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Beijing Consensus: The effects of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment on Neopatrimonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Beijing Consensus

The effects of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment on Neopatrimonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Contents

Introduction	3
Chapter 1: “The Institutional Heritage of Neopatrimonial Rule”	5
Neopatrimonialism under the Washington Consensus.....	6
Chapter 2: The Answer from the East.....	8
Existing Theories.....	9
Chapter 3: Research Design.....	13
Method of Analysis.....	16
Results.....	17
Is there a decline in neopatrimonialism?.....	17
The correlation.....	17
Chapter 4: A Useful Side Effect.....	19
The Case of Nigeria.....	19
A Sigh of Relief.....	20
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion.....	22
 <i>Bibliography</i>	 24
<i>Appendix</i>	28

Introduction

Global trends of neopatrimonialism have been on the decline since the 1990s (Sigman & Lindberg, 2019, p. 2). Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (referred to interchangeably with Africa for the rest of the paper), this trend coincides with the transition from aid to investment from China that also took place in the 1990s (Morgan & Zheng, 2019, pp. 558-560). However, Africa is not unfamiliar with foreign investment. The region has increasingly received external finances in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) since the 70s (Anyanwu & Yaméogo, 2015, p. 347). It has been argued and accepted that the spheres of economic and political development are both independent and inherently interlinked (Ish-Shalom, 2006). Moreover, it has been theorised that economic growth leads to political development that establishes democracy (Ish-Shalom, 2006). Political development that establishes democracy implies a decrease in neopatrimonialism because most of its practices are incompatible with democratic processes (Englebert & College, 2000, p. 9). Why, therefore, did we not see a decrease in neopatrimonialism under the first wave of FDI and only begin to observe it under the Chinese wave? Is it something to do with China's approach particularly? The research question of this paper thus establishes itself in this puzzle, asking what is the effect of China's FDI in sub-Saharan Africa on neopatrimonialism? Understanding this is important because neopatrimonialism has widespread consequences on development and governance, therefore efforts towards demystifying its dynamics opens up a gateway through which policymakers might be more informed on how to approach its faces for a better functioning society.

I propose that the reason we see a change in levels of neopatrimonialism under FDI from China after years of prevalence under western investment is the difference in their approaches. The Eastern model of investment, namely the Beijing Consensus (BC), is more conducive to mitigating neopatrimonialism than the Washington Consensus (WC) of the West. The Washington Consensus is the set of liberal principles that aim to restructure a countries economy and are set forth as policy reforms required before capital is invested (Galchu, 2018, p. 2-3). Receiving finances from institutions that adhere to this model is contingent on the implementation of predetermined reforms. On the other hand, China's approach to outward investment is non-conditional and based

on principles of non-interference (Galchu, 2018, pp. 4-5). It is under this ‘no strings attached’ FDI that we observe decreasing levels of neopatrimonialism. This paper proceeds to suggest that the decrease is not due to explicit countermeasures taken by the BC, but rather that the decrease is an unintended consequence of self-determination.

Naturally, principles of non-conditionality and non-intervention imply that there are no policies enacted that directly address or rectify neopatrimonialism, and yet we observe a decrease in levels of neopatrimonialism. When presented with capital that is not contingent on reforms, governments, private and public actors have incentive and opportunity to self-determine reforms that increase access to and profitability of this capital. The reforms aim to create an environment that is more optimal to exploit the incoming capital and I theorise that this environment includes an unintended mitigation of neopatrimonial practices within acting institutions. Diminishing levels of neopatrimonialism are therefore firstly an indirect result of capital accumulation directives. Secondly, Africa’s colonial history bleeds into her states’ interactions with Western powers in the post-independence era, producing a relationship smeared with suspicion. Interventions such as the compulsory reforms of the WC are viewed as a threat to national sovereignty. In response, elites take actions to evade the demands of required reforms and such actions entail the exercise of a neopatrimonial regime. Neopatrimonialism is seen maintained and increasing under the WC because it is the tool by which state actors combat the implications of conditionality. FDI from China mitigates neopatrimonialism because it introduces the tenure of the BC which is void of conditionality and intervention, and thus void of necessity to employ neopatrimonial tactics. The BC does not actively counteract neopatrimonial practices, it simply creates an environment in which it is unnecessary to use them, therefore diminishing the neopatrimonial regime.

In order to explore this, I will take a qualitative approach, analysing existing theory and academic findings. I have also collected FDI and neopatrimonial indicator statistics for the time span of a decade in order to display the trend and analyse it. Lastly, I include an illustrative case to more extensively investigate and discover examples of the causal links at play. What follows is a conceptualisation of key terms, a discussion of existing theories and their limitations in explaining the phenomenon of increasing FDI from China and decreasing neopatrimonialism, the presentation of the results of my analysis and ending with a discussion and conclusion.

1.

“The institutional heritage of neopatrimonial rule”

A generally accessible definition of neopatrimonialism is made plain by Mkandawire (2015). He describes neopatrimonialism as an institutional arrangement in which leadership places allegiance and favour over bureaucratic process and qualification, materialising into the pursuit of personal interest and governance dominated by corruption, clientelism, patronage, prebends and unlawful rent-seeking (Mkandawire, 2015; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). It has been referred to as “big man” politics because it allows an individual or small group to concentrate power, and by operating outside of the rule of law they in essence raise themselves above the state. Beekers & van Gool (2012) define it from the perspective of Max Weber’s traditional patrimonialism in which what is patrimonial is these practices of patronage, clientelism and corruption that occur when there is a lack of the bureaucratic separation between the private and official spheres to the extent that bureaucracy breaks down. They insert that these practices are also found, and in most cases are embedded in modern formal institutions of government, operating alongside and even through the bureaucracy. This “dual political system in which patrimonial politics exist next to, and feed off, modern bureaucracies, has been described as neopatrimonialism” (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, pp. 11-12).

What are these practices that make up neopatrimonialism? Patronage refers to a relationship where the executive provides a job in return for allegiance from the receiver in a bid to maintain or obtain control, typically materialising as a governmental appointment (Kopecký, Scherlis, & Spirova, 2008; van de Walle, 2007; Lindberg, 2010, Kopecký, 2011; Tangri, 1999). Handing out a position in politics is not confined to nepotism alone as personnel drafted based on qualifications but outside of the designated bureaucratic procedure fall into the bracket of the patron-client dynamic (Kopecký, Scherlis, & Spirova, 2008, p. 4). Patronage can occur within the designated bureaucratic procedure when the candidate selected through the process is influenced by a personal motive.

