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## **Beyond the Security Frame? Media Framing of the Refugee Crisis in Central and Eastern European Countries**

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*Egypt as a Case of Concordance? An explanation of the  
Egyptian Military intervention of 2013*



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## **(I)Introduction**

The institutional separation that emerged between civil and military institutions in European states during the 18th and 19th centuries has become a key principle and a central understanding of military rule in academic discourse. Unlike this notion of separation, military involvement in politics, either directly or indirectly and/or through ruling or governing, is still a key characteristic of developing countries including Arab-majority countries (Edeh & Ugwueze, 2014, p.2047). In Egypt, the military has been one of the most powerful institutions; the history of the Egyptian army may be traced, not just to the Egyptian revolution of 1952, but also to Mohammed Ali Basha who transformed Egypt into the most powerful military in the region (Hashim, 2011, p.64). There are a total of three times in which the Egyptian military has officially, directly, intervened to remove a regime. Once, in 1952 with the removal of the monarchy, the second time in 2011 when they forced Mubarak out of office, and once again in 2013 when Morsi was forced to resign. The political intervention of 2011 caught many scholars by surprise because, for so long, the Egyptian military worked to back up Mubarak's regime. However, in the course of the Arab spring, the military showed a different side, which triggered extensive research on the role of the military during mass uprisings and its impact on political developments (Kartveit & Jumbert, 2014). Questions mainly revolved around the different conditions that made some militaries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to remain loyal to authoritarian regimes and for others to defect to the opposition. The literature on the Arab Spring made it evident that the failure or the success of the revolutions depended on the military's response. Thus, making the military institution the ultimate judge of revolution (Holmes & Koehler, 2018, p.45).

In the case of Egypt and Tunisia, both militaries chose not to shoot protestors. In Egypt, the military seemed to be highly supportive of the pro-democratic movements. The significant role of The Supreme Court Of Armed Forces (SCAF), during and after the revolution promised a democratic future for the Egyptian people. And finally, after years of authoritarian rule both, Tunisia and Egypt, held their first, free, and fair competitive elections (Belle, 2014, p.2). Eventually, elections brought Islamists groups into power. Tunisia succeeded in transitioning to

a democracy. However, Egypt showed very unpredictable political trajectories, and the first free elections in Egyptian modern history turned into a crisis. On the one-year anniversary of Morsi's presidency, the same people who mobilized for democratic reforms demanded the immediate resignation of the president. On the 3rd of July 2013, the Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah El-Sisi decided to respond and directly intervened and removed the elected civilian president.

The level of integration between the military, the society, and the government is the subject of this thesis. Also, the historical and cultural conditions affecting Civil Military Relations (CMR) are key. The central research question is: What explains the Egyptian military intervention that took place in 2013? Our research question will be answered through a single-case study that looks at different patterns of Egyptian CMR. The argument presented in this thesis, mainly has its roots from Concordance theory. The objective of this research is to show that civil-military relations policies that were formulated by Morsi's regime, were in conflict with the institutional interest of the military, and the interest of the society, causing a high level of discordance leading to a military intervention. The thesis will be structured as follows, first, we begin with a theoretical framework in which the main theoretical approaches to CMR are investigated. Then, the most dominant debates on the Egyptian crisis between 2011 and 2013 are presented. Followed by a section that defines and explains the concordance theory. Furthermore, based on previous literature, and on the concordance theory, we derive our hypotheses and expectations, which are presented in the fourth section. The fifth section provides the design of our research, its strengths, and limitations. We then explore and analyse the case study in section six. Finally, we end with a discussion and a conclusion that the application of concordance theory is necessary to maintain democratic transitions.

## **(II) Theoretical Framework**

Between 2011 and 2013 the Egyptian Military chose to endorse two mass uprisings and to dispose of two different regimes. Such military interventions were the ultimate test of any democratization process. Questions revolved around whether both coups will give back power to civilian institutions. The military showed to be quite mysterious in the course of these events.

However, it was able to demonstrate two main things: First, its ability to suppress any challenges to authoritarian rule; this was shown during the first week of the revolution. Second, it demonstrated its ability to side with mass uprisings, which became the main role the military took until Mubarak was forced to resign on February First 2011.

The ousting of Mubarak by the military posed several concerns, regarding the potential causes and consequences of the revolution. The theoretical literature that emerged as a response to the so-called Arab Spring was mainly at the regional level. Most of this literature tried to emphasize the critical role of Middle Eastern militaries during periods of regime crises and transitions. Having different military responses to pro-democracy uprisings across the region, triggered many scholars into comparing the different types of military behaviour. Moreover, some scholars tried to group different Arab states based on whether their armed forces defected from the regime or defended the regime. By doing so; some tried to predict what the military's behaviour meant for the future. Therefore, the military's double-edged sword created a common belief among several scholars that the military's reaction during the Arab Spring is what will allow or obstruct democratization (Ndwana, 2018).

