NTS). A textbook example of such cooperation is depicted below (Figure 3) in the Greek Anti-terrorist mechanism organizational structure.



Figure 3 Dokos, T. (ed) (2007) Greek Security Policy in the 21st Century, p. 8

The chart demonstrated that the 'workflow' in combating terrorism is divided among six ministries, five agencies and four task forces. Most of these actors combined forces to tackle one of the most menacing internal threats of modern Greek history, that of the '17 November' terrorist organization. The terrorist group which had been operating in Greece since the 1970s and was responsible for the death of 23 Greek and foreign politicians, was successfully dismantled in 2002, in an effort that is considered to be the greatest success of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) until the present day (Dragonas, 2021).

The necessity of involvement of multi-functional stakeholders in preventing a NTS such as terrorism alarmed the HNSP officials, who concluded that '17 November' could have been caught earlier whether better coordination, cooperation and jointness had been achieved. In this regard, the idea of establishment of an 'umbrella organization' able to supervise and monitor transectoral communication and ensure horizontal and vertical coordination, gained more and more ground. This idea was translated into the creation of a National Security Council which would lead a holistic approach to the forecasted challenges in the security sector for the coming decade, namely:

a. the development and maintenance of highly trained and motivated officers,
b. the increase of professionalism throughout ranks,
c. the acceleration of inter-agency cooperation,

d. the development of a security culture via the deployment of civilian experts and the improvement of education both in professional and student capacity,
e. the confrontation of chronic inefficiencies of the Greek public administration system, so as to set the security sector reform into motion (Dokos, 2007, p. 8).

In other words, the establishment of a National Security Council, was viewed at the time, as a 'Trojan Horse' for the promotion of a radical reform in the security sector, one that would satisfy the needs of a contemporary western state. However, the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis critically damaged the Greek economy, monopolizing the interest of PA officials. The security sector reform was put on hold and even worse, Greece did not manage to reap the benefits of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games security legacy. High quality infrastructure, personnel, equipment, good practices and expertise were not properly exploited, leading Greece to the modern security landscape of the second decade of the 21st century with an inefficient national security apparatus.

D.2.3 From 2010 until 2020

The deep economic and fiscal crisis severely affected defence expenditure at the threshold of the next decade. The urgent need for the reduction of public deficit and the control of public debt lead to the implementation of concomitant austerity measures, bringing about unprecedented budget cuts.



Figure 4 Dokos, T. & Kollias, C. (2013). Greek Defence Spending In Times Of Crisis: The urgent need for defence reform, p. 5



Figure 5 Dokos, T. & Kollias, C. (2013). Greek Defence Spending In Times Of Crisis: The urgent need for defence reform, p. 5

Defence spending was not an exception. Similarly to most European countries, the Greek defence budget begun to shrink in 2009, recording a significant cutback of 0,9% between 2009 and 2010 (Figure 2). It is also noteworthy that the Greek GDP was falling, at the time, in an unprecedented rate (-3.1% in 2009, -4.9% in 2010 and -7.1% in 2011) revealing the real magnitude of the reduction of the Greek defence budget (Dokos & Kollias, 2013, p. 5). Figure 5 constitutes an ever more realistic representation of the budget cuts in Greece. The -28.9% downscale in Greek defence expenditure was significantly more comparing to other EU countries, such as Portugal (-7.9%), Ireland (-9.7%) and Spain (-15.1%), which were severely struck by the financial crisis at the same period (Dokos & Kollias, 2013, p. 6).

In view of the above, despite its dire economic and fiscal position, Greece managed to maintain sizeable armed forces, given that Turkey continued to dominate the HNSP agenda, under a different cloak, however. From 2014 onwards, migration has been the bone of contention among the Greek-Turkish relations. Greek maritime and land borders represent an entry point for irregular migrants and asylum seekers transiting though Turkey.

Arrivals to Greece 2014-2020			
Previous years	Sea arrivals	Land arrivals	Dead and missing
2020*	7,569	2,072	-
2019	59,726	14,887	70
2018	32,494	18,014	174
2017	29,718	6,592	59
2016	173,450	3,784	441
2015	856,723	4,907	799
2014	41,038	2,280	405

Figure 6 Dimitriadi, A. (2020) Refugees at the Gate of Europe, p. 3

As depicted above (Figure 6), approximately 1.2 million people arrived in Greece between 2014 and 2020 accounting for more than 10% of the country's population. The continuous influx in combination with the lack of infrastructure has brought islands and local communities to a boiling point. The current government prioritizes migration in the HNSP agenda, however the steps taken to tackle the issue are ostensible at best. The containment strategy, aiming to confine migrants to hotspots, further escalates the humanitarian crisis, while the absence of comprehensive planning on migration policy proves that Greece 'bites more than it can chew' in this front (Dimitriadi, 2020).

