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A Prolegomenon to Partition: Greek-Cypriot Elite Rhetoric and the “Settler Problem”

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Citation

Lamnisis, T. (2021). *A Prolegomenon to Partition: Greek-Cypriot Elite Rhetoric and the “Settler Problem”*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

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Figure 1. Close-up of a border fence made from barbed wire and oil barrels at the “Green Line” on the hill of Aronas, Nicosia, Cyprus. Captured by S. Lamnisos, 2021.

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Leiden University, 2020-2021

MSc Thesis Seminar: Borders and Migration

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Second Reader: Dr. Tom Theuns

Political Science (MSc): Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Development (NECD)

Word Count: 11,511

Abstract

While examining the persistence of partition in ethno-nationally divided polities ranging from the Balkans to the Middle East, the two competing logics of partition literature (ethnic spoils; ethnic security dilemma) are limited by their sole focus on military/security or economic factors. To overcome such a theoretical limitation, this qualitative study, which employs a Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), offers an interpretative account of the discursive elements of enduring partition through an investigation of the rhetoric of Greek-Cypriot elites regarding the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in Northern Cyprus. Previous research on the “settler problem” emphasizes that it is a question of demographics in both public and elite discourse(s). In contrast, by utilizing the middle-way approach to native-settler relations and the Agambenian state of emergency to explain the generative role of partition and its influence on the rhetoric of elite figures, this study finds that, from 2004 (t = 0) to 2017 (t = 1), Greek-Cypriot elites combined the discursive strategies of demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization to frame the supposed “settler problem”. This discursive inquiry that probes a purposive sample of primary and secondary textual sources (N = 60) provides a new window into the role of enduring partition in generating the discourse of political elites and counters monolithic understandings regarding the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants. Therefore, providing a framework for future studies that aim to understand the influence of partition on the rhetoric of “native” elites about “non-native” groups both in the island of Cyprus and in other socio-politically divided societies.

Keywords: Framing; Discourse-Historical Approach; Partition; Settlers/Migrants; Greek-Cypriot Elites; Northern Cyprus

Contents

Introduction.....	3
Historical Context.....	6
Conceptual Synopsis.....	8
Spoils or a Dilemma?.....	9
A Spectral View of Discursive Interactions.....	11
Theoretical Framework.....	14
Methodology.....	17
Unearthing and Deciphering Archival Data.....	19
Analysis and Findings.....	20
2004-08: The “War of Numbers”.....	22
2008-13: Security, Race, and Turkish-Cypriot “Compatriots”.....	25
2013-17: “Legitimate Citizens” and “Vulgar Anatolians”	28
Discussion.....	30
Conclusion.....	31
References.....	34
Appendix A.....	46
Endnotes.....	47



For my maternal grandmother, Zoe, and my paternal grandfather, Tasos, who did not get to see a united Cyprus before their passing.

A Prolegomenon to Partition: Greek-Cypriot Elite Rhetoric and the “Settler Problem”

“People must love their country... / so he says,
so my father always says. / My country, /
from the middle has been split into two. /
Which half must people love?”

(Yashin, 2000, p. 139)

For polities where the meaning of citizenship is diachronically ascribed through ethno-national identificatory criteria, the political legacy of the 20th century has visibly been one of civil war, displacement, and partition (Kaufmann, 1998; Sambanis, 2000). Be it an outcome or a cause of ethnic conflict, the phenomenon of partition has received a notable amount of scholarly attention (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009, p. 82) from both proponents (Downes, 2006; Kaufmann, 1996) and ardent critics (Ioannou, 2020) of this ostensible territorial solution to ethno-national rivalries. Besides examining the costs and benefits that come with such a form of socio-political division, several observers opt to trace the conditions behind the seeming perpetuation of partition in a host of multi-ethnic nations ranging from Kosovo (Rossi, 2014) to Palestine (O’Leary, 2016).

Whether analyzing the politics of division in the Balkans or the Middle East, scholars that tread this line of inquiry are united by a single, “ageless” question: Why does political partition persist in ethno-nationally divided societies? Despite this postulated common pursuit, conventional inquiries into partition posit two *competing* logics that supposedly explain why territorial separation seems to endure in the historical context of ethno-national polities. On the one hand, the logic of the *ethnic security dilemma* holds that partition persists due to military and security factors (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 148), such as the perceivable inability of multi-ethnic states to ensure the security of their constituents in “post-war” settings that are hypothetically overrun by an anarchical competition for power (Johnson, 2015, p. 30). On the other hand, the logic of *ethnic spoils* builds on the conception that the perpetuation of partition is a question that can primarily be answered by delineating a number of economic factors (Jenne, 2012, p. 261); including the extent to which the leaders of a particular ethno-national group exert authority over the financial or physical “resources” of another group (Jenne, 2010, p. 372). While these two logics are not without empirical merit, this study will claim that – by virtue of

their *mono-paradigmatic* theoretic focus on military/security or economic factors – established explanations regarding the persistence of partition overlook the discursive manifestations of enduring socio-political division. In effect, how ethno-national political elites may politicize and rhetorically frame¹ the presence of “non-native” populations, in this case, settlers, as a symbolic obstacle to political reunification (Andreasson, 2010).

Cut in half by barbed wire and decrepit oil barrels, the Eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus, with its decades-long division between the local Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities (Bryant, 2012), provides a worthwhile case study for an exploration that seeks to interpret the linkage between lasting partition and elite discourse. Following the Cypriot Civil War that erupted on December 21, 1963 (Lamnisos, 2021; Varnava, 2013), and the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus (Harmanşah, 2021), which further fragmented this multi-ethnic polity into the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), the northern section of the island saw the gradual arrival of *settlers/migrants*² from Turkey (Akçali, 2007, p. 71). Among other political and economic motivations, this migratory movement was initially effectuated through an orchestrated attempt by Turkish-Cypriot and mainland Turkish authorities to repopulate the hurriedly abandoned abodes of Greek-Cypriot refugees that fled to the RoC-controlled south (Talat Zrilli, 2019, p. 503) after the 1974 landing of Turkish troops at the shores of Pénte Mili (Fouskas, 2005, p. 59). Since the initial “wave” of appearance of Turkish settlers/migrants in Cyprus, which lasted from 1975 to 1980 (Talat Zrilli, 2019, p. 495), the TRNC and the RoC experienced several diplomatic breakdowns in bi-communal efforts to reunite the partitioned island (Dodd, 2010). Accordingly, over the years, the rhetoric of Greek-Cypriot political elites¹ has discursively politicized the presumed “settler problem”, framing it as a substantial hindrance to the progress of negotiations that were aimed at achieving reconciliation between the two ethno-national groups (Loizides, 2011, p. 395).

Within such a politicized environment, 21st-century scholarship about this partitioned polity saw multiple noteworthy endeavors to examine the broader implications that are posed by the thorny presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in Northern Cyprus (Harmanşah, 2021; Hatay, 2005). Although these recent analytical efforts led to a more nuanced understanding of the “settler problem”, more often than not, researchers seek to merely explain how, by framing their hostile discursive representations of settlers, both elites and Cypriot citizens may

¹Influenced by Fenton’s (2018) conceptualization, here, framing refers to the rhetorical practices and discursive strategies that elites utilize to construct a narrative about issues of contention, in this case, the “settler problem”, and how political actors adopt socio-cultural notions to construe a given event (p. 236).

²As is the case with individuals that are considered as “heroes” by one side of an ethno-national conflict or as “terrorists” by the opposing side (Haddad, 2008, p. 451), the normative decision to cast individuals as settlers or migrants largely depends on the side that one chooses to support politically in contested territories. In an effort to avoid inadvertently picking a side in the Cyprus dispute, this study employs the term settlers/migrants (Loizides, 2011, p. 399) as the Turkish

contribute to the dissolution of partition (e.g., Christiansen, 2005). In an aim to *flip* such a routine mode of questioning, this study aims to inversely probe how enduring partition may generate the discursive strategies that Greek-Cypriot political elites utilize to frame the Turkish settler/migrant population. Among the Greek-Cypriot elite, the persistence of partition has – despite claims to the contrary and intra-elite ideological differences (Ioannou, 2020) – made the effective removal of settlers a virtually non-negotiable, sacrosanct prerequisite for any political solution to the Cyprus dispute and the eventual reunification of the two divided ethno-national communities (Christiansen, 2005, p. 156). This notwithstanding, the question remains about the *generative* effect of enduring partition on the specific discursive strategies that Greek-Cypriot political elites employed to frame the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants. In essence, the prototypical notion that enduring partition possesses a generative nature suggests that, in historical phases of persisting ethno-national segregation, the contested setting of division may engender notable shifts in how “native”³ political elites, and citizens alike, politicize a given “non-native” settler/migrant group.

For the purpose of denoting the generative effect of enduring partition, the analysis will focus on the brief period before the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the UN-sponsored “Annan Plan”, which was expressed through a public referendum on April 24, 2004 (t = 0; Dodd, 2010, pp. 154, 253), and the consequent phase of persisting division that culminated on July 7, 2017, after a turbulent collapse of peace talks between Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot diplomatic delegations at Crans Montana in Switzerland (t = 1; Faustmann & Sözen, 2019). As such, this investigation will undertake the task of answering the following research question:

How did Greek-Cypriot political elites publicly frame the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in Northern Cyprus during the period from 2004 to 2017?

In spite of its evident focus on the “settler problem”, the crux of the guiding question rests on the 2004-17 phase of enduring partition and, in this regard, allows this examination to address concerns about why partition seems to persist in ethno-nationally divided polities by tracing the generative nature of the Cypriot socio-political division. By formulating a response to this question, the significance of such a discourse-analytical, interpretative study will be exhibited through two parallel contributions. As a first step, and in relation to the conventional scholarly understandings of partition (Jenne, 2010; Johnson, 2015; Kaufmann, 1996), the liter-

nationals that inhabit Northern Cyprus are characterized as settlers by those who oppose their presence in the island, and as migrants by those who focus on their migratory characteristics (e.g., year of arrival or duration of stay; Hatay, 2005).

³Notwithstanding its problematic connotations (Liaras, 2015, p. 143), the term “native” will be used to refer to Greek-Cypriot elite figures or Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot citizens because this is the predominant mode of self-characterization that individuals deploy in the Cypriot polity. Correspondingly, the term “non-natives” will be applied in the case of Turkish settlers/migrants, as this is how Greek-Cypriot elites tend to perceive this population (e.g., PIO, 2007a).

ature review will endeavor to account for the theoretical inability of the logic of ethnic spoils and the ethnic security dilemma to delimit the influence of enduring partition on how “native” political elites frame the presence of settler/migrant populations in contested territories, such as Northern Cyprus (Krasniqi, 2019). By dint of its empirical findings, this study will suggest that partition can also persist in ethno-nationally divided polities through its generative nature that inadvertently gives shape to the discursive strategies of political elites and provides the environment in which settlers become rhetorically politicized and represented as a barrier to reunification. In describing the generative nature of persisting partition, the analytical section and the ensuing discussion will build on the *Agambenian* postulation that division produces a “state of emergency” (Bryant, 2012, p. 336) and on the newly-termed “middle-way” approach (e.g., Loizides, 2011, 2015). Effectively, the space for a middle-way approach to native-settler relations will be carved out by demonstrating the limitations of the two core schools of thought in this fieldⁱⁱ (sons-of-the soil studies; immigration studies).

At the same time, by inverting the questions that observers of Cypriot politics often seem to pose concerning the antagonistic rhetoric of citizens and political elites about Turkish settlers/migrants (Christiansen, 2005), the analysis will indicate that, in order re-frame such problematic representations, one needs to first acknowledge how partition may affect their development. In a societal sense, this means that – on each side of the historic Cypriot divide – a broader acceptance of cohabitation with Turkish settlers/migrants (Psaltis et al., 2019), along with a path to future reunification may be illuminated through a problematization of the role of enduring partition in the formation of such hostile discourse(s). All in all, this study will contribute to political science scholarship by concurrently accounting for the inattentiveness of partition literature regarding the discursive manifestations of how settlers/migrants are framed as an obstacle to the dissolution of division and will further explain that the generative effect of enduring partition solidifies the segregation of “rival” ethno-national groups as it informs how settler/migrant populations are antagonistically represented, and increasingly politicized, in elite rhetoric. Prior to engaging in the literature review, a brief treatment of the historical context of the Annan Plan will be provided.

Historical Context: The “Graveyard of Diplomats”

Seemingly frozen in time, the U.N.-patrolled buffer zone (Figure 2) – vernacularly referred to as the *Green Line* (Innes, 2017, p. 354) – which acts as an “unclosed gash” (Lloyd, 2003, p. 480) that lies between the RoC and the TRNC, has not been dissolved despite several

late 20th-century and early 21st-century efforts to bring an end to the partition of Cyprus through a negotiated peace settlement (Dodd, 2010; O’Leary, 2007). Aptly named as a “graveyard of diplomats” (Manouselis, 2020, p. 1), under the auspices of the U.N., this Mediterranean polity has seen a myriad of failed diplomatic attempts to reunify the two ethno-national communities in a bizonal, bicomunal federation (Loizides, 2016, p. 10).




Figure 2. Territorial map of Cyprus depicting the U.N. buffer zone and the “administrative divisions” of the island. From “Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection: Cyprus Maps”, by Central Intelligence Agency, 2010, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/txu-pclmaps-oclc-664083139-cyprus_admin-2010.jpg

After decades of shattered 20th-century peace initiatives, Cypriot negotiating teams were nearer than ever to reunifying the partitioned island (Michael, 2007) through the proposals of the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his Special Envoy Alvaro de Soto (Dodd, 2010, p. 205), which were summed up in the highly controversial Annan Plan (Moulakis, 2007). On April 24, 2004, the implementation of the fifth iteration of the Annan Plan was to be decided by two joint referenda, one in the RoC and one in the TRNC, where citizens were called upon

to express their opinion with a simple “yes” or “no” vote (Amaral, 2018; Dodd, 2010; Vural & Peristianis, 2008). In a decision that made the prospects of reunification appear unlikely for the upcoming years (Kinacioğlu & Oktay, 2006), the majority of the Greek-Cypriot electorate (76%) voted against the final Plan with a vehement “No” (Ioannou, 2020, p. 156), while 65% of TRNC’s citizens voted in favour of the proposal (Amaral, 2018, p. 361). Both in the lead up to the referenda and in the post-Annan period, the “settler problem” has been tied to the resolution of the Cyprus dispute. In this regard, Greek-Cypriot elite figures and a significant section of their constituencies consider the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants as an obstacle to the transition from partition to federalism (Loizides, 2016; Xypolia, 2017).

Conceptual Synopsis: A Panoramic View of Partition and Native-Settler Relations

Throughout the past decades, scholarly debates about the persistence of partition in ethnically divided polities, in other words, how this phenomenon may become irreversible (O’Leary, 2007, p. 905), have been dominated by two competing logics that are informed by the rational choice *paradigm* of political science (Monroe, 2001, p. 153). Specifically, the notion of ethnic spoils (Caspersen, 2008) and the ethnic security dilemma (Kaufmann, 1996; Johnson, 2015). As was previously hinted, for proponents of the ethnic spoils model, partition seems to endure due to an array of economic factors (Jenne, 2012), while for supporters of the ethnic security dilemma, the perpetuation of division is a question of military and security variables (Kaufmann, 1996).

The core objective of this section is to explain how these conventional theorizations of enduring partition – by virtue of their mono-paradigmatic scope – inherently neglect the significant discursive dimensions of socio-political separation and, in this vein, do not possess the conceptual tools that are needed to address the guiding question of this study. In an effort to account for the pronounced inability of the ethnic spoils and the ethnic security dilemma models to explain how Greek-Cypriot political elites framed Turkish settlers/migrants, the ensuing discussion will construct a theoretical spectrum of native-settler relations (Figure 3) and will indicate how the originally termed *middle-way* approach (Andreasson, 2010; Loizides, 2011) provides a window into the generative effect of enduring partition. Correspondingly, in a multi-paradigmatic manner, the theoretical framework will introduce Bryant’s (2012) cogent application of the *Agambenian* state of emergency in the Cypriot context (p. 336) and will hypothesize about the discursive strategies that Greek-Cypriot political elites had at their rhetorical disposal between 2004 and 2017. These strategies will be categorized by employing

three relevant inter-related concepts: “demographic imbalance” (Forstenlechner & Rutledge, 2011, p. 24), “securitization” (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020, p. 7), and “racialization” (Bonjour & Duyvendak, 2018, p. 897). In concise terms, the rhetoric of demographic imbalance indicates how settler/migrant populations can be represented as a peril to the numerical and political demographic balance of a specific polity (Sarmadi, 2013) and, relatedly, the strategy of securitization points out that such “non-native” groups may be deemed as an active threat to the physical or material security of “natives” (Nyman, 2018). Lastly, racializing utterances render settlers/migrants as being culturally incompatible with “native” ethno-national groups on the basis of ascribed racial/ethnic attributes (Chun, 2011).

Spoils or a Dilemma? The Competing Logics of Enduring Partition

Shaped by rational choice theory, the logic of ethnic spoils draws on the assumption that, in post-war environments of ethnic conflict, partition persists through a visible inability of warring elites to reunify divided communities as they are trapped in an economic structure of ethnic spoils (Jenne, 2010, p. 372). In this Augean setting, ethno-national elite figures, which according to this perspective make decisions through rational, “strategic calculations” (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2015, p. 12), have a monetary stake in perpetuating partition as they can directly benefit from the resource-based spoils of demographic separation (Jenne, 2012). For instance, the deserted abodes, agricultural fields, or communal buildings of rival communities (Jenne, 2010, p. 372). Alongside this, societal reintegration, which could bring about the dissolution of partition, is thwarted as the repatriation of displaced individuals on each side of the divide is disincentivized by economically-motivated elites that effectively prevent refugees from recovering their properties (Đorđević, 2015, p. 132) and moving back into the territories that they were expelled from (Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2015). As further evidence of this rationalist view of enduring partition (Caspersen, 2008), seminal proponents of the logic of ethnic spoils, such as Caselli and Coleman (2013), suggest that, for political elites, ethno-national identity takes on an instrumental value and is primarily employed for the exclusionary purpose of deterring ethnic antagonists from gaining “...access to the spoils of conflict.” (p. 188).