This section will be organized in a sequential order that leads us to our main research question and finally our hypothesis. Firstly, we will have to investigate what are the main theoretical approaches of Civil Military Relations (CMR). We will discuss different approaches that tend to focus more on the military itself and other approaches that focus more on the interactions between civilians and the military. In the second part we will examine the most dominant debates on the Egyptian military's intervention during and after the Arab Spring. We will look into different authors such as Barany (2013), Hazen (2019) and Lutterbeck (2013) who interpreted the behaviour of the Egyptian military. However, it is important to note that most literature that deals with the Arab spring does not deal with the case of Egypt directly. Finally, this section will end by presenting the theoretical orientation of the thesis in which Egypt CMR is to be visualized through the concordance theory of Schiff (1999).

## *2.1. Theoretical Approaches*

If we were to address civil-military relations (CMR) in Egypt, there are two primary schools of thought, represented by Huntington and Janowitz. However, there are some disagreements on the applicability of the separation model or in other words the Huntington model in developing nations. This is solely because the separation model in literature is widely acknowledged and regarded as a democratic and legitimate. It is classified with mainly three developments (1) strong civilian institution (2) weaker military institution (3) preamble of fragmented military boundaries (Islam, 2000). This approach to CMR is not just derived from experiences of the West, but it also only reflects on the military institution. However, in the Middle East and in Egypt in particular, the military has hardly been a separate institution from the civilian political institution. And up until today the military continues to play a vital role in domestic politics and in particular in times of crisis (Lutterbeck, 2013).

An alternative to this model is the famous sociologist Janowitz (1960), whose theory introduced important innovations to CMR. He rejected this neat institutional separation (Kartveit & Jumbert, 2014). And he argued that the military and the civilian institution should remain interconnected to achieve civilian control over the military. This interconnectedness is based on regular interactions and mutual exchange between the two institutions (Luterbeck, 2011). A perfect example of military and civilian convergence is the concept of a general conscript army which can be applied perfectly to the case of Egypt (Arafat, 2017). A general conscript army is an army in which the majority of young men regardless of their religion or ethnicity, are expected or even forced to join the military, for the sake of the nation. Jannowitz (1960) argues in favour of general conscription because, in his view it ensures that the values and expectations of society remain present within the military institution (Arafat, 2017). To this day, young Egyptian men spend between 2 and 3 years in service which is making the military very much interlinked with society. The integration between the military and the society reflects on the nature of the military institution.

Furthermore, Janowitz (1977) formulates a number of hypotheses about the political capacities of the military to rule and to modernize. Janotwiz's presumptions of the militaries in the new nations, was particularly highlighted in the case of Egypt during the overthrow of King

Farouk in 1952 by the Free Officers movement. The military being the successor of the revolution considered themselves to be the modernizing force of society, accountable for bringing the organizational capacity and technology of the West (Cook, 2007, p.15). The Egyptian revolution of 1952 created a sort of domino effect through the rest of the region, illustrating the importance of Middle Eastern militaries (Kartveit & Jumbert, 2014, p.4).

Although the Janowitz model of military and civilian convergence tries to take into account countries of the MENA region, still the specific nature of those militaries is quite different. Cook (2007) argues that in reality, when during periods of unrest those military movements who called for reform and advocated democracy appear to drop their disguise and reveal their true authoritarian core of the political order. Whereby, they claim they have the power to exert political control over civilian institutions. If necessary they would even crack down any democratic process, if they feel their interest is being threatened. Lutterbeck (2013), further contributes to the argument and adds that their reins of power get exacerbated when their core interests and values are challenged. The conclusion of both approaches on CMR is that the military should remain separate from the political institution.

## *2.2. Dominant Debates*

For the 2011 incidents and particularly the 2013 Egyptian military coup, different arguments were advanced to understand the reality behind the Egyptian military intervention. Before jumping directly into how the 2013 Egyptian military coup was interpreted among different scholars, it is important to consider the military's behaviour during the 2011 revolution. In the call of The Arab spring, the military was confronting a regime crisis in which it had to take sides. The Egyptian military chose not to shoot, which gave many the hope that the older autocratic regime was coming to an end. These hopes turned into reality when the military chose to intervene and put down former president Mubarak. While many acknowledged that a democratic transition would be a long process, most analyses of the military's behaviour were imbued with assumptions of modernization and references to "The third wave of democratization" (Stacher, 2015, p.259). In this section we will not study literature that holds the assumption that military defection from the regime meant support for democracy. Instead, we



will focus more on literature that studies the military's behaviour in 2011 with scepticism. This owes to the fact that such literature takes into account the historical context of political-military relation in order to understand the reality behind military forces. We will focus on three main Sub questions when studying these literatures. First we need to understand, what made it hard for the military to shoot protestors? With the main focus on the argument proposed by Lutterbeck (2012). The second sub question asks what was the political-military relation during Mubarak's regime? Focusing mainly on Sayigh (2012) and Bou Nassif (2013). Our final interest will be in studying literature on the post-Mubarak regime.