The difference between patronage and clientelism lies mostly in the offer and the desired outcome. Patronage practices seek control over offices, policies and jurisdictions by providing jobs, whereas clientelist practices intend to purchase support or votes by giving away state resources - anything from the promise of jobs to money, food items, infrastructure, etc (Kopecký, Scherlis, & Spirova, 2008; Kopecký, 2011; Lindberg, 2003; van de Walle, 2007; Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). Clientelism is therefore defined as the trade of votes for benefits. A three-way distinction is made by van de Walle (2007) between the types of clientelism: tribute, mass and elite. Tribute, though no longer observed, resembles a barter system where in the traditional era, a gift was exchanged for a favour (van de Walle, 2007, p. 3). More present today is elite and mass clientelism. Elite clientelism consists of exchanges among the existing bourgeoisie and the one consequently being created and reinforced by the practice, and mass clientelism is concerned with the wider public: large groups are offered public services and goods in return for electoral support (van de Walle, 2007, p. 3). There is empirical evidence in various studies that supports a link between economic development and clientelism (Veenendaal, 2019; Kelsall, 2011, p. 76). However, as Veenendaal (2019) also notes, the mechanisms by which economic development eradicates clientelism are still underspecified (p. 1036).

Neopatrimonialism under the Washington Consensus

The kind of economic development Africa has known for the first part of recent history has been under the Washington Consensus. In 1989, John Williamson presented a paper that introduced ten economic policies, rooted in liberal ideals, he thought almost all of Latin America needed, and believed the majority of Washington would agree on – therefore acquiring the imaginative name of Washington Consensus (WC) (Kennedy, 2010, pp. 462-463). After the WC was made public, Williamson revisited the list to qualify and revise it. He acknowledged that there was disagreement on some points and lack of consensus entirely. Nevertheless, it had entered the international political and economic environment. The contemporary Bretton Woods institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) adopted the macroeconomic reforms of the WC and began implementing a further revised version of the WC in their move to restructure the economies of developing countries (Galchu, 2018, pp. 2-3) The core principles of the WC are: secure property rights; reallocation of public

funds to areas of high economic return and potential to enhance income distribution; fiscal discipline; tax reform where revenue is increased by a broad tax base together with moderate marginal tax rates; a competitive exchange rate; liberalisation of interest rates; liberalisation of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI); privatisation of state enterprises; and deregulation of entry and exit to industries (Galchu, 2018, p. 3). In order to receive finances, inquiring states are required to implement these policies.

At the same time, neopatrimonialism levels show an increase across Africa along with the universal push of the WC (Sigman & Lindberg, 2017). Not only did structural adjustment programmes increase debt in Africa by 500% between 1980 and 2004, but any morsel of economic growth that did occur did not mitigate neopatrimonialism in the way it is theorised to (Ismi, 2004, p. 12). Perhaps the lack of substantive results according to the objectives of the WC is due to the scrutiny with which African governments interacted with European powers after the colonial period (Galchu, 2018, pp. 5-7). In a study that compares the WC to the BC, Galchu (2018) publishes that post-independence African governments and nationals viewed Western engagement with suspicion and critique (Galchu, 2018, p. 2). These post-colonial reservations bear an influence on governments' respect for and implementation of the principles of the WC. If we consider this, then the principles of the WC might have been unsuccessful due to lack of commitment rather than a conditional approach being ineffective. However, it can be argued that because neopatrimonialism is embedded in the de jure and the de facto of governance, and that economic and political institutions are in constant interplay, then any action commissioned by the WC and carried out, whether to fullness or not, could cause an effect. For the reason that we see neopatrimonialism levels boosted, it can be assumed that the insertion of the WC principles contributed.

2.

The answer from the East

Here enters the contrast of the Beijing Consensus (BC) – the alleged answer from the East. Similar to the WC, the BC was a claim made by one man, Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004), as a title for the counter model from the East that he observed already in operation by the Chinese in the international economy (Kennedy, 2010, pp. 467-468). Ramo's (2004) Beijing Consensus refers to a model that is not based on any particular ideal seeking to be made universal, but that adheres to the belief of a multifaceted and contextual approach to economic development (Galchu, 2018, p. 4). As a result, there are no policy reforms necessary for the Chinese to engage financially. Where the WC has the aforementioned macroeconomic conditions dependent on each loan or investment, Chinese investment under the Beijing Consensus is based on principles of non-conditionality and non-intervention in domestic affairs (Galchu, 2018). These alternative principles are specifically: innovation-based development, economic success assessed according to sustainability and level of equality, and the principle of self-determination (Kennedy, 2010, p. 468).

Under the BC we have observed widespread economic growth on the continent, alongside infrastructural improvements. China-Africa trade increased by 700% in the 1990s resulting in China becoming Africa's leading trade partner in 2009 (Galchu, 2018, p. 5). According to a report made by China's Ministry of Commerce, China's direct investment in Africa was US\$6.6 billion for the years 2000-2006, however these figures were taken as an underestimation (Alden, C et al., 2008, p. 13). Chinese FDI in Africa was recorded at US\$44.3 billion in 2019 (CARI, 2021). Correspondingly, the economy has grown, save for the setbacks experienced globally due to the COVID-19 pandemic these past two years, and neopatrimonialism has decreased. Recent reports show a 6.58% increase of sub-Saharan African GDP from 2016-2017, followed by an increase of 4.83% in 2018, and 2.66% in 2019 (Macrotrends, 2021). It can be argued that economic growth cannot be credited only to Chinese FDI because there are other actors that invest in the continent and local initiatives as well. Although this is noteworthy, China's FDI is significantly larger than all other actors and that makes their contribution meaningful to economic growth (Ngundu & Ngepah, 2020). Moreover, the empirical works of Doku et al. (2017), Chen et al. (2015) and

Ngundu and Ngepaha (2020) demonstrate that FDI from China has advanced economic growth in Africa (Ngundu & Ngepah, 2020, pp. 384-393). As for the decline in neopatrimonialism, the tables in the Appendix of this paper present combined data that displays a trend of decrease, which is later explored in the results section of this paper.

In addition, Ngundu and Ngepah (2020) reiterate that the impact of FDI on growth probably depends on the “attributes and motives of the foreign investor” (Ngundu & Ngepah, 2020, p. 382). Since the attributes and motives of the Chinese are primarily found in the BC, we can assume that the aforementioned growth is caused partially by the principles of the BC and other direct or residual effects of the FDI can be attributed to the BC as well. One of these residual effects is a diminishing neopatrimonial state as demonstrated in the results of the analysis of this paper. Before contending for a new theory that proposes that the BC principles of non-conditionality and non-interference have caused the decline of the neopatrimonial regime across the continent, I will first discuss why existing theories are not sufficient to explain the decline.