All the more, the EU - Turkey Statement on Migration in 2016, which mostly focused on border controls and the reduction of irregular migratory flows, did not alleviate the situation (Manoli & Dokos, 2017). Turkey over the past seven years did not hesitate to violate the agreement as a means to put pressure on the European side for the provision of more benefits and resources. Greece stands in the middle of this of this transaction, suffering the consequences of the EU-Turkey occasional disputes. The Evros border crisis, in February and March 2020, constitutes the capstone of the ongoing migration issue. The instrumentalization of migration by the Turkish authorities was translated among HNSP officials as a NTS threat, namely an orchestrated operation aiming to provoke Greece's inability to defend its border against a few hundred unarmed civilians (Tzimas, 2021). Greece was found trapped between a rock and a hard place, invoking article 78 (3)[3] for the justification of the suspension of asylum at the expense of border defence (Dimitriadi, 2020). However, the EU and the

[3] The Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) accommodates for the adoption of provisional measures in emergency migratory incidents at the EU's external borders.

international public opinion, responded immediately, reading the situation and assessing the Turkish intentions, standing by the Greek side and denouncing the Turkish opportunism (BBC, 2020).

After providing a descriptive contour of the HNSP, including its objectives and its challenges over the past three decades, the thesis at hand proceeds to the analysis part. In this chapter, the evolution of the HNSP will be examined through the dimensions provided by the security governance theory.

D.3 Analysis: The post-Cold War Hellenic National Security Policy through the lenses of the security governance theory

D.3.1 The geographical Scope

From a geographical standpoint the HNSP course over the last thirty years is characterized by decentralization. In the 1990s the Greek security policy was a matter of few, namely the Ministry of National Defence (MoD), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the acting Prime Minister (PM), while the armed forces and the diplomatic corps served as the executive bodies for the HNSP directives.

Through the 2000s, internal security needs lead to the supra-national and the intra-national expansion of the actors involved in the HNSP. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Hellenic Police (HP) gained an important role in national security planning, while smaller sub-national actors and agencies, such as the HP anti-terrorist unit, the Coast Guard and the General Secretariat for Civil Protection, became indispensable elements of the HNSP.

The next decade, the migration crisis brought a wider geographical fragmentation in the HNSP planning. The Greek islands of Aegean do not only host migrants and asylum seekers. Military personnel, civilian personnel, national and international NGOs, civil servants, humanitarian workers, translators and journalists formulate a fragile mosaic that co-exists alongside local communities. That being said,

the HNSP accounts for a series of non-traditional security actors, which may or may not belong in the public sphere or even in a close geographical proximity.

Furthermore, the geographical expansion of the HNSP is, also, prevalent in the country's participation in several EU CSDP, NATO and UN missions over the course of the last three decades. Greece provided both military and civilian personnel – according to the mission's nature – for EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea, EUMM Georgia, EUTM Mali, EUAM Ukraine, EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, KFOR and RSM Afghanistan among others (Triantafyllou, 2020). The active participation of the country in international security assemblages attests to the fact that geography does not pose an obstacle for modern NTS threats, rendering unilateral approaches obsolete. Hence, national defence planning counts on the inclusion of intra-national, national, supra-national and global actors that belong either in the public or the private sphere, moving away from the centralized state-based approach of the 1990s.

D.3.2 The functional scope

The harsh reality when it comes to planning for the Hellenic security is that relations with Turkey have been, are and always will be the most important variable to account for. Though, Greece, over the course of the last three decades is making progress in managing the "Turkish obsession", planning for a series of NTS threats that are not exclusively state-based.

The expansion of the functional scope the HNSP over the years is prevalent by the evolution of the composition of the Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA). KYSEA is the supreme decision-making body on national defence and foreign policy issues, and its decisions are binding for all parties. Since its establishment, in 1986, its composition was subjected to change more than once. Through the 1990s, KYSEA used to host the Prime Minister, who was presiding over the meeting, the foreign affairs Minister, the national defence Minister as well as the Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS). The blurred distinction between internal and external security in the beginning of the 21st century and the rise of terrorism as a major internal security challenge, brought about the

addition of the head of the Public Order Ministry (currently Citizen Protection Ministry). The next decade, the migration crisis led to the inclusion of the Minister for shipping and island policy, leading to its eventual synthesis which stands still until the present day. It is worth mentioning that the Ministry for Migration Policy (MMP) is represented in KYSEA, as from 2019 onwards the MMP has become an integral part of the Citizen Protection Ministry (Triantafyllou, 2020).

On a last note, the Hellenic participation to the UN, NATO and the EU (ESDP) has played a vital role in the thematic expansion of the HNSP, integrating a plethora of 'low-politics' matters, such as environment, trade, technology and peacekeeping among others. Most importantly, the acquired experience of the participating military officers and civilian personnel has long been serving as the locomotive for the modernization of the HNSP, familiarizing the HNSP with good practices, state-of-the-art equipment, training drills and organizational methods, fostering the spirit of jointness among the military branches and cultivating openness for the inclusion of civilian experts and other non-military actors.