Even though, like ethnic spoils, the logic of the ethnic security dilemma is driven by the paradigm of rational choice, this perspective primarily eschews the economic dimensions of ethnic conflict and posits that partition may endure in divided societies as antagonistic ethno-national groups are structurally motivated to wage attacks against each other (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 139). Rather than a system of spoils, in this view, the military/security architecture of socio-

political division is what perpetuates partition (Downes, 2006) through two interdependent conditions (Johnson, 2015). First, if the partition of two or more polities does not entirely separate rival groups and leaves “stay-behind minorities” in the territory of the opposing ethno-national community (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 139), then this may lead to inter-ethnic insecurity and calls for aggression by “homeland” elites (Johnson, 2015, pp. 30-31). Such actors are strategically motivated by a postulated need to rescue their co-ethnics from what they perceive as potential oppression in another state (Johnson, 2015; Melander, 2009). Second, in broader structural terms, the assumed Hobbesian, anarchical post-war context of partitioned polities (Roe, 1999, p. 184) can produce incentives for violence as the vulnerability of rival states and their incapacity to exert military or political authority over their local populations may prompt opposing ethno-national elites and autonomous combatant groups to engage in self-serving hostile acts (Johnson, 2015, p. 31). Deeply entrenched in a psychologically-driven dilemma of “...defensive vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities.” (Kaufmann, 1996, p. 139), elite figures and armed militias rationally decide to engage in violence and, as such, to perpetuate partition through inter-ethnic hostilities (Melander, 2009). In conjunction with the previous arguments, this dilemmatic perception of enduring partition is further distinguished from the logic of ethnic spoils as it presupposes that – rather than being instrumental (Caselli & Coleman, 2013) – identification with an ethno-national community is dependent on inflexible, primordial, attributes (Kaufmann, 1996; Posen, 1994). These identificatory characteristics are supposedly ascribed to individuals through lineal descent, and, for this reason, political elites cannot mute them in efforts to enact cross-ethnic appeals (Kaufmann, 1996, pp. 140-141).

Notwithstanding their points of divergence (Jenne, 2012), in seeking to delineate why partition endures in ethno-nationally divided polities, these two mono-paradigmatic logics indicate that scholarly treatments of division conventionally neglect the discursive elements of socio-political separation. This tendency to overlook how, for example, “native” political elites may frame the presence of settlers as an obstacle to the dissolution of partition, is explained by the fact that such approaches merely focus on the structural military, security, or economic factors behind the perpetuation of division (e.g., Downes, 2006; Jenne, 2012). By treating individual ethno-national elites and combatants as unitary actors that hold “fixed” preferences (Zafirovski, 2014, p. 442), the rational choice models of ethnic spoils and the ethnic security dilemma are relatively blind to the particularistic and contextually-dependent ways in which persisting partition may generatively influence the politicization of settler populations in elite discourse.

In particular, the case of the Cypriot “settler problem” exemplifies how ethnic security dilemma and ethnic spoils explanations, through their respective primordial and instrumental conceptions of ethno-national identification, are inapplicable in the analytical setting of this study (Christiansen, 2005; Harmanşah, 2021). As Christiansen (2005) aptly states, in Cyprus, the public rhetoric of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot individuals “..about Turkish settlers *cannot* be dismissed as a case of historic hatreds or cross-ethnic animosities, for slurs against Turkish immigrants are echoed on *both* sides of the island.” (p. 156). This suggests that, in framing the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in Northern Cyprus, Greek-Cypriot elites are not solely motivated by an instrumental and hostile attempt to exclude this “non-native” group from the economic profits of ethnic conflict, which the RoC has acquired (Ioannou, 2020, p. 151), as the logic of ethnic spoils would contend (Caselli & Coleman, 2013). Nor by an immutable primordial hatred that prevents them from casting the “settler problem” as a putative source of cross-ethnic unity with Turkish-Cypriots, as per the logic of the ethnic security dilemma (Kaufmann, 1996). Importantly, in the case of Cyprus, a rationalist would expect only the ethnic antagonists, Greek-Cypriots, to be hostile towards the Turkish settler/migrant group, but instead, per Christiansen’s (2005) outlook, both Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots rhetorically oppose the presence of settlers/migrants through not simply economic or security concerns but also racial terms. Therefore, indicating how the “settler problem” does not fit neatly into the logic of ethnic spoils or that of the ethnic security dilemma. Even if one may argue that the presence of settlers/migrants can be politicized as an economic risk or a security threat to a particular “native” group, the politicization of Turkish nationals on both sides of the island poses a deeper question through its significantly contentious nature.

Effectively, the “settler problem” presents an intriguing interpretative challenge as it notably calls into question the conventional logics of partition literature, which aim to explain why socio-political division persists in ethno-national societies. Therefore, suggesting that an instructive theoretical review of the core schools of thought on native-settler relations may aid in building a more nuanced understanding of how Greek-Cypriot elites framed Turkish settlers/migrants in the period from 2004 to 2017.

A Spectral View of Discursive Interactions Between “Natives” and “Settlers”

One would not be too sceptical in asking *how* the diverse field of native-settler relations presents a framework for probing the generative effect of enduring partition on the discursive practices of ethno-national elites concerning settler populations. The answer is that, through its

current disciplinary differentiation (Haklai & Loizides, 2015 pp. 3-4) among schools of thought that view native-settler relations as primarily conflictual (i.e., sons-of-the-soil studies; Fearon & Laitin, 2011) and those that picture such interactions as being predominantly peaceful (i.e., immigration studies; Kymlicka, 1996), the field does not conceptually lend itself to context-informed investigations of partition. With an aim to mitigate such a typological problem, this section aims to draw a novel distinction between *static* and *non-static* lenses of native-settler relations. Essentially, the non-static position allows for the development of analyses that are attentive to dimensions of temporality and contextual-specificity (Bailey & Madden, 2017), while static thought – in like manner to the competing logics of ethnic spoils and the ethnic security dilemma – does not. By locating this conceptual gap in the research field of native-settler relations that is exhibited by the static nature of sons-of-the-soil and immigration studies, this examination aims to open up the space for the development of a non-static and contextually attentive middle-way approach, which will be potentially formulated upon engaging in the analysis and determining an empirical referent for such a perspective.


In substance, the middle-way approach may move beyond the staticity of the two core schools of thought in this domain of research by postulating that, as an indirect effect of enduring partition, the framing practices of elite figures are malleable and possess the ability to fluidly shift throughout time due to contextual influences (Loizides, 2011, p. 399). As a preliminary step for the development of this in-between account, the established sons-of-the-soil and immigration perspectives, along with the original middle-way approach, will be positioned on a theoretical spectrum that is defined according to the extent to which they are static or, conversely, non-static (Figure 3). The link between this section and partition literature rests on the fact that the two competing logics of ethnic spoils and the ethnic security dilemma are inapplicable in the Cypriot context and neglect the discursive manifestations of enduring ethno-national segregation; hence, necessitating a review of native-settler relations that may lead to the development of a multi-paradigmatic approach that aligns with the rhetoric-based account of this study.

Practically acting as a prevalent indication of static perception, sons-of-the-soil studies implicitly suppose that, while rhetorically framing the presence of “settlers” within a particular territory, “native” elites are instrumentally motivated by an effort to secure their economic and military interests (Green, 2012; Fearon & Laitin, 2011). This perspective, which assumes the universal rationality of political actors (Alcantara, 2007, p. 348) and argues that elites are self-interestedly prone to characterize settler populations as a source of economic contention in politicized territories (Côté & Mitchell, 2018), evidently cannot enable the development of

analyses that aim to probe particular temporal shifts or contextually-specific representations of settlers in elite rhetoric. In a similar manner to the logic of ethnic spoils, sons-of-the-soil studies are incapable of probing how enduring partition may influence the discourse of elites as they often focus on native-settler conflicts that revolve around the economic significance of “soil” (Côté & Mitchell, 2018, p. 142). Against this setting, soil, which is conceptualized as a given contested territory (Fearon & Laitin, 2011), takes analytical precedence and obscures how, as is the case in the partitioned island of Cyprus, antagonistic concerns about the presence of settler populations may be more salient in the discourse of elite figures rather than the economic properties of a contentious piece of land (Krasniqi, 2019). Moreover, such an intrinsically static view of native-settler relations is limited in an ontological sense as it neglects to acknowledge the categorical hybridity that is associated with settler/migrant populations, which are interchangeably portrayed as migrants or settlers both in academic and social fora (Christiansen, 2005; Hatay, 2005). Instead, sons-of-the-soil studies choose to define such communities as merely consisting of “settlers” (e.g., Alcantara, 2007).

Figure 3

The Theoretical Spectrum of Native-Settler Relations



Note. Key terms adapted from Haklai and Loizides (2015). Perspectives positioned according to the degree to which they are static or non-static.

^aOriginal concept formulated by the author.

By way of contrast to the sons-of-the-soil school of thought, immigration studies bear the propensity of ontologically equating “settlers” with migrants, and, in this sense, argue that, like migrant populations, the presence of settlers is not likely to be a source of conflict even in highly “politicized” environments (Kymlicka, 1996, p. 67). Such a conjecture is ostensibly supported by the notion that settler populations veer away from participation in civil wars and

do not engage in secessionist campaigns once they have settled in a particular territory (Laitin, 2009, pp. 48, 57). While sons-of-the-soil studies exhibit their static nature by assuming the rationality of elite figures, immigration studies are statically inattentive to the contextual and temporal elements of native-settler relations as they present a relatively unchangeable and benign picture of the discursive interactions between elite figures and settlers/migrants (Haklai & Loizides, 2015; Mitchell, 2018). On these grounds, immigration literature on the relationships between settler populations and natives does not provide the tools that are needed to theorize or investigate how, over time, an environment of enduring partition can influence the rhetorical politicization of settlers/migrants in elite discourse.

Theoretical Framework: Discursive Strategies Within a State of Emergency

For the purpose of tracing partition-generated contextual variations in the exclusionary rhetoric of Greek-Cypriot elite figures – contra sons-of-the-soil and immigration studies – and mitigating the inability of the competing logics of partition literature (ethnic spoils; ethnic security dilemma) to read into the discursive elements of division, this study will employ three inter-related discursive strategies. The first strategy, demographic imbalance, is defined as an asymmetry-related and phobic rhetorical practice by political elites concerning the numerical presence of “native” and “non-native” populations, in this regard, settlers/migrants, within a contested territory (Forstenlechner & Rutledge, 2011, p. 25). Through an engagement in the discourse of demographic imbalance, Greek-Cypriot political elites may seek to frame the presence of Turkish settler/migrants as a postulated threat to the maintenance of numerical or political demographic stability among the two local ethno-national communities of Cyprus and the settler/migrant population. Similarly, this discursive strategy will be indicated in the textual analysis if elite figures frame the demographic presence of settlers/migrants as a peril to the preservation of the ethno-national identity of a particular “native” community (Sarmadi, 2013).


In parallel to the rhetoric of demographic imbalance, the second discursive strategy, securitization, denotes that the presence of settlers/migrants can be framed as a hazard to the physical and symbolic existence or material wellbeing of “native” groups (Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020, p. 7). By viewing the Turkish settler/migrant as a socio-politically excluded individual, this strategy can be traced in the rhetoric of Greek-Cypriot political elites if they opt to discursively securitize the presence of settlers/migrants by deeming them as a purported

“existential threat” (Gulmez, 2019, p. 890) that lies beyond the realm of ordinary legal or governmental concerns (Nyman, 2018, p. 104).

Apart from this, the final discursive strategy of racialization reveals that political elite figures can advance a prejudicial rhetorical practice of racially or ethnically-defined “cultural incompatibility” between “native” constituencies and settler/migrant populations (Bonjour & Duyvendak, 2018, p. 895). In the discourse of Greek-Cypriot political elites, this strategy may tacitly take the form of highlighting an ethno-national identificatory differentiation among Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots on the one hand and Turkish settlers/migrants on the other, which assigns “meanings of race...onto cultural signs...” (Chun, 2011, p. 405).

Although the three outlined discursive strategies are not often considered in conjunction with each other and, in some instances, are seen as being mutually exclusiveⁱⁱⁱ, this middle-way framework will assume the contextually-dependent potentiality that, within a generative setting of enduring partition, which is theoretically likened to a state of emergency⁴ (Bryant, 2012), such rhetorical practices may be combined in the discourse of Greek-Cypriot political elites. Thus, generating a potential “interaction effect” (Figure 4) between the strategies that elite figures utilized from 2004 to 2017 to frame the presence of Turkish settler/migrants in Northern Cyprus. Drawing upon the innovative way in which Hoch et al. (2015) adapted the positivist-informed notion of the interaction effect (Halperin & Heath, 2016, pp. 424-423) in a discourse-analytical investigation (p. 321), this interpretative study will probe whether, over time, Greek-Cypriot elites linked or compounded the strategies of demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization in their public utterances about Turkish settlers/migrants. Effectively, proof of this amalgamating effect will be revealed in the analysis if elite figures attempt to combine the three rhetorical practices, which are otherwise regarded as self-contained acts (e.g., Howell & Richter-Montpetit, 2020).

⁴Implicitly drawing upon Agamben’s (2005) philosophical postulates, Bryant (2012) theorizes that the persistence of political partition in the Cypriot context gives rise to a “...continual state of emergency.” (Lloyd, 2003, p. 480). In this environment, the Green Line, which divides the Greek-Cypriot (RoC) and Turkish-Cypriot (TRNC) governments, lacks widespread international acknowledgement and is not deemed to be legally legitimate (Bryant, 2012, p. 336). Beyond the border, the RoC is internationally viewed as possessing *de jure* sovereignty throughout the entirety of the island, as opposed to the *de-facto* authority of the TRNC and its sole recognition by the state of Turkey (Kyris, 2018, p. 431). Despite this, the seemingly perpetual nature of partition and the unsettled status of the Green Line brings forth an Agambenian state of emergency, whereby the 1960 constitution of the RoC, which, in writing, applies to both the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities (Adams, 1966, pp. 477-478), is temporally abrogated (Bryant, 2012, p. 336) until the resolution of the Cyprus dispute (Vural & Peristianis, 2008).

Figure 4*Interaction Effect Between Three Discursive Strategies*

Note. Conceptual layout drawn from Halperin and Heath (2016).

In Hatay’s (2007) perspective, Turkish settlers/migrants have been traditionally tied to perceptions of “demographic danger” both in journalistic and political elite depictions of the presence of this population in the TRNC (p. 13). This widespread perception that the “settler problem” is predominantly a symbolic question of demographic imbalance, rather than one of security or race, is further supported by Akçali (2007), who argues that, from the elite to the lower classes, Greek-Cypriot citizens tend to be considerably wary of the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants whom they view as a threat to Cyprus’ “demographical structure” (p. 74). As such, with the available historical evidence in mind, and in contrast to the interaction effect that is suggested among the selected discursive strategies (Figure 4), one could hypothesize that, in the discourse of Greek-Cypriot political elites about Turkish settlers/migrants, the rhetoric of demographic imbalance will be more numerically prevalent and contextually salient than the practices of securitization or racialization (Akçali, 2007; Hatay, 2007). With an eye to potentially rejecting and problematizing this relatively monolithic assumption, the analytical section will consider whether, in accordance with Loizides’ (2011) middle-way viewpoint, the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants is not solely framed through the strategy of demographic imbalance and instead demonstrates tacit Greek-Cypriot elite “security concerns” (p. 394), or racial characterizations regarding this “non-native” population (Loizides, 2015). Moreover, if

the interaction effect among demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization is found to be more salient in the Cypriot context of enduring partition (2004-17) than the discrete use of demography-related rhetoric to frame Turkish settlers/migrants, then the discussion will further challenge the notion that the “settler problem” is primarily manifested as a demographic issue in Greek-Cypriot elite rhetoric (Akçali, 2007; Hatay, 2007).

Methodology: A Critical Gaze Into a Textual Space

By taking the interpretative impulse of this exploration into account, the analysis will employ a Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) – which is one of the variants of the “Vienna School” of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA; Boukala, 2019, p. 87) – to examine the 2004-17 rhetoric of Greek-Cypriot elites regarding Turkish settlers/migrants. Unlike text-driven procedures that eschew a thick reading of situational meaning(s) or temporal contingency (Halperin & Heath, 2016, p. 354) and instead choose to make statistical inferences about discursive practices (Lock & Seele, 2015, p. 26), such as quantitative content analysis (QCA), the methodological aspects of DHA are attuned to tracing “diachronic change” in discourse that may depend on contextual factors (Wodak, 2001, p. 4). Therefore, indicating that DHA provides the toolkit that is needed for probing the generative effect of a context of enduring partition on elite discursive practices (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Characterized by an open-ended theoretical eclecticism (Wodak, 2001, p. 8), DHA further aligns with the multi-paradigmatic purpose of this study, which will couple the middle-way approach (Loizides, 2011) with the Agambenian state of emergency (Bryant, 2012) to interpret the outlined discursive strategies of Greek-Cypriot elite figures.

In broad terms, the methodology of DHA, with its explicit emphasis on how rhetorical practices are “embedded” in a given historical setting (Wodak, 2001, p. 4), offers a much-valued qualitative toolkit in a field that is dominated by contextually-blind and positivistic discourse-analytical approaches, including QCA, that, oftentimes, seek to solely establish chains of causation (Lock & Seele, 2015, p. 35). Consequently, for DHA, what predominantly matters is the particularistic context in which the discourse of elites and citizens is enunciated (Boukala, 2019; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), not widely generalizable causal inference. That being said, DHA also stands out in the sub-field of interpretative accounts of elite rhetoric since it is specifically attuned to uncovering diachronic rhetorical shifts (Wodak, 2001) in contrast to other viewpoints that endeavour to delineate historical snapshots of a particular event (Toker, 2021). Thus, demonstrating the applicability of DHA in the context of this study, which aims

to detect significant changes in the discourse of Greek-Cypriot elites within a generative setting of enduring partition (2004-17).

For exponents of DHA (e.g., Aydın-Düzgit, 2016; Lamnisos, 2021; Wodak, 2001), this method posits a “three-dimensional” empirical process for the interpretation of textual sources (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 44). In the first dimension, the key “discourse topics” of particular rhetorical practices are delineated (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016, p. 48). Within the Cypriot context of enduring partition, three topics are often related to the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in Northern Cyprus: the stationing of the Turkish “occupation” army in the TRNC (Christiansen, 2005; Hatay, 2005); the role of international fora (e.g., the European Union) and bi-communal negotiations in how this settler/migrant population is perceived (Krasniqi, 2019, p. 308); and finally, the participation of Turkish settlers/migrants in voting along with broader democratic procedures (Akçali, 2007; Hatay, 2007). While conducting the analysis, each of these topics will be addressed to denote whether they bear potential linkages to the selected discursive strategies (Wodak, 2001) that Greek-Cypriot elite figures adopted to frame the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants through their public discourse. By way of illustration, the decision of individuals from this “non-native” settler/migrant population to vote in national or local elections (Hatay, 2005) may be tied to a strategy of demographic imbalance as it is frequently represented, both by Cypriot NGOs and political elites, as an obstacle to the equal political representation of “native” Turkish-Cypriots (Loizides, 2011, p. 394), and, by implication, to demographic stability in the north.

Following the selection of the relevant discourse topics, the second dimension of DHA revolves around the investigation of the discursive strategies that are used to rhetorically frame a given political issue (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016, p. 48). In seeking to identify manifestations of the discursive strategies that Greek-Cypriot elites deployed in the period from 2004 to 2017, this study will pose several probing questions to examine the textual sources under consideration (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). As inferred by the middle-way approach, what are the temporal and contextual shifts in the rhetorical practices of demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization that were used to discursively frame the presence of the Turkish settler/migrant population in an environment of enduring partition? How, if at all, are Turkish settlers/migrants socio-politically excluded from the Cypriot polity elite discourse? To what extent is an interaction effect among the three discursive strategies (Figure 4) present in the texts? What are the context-informed adjectives, hyperboles, and symbolic depictions (e.g., Anatolian^{iv}) that are discursively related to the “settler problem”?

Consequently, the third and last dimension of DHA takes into account the specific “linguistic means” (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 9) that evidence the utilization of each discursive strategy in the textual sources (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2016, p. 49). During the analytical discussion, each uncovered linguistic mean will be introduced by a selection of topically pertinent excerpts (Aydın-Düzgüt, 2016; Toker, 2021), which will demonstrate tangible examples of the central strategies of demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization, along with broader rhetorical patterns in the public discourse of Greek-Cypriot elites (Lamnisos, 2021).

Unearthing and Deciphering Archival Data

In order to probe how Greek-Cypriot elites publicly framed the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in the chosen 14-year-long period of persisting partition, this study will draw upon a selection of primary and secondary textual sources. First, the primary sources of elite discourse were obtained from the press release archival database (<https://www.piopressreleases.com.cy>) of the Press and Information Office (PIO), which is a state agency that is run under the aegis of the Interior Ministry of the RoC (Lamnisos, 2021, p. 36). After defining the search scope in the archive to only yield press releases that were published in the years between 2004 and 2017, one English and two Greek keywords were typed in the search field to unearth the relevant textual sources (see Appendix A). While reviewing all the primary material that the archival search produced, an initial “purposive sample” of 100 sources was drawn (Ames et al., 2019; Westbrook, 2007), according to the criterion that they explicitly conveyed the discourse of one or more Greek-Cypriot elite figures and that they were speeches, diplomatic addresses, or interviews that politicians officially delivered in a public context (Cameron & Panović, 2014). To make the sample more manageable and to exclude press releases that merely referred to Turkish settlers/migrants by name but did not provide any further insights into how Greek-Cypriot elites framed the “settler problem”, 43 analytically irrelevant textual sources were removed from the initial population; hence, yielding a final sample of 57 sources. In specific terms, the removal of the 43 sources was enacted through a process of theoretical construct sampling whereby the conceptually defined discursive strategies of demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization were used as selection criteria to discard sources that did not evidence the utilization of one of these rhetorical practices, or any contextually-relevant strategy for that matter (Ames et al., 2019, p. 3).

As a means of manually coding the relative numerical prevalence of the three discursive strategies, a group of discursive indicators will be utilized to indicate their presence in Greek-

Cypriot elite rhetoric (see Appendix A, Table A1). Aside from this, the analysis will assay the contextual salience of demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization by considering whether, despite its numerical quantity, a specific strategy, or a combination thereof, such as the interaction effect, takes discursive precedence in the setting of persisting partition (Brentari, 2018). To test the middle-way approach in the case of Cyprus and to trace diachronic shifts in the discursive strategies of Greek-Cypriot elites along with their relative prevalence and salience, the analysis will be divided into three time periods (2004-08; 2008-13; 2013-17) that respectively correspond to the presidential terms of three Greek-Cypriot elites during the scope of examination. These political elites are, namely, President Tassos Papadopoulos (2004-08), President Demetris Christofias (2008-13), and, lastly, President Nicos Anastasiades (2013-17; Schemmel, 2021).

The fact that the PIO database falls under the jurisdiction of the RoC hints at the likely presence of a bias of “silence” (Carter, 2006, p. 217) in the archive that may lead to the potential exclusion of problematic elite perceptions or characterizations of Turkish settlers/migrants, which Greek-Cypriot state officials wish to mute in formal accounts. To counter-weigh this bias, the discussion will include a selection of secondary sources regarding the discourse of Greek-Cypriot elites that have been retrieved from two Cypriot newspaper publications: *Politis* (<https://politis.com.cy/>) and *Haravgi* (<https://dialogos.com.cy/haravgi/>). Further, in line with DHA, the inclusion of these secondary sources in the analysis (N = 3) will allow for a procedure of “triangulation” (Wodak, 2001, p. 4) that aims to avoid biasing the results in a given direction by solely drawing primary textual sources from the PIO.

Analysis and Findings: Toward a Chronology of Rhetorical Practices

At first glance, the critical examination of the 60 primary and secondary textual sources seems to support the aforestated assumption that the strategy of demographic imbalance was more numerically prevalent than the rhetoric of securitization or racialization in the public discourse of Greek-Cypriot elites during the period from 2004 to 2017 (Table 1). Notwithstanding this observable aggregate prevalence of demographic imbalance, from a question of demographics under the Papadopoulos administration (2004-08), the “settler problem” eventually became more politicized through the employment of the strategies of securitization and racialization under President Christofias’ (2008-13) and President Anastasiades’ (2013-17) terms in office. In this context, the state of emergency (Bryant, 2012), which defines the Cypriot environment of enduring partition, generated an interaction effect (Figure 4) between the three, supposedly

distinct, rhetorical practices. Although utterances of demographic imbalance were, in discrete terms, utilized more frequently than securitizing and racializing characterizations, this notable interaction effect suggests that – while framing the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in Northern Cyprus – the combination of the selected strategies was more contextually salient in the public discourse of Greek-Cypriot elites rather than a specific rhetorical practice.

Table 1

The Numerical Prevalence of the Three Discursive Strategies of Greek-Cypriot Elites

Time Period ^a	Discursive Strategies ^b		
	Demographic Imbalance	Securitization	Racialization
2004-08 (President Tassos Papadopoulos)	22	4	3
2008-13 (President Demetris Christofias)	24	13	12
2013-17 (President Nicos Anastasiades)	12	11	7
Total N	58	28	21

Note. Data gathered from a sample of 60 textual sources that were published by the Press and Information Office (PIO), Politis, and Haravgi, in the period from 2004 to 2017.

^aDivided according to three presidential terms. ^bIn cases where the strategies were combined, they were coded as individual instantiations of each rhetorical practice.

As will be shown below, this amalgamating process⁵ lends credence to the development of a middle-way approach to native-settler relations (Andreasson, 2005) since it problematizes the monolithic perception that the “settler problem” was solely a demographic issue in elite representations (Akçali, 2007; Hatay, 2007), and indicates a form of diachronic change in the manners in which Greek-Cypriot elite figures framed Turkish settlers/migrants. Therefore, revealing that enduring partition can have a generative nature, which leads to notable shifts in the strategies that “native” elites employ to portray “non-native” populations as a barrier to reunification. Moving forward from the arguable contextual and temporal inattentiveness of sons-of-the-soil and immigration studies, which is an implicit outcome of their static nature (Figure 3), the middle-way approach is “...attuned to changing circumstances...” (Lustick,

⁵In utilizing the concept “amalgamating process”, this section refers to the interaction effect among the three discursive strategies.

2002, p. 21), and posits the useful amalgamated term “settlers/migrants” (Dembinska, 2017, p. 405). In an evidently nuanced manner, this term accounts for the ontologically fluid nature of individuals that are considered as “settlers” by sons-of-the-soil studies and as “migrants” by immigration studies (Haklai & Loizides, 2015). The middle-way viewpoint acknowledges that the demographic presence of settlers/migrants within a given territory can be framed as a postulated obstacle to the dissolution of partition (Ekenoğlu & Loizides, 2018, p. 126), and, at the same time, remains open to the fact that the discursive strategies that make up elite rhetoric are subject to change as partition persists (Psaltis et al., 2019). From this view, such a non-static understanding provides the initial step in reflecting on how Greek-Cypriot elites framed Turkish settlers/migrants in the period from 2004 to 2017.

2004-08: The “War of Numbers”

After several months of arduous negotiations with the President of the TRNC Rauf Raif Denktaş, which exemplified a lack of mutual agreement regarding the core U.N. provisions for a solution to the Cyprus dispute, on the 7th of April 2004, President Tassos Papadopoulos made a tearful appearance on national television to publicly express his opposition to the Annan Plan (Christophorou, 2005, pp. 86, 89). While urging Greek-Cypriot citizens to “...reject the Plan...” by casting a decisive vote of “NO” in the upcoming referendum that would take place on the 24th, Papadopoulos claimed that this U.N.-produced proposal did not quell “...Turkey’s pursuit to control and dominate Cyprus...” and harboured the “...danger of a permanent mass settling...” of the island (Press and Information Office [PIO], 2004a, pp. 5, 9). By denouncing the Annan Plan through an argument that it furthered the supposedly dominating interests of the mainland Turkish government, Papadopoulos implicitly linked the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants to his perception of Turkish (neo)-imperial ambitions (Xypolia, 2017) and utilized the fear-inducing image of “mass settling” to frame this population as a peril to demographic stability in Northern Cyprus (PIO, 2004a, p. 5). This tacit employment of the strategy of demographic imbalance set the tone for elite rhetoric under Papadopoulos’ presidency, which, following his emotional address, primarily gravitated around the demography of Turkish settlers/migrants (Table 1).

Once the Annan Plan was rejected by an overwhelming majority of Greek-Cypriots (76%), both President Papadopoulos and other preeminent elite figures of the RoC engaged in a “war of numbers” (Hatay, 2007, p. 4) that exploited contentious statistics about Turkish settlers/migrants as rhetorical ammunition to propound a narrative of demographic imbalance.

Positioned in a state of emergency, the RoC – which refuses to recognize the de facto existence of the TRNC and characterizes it as a “puppet” state that is governed by Turkey (Bryant & Hatay, 2020, p. 174) – paradoxically constructed spurious population estimates about Turkish settlers/migrants by gathering arrival and departure data from the TRNC along with excerpts from Turkish-Cypriot journalistic reports (Hatay, 2007, pp. 4-5). In these RoC projections, no distinction is made between Turkish agricultural workers that initially arrived in the north (1975-1980) due to a structured settlement policy (Talat Zrilli, 2019, pp. 495, 503) and Turkish vacationers or students that temporarily reside in the TRNC (Hatay, 2005, pp. 9-10).