Existing Theories

There are two theories that have largely been revisited and utilised when looking into China-Africa relations: Dutch disease and modernisation theory. When natural resources that are capital-intensive are abundant, opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour that ameliorates levels of corruption increase (Zafar, 2007, p. 107). Incentives for rent-seeking increase because entrepreneurial activities are crowded out by the natural resource market, therefore appropriating wealth using unproductive activities, such as practices of neopatrimonialism, is more profitable than engaging in productive activities to increase wealth (Kalcheva & Oomes, 2007, p. 6). This phenomenon is referred to and theorised as the Dutch Disease. It is applicable to the China-Africa paradigm because China has heavily invested in natural resources in sub-Saharan economies. Due to an increasing energy focus in China, natural resources such as oil, coal and hydropower are high on the foreign policy agenda (Alden & Alves, 2009, p. 3). Oil from African states, particularly Nigeria and Sudan, is included in 26% of China’s total oil import; in Zimbabwe, China has invested in improving the hydroelectric power stations and state companies and partnerships are putting millions into new coal mines (Alden & Alves, 2009, p. 7; China Dialogue, 2020). The natural

resource market has grown due to FDI from China and according to the Dutch Disease theory, we should see an increase in neopatrimonialism and a stagnation of economic growth. As previously stated, the economy, save for the pandemic, has not stagnated or relapsed, and for the effect on neopatrimonialism, the trend analysis of this paper reveals a decline. Moreover, it has been argued that the Dutch Disease does not always play out the same way but depends critically on the factor endowments of a country (Zafar, 2007, p. 108). A limited tradable sector, so one or few natural resources, adheres to the theory by resulting in contracting growth, however a large tradable sector usually results in increasing returns and so the theorised outcomes are not observed. The Dutch Disease therefore, is not comprehensive in its explanatory power on the effect of economic development, and therefore FDI from China, has on neopatrimonialism in Africa.

When we turn to modernisation theory, it does not expound much more. On the surface, modernisation theory has been advanced as the reinforcing relationship in which economic development results in more democratic forms of government (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009, p. 1). The general holding is that poor countries are less likely to be democratic. Firstly, this is a relevant and explanatory theory only to the extent to which democracy holds the implication of low levels of neopatrimonialism. In Diamond, Linz & Lipset's (1988) *Democracy in developing countries: Africa*, an empirical analysis of six case studies revealed that mass and elite clientelism, corruption, patronage, illicit rent-seeking and prebendalism – the ingredients of neopatrimonialism - all have roots in or precede the centralisation of power in a tyrannical or oligarchic manner, and have a general incompatibility with democratic procedure. According to these authors, democracy implies low levels of neopatrimonialism because democratisation requires it (Diamond, Liz & Lipset, 1988). Yet, it was later argued by van de Walle (2007) in *The Path from Neopatrimonialism: Democracy and Clientelism in Africa Today* that democratisation reinforces clientelism and therefore the dynamics of neopatrimonialism will not be eradicated but altered as democracy is successfully established (van de Walle, 2007, pp. 1-2). It thus cannot be expected that levels of neopatrimonialism would decrease and disappear as democratic forms of government are established because neopatrimonialism itself is a tool of these governments. As Bratton & van de Walle (1997) put it, in Africa, democratisation is an ongoing institution-building endeavour under the framework of “the institutional heritage of neopatrimonial rule”, not despite it (pp. 268-269).

Secondly, if poor countries are less likely to be democratic than rich countries, then countries increasing in wealth should show an increasing democratic form of government *ceteris paribus*. We could look at the research question through this lens with the expectation that as FDI from China increases state wealth, levels of neopatrimonialism will decrease due to increasing democracy, however, in addition to the conceptual holes in equating democracy with absence of neopatrimonial practices mentioned above, the popularised theory itself is delusive. Wucherpfennig & Deutsch (2009) amalgamate the works of notably Lipset (1959), Przeworski et al (2000), Acemoglu & Robinson (2005), and others to provide a sound and rounded discussion of the modernisation theory (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009). In this review, they illude to the fact that Lipset's modernisation theory has been quoted more than it has been studied (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009, p. 1). The first omission in contemporary uses of the theory is its probabilistic nature. The *chances* a nation can sustain democracy increase with its wealth (Lipset, 1959). The next, and most consequential for this paper, is the frequent omission of the fact that the modernisation theory is a description of the *socio-economic conditions* for democracy (Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009, pp. 1-2). Wealth is not a lone determiner of political development. The in-depth explanation of Lipset's (1959) modernisation theory is that industrialisation, urbanisation, education and wealth – socio-economic development – result in an inclusive class system and a broad middle class and that is what either triggers democratic transition or establishes democratic stability (Lipset, 1959; Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009). In other words, it is the resulting stronger human capital created when these conditions are met, such as a larger labour force with decreasing wage gap, that mobilises to establish more democratic forms of government. Be that as it may, FDI does not always go the socioeconomic route. For example, if China invests in mining yet employs Chinese workers and expertise, the state of the local labour force does not improve and so the socio-economic conditions for democratisation are not met. Because FDI does not always and is not required to develop human capital, the intermediary variable conducive to democracy, modernisation theory also cannot comprehensively explain the effects of FDI from China.

An alternative theory on FDI's effects through which we can find some explanatory power is put forward by Francis Fukuyama (2004). In 2004, Fukuyama theorised that while donor conditions

intend to limit the scope of the state, the elevated political dominance of neopatrimonial regimes use external conditionality as a justification for “cutting back on modern state sectors while protecting and often expanding the scope of the neopatrimonial state” (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 582). International financial interjection under the WC that is based on principles of conditionality and reform, according to Fukuyama, results in an expansion of the neopatrimonial state, and that is indeed what we see. However, the BC is characterised by its lack of conditionality and non-interference. Fukuyama (2004) does not explore what we would observe then. Does the opposite occur and unconditional capital injections challenge the endurance of the neopatrimonial state? Under this assumption, we should see a stagnating and perhaps even a shrinking of the neopatrimonial state as FDI from China increases. I explore this assumption in the following section which presents my analysis and the results of that analysis that indeed suggest a shrinking of the neopatrimonial state. As such I hypothesize: as FDI from China increases, levels of neopatrimonialism decrease.

3.

Research Design

To investigate the question of this paper, I carry out a longitudinal research design (LRD) to search for a trend. Though a cross-sectional study can be employed to study trends, the data is collected from single points in time and compared, which challenges the validity of making conclusions about changes over time. With a longitudinal study, an entire period is observed and the associated changes over time analysed. A longitudinal study is thus better suited to answer the research question because the effects of capital injection, in this case FDI, cannot be accurately observed in a single point in time. Different forms of investment capital take varying amounts of time before making a substantial change in the market, before transforming into economic development and before affecting the political environment. Consider this: an investment in infrastructure, let us take a cross-country highway as an example, does not instantly cause display all of its effects on society. Though the reports will note a multimillion-dollar capital injection, until the money is put to work, some dependent variables will go unstimulated. It is only when the process of construction begins that one can start to observe political shifts, perhaps in the selection process of contractors and the institutions created or implemented towards the progression of the project. It is only when the road is complete and in use when trade routes become more efficient and thus the economy grows. These observations take time and a longitudinal research design fundamentally incorporates that. Contrastingly, FDI towards debt relief would instantly show its effects by bridging the gap between revenue and expenditure, boosting economic growth and changing political dynamics intra- and internationally. FDI from China takes multiple forms: agricultural investment, infrastructure investment, trade investment, loans, and so on. For these reasons, observing the effect of FDI from China on neopatrimonialism in African states is best carried out using the time-sensitive approach of the longitudinal research design in order to allow room for all the forms of FDI to make an effect.