D.3.3 The distribution of resources

Since the 1990s there have been systematic efforts for the development of a defense industry that would satisfy the national military needs, limit the dependency on foreign military suppliers and increase the participation of domestic manufacturers. From a technological standpoint the endeavor was partly a success, given that domestic defense industries produced a wide range of equipment that covered the needs of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the defence equipment exports were very limited. All the more, the national defence industry faced a series of financial problems that seriously affected its viability: small size of domestic market, inefficient management methods, delayed response to technological advancements and, consecutively, to the changing needs of the Greek military (Dokos, 2007) Most importantly, military assistance programs, bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding with EU countries as well as the US and Russia, severely damaged the competitiveness of the domestic defence industry.



Figure 7 Dokos, T. & Kollias, C. (2013). Greek Defence Spending In Times Of Crisis: The urgent need for defence reform, p. 7

The pie chart (Figure 7) breaks down the distribution of resources in terms of importing conventional arms between 2000 and 2011, a period when Greece ranked 5th in the list of conventional weapons importers worldwide. Germany ranks higher among the EU exporters to Greece, accounting for 45%, followed by France (23%) and the Netherlands (12.5%) (Dokos & Kollias, 2013).

The increased reliance of the HNSP on foreign suppliers resulted in the privatization of several state-owned industries, opting for competitiveness and survival. As per 2019, the Greek defence industry consists of 51 firms –the majority of which are private- that appear to produce defence related material in a regular basis (HELDIC, 2019). Notwithstanding, more than 140 firms are members of the Greek Manufacturers of Defence Material Association (SKEPY). These firms are part of the wider 'defence sector', but engage in a highly divergent set of industrial activities to earn the vast majority of their annual turnover.

On the whole, it is noticeable that Greek defence expenditure is highly decentralized among multilateral obligations (NATO), international imports (US, Russia, Germany, France, the Netherlands etc.), public defence material suppliers and private manufacturers.

D.3.4 Interests

As far as the interest dimension is concerned, the HNSP is not confronted with divergent interests in its internal planning and execution. While the country's friction

with the private sphere is gradually increasing under the umbrella of the HNSP, private influence, accompanied by the protection of vested interests, does not –yet- reach the level of HNSP planning.

On the other hand, the growing reliance of the HNSP on external balancing (UN, NATO, EU etc.), has repeatedly demonstrated that is incapable of meeting the Hellenic expectations, creating an obvious 'expectations-reality gap' that is illustrative of the divergent interests (Tsakonas & Tournikiotis, 2003). The international community, over the years has adopted a balanced approach regarding the Turkish-Greek relations, acknowledging the importance of both actors in the western security mosaic. Even after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974, NATO and the UN, served a 'referee' role that focused on peacemaking rather than returning to the status quo ante. The years to come were characterized by disillusionment for the HNSP, leading to a breakthrough for the Greek strategic thinking, stressing the importance for the development of internal balancing capabilities to cover for the neutrality of the international community.

Similarly, 22 years later, the US maintained a moderate role in the Turkish invasion of the Imia/Kardak islets, confirming the pattern of neutrality, reminding the HNSP officials that Greece needs to provide for its own security against any wrongdoings from the Turkish side.

The migration crisis verified, once again, that the external agents of the HNSP serve differentiated interests comparing to the Greek ones. Europe proved its inability and its unwillingness to showcase solidarity, limiting its interference to the provision of financial assistance to Greece, while making ostensible agreements with Turkey that only prolong the crisis. This stance attests to the fact that Greece is Europe's 'shield' only in rhetoric, as the undertaken burden is disproportionate to the capacity and capability of the HNSP (Dimitriadi, 2020).

D.3.5 Norms

External balancing has been the norm in the Greek national security discourse since the establishment of the modern Greek state in 1827. Greece, being a relatively small power, acknowledges its limited role and influence in the international system.

One of the country's national strategy priorities –extending to the HNSP- is to participate in international or regional security assemblages, so as to reap the deriving benefits in profit of its national security, ensuring the ultimate goal of survival. Greece's active participation in the UN, NATO and the EU demonstrates its willingness to insource sovereignty in a supranational level so as to cover for its inability to deal alone with the Turkish threat and bind its interests with that of security-providing hegemons, thus strengthening its status in the international state system (Tsakonas & Tournikiotis, 2003).

However, external balancing and insourcing of sovereignty is not merely practiced for national strategy purposes. Cost-effectiveness can, nowadays, be found among the highest principals when it comes to defence expenditure. Reiterating to the previous sub-chapter, Greece has moved far away from the 1990s arms race with Turkey. Defence budget cuts rose as a necessity in the aftermath of the 2007 recession. Despite the fact that the country managed to maintain a critical mass of its armed forces intact, national authorities did not achieve to go through with the security sector reform, while the qualitative and technological advancement of the police and the armed forces is progressing in an extremely slow pace. That being said, it is more than evident that Greece should manage its limited resources in HNSP in a smart way, while taking maximum benefit of EU's concept of 'Pooling and Sharing', NATO's 'Smart Defence' concept, bilateral and multilateral security arrangements, joint training opportunities, cooperative schemes, and the use of new technologies.