### *2.3. The Military & The Protestors*

Lutterbeck (2016) assesses Middle Eastern military openness to pro-reform movements based on the level of institutionalization and the military link to society at large. He predicts that the higher the level of institutionalization and the weaker the link is towards society, the more likely the military will try to protect the regime during mass uprisings. And the lower the level of institutionalization and the stronger the link is towards society, the more likely the military will not repress the protestors. In the case of Egypt, the military played a very ambiguous role during the first days of the mass-uprisings. Because the first week of protests, the military sided with the regime and suppressed the protests (Holmes & Koelher, 2016). Lutterbeck (2016) explains this ambivalent attitude based on the low degree of institutionalization of the Egyptian military and the strong link it has with the Egyptian society (Lutterbeck, 2016, p.24). What indicated this strong link is the fact that Egypt has a general conscript army, in which most young male members of the society are part. Therefore, the military found itself between protecting the regime in which it was a big part of, or defending its society. However, because the shared bond it had with the society was stronger than the one it had with Mubarak's regime, the military chose not to repress the protestors. Holmes & Koehler (2016) suggest that although the military has a strong link to the society, we cannot understand their attitude as opposition against the regime.

#### 2.4. *Mubarak's Regime*

Sayigh (2012) adds to this argument by explaining why the military's link to the regime was not considered strong and how Mubarak's regime alienated the military. Sayigh (2012) defines the period after the Egyptian revolution of 1952 as "The Officers' republic" mainly because the military traditionally continued to hold onto the Egyptian presidency. However, Sayigh (2012) & Bou Nassif (2013), suggest that Mubarak's regime was quite different from Nasser's and Sadat's. Bou Nassif (2013) argues that the military was portrayed in previous regimes as the champion of the poor or liberators of the occupied land. However, Mubarak's regime came and tried to depoliticize the Egyptian armed forces (EAF) and abandon the former presidents' ideological missions (Sayigh, 2012). Instead, he tried to deploy a system that was more based on meritocracy and patronage (Sayigh, 2012; Bou Nassif, 2013). Here is where Sayigh (2012) Bou Nassif (2013) arguments start to drift apart. One focuses on the ways in which the military has been politically alienated from Mubarak's regime. And the other focuses more on the ways the military has been wedded to Mubarak's regime.

Sayigh (2012) suggested three factors that motivated the officer's corps to integrate themselves within Mubarak's regime. The incorporation to Mubarak's system was based on a promise between the regime and the military. Whereby, officer corps would give their loyalty to Mubarak's regime, become depoliticized and accept poor wages during their year of service, in exchange for a second salary in addition to military pensions (Sayigh, 2012). The first driving factor is that Mubarak was strongly trying to protect his position as a president. Meaning that if anyone could pose a challenge to his presidency he would immediately resist him. The second factor is that the rate of the defence budget was rising much lower compared to the Interior's Ministry budget. Finally, Mubarak introduced neoliberalism ideologies to the Egyptian economy, which led to a distorted capitalist development. Consequently, the military became exposed to state owned companies/industries and the country's political economy in large. Overall, Sayigh (2012) concludes that although the military had a significant role that was never removed during Mubarak's regime, the master and key player in the political sphere was Mubarak. Therefore, the military on the overall is more committed to the meritocratic system rather than the regime itself.

Bou Nassif (2013) on the other hand focuses more on how the military benefited from the regime. He argues that Mubarak's regime made every way possible for the military to be unanswerable to the law in exchange for their loyalty. He suggested that this way Mubarak achieved to change Egypt into a military society. Which led both Sayigh (2012) and Bou Nassif (2013) to be sceptical of Egypt's post-revolution outcomes. Especially, that the Supreme Court of Armed Forces (SCAF) fought hard to preserve its interest after Mubarak's fall. Therefore, Sayih (2012) proposed that only when civilian supremacy becomes a firm belief among Egyptian officers; then a second republic can be born.

### *2.5 The Muslim Brotherhood*

Previous scholars would agree that the military's behaviour toward the 2011 revolution is not dependent on a single factor. In his book Arafat (2018) summarizes all different explanations on the military's behaviour in four main indicators: (1) the military's economic autonomy, (2) the hereditary succession plan, (3) and convergence between the society and the military. The second factor was also mentioned by Lutterbeck (2011) where he argues that the fact that Mubarak wanted his son to succeed him, led to military tensions. The military's close link to society and its willingness to side with demonstrators, have driven the military to enable some sort of inevitable reform. At the same time, it paved a way for the military to be the cornerstone of the new regime. This new regime required a new form of democratic government that was in fact established by paradoxically welcoming, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) (Arafat, 2018, p.90). Arafat (2018) explains this by claiming that the military's relations to the MB at that period was primarily embedded in the fact that the MB are more conservative and more disciplined compared to secularists. On the other hand the MB discovered that by supporting the military they would be welcomed in the future regime (Arafat, 2018, p.90). In fact, by June 2012 Morsi won the presidential elections. However, during his year in presidency this firm relationship was turned upside down, when the MB decided to weaken all opposing forces. This period was characterized by Morsi's failure to create a cohesive strategy concerning civil-military relations. One of the dramatic steps taken by Morsi was when he decided to nullify the SCAF's June constitutional declaration and replace senior high-ranking generals with middle-ranking SCAF


members (Roll, 2016). Arafat (2018) furthers and explains that the military intervention later occurred in 2013 because of Morsi's weak coup-proofing strategy, which paved the way for the current Sisi regime. Arguments on coup-proofing strategies indicate that the primary way of maintaining civilian supremacy is by introducing different strategies that would limit the military's effectiveness. However, the question is: Can the military's intervention only be rooted in the failure of Morsi to effectively manage the interest of military elites? How can we explain this intervention?

