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## **Climate-induced migration: a mass exodus or a complex adaptation strategy? A critical discourse analysis of the framing of climate-induced migration**

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# Climate-induced migration: a mass exodus or a complex adaptation strategy?

A critical discourse analysis of the framing of  
climate-induced migration



Climate migrants in Mexico (Lustgarten, 2020a)

Master Thesis

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# Abstract

Predictions for the twenty-first century stipulate that an increasing amount of people will be forced to migrate as extreme weather events become more intense and frequent due to climate change. Despite the migratory effects of climate change already being an issue on the international agenda for numerous years, a significant amount of uncertainty on (predictions of) climate-induced migration remains. To determine whether the international policy pressure on the issue is currently acted upon, this study examines how the Dutch government frames climate-induced migration in its policies. Additionally, with several Dutch newspapers covering the issue over the last few years, the type(s) of discourse on climate-induced migration used in newspaper articles and, thereby, the influence of the media in shaping how an issue is addressed in the political arena are analysed. In order to place the findings of the Dutch policy analysis in a broader perspective, the framing of climate-induced migration in EU policy areas is investigated as well. Lastly, to provide a meaningful overall comparison, stories outlining the experiences and needs of climate migrants are analysed. The findings that result from the conducted critical discourse analysis are surprising. First, they show a lack of political influence of the media. Second, they show that both the Dutch government and the EU only acknowledge or act upon climate-induced migration to prevent the need for migration. While the climate migrant stories partly demonstrate that using migration as an adaptation strategy may be far from desirable, prevention is only the first stage of climate-induced migration. Hence, policy recommendations (to the Dutch government) to meaningfully address all stages of the growing issue are presented.

**Keywords:** climate-induced migration, adaptation, mitigation, resilience, critical discourse analysis

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# List of abbreviations and acronyms

ACVZ: Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken

CDA: Critical discourse analysis

CEAS: Common European Asylum System

COIN: Climate Outreach and Information Network

Council: Council of the European Union

De NRC: De Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant

EU: European Union

EC: European Commission

EP: European Parliament

GCM: Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

Het AD: Het Algemeen Dagblad

IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IEP: Institute for Economics and Peace

IOM: International Organisation for Migration

IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

Max.: Maximalist (discourse)

Min.: Minimalist (discourse)

PBL: Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving

SIDS: Small Island Developing States

UN: United Nations

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

VVD: Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

Predictions for the twenty-first century stipulate that more and more people will be forced to move as extreme weather events, including heatwaves, droughts and hurricanes, become more intense and frequent due to climate change (IOM, 2020). With the planet possibly witnessing a more substantial temperature increase in the upcoming fifty years than it has seen in the previous six thousand years combined, many people around the world will become displaced and have to find a new home in a more secure place (Lustgarten, 2020a). Particularly in developing countries, the spiralling impacts of climate change on the ability of ecosystems to provide water, food and shelter for populations will result in mass migration (De Sherbinin, 2020).

### *Climate-induced migration: varying predictions*

The issue of climate-induced migration – individuals or communities being forcibly displaced within and beyond national boundaries by short- or long-term environmental disasters caused or aggravated by climate change (Ayazi and Elsheikh, 2019) – is not new. In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) already declared that the “greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration” (Brown, 2008, pp. 9). In 2008, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) emphasised that the most widespread prediction of climate migrants was 200 million by 2050 (Brown, 2008). This number implies that climate change will displace “one in every forty-five people in the world” by that time (ibid., pp. 11).

Strikingly, a more recent study by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) found that the planet may see 1.2 billion climate migrants by 2050 due to rapid population growth and ecological threats resulting from the climate crisis (Henley, 2020). These migrants will likely come from thirty-one countries, most of them in the Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Since mass climate-induced migration will result in much larger refugee flows to the developed world, it is argued to pose significant social and political impacts and challenge global peace (ibid.). Then again, a recent report by ProPublica, The New York Times and the Pulitzer Center predicts that more than 3 billion people worldwide may not live in an optimum environment for human life in 2070 (Lustgarten, 2020b). As a result, “tens of millions of migrants” will move north – where landmass and economic prospects are the greatest – into Europe and the United States (ibid., para. 9).

Overall, there is no consensus on predictions of climate migrants. Nevertheless, currently available data does indicate that the majority of mobility in the face of climate change is internal (Migration Data Portal, 2021). That is, most climate-induced migration takes place within national borders. A report by The World Bank that solely investigates internal climate-induced migration

predicts that, without critical international climate and development action, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia may witness more than a combined 140 million internal climate migrants by 2050 (Rigaud et al., 2018). Mainly the poorest people in these regions will be forced to migrate due to rising sea levels, water shortages and decreasing crop productivity (ibid.). With climate change negatively affecting food production in rural areas, another clear trend is that people abandon farms to move to cities (Lustgarten, 2020a). By doing so, cities may quickly grow overcrowded, and the number of people in slums will accumulate. In slums, climate migrants will once again be more vulnerable to environmental disasters such as floods (ibid.).

### *Climate-induced migration: a contemporary issue*

The various predictions of future climate migrants may suggest that climate-induced migration is not a major issue yet. In reality, the Othering & Belonging Institute, a research institute of the University of California (Berkeley Research, n.d.), stresses that environmental disasters in 2018 alone displaced 17.2 million people worldwide (Ayazi and Elsheikh, 2019). These people lived in 148 different countries, of which the countries with more than 100,000 environmentally displaced people include Afghanistan, China, Ethiopia, India, Japan, Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, the Philippines, Uganda, U.S.A. and Vietnam (ibid.). However, the list of countries most exposed to climate change and climate-induced migration does not end here. The IOM, for instance, highlights numerous examples of where migration in changing climatic conditions already occurs. These examples range from communities that are forced to move in Pacific islands due to coastal erosion to communities in Asian countries due to storms, in West Africa due to ocean acidification, in Central Asia due to worsened rural livelihoods, in East Africa due to desertification, and in Latin America due to droughts (IOM, 2019). In total, the IOM distinguishes 91 countries with a combined population of 1.1 billion people most vulnerable to climate-induced migration (ibid.).

### *Climate-induced migration and Europe*

Climate-induced migration also affects European countries. According to the Othering & Belonging Institute, between 2000 and 2014, variations in climate conditions in over one hundred countries resulted in a yearly average of 351,000 asylum applications to the European Union (EU) (Ayazi and Elsheikh, 2019). In 2017, climate researchers of Columbia University predicted that these applications might increase to roughly 450,000 per year by the end of the century when global temperatures continue to rise (ibid.). Besides affecting European asylum applications, climate change also forces European citizens to leave their homes. A rapportage by Euronews underlines that between 2016 and 2019, climate events resulting in (internal) displacement in Europe “have more than doubled” from 43 to 100 (Martinez and Monella, 2020-a, para. 9). Overall, between 2008 and 2019, there have been about 700,000 climate displacements in Europe. These primarily resulted from floods,

storms, avalanches and natural wildfires that frequently affected the same locations more than once. In descending order, the ten European countries characterised by the most displacements between these years are Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Spain, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Serbia, Poland, Czech Republic and Ukraine (ibid.).

### *Quantifying climate-induced migration*

Even though the numbers presented in the sections above might suggest otherwise, quantifying climate-induced migration is challenging (Migration Data Portal, 2021). Not only are comprehensive data collection standards and datasets on environmental migration at the global level lacking, but it is also challenging to differentiate which factors, besides climate change, shape an individual's decision to migrate (ibid.). As climate change may result in or prevent mobility in combination with a range of socio-economic, demographic, political, personal and cultural factors, including poverty, human security and population growth (Bassetti, 2019), the IOM argues that it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a linear relationship between climate change and migration (Brown, 2008). Hence, a significant amount of uncertainty about climate-migration relationships and future migratory flows remains, explaining the wide range of estimates of future climate migrants (Mazzai, 2020). This uncertainty also means that alarming predictions of climate migrants, although often well-intentioned to “raise awareness of the plight of people vulnerable to climate change and motivate humanitarian action on their behalf”, are not always accurate (Durand-Delacre et al., 2020, para. 2).

### *Governing climate-induced migration*

In terms of the international governance of climate-induced migration, the IOM recently stated that historical developments had taken place as states now formally recognise the impacts of climate change and its environmental consequences on migration (IOM, 2019). In 2016, Heads of State and Government gathered in the UN General Assembly to establish the first international framework on migration, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) (IOM, 2021). The GCM, a non-binding agreement approved by all UN Member States except for the United States (D'Aprile, 2018), indeed “recognises that migration in the context of climate change, environmental degradation and disasters is a reality” (IOM, 2019, pp. 3). It also commits countries to “cooperate to identify, develop and strengthen solutions” for migrants forced to leave their countries due to the effects of climate change (D'Aprile, 2018, para. 8).

Still, acknowledging climate-induced migration and demonstrating a commitment to cooperate internationally is only a minor step as the IOM and The World Bank stressed the need for more drastic policy changes. In 2008, the IOM proposed several policy recommendations to address climate-induced migration (Brown, 2008). With the international legal framework on migration not providing legal status to individuals forced to relocate due to climate change, among others, the organisation

called for an expansion of the refugee definition to formally recognise people displaced by climate change (ibid.). More than ten years later, the international legal framework still does not provide such legal status (Mazzai, 2020). The IOM also emphasised the need for countries not significantly affected by climate change to open their ‘immigration gates’ to people forced to migrate due to the climate crisis (Brown, 2008). More recently, in a 2019 report, the IOM set forth numerous policy recommendations once again (IOM, 2019). In essence, most of the recommendations for the international community not significantly affected by climate change – including international and regional agencies, the private sector, academia and civil society – revolve around an increase of support for affected regions to establish internal capacities and seize opportunities in responding to climate-induced migration (ibid.).

Regarding The World Bank, in 2018, the organisation underlined three main areas in which countries need to take action to drastically reduce the number of climate migrants and prevent climate-induced migration from becoming a crisis (Rigaud et al., 2018). First, to limit global warming to well below two degrees Celsius and thereby meet the goal of the Paris Agreement, the organisation states that more compelling global climate action is needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Second, (vulnerable) countries are urgently pressured to embed climate-induced migration into their national development plans to better deal with all of its phases. Third and last, the organisation stresses that more financial investment and new data sources are required to understand better the nature, scale and magnitude of climate-induced migration (ibid.).

## 1.2 The focus of this study

In the face of such international policy pressure on climate-induced migration, it would be interesting to investigate if and how governments address the quantifiably challenging issue. Is the issue acknowledged in their migration or (international) development policies, for instance? Or is it mentioned in their climate policies, possibly as an alarming phenomenon that could be limited by reducing greenhouse gas emissions? In answering these questions, this thesis will specifically analyse how the government of the Netherlands perceives and acts upon the impact of climate change on migration in its policies. At first glance, it seems as though the Dutch government does not take a clear policy stance on climate-induced migration. Neither the country’s climate nor its migration policy distinctly touches upon the existence of contemporary climate migrants or predictions of future climate migrants (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-a; Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b; Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, 2020).

At the same time, climate-induced migration may be seen as an issue worthy of a policy response by the Dutch public, as plenty of Dutch newspapers have covered the issue over the last few years (De NRC, 2013; De NRC, 2021; Het AD, 2013; Het Financieele Dagblad, 2020; Het Parool, 2015; Het Nederlands Dagblad, 2017; Trouw, 2011; Trouw, 2020). Interestingly, previous studies on

the impact of the media, including newspapers, have resulted in the general argument that media coverage influences the political (agenda-setting) stage by making political actors more attentive to certain issues (Fawzi, 2018; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2016). Simply said, the media can increase the need for a policy response on a particular issue by communicating the opinion and demands of the public to policy-makers (Fawzi, 2018). It can also amplify an issue to make the public, and ultimately policy-makers, aware of the urgency at stake (Langer and Gruber, 2021). With such an influence of the media, one could argue that the framing of climate-induced migration in Dutch newspapers may shape how the issue is yet to be addressed in Dutch policy areas. One could also argue that the Dutch media framing may explain why, despite international pressure, the issue is not yet addressed in the policy areas in the first place. By analysing the type(s) of discourse used in Dutch newspaper articles on climate-induced migration and investigating the policy impact of newspaper coverage, this thesis will indicate which of these possibilities is most likely.

In addition to analysing Dutch newspaper coverage and policy areas, this thesis will also analyse the type(s) of discourse on climate-induced migration promoted in EU policy areas. The choice to do so was based on two factors. First, as an EU Member State, the policies and policy agenda of the Dutch government are shaped by EU policies and legislation. Hence, finding out how climate-induced migration is addressed in EU migration, climate and (international) development policies – including the New Pact on Migration and Asylum and the European Climate Law (European Commission, n.d.-a; General Secretariat of the Council, 2021-a) – is of relevance to the aim of this thesis. Second, the Dutch government may refer to climate-induced migration as a European climate or border issue in its policies. In that case, once again, it is relevant to investigate the policy stance of the EU.

Lastly, this thesis will analyse stories of climate migrants around the world to examine the extent to which their experiences and needs resemble how climate-induced migration is framed in the Dutch media and acted upon in Dutch and EU policy areas. Overall, this comparison may result in useful policy advice on the growing but relatively unfamiliar phenomenon of climate-induced migration. The accompanying research question of this thesis reads as follows:

*“How is the concept of climate-induced migration constructed by Dutch newspapers, global climate migrants and in Dutch and EU policy areas, and how can Dutch policy-makers learn from this?”*

### **1.3 Societal relevance**

Altogether, the societal relevance of this study is multifaceted. First, it will discover whether the way in which climate-induced migration is framed in the Dutch media and addressed in Dutch policy areas reflects the international policy pressure on the growing but puzzling issue. In doing so, it will explore how the media may have influenced, or might still influence, the Dutch policy stance. On a

related note, by thoroughly analysing newspaper coverage, the findings of this study may also reflect how the issue is generally perceived in the Dutch society – the audience of the newspapers. Second, as mentioned in the previous section, by additionally analysing how climate-induced migration is addressed in EU policy areas, the Dutch policy position on the issue can be placed in a broader perspective. Such a perspective is expected to be helpful for this study when it comes to providing policy recommendations (to the Dutch government) on how to manage climate-induced migration. Third, perhaps even more helpful for the provision of policy recommendations is the analysis of climate migrant stories in this study. The findings of this analysis will enable the researcher to examine whether current policy (and newspaper) coverage on climate-induced migration is based on or takes into account the experiences and needs of climate migrants. Subsequently, the researcher will be able to determine if policy improvements can or should be made.

## 1.4 Scientific relevance

In terms of the scientific relevance of this work, the debate on climate-induced migration is shaped by several types of discourse (Baldwin et al., 2014). As further touched upon in the literature review (chapter two) of this thesis, each type of discourse frames the nature and gravity of such migration differently for different reasons. Due to the uncertainty surrounding (future) climate-induced migration, there is no clear consensus on which type of discourse is most accurate. Still, it seems as though the (international) political and public sphere are dominated by a maximalist discourse typically predicting a distressing amount of climate migrants. At the same time, the academic sphere seems to be dominated by a minimalist discourse typically underlining the complexity of climate-induced migration and challenging significant quantitative predictions of climate migrants (ibid.). By analysing how the type(s) of discourse prevailing in the Dutch media relate to the Dutch and EU policy positions and the stories of climate migrants, the findings of this thesis will either strengthen or weaken the assumptions about which type of discourse prevails in which sphere.

More generally, research on climate-induced migration is said to lack the input of affected populations, which is required to understand the complexity and develop policy solutions to the challenges of climate-induced migration (Boas et al., 2019). To some extent, this thesis will address this deficiency by analysing the experiences and views of climate migrants around the world. Research on climate-induced migration is also said to require a shift of (part of) its focus from vulnerable sending areas to (potential) destination areas (Boas et al., 2019). After all, whether such migration becomes a humanitarian or political crisis depends mainly on host and transit countries' climate and migration policy decisions (ibid.). By exploring how climate-induced migration is perceived and acted upon in the Netherlands and the EU, where the numbers of asylum applications due to climate change are expected to rise in the following decades (Ayazi and Elsheikh, 2019), this thesis will contribute to such a shift of focus.

## 1.5 Thesis outline

The remainder of this thesis can be outlined as follows. First, previous theoretical arguments and empirical findings, mainly on prevailing discourses on climate-induced migration but also on the political influence of the media, are discussed in the literature review (chapter 2). The chapter also sets forth several theoretical expectations for the findings of this thesis.

Afterwards, chapter 3, the research design, outlines how the data used for this thesis was collected. It also describes the research method – critical discourse analysis – and operationalisation used to analyse this data.

Subsequently, in chapters 4, 5 and 6, a data analysis using figures of the framing of climate-induced migration found respectively in Dutch newspapers, climate migrant stories, and Dutch and EU policy areas is presented.

Chapter 7, in turn, serves as an overview and reflection of the findings presented in the previous three analysis chapters. The chapter compares these findings with the theoretical expectations outlined earlier in chapter 2.

Finally, in the conclusion (chapter 8), a summary of the findings and an answer to the research question of this thesis are provided. The chapter also addresses the limitations of the conducted research and sets forth possible avenues for future research.

## 2. Literature review

In the following chapter, several theoretical arguments and empirical findings from previously performed studies with significant relevance to this thesis are discussed. The chapter is divided into four sections. First (2.1), the definition of the concept of climate-induced migration adopted in this thesis is clarified. Second (2.2), the main discourses shaping the debate on climate-induced migration are thoroughly analysed and ultimately summarised in a tabular format. Additionally, the second section indicates which discourses prevail in the academic, political and public debate. Third (2.3), the influence of the (Dutch) media on the issues covered in the political arena is examined. Fourth and last (2.4), several theoretical expectations for the findings of this thesis are outlined.

### 2.1 Clarification of climate-induced migration

Due to the fact that “an individual’s decision to move is often induced by a combination of factors rather than by one single factor”, the scope of climate-induced migration is debated (Mayer, 2011, pp. 365-366). Fundamentally, a decision to migrate in the context of climate change is not only shaped by the negative consequences of environmental degradation but also by other factors in people’s lives (ibid.). These include, among others, an individual’s affiliation to their roots or a particular territory, their economic prospects and the costs of migration, their perceptions of (in)security, and their perspectives on the opportunities to be found in a different place. Hence, Mayer (2011) stresses that, although the direct environmental impacts of climate change may undoubtedly be a reason to migrate, it cannot be assumed that such impacts are the sole determinant of a migration decision. As a result of the range of factors that impact climate-induced migration, predictions of climate migrants are contrasting (ibid.). The next section of this chapter (2.2) will reflect on the contrast in the discourse on such migration.

#### *Definition based on Mayer (2011)*

Even though the next section (2.2) will also show that Mayer (2011) takes a stand in the academic debate on climate-induced migration, the definition of the concept provided by the author is relatively objective and encompassing. Therefore, the definition of climate-induced migration adopted in this thesis is primarily, but not solely, based on how Mayer (2011) describes the concept. First, the scholar explains why the focus should be on ‘climate migration’ rather than ‘environmental migration’. Whereas climate migrants move because of climate change, environmental migrants might move due to any environmental changes. Although the distinction may be difficult to prove in practice, on paper, the difference is relevant in portraying the role of the international community responsible for the causes of climate change. In other words, the use of the concept of environmental



migration is argued to be a way to avoid meaningful international commitment and responsibility towards climate change (ibid.). Therefore, this thesis will not speak of environmental migration.

Second, based on the previously mentioned factors that impact an individual's decision to migrate in the face of climate change, the scholar emphasises why one should use the concept of 'climate-induced migration' instead of, for instance, 'climate-caused migration' (Mayer, 2011). Ultimately, climate change will rarely be the unique cause of displacement and should instead be considered its *driver* (ibid.) – which is the case in this thesis.

Third, Mayer (2011) solely focuses on *permanent* climate-induced migration. Temporary displacements – resulting from heavy climate events or environmental catastrophes – present a different (legal) issue than its permanent counterpart since such displacement may be uncoupled from any continuous climate process. As temporary displacement is more likely to result from a unique environmental change at a specific point in time, it might not reflect migration induced by ongoing climate change (ibid.). For that reason, focusing on (data on) temporary climate-induced migration will be avoided in this thesis.

Fourth, the scholar stresses that permanent climate-induced migration includes both 'climate processes' (or slow-onset changes) and 'climate events' (or sudden climate hazards) (Mayer, 2011). Climate processes include, but are not limited to, rising sea levels, desertification, increasing temperatures, land degradation, the slow infiltration of saltwater in agriculture, droughts, biodiversity loss, and ocean acidification (Tosun and Howlett, 2021). Climate events, in turn, include severe weather events such as storms and floods and other types of climate crises or 'shocks', including rapid soil erosion (ibid.). Both types of phenomena are considered a source of permanent climate-induced migration by Mayer (2011) (and in this thesis), as both are becoming more frequent and violent due to climate change. A migration decision may even be induced by both types of phenomena simultaneously when a slow-onset climate process shapes the background of a climate event (ibid.).

### ***Definition in contrast with Mayer (2011)***

Whereas the previous points are embraced in defining climate-induced migration, a different approach to Mayer's (2011) final point is taken. Since the situation of international climate migrants is of a different legal nature than one of people who migrate within their country (internal climate migrants), the scholar only focuses on international climate-induced migration. Internal climate migrants are not necessarily argued to be in less need of receiving resettlement aid. However, they still fall under the same national protection as before their migration practice. By contrast, international climate migrants are excluded from their state's jurisdiction after migrating. They cannot simply acquire 'new' national protection in the process as they do not fit the legal requirements to be acknowledged as refugees (ibid.). The 1951 Refugee Convention of the UN defines a refugee as "a person who has crossed an international border owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for

reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (UNHCR, 2021, para. 20). Indeed, climate change is not included in this definition. One of the reasons for this exclusion is the difficulty of isolating climate change as the sole reason for migration (UN, 2019).

Another reason provided by the UN for not including the cause of climate change in the definition of a refugee is that climate migration is primarily internal (UN, 2019). Climate change “typically creates internal displacement before it reaches a level where it displaces people across borders” (UNHCR, 2021, para. 20). Hence, one could argue that internal migration is an essential response to climate change. Unlike the scholar's own study, Mayer (2011) states that a large part of academic literature on climate-induced migration does include internal migration. For instance, Boas et al. (2019) emphasise that climate mobility frequently involves reasonably short distances. Similarly, Wyman (2013) argues that whereas some migrants may be prompted to move across borders, most will likely do so within their regions or countries of origin. Since this thesis does not revolve around the legal aspects of climate-induced migration – which is the case in the study by Mayer (2011) – the choice has been made to focus on international and internal climate migration. Due to the assumed significance of internal migration, the relevance of this thesis would be limited if such migration were not to be included.

### *Definition in the selected theories*

The remainder of this theoretical chapter is not restricted to academic papers that solely fit the definition of climate-induced migration sketched above. As a result, some of the selected theories use concepts such as environmental migration, climate displacement or climate refugees. These theories have been included due to the relevance of their insights on the relationship between climate change and migration. Meanwhile, based on the arguments presented above, the remainder of the chapter is confined to theories that focus on permanent climate-induced migration rather than its temporary or seasonal counterpart.

## **2.2 Discourse on climate-induced migration**

A growing popularisation of global environmental change in the 1980s marks the beginning of a discourse on climate-induced migration (Baldwin et al., 2014). Although it was difficult to detect climate migrants at the time, the decade saw a rise of concerned scientists and activists arguing that environmental change would likely result in mass displacement around the globe without proper measures against it. Even in the year 2014 – when their paper was published – the authors stressed that it remains difficult to clearly define which groups of people migrate in the context of climate change and which do not. As a result, narratives on climate-induced migration are usually written in a ‘future-

conditional tense', and the currently existing knowledge about the concept tends to be speculative. The authors emphasise that the futurological academic debate about climate-induced migration has been – and still is, as will be shown below – divided between 'maximalists' and 'minimalists'. Whereas scholars linked to the former typically predict an alarming amount of future climate migrants or refugees, the ones linked to the latter typically challenge such quantitative predictions by underlining the complexity of climate-induced migration (ibid.). Both types of discourse are further analysed below.

## 2.2.1 Maximalism and security

### *The Copenhagen School: legitimising policy pressure*

In terms of the maximalist discourse, Trombetta (2014) reflects upon the difference between the alarmist framing of climate-induced and 'regular' migration within the EU. With climate-induced migration being presented according to the logic of the 'Copenhagen School', speech acts are used to highlight the distressing consequences of environmental degradation on migration. These speech acts result in climate-induced migration being perceived as a self-evident threat and security issue, for which pro-active environmental measures and policies are more easily legitimised. By contrast, the scholar argues that other more 'regular' types of migration are governed based on the 'Paris School'. Accordingly, these types are securitised and presented as a threat mainly through everyday practices rather than speech acts. This is visible in Europe's migration management, which consists of particular surveillance, policing and monitoring practices at its borders through agencies such as FRONTEX and EUROSUR. As these practices and the expertise they are based on create a sense of uneasiness and insecurity over time, they are deployed to keep migration in check and limit the number of migrants entering Europe (ibid.).

### *Example: improving the legal protection of climate migrants*

The use of the alarmist logic of the Copenhagen School and its aim to promote environmental measures that address the issue of climate-induced migration can be recognised in several papers. Mayer (2011), for instance, argues that "tens and maybe hundreds of millions of people have been or are about to be displaced" (pp. 357) due to environmental degradation and rising global sea levels resulting from global warming. Internal displacement of such populations is not always possible as entire territories may become uninhabitable in countries such as the Maldives, or displaced populations may not be able to move to unaffected territories in countries that already face demographic pressures such as Vietnam, Nigeria, Egypt and Bangladesh. However, when forced to migrate internationally, these populations cannot benefit from any protection under international law since they do not fit the legal requirements to be recognised as 'refugees'. Hence, the scholar highlights the need for an improved international legal protection of climate migrants while

simultaneously arguing that an international treaty on climate-induced migration would unlikely receive sufficient ratifications and would not accommodate the specifics of various migration scenarios. Correspondingly, the paper proposes a framework to establish a United Nations' agency in charge of protecting affected populations and coordinating international funding and local decision-making on resettlement (ibid.).

### *Example: acknowledging climate refugees*

Similarly, after analysing and presenting Bangladesh as an extreme example of the development of climate-induced migration due to its environmentally vulnerable geography, Ahsan et al. (2014) stress that international action – potentially through the UN – is required to formally recognise the category of 'climate refugees'. Such an acknowledgement would secure the eligibility for resettlement and aid of these individuals – either internationally or within their own countries. In stressing this need, the authors emphