Immigration Attitudes and Support for Redistribution

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Abstract

There is much research indicating that people's attitudes towards immigration can influence whether or not they support redistribution programs. In accordance with one view, anti-immigration attitudes weaken support for redistribution, as those who hold negative attitudes towards immigration supposedly consider immigrants to be "free-riders" who disproportionately benefit from the welfare state. Nevertheless, there are competing views suggesting that the same negative attitudes towards immigration can arouse residents' subjective income insecurities, which then leads them to support welfare solidarity and redistribution. This thesis analyzes evidence collected through the European Social Survey (ESS) in support of the latter view. More specifically, this research finds that negative attitudes towards immigration lead to higher support for redistribution when subjective income insecurity increases, whilst pro-immigration attitudes also lead to support for redistribution when there is a higher percentage of foreign-born citizens.

Keywords: immigration, redistribution, social protection, welfare state, Europe.

1. Introduction

Scholars have differing views on how international migration affects redistributive programs in European countries, including the Netherlands. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) claim that high wages and employment opportunities are more important factors than welfare benefits when it comes to a migrant's decision to move to another country. Burgoon (2014) suggests that when migrants are well integrated, the relation between migration and government redistribution is non-significant. Gaston & Rajaguru (2013), however, conclude that a higher number of high-skilled/educated migrants will cause a decrease in social expenditures. Indeed, high-skilled/educated migrants tend to be high income earners and are therefore more likely to choose jurisdictions with relatively lower tax obligations and smaller welfare states (Gaston and Rajaguru, 2013).

Different hypotheses prevail in the political economy literature on immigration in Europe. The goal of this research is to determine the effect of international migration on redistributive programs in the Netherlands and Europe in 2018-20. The political economy of immigration has two essential competing approaches that try to clarify how immigration may alter national welfare states. These are the compensation and the efficiency hypotheses (Fenwick, 2019). The former proposes the need to compensate the losers of globalization. As native workers fear being substituted by immigrants, governments provide more social protection against the risks posed by an increased labour migration in order to keep their support for open borders (Walter, 2010). The efficiency hypothesis, on the other hand, centers on how globalization leads to a social race to the bottom. Governments reduce the generosity level of their welfare state benefits in order to remain globally competitive and lessen the fiscal strain of migrants (Gaston and Rajaguru, 2013). This thesis focuses on the compensation theory in order to examine the influence of immigration on support for redistribution in a quantitative manner.

1.1. The Added Value of this Study

Being a so-called immigrant society, the Netherlands has been a focal point for debates about the European refugee crisis. In the previous two decades, socioeconomic (e.g., financial crisis) and political pressures disturbed the European Union and its welfare states (Meuleman et al., 2016; Haidar, 2012). Concerns have been raised not only about the relations between newcomers and the

host society, but also about the ability of welfare states to handle the increasing numbers of immigrants (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020; Lahusen & Grasso, 2018). This research goes beyond welfare state types and the econometric whim into fields such as public finances. The methodology examines causal mechanisms in order to give insights into welfare economics and the political economy of immigration on socioeconomic circumstances (i.e., subjective income) (Fenwick, 2019; Chojnicki & Ragot, 2015).

Literature on globalization has long focused solely on trade and capital flows. However, these kinds of issues are beginning to lose urgency in comparison with the complexity of international migration (IOM, 2019). Due to the low availability of labor migration data, academics have only recently begun to analyze migration in the political economy. Although the relation between contextual variables (e.g., subjective income) and how immigration relates to welfare policies has been theoretically examined, the empirical implementations are still limited. The challenge is to determine how immigration attitudes are related to subjective income insecurity and to identify the direction of immigration attitudes and welfare redistribution. Therefore, this research, focused within the Netherlands and Europe, contributes empirically to current knowledge on welfare, the political economy of immigration, and the broader political debate (Fenwick, 2019).

Still, the existing empirical research supports the idea that immigration attitudes do affect redistributive policies (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020). It is commonly known that demand for redistribution is steered by individuals' subjection to risk. In this context, resident workers who fear losing their employment are more likely to support redistributive policies. Immigration might increase rather than decrease support for redistribution, as it boosts exposure to insecurities and earnings loss on the labor market. Debates on such mechanisms, at least those that avoid the usual anti-solidarity hypothesis, have been limited in the literature on the association between immigration and social policies (Finseraas, 2008).

1.2. Research Question

This thesis investigates the effect of international migration on redistributive programs in the Netherlands and Europe through the effects of subjective income and rates of foreign-born populations. The main research question of this study is:

What is the effect of migration on redistributive programs in the Netherlands and Europe?

To carry out this research question, I use cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 9 source questionnaire, operated in 29 European countries. I apply a comparative design and perform a logit regression using the Software for Statistics and Data Science (Stata). I also employ a moderation strategy to catch the possible effects of subjective income insecurities and foreign-born on support for redistribution in the Netherlands and Europe.

1.3. Findings and Structure

This study's findings imply that support for redistribution in the Netherlands and Europe increases as subjective income insecurity increases. More precisely, residents who struggle on their current income are more inclined to support redistribution in the Netherlands and Europe. In short, the positive effect of subjective income on support for redistribution is based on the likelihood of accessing social benefits. Therefore, natives decide rationally whether or not to support redistribution, which is in line with the economic interest reasoning and social rivalry theory (Esping-Anderson,1990; Corneo & Gruner 2002).

This study recommends caution when analyzing the moderation technique. The interaction effect suggests that, in the Netherlands and Europe, immigration attitudes moderate how strongly subjective income affects support for redistribution. More specifically, residents with subjective income insecurities and pro-immigration attitudes have more negative attitudes towards redistribution than those who live comfortably and hold attitudes against immigration. Finally, this study finds that pro-immigration attitudes have a positive impact on welfare redistribution support even when a larger percent of the population is foreign-born. These findings support the idea of an increase in solidarity (interest in others) suggested by Burgoon and Rooduijn (2020).

In the following chapter, I trace the political economy literature and formulate hypotheses regarding immigration's role in the reduction or enlargement of the welfare state. In the next chapter, I focus on the methodology and explain the research design and data applied in carrying out the research question. The outcomes and analyses are introduced in the succeeding chapter, followed by a discussion on the study's data validity and reliability. Finally, in the last chapter, I discuss the conclusions and propose areas for prospective research.

2. Theoretical Approach and Hypotheses

In this heading, several main concepts will be scrutinized and summarized. Specifically, the 'immigrationization' of the concept of welfare as maintained by Burgoon and Rooduijn (2020). This refers to where the understanding of welfare expenditure is becoming increasingly affected by attitudes toward immigration (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020). Building on existing literature, this chapter will also apply the framework of the political economy of migration to test three hypotheses about how international migration affects redistributive programs in the Netherlands compared to Europe. We start in section 2.1. with a review of relevant concepts. In section 2.2. we discuss the 'immigrationization' of the concept of welfare. Section 2.3. illustrates the consequences of immigration according to the theory of the political economy of migration. In section 2.4., a study of the economics-migration nexus allows us to interpret immigration effects on redistribution and the diverse discourses that it creates. This part of the analysis is largely inspired by Burgoon and Rooduijn (2020) and Freeman and Kessler (2008).

2.1. Concepts and Operationalization

In order to focus this research, it is necessary to formulate a precise definition of international migration, as well as one for redistribution. In principle, international migration is a movement of people crossing a border from the country of their nationality or habitual residence to stay in another country for an extended period. Thereafter, the destination country effectively becomes the new country of residence. The trajectories, motives, and effects of these migrations are complex and manifold.

Even though the spatial side is easily understood, there are different trajectories in immigration policies. For the old European democracies, immigration is less institutionalized and instead prioritizes giving access to temporary workers. Post-colonial immigration is, in this context, easier to question and more subject to change in political opinion (Freeman, 1995).

The following is a short introduction to some of the motives behind international migration. Migration can create huge benefits for migrants, their families, and sometimes even their host country. The choice to migrate may be based on voluntary decisions or external conditions, such as the promise of a substantial increase in wages. This increase in monetary income allows an improvement in living conditions (well-being, remittances) and human development (health,

education) (Winter-Ebmer, 1994). In any case, there is a difference between those with a social motive, involuntary migrants (i.e., refugees) and those hoping for suitable job opportunities (i.e., labor migrants). Different reasons for immigration lead to different economic outcomes and different attitudes towards migration (Verkuyten, 2021). Additionally, the receiving state's welfare generosity plays a role when it comes to choosing a destination country.

As for redistribution, redistributive programs are defined as a monetary or in-kind institutional mechanism (collective services for example) set up by the State or social security, which collects income from certain individuals or households (through social contributions and taxes) in order to redistribute it to other households in the form of allowances or benefits. The objective of this redistribution is to increase economic equality.

2.1.1. The Role of States in Framing Migration Politics

The role of states in shaping migration politics has been extensively examined. The existing literature supports the idea that political opportunity structures alter the way that different groups express their preferences regarding migration. Different sub-groups may associate certain policy measures with their own economic gains and losses, leading them to stand either for or against immigration (Freeman & Kessler, 2008). However, as stated by Freeman and Kessler (2008), researchers (political scientists and economists) fail to recognize the fundamental position of states in regulating migration flows. Migration policies, more specifically the nature of flows and the relationship between migrants and natives, can be considered problems of administration and regulation—making migration a function of the state. Because the activities of states affect the reasons for migration, regulations play an essential role in migration world-wide (Freeman & Kessler 2008).

Investigating liberal migration policies implies recognizing that they are directed towards economic gains. However, states addressing immigration must bear in mind its potential impacts on how groups perceive factors like economic stability as part of national security. Burgoon (2014) argues that the immigration debate might not be about the actual budgetary pressures or the impact of immigrants in the labor market, but rather about immigration's perceived effects on the labor market. If voters believe that immigration has a negative budgetary effect, such as an increase in

unemployment, then politicians are pushed to reform welfare state programs, regardless of what the impact actually is (Burgoon, 2014).

Several authors such as Rudolph (2003) and Hollifield (2004) concentrate on the distinct functions played by institutions in immigration policy-making. Institutions are defined by Freeman and Kessler (2008) as the collection of rules and norms applied by the members of an organization, which may become accessible to the individual (by virtue of path dependence and history) to determine complex policies. Path dependency is another issue that must be considered. Policy feedback from former political decisions can affect present-day political struggles. New welfare programs create interest groups that defend established social policies. Due to these interest groups, the left and right-wing political distinction has become less relevant, and it has become difficult to change welfare states. On top of that, globalization also limits the instruments for making social policies within a country. Finally, individuals will take more risks and engage in more conflict when faced with the threat of large losses to their current situation. This negativity bias acts to prevent welfare retrenchment, more than it increases welfare expenses (Pierson, 1996).

2.1.2. The Netherlands and EU-Citizens Views on Immigration



Figure 1. Country Differences in Support for Immigration (Mean Scores)

Source: ESS (2016); Heath & Richards (2016)

In the Netherlands and 12 other European countries, the 2002 mean support for immigration was less than 5 on a 0–10 scale. On this scale, a 0 = '[country] is made a worse place to live in as a result of migration' whereas a 10 indicates that respondents think a '[country] is made a better place to live in as a result of migration'. The 2002 mean support suggests that citizens of these countries, on average, believed that their country was made a worse place to live in as a result of migration. In 2014, most of the mean scores evaluating the levels of support for immigration increased, with the only exception of Austria and the Czech Republic (ESS, 2016). The Netherlands' average increased above the midpoint of this support for immigration scale from 2002 to 2014, making it a better place to live in because of immigration. Still, in both years the attitudes to immigration in the Netherlands were very divided (Heath & Richards, 2016).

As stated by Verkuyten (2021), Northern (e.g., Denmark, Norway and Finland) and Western Europe countries (e.g., Germany and Switzerland) have higher levels of support for immigration than Eastern European countries (e.g., Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia). Nevertheless, there are a few exceptions to this trend, such as Poland, which had surprisingly high levels of support for immigration in 2014 (Heath & Richards, 2016). Austria, Belgium and France are also exceptions since in 2014 they had low levels of support for immigration in comparison to the rest of Western Europe (ESS, 2016). There are several explanations for these country dissimilarities, such as the region's immigration and emigration past, political circumstances, immigration and social policies, the proportion of foreign-born population, and their characteristics such as origin, religion, education and skills (Verkuyten, 2021).

2.1.3. Immigration and the Welfare State

Several studies have investigated attitudes towards immigration and their effect on solidarity/altruism and, therefore, on support for welfare redistribution. Most previous studies estimate attitudes towards immigration by measuring the people's perceptions of how immigration impacts a country's economy or culture, as well as measuring its citizens' willingness to permit immigrants into the country (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Davidov & Meuleman, 2012). The idea that immigration leads to negative or positive budgetary effects, (or

to more or less unemployment) can be shaped by factors such as sociotropic concerns (cultural impacts or perceived economic competition, e.g., Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Verkuyten, 2021), regional characteristics (local context, e.g., Markaki & Longhi, 2013), economic downturns, inequality (e.g., Vogt Isaksen, 2019), views on immigrants' rights (e.g., Fenwick, 2020), foreign-born percentages and welfare-state protections (e.g., Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020), among others.

In short, support for redistributive programs is driven by a viewpoint of international migration as either a threat (more costly for the native-born) or as a positive net fiscal contribution to European welfare states (Fenwick, 2020). Regardless of the real budgetary pressure, or the labor market's effect on politics, we observe voter perception of how immigration affects the labor market. Exposure to international migration (independent variable) may increase subjective income insecurities. This means that native citizens who perceive many immigrants in their day-to-day life may be more worried about how it will affect their socioeconomic position, leading to conservative economic viewpoints. However, it can also lead to an increase in solidarity (interest in others) and a boosted concern about poverty, job-loss, and inequality, which may significantly and positively stimulate support for redistribution and welfare. Decision-makers are therefore pressured to incorporate these perceptions into reforms in the welfare state programs—such as redistributive programs—in order to deal with this perceived effect.

2.2. Immigrationization of the Welfare State

How to explain the fluctuations in support for redistribution in Europe? The challenge immigration presents is at the heart of the political and public debate as well as research in social sciences. Many politicians state that their country's welfare state cannot adapt to too much immigration.

2.2.1. Immigrationization and Redistribution Programs

In 2011, Dutch Ministers Kamp of Social Affairs and Employment, Donner of Interior and Kingdom Relations, and Leers of Immigration and Asylum Policy, along with the mayors of the towns most affected, spoke on the issues related to the increasing number of migrant workers from Central and Eastern Europe. They expressed concerns about exploitation, overpopulation and the expanding burden placed on social security aids (Government of the Netherlands, 2011). In his 2014 EU speech, David Cameron proposed initiating a referendum, as there were 'too many'

immigrants from Central and East European countries making use of Britain's health care system. Cameron's immigration argument later triggered the Brexit debate (BBC News, 2014). Lastly, it is often asserted that the U.S. has a smaller welfare state than the majority of European countries as a result of its immigration past, which culminated in an ethnically-varied society. A fundamental hypothesis in this research is that more diversified societies find it difficult to comply with a common assortment of policies, leading to lower social protection. This hypothesis has provoked a controversy about the fate of redistributive programs in Europe. Will the diversification of European communities induce less redistribution? (Elsner & Concannon, 2020).

Redistribution programs seem to be shaped—especially in the case of radical right parties in Western Europe—mainly by the politics of immigration themselves. Burgoon & Rooduijn (2020) even maintain that support for redistributive programs has become 'immigrationized', meaning that it is dependent on immigration. They maintain that political economic conditions should also be considered in the study of the 'immigrationization' process in welfare-state politics. In this 'immigrationization' process, immigration might moderate support for welfare redistribution among individuals with negative views towards migration. Additionally, welfare state efforts have a substantial effect on the relationship between feelings against migrants and support for redistribution (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020). This is because citizens sometimes fear that immigrants might benefit disproportionately from redistributive programs.

2.2.2. Literature Review on the 'Immigrationization' Process

As stated by Burgoon & Rooduijn (2020), generous assistance or high social expenditure might foster rejection for welfare redistribution among natives who benefit from existing socioeconomic protections. Specifically, scholars confirm that the resulting aversion to welfare protection comes from natives' assumption that unskilled and undeserving immigrants might consume welfare resources (Garand et al., 2017; Camarota, 2012; Boeri, 2010; Gilens, 1999). The connection between immigration and support for redistribution is based on how natives understand immigration issues (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020).

There are various articles investigating the relationship between ethnic diversity and redistributive policies. Desmet et al. (2009) identify a negative correlation between linguistic differences and successful welfare policies. A following article by Baldwin and Huber (2010)

assesses which aspect of diversity (ethnic, cultural, economic) has a more significant impact on redistribution. They notice that economic diversity has a strong negative correlation with the availability of public goods, while ethnic and cultural diversity seems to have no relationship with redistributive policies (Elsner & Concannon, 2020). Thus, these authors conclude that focusing on group economic disparities is the best way of understanding the effects of ethnic and cultural diversity and inequality on politics (Baldwin & Huber, 2010).

Economic disparities work alongside racial bias in hindering the success of welfare policies. Racialized nativism is a phenomenon where natives of a country perceive immigrants as a threat to cultural identity. This racialized nativism can be seen when natives express concern that public assets are being allocated to "undeserving" immigrants, and this leads to a reduced support for redistribution (Hawes & McCrea, 2017). However, this anxiety makes citizens feel less secure economically, which then, paradoxically, increases their demand for and approval of redistribution programs. According to Burgoon & Rooduijn (2020), the aforementioned opinions and fears of natives are influential in policy decision making.

2.3. The Economics of Immigration

In this section, we draw an economic analysis of immigration's possible effects on earnings and welfare from different angles (e.g., the destination and origin countries or resident workers, foreigners and capital owners), and the resulting distribution. Economic models demonstrate that public resistance to immigration is based on both the actual and perceived benefits and costs for the host economies. At the center of the immigration policy debate is the following question: to what degree does the resident working population gain or lose from migration? The answer depends on labor market opportunities and trade theories.

2.3.1. The Benefits from Immigration

Taking into account the wage and income effects of migration, liberal states should compensate the losers of migration and generate a net social gain. Certain aspects of immigration increase the wages of other socioeconomic actors, for example when businesses profit from a rise in the supply of labour. Migrants are commonly perceived as labor power and their initiation into labor markets is therefore assumed to boost an economy's resources and capabilities (Freeman & Kessler, 2008).

To understand the effects of migration, we can apply a welfare-based analysis. This analysis investigates how migration affects distribution in both the migrant's country of origin and their country of destination. If migration increases total welfare, there will be gains and losses within countries—namely distributional effects. The distributional effects of migration consist of the distinct impacts (gains and losses) within countries affected by migration. In destination countries, wages decrease and production level increases since workers move from the origin country to the destination country. As a consequence, workers experience welfare losses and the owners of capital—employers—benefit from welfare gains as the labor supply becomes larger.

On the other hand, in origin countries labor supply becomes smaller so wages increase and production level decreases. As a result, workers who stayed experience welfare gains and the owners of capital in origin countries—employers—experience welfare losses. Workers who migrate have a higher wage and also experience welfare gains. Overall, the net effect of migration is positive welfare gains. For the destination country, migration contributes to higher levels of marginal productivity and for the origin country it leads to higher wages. According to Baldwin and Wyplosz (2020), migration between countries leads to a more efficient allocation of the labor production factor across countries, leading to an increase of total welfare (i.e., higher GDP or economic growth).

2.3.2. The Costs from Immigration

Wages and fiscal issues are the economic effects of migration at the heart of economic theory. In order to explain class conflict, Freeman and Kessler (2008) differentiate between the 'large' and 'small' labor market effects of immigration. The 'large' effect of immigration refers to the increase of labor supply and the pressure put on wages by an inflow of immigrants. It is argued by Freeman and Kessler (2008) that the increase in labor supply from immigration leads to a more competitive labor market. Citizens with similar skill levels to immigrants tend to oppose immigration, as it lowers their wages. Certain social programs, such as unemployment benefits, attempt to alleviate the negative aspects of the 'large' effects of migration and reduce competition between businesses and immigrants. When this happens, policy makers are more likely to be swayed by non-economic concerns (ethnic conflict, political dissatisfaction, etc.) rather than economic ones (wage, income and fiscal).

The economic and fiscal factors are not enough to understand migration—the political aspect must also be taken into consideration. Immigration can lead to political conflict due to differing economic interests, as income is often redistributed from native laborers to foreigners and capital owners. For this reason, those who benefit from immigration should rightfully compensate those who do not, in order to create a net social benefit. Or else, the fiscal losses and gains of immigration can affect national policy. By relying on government benefits, immigrants also raise concerns over fiscal effects rather than wage effects. For instance, natives may fear that taxes are spent on immigrants' consumption of public goods. It is therefore necessary to introduce political variables (e.g., immigration attitudes) into the study. The following studies examine whether or not economic incentives produced by migration have an impact on political conflicts and coalitions (Freeman & Kessler, 2008).

2.3.3. Limitations and Strengths of the Economic Theory of Immigration

We now turn to the limitations that researchers face when trying to quantify the consequences of immigration on native laborers. Some critics of neoclassical economics have claimed that its conceptual, general and simplified design reflects material interests, as it does not analyze the preferences of actors nor the variety of political, social and cultural positions.

Migration movements are more abundant and complicated than economic models can predict. Barry (2012), for example, argues that the economics approach reduces issues to 'technical' problems determined by 'experts', not leaving room for democratic, political or ethical discussion. Addressing the relationship between economic and non-economic concerns is also crucial. However, Freeman and Kessler (2008) affirm that economic models assemble testable hypotheses which can explain the provenance of actor preferences. Although they stress the material interests of migration in an economic analysis of the migration policy process, material stakes function as the critical inputs for the understanding of economic underpinnings. As such, material interests play an integral part of their neoclassical economics theory (Freeman & Kessler, 2008).

Still, as a result of Barry's (2012) insistence on the essential role of the political, cultural, and economic perspectives in economic models, ideologies have to be addressed by the economist actor and cannot be disregarded. Consequently, the political economy model of immigration is

ideal for explaining or analyzing any social phenomena or practical action, namely, the kind of facts that can lend credibility to matters of injustice, inequality or helplessness that go beyond formal political theory. Within this strand of immigration economics, the unit of analysis is composed of resident workers as they assess the economic impacts of immigrants. Immigrants in this vein are the political players that are responsible for possibly altering the skill configuration of the labor force (Barry, 2012). Thus, in this model of immigration, the goal is to track, supervise and formulate human relations with one another.

2.4. Migration and Redistribution: Examining the Academic Debate

This chapter presents an analysis of the important theoretical notions on the 'immigrationization ' of welfare politics. It thus examines the weight of immigration in deciding the politics and economics of the Netherlands and Europe. In doing so, this chapter compiles evidence to make a complete picture of how immigrants have been represented in the Netherlands and Europe until now. The effects of immigration on redistribution in the EU is amid the most studied themes in economic publications. In the research carried on this subject, there have been two central but non-exclusive lines of research.

2.4.1. Immigrationization and Anti-Solidarity Effects

In the first line of research, scholars concentrate on anti-immigration beliefs that immigrants are undeserving and take advantage of European welfare, a paradigm which undermines support for redistribution. The efficiency hypothesis states that immigration (independent variable) has a negative impact on the generosity of the welfare state (dependent variable). According to the insurance economics literature, countries with generous welfare programs attract individuals with higher chances of needing social benefit programs, also referred to as 'bad risks' individuals. According to this line of thinking, 'bad risks' are attracted to countries with generous social benefit programs, as they have a higher chance of accessing social benefits in these countries. However, De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) assert that migrants mainly move because of employment opportunities and the level of the wages, rather than welfare benefits.

In contrast, high-skilled workers who have a lower chance of becoming unemployed—referred to as 'good risks'—would be attracted to countries with lower unemployment benefits and, therefore, lower tax rates (Gaston & Rajaguru, 2013). If both bad and good risks follow this

path simultaneously, countries with generous welfare states would end-up mainly with 'bad risks', whereas 'good risks' would move to countries with lower taxes. This means that the former would have trouble financing their welfare programs. As a consequence of a social race to the bottom, these countries would have to reform their welfare state in order to reduce the generosity of the benefits.

2.4.2. Immigrationization and Compensation Effects

For the second line of research, literature has centered on the growing support for social protection and redistribution as a result of attitudes against immigration. The compensation hypothesis postulates that immigration (independent variable) has a positive impact on the generosity of the welfare state (dependent variable). Using data from the ESS Round 1, Finseraas (2008) advances that social redistribution policies work as an insurance when immigration increases the subjective income insecurities of natives. Brady and Finnigan (2014) maintain that social policy reassures citizens who fear that immigration will increase unemployment and job competition. In the same vein, Gaston and Rajaguru (2013) also find evidence for the exposure effect, which is when natives who frequently encounter migrants have a higher preference for a more generous welfare state. Finally, Burgoon et al. (2012) assert that welfare programs protect respondents who fear that immigration will strengthen economic competition and lead to unemployment or poverty. This is in line with:

Hypothesis 1: Attitudes against immigration spur support for social protection and redistributive programs.

When the native's own subjective income insecurities (moderating variable) rise—when the coefficients in subjective income are higher—international migration has positive effects on redistributive programs. Dutch subjective income insecurities—the degree to which respondents struggle to live on their present income—inspire support for welfare protection and redistribution. As immigration increases and natives feel less economically secure, the supply of social protection policies also increases to balance it out. When this demand is converted into the policy-making arena, immigration leads to an enlargement—or at least a lack of reduction—of the welfare state (Walter, 2010). The focus of this thesis will be on this second line of research (compensation

hypothesis), as this study focuses on how attitudes against migration in the Netherlands and Europe have awakened natives' own subjective income insecurities;

Hypothesis 2: Attitudes against immigration arouse one's own subjective income insecurities that trigger support for social protection and redistributive programs.

2.4.3. The Embedded Liberalism Hypothesis

Whereas most studies find that immigration has a negative impact on support for redistribution (efficiency hypothesis), we defend that immigration has a positive result instead (compensation hypothesis). From a political economy perspective and according to the embedded liberalism hypothesis, immigration exposure leads to more demand for social protection. The purpose behind the compensation hypothesis is to aid the losers of globalization (workers or employers), in order to gain their political support for international migration and international trade, which are beneficial for the economy. In order to finance additional social protection, politicians or governments can use welfare gains instead of increasing taxation (Hays et al., 2005).

In this vein, Brexit in 2020 or Trump's Presidential election in 2016, could also be explained according to the embedded liberalism hypothesis. When the losers from globalization are not compensated enough, they are likely to vote for politicians whose positions are against more globalization or more open borders (Dustmann et al., 2007). For instance, one firm might decide to fire a worker in order to hire a foreign one, which leads to insecurity among native workers. Therefore, natives are more exposed to economic risks and competition, which creates a fear of unemployment or poverty. Because of these higher levels of competition, companies have an incentive to decrease their wages, which, in turn, boosts demand. In order to do so, they prioritize giving the job to cheap laborers, which sparks the perception that jobs are being 'taken away'. Thus, the image of a high foreign-born population arouses native's own subjective income insecurities, which in turn triggers support for welfare redistribution (Scheepers et al. 2002). These arguments lead to the following hypothesis;

Hypothesis 3: Attitudes against immigration will tend to boost support for social protection to the degree that foreign-born percent is high.

2.5. Theoretical Model



Figure 2. Theoretical Model (Own Compilation)

3. Methodology

This chapter presents the methods adopted in order to perform this research. First, the data is described in section 3.1, while section 3.2 will explain the research design. Section 3.3 will expose the methods and empirical founding of the logit model used in this study. The variables (dependent, explanatory, moderating and control) operated are presented in Section 3.4.

3.1. Description of the Data

The cross-sectional ESS is used as data to test the stated hypotheses. The ESS holds valuable data for scientific, policy or socially-focused research. It provides relevant data for monitoring popular support for welfare policies, in particular for redistribution. The answers were collected by face-to-face Computer-Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI). The ESS questionnaire has a core section—media and social trust, politics, subjective well-being, social exclusion, religion, national and ethnic identity, gender and household, sociodemographic and human values—and a rotating section—justice and fairness. Surveys were conducted between August 28, 2018 and January 31, 2020 with the aim of examining the way European social, political and ethical fabric is changing. The unit of observation is composed of private household members in Europe regardless of their origin, citizenship or mother tongue. This ensures that ESS samples appropriately represent each national resident, which allows for comparability between countries. Age-wise respondents were fifteen or older, as this age range was presumed capable of deciding in their best interest and therefore less vulnerable to persuasion (ESS, n.d.; Lenhart, 2013).

To evaluate the aforementioned hypotheses, we examine how attitudes regarding immigration affect support for welfare redistribution policies and consider the extent to which this relation is conditional upon natives' own subjective income. This proposal builds on former research designs, statistical data, academic literature and newspaper articles examining the association between immigration and support for the welfare state. Furthermore, this approach builds on a determined and high-quality model, along with an in-depth study focused on a specific socioeconomic background. Through recurrent questions on immigration and government spending, the ESS arranges such quality surveys, which can be interpreted in the context of a migration crisis (Lafon, 2018).

More precisely, we use the most recent and up-to-date ESS Round 9 issued in February 2020 and concentrate on a Western European country known to have recorded a significant (12%) rate of immigration in 2019: the Netherlands (Pison, 2019). In order to guarantee accuracy of data, the ESS is set up in accordance with a 'Specification', in which the collected data has to meet certain standards concerning response and non-contact rates, fieldwork period, briefing of interviewers, interviewer workload and call schedule, contact form, quality control and fieldwork monitoring (ESS, n.d.). The ESS Round 9 consists of a minimal target response rate of 70% (ESS, 2018). The number of interviews accepted for the Netherlands was 1673, which is larger than the minimum efficacious sample size of 1500 (ESS, n.d.). Correspondingly, the responses 'don't know' and 'refusal' are omitted.

3.2. Research Design

The quantitative research design of this study is implied by the way in which the analysis tests previously-formulated hypotheses based on the determination of quantities. This involves a process of numerical and inferential statistical analysis. Quantitative research is based on the belief that knowledge must be objective and generated from a deductive process for results to be generalizable to wider populations. Qualitative analysis, in contrast, is inductive, which implies that it uses data collection (interviews, observation, documents) to finalize research questions or uncover new questions in the interpretation process (Universidad de Colima, 2021). Addressed properly, this question calls for a quantitative approach in order to study different variables and their correlation. By introducing a research question beginning with 'what', this research aspires to explain the relationship between international migration and redistributive programs in the Netherlands and Europe.

The present research is comparative and uses process tracing to determine causal effects—why migration and migrants affect European redistribution policies—by focusing on citizens' preferences for redistributions in the Netherlands and Europe, and how they are defined by attitudes towards immigration. Process tracing involves making inferences based on evidence. This method focuses on existing scholarship about how international migration is experienced by European natives. This type of research links abstract variables *Immigration attitudes*, *Income (subjective)* and *Foreign-born* to the *Support for redistribution* variable.

Not only is process tracing a strong research style for the sub fields of international relations and historical political sociology, but it can also draw a realistic scene of what European citizens want, what opinions they have, and by what means the Dutch State can reach its objectives. Through analyzing how natives perceive their own income —and with enough data to allow an estimation of causal effects and an examination of relevant variation—the research design includes both individual events (e.g., survey responses) and general facts (e.g., personal data). In addition, the analysis applies an adjusting strategy to identify the confounding factors and get rid of their impacts so that the main relationship we are focused on can emerge (Toshkov, 2019).

3.3. Methods and Empirical Founding of the Logit Model

We aim to understand whether the relationship between support for redistribution (dependent variable) and immigration attitudes (explanatory or independent variable) is moderated by the value of subjective income and foreign-born variables. The logit is a suitable nonlinear econometric model with which to analyze the probability of a native supporting redistributive programs. It also takes into account their sociodemographic characteristics. It is a type of regression used to carry out this sort of study, as the existence of an underlying latent variable is fulfilled for which dichotomous evidence is observed. In this study, the logit model postulates as an observable variable whether or not an individual supports redistribution policies. It must be taken into consideration that this variable is not directly observable. Therefore, it must be measured through a categorical variable that reflects the respondents' assessment of whether or not the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. With this information, the subsequent model reproduces a latent variable, which is defined as the propensity of an individual to have attitudes against immigration (Aparecida, 2005).

Table 1: Hypotheses

H1	Attitudes against immigration spur support for social protection and redistributive programs.
H2	Attitudes against immigration arouse one's own subjective income insecurities which therefore trigger support for social protection and redistributive programs.
H3	Attitudes against immigration will tend to boost support for social protection to the degree that foreign-born percent is high.

A mediation technique could offer causal explanations of attitudes towards immigration on support for welfare redistribution in Europe. We thus explore 6 models throughout a given statement. M1 to M4 test how immigration attitudes affect support for redistribution without the interaction terms. M5 and M6 to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 with the *Income (subjective)* and *Foreign-born* interaction terms.

In addition, the ordered logit model is used to calculate variations in the probability of *Support for redistribution* (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly) when there are changes in the main independent variable of the model. The groups of variables used in this work are the independent variable (*Immigration attitudes*), the 6 sociodemographic control variables (*Social benefit dependency*, *Education*, *Unemployed*, *Age*, *Gender* and *Religiosity*) and the moderating variables (*Income (subjective)* and *Foreign-born*). Thus, in this work an ordered logit model will be used, with the explained variable as a latent variable. The model to be estimated is the following:

$$H_i^* = B_i' X_i + \mu$$

Where H_i^* represents the different categories of support for redistribution; X_i is a vector of independent variables (in this case, the main one being the *Immigration attitudes* variable, the control variables and the moderating variables) and μ is the error term. The variable is defined in 5 categories:

$$H = \begin{cases} \text{Agree strongly} = 1 \quad \text{if} \quad H_i^* \leq \mu_1 \\ \text{Agree} = 2 \quad \text{if} \quad \mu_1 \leq H_i^* \leq \mu_2 \\ \text{Neither agree nor disagree} = 3 \quad \text{if} \quad \mu_2 \leq H_i^* \leq \mu_3 \\ \text{Disagree} = 4 \quad \text{if} \quad \mu_3 \leq H_i^* \leq \mu_4 \\ \text{Disagree strongly} = 5 \quad \text{if} \quad \mu_5 \leq H_i^* \end{cases}$$

The probability of observing each of the H_i categories is defined by:

$$\begin{gathered} Log(H = 1) = \Phi(\mu_1 \quad - B'X) \\ Log(H = 2) = \Phi(\mu_2 \quad - B'X) - \Phi(\mu_1 \quad - B'X) \\ Log(H = 3) = \Phi(\mu_3 \quad - B'X) - \Phi(\mu_2 \quad - B'X) \\ Log(H = 4) = \ \Phi(\mu_4 \quad - B'X) - \Phi(\mu_3 \quad - B'X) \\ Log(H = 5) = 1 - \ \Phi(\mu_5 \quad - B'X) \end{gathered}$$

From the above probability equations, the term Φ represents the cumulative distribution or density function of the *logit*[1] estimate, which in this case is the normal distribution function. The thresholds or barriers and *B* values are estimated jointly, using the maximum likelihood method. As the forward logit models will guarantee that the estimated probabilities are safely between the logical limits 0 and 1, it must be satisfied that $\mu_1 < \mu_2 < \mu_3$ (Gujarati, 2009, p. 545-550).

To interpret the ordered models, those of the partial derivatives or the marginal effects of each coefficient are calculated; thus, the marginal effects are interpreted as the variation of the probability, for the categories of the *Support for redistribution* variable, when the variables of the explanatory vector vary in a base unit. The marginal effects are represented as:

$$\partial Prob(H = 1)/\partial X = -\Phi(\mu_1 - B'\mathrm{X})\mathrm{B}$$
$$\partial Prob(H = 2)/\partial X = -\Phi(\mu_2 - B'\mathrm{X})\mathrm{B} + \Phi(\mu_1 - B'\mathrm{X})\mathrm{B}$$
$$\partial Prob(H = 3)/\partial X = -\Phi(\mu_3 - B'\mathrm{X})\mathrm{B} + \Phi(\mu_2 - B'\mathrm{X})\mathrm{B}$$
$$\partial Prob(H = 4)/\partial X = -\Phi(\mu_4 - B'\mathrm{X})\mathrm{B} + \Phi(\mu_3 - B'\mathrm{X})\mathrm{B}$$
$$\partial Prob(H = 5)/\partial X = -\Phi(\mu_5 - B'\mathrm{X})\mathrm{B}$$

3.4. Variables

3.4.1. Dependent Variable

Support for redistribution: The main objective of the study is to determine whether or not attitudes against migration contribute to support for redistributive policies in the Netherlands and Europe. Therefore, the *Support for redistribution* variable is used as a dependent variable to measure whether natives with negative views towards migration support redistribution or not. In using the *Support for redistribution* variable, the intention is also to measure whether immigration attitudes have an impact on natives' perception of their own income, reinforcing their support for redistributive policies in the Netherlands and Europe. In order to measure natives' support for redistribution, the dependent variable is determined by to what extent respondents agree with the following statement: 'The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels'. The respondents assessed their support for redistribution with a 5-point Likert scale.

[1] In general terms, the cumulative distribution is:

$$P(H \leq j|\mu_j, B, X) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\mu_j - XB)}}$$

Respondents could answer on a 1–5 scale from 1 = ‘agree strongly’ to 5 = ‘disagree strongly’, meaning that lower values indicate stronger support for welfare redistribution. Our estimates center on binary coding of the *Support for redistribution* (binary) variable, where 1 = ‘agree strongly or agree’ and 0 = ‘neither agree nor disagree, or disagree or disagree strongly’. This is because the logit model is used when the dependent variable is binary or dummy, that is, it can only take two values (Padilla, 2020).

3.4.2. Explanatory Variable

Immigration attitudes: The independent variable—a native’s *Immigration attitudes*—is determined by respondents’ assessments of the following statement: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?’. Respondents’ answers range from 0 = ‘bad for the economy’ to 10 = ‘good for the economy’ on an 11-point Likert scale, where lower values indicate a stronger unfavorable attitude towards immigration. It is uncertain whether immigration attitudes impact redistributive programs directly, as negative attitudes towards immigrants are less significant in geographic areas with fewer foreigners (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020). Nonetheless, attitudes towards immigration can alter a person’s own perception of their income, through which immigration can either weaken or reinforce support for redistributive policies. We state that a person’s attitude against immigration is likely to strengthen immigration’s positive outcomes on redistribution, more so than its negative outcomes.

3.4.3. Control Variables

Along with immigration attitudes, other 6 background socio-demographic factors of respondents are also included.

Social benefit dependency: We expect that social benefit dependents will have high support for redistribution, since they rely on transfers (Rehm, 2005). For that reason, social benefit dependency is used as a control variable in this research. In order to measure respondents’ social benefit dependency, the control variable is established by respondents’ answers to the following statement: ‘What is the main source of income in your household?’. The respondents assessed the main source of income in their household with a Card. Respondents could answer from 1 = ‘wages or salaries’ to 8 = ‘income from other sources’. Our estimates center on binary coding of the *Social*

benefit dependency (binary) variable, where 1 = 'unemployment/redundancy benefit or any other social benefits or grants' and 0 = 'wages or salaries, or income from self-employment, farming, pensions, investment, savings, insurance or property or income from other sources'.

Education: When evaluating redistribution preferences, Gelepithis and Giani (2020) distinguish between vocational and university education. According to these authors, education is important in discerning how economic security influences voters' views toward redistribution. Indeed, education alters life-possibilities and income opportunities (Rehm, 2005). However, Gelepithis and Giani (2020) also argue that individuals' education levels are related to more than just economic factors. That is to say, redistribution preferences could be shaped, not only by the economic security that education tends (or not) to provide, but also by the idea-shaping socialization process that is part of education (Gelepithis & Giani, 2020). Therefore, education is applied as a control variable in this analysis. We thus approximate the years of full-time education completed by the respondent.

Unemployed: Unsurprisingly, the unemployed are predicted to support considerable levels of redistribution, as they rely on transfers (Rehm, 2005). As maintained by Rehm (2009), income and risk-exposure are central to how job insecurity influences voters' views toward redistribution. Then, unemployment is implemented as a control variable in this study. In order to determine whether (or not) respondents are unemployed, respondents had to code the descriptions that applied to their occupation for the last 7 days. We thus approximate whether the respondent has been unemployed and actively looking for a job for the last 7 days.

Age: This control variable is valuable, as it might have welfare consequences as well. More specifically, aging can alter a person's pension or health insurance-related interests, therefore reinforcing support for redistributive policies (Burgoon, 2014). We also argue that aging can increase concerns with unemployment and income and is likely to strengthen positive attitudes towards redistribution, more than its negative attitudes (Rehm, 2005). Accordingly, age is employed as a control variable in this research.

Gender: Gender differences can be explained by men's assurance regarding their own abilities and their overestimated income position compared to women. Men are also less risk averse. We argue that this gender difference is likely to strengthen women's positive attitudes

towards redistribution (Buser et al., 2016). Another possible explanation is that women enter and leave the marketplace more frequently than men. This is mainly due to the fact that women are generally considered responsible for the rearing of their children. Women's employment is also over-proportionally conditional upon the welfare state. Finally, women's superior life expectancy contributes to more favorable inclinations for redistributive schemes (Rehm, 2005). For that reason, gender is used as a control variable in this analysis (1 = male; 2 = female).

Religiosity: Stegmueller et al. (2012) differentiate between religious and secular individuals when estimating preferences for redistribution. As stated by these authors, religion is central to discerning how social identities influence voters' views toward redistribution, especially in circumstances where the polarization between believers and non-believers is bigger (Stegmueller et al., 2012). Therefore, religion is applied as a control variable in this study. We then calculate how religious a respondent is. Respondents could answer on a 0–10 scale from 0 = 'not at all religious' to 10 = 'very religious', with higher values indicating a stronger religiosity'.

3.4.4. Moderating Variables

Income (subjective): Income insecurities are measured subjectively, focusing on patterns seen in certain aspects of natives' perceived socioeconomic background, which are also relevant for evaluating their economic non-integration. Subjective income captures the degree to which respondents are likely to feel subjective income insecurities. A person's experience of a situation and their abilities in managing it can alter subjective insecurity and, therefore, support for redistributive policies (Chung & Mau, 2014). To estimate such probabilities, we assess if respondents struggle with their present income. The respondents assessed their subjective income with a 4-point Likert scale. They could answer from 1 = 'living comfortably on present income' to 4 = 'finding it very difficult on present income', with higher values indicating stronger subjective income insecurities. This facet of economic uncertainty likely has a significant connection to support for redistributive programs in the process of immigrationization.

A respondent's subjective income insecurity can be detected by means other than perceived financial measures—most clearly in terms of greater globalization exposure and/or deindustrialization (limited transferability of skills) (Hays et al., 2005; Walter, 2010; Burgoon, 2001). This is particularly relevant for researchers analyzing the higher demand for employment

and/or social protection policies by the losers of globalization and/or technological progress (e.g., low-skilled workers). Our focus on natives' perceived financial capacity as an explanatory variable makes the subjective income measure useful in determining the economic pressure that results from negative attitudes towards immigration.

A participant's perception of economic pressure is important for examining its moderating function and evaluating our hypotheses. Our claim is that views against migrants can explain the rise of a population's own subjective income insecurities, and that those insecurities explain the rise in support for redistribution. In this, the effects of subjective income on views towards migrations are crucial. To boost this argument, we include an interaction between immigration attitudes and subjective income.

Foreign-born: Another important aspect is foreign-born—capturing the likelihood that respondents were (or not) born in the Netherlands or Europe (1 = born in the Netherlands or Europe; 2 = born abroad). This contextual moderation is valuable, as it might have welfare consequences as well. High percentages of foreign-born citizens can raise insecurities so that immigrants are perceived as fiscal and macro-economic burdens. We also state that a considerable foreign-born population can increase solidarity, trust, as well as social capital, and is likely to strengthen positive attitudes towards redistribution. Thus, the outcomes of attitudes towards migrations that depend on foreign-born are crucial (Burgoon, 2014). To support this argument, we add an interaction between immigration attitudes and foreign-born. Respectively, the effects of the interaction terms should become more noticeable as negative attitudes towards migration increase.

4. Results and Analysis

4.1. Descriptive Analysis

Before a logit analysis can be executed, the descriptive results must be carefully examined. Table 2 provides an outline of the summary statistics of the main research variables used in this study, separated for the Netherlands and Europe.

Table 2. Summary Statistics

Variable	Netherlands			Europe		
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Support for redistribution	1991	0.795	0.404	48586	0.742	0.438
Immigration attitudes	1955	5.042	2.477	47450	5.182	2.564
Soc. benef. dependency	1990	0.059	0.235	48743	0.043	0.202
Education	1972	13.123	4.176	48811	12.963	4.164
Unemployed	1673	0.021	0.145	49519	0.034	0.183
Age	2010	52.374	18.97	49297	51.066	18.647
Gender	2010	1.546	0.498	49519	1.535	0.499
Religiosity	1987	4.725	3.484	49000	4.543	3.136
Income (subjective)	1994	1.961	0.78	48821	1.962	0.85
Foreign-born	2009	1.12	0.325	49494	1.098	0.297

* Means and standard deviations between 2018 and 2020 based on a sample of 49519 respondents from 29 EU member states.

4.1.1. Dependent and Explanatory Variables

Support for redistribution: In our sample, the sample means of the dependent variable are 0.79 in the Netherlands and 0.74 in Europe, implying that most Dutch and European people supported redistribution between 2018 and 2020. The average agrees with the statement that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.

Indeed, and as shown in Figure 3, between 2018 and 2020, most of the mean scores evaluating the levels of support for redistribution in Europe were above the average (4 over 8), with the only exceptions being Hungary, Slovakia and Serbia. The Netherlands' average is above the midpoint (4 over 8) of this support for redistribution scale (ESS, 2018). Northern (e.g., Iceland, Ireland and UK) and Western Europe countries (e.g., Switzerland and Germany) have higher levels

of support for redistribution than Eastern European countries (e.g., Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia and Bulgaria). Nevertheless, there are a few exceptions to this trend, such as Latvia and Poland, which had surprisingly high levels of support for redistribution between 2018 and 2019. France is also an exception since it had unexpectedly low levels of support for redistribution between 2018 and 2019 (ESS, 2018).



Figure 3. Country Differences in Support for Redistribution

Source: ESS 2018, own calculations

Immigration attitudes: Moving on to our key independent variable, the sample means of the independent variable are 5.04 in the Netherlands and 5.18 in Europe, indicating that most Dutch and European people held middling views towards immigration between 2018 and 2020.

As shown in Figure 4, between 2018 and 2020, most of the mean scores evaluating the levels of support for immigration in Europe were above the average (4 over 8), with the only exception of Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria. The Netherlands' average is above the

midpoint (4 over 8) of the views towards immigration scale, meaning that Dutch have rather positive views towards immigration (ESS, 2018). The Netherlands is the 7th country (out of 29) with the most positive views towards immigration in Europe. Northern (e.g., Iceland, Sweden and Ireland) and Western Europe countries (e.g., Netherlands and UK) have higher levels of support for immigration than Eastern European countries (e.g., Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria). Nevertheless, there are a few exceptions to this trend, such as, again, Poland, which had surprisingly positive views towards immigration between 2018 and 2019. Austria and, again, France are also an exception since they had unexpected low levels of support for immigration between 2018 and 2019 (ESS, 2018).



Figure 4. Country Differences in Immigration Attitudes

Source: ESS 2018, own calculations

The stated results for 2018-20 are perfectly in line with those from 2002 and 2014 for immigration support mentioned in the **2.1.2.** subhead in the theory chapter of this paper. This allows us to confirm the aforementioned trend of Northern and Western Europe countries having

not only higher levels of support for redistribution, but also more positive views towards immigration than Eastern European countries. Poland and France were an overall exception to these trends in 2002, 2014 and 2018-19. In addition, scores evaluating the levels of support for immigration increased surprisingly from 2002 to 2018-20 in some European countries. For instance, Portugal had the lowest levels of support for immigration in 2002 but increased to be the 6th country (out of 29) with the most positive views towards immigration in 2018-19. In addition, Belgium was the 3rd country (out of 21) with the most negative views towards immigration in 2002 but in 2018-19 increased to have slightly better views towards immigration than the average. Finally, the UK was the 5th country (out of 21) with the most negative views towards immigration in 2002 and increased to be the 8th country (out of 29) with the most positive views towards immigration in 2018-19 (ESS 2016; ESS 2018). Overall, these results give an overview of the connection between levels of support for redistribution and immigration, which move towards the same direction.

4.1.2. Control Variables

Social benefit dependency, Education, *Unemployed*, *Age*, *Gender* and *Religiosity*: The average respondent is a non-religious and university-level educated female between 51 and 52 years old. The main source of income in most of respondent' households are wages or salaries, or income from self-employment, farming, pensions, investment, savings, insurance or property or income from other sources, rather than unemployment/redundancy benefit or any other social benefits or grants.

4.1.3. Moderating Variables

Income (subjective) and *Foreign-born*: The sample means of the *Income (subjective)* variable is 1.96 in the Netherlands and Europe, suggesting that between 2018 and 2020 most Dutch and European people felt they were able to cope with their present income. In addition, the sample means of the *Foreign-born* variable are 1.12 and 1.11, implying that most respondents were born in the Netherlands and in Europe.

Matrix of correlations

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) *Immigration attitudes*	1.000								
(2) *Foreign born*	0.112	1.000							
(3) *Soc. benef. dependency*	-0.013	0.043	1.000						
(4) *Education*	0.208	0.022	-0.046	1.000					
(5) *Income (subjective)*	-0.208	0.026	0.199	-0.260	1.000				
(6) *Age*	-0.082	-0.043	-0.079	-0.211	0.094	1.000			
(7) *Gender*	-0.041	0.010	0.004	-0.012	0.070	0.028	1.000		
(8) *Religiosity*	-0.039	0.080	-0.010	-0.136	0.095	0.196	0.148	1.000	
(9) *Unemployed*	-0.021	0.033	0.243	-0.016	0.143	-0.111	-0.014	0.010	1.000

4.2. Logit Regression

This is followed by a Ceteris Paribus interpretation, to keep everything else constant. For the interpretation, all the models are taken into account and the coefficients represent the marginal effects.

4.2.1. Immigration Attitudes and Support for Redistribution

We analyze the relationship between immigration attitudes and support for redistribution. Table 3 compiles the outcomes focused on support for redistribution. We first consider how attitudes against immigration directly affect support for redistribution. More specifically, this data shows how much people with attitudes against migration think that their government should take measures to reduce income inequality, presenting evidence for Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis is that natives with attitudes against immigration are more inclined to support social protection and redistributive programs.

The outcomes in M1, M3, M5 and M6 imply statistically significant positive results for immigration attitudes in the Netherlands and Europe. For example, when the positive perception of immigrants in the economy increases on a unit scale, the probability that the person agrees strongly/agrees with the redistribution increases by 3.56% (M5) for the Netherlands and 0.92% (M6) for Europe. This positive trend is persistent in the Netherlands (M1, M3 and M5), while in Europe it is only seen in the latest model (M6). This means that respondents maintaining pro-immigration feelings are more inclined to support redistribution than respondents with anti-immigration attitudes in the Netherlands, whereas in Europe it depends on the model. The findings contradict the first hypothesis that attitudes against immigration positively influences welfare

attitudes. Instead, they complement Garand et al. (2017) and Hawes and McCrea's (2017) ideas that natives' viewing immigrants as a threat to cultural identity translates into reduced support for redistribution.

Table 3. Immigration Attitudes and Dependent Variable

VARIABLE	(M1) Logit Netherlands	(M2) Logit Europe	(M3) Logit Netherlands	(M4) Logit Europe	(M5) Logit Netherlands	(M6) Logit Europe
Immigration attitudes	0.0111*	-0.00611***	0.0163**	-0.00206**	0.0356	0.00924**
	(0.00659)	(0.000797)	(0.00691)	(0.000831)	(0.0299)	(0.00362)
Soc. benef. dependency			0.135***	0.0273***	0.0917**	-0.0215*
			(0.0402)	(0.0103)	(0.0456)	(0.0117)
Education			-0.00632**	-0.00868***	-0.00516*	-0.00612***
			(0.00298)	(0.000519)	(0.00302)	(0.000527)
Unemployed			-0.0274	0.0581***	-0.0533	0.0286**
			(0.0900)	(0.0106)	(0.0923)	(0.0117)
Age			0.00431***	0.00141***	0.00424***	0.00118***
			(0.000692)	(0.000117)	(0.000705)	(0.000117)
Gender			0.0963***	0.0487***	0.0894***	0.0435***
			(0.0253)	(0.00416)	(0.0256)	(0.00415)
Religiosity			-0.00209	0.00464***	-0.00214	0.00404***
			(0.00406)	(0.000681)	(0.00418)	(0.000685)
Income (subjective)					0.174***	0.109***
					(0.0617)	(0.00600)
Immig. attitudes X income (subjective)					-0.0179*	-0.00704***
					(0.0105)	(0.00103)
Foreign-born					-0.0928	-0.0518***
					(0.159)	(0.0178)
Immig. attitudes X foreign-born					0.00881	0.00503*
					(0.0252)	(0.00273)
Observations	1,614	46,782	1,576	45,093	1,560	44,716

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

However, results for M2 and M4 indicate otherwise, as they show statistically significant negative results for immigration attitudes in Europe. This implies that respondents maintaining further anti-immigration attitudes are more inclined to support redistribution than respondents with pro-immigration feelings. These findings are in line with our first hypothesis. They also complement Finseraas (2008) and Brady and Finnigan's (2014) ideas that natives' connecting immigrants with unemployment and job competition translates into subjective income insecurities and higher preferences for a more generous welfare state.