In order to carry out an LRD for the objectives of this paper, data is needed on the amount of FDI countries have received yearly over a certain period of time, and on levels of neopatrimonialism

in those same countries within the same period of time. Such a dataset is not available as I did not encounter one in my search. As such, I have developed a dataset that contains 45 Sub-Saharan African countries, the amounts of FDI they received from China in the years 2008 till 2018, their levels of neopatrimonial, clientelism, presidentialism and regime corruption in those years, and the years in which they held elections or constitutional changes and what kind of elections and changes those were¹. Firstly, I only observe 45 of the sub-Saharan states because Madagascar, Somalia, eSwatini and Zanzibar had no data recorded and Sao Tome and Principe received negligible amounts of FDI. Next, I selected the years 2008-2018 to reduce the occurrence of outlier cases due to the financial crises of 2008 and so my observations of FDI begin in that year and continue from there to maintain enough normalcy to recognise a pattern. The time frame ends in 2018, the year before COVID-19 became a global pandemic, similarly to avoid an interruption that would produce outlier cases. The years between 2008 and 2018 therefore provide enough normalcy and also allow enough time to pass, ten years, in order to observe a trend if it arises.

Secondly, the FDI from China data is taken from the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) of the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (CARI, 2021). The CARI data is suited to the objectives of this paper because it is based on China's definitions and expressions of FDI which fall completely under the principles of the Beijing Consensus and thus the field of interest of this paper. It compiles outward direct investment (ODI) data from the China Statistical Yearbook and the Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment. The shortfall of this dataset however, is that it does not include small investors. It also does not include investments that involve African assets but which took place in another country. So, a purchase of a Swiss company that owns properties on the continent, and through which a proportion of that investment would enter the African state, is not recorded in the figures of this dataset, making the reports underestimations. The dataset is still favourable because investment through acquisition in the aforementioned way inserts a middle player whose business or project model may not aligned to the principles of the BC, altering our explanatory variable. The recorded amounts in the CARI dataset might be an underestimation but they are wholly under the principles of the BC and therefore, keep the explanatory variable intact.

¹ Can be found in the Appendix

The dependent variable (DV), levels of neopatrimonialism, is operationalised as the neopatrimonial index (Neopat. Index), clientelism index (Client. Index), presidentialism index (Pres. Index) and regime corruption index (RCI).² These indices are extracted from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset and compiled by Sigman & Lindberg (2019) who worked on *Neopatrimonialism and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation of Africa's Political Regimes* in 2017, of which the findings feed into the V-Dem dataset. The V-Dem dataset is reliable because it is based on statistics submitted by nearly 3 000 country experts, and takes into account both de jure and de facto elements of political regimes (Sigman & Lindberg, 2017, p. 6). In addition, Sigman & Lindberg (2017) conceptualise neopatrimonialism in a way that is synonymous with that of this paper, making the objects of their empirical investigation similar. Furthermore, one of the dimensions they investigated when collecting the data was state resources for political legitimisation. This dimension entails the use of private resources by public offices. It is important that this element is a part of the data used for the dependent variable because FDI is a private resource and so the direct interaction with neopatrimonialism is captured, significantly decreasing the likelihood of a spurious association and building a bridge for a causal relationship to be observed. The internal validity that the data therefore provides makes it a beneficial source of data. Also, by not only observing aggregate neopatrimonialism levels but including separate indices for clientelism, presidentialism and regime corruption, allowance for the answer to the research question to be more comprehensive is provided, revealing multiple dynamics of the relationship between FDI from China and neopatrimonialism in Africa. Finally, the years in which and what kind of elections were held and constitutional reforms and referendums is included as a control as elections and constitutional jurisdictions are confounding factors that have an effect on neopatrimonialism levels.

A weakness in using the V-Dem data is that it does not include an index for patronage and so its operationalisation of neopatrimonialism is incomplete. Patronage is an inherently necessary phenomenon for the other forms of neopatrimonialism to exist at the state level “since it is only due to their ability to control state positions that parties are able to manipulate state resources” (Kopecký, Scherlis, & Spirova, 2008, p. 7). To compensate this, I could have included data on cabinet size as pioneered by the work of Arriola (2009) and van de Walle (2001). The cabinet

² Column headers in the data table found in Appendix

represents the elite clients of a state leader and an increase in cabinet size is synonymous with an increase in political support for this leader (Arriola, 2009, pp. 1346-1347). Patronage-based rule can therefore be indicated by an increasing number of cabinet appointments. However, due to time constraints I had to limit my collection. I therefore leave this as a recommendation to future replications of this research.

Method of Analysis

To analyse the data, I compiled it into horizontal tables with the columns divided into years and the rows containing the independent variable (IV), FDI from China, and the DV, neopatrimonialism, clientelism, presidentialism and regime corruption indices. I then manually read through each country's statistics, highlighting trends of increasing FDI over the years, and highlighting corresponding trends in the DV rows. I also carried out further investigation to move away from simply observing correlation into discovering causation. For example, Kenya has received an increasing amount of FDI in the years 2008-2018, and simultaneously neopatrimonialism and her other indicators have steadily decreased. In 2010, there is a larger influx of FDI and an equally significant drop in the presidentialism index. To leave this observation at a correlative analysis would result in the conclusion that FDI indeed decreases neopatrimonialism however, further investigation reveals that in 2010 Kenya adopted a new constitution that more clearly defined the expectations of the president and increased the limitations on their power, thus resulting in a sharp decrease in presidentialism that cannot be accredited to FDI from China. Therefore, as an effort towards greater reliability, and to reduce the chances of my research method being confirmatory, I will include an investigation into the case of Nigeria as an illustrative case. Nigeria received consistent and increasing amounts of FDI and experienced consistently decreasing levels of neopatrimonialism. The insertion of a case study makes the overall research design of this paper a nested design.

Results

Is there a decline in levels of neopatrimonialism?

Of the 45 countries observed, 32 display a decrease in neopatrimonialism, that is 71,1%³. A decrease in neopatrimonialism is presented by a decrease in the figures of any of the neopatrimonial indices in the tables. It should be noted that this means that even if a state only decreases in one aspect of neopatrimonialism it is counted as a diminishing of the neopatrimonial state. Having said this, there is still a convincing number of states that show a decrease in all recorded measures of neopatrimonialism; 11 of the 32⁴. The regime corruption index shows the least sensitivity to changes over the years, taking more time to show its trajectory over the years. Presidentialism either increased or remained the same in some countries. This resistance is expected as many regimes on the continent follow a presidential system therefore the powers of the office of the president are not only extensive, but protected by the constitution. For these reasons it was expected for the presidentialism index to change only slightly if at all. On the other hand, 19 of the 45 countries decreased their clientelism scores whilst 8 countries increased in clientelism, making clientelism the most sensitive facet of neopatrimonialism to change.