All the previous literature helped us understand in some way or another the course of different events that happened in Egypt between 2011 and until 2013. They mainly focus on the military institution itself with regard to its needs and interests. However, they neglected the position of civilians or the society in civil-military relations. This is shown in the scholars' inability to explain why the Egyptian society has mobilized for very limited democratic reforms. Therefore, this requires us to look beyond the military sphere and more into the societal sphere.

### **(III) Concordance Theory**

Previously, we reviewed two different types of theories in CMR, one that takes an approach which is more focused on the military institution itself and the other takes an approach that is more focused on interactions between civilians and the military. However, they both conclude that the military should remain separate from the political institution. The problem of previous literature and approaches is although they can take into account the role of civilians in CMR, they tend to ignore the specific institutional and cultural conditions shared by all the three partners in CMR which are (1) The Military (2) The Society and (3) The political leadership. As previously argued the military in Egypt has been inseparable from the political spheres. We will build on the second approach to test whether theories analysing the interactions between civilians and the military account as an explanation of the Egyptian military intervention of 2013. The Concordance theory by Rebecca Schiff follows this approach. In her model Schiff (1995) departs from the assumption that there are different types of CMR in which the military, government and the society can take either a form of separation, integration or some alternative”

(Schiff, 1999, p.18). Furthermore, she argues that the diversity in CMR is mainly rooted in the culture and history specific to each nation. In order to achieve a high level of unity Schiff proposes a triangular relationship which one can see in figure 1. The arrows in the figure show that all the actors are related to one another. The relation they have is established through several indicators. The first indicator is The composition of the officer corps, which relates to what types of officers are in charge. For example, are they from a specific class, religion or ethnicity? The second indicator would be “the political decision-making process” which Schiff describes as how the institutional organs of society will allocate “the specific channels that determine the needs and allocations of the military” (Schiff, 1999, p.14). It is critical because it examines whether the requirements of the armed forces are met. The third indicator depends on the “recruitment method” which we discussed earlier on how citizens get recruited into armed forces. The final indicator is “military style” which is the most difficult to articulate because it is a complex mix that reflects the external manifestation of the military and also the military’s mindset. Schiff (1999) defines it as: what the military looks like, what ethos derives it and what people think about it. Her theory does not emphasize the importance of separation in fact, she argues that the type of CMR that states adopt is not very important (Schiff, 1995, p.8). Instead, she stresses on the relationship the three partners develop.



(Figure 1)

Finally, Schiff (1999) predicts that if the three partners get to agree on those different indicators, civil military relations will operate efficiently hence, domestic military intervention will be less likely to occur (Schiff, 1999, p.13). We intend to test the validity of Schiff's theory on the case of Egypt. Moreover, we want to examine whether this theory is a better alternative, by which to analyse CMR in Egypt. And, if it can be generalizable for other cases at the regional Level. Therefore, we will build our thesis on Schiff's theory of concordance, to examine whether cultural and historical roots of Egypt are what truly account as an explanation for the military intervention of 2014.

#### **(IV)Hypothesis and Expectations**

It is anticipated that the military intervention that took place in 2013 would be the product of disputes between the Muslim Brotherhood regime, segments of society and the military over the following (1) composition of officer corps and (2) ethos that drive the military and their external manifestation finally (3) Political Decision-making process. We are however, sceptical with the following. Schiff (1995) points out that the form of military recruitment is a significant factor which can allow or disallow concordance between the military and the citizenry. Moreover, she proposes that when recruitment is obligatory, concordance between the military and the citizenry would be more difficult to achieve. This does not however, prevail in the case of Egypt. Instead, as mentioned above, we agree with Jannowitz that the method of general conscription allows the military to be interlinked to society. Since, it ensures that the values and expectations of the society are met. In addition, it was also deemed one of the key reasons on which the military based its decision not to fire demonstrators during the 2011 revolt (Lutterbeck, 2013 & Barany, 2016).