Overall, these findings suggest that it is difficult to confirm the direct impact of immigration attitudes in Europe. Indeed, results vary depending on the estimated model and the variables (control and interaction terms) it includes to measure support for redistribution (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020). Beyond that, a possible explanation for the differing results between the Netherlands and Europe could be that Dutch have fiscal concerns while Europeans have wages preoccupations because of immigration. More precisely, natives in the Netherlands would worry about taxes spent on immigrants' consumption of public goods, whereas Europeans would fear entering a more competitive labor market and be exposed to income or job loss.

4.2.2. Control Variables

Apart from the independent variable, the six control variables are *Social benefit dependency*, *Education*, *Unemployed*, *Age*, *Gender* and *Religiosity*. Social welfare dependency refers to the main source of income in households, whereas variables like education, unemployment, age, gender as well as religiosity make up respondents' socio-demographic profiles. The analysis of these socio-demographic controls is especially useful since these factors could also affect natives' support for redistribution. Adjusting for the effects of the control variables helps to reveal the real positive effect of immigration attitudes on support for redistribution, as maintained by Toshkov (2019).

Social benefit dependency and *Unemployed*: Consistent with Rehm's (2005) predictions, Table 3 shows that social benefit dependency significantly increases support for redistribution in the Netherlands. When *Social benefit dependency* takes the value of 1 (the individual has economic dependency), the probability that the person supports/strongly supports redistribution is 9.17% higher for the Netherlands (M5). However, Table 3 shows that social benefit dependency statistically significantly decreases support for redistribution in Europe. The same probability is 2.15% lower for Europe (M6), compared to individuals who do not have economic dependency, on average.

Likewise, the unemployed show weaker support for redistribution in the Netherlands but are not statistically significant. When the *Unemployed* variable takes the value of 1 (the individual was unemployed or actively looking for work in the last 7 days), the probability that the person agrees strongly/agrees with the redistribution is 5.33% lower for the Netherlands (M5). On the

contrary, the unemployed statistically significantly support more redistribution compared to individuals who do not report being unemployed or looking for work in Europe. The same probability is 2.86% higher for Europe (M6), compared to individuals who do not report being unemployed or looking for work, on average.

Consequently, this provides also evidence for Hoy and Mager's (2019) hypothesis that relatively poorer people will be less supportive of social protection. According to these authors, individuals' (perceived and actual) position in national income distribution is important for discerning the notion of "benchmarking" influencing voters' views toward redistribution. "Benchmarking" refers to individuals that apply their own level of comfort as a baseline for what they believe should be acceptable for others. This mechanism has a negative effect on poorer individual's support for redistribution since they perceive their level of comfort as decent, so they are less inclined to believe redistribution to the underprivileged is needed (Hoy & Mager, 2019).

Education can affect a person's subjective income insecurities. Thus, this paper speculates that education can strengthen negative attitudes towards redistribution, more than their positive attitudes. Table 3 shows that increased levels of education statistically significantly diminish support for redistribution in the Netherlands and Europe, with results being more significant in Europe. When *Education* increases in one year, the probability that the person agrees strongly/agrees with the redistribution decreases by 0.51% (M5) and 0.61% (M6) for the Netherlands and Europe on average, respectively. Therefore, this provides evidence for Gaston and Rajaguru's (2013) assumption that a more generous welfare state would attract fewer high-skilled workers, since well-educated individuals are usually high-income earners, and would therefore have comparatively higher tax burdens. Labor taxes used to subsidize welfare benefits have two effects: they encourage welfare recipiency and discourage labor effort. Mobile individuals with high income earning capacities are, all else equal, likely to choose jurisdictions with relatively lower tax obligations and smaller welfare states (Gaston & Rajaguru, 2013).

Age and *Gender*: These control variables contribute remarkably to this research. This study argues that ageing and female respondents can strengthen positive attitudes towards redistribution, more than its negative attitudes. Table 3 also confirms this statement, as ageing and female respondents' stocks significantly boost support for redistribution in the Netherlands and Europe. When the variable *Age* increases by one year, the probability that the person agrees strongly/agrees

with the redistribution increases by 0.42% (M5) and 0.11% (M6) for the Netherlands and Europe on average, respectively. Thus, this provides evidence for Burgoon (2014) and Rehm's (2005) assumption that aging can alter concerns related to pension, health insurance, unemployment and income therefore reinforcing support for redistributive policies. Likewise, when the *Gender* variable (M5 and M6) takes the value of 1 (the individual is a woman), the probability that the person agrees strongly/agrees with the redistribution is 8.94% (M5) and 4.35% (M6) higher for the Netherlands and Europe respectively compared to the male average. Then, this also provides evidence for Buser et al. (2016) supposition that gender can impact worries related to abilities, income positions, professions, women's expected role as a caregiver, as well as their life expectancy, thus increasing support for redistributive policies.

Religiosity: Non-religious participants support more redistribution than religious ones in the Netherlands but are not statistically significant. When *Religiosity* increases by one unit (the individual is more religious), the probability that the person agrees strongly/agrees with the redistribution decreases 0.21% (M5) for the Netherlands. Accordingly, this provides proof for Stegmueller's (2013) hypothesis that religious people will be less supportive of social protection. According to this author, an individual's conservative morals are crucial to discerning the moral preferences that influence voters' views toward redistribution. Indeed, strategic political parties combine conservative moral approaches with anti-redistribution stances, encouraging religious individuals to vote based on principles rather than economic preferences (Stegmuelle, 2013). However, religious respondents statistically significantly support more redistribution than non-religious ones in Europe. The same probability that the person agrees strongly/agrees with the redistribution increases by 0.40% (M6) for Europe, on average. Accordingly, this provides evidence for Savage's (2019) hypothesis that when parties integrate religion with redistributive programs, religious natives are more likely to support redistribution, since doing so strengthens their partisan identity (Savage, 2019).

4.2.3. From Immigration Attitudes to Subjective Income

The second hypothesis is that attitudes against immigration arouse one's own subjective income insecurities (residents are likely to find it difficult on present income) that trigger support for social protection and redistributive programs. M5 and M6 test Hypothesis 2, correspondingly. We confirm the regularity and significance of this correlation at the 0.1 level for the Netherlands and

0.01 level for Europe, in order to demonstrate that subjective income insecurities—which influence fiscal policy options and consequences—are shaped by attitudes against immigration.

Table 3 validates the second hypothesis, as when *Income (subjective)* increases in one category (when the difficulty of living with the current income increases), the probability that the person agrees strongly/agrees with the redistribution increases by 17.4% (M5) and 10.9% (M6) for the Netherlands and Europe on average, respectively. However, the factor of struggling to live with one's current income statistically significantly increases support for redistribution even more so for individuals with attitudes against immigration. This can be observed by the significant negative coefficient for the interaction term associating *Support for redistribution* and *Immigration attitudes* on the one hand and *Income (subjective)* on the other. The negative interaction effect indicates that the positive effect of subjective income on welfare redistribution support is conditional upon attitudes toward immigration. More precisely, the negative interaction effect indicates that the positive effect of subjective income on redistribution, as previously mentioned, fades when pro-immigration attitudes increase. Equivalently, the positive effect of subjective income on support for welfare redistribution is bigger when attitudes against immigration increase. That is to say, the interaction is in line with the second hypothesis.

4.2.4. From Foreign-Born Respondents to Immigration Attitudes

The third hypothesis is that attitudes against immigration lead to higher support for social protection in cases where foreign-born percentages are high. An increase in the percentage of foreign-born citizens drives up subjective income insecurities which trigger support for social protection and redistributive programs. M5 and M6 also test Hypothesis 3. We confirm the regularity and significance at the 0.1 level of this correlation in Europe, in order to demonstrate that immigration attitudes are shaped by foreign-born percentages.

What we cannot validate, however, is the significance of the correlation between support for redistribution and foreign-born percentages in the Netherlands, nor the significance of the interaction term associating *Support for redistribution*, *Immigration attitudes* and *Foreign-born*. The reason behind these insignificant results could be that Dutch attitudes toward immigration are more positive (they have a higher belief that the Netherlands is made a better place to live by the presence of immigrants), than those in the rest of Europe in general. The results of these positive

attitudes is that immigrants are more likely to be integrated, which reduces the gaps between immigrants and natives in regards to unemployment levels and social benefit dependency. In short, even if high percentages of foreign-born citizens do increase subjective income insecurity, exposure to international migration—in the case of the Netherlands—does not have significant effects on redistributive programs when migrants are well-integrated (Burgoon, 2014).

The results of the logit analysis for Europe (depicted by Table 3), contradict the third hypothesis. When the person was not born in Europe, the probability that the person supports/strongly supports redistribution decreases by 5.18% (M6) for Europe on average. However, foreign-born percentages significantly increase support for redistribution when individuals have pro-immigration attitudes. This can be observed in the significant positive coefficients for the interaction term associating *Support for redistribution* and *Immigration attitudes* on the one hand and *Foreign-born* on the other. The positive interaction effect indicates that the positive effect of pro-immigration attitudes on support for redistribution remains constant when foreign-born percentage increases.

4.3. Ordered Logit Regression

Assuring the validity of the analysis involves performing a second Ceteris Paribus interpretation, whilst keeping all factors constant. This interpretation uses the 5 categories of the endogenous categorical variable: "The government should reduce the differences in income levels": 1) Agree strongly, 2) Agree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Disagree and 5) Disagree strongly. This is done in order to more accurately determine the possible differences or similarities between categories.

Tables 4 and 5 plot the allocation of support for redistribution (conditional on the other variables) in both the Netherlands and Europe. To avoid confusion, we focus on the subgroup of natives who support redistribution (answers "agree" and "agree strongly" that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels) in each of the subsets defined by explanatory, control and moderating variables. The results indicate four main findings.

Table 4. Support for Redistribution by Category in the Netherlands

VARIABLE	(1) Agree strongly	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	(4) Disagree	(5) Disagree strongly
Immigration attitudes	0.0261*	0.0177	-0.0127*	-0.0266*	-0.00458
	(0.0159)	(0.0108)	(0.00767)	(0.0161)	(0.00287)
Soc. benef. dependency	0.0674***	0.0457***	-0.0326***	-0.0687***	-0.0118***
	(0.0236)	(0.0165)	(0.0115)	(0.0242)	(0.00455)
Education	-0.00184	-0.00125	0.000891	0.00187	0.000323
	(0.00148)	(0.00101)	(0.000716)	(0.00151)	(0.000264)
Unemployed	-0.0112	-0.00760	0.00542	0.0114	0.00196
	(0.0433)	(0.0294)	(0.0210)	(0.0441)	(0.00760)
Age	0.00250***	0.00170***	-0.00121***	-0.00255***	-0.000439***
	(0.000360)	(0.000251)	(0.000173)	(0.000356)	(9.30e-05)
Gender	0.0387***	0.0263***	-0.0187***	-0.0394***	-0.00678***
	(0.0126)	(0.00871)	(0.00611)	(0.0128)	(0.00246)
Religiosity	-0.00148	-0.00100	0.000715	0.00151	0.000259
	(0.00208)	(0.00141)	(0.00101)	(0.00212)	(0.000367)
Income (subjective)	0.0875***	0.0594***	-0.0424***	-0.0892***	-0.0153***
	(0.0294)	(0.0201)	(0.0143)	(0.0298)	(0.00568)
Immig. attitudes X income (subjective)	-0.00897*	-0.00609*	0.00434*	0.00914*	0.00157*
	(0.00507)	(0.00345)	(0.00246)	(0.00516)	(0.000922)
Foreign-born	-0.0169	-0.0115	0.00817	0.0172	0.00296
	(0.0816)	(0.0554)	(0.0395)	(0.0832)	(0.0143)
Immig. attitudes X foreign-born	0.000288	0.000195	-0.000139	-0.000293	-5.04e-05
	(0.0131)	(0.00887)	(0.00633)	(0.0133)	(0.00229)
Observations	1,560	1,560	1,560	1,560	1,560

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

First, the findings for natives' *Immigration attitudes*, *Education*, *Age*, *Gender*, *Income (subjective)*, *Foreign-born* and *Support for redistribution* are comparable between the Netherlands and Europe. On the one hand, support for redistribution seems to be higher for both respondents finding it (very) difficult with present income and females. However, it is slightly higher among these demographics in the Netherlands than in Europe in general. On the other hand, support for redistribution appears to be lower for both educated and foreign-born participants, but more significantly so in Europe in general than in the Netherlands. These results are in line with what one would anticipate based on Figure 3, where the Netherlands is classified as the 13th country with the highest support for redistribution levels among 29 European countries.

Table 5. Support for Redistribution by Category in Europe

VARIABLE	(1) Agree strongly	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	(4) Disagree	(5) Disagree strongly
Immigration attitudes	0.00566*	-0.000252*	-0.00259*	-0.00223*	-0.000589*
	(0.00310)	(0.000144)	(0.00142)	(0.00122)	(0.000323)
Soc. benef. dependency	-0.00353	0.000157	0.00161	0.00139	0.000367
	(0.00900)	(0.000401)	(0.00411)	(0.00355)	(0.000937)
Education	-0.00362***	0.000161***	0.00166***	0.00143***	0.000377***
	(0.000450)	(3.34e-05)	(0.000206)	(0.000179)	(4.85e-05)
Unemployed	0.0359***	-0.00160***	-0.0164***	-0.0142***	-0.00374***
	(0.00998)	(0.000518)	(0.00456)	(0.00394)	(0.00105)
Age	0.00105***	-4.68e-05***	-0.000481***	-0.000415***	-0.000109***
	(9.82e-05)	(9.00e-06)	(4.50e-05)	(3.91e-05)	(1.08e-05)
Gender	0.0397***	-0.00177***	-0.0182***	-0.0157***	-0.00414***
	(0.00349)	(0.000334)	(0.00160)	(0.00140)	(0.000388)
Religiosity	0.00258***	-0.000115***	-0.00118***	-0.00102***	-0.000269***
	(0.000578)	(3.20e-05)	(0.000264)	(0.000229)	(6.08e-05)
Income (subjective)	0.104***	-0.00464***	-0.0477***	-0.0412***	-0.0109***
	(0.00453)	(0.000794)	(0.00213)	(0.00189)	(0.000591)
Immig. attitudes X income (subjective)	-0.00631***	0.000281***	0.00288***	0.00249***	0.000657***
	(0.000799)	(5.78e-05)	(0.000367)	(0.000318)	(8.60e-05)
Foreign-born	-0.0674***	0.00300***	0.0308***	0.0266***	0.00702***
	(0.0151)	(0.000840)	(0.00692)	(0.00598)	(0.00159)
Immig. attitudes X foreign-born	0.00638***	-0.000284**	-0.00291***	-0.00252***	-0.000664***
	(0.00234)	(0.000114)	(0.00107)	(0.000924)	(0.000244)
Observations	44,716	44,716	44,716	44,716	44,716

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Second, results for *Social benefit dependency*, *Unemployment*, *Religiosity* and *Support for redistribution* vary substantially in the Netherlands compared to Europe. Support for redistribution is seen to be increasing among social benefit dependents in the Netherlands and the unemployed and religious in Europe, however it is decreasing among the same groups in the Netherlands. This pattern is incompatible with the common belief that social benefit dependents and the unemployed can be painted with the same brush (Rehm, 2005). Indeed, this finding contradicts the expectation that social benefit dependents and the unemployed are, as low-income respondents, always expected to support redistribution due to their reliance on transfers.

However, it is important to note that the *Unemployed* variable classifies respondents who have been actively looking for a job for the last 7 days as "unemployed". This means that our *Unemployed* variable does not differentiate between short and long-term unemployment. This is significant because there are different factors leading to short-term unemployment (such as the termination of a temporary contract) versus long-term unemployment (such as insufficient skills or productivity). On top of this, those who are short-term unemployed are more likely to be going through a "phase" which is less likely to impact their happiness or employability than long-term unemployment (de Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015). Therefore, findings are more in line with the alternative reasoning that the unemployed in the Netherlands may be only temporarily unemployed (in the case of the end of a temporary contract) or willingly out of the labor force by choice (in the case of stay-at-home parents), leading them to be less supportive of redistribution, as they are not necessarily reliant on transfers (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014).

Amongst the religious, support for redistribution is decreasing in the Netherlands, but increasing in Europe. The latter pattern also contradicts the conventional wisdom that religious affiliation is a reliable factor in predicting support for redistribution, as strategic political parties often align themselves with conservative morals, which rarely support redistribution policies (Stegmuelle, 2013). However, in regards to Europe, it has been observed that some conservative or religious political European parties may integrate religion with redistributive programs in Europe, thereby strengthening the correlation between religiosity and support for redistribution (Savage 2019).

Third, *Immigration attitudes*, *Education*, *Unemployment*, *Religiosity*, *Foreign-born* and the interaction terms have a more statistically significant impact on support for redistribution in Europe than in the Netherlands. A potential explanation is that there is less polarization in the form of wealth inequality and ethnic pressure in the Netherlands than overall in Europe. This would mean that these variables are less likely to explain fluctuations in support for redistribution (Stegmueller et al., 2012; Keefer & Knack, 2002). However, *Age*, *Gender* and *Income (subjective)* are statistically significant variables at the 0.01 level, able to explain levels of support for redistribution both in the Netherlands and Europe.

Finally, regarding these statistically significant results, respondents in the Netherlands present larger percentage points for the category "agree", while Europe has bigger percentage

points for the category “strongly agree”. Similarly, the smallest percentage points in the Netherlands are for the categories “strongly disagree” while for Europe it is for “disagree”. This indicates that the Dutch select more moderate options, compared to the more extreme options chosen by the rest of Europe. One explanation for this could be the higher level of education in the Netherlands than in many other European countries which could make the Dutch less likely to manifest more “radical” opinions (Eurostat, 2021; Savelkoul & Scheepers, 2016; Winkler, 2019).

4.4. Immigration Attitudes Marginal Effects

This section calculates the marginal effects of the different categories, in order to visualize the changes in the marginal coefficients for the *Support for redistribution* variable.



Figure 5. Marginal Effects in the Netherlands

Source: Stata

The coefficients of the regressions carried out are already expressed in terms of marginal coefficients. Therefore, interpreting them involves identifying how likely they are to belong to the category *Support for redistribution* when there is a unit increase of *Immigration attitudes*.



Figure 6. Marginal Effects in Europe

Source: Stata

Figures 5 and 6 visualize the 2018-20 changes in the marginal effects for the Netherlands and Europe. In the Netherlands, there is an observable increase in the probability of supporting redistribution (agree strongly and agree) and a decrease in the probability of not supporting redistribution (disagree strongly and disagree), which confirms that the Dutch support redistribution policies.

For Europe, the opposite is true: a lower probability of agreeing strongly with income redistribution policies and an increased chance of disagreeing strongly and disagreeing with income redistribution policies. Interpreting this in light of the model suggests that in the Netherlands redistribution policies are better received and possibly have a better reputation than in Europe. These results could potentially be explained by higher institutional quality as well as lower domestic levels of corruption in the Netherlands (Transparency International, 2020). These findings help us comprehend how and why corruption might weaken society's ability for collective action (Bauhr & Charron, 2018).

5. Discussion

5.1. Advantages of the Study

This study analyses the complex issues that encounter migration policymakers, instead of describing present policy on migration. It thus contributes to passing on knowledge that can be useful for policy deliberations and assist in shaping policymaking (IOM, 2019).

The survey data captured from the ESS Round 9 comes from an extensive and random probability sample of respondents. It includes respondents from 29 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK. The dataset's sample size is also large enough to be considered an efficacious sample size. Thus, the conclusions of this research can be generalized to the citizens of both the Netherlands and the EU. Moreover, since the ESS is conveniently accessible, this research can be replicated. Finally, Stata allows us to replicate the outcomes of this research, thus gaining external validity.

Another benefit of this dataset is the considerable amount of information that can be collected through the wide variety of questions. For instance, respondents were asked questions about their interests, participation, perceived influence on politics, as well as their political beliefs and preferences. More precisely, they were asked about their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the current state of the economy, the government and the way democracy works in the Netherlands and Europe. Respondents were also asked their general opinions about the state of the education and health systems in the Netherlands and Europe, as well as their stance on European unification (ESS, 2018). Thanks to the considerable amount of information provided by responses, many control variables can be used in this research.