During the war of numbers, the propagandistic statistical reports of the RoC were used to cast all citizens of Turkish origin as “settlers” and as evidence of Turkey’s alleged attempt to colonize Cyprus (Hatay, 2007, p. 5). As an illustration, the acting Government Spokesman of the RoC, Kypros Chrysostomides, issued a public warning on the 21st of February 2005 that “...Turkish settlers constitute the majority in the occupied areas [TRNC]...” (PIO, 2005a, p. 1) to affirm Papadopoulos’ earlier statement about the presence of “...119,000 illegally implanted Turkish settlers.”, which had the supposed effect of “...altering...and distorting the demographic balance..” of Northern Cyprus (PIO, 2004c, pp. 2, 4). In corroborating the assertions that were made by President Papadopoulos and claiming that Turkish settlers/migrants were the majority of TRNC’s population, Chrysostomides engaged in a strategy of demographic imbalance as he framed the existence of this settler/migrant group as a peril to demographic stability among Turkish nationals and Turkish-Cypriot citizens who were assumed to be a minority in the north (PIO, 2005a). Arguably, in a counterfactual scenario, Greek-Cypriot political elites would not be able to easily posit false statistics about Turkish settlers/migrants (Hatay, 2007) and to enact a discourse of demographic imbalance if they were not functioning within a state of emergency, as the statistical agencies of the RoC would have direct physical access to numerically measure this group and potentially falsify any mis-categorizations. Thus, indicating how the Cypriot context of enduring partition can be generative of particular rhetorical practices.

Besides the fact that Greek-Cypriot elite figures typically focused on the demography of Turkish settlers/migrants during the Papadopoulos administration, the public utterances of the Minister of Commerce, Giorgos Lillikas (PIO, 2005b), which combined the strategies of demographic imbalance and racialization, exemplify the ensuing higher degree of politicization that would transpire from 2008 to 2017 (Table 1). On the 16th of July 2005, in a mass protest at Trafalgar Square against the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Minister Lillikas condemned the island’s “occupation” by asserting that it led to “...the destruction of our [Greek-Cypriot] cultural heritage, the closure of Greek schools, the destruction of places of worship and the

mass influxes of Turkish settlers...” (PIO, 2005b, p. 1). In Lillikas’ viewpoint, these “colonists from Anatolia” were placed in Cyprus as part of a “[T]urkish policy for the alteration of the demographic character and the historical identity of Cyprus.” (PIO, 2005b, pp. 1-2). While convincing evidence of cultural cleansing is present in the TRNC (Figure 5), by exclusively associating the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants with such acts of vandalism and casting them as Anatolian “colonists” that were supposedly introduced in Cyprus to reshape the demographic structure of the island and its historical legacy (PIO, 2005b, pp. 1-2), Lillikas frames this population as a threat to demographic stability and as a source of cultural incompatibility.

In reality, not all settlers/migrants that have arrived in Cyprus were originally from the Central Anatolia region of Turkey (Talat Zrilli, 2019). Accordingly, Lillikas’ depiction of Turkish settlers/migrants as being Anatolian suggests a form of racializing rhetoric that, like informal racist characterizations of “Anatolian apes” (Christiansen, 2005, p. 154), is utilized to draw a cultural distinction between “native” Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots that he deems as the “legal inhabitants” of Cyprus (PIO, 2005b, p. 1) and this “non-native” group. Further, the assumed illegality of Turkish settlers/migrants in the above excerpt (PIO, 2005b), which is also present in Papadopoulos’ portrayal of “illegally implanted Turkish settlers” (PIO, 2004c, p. 2), points out how, in Greek-Cypriot elite discourse, these individuals are rhetorically positioned outside the domain of law.



Figure 5. Damaged mosaic at the Church of “Panayia tis Kanakarias” in the Boltaşlı village, Karpas, Cyprus. From “The Loss of a Civilization: Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Occupied Cyprus”, by PIO, 2012c, [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_stockholm.nsf/A64B1EE900605967C22578B90025C290/\\$file/Destruction%20of%20cultural%20heritage%20\(English%20version\).pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_stockholm.nsf/A64B1EE900605967C22578B90025C290/$file/Destruction%20of%20cultural%20heritage%20(English%20version).pdf). Screenshot by author.

Alongside his racial descriptions, Lillikas directly participated in the war of numbers as he challenged the legitimacy of a 2006 population census that was carried out by the TRNC on the 30th of April (PIO, 2006). Two days after the census was completed in the north, he claimed that the “...so-called census...by the occupation regime in the occupied areas is aimed at distorting, yet again, the demographic data of the occupied areas and at presenting the settlers as Turkish Cypriots...” (PIO, 2006, para. 1). Here, Lillikas disputes the validity of the census, and, in a broader sense, the sovereign capacity of the TRNC to conduct such a population survey by pejoratively employing the adjective “so-called” to refer to it while also framing the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants as a hazard to maintaining demographic stability because, according to him, they were falsely presented as “native” Turkish-Cypriots in the census (PIO, 2006, para. 1). Mirroring Lillikas’ rhetoric of demographic imbalance, in a 2007 reception of diplomatic credentials, President Papadopoulos maintained that “...Turkey has embarked on a well organized plan to change the *demographic character* [emphasis added] of Cyprus by introducing over 160.000 Turkish settlers...” (PIO, 2007a, p. 3). While claiming that Turkish settlers/migrants arrived in the northern section of Cyprus due to a Turkish (neo)-imperial policy of transforming the “demographic character” of this contested territory and adding that Turkish settlers/migrants “...outnumber the indigenous Turkish Cypriots, of about 80.000, by two to one.” (PIO, 2007a, p. 3) Papadopoulos utilized the contentious RoC statistics about this population (Hatay, 2005) to construct a picture of demographic imbalance. In this picture, Turkish-Cypriots were painted as an “indigenous” minority that was in danger of being socio-politically dominated and outvoted by the demographic majority of Turkish settlers/migrants (PIO, 2007a) because, according to Papadopoulos, they made up a “...majority of persons on the ‘electoral rolls of the TRNC’...” (PIO, 2004b, p. 2).

2008-13: Security, Race, and Turkish-Cypriot “Compatriots”

The election of President Demetris Christofias on the 28th of February 2008 (Schemmel, 2021) signalled a significant contextual shift in the discourse of Greek-Cypriot elites. Even though his predecessor, President Papadopoulos, predominantly engaged in the rhetoric of demographic imbalance and noted “...that the Cyprus dispute has no religious connotations” (PIO, 2007b, p. 2), during the Christofias administration, political elites framed the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants through a combination of securitizing, racializing, and imbalance-related strategies, which, at times exhibited cultural or religious concerns. This higher degree of politicization that is evidenced by an interaction effect among the three outlined strategies

(Figure 4) would effectively persist under the presidential term of Christofias’ successor Nicos Anastasiades.

In an effort to move beyond the Annan-imposed impasse that stained Papadopoulos’ legacy, President Christofias restarted peace negotiations with Mehmet Ali Talat, the President of the TRNC (Loizides, 2016, pp. 31-32). Speaking at the 63rd session of the U.N. General Assembly, Christofias asserted that a solution to the Cyprus dispute “...would allow...Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to live together and work together in an independent prosperous country, without the presence of foreign armies and *illegal colonists* [emphasis added] under conditions of security and respect for their identity and rights.” (PIO, 2008, pp. 3-4). This statement, coupled with Christofias’ wariness about the arrival of “...tens of thousands of settlers...” in the TRNC, indicates that, for the RoC President, the “illegal” existence of settlers/migrants, which is tied to “foreign” Turkish troops, constitutes a dual demographic and security threat for Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot citizens (PIO, 2008, pp. 3-4). By combining the strategies of securitization and demographic imbalance, Christofias contended that, without the repatriation of Turkish settlers/migrants, the two “native” communities would continue to live in an insecure state of emergency that, inter alia, challenged their ability to maintain their ethno-national identity and to “live together” under the jurisdiction of a consociational state (PIO, 2008, p. 3).

Apart from the preceding amalgamation of demographic imbalance and securitization, Greek-Cypriot political elites often combined racializing rhetoric with their perceptions about the demography of Turkish settlers/migrants; specifically, 8 (33.33%) out of the total 24 indications of demographic imbalance (Table 1) were manifested through a combination of this discursive strategy and racialization. For instance, in referring to U.N. resolutions about the Cyprus dispute, the RoC’s Permanent Representative to the U.N., Minas Hadjimichael, chose to highlight the “...destruction of the cultural and religious heritage in occupied Cyprus and the change of the demographic composition of that part.” (PIO, 2009a, p. 1). From his perspective, these pernicious outcomes resulted from the fact that the Turkish mainland government “...has in the course of 35 years implanted in the northern part of Cyprus some 200,000 settlers from Anatolia, more than twice the number of the indigenous Turkish Cypriots...” (PIO, 2009a, p. 1). Through such utterances, Hadjiminias frames the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants as a source of demographic imbalance in Northern Cyprus by exaggerating about their numbers, which he hyperbolically deems to be “200,000” (PIO, 2009a, p. 1) in contrast to later RoC reports that place this population at “160,000” (PIO, 2009c, p. 1), and by arguing that they considerably outnumber the “native” Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants of the TRNC. At the same

time, he attempts to racialize Turkish settlers/migrants by emphasizing their Anatolian origin and their purported complicity in acts of defacement (e.g., Figure 5) of “cultural and religious heritage” (PIO, 2009a, p. 1), which essentially gives rise to a form of cultural incompatibility among this group and Greek-Cypriots.