D.3.6 The decision making process

In many countries, including Greece, the concept of a holistic security governance approach constitutes an overlooked priority which is gradually starting to emerge as a necessity in the formation of national security policies. Throughout the 90s, Greece was characterized by deep-seated departmentalism, with different ministries being responsible for the planning and development of policies in their respective field. The structural rigidity of public institutions had nurtured the perception that diverse problems must be addressed independently by the respective ministry or agency, while cross-sectoral coordination was either inexistent or took place on an ad hoc basis (Triantafyllou, 2020). This led to a barrage of disastrous failures in mid and late 90s, concerning the Imia/Kardak and the Ocalan cases respectively.

In the policy area of Migration, it was not until the matter arose as an urgent security challenge in 2014 that an actual structure responsible for the management of the migration crisis was created. Two years later, via the Presidential Decree 123 of 2016, the Ministry of Migration Policy (MMP) was established, assuming full responsibility and taking the burden off the Ministry of Interior in coping with the vast migration flows. Ever since, the MMP is responsible for cross-ministerial coordination (horizontal coordination) and coordination among local and regional authorities, national and international NGOs as well as other civil society actors (vertical coordination) (Triantafyllou, 2020).

Reiterating to the example of KYSEA, its evolution over the last decades suggests that more and more stakeholders are added to the decision making process, bringing divergent perspectives and expertise to the table of negotiations, attesting to the complexity of NTS threats. For instance, during the 1990s, Greek security concerns were primarily geopolitical and state-based, calling for a diplomatic or military approach. The next decade terrorism dominated the HNSP, demanding a higher contribution on behalf of police, anti-terrorism units and the NIS in the battle against '17 November' and the provision of citizen protection throughout the 2004 Olympics in Athens. Similarly the continued rise of NTS threats in the next decade, such as irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling, caused the further fragmentation of the decision making process. The Greek islands that held most of the migratory flows gained a representative voice at the table of negotiations through the presence of the Minister for shipping and island policy.

The evolution of KYSEA, shows in itself the parallel development of the HNSP with the security governance concept. KYSEA's expansion over the years attests to the fact that the HNSP decision making is no longer a centralized procedure. It is a fragmented negotiation process that brings divergent perceptions into discussion, towards the discovery of the optimal solution that accounts for most –if not all- the aspects of modern NTS threats.

D.3.7 The policy implementation

Through the 1990s the narrow scope of Hellenic security demanded action from the armed forces and the diplomatic corps. The main security concerns revolved around geopolitical issues and could be addressed either with diplomatic means (North Macedonia name issue, Albanian ethnic tension, Ocalan case) or with a combination of diplomatic and military means (Imia/Kardak incident).

The next decade, the complexity of internal threats served as breeding ground for the fragmentation of the HNSP implementation. The Hellenic Police, the National Intelligence Service, the General Secretariat for Citizen Protection, the Special Forces and the national anti-terrorist branch were tasked with the alleviation of the terrorist threat, as well as the provision of security throughout the 2004 Olympics.

The past five years, due to the multiplicity of the migration crisis, constituting a humanitarian and socio-economic issue, the HNSP heavily relies upon the voluntary action of national and international NGOs, humanitarian workers and civil servants, for the mitigation of the boiling atmosphere in the islands of Aegean and the north-eastern border of Evros. In fact, the Hellenic military and police forces are tasked to provide a safe environment for the smooth operation of such voluntary organizations, proving that the implementation of the HNSP is no longer a centralized authoritative process that solely depends upon traditional security actors.

E. Reflection on empirical findings – Conclusion

E.1 Assessing the level of application of the Security Governance concept to the HNSP

E.1.1 The gradual HNSP shift from government to governance

The evolution of the HNSP could be parallelized with that of the governance concept, as presented in chapter 2. In the 1990s, the threat perception in Greece was deriving, almost explicitly, from the external environment. The end of the Cold War did not change the underlying rationale of the HNSP, which was heavily oriented in deterring the Turkish threat. Although, several additions were made to the threat landscape, including geopolitical instability in the Balkans and the rise of NTS threats. Nonetheless, Greece was unprepared and incompetent to deal with the rising security environment. The centralized and strictly hierarchical decision making process did not allow for the modernization of both the HNSP theory and practice. The strong institutional and organizational rigidities of KYSEA served as blinders for the HNSP, given that the country did not have a holistic security plan that would account for the state's smooth transition from the era of bipolarity to that of the US hegemonic stability. At the time, Greek practitioners perceived the change in international power balance as a threat. Greece during the 1990s was dominated by a strong sentiment of insecurity, which led to a wasteful arms race against Turkey from 1995 to 1999, which has proven to be a monumental mismanagement of national resources for the years to come. Arguably, throughout the 1990s the Greek security thinking was simulating the dictations of the classic PA, heavy relying its security policy upon the rule of international law, making decisions in the name of national sovereignty -leading to illogical budget allocations to the national defence industry- and last but not least, feeding on the hegemony of professional public servants with no knowledge or expertise in the security field.