The correlation

Chapter 2 illuminated the increasing FDI from China as observed from reports and other qualitative sources, and the tables in the appendix with the statistics for each country confirm this rise. The correlation between FDI from China increasing and neopatrimonialism decreasing is statistically convincing because 28 of the 32 countries that experienced decreasing levels of neopatrimonialism have had an increasing amount of Chinese FDI, that is 87,5%⁵. Moreover, in two countries when FDI decreased, neopatrimonialism began to increase once again, further suggesting the premise that increasing presence of FDI from China has a decreasing effect on neopatrimonialism. On the other hand, we do observe all indicators of neopatrimonialism

³ Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

⁴ Burkina Faso, CAR, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Zimbabwe.

⁵ Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Comoros, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

increasing along with FDI from China increasing in 7 states⁶. A reason for this may be that these 7 states experience a large number of elections resulting in incumbent instability. It has been argued that a rational leader who is fixed on concentrating power to themselves will exercise patronage to establish the minimum winning coalition necessary to keep them in power (Arriola, 2009, p. 1345). The fixation with amassing power might explain rising levels of neopatrimonialism when many elections occur because each new incumbent in a neopatrimonial regime would exercise patronage and clientelism in order to greater establish their position. Holding all else equal, a correlation exists between increasing FDI from China and decreasing levels of neopatrimonialism. The following chapter provides a potential reason why we see this correlation, exploring the case of Nigeria as an example of a decreasing neopatrimonial state being an unintended consequence of FDI under the Beijing Consensus.

⁶ Burundi, CAR, DRC, Mauritania, Mozambique, Zambia and Uganda.

4.

A useful side effect

The case of Nigeria

Sino-Nigeria relations have a long history beginning post-independence and bearing economic fruit leading up to Nigeria becoming the largest recipient of Chinese FDI since 2016 (Raji & Ogunrinu, 2019, p. 125). In addition to having a strong presence of our independent variable, Nigeria is an apt case to study because the investments include multiple destinations such as infrastructure and natural resource sectors (Izuchukwu & Ofori, 2014). Moreover, Nigeria underwent the transition from Washington Consensus FDI to Beijing Consensus FDI. Raji & Ogunrinu (2019) note remarks made by the World Bank criticising the conditions of lending, or lack thereof, of China towards Africa. The World Bank report argued that BC principles sabotage the endeavours of global financial institutions, in other words the WC, to promote good economic and political governance in Africa (Raji & Ogunrinu, 2019, p. 126). However, as revealed in the analysis of this paper, the WC did not result in good governance as neopatrimonialism remained rife. On the other hand, the data shows neopatrimonialism decreasing under the BC as Chinese FDI increased in Nigeria⁷.

Is there a cause within the correlation? At the onset of substantial FDI from China, there were no conditions or reforms asked of the Nigerian government. However, in order to attract more capital, the Nigerian government initiated a policy that granted tax holidays to Chinese investment groups and companies (Izuchukwu & Ofori, 2014; Raji & Ogunrinu, 2019). A tax holiday is an elimination or reduction of taxes businesses have to pay as part of governmental incentives (Kagan, 2020). Policymakers implement tax holidays to attract more investment as it is a favourable condition to do business under. Tax holidays also increase capital because they maintain a larger revenue for businesses, due to no taxation, which results in growth (Kagan, 2020). This profit-seeking reform has unintended consequences for neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism, particularly clientelism,

⁷ Table 1.7 in the Appendix, p. 31

entails the use of private or state resources by public offices or for personal gain (Kopecký, Scherlis, & Spirova, 2008; Kopecký, 2011; Lindberg, 2003; van de Walle, 2007; Lemarchand & Legg, 1972). Most governments make their revenue and accumulate financial resources through taxes. Tax holidays result in a decrease in revenue and create a limited resource pool that subsequently decreases the capacity for clientelist practices because it reduces the pool from which officeholders can draw to purchase support or trade for extra-jurisdiction benefits. Therefore, as FDI from China increases, more tax holidays are given and though the amount of money coming into a state increases, the government's access to it is limited via the implementation of tax holidays as a self-determined reform intended to increase profit. The case of Nigeria reveals that the non-conditionality of the BC leaves room for receivers of FDI to make incentivised reforms that maximise profit. The reform of tax holidays inadvertently crippled clientelism by reducing the sum of resources directly available to the state and as a result, increasing FDI from China decreased neopatrimonialism. In Nigeria, the reform is tax holidays but it can appear as something else in other states. Diminishing levels of neopatrimonialism are an indirect result of capital accumulation directives.

A sigh of relief

Let us now consider the second proposed theory: neopatrimonial practices used to evade external demands for reform are engaged with less when there are no policies to circumvent. The relief of the BC's non-conditionality and non-interference therefore diminishes the neopatrimonial regime because it does not warrant engagement. In *China Returns to Africa*, Denis M. Tull (2008) provides an argument that feeds into the initiation of the above theory. He argues that one of the reasons China has created strong ties on the continent is because conditionality and interference through the hand of Structural Adjustment Programmes of the WC tore away at the sovereignty of African states (Alden, Chris; Large, Daniel; de Oliveira, 2008, pp. 118-119). Undermined sovereignty at the hands of the West resulted in the elites of African states approaching demanded reforms with methods of circumvention (Alden, Chris; Large, Daniel; de Oliveira, 2008, p. 119) A degree of neopatrimonialism is exercised in strategies to get around reforms; exercising patronage to manipulate personnel in order to maintain control or establishing clientelist relationships to purchase support that would otherwise be lost under new liberal structures. The WC was rejected

and failed because of active resistance to external imposition which inherently employs neopatrimonial practices. The BC succeeded and subsequently decreased neopatrimonialism because of the relief it presented from Western imposition and in the absence of conditions to evade, the neopatrimonial regime is engaged with less. FDI from China therefore decreases neopatrimonialism because it is accompanied by non-conditionality which is void of neo-colonial imposition that warrants evasion using extra-bureaucratic means. Neopatrimonialism does not decrease because the BC directly address it with proactive countermeasures, it decreases because under the BC its methods do not have to be used as much.

5.

Discussion and Conclusion

For the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, the case of Nigeria is revealing because it provides an example of the new theory at work. Fukuyama (2004) theorised that donor conditions intend to limit the scope of the state and neopatrimonial regimes maintain and advance themselves by justifying neopatrimonial practices using the bounds of external conditionality (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 582). The new theory proposed by this paper estimates that in the absence of external conditionality, states make incentivised conditions on their own accord that aim to increase the amount of funds they receive and the profitability. Any decrease in neopatrimonialism occurs as a by-product of these fiscal centred policies. The BC is an absence of external conditionality through its provision of self-determination based on the principles of non-interference, allowing the generation of self-interested policies. Because we do not observe explicit laws and reforms created targeting neopatrimonial practices and yet there is a decrease, the policies that are implemented regarding other offices can be assumed to have a spill-over affect. The BC thus causes a reduction in neopatrimonialism as seen by increasing Chinese FDI corresponding with decreasing levels of neopatrimonialism because of the inadvertent interplays allowed for in the absence of contingency in investment.