In tandem with the visible interaction effect in Hadjiminias’ discourse, this contextually-specific combination of demographic imbalance and racialization can be traced in Christofias’ assertion that the arrival of “settlers from Anatolia” has altered the “demographic character” of Northern Cyprus and has indirectly led to the destruction of “cultural monuments” (PIO, 2009b, p. 4). Moreover, such a rhetorical amalgamation is present in Archbishop Chrysostomos’ II claim that “hundreds of thousands of settlers from Anatolia” have tilted the demographic balance of the TRNC in their favour and have damaged the “cultural heritage” and “Christian monuments” of Greek-Cypriots (PIO, 2010, p. 2).

As a counterpoint to the logic of the ethnic security dilemma, which supposes that elite figures are unable to enact cross-ethnic appeals due to their primordial hatreds and inflexible attachments to their ethno-national identity (Kaufmann, 1996), the discourse of Greek-Cypriot elites points out that the “settler problem” was framed as a source of cross-ethnic unity between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. In the inaugural ceremony for the newly-built hall of a community building of the Cypriot diaspora in Australia, President Christofias addressed the Greek-Cypriot attendees with the following statement:

Our Turkish Cypriot *compatriots* [emphasis added] are not our enemies, they are our brothers and I have been blamed for saying that. They are Cypriots like us and that is why they are protesting against the presence of thousands of settlers from Turkey, who are brought in to change the demographic composition of the Cypriot population...

(PIO, 2011, p. 1)

For Christofias, the thorny presence of Turkish settlers/migrants symbolizes a common cause among Greek-Cypriots and their Turkish-Cypriot brotherly “compatriots”, who, in his view, are fighting against the fact that the implantation of settlers/migrants has transformed the demography of the north (PIO, 2011, p. 1). Besides this indication of the strategy of demographic imbalance, in his cross-ethnic appeal, Christofias implicitly racializes the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants by conjuring up a common “Cypriotness” (Dembinska, 2017, p. 399) that unites Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot individuals (PIO, 2011) but excludes the culturally differentiated settler/migrant. In his public addresses, Turkish-Cypriots are “Cypriots like us [Greek-Cypriots]” (PIO, 2011, p. 1), whereas Turkish settlers/migrants are racially framed as

Anatolian foreigners that participate in the “turkification” of Northern Cyprus (PIO, 2012b, p. 1). As further evidence of his aim to cast the racialized presence of Turkish settlers/migrants as a basis of cross-ethnic solidarity among Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, on the 29th of March 2012, Christofias would go on to state that “Turkish-Cypriots have more in common with Greek-Cypriots than they have with Turks” (PIO, 2012a, p. 2).

2013-17: “Legitimate Citizens” and “Vulgar Anatolians”

Despite that, following his election, the policies of President Nicos Anastasiades were characterized as a “[s]ignificant first step” for the dissolution of partition in mainstream Greek-Cypriot narratives (Loizides, 2016, pp. 34-35), during his term in office, political elites did not abstain from increasingly politicizing the “settler problem” and framing it as a symbolic barrier to reunification through a combination of the three discursive strategies (Table 1). Once the optimism from the resumption of peace talks in 2014 dissipated, Anastasiades’ presidency led to the current impasse that defines the Cyprus dispute, which was caused by the breakdown of diplomatic negotiations at Crans Montana on the 7th of July 2017 (Ioannou, 2020, pp. 158-159).

Eight months after his assumption of duties as President of the RoC, Anastasiades gave an impassioned speech at a commemoration ceremony for Kyriakos Matsis, who was a member of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot fighters) that fought against the British colonial government of Cyprus (PIO, 2013). While addressing the Greek-Cypriot crowd, Anastasiades stated that the resolution of the Cyprus dispute will bring about “...an end to the Turkification of our occupied areas [TRNC], will stop the flow of Turkish settlers to Cyprus...and will develop conditions of unity and creative cooperation for all the people of Cyprus...” (PIO, 2013, p. 1). In a similar fashion to Christofias’ warnings about the “turkification” of Northern Cyprus (PIO, 2012b, p. 1), President Anastasiades engages in the rhetoric of racialization by linking the presence of settlers/migrants with their Turkish mainland origin and by assuming that they were implanted in the island to erase its supposed Greek-Cypriot cultural heritage and character (PIO, 2013). Unlike Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, who were seen by Anastasiades as the “...legitimate citizens of Cyprus...” (PIO, 2014, p. 1), the Turkish settler/migrant population was framed as a racially foreign group that illegally existed in the TRNC (PIO, 2013). This racializing discourse was amalgamated with the strategy of securitization, as he claimed that, without terminating the “...flow of Turkish settlers to Cyprus...”, the symbolic existence of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots would continue to be endangered as they can only live

in “...conditions of unity and creative cooperation...” if, among other things, this migratory movement is halted through Cyprus’ reunification (PIO, 2013, p. 1).

On the 1st of April 2015, Fotis Fotiou, the Presidential Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs and Overseas Cypriots, spoke at a celebratory event for the national anniversary of the 1955-59 “struggle” of EOKA (PIO, 2015). During his speech, Fotiou condemned the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and claimed that, as a result of this incursion, “...thousands of settlers, who have surpassed Turkish-Cypriots in numbers, are defiling our [Greek-Cypriot] land...and are usurping our properties.” (PIO, 2015, p. 3). This religiously imbued picture of defilement indicates a securitizing strategy in Fotiou’s discourse since he frames the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants as an existential threat to the material possessions of Greek-Cypriot refugees, specifically, their “properties” in Northern Cyprus (PIO, 2015, p. 3). Further, in his statement, the Commissioner combines the rhetoric of securitization with the strategy of demographic imbalance because he stresses that settlers/migrants “...have surpassed Turkish-Cypriots in numbers...” (PIO, 2015, p. 3); hence, jeopardizing the numerical, demographic, stability of the north.

In conjunction with the above illustrations of the interaction effect among the rhetoric of demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization, this contextually salient fusion of the selected discursive strategies was found in Archbishop Chrysostomos’ II xenophobic utterances, which are excluded from the PIO archive (Politis, 2017). As Aydın-Düzgüt (2016) explains, the silence of textual sources about specific topics may bear equal significance to the words that are explicitly uttered in official accounts (p. 50) – in this case, the silence of the PIO archive about Chrysostomos’ discourse does not discount the fact that his rhetoric exemplified the broader pattern of increasing politicization of the “settler problem”.

During the politicized lead-up to the Crans Montana talks, Chrysostomos asserted that Northern Cyprus is home to “...more than 300,000 settlers, which are vulgar Anatolians that are not going to become Europeans even after 100 years...” (Politis, 2017, para. 5). After posing a rhetorical question about “where are we [Greek-Cypriots] headed if they [settlers] stay here and give birth to a dozen of children per family?” the Archbishop added that Turkish settlers/migrants arrived in the TRNC because they “wanted to distort the demographic composition of our people...” but “at least, Turkish-Cypriots dislike them...and intermarriages are few.” (Politis, 2017, para. 5). In like manner to the Secretary of the Council of Ministers, Theodosios Tsiolas, who warned about the migration of “settlers from Anatolia” that led to a “demographic shift” in the north (PIO, 2016, p. 1), Chrysostomos combined the strategy of demographic imbalance with that of racialization. This interaction effect is evidenced through two inter-

related statements. First, Chrysostomos’ rhetorical attempt to frame the Turkish settler/migrant population as a threat to the “demographic composition” of Northern Cyprus, because, in his xenophobic narrative, these “uneducated” individuals “...give birth to a dozen of children per family...” (Politis, 2017, para. 5). Second, his claim that this population consists of “vulgar Anatolians” that are culturally incompatible with Greek-Cypriots – who are symbolically seen as “Europeans” – or Turkish-Cypriots that allegedly avoid marrying settlers/migrants (Politis, 2017, para. 5).

Discussion: The Synthesis of Middle-Way and Agambenian Insights

The foregoing analysis exhibits how the quantitative prevalence of a given framing strategy, such as the rhetoric of demographic imbalance, cannot solely explain patterns in the discourse of elite figures if what lies underneath is a qualitative amalgamation of contextually salient, and more politically relevant, rhetorical practices. In observing the Cypriot state of emergency, at face value, one would be tempted to interpret the evidence as reflecting the fact that Greek-Cypriot elites predominantly framed the “settler problem” as a demographic issue (Table 1). Nevertheless, the evident interaction effect among the three discursive strategies (Figure 4) demonstrates that the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in Northern Cyprus was simultaneously racialized and securitized while being framed as a threat to the demography of the TRNC and of an envisioned federal inter-ethnic state. Correspondingly, the interpretative evidence of an amalgamating process between the outlined strategies pointed out how the “settler problem” was increasingly politicized in the period of enduring partition, which persisted from 2004 to 2017; thus, indicating the fact that, by functioning as an Agambenian state of emergency (Bryant, 2012), lasting ethno-national segregation can be generative of diachronic shifts in the rhetorical practices of political elites. In theoretical terms, the contextually-specific and non-static temporal shift that was illustrated by the discourse of Greek-Cypriot elites paved the way for the development of a middle-way approach to native-settler relations that may account for such rhetorical transformations in how settlers/migrants are politicized by “natives” within a contested territory.