Similarly, it can be defended that the 2000s simulate Osborne's New Public Management (NPM) concept. At the time, Greece gradually steers away from the Turkish monopoly in national security planning, opting for an increased international engagement in security assemblages, with a view to strengthen its position in the

western security nexus and fortify its vulnerable geopolitical entourage. Simultaneously, the Greek foreign and security policy are gradually being Europeanized, leading to the slow but steady modernization of the HNSP thinking. Furthermore, the need to combat an internal NTS threat posed by '17 November' in 2001, alongside the vital import of equipment, knowledge and expertise in regards to the security management of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, contributed to the update of the greek security thinking, elevating internal security planning as an integral part of the HNSP. Furthermore, the Greek accession to the European Monetary Union (EMU) facilitated the import of weapons in a fraction of the cost of the defence material provided by the domestic security industry. That being said, reiterating to the main argument of this paragraph, the Hellenic security thinking in the 2000s imitates the NPM concept as national security policy is no longer viewed as a 'black box', given that more and more ministries, agencies and units started participating in the security policy planning and execution. At the same time, the mitigation of external threats through the increased international engagement allowed for the norm of cost-efficiency to become number one priority in defence spending, an evolution that did not only rose as an option but became a necessity following the devastating effect of the 2007 financial crisis on the Greek economy. On a last note, the first decade of the 21st century is the decade of disillusionment for the HNSP, as the Greek officials and the public opinion gradually begin to realize the expectations – reality gap in external balancing that comes as a derivative from binding national interests with hegemonic security providers or collective security alliances. This development constitutes a 'lesson learned' from the 1990s, highlighting that the international law does not constitute a 'panacea' for the promotion of the HNSP demands to the international fora. This realization, however, up until the present day, does not come with a public admission, nor is it visible in the HNSP planning, mainly owing to the country's weak financial and demographic capacity in relevance to its long-lasting rival.

In continuance of the developed parallelization, the second decade of the 21st century could be characterized as the New Public Governance (NPG) decade for the HNSP. Despite the vast budget cuts of the early 2010s, Greece maintained a significant defence force, owing to the gradual deterioration of the country's relations with Turkey. The revitalized rivalry owing to the 2014 migration crisis brought dramatic changes to the HNSP planning and practice. First and foremost, Greece was obliged to put forward

a plural state, emphasizing on the achievement of viable inter-organizational relationships, not only between external and internal public security actors, as happened in early 2000s, but among a plethora of public, private and voluntary intra-national, national and international agents. These stakeholders rose as indispensable NTS actors, counterbalancing the functional deficiencies of the HNSP towards the migration crisis, while expanding the geographical scope of the Hellenic security. Radical changes were also brought about to the decision making and policy implementation field, given that the intertwined nature of the actors involved has created 'heterarchical' centers of influence, able to negotiate the planning and application of the HNSP in terms of the migration crisis. As far as the policy implementation is concerned, the Hellenic Police and the armed forces presence in the Aegean islands provides a safe environment for the operation of humanitarian workers, civil servants, journalists, translators etc., forming a civil-military mosaic of public, private and voluntary actors. The work of those actors is assessed based upon the provided outcomes, imitating the New Public Governance concept. On a last note, one could argue that defence spending in 2010s simulates Osborne's NPG rationale of boosting competition among the stakeholders in order to procced to good value purchases. Greece seems to have adopted a similar strategy in defence spending, distributing its defence budget among international imports and the domestic security market, which is gradually recovering, mainly due to its extensive privatization over the last decade.

E.1.2 The locomotives of change

The national-anti terrorism mechanism

Terrorism had been lurking in Greece since the 1970s, reaching its peak in June 2000, following the assassination of the British attaché Brigadier Stephen Saunders by the '17 November' terrorist group. Up until that time, terrorism had been an internal security threat, often underestimated by the national security officials. The National

Intelligence Service (NIS) and the independent counterterrorist unit (CTU) of the Hellenic Police had been the most important actors in combating terrorism, without any success, however. The NIS lacked expertise in terms of understanding the modus vivendi of terrorist groups, while it was understaffed, ill-equipped and criminally unprofessional. The CTU was equally unprofessional, lacking a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, while the constant leadership changes disrupted continuity in the collection and assessment levels (Nomikos, 2004).