The other unintended consequence of mitigation is no mitigation at all, but rather under-stimulation. Neopatrimonialism is engaged increasingly when state actors want to evade externally imposed reforms and their implications. Patronage and clientelism are methods to counteract the ramifications of liberalist reforms, such as the WC, that decentralise power. However, when there are no liberal principles and external conditions undermining sovereignty, there is no rousing of the neopatrimonial regime. The unconditionality of the BC therefore does not stimulate neopatrimonialism because it presents no bureaucracy to escape. As a result, one of the effects of FDI from China on neopatrimonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa is indeed a decline, though indirect and unintended.

A weakness of this research is that it involves one illustrative case and therefore one example of a reform enacted through the self-determination allowed by the BC. Future researchers and testers of this phenomenon and these theories are recommended to carry out wide case studies in order to determine whether the illustration is indeed the whole picture or just an exclusive case. Overall, the objective of this research is not to support the Chinese approach as the most beneficial to the African continent, neither is it to strike out the Western perspective as a harmful model. The objective of this research is to explore some of the products of self-determination on a continent that has not had the luxury and to further dissect the dynamics of neopatrimonialism as an inherent companion to the regimes operating across the continent and the world at large, and as a beast that impairs progress towards political and economic development. We have uncovered that the WC woke the beast and provoked her, and the BC is soothing her back to slumber. We must continue the efforts to understanding her dynamics for the sake of political and economic development on the African continent. Otherwise, we leave ourselves at the mercy of the neopatrimonial beast, accepting quiet and yet risking future frenzy.

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Appendix

Table 1.1

		Angola										
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China stock	FDI	68.89*	195.54	351.77	400.59	1245.1	1634.74	1214.04	1268.29	1633.21	2260.16*	2299.19
Neopat. index		0.81	0.81	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.73	0.66
Client. index		0.74	0.72	0.69	0.69	0.73	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.71	0.69
Pres. Index		0.60	0.60	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.60	0.57
RCI		0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.68	0.55
		Benin										
China stock	FDI	53.15	54.01	39.33	40.03**	47.60	49.91	69.17	87.31**	102.51**	104.37	103.99
Neopat. Index		0.38	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.38	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.29	0.21	0.31
Client. Index		0.53	0.53	0.53	0.52	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.41	0.37	0.42
Pres. Index		0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.21	0.20	0.16	0.24
RCI		0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.47	0.47	0.48	0.40	0.17	0.30
		Botswana										
China stock	FDI	65.26	119.25*	178.52	200.38	220.15	230.90	262.13*	321.08	437.5	296.87	258.16
Neopat. Index		0.15	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.18
Client. Index		0.17	0.21	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.21	0.18
Pres. Index		0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.15
RCI		0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.13	0.17
		Burkina Faso										
China stock	FDI	0	0	0**	0	0	4.34	8.78	0*	0.2	0.2	0.2
Neopat. Index		0.47	0.46	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.39	0.33	0.30	0.30	0.35	0.41
Client. Index		0.72	0.72	0.71	0.72	0.70	0.71	0.71	0.63	0.59	0.59	0.62
Pres. Index		0.38	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.30	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.30
RCI		0.33	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.30	0.27	0.24	0.26	0.40	0.41
		Burundi										
China stock	FDI	1.65	4.64	6.51**/**	7.2	8.7	9.79	13.24	12.37**	12.42	10.29	12.52
Neopat. Index		0.82	0.82	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.90	0.91	0.93	0.96	0.96	0.96
Client. Index		0.75	0.75	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.80	0.80	0.83	0.91	0.91	0.90
Pres. Index		0.70	0.70	0.72	0.72	0.73	0.85	0.86	0.90	0.92	0.93	0.93
RCI		0.83	0.83	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.89	0.90	0.90	0.94	0.94	0.94

*general, legislative, local elections; **presidential and parliamentary elections; ***constitutional referendums and amendments

Table 1.2

		Cameroon									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China FDI	20.34	25.05	59.61	61.54	79.50	148.40**	177.84	207.34	366.74	424.36	499.21**
stock											
Neopat. index	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.90	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.93
Client. index	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.77	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.76	0.83	0.85
Pres. Index	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.81	0.87
RCI	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.91	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.95	0.91	0.93
		Cape Verde									
China FDI	5.13	5.04	4.58	4.58**	11.6	15.23	15.18	15.18	15.23**	15.23	14.63
stock											
Neopat. Index	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.12
Client. Index	0.25	0.25	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.27	0.28	0.34
Pres. Index	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07
RCI	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
		CAR									
China FDI	3.98	16.71	46.54	51.02**	51.02	60.38	57.08	46.22*	35.61*	16.12	88.13
stock											
Neopat. Index	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.81	0.70	0.69	0.66	0.62	0.60
Client. Index	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.87	0.87	0.91	0.80	0.80	0.77	0.60	0.77
Pres. Index	0.59	0.59	0.58	0.59	0.59	0.61	0.53	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.48
RCI	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.77	0.75	0.68	0.66	0.66
		Chad									
China FDI	25.36	76.57	80.00	108.12**	194.12	321.26	404.61	422.72	396.64**	412.25	592.59
stock											
Neopat. Index	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.95
Client. Index	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.92	0.89	0.89
Pres. Index	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.89
RCI	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.94	0.94
		Comoros									
China FDI	4.05	4.05*/***	4.04***	4.04	4.54	4.54	4.54**	4.53*	4.53	4.53	5.45
stock											
Neopat. Index	0.63	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.61	0.59	0.58	0.63	0.61	0.72	0.77
Client. Index	0.61	0.62	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.64	0.64	0.69	0.69	0.58	0.70
Pres. Index	0.52	0.57	0.50	0.47	0.47	0.45	0.45	0.47	0.45	0.61	0.66
RCI	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.62	0.62	0.67	0.67	0.70	0.72

*general, legislative, local elections; **presidential and parliamentary elections; ***constitutional referendums and amendments

Table 1.3

		Republic of Congo									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China FDI	75.42*	115.17**	135.88	142.40	504.90	695.43	988.76	1088.67	782.91	1126.06	795.1
stock											
Neopat. index	0.89	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.87	0.87
Client. index	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.85	0.85
Pres. Index	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.77
RCI	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87
		D.R Congo									
China FDI	134.14	397.43*	630.92	709.26	970.49	1091.76	2168.67	3239.35	3514.98	3884.11	4444.46**
stock											
Neopat. Index	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.85	0.86	0.89	0.89	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.91
Client. Index	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.78	0.78	0.80	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.84	0.80
Pres. Index	0.70	0.69	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.74	0.74	0.76	0.76	0.77	0.75
RCI	0.93	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.94	0.94	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
		Ivory Coast									
China FDI	21.16	37.65	32.99**	34.67**	40.04	35.00	64.29	126.78	179.66	303.68	441.54
stock											
Neopat. Index	0.56	0.57	0.54	0.43	0.41	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.43
Client. Index	0.73	0.73	0.70	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.45	0.42	0.42
Pres. Index	0.35	0.36	0.32	0.26	0.25	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.40	0.36
RCI	0.72	0.70	0.70	0.60	0.58	0.51	0.51	0.54	0.54	0.45	0.46
		Djibouti									
China FDI	1.6**	7.03	12.47	18.13	17.99	30.55**	40.08	60.46	125.40**	232.86	178.49**
stock											
Neopat. Index	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.84
Client. Index	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.75	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.71	0.71	0.73
Pres. Index	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.80
RCI	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
		Eq. Guinea									
China FDI	40.62*	61.5**	86.25	98.68	404.64	260.85	208.20	231.63	236.59**	395.97*	552.85
stock											
Neopat. Index	0.94	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
Client. Index	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83
Pres. Index	0.91	0.91	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.92	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
RCI	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93

*general, legislative, local elections; **presidential and parliamentary elections; ***constitutional referendums and amendments

Table 1.4

		Eritrea										
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China stock	FDI	6.73	9.6	12.54	14.31	103.78	104.55	106.71	119.4	378.45	216.55	223.29
Neopat. index		0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.95	0.96
Client. index		0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.60	0.69
Pres. Index		0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
RCI		0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58	0.59	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.55	0.65
		Ethiopia										
China stock	FDI	126.45*	283.44*	368.06	426.79	606.55	771.84	914.62	1130.13*	2000.65	1975.56	2568.16
Neopat. Index		0.75	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.74	0.67
Client. Index		0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.52	0.51	0.49	0.45
Pres. Index		0.81	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.74
RCI		0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.40	0.33
		Gabon										
China stock	FDI	88.14*	100.05**	125.34	127.10	128.47	168.48	180.41	244.42	256.83**	385.35	258.66**
Neopat. Index		0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.79	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.78	0.82
Client. Index		0.56	0.55	0.51	0.48	0.50	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.50	0.55	0.53
Pres. Index		0.70	0.70	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.71	0.79
RCI		0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.86	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.78	0.78
		The Gambia										
China stock	FDI	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.19	1.24	1.24	3.84**	5.36**	24.79
Neopat. Index		0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.78	0.23	0.23
Client. Index		0.58	0.58	0.58	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.47	0.44
Pres. Index		0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.73	0.12	0.10
RCI		0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.69	0.29	0.40
		Ghana										
China stock	FDI	58.02**	185.04	202.00	270.15	505.27	834.84	1056.69	1274.49	1958.27*	1575.36	1797.47
Neopat. Index		0.34	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.36	0.36	0.33	0.39	0.36	0.36
Client. Index		0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.51	0.48	0.48	0.51	0.47	0.47	0.47
Pres. Index		0.12	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.17	0.14	0.14
RCI		0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.70	0.70	0.72

*general, legislative, local elections; **presidential and parliamentary elections; ***constitutional referendums and amendments

Table 1.5

		Guinea										
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China stock	FDI	96.37	129.32	136.41**	168.43	234.67	338.58*	419.07	382.72	417.74	675.45	742.44
Neopat. index		0.93	0.90	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.82	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.85
Client. index		0.84	0.61	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.67	0.67	0.65	0.65	0.68	0.68
Pres. Index		0.90	0.89	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.77
RCI		0.97	0.95	0.90	0.86	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.85
		Guinea-Bissau										
China stock	FDI	0*	27.00**	27.00	27.00	27.00	27.00	66.82**	69.06	70.16	76.39	65.21
Neopat. Index		0.68	0.68	0.69	0.69	0.79	0.67	0.65	0.65	0.67	0.66	0.65
Client. Index		0.74	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.73	0.60	0.58	0.58	0.60	0.62	0.62
Pres. Index		0.42	0.42	0.43	0.44	0.61	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.40	0.40
RCI		0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.90	0.84	0.79	0.79	0.84	0.84	0.84
		Kenya										
China stock	FDI	78.36	120.36	221.58***	308.83	402.73	635.90*	853.71	1099.04	1102.70	1543.45*/**	1755.88
Neopat. Index		0.61	0.60	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.43	0.48
Client. Index		0.73	0.73	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.64
Pres. Index		0.41	0.41	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.20	0.25
RCI		0.76	0.76	0.73	0.72	0.72	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.72	0.72	0.72
		Lesotho										
China stock	FDI	8.22	8.32	8.88	8.91	9.13	9.13	11.07	11.15*	6.63	6.53*	6.53
Neopat. Index		0.40	0.40	0.38	0.38	0.36	0.32	0.32	0.34	0.35	0.32	0.38
Client. Index		0.49	0.49	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.43	0.43	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.56
Pres. Index		0.23	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.23
RCI		0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.48	0.42	0.42	0.49	0.47	0.38	0.41
		Liberia										
China stock	FDI	37.36	56.39	81.67	114.74***	154.37	196.10	229.65	288.99	297.30	319.63*	260.39
Neopat. Index		0.49	0.49	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.57
Client. Index		0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.64	0.70
Pres. Index		0.24	0.24	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.27	0.30
RCI		0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.73	0.80

*general, legislative, local elections; **presidential and parliamentary elections; ***constitutional referendums and amendments

Table 1.6

		Libya										
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China stock	FDI	81.58	42.69	32.19	67.78	65.19	108.82	108.94*	105.77	211.12	366.75	425.68
Neopat. index		0.90	0.90	0.89	0.59	0.49	0.51	0.53	0.52	0.54	0.53	0.61
Client. index		0.73	0.73	0.73	0.36	0.23	0.35	0.34	0.26	0.26	0.28	0.40
Pres. Index		0.86	0.86	0.84	0.59	0.37	0.33	0.34	0.37	0.38	0.41	0.46
RCI		0.84	0.84	0.84	0.74	0.66	0.68	0.70	0.69	0.74	0.64	0.68
		Malawi										
China stock	FDI	6.59	14.54*	32.40	49.30	253.82	257.62	258.15	259.05	291.12	292.10	292.10
Neopat. Index		0.44	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.48	0.42	0.44
Client. Index		0.57	0.56	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.59	0.59	0.65	0.56	0.63
Pres. Index		0.22	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.25	0.22	0.23
RCI		0.59	0.70	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.67	0.70
		Mali										
China stock	FDI	30.95	44.72	47.77	160.06	211.43**	316.67**	342.86	307.33	320.01	394.86	301.47**
Neopat. Index		0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.58	0.58	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.59
Client. Index		0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.62	0.60
Pres. Index		0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.35	0.49	0.37	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.40
RCI		0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.72	0.71
		Mauritania										
China stock	FDI	24.76	31.29**	45.88	74.71	106.15	108.28	100.95	105.83	193.36	235.85	232.61**
Neopat. Index		0.84	0.84	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.88	0.85
Client. Index		0.67	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.77
Pres. Index		0.76	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.79	0.70
RCI		0.79	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.89	0.90
		Mauritius										
China stock	FDI	230.07**	242.84	283.29**	605.94	700.80	849.59	579.71	1096.58	1176.20	960.87	997.66
Neopat. Index		0.23	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.22	0.22
Client. Index		0.34	0.34	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.51	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.41	0.41
Pres. Index		0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.08	0.08
RCI		0.54	0.54	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.53