As a counterpoint to scholars that perceive the Agambenian approach as “ahistorical” and inattentive to contextual nuances (Lee et al., 2014, p. 662), the analysis delineated that, in line with the middle-way lens of native-settler relations, enduring partition – which is seen as a state of emergency – generated a form of diachronic change in the discourse of Greek-Cypriot political elite figures. Within such a multi-paradigmatic framework, the state of emergency in

the partitioned context of Cyprus (Bryant, 2012) cannot be deemed as a static phenomenon but rather as a fluid potentiality (Lee et al., 2014) that effectuated discursive shifts in how Greek-Cypriot elites framed Turkish settlers/migrants in the period from 2004 to 2017.

Lastly, by socio-politically excluding the Turkish settler/migrant population from the Cypriot polity on account of its supposedly illegal presence, which was conveyed through statements that this group was “illegally implanted” in the north (PIO, 2004c, p. 2) and that it did not consist of “legitimate citizens” (PIO, 2014, p. 1) like the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot “native” communities, Greek-Cypriot elites framed the Turkish settler/migrant as a foreign *homo sacer* (Agamben, 1998, p. 73). According to Agamben (1998), the *homo sacer* is an individual that cannot be sheltered by legal principles as he or she is rhetorically relegated to the external political periphery of a given *pólis* (Tansuğ, 2021, pp. 4-5). Observably set within a partition-imposed state of constitutional emergency, in the eyes of the elite class of the RoC, the Turkish settler/migrant takes on the properties of the archetypal *homo sacer* (Agamben, 1998, p. 82), which, in this case, by virtue of acting as a symbolic obstacle to reunification, is placed outside the sphere of law (Nair, 2011; Hunter & MacDonald, 2017). This indicates that, while framing the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in Northern Cyprus, Greek-Cypriot political elites engage in a discriminatory discourse of exclusion that has an unuttered objective (Agamben, 1998) of suspending the legal entitlements and freedoms of this settler population (Hunter & Macdonald, 2017, p. 496).

Conclusion: Addressing Critique and Paths for Future Inquiries

All things considered, the above interpretative evidence suggests that, in the period of enduring partition that lasted from 2004 to 2017, Greek-Cypriot political elites publicly framed the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants in Northern Cyprus by predominantly combining the outlined discursive strategies of demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization. This interaction effect between the three rhetorical practices (Figure 4) indicates that, instead of the numerically prevalent strategy of demographic imbalance (Table 1), an amalgamation of demography-related, securitizing, and racializing utterances was more contextually salient in Greek-Cypriot elite discourse than a specific discursive strategy. Through a problematization of the dominant assumption that the “settler problem” is primarily framed as a demographic question in elite narratives (Akçali, 2007; Hatay, 2007), this study, which views socio-political division as a state of emergency (Agamben, 2005; Bryant, 2012), demonstrated the generative

nature of enduring partition in the Cypriot context and explained how this environment enabled contextual shifts in the rhetoric of Greek-Cypriot elites. While under President Papadopoulos’ administration (2004-08), the presence of Turkish settlers/migrants seemed, at first sight, to be subject to a discourse of demographic imbalance that – inter alia – drew upon propagandistic statistics, the ensuing terms of President Christofias (2008-13) and President Anastasiades (2013-17) signalled a higher degree of politicization of the “settler problem” as the previously demographic descriptions of this settler/migrant population were securitized and racialized. In effect, this contextually-specific pattern of diachronic change (Wodak, 2001) in elite discourse was initially manifested after Christofias’ 2008 election and his propensity to cast Turkish settlers/migrants as a source of insecurity for “native” Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots (PIO, 2008). Coupled with these findings, the discussion illustrated how, unlike the two ethno-national communities of Cyprus that were termed as its “legal inhabitants” (PIO, 2005b, p. 1), Turkish settlers/migrants were, in line with Agamben’s insights (1998), framed as an excluded homo sacer in elite rhetoric by dint of their purported illegality.

Besides the evidentiary confines of this case study, the middle-way approach of native-settler relations (Andreasson, 2010), which was differentiated from the school of immigration and sons-of-the-soil studies through its non-static character (Figure 3) that points to the fluidity of “native” elite discourse about “non-native” settlers/migrants (Loizides, 2011), was found to be applicable in the Cypriot context that exhibited a contextual shift in the rhetoric of Greek-Cypriot elites. By flipping the traditional questions that researchers often seem to pose about the symbolic representation of Turkish settlers/migrants in elite narratives (Christiansen, 2005), the discussion suggested that persisting partition can generate a higher degree of politicization of “non-native” populations, and, in this regard, may make the road to reunification more difficult in societies that, like Cyprus, remain divided for decades (Bryant, 2012). From a policy standpoint, this means that, in order to re-frame the hostile discourse(s) of elites about settler/migrant groups, credible steps toward reconciliation, such as the bottom-up participation of Turkish settlers/migrants in peace-building efforts, must be taken across the divide (Loizides, 2011, p. 396). Apart from probing the applicability of the middle-way approach in the case of Cyprus, the multi-paradigmatic theoretical framework of this investigation, which combined Bryant’s (2012) Agambenian perception of the state of emergency and the middle-way insights, provided a way forward from the two competing logics of partition literature (ethnic spoils; ethnic security dilemma). With a broad theoretical purpose in mind, these conventional logics were challenged due to their mono-paradigmatic scope that rationalistically focuses on the economic or military/security variables behind the persistence of partition in ethno-nationally

divided societies and, accordingly, omits the discursive manifestations of enduring division; essentially, how settlers/migrants may be rhetorically deemed as an obstacle that stands against reunification.

A potential criticism that may arise in reviewing this examination relates to the internal validity of the findings (Halperin & Heath, 2016, p. 174). In particular, one may contend that by solely focusing on the discourse of Greek-Cypriot political elites, the analysis provides a relatively one-sided view of the “settler problem” that excludes the generative influence of enduring partition on the rhetoric of Turkish-Cypriot elites about Turkish settlers/migrants. Even though such an assessment is not without merit, due to its limited length and the fact that it adopted a novel mode of questioning in empirical research about Cyprus, this study opted to focus on the explicitly antagonistic utterances of Greek-Cypriot elite figures. This analytical scope was selected as a means of providing the groundwork for future comparative studies that may attempt to draw parallels between the rhetorical practices of elites on both sides of the Green Line (Figure 2) or in other partitioned polities.

Moving beyond the elite-based “high politics” account of this interpretative dissection of Greek-Cypriot elite rhetoric (Craig, 2010, p. 454), Cypriot scholarship may benefit from an ethnographic gaze into the perceptions of Turkish settlers/migrants regarding their depiction in official and widespread public narratives. Following Longo and Zacka’s (2019) noteworthy call for the integration of ethnography and political theory, by looking at how individuals from the understudied population of Turkish settlers/migrants generate and renegotiate meanings about their characterization as an impediment to reunification, researchers may capture a more “thick” picture of this phenomenon (pp. 1066-1068). Ultimately, as the “settler problem” is a normatively contested issue in Cyprus, per Longo and Zacka’s (2019) suggestion (p. 1070), an ethnographic methodology could provide the much-needed bridge between normative (e.g., Akçali, 2007) and empirical understandings (e.g., Ekenoğlu & Loizides, 2018) of native-settler relations in this partitioned polity. As the Mediterranean island of Cyprus remains divided by barbed wire and oil barrels to this day (Figure 1; Harmanşah, 2021), the societal significance of examining how – besides Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot citizens or elites – Turkish settlers/migrants perceive the “settler problem” does not seem to dissipate.

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Appendix A

Three Keywords and Coding Guidelines

. One English and two Greek keywords: “Settlers”; “Εποικιοι”; “Εποίκους”. Note that the word “Εποικιοι” (Époikoi) is the Greek translation of the term “Settlers” and the word “Εποίκους” (Epoíkous) is the plural possessive of the same word.

Table A1

Coding Guidelines

Discursive Strategy	Discursive Indicator
Demographic Imbalance	e.g., “...the systematic implantation of settlers from mainland Turkey with the aim of altering the <i>demographic structure</i> [emphasis added] of the island...” ^a
Securitization	e.g., “...without the complete withdrawal of...the settlers, the safeguarding of the future of the Cyprus state through strong international guarantees and the <i>securing</i> [emphasis added] of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Cyprus people [sic], there can be no solution to the Cyprus problem.” ^b
Racialization	e.g., “...the <i>Turkification</i> [emphasis added] of the area through the transfer of thousands of settlers from Turkey and the destruction of our cultural heritage ...” ^c

Note. The discursive strategies of demographic imbalance, securitization, and racialization were drawn from Forstenlechner and Routledge (2011), Howell and Richter-Montpetit (2020), along with Bonjour and Duyvendak (2018).

^aPress and Information Office (1990, p. 1). ^bPress and Information Office (1987, p. 1). ^cPress and Information Office (1999, para. 1).

Endnotes

ⁱIn referring to “Greek-Cypriot political elites”, the analysis will focus on political actors that, in accordance with Winters’ (2011) criteria, maintained “official positions” in the RoC (e.g., the presidency) or the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus during the relevant period under examination (2004-17), along with “mobilizational power”, which may be evidenced by the capacity of politicians to stimulate civic action among Greek-Cypriot citizens (pp. 12-15).

ⁱⁱFor a preliminary discussion of the schools of thought of sons-of-the-soil and immigration studies, see Haklai and Loizides (2015) and Loizides (2011).

ⁱⁱⁱOn the supposed mutual exclusivity of otherwise interdependent discursive strategies, see Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s (2020) discussion of the current disciplinary incompatibility between racialization and securitization.

^{iv}In the context of Cyprus, Turkish settlers/migrants are often symbolically tied to their mainland Turkish origin by Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot individuals that describe them as being Anatolians (Christiansen, 2005; Loizides, 2015).