The assassination of Stephen Saunders pointed the British attention to the Greek anti-terrorism mechanism, offering the NIS and the CTU the necessary know-how capacity to deal with terrorist groups. The contribution of the British was immense. They introduced Greeks with systematic and more thorough examination techniques of the existing evidence, state-of-the-art technological methods of analysis, advice on how to prepare and alert the Hellenic society, and last but not least, crucial professional mindset (Nomikos, 2004). Most importantly, the British brought it the culture of jointness and information sharing in dealing with such complex NTS threats, leading to the formulated anti-terrorism scheme shown in figure 3 (chapter 4), which stand still until the present day. In the meantime between the Saunders assassination and the hosting of the 2004 Athens Olympics, the Greek government reacted to strong internal and external pressure, re-evaluating all measures and policies against terrorist threats, elevating internal security to the top of the HNSP agenda, in an attempt to boost the effectiveness of its security apparatus. In 2001 the NIS was brought under the command of the Minister of Public Order, launching a wide anti-terrorist campaign, aiming to discourage sympathy regarding the ’17 November’ actions and denounce the group’s ideology (Nomikos & Liaropoulos, 2010 The next step was the NIS reform, in 2002. Its agenda was broadened, including areas formerly controlled by the HP, such as illegal migration, organized crime and drug trafficking. Simultaneously, the NIS operational framework was strengthened via the use of augmented electronic surveillance capabilities, while its civilian personnel was increased in contrast to police and military staff. Also, the NIS was compelled to submit annual activity reports to the Hellenic Parliament, increasing oversight, accountability and institutional transparency (Dragonas, 2021).

The migration crisis management

The management of the migration crisis is an ongoing challenge faced by the Greek government, exceeding the limits of the HNSP, but including several aspects of it. As mentioned in chapter 4, since 2014, Greece has become the main entry point for thousands of people from Africa, Asia and the Middle-East. Political and economic instability and war in various regions has skyrocketed the amount of migrants and asylum seekers entering the country from the eastern sea borders or by land, overcrowding the islands' reception and identification centers (RICs). The efforts to decompress the situation has been extremely slow, mainly due to the limited availability of accommodation in the Aegean islands and mainland Greece. The central priority of the crisis management response has been the expansion of reception schemes in order to alleviate human suffering and facilitate site management procedures. Under this scope, covering the beneficiaries' vital needs (shelter, sanitation, water and food) and ensuring that assistance is mainstreamed within a safe environment have been Greece's high priorities.

The Greek government, under the auspices of the Ministry for Migration Policy (MMP), holds a coordinating role, ensuring the safe and viable cooperation among relevant stakeholders such as the Reception and Identification Service (RIS), UN agencies, governmental counterparts, NGOs and charities. For the management of this NTS crisis, a Steering Committee convenes regularly in purpose of monitoring the progress of emergency response and coordinating the activities of the aforementioned stakeholders, including the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Health. Simultaneously, a plethora of sector working groups is taking place, shouldered with the coordination of technical site management, protection, education, health, integration and accommodation. These groups are not only supervised by the Greek authorities, but they report to a plethora of supra-national institutions such as the European Commission/DG Home, the International Organization for Migration, the UN Refugee Agency and UNICEF (IOM, 2020).

Under this scope, the Hellenic Armed Forces, the Hellenic Police and the Coast Guard, the three main national security providers in terms of the migration crisis management, are cooperating to provide a safe environment for the stakeholders. The Evros border incident in early 2020, was deemed by the Greek officials and the public

opinion as a successful crisis management operation, showing that Greece will not be "bullied" into accepting more people than it can host, prioritizing the security and well-being of the hosted refugees as well as its own population.

E.1.3 The Security Governance concept and the HNSP: reviewing the set hypotheses

After reflecting on the transition of the HNSP from government to governance, this section makes a more targeted approach, aiming to answer the research question posed as *to what extent does the security governance framework apply to the development of the post- Cold War Hellenic National Security Policy?*

The application of the seven dimensions of the SG theory to the HNSP has lead the research to the formation of the following table, upon which the seven hypotheses (H) are to be reviewed:

	90s	00s	10s
Geographical scope	PM, MoD, MFA	+ NIS, HP, HP, national anti-terrorist unit, Coast Guard, General Secretariat for Civil Protection	+ National and international NGOs, civil servants, humanitarian workers
Functional scope	KYSEA comprising of the PM, the Minister of national defence and the Chief of the HNDGS	+ Public Order Ministry (current Citizen Protection Ministry)	+ Citizen Protection Ministry (including the MMP), Ministry for Shipping and Island Policy
Distribution of resources	Domestic - nationalized defence industry	Arms imports from the EU (Germany, France and the Netherlands), the USA and Russia	International imports, domestic – private and public defence material suppliers
Interests	External balancing	Realization of the expectations – reality gap	Development of internal balancing capacity
Norms	Insourcing sovereignty to supranational level to achieve external balancing	Insourcing sovereignty to supranational level for cost-effectiveness purposes	Increased engagement to multinational security arrangements aiming towards a qualitative upgrade of the HAF
Decision making	Centralized to KYSEA, focusing on external security	Inclusion of actors that deal primarily with internal security	Fragmented negotiation process accounting for traditional and NTS actors
Policy implementation	HAF and the Hellenic diplomatic corps	+ HP, NIS, General Secretariat for Citizen Protection, Special Forces, national anti-terrorist unit	+ Voluntary action of national and international NGOs, humanitarian workers and civil servants

Figure 8 The evolution of the HNSP through the lenses of the security governance theory

H. 1 *From a geographical standpoint, the HNSP governance extends beyond state and region, incorporating sub-national and global actors that do not solely belong to the public sphere.*

From a geographical perspective, a 'downwards', 'upwards' and 'sideways' expansion is noticed, evolving from a state-centralized HNSP in the 90s, to a more inclusive and decentralized to internal security actors HNSP in the 00s, reaching the multifaceted and highly decentralized HNSP of the past decade, incorporating a plethora of sub-national, regional and global actors, both from the public and private sector.