*general, legislative, local elections; **presidential and parliamentary elections; ***constitutional referendums and amendments

Table 1.7

		Mozambique										
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China stock	FDI	43.00	74.96*	75.24	98.07	336.91	508.09	653.09*	724.52	782.26	872.91	1410.17
Neopat. index		0.47	0.47	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.44	0.47	0.48	0.52
Client. index		0.44	0.41	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.42	0.44	0.43	0.47
Pres. Index		0.36	0.36	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.37	0.38	0.40
RCI		0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.49	0.49	0.48	0.50	0.55	0.58
		Namibia										
China stock	FDI	19.95	46.18*	47.11*	60.21	94.53	349.45	981.84*	380.44	453.57	480.47	426.15
Neopat. Index		0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.22
Client. Index		0.27	0.30	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.25	0.25
Pres. Index		0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.16
RCI		0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21
		Niger										
China stock	FDI	136.50	184.20***/*	379.36***	429.57**	125.33	241.87	198.08	565.44	525.30*	665.65	758.4
Neopat. Index		0.48	0.46	0.49	0.43	0.38	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.40	0.43	0.45
Client. Index		0.39	0.51	0.28	0.31	0.29	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.59	0.55	0.50
Pres. Index		0.35	0.45	0.50	0.34	0.29	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.28	0.31
RCI		0.64	0.68	0.65	0.55	0.55	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61
		Nigeria										
China stock	FDI	795.91*	1025.96	1210.85	1415.61**	1949.87	2146.07	2323.01	2376.76*	2541.68*	2861.53	2453.49
Neopat. Index		0.70	0.70	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.62	0.62	0.59	0.62	0.63	0.67
Client. Index		0.87	0.88	0.87	0.81	0.81	0.78	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.80
Pres. Index		0.38	0.38	0.37	0.35	0.35	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.36	0.37	0.37
RCI		0.90	0.90	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.86	0.81	0.87	0.87
		Rwanda										
China stock	FDI	20.18**	28.80	41.63**	58.52	63.53	73.33**	110.72	123.57	89.36	99.25**	146.82**
Neopat. Index		0.74	0.74	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.67	0.70	0.69
Client. Index		0.31	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.29	0.30	0.29
Pres. Index		0.77	0.76	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.72	0.77	0.75
RCI		0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.46	0.46

*general, legislative, local elections; **presidential and parliamentary elections; ***constitutional referendums and amendments

Table 1.8

Senegal												
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China stock	FDI	10.61	26.07	45.03	45.20	102.22**	83.25	130.01	126.02	149.59***	214.30**	314.65
Neopat. index		0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.30
Client. index		0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.53	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.43	0.36	0.36
Pres. Index		0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.26
RCI		0.27	0.27	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.28	0.29
Seychelles												
China stock	FDI	6.60	7.00	19.36	23.80	77.19	103.47	114.40	160.11	246.65**	231.27	451.91
Neopat. Index		0.30	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.30	0.26	0.26	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.21
Client. Index		0.39	0.39	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.33	0.33	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.33
Pres. Index		0.25	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.24	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.14
RCI		0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
Sierra Leone												
China stock	FDI	43.70*	51.23	41.48	52.23	52.71**	108.36	147.74	196.30	188.82	184.22	168.06
Neopat. Index		0.69	0.69	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.74	0.66	0.60
Client. Index		0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.65	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.66	0.63
Pres. Index		0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.55	0.48	0.46
RCI		0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.74	0.65
South Africa												
China stock	FDI	3048.62**/*	2306.86**/*	4152.98	4059.73*	4775.07	4400.40	5954.02*	4722.97	6500.84*	7472.77	6531.68
Neopat. Index		0.22	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.24
Client. Index		0.36	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.42
Pres. Index		0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.11
RCI		0.38	0.41	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.45	0.45	0.48	0.48	0.50	0.46
South Sudan												
China stock	FDI	0.00	0.00	0.00**	0.05	10.9	26.47	19.26	35.98	37.03	47.68	35.69
Neopat. Index					0.83	0.84	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.95	0.92	0.95
Client. Index					0.74	0.76	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.94	0.91	0.91
Pres. Index					0.76	0.76	0.84	0.85	0.88	0.89	0.86	0.93
RCI					0.78	0.78	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.93	0.86	0.92

*general, legislative, local elections; **presidential and parliamentary elections; ***constitutional referendums and amendments

Table 1.9

		Tanzania										
		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China stock	FDI	190.22	281.79	307.51*	407.07	540.80	716.46	885.18	1138.87***/*	1191.99	1280.30	1302.75
Neopat. index		0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.32
Client. index		0.50	0.50	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.47	0.53
Pres. Index		0.20	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.25
RCI		0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.43	0.43	0.38	0.29	0.28	0.23
		Togo										
China stock	FDI	23.12	33.02	58.11**	67.15	98.38	123.09**	135.81	128.82**	118.57	112.85	102.07**
Neopat. Index		0.76	0.75	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.81
Client. Index		0.51	0.51	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.52	0.59
Pres. Index		0.71	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.71	0.71	0.73	0.72	0.74	0.76
RCI		0.78	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.81
		Uganda										
China stock	FDI	11.98	58.56	113.68	126.21*	141.10	383.76	464.10	722.15	1006.47*	575.94	798.17
Neopat. Index		0.60	0.60	0.59	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.62	0.63	0.62	0.61
Client. Index		0.64	0.64	0.65	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.64	0.63	0.64	0.55	0.59
Pres. Index		0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.42	0.41	0.43	0.42	0.44	0.45	0.43
RCI		0.78	0.78	0.76	0.78	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.78	0.78
		Zambia										
China stock	FDI	651.33**	843.97	943.73	1199.84*	1998.11	2164.32	2271.99	2338.02**	2687.16*/**	2963.44	3523.02
Neopat. Index		0.26	0.30	0.30	0.27	0.23	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.35	0.44	0.47
Client. Index		0.52	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.63	0.63	0.61	0.60	0.63	0.60
Pres. Index		0.14	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.26	0.35	0.36
RCI		0.36	0.37	0.37	0.31	0.15	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.36	0.43
		Zimbabwe										
China stock	FDI	60.01**	99.75	134.54	576.44	874.67	1520.83*	1695.58	1798.92	1839.00	1748.34	1766.25*/**
Neopat. Index		0.82	0.75	0.71	0.71	0.70	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.70	0.65	0.70
Client. Index		0.79	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.66	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.72
Pres. Index		0.66	0.55	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.51	0.47	0.53
RCI		0.86	0.84	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.77	0.74	0.76

*general, legislative, local elections; **presidential and parliamentary elections; ***constitutional referendums and amendments