Generally, several criticisms have developed as to how the indicators of the concordance theory function. For example, Anderson (1998) presents a series of questions regarding how much opposition or consensus is required to deter the military from political intervention? How do we know if concordance has been achieved? (Anderson, 1998, p.31). Such concerns emerged because Schiff (1995) does not indicate that there must be an absolute level of concordance

between the three partners. However, she points out that the greater the degree of discordance the more likely the military will intervene. Focused on the literature we reviewed and the concordance theory, along with its critics we came up with the following hypothesis:

*If concordance holds to be true, then the military intervention of 2013 can be explained by a level of discordance between the three partners, the military, the citizenry and the political elites over the four indicators.*

However, we expect to find that each indicator is not sufficient on its own to lead to a military intervention. Therefore, there must be a great level of discordance between two or three of the partners in order for the military to intervene. We also expect to find that the military institution has been very much influenced by the Egyptian culture and society, vice versa. This is mainly represented in the indicator on the military style, which deals with the norms, customs and values of particular nations (Schiff, 1996)

## **(V) Research Design**

### *5.1 Case Study: Strength and Limitations.*

Schiff (1995) emphasizes that culture and history are essential to concordance theory. A case study is the greatest opportunity to address historical and cultural explanations for CMR in Egypt. Moreover, it is the perfect tool for detailed and thick description of the phenomena at hand. This is different from large N studies that cannot get into depth and clarify how certain events happen. Finally, as Hague & Harrop (1982) argue it can also help us draw inferences to larger theoretical questions and relationships. However, there are also certain drawbacks correlated with case studies. The limitations are largely attributed to the failure of case studies to be generalized to all cases. However, for this paper we chose to explore the case of Egypt, mainly for three reasons. One because Egypt has undergone several changes in the past years that are quite ambiguous. For example, the fact that millions of people mobilized for pro-democratic reforms and received only quite a few. Second, the application and the testing of theories on cases of the MENA region are lacking. This takes us also to the fact Egypt is part of the MENA region. Which brings us to another fact that Egypt has the most powerful army not just on the

regional level but, still according to Global Firepower it ranks the 12th most powerful worldwide (GFP, 2019).

In addition, Egypt, according to various literature, is a worthy target for military intervention. Perlmutter (1969) extensively observed civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa. In his essay he classifies several states of the region as modern praetorian states. He describes a praetorian state as “a state in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system” (Perlmutter, 2020, p.383). After his publication Egypt became known as a praetorian regime, resulting from its failure of maintaining power over the military. Ndawana (2018) claims that due to the ineffectivity of civilian bodies, they became unable to exert control over the military.

While the Egyptian military has significant authority over domestic politics, we cannot claim that the military explicitly rules and regulates political decision-making. Alternatively, Kamrava (2000) points out that countries such as Egypt and Algeria fall more into the category of what he calls “autocratic officer-politician regimes”. He defines them as states governed by former/retired military officials who over time turned into civilian politicians (Kartveit & Jumbert, 2014). Taylor and Martini (2011) further claim that in such regimes the military cannot directly rule because it undermines their position by theoretically provoking instability. Therefore, we presume that Egypt is the most suitable case because it reassures Schiff’s assumptions that CMR cannot often be addressed on the basis of well-developed “civil” or “civilian” spheres separate from the army (Schiff, 1995, p.17).

## *5.2 Methodology*

If the concordance theory holds true then we expect to find that the military intervention of 2013 occurred because of a great discordance between two or even the “three partners” in CMR over the four dimensions. Although, there is little direct quantitative data that specifically addresses the concordance theory. It is possible to derive qualitative data to test our hypotheses.

The time frame of the case study starts from the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 until the Egyptian military intervention in 2013. Our goal is to trace the mechanisms that encourage military intervention. And also to find a convincing explanation of the puzzling Egyptian



military behaviour and its take over of the regime in 2013. Although this thesis is a case study we will mainly be comparing and contrasting between two different presidential eras, Mubarak's regime and Morsi's regime. Hence, this is a qualitative research, based on comparison and process tracing methods. Process tracing is defined as the systematic study of the link between an outcome of interest and an explanation based on the rigorous assessing and weighting of evidence for and against causal inference (Ries & Liu, 2018, p.842). Beach & Wauters (2018) claim that causal mechanisms are different from causality, they are instead systems of interacting parts that work together in order to produce an outcome. The dependent variable (DV) is military intervention which is our key variable of interest. Regarding the independent variable it has become clear from our theoretical framework that there are several causal mechanisms that will determine whether the military will intervene or not. These variables are (1) composition of the officer corps, (2) political decision-making process, (3), military style and lastly (4) military recruitment. The evidence collected for testing those causal mechanisms will be assessed based on the temporal sequence of events.

Evidence is mainly derived from a wide range of primary and secondary sources. Our primary source is mainly the Egyptian constitution, we will compare between different constitutions. Table (1) presented below shows that with every new constitution there is also a new regime. The differences between the constitutions will be analysed based on specific preambles and articles. Our goal is to find out how those differences reflect on the level of concordance or discordance between the "three partners". Finally, we will also look at the ethos that derives from the military and the people. Egyptian nationalism will then be compared to the Islamic ideology adopted during Morsi's regime in 2012. This is primarily done through secondary sources such as: speeches and previous literature. Finally, secondary sources will also serve to identify the extent to which the military's external manifestations were encouraged or suppressed by each regime.

**Table 1***Time frame of Egyptian Constitutions*

<b>The constitution</b>	<b>The President</b>
Constitution of 1956 Constitution of 1958 (United Arab Republic)	Adopted by Gamal Abdel Nasser
Constitution of 1971 (The Permanent Constitution of Egypt)	Adopted by Anwar El Sadat
The Same 1971 constitution	Followed by Hussni Mubarak
Provisional constitution of 2011	Interim president following the Egyptian revolution of 2011.
Constitution of 2012	Adopted by Mohammed Mursi
Constitution of 2014	Adopted by Abdel Fatah El-Sisi

**(VI) Analysis of Egypt as a Case of Concordance.***6.2 The social composition of officer corps*

According to Schiff (1995) the composition of officer corps is the primary indicator of concordance. The officer corps consists of soldiers who dedicate their lives to the military which not only provides a direct link between citizenry and the military, but also plays a role in establishing a critical link between the military and the government. Moreover, each nation has a particular composition of the officer corps which depends on historical and cultural traditions. Traditionally, since Al Sadat, Egyptian officers have been selected solely from military academies (Perlmutter, 1974). Through the years, recruitment and acceptance to military academies have become more complicated. Prior to Mubarak's regime the sons of poor or illiterate parents and lower-middle-class families could more readily gain entry to military colleges (Sayigh, 2012, p.21). However, in Mubarak's era access to the officer corps has become increasingly less-inclusive. And members of the officer corps became significantly separated from the Egyptian society (Bannerman, 2011). Moreover, Sayigh (2011) claims that there is limited information about the social composition of military corps, which shows how ubiquitous

the institution is. However, unlike Sadat, Mubarak made sure that military officers did not hold prime minister positions (Selim, 2018). Yet access to the officer corps meant an upward social mobility. And retired officer corps were appointed high-ranking positions in state structures such government and ministries. In addition, they also had exclusive monopoly over state-owned enterprises, giving them extra wages and valuable incentives for extra revenue generation and asset accumulation (Sayigh, 2011). All of these privileges and the political inclusion of senior officer corps were made possible with the guarantee of their allegiance to the Mubarak regime.

This era seemed to be coming to an end, when military officers started worrying about Mubarak's efforts to pass the presidency to his son, Gamal (Springborg & Williams, 2019). And unlike all Egyptian presidents, Gamal, never served in the army. There was also a fuelled belief that Gamal's policies in the future would threaten the military's interest in the nation as a whole (Frisch, 2013, p.187). Such tensions were key factors in understanding why the military chose to stay neutral during the mass uprisings in 2011 and did little to support Mubarak's regime. There were strong points of disagreements between the military officers and the government about political power and hereditary succession. We can say that this was one of the crucial points of concordance between civilians and the military during the revolution of 2011 (Frisch, 2013, p.188).

As Morsi took over the presidency, the situation of the military officers became much more complicated. One day unexpectedly 16 soldiers were killed in Arish, a state in the northern Sinai Peninsula. Morsi immediately reacted and forced the top officers of the officer corps to retire, such as Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and the army chief of staff, Sami Hafez Enan together with the heads of the air force, navy and air defence to be forced into retirement (Fahim & El Sheikh, 2018). Morsi's action was not really a reaction against what happened in Sinai instead, his aim was to get rid of any remainder from the previous regime. However, this shift of guards and the officer corps left uncertain landscapes. Especially, that El-Sisi was the first defence minister appointed by a civilian. However, the ubiquitous nature of Egypt's military made it difficult to determine whether prior agreements were reached between Morsi and the military institution, before Morsi's declarations (Fahim & El Sheikh, 2018). Springborg (2018) for example, claimed that although it is unclear whether concordance

between the two parties was reached, yet there has been ongoing disagreements within the military institution. This is mainly because the Egyptian military struggled to maintain its strength as a united establishment during the Egyptian crisis; Therefore, Sisi's first goal as a defence minister, was to protect the military institution (El-Kouedi, 2013,p.2). Although, there was no direct discordance over the social composition of officer corps during Morsi's era; there was however, a threat to the role of the officers and the military institution more generally. This is particularly highlighted in other indicators such as the military style and the political decision-making process.

### 6.3 The political Decision Making process

In this indicator the military may or may not participate in the political decision-making process that allocates the needs of the military. However, as already stated the military during Mubrak's regime was a pool for the recruitment of political positions and the bureaucratic apparatus which included parliamentary seats (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011, p.14). For most of the decade the Egyptian military has had an impact and has undergone constitutional changes. If we also look at the constitution of 1971 adopted by Mubarak, we can see that there is no article that addresses how the military budget would be decided. Although there is no data of transparent information under civilian oversight, we know that the military during Mubarak's era used to exercise exclusive control over the defence budget (Sayigh, 2018). There seemed to be a long-term agreement reached between the military and the government, that the military would manage its own official military economy (Sayigh, 2012). This also meant that any profit produced through the military would not go through the public treasury.

However, after the downfall of Mubarak Egypt had no constitution, no parliament and no president. This led to a lot of critical events that are displayed in the table below.