H. 2 *The HNSP accounts for political, social and environmental risks, embracing a broad functional scope that does not purely concentrate on military affairs.*

Similar to the geographical scope, the functional scope has become deeper and more inclusive. External security does no longer holds the primacy as happened back in the 1990s. The rise of internal security at the top of the HNSP agenda in the 2000s attests to the need for the incorporation of the Public Order Ministry in the HNSP planning. What is more, the unprecedented NTS issue of irregular migration in the 2010s called for the functional specialization of the Ministry for Migration Policy and the Ministry for Island Policy and Shipping, added to the existing HNSP stakeholders.

H. 3 *Under the umbrella of the HNSP, the distribution of resources is fragmented among public and private actors and not centralized in state authorities.*

Continuing in the same vein, a fragmentation of budgetary expenses is noticed throughout the last three decades. The 2007 financial crisis pushed Greek defence spending abroad, damaging the national defence industry which was gradually privatized. Nowadays, the HNSP budget is divided among international imports, the domestic security industry and private manufacturers.

H. 4 *The interests being served by the agents of the HNSP are not common, but differentiated.*

The interest dimension presents great interest for the HNSP, corroborating Krahmann's claim regarding the hesitation of states to actively engage into international

security when their core interests are not directly affected. The HNSP, follow the years of disillusionment in the 2000s is gradually moving away from its reliance on external stakeholders, trying to build its internal balancing capacity.

H. 5 *The HNSP does not prioritize ideological norms and appears to be flexible in limiting its sovereignty for the purpose of increasing cost-efficiency.*

The normative dimension, also, imitates the security governance concept, given that, Greece, despite having to deal with the long-lasting Turkish threat, is moving away from the past HNSP of military spending in the name of national sovereignty, seeking for cost-efficient choices, while ensuring the gradual qualitative upgrade of its armed forces through the participation in international security 'assemblages'.

H. 6 *The decision making process for matters concerning the HNSP is a fragmented process that is open to negotiations, rather than a centralized process that entails consensus.*

H. 7 *The implementation of the HNSP takes place in a fragmented and voluntary basis and it is not a centralized and authoritative process*

The decision making process, alongside the policy implementation have been the strongest indications that the HNSP governance resemblances Krahmann's security governance model. Reiterating to the 'locomotives' of change for the HNSP as described in the previous subchapter, the combat against terrorism in the 2000s and the ongoing migration crisis, have expanded the map of HNSP stakeholders both in terms of planning and execution. Nowadays, the HNSP decision-making process leans towards a fragmented negotiation model rather that a centralized hierarchical one, as it had been in the 1990s. HNSP decisions take into account both public and private interests, while incorporating the perspectives of 'heterachical' power centers formulated by supra-national institutions and international organizations. In similar manner, the policy implementation has been demilitarized, taking into account the need for the functional specialization of divergent actors in coping with contemporary NTS issues. Hence, the inclusion of a plethora of NTS actors such as several international institutions and organizations, charities, NGOs, private donors, humanitarian assistants, civil workers and volunteers.

On the whole, it is argued that all seven hypotheses are confirmed, setting the HNSP into a security governance track, imitating, on its own –indicatively slow- pace,

the evolution of western security policies. Although, the road is still very long, and Greece is still in the beginning. That is to say, several steps are to be taken in order to accelerates this process and make sure that the country does not get off track. Several suggestion in this direction shall be mentioned in the policy recommendation section.

E.2 Relevance of the study to security and social studies

The thesis at hand presents considerable value for the field of security and the social studies in general.

The research outcome attests to the fact that a national security policy with the peculiarities of the HNSP, is able to move in parallel with a western theory, such Krahmann's security governance model. This proves that more and more states, certainly within and probably outside the western world, inevitably engage into a degree of governance in regards to their security policy, aiming towards assimilating to the contemporary security landscape and, consecutively, ensure their survival.

The thesis at hand, also, achieves to elevate governance as a core element of a 'high-politics' matter, that of national security. It confirms the sectoral shift of governance from traditionally 'low-politics' fields, such as internal and judiciary affairs, public health etc. to fields responsible for the state survival, such as national defence, citizen protection etc. impacting all walks of global politics. All the more, it proves that a theory which was constructed to describe the evolution in international security practices in a supra-national level is starting to become common practice in national security policy ideation, planning and implementation.