This research also ensures internal validity by controlling for confounding factors. It does so by adding 6 control variables to the regression: *Social benefit dependency*, *Education*, *Unemployed*, *Age*, *Gender* and *Religiosity*. This adjusting strategy allows the influence of immigration attitudes on support for welfare redistribution to stand out (Toshkov, 2019). Among the 6 control variables, it can be observed that *Education*, *Age* and *Gender* have a significant effect on support for redistribution in the Netherlands and Europe and thus contribute substantially to the

study. However, certain other control variables do not react as anticipated. For instance, social benefit dependents are less likely to support redistribution in Europe, the unemployed are less likely to support redistribution in the Netherlands and religious people are more likely to support redistribution in Europe. Additional research is needed to analyze these unexpected results.

Finally, this dataset measures stated preferences. For instance, researchers asked respondents' stances on whether or not the government should take measures to reduce inequalities, but did not measure whether the government is actually taking such measures. They also asked respondents their views on immigrants, not measuring if immigrants were actually good or bad for the economy. We also focus on subjective income, assessing whether respondents find it difficult to survive on their current income rather than measuring their actual income. Perceptions are particularly interesting to our case, as they have welfare consequences. More specifically, respondents' views on immigrants can alter their own subjective income, therefore weakening or reinforcing their support for redistributive policies. Therefore, this research focuses predominantly on stated preferences.

5.2. Limitations of the Study

Upcoming studies could compare the discrepancy between objective and subjective income in order to comprehend which plays a more significant role on welfare attitudes (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2019). In addition, it would be advantageous to include other respondent characteristics such as types of job contract (e.g., unlimited), duty (e.g., supervisory), occupation (e.g., manager, senior officials or unskilled/elementary) and labor union preference, in order to analyze the dissimilarities affecting support for redistribution across various groups (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020; Burgoon, 2014; Markaki & Longhi, 2013).

It would also be more insightful to carry out an in-depth study and focus more specifically on why respondents have positive or negative attitudes towards immigration. Specifically, it is important to address cultural explanations, using data that provides comparable identity measures and takes all origins of immigrants into consideration: Turkey, Morocco, Germany, Romania, Somalia, China, United States and Poland. For instance, in a Dutch Survey 'Immigrants in the Netherlands', Germans are indicated to be almost twice as 'likeable' as Romanians and Moroccans. Moreover, most natives think that an increased number of Moroccans will cause an

increase in criminality, and would not benefit the Netherlands in regards to scientific and technological progress (Elshout, 2012). This shows that natives can have stronger negative attitudes towards specific groups of migrants, and that negative attitudes towards immigration cannot be generalized to every group of immigrants. Naumann and Stoetzer (2017) also claim that data should distinguish between other migrant characteristics, such as their visibility and/or their religion. This could lead to a better comprehension of which determinants influence attitudes towards migration.

Finally, it is often overlooked that anti-immigration attitudes, in addition to increasing the subjective income insecurities of natives, can also increase the subjective income insecurities of immigrants themselves. Although a respondent's reasons for struggling on their current income are complex, anti-immigration attitudes leave immigrant families at risk of the stressful consequences of income insecurity (e.g., job loss). Indeed, discrimination eventually translates into lower wages (associated with insufficient development, health and education outcomes) and housing discrimination (ethnic enclaves), among others (Ayón, 2015).

Concerning the period of time, the survey data focuses on responses made in 2018. This study applies a cross-sectional research design within the EU, mostly because research on migration, as well as its role in framing contemporary welfare state reactions, is a relatively new phenomenon in the political economy field. The most recent ESS that focuses on immigration in Europe is from 2014, and thus far no other ESS has been conducted. Last but not least, this study is limited in its inability to complete a longitudinal study. This is because a longitudinal study certainly could lead to costly research that may have to extend over several years. If it were possible, this research would have applied a time-element in order to differentiate the effects of immigration attitudes and perceptions on policy preferences over time. The temporal limitations of this study should be taken into account when considering the outcomes of this research. As it stands, the cross-sectional research design is apt to partiality and selection effects, since the design variables are obstructed by ordinary time effects. This research uses a conditioning design, controlling for different explanations in order to diminish reversed causality and thus ensuring increased precision (Toshkov, 2019). In addition, a moderation technique is used to clarify the causal hypothesis (Wu & Zumbo, 2008). It is undeniable, however, that it could be advantageous if further research on migration could take the time-element into account.

6. Conclusion

This section presents the conclusions of this study. Taking into account the socio-economic and political constraints influencing the Netherlands and the European Union, this research aims to examine the effect of international migration on redistributive programs in the Netherlands and Europe in 2018-20. The findings were as follows: first, most Dutch and EU residents favor social programs and redistribution policies. These results can be explained by the path-dependent outcome of enlarging social, political and economic freedoms through the European unification process strengthening society's ability for collective action and setting off welfare solidarity preferences (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015).

This thesis tests the impact of immigration attitudes on support for redistribution in order to identify residents who believe that the government should take measures to reduce income inequality. For the first hypothesis, we focus on the direct effect of immigration attitudes on support for redistribution, regardless of the possible moderating factors. Results for M1, M3, M5 and M6 identify that residents who have pro-immigration attitudes in the Netherlands and Europe are more likely to support welfare redistribution. However, results for M2 and M4 show that residents with anti-immigration attitudes in Europe are more likely to support redistribution. Thus, these outcomes provide no conclusive statement on the way that immigration attitudes and redistribution policies are associated.

For the second and third hypotheses, this research used a moderation strategy with interactions in order to expose how immigration attitudes are altered by subjective income and foreign-born percentages. Our main claims and survey responses imply that subjective income and foreign-born percentages moderate the principal immigration attitudes dynamic. Subjective income insecurity has a positive effect on support for redistribution. Moreover, subjective income's positive effect on support for welfare is somewhat conditional upon immigration attitudes. More precisely, subjective income insecurity has less of a positive effect on redistribution when pro-immigration attitudes increase. Equivalently, subjective income insecurity correlates with a stronger support for welfare redistribution when attitudes against immigration increase.

Therefore, this research presents some level of evidence that subjective income is not only a valid estimate for attitudes toward welfare, but also indicates how subjective income moderates

welfare redistribution. In short, this trend reflects a major pattern in the way that welfare politics are immigrationized in opposing directions. Anti-immigration attitudes affect voters' support for welfare redistribution, as they provoke the fear of entering a more competitive labor market and be exposed to income or job loss, and they awaken residents' own economic insecurities—which increases their demand for social protection (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020).

This study also examined the possible effects of increases in migration flows through the foreign-born variable (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2020). The impact of foreign-born percentages on support for redistribution turned out to be statistically insignificant in the Netherlands. These findings suggest that subjective income is a more important factor than the foreign-born percentage of the population in explaining residents' support for redistribution. Subjective income has been found to be pivotal in establishing structural cleavages that shape citizens' preferences for redistribution. Therefore, as EU policymakers expand redistribution policies, the focus should be on how individual attributes affect support for redistribution.

For the time being, the significant cross-country survey and high quality sample of the ESS does offer clues regarding immigrationization in the Netherlands and Europe. Subjective income and foreign-born percentages moderate how attitudes toward immigration affect attitudes toward redistribution programs. The subjective income moderating condition emerges in a way that supports more the compensation effects hypothesis than anti-solidarity of residents' immigration attitudes. Still, whether or not Hypotheses 2 and 3 survive additional data and assessment procedures must await additional research. We greet such theoretical and empirical research into how immigration attitudes transform into social attitudes and how subjective economic statuses can moderate such alteration. Specifically, further study should explore more precise evaluations of the relationship between attitudes toward immigration and attitudes towards redistribution policies. This could include— more details about migrants (e.g., their origin or nationality) and welfare (e.g., education and health systems). In addition, we support contributions linking such data to experimental treatments which further contribute to investigating the compensation hypothesis.

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Appendix

Assumptions test selection of the logit model

Logit vs Probit Model

When making the estimates of both models, it is evident that the predictions of the two are very similar, since most of the predicted values are located on a 45-degree line, for which there is no strong graphic criterion to choose one of the two models. Similarly, for the values of the descriptive statistics, there are no significant differences in the mean and standard deviation of the data. Thus, as there is no significant distinction between the two models, the present work will adhere to the theoretical considerations of the Logit model, partly following Gujarati (2009), which indicates that in practice this model is more widely used given its comparative mathematical simplicity. Furthermore, such a model would be a bit more appropriate given its more attenuated mean and variance values.

Europe



Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
logit p	45264	0.7413493	0.0814
probit p	45264	0.7413092	0.0808

Both models are very similar in the values of the mean and variance of the prediction, so there is no significant difference between them. The predicted values of each will be analyzed.

Netherlands



Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
logit p1	45264	0.6603369	0.1148845
probit p1	45264	0.6600541	0.1157372

Predicted values Europe

```
. estat classification

Logistic model for SuppDistrib

                 True
Classified |         D          ~D |     Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
         + |     33120       11565 |     44685
         - |        21          10 |        31
-----------+----------------------+----------
     Total |     33141       11575 |     44716

Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
True D defined as SuppDistrib != 0
-------------------------------------------------
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   99.94%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)    0.09%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   74.12%
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   32.26%
-------------------------------------------------
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   99.91%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)    0.06%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   25.88%
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   67.74%
-------------------------------------------------
Correctly classified                        74.09%
-------------------------------------------------
```

```
. estat classification

Probit model for SuppDistrib

                 True
Classified |         D          ~D |     Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
         + |     33122       11566 |     44688
         - |        19           9 |        28
-----------+----------------------+----------
     Total |     33141       11575 |     44716

Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
True D defined as SuppDistrib != 0
-------------------------------------------------
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   99.94%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)    0.08%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   74.12%
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   32.14%
-------------------------------------------------
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   99.92%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)    0.06%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   25.88%
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   67.86%
-------------------------------------------------
Correctly classified                        74.09%
-------------------------------------------------
```

Predicted values Netherlands

```
. estat classification

Logistic model for SuppDistrib

                 True
Classified |         D          ~D |     Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
     +     |       861         456 |      1317
     -     |       113         130 |       243
-----------+----------------------+----------
   Total   |       974         586 |      1560

Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
True D defined as SuppDistrib != 0
-------------------------------------------------
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   88.40%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   22.18%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   65.38%
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   53.50%
-------------------------------------------------
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   77.82%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)   11.60%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   34.62%
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   46.50%
-------------------------------------------------
Correctly classified                        63.53%
-------------------------------------------------
```

```
. estat classification

Probit model for SuppDistrib

                 True
Classified |         D          ~D |     Total
-----------+----------------------+----------
     +     |       863         456 |      1319
     -     |       111         130 |       241
-----------+----------------------+----------
   Total   |       974         586 |      1560

Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
True D defined as SuppDistrib != 0
-------------------------------------------------
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   88.60%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   22.18%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   65.43%
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   53.94%
-------------------------------------------------
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   77.82%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)   11.40%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   34.57%
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   46.06%
-------------------------------------------------
Correctly classified                        63.65%
-------------------------------------------------
```

Again the differences between models are not relevant. Therefore the logit will be used to follow the respective author.