**Table 2**  
*Time table of the Post-revolution 2011*

13 February 2011	The Supreme council dissolved the Egyptian parliament of 1971 and laid out a six months plan to draft the provisional constitution.
28 November 2011	The Islamist party won almost 90% of the seat in the upper house.
23 May 2012	The presidential elections begin

15-17 June 2012	SCAF announced that a 100-person assembly will be created in order to write the country's new and permanent constitution. A day before the final elections, the military started giving itself more authority with regard to the national budget and the power to issue laws. Removal of presidential authority and oversight over the military and defence minister.
30 June 2012	Morsi Sworn in as president
12 August 2012	Morsi nullifies the military's June declaration and fires critical members of the officer corps.
21 November 2012	Morsi issues a decree and allows himself more power.
29 November 2012	The draft of the first constitution.

The military was quite unready and uncertain on how the events would unfold therefore, they sought to protect their interest especially after the suspension of the constitution of 1971. On November first, 2011 SCAF proposed an initiative referred to as the supra-constitutional communiqué, that intended to give SCAF exclusive military authority and no civilian oversight over its budget (Selim, 2015). Which also meant the military would have significant influence over the political decision-making process. On the 14th of february The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) layed out a provisional constitution which defined the main aspects of the document. The military then persuaded society to believe that only generals were capable of understanding the army's politics. With that narrative the military was able to shut any challenges that would subject their authority to civilians (Goldberg, 2016).

However, this was about to change when Morsi was sworn in as president on the 30th of june. Just soon after the Sinai attack mentioned above Morsi also took the following decision: He nullified the SCAF declarations that were announced in June. It was clear that in order to facilitate the transition process Morsi had to assert effective civilian supremacy over the government. This was further highlighted on his speech on 13th of August when he praised the army and demanded them to focus on protecting the nation. In his speech he stated the following:

“ I do not intend to direct any of my decisions at any particular person, or send a negative message or bad intentions' (Al Jazeera, 2012). Further, in his speech he asserts that his main goal in such actions is to protect the nation and the revolution. Morsi gave himself exclusive legislative and executive powers, and has put himself above the law.

This is further stressed in the first draft of the 2012 constitution where the elected president claims disproportionate powers. In article (104) the president gives himself veto legislative power over the parliament which is also similar to Article (112) of the permanent constitution. Both constitutions give presidents exclusive political figures above checks-and-balances instead of making the executives a balancing act between powers. In addition, Morsi even takes a further step in allowing himself to appoint members of the supreme court which is shown in article (176). The new constitution adopted by Morsi, in some way or another enhanced the authority of the military institution which was not present in the institution of 1971. Moreover, Morsi was the first president to set a National Defense Council (NDC) through which the armed force's budget will be decided and granted (Lipin, 2012). The NDC, is also headed by a civilian elected president, and half of it is made up of civilian cabinet ministers. The formation of this council meant that the military for the first time would have to balance the authority of its affairs together with civilians. However, it is argued the Egyptian military never accepted this sort of civil supremacy.

Furthermore, the way Morsi was trying to marginalize the military had reached a tipping point on the 15 of June 2013, when, Morsi in a speech explicitly spoke on behalf of the military in a conference supporting Syrian rebels (El-Kouedi, 2013, p.2). In this conference Morsi was seated alongside Islamists clerics who were calling for Jihad<sup>1</sup> in Syria. Morsi was showing support for the Syrian uprising, in the name of the Egyptian people, and the Egyptian Army. He stressed on the following: “The Egyptian people are supporting the struggle of the Syrian people, materially and morally... and Egypt its people, army and leadership will not leave the Syrian people until they obtain their freedom and achieve sovereignty on their land” (Al Ahram, 2013). As we previously mentioned, the Egyptian army is a conscript army, in which young males are obliged to join, in order, to protect the Egyptian nation, land and fight against

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<sup>1</sup> Jihad is a controversial Islamic term, however, in this context it meant, to go on a holy war against Bashar Al Asad whom they perceived as an enemy.

terrorism. This is also highlighted in all Egyptian constitutions, under article (7), it is stated that: “Safeguarding national security, defending the motherlands and protecting its soil is an honour and sacred duty. Conscription is obligatory and organized by law” (CONST 2012, Art. 7. p.12). However, Morsi’s speech suggested the Egyptian military would get involved to protect Syrian people and Syrian lands, which has never been the mission of the Egyptian military. Moreover, he also reached to other regional powers to intervene, such as Iran, Turkey and Saudi-Arabia. This non-explicit call for Jihadism and regional intervention against Bashar-Al Assad, threatened not just the military, but also put the Egyptian nation at a high security risk. Although, according to the constitution, the president is also the supreme commander which gives him the right to declare war. Yet, the military remains the master of its own destiny (The Irish Times, 2013). Since Morsi did not consult the military before attending the conference, the military immediately urged Morsi to withdraw this initiative. Discordance between the government and the people became evident when, by the end of the month, many Egyptians gathered and started demonstrating against Morsi. On the other hand, discordance between the military officers and Morsi’s regime was already indirectly expressed in many SCAF statements (Asseburg & Wimmen, 2019). In addition, Morsi’s administration was also struggling with other institutional organs of society, such as the Judiciary and the police (El-Kouedi, 2013, p.2).

### 6.1 The military style

The roots of the military as an institution are embedded in the mechanisms that explain and justify roles, identities, common purposes, and normative beliefs, which constitutes the mindset of the relevant actors (Sayin, 2010, p.98). The military’s style refers to a mix on how the institution functions; Its external manifestations, the inner contractions associated with it, the ethos that drives it, and what people think about it. The military is considered by many to be synonymous with Egyptian identity; it has considerable popularity among the nation and it regards itself as the guarantor of domestic stability and integrity. In symbolic terms the military views itself as guardian of the state, for several reasons. For example, it served as a platform for the assassination of Sadat during a military parade. And recently, it played an active role in the

revolution of 2011 (Gaub, 2014). Moreover, it perceived itself as a “servant of the state rather than of the government in power” (Albrecht & Bichara, 2011).

However, in 2012 the way the military used to represent itself to the Egyptian people was undermined and in fact threatened, under Morsi’s presidency. This is particularly shown on the 6th of October 2013, a national holiday in which Egyptians celebrate the liberation of the Sinai Peninsula, and commemorate the initial success of the Armed forces in the 1973 war fought against Israel. This celebration is usually one of the main rituals and historical symbolism, celebrated by the military and especially the people, for the remembrance of all Egyptian soldiers that died for their nation. However, Morsi used that day for his own propaganda. The first mistake Morsi committed was, when he invited terrorists among whom was Tarek El-Zomor who was convicted for the assassination of former president Al Sadat during a military parade (Dream TV Egypt, 2014). He also allowed them to sit two blocks away from where former president Al Sadat was killed. The second issue was that Morsi used Al Sadat’s car to enter the stadium and greet the guests which were mostly members of the Muslim Brotherhood (DMC, 2017). Moreover, many people in the stadium were carrying Muslim Brotherhood flags, instead of the Egyptian flag. Hence, the celebration turned from idealizing the efforts of the Egyptian military into propagating Morsi. In addition, from celebrating the liberation of Sinai, to celebrating the president and the assassination of Al Sadat, who was killed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, after the ousting of Morsi, Abdel-Fatah El Sisi was invited in a TV show in which he argues that Morsi’s decision to change the rituals of October’s celebration was a mistake, for which he had to pay (El Dream TV, 2014). In another TV show the Wife of Al Sadat, was invited to talk about the incident, where the TV presenter stresses that the Egyptian people will never forgive Morsi’s actions on that day (DMC, 2017). Overall, Morsi’s decision to challenge the long-term military style was not popular among the Egyptian people, and it antagonized the Egyptian military. From Schiff perspective, this could be viewed as discordance.



## **Conclusion and discussion**

This thesis started off by exploring the long-standing assumptions and theories of civil-military relations. The primary theory of civil-military relations, suggests that the military and civilian institutions should remain separate. Domestic military intervention is thus prevented, if civilians have supremacy over military institutions. However, this approach is primarily derived from Western experiences and can hardly be applied to Arab-majority countries. Primary, because, militaries of the MENA region have historically been very powerful institutions in terms of being the modernizing force of the state and protecting authoritarian regimes. The goal of this thesis was to examine the concordance theory against the case of Egypt and to challenge the prevailing assumptions. As a case study, Egypt challenges the separational model, because its military institution has hardly been separated from civilian institutions. Although Egypt is considered a praetorian state whereby the military tends to intervene in politics, Egypt has only experienced two military coups. The central question of this thesis was how can we explain the military intervention or in other words, the military coup of 2013. Expectations derived from our theoretical framework mainly revolved around the validity of concordance theory.

Given the analysis presented over the four indicators of concordance theory, it appears that generally, the theory of concordance, holds up. However, we could not really find clear discordance between the three-partners over the following: Social composition of officer corps and military recruitment. Although Morsi reshuffled the composition of the officer corps, we are not certain whether this led to discordance between the partners. In addition, and in regard to the military recruitment indicator, there were no clear disagreements over conscription. However, the citizenry and the military only reacted when Morsi tried to shift the mission of the Egyptian Army from protecting its own land, to protecting the Syrian land. Egyptians were fuelled with anger primarily, because Egypt has lost many soldiers during periods of war, and the Egyptian society would not want to experience that again. Instead, discordance between the three partners was more apparent when it came to the political-decision making process, and the military style.

Morsi tried to marginalize a military that for so long has been the cornerstone of domestic politics and a symbol of unity, to the Egyptian people.

This thesis provides a good deal of other potential research on the Egyptian case. We suggest that future research should expand more in further detail about Egyptian society. For example the role of minorities in political transitions and how Egyptian Christians were affected by Morsi's regime, and what role they played during the Egyptian crisis from 2011 until 2013. Our case study was able to look into national Egyptian documents and media which allowed us to understand more the case. However, we suggest that statistical quantitative studies may have revealed things, our qualitative research could not. For example, whether the Egyptian society really wanted a military coup, in 2013, and their level of satisfaction with the current regime. Finally, there is a possibility that our case study can enable research in other similar countries such as Turkey, Pakistan and Algeria.

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