Provided that every theory is a product of the dictations of any given era, security governance, as applied in a peculiar, yet 'most-likely' case, as the Greek one, covers the knowledge gap regarding the response of national security policies in view of the ever changing security landscape. Even more so, it suggests that concepts such as 'inclusion', 'fragmentation', 'negotiation', 'coordination', 'jointness', 'privatization' and 'cost-efficiency' constitute key words that are to be found –if not already included- in several national security apparata in the near future.

On a last note, reiterating to the main argument of the present thesis, the HNSP, in the course of the last three decades, has moved from an obsolete centralized national security policy with strong institutional rigidities and an even stronger predisposition for exclusion, to a relatively decentralized and inclusive security policy incorporating NTS actors to join action with traditional security stakeholders in combating NTS threats. This observation can be used as breeding ground for future researchers who wish to compare and contrast the evolution of Hellenic national security apparatus under divergent governance perspectives or pursue comparative case studies under the scope of the security governance theory.

E.3 Policy Recommendations - Conclusion

Reiterating to the closing sentence of the section E.1.3, Greece may be gradually synchronizing with the security governance concept, but several steps are to be taken in order to meaningfully modernize the HNSP and not just loading it with more and more reactive decisions that only touch the surface of contemporary NTS. Meaningful change comes in times of peace, so as the state is ready to cope with impediments that may arise in times of crisis. This phrase summarizes the element of security culture that is lacking in Greece, both in security stakeholders and in public opinion. That being said, the following three recommendations summarize the most important proactive measures voiced over the past decade, necessary to counter the chronic deficiencies of the HNSP.

The discussion in regards to the establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) should –finally- reach a fortunate end. Although NSC does not constitute a 'panacea', a permanent, rival institution to KYSEA could significantly ameliorate strategic security thinking and contribute to the modernization of the HNSP. A necessary prerequisite for this recommendation is the institutionalization of a National

Security Advisor position that would serve as a liaison between the two cabinets, monitor their competitiveness to a productive level and report directly to the Prime Minister. The role of the NSC, according to the international practice, shall entail the provision of detailed assessments in regards to the country's internal risks as well as external threats, co-shaping the national and foreign policy with the political leadership. What is more, drafting scenarios of potential threats, regular coordination of crisis management bodies in simulated activities shall ensure operational and tactical edge, providing valuable feedback regarding the readiness of the HNSP stakeholders in any given situation. Last but not least, the mixed staffing of the NSC, including military personnel, civilian experts, technocrats and field specialists is of outmost significance for the development of a civil/military culture, able to offer unique syntheses of views that correspond to the complexity of contemporary NTS threats.

The investment of political capital into the 'resurrection' of the undermined National Intelligence Service, elevating it to "*an 'umbrella' organization that orchestrates the intelligence policy among legislative and executive branches, Military, Police, Coast Guard as well as not traditional intelligence sources such as mass media, think tanks and the academia"* (Dragonas, 2021, p. 11). The blurred distinction between internal and external security nexus demands a holistic intelligence approach, one that understands the interconnectedness of modern threats such as terrorism, geopolitical instability, illegal migration, transitional crime, human trafficking, arms smuggling, political violence, social unrest etc. The NIS should become the center of analysis of such threats, coordinating the information flow among all HNSP stakeholders, ensuring their smooth cooperation and preventing potential intelligence failures. Given its pivotal role in the HNSP, it is further suggested that the NIS should be established under the greatest authority of the Hellenic State, that of the Presidency of the Hellenic Republic, ensuring that its staffing and oversight carries less political burden and the NIS is not susceptible to short-term political agendas.

Finally, but most importantly, any effort for a meaningful security sector reform would be in vain, unless a 'bottom-up' security culture is cultivated among the Hellenic society. In this view, government officials, mass media and any public figure that wishes to articulate arguments relevant to national security, should –at the very least- be at the same page when discussing delicate security matters linked with the core interest of state survival. In this regard, it is imperative to cultivate strategic

communication mechanisms, targeting the re-examination of government officials and public opinion's preconceived notions regarding national security practice and the nature of internal and external risks. The only shortcut to the missing element of 'pro-activeness' in the HNSP is the development of a new strategic security thinking on the basis of common ground.

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G. Abbreviation List

CJTF Combined Joint Task Forces

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

EMU European Monetary Union

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

EU European Union

HAF Hellenic Armed Forces

HNDGS Hellenic National Defence General Staff

HNSP Hellenic National Security Policy

HP Hellenic Police

KYSEA Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MMP Ministry for Migration Policy

MoD Ministry of (National) Defence

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-governmental Organization

NIS National Intelligence Service

NPA New Public Management

NPG New Public Governance

NTS Non-Traditional Security

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PA Public Administration

PM Prime Minister

SG Security Governance

SKEPY Greek Manufacturers of Defence Material Association

TS Traditional Security

UN United Nations

USA United States of America

WMDs Weapons of Mass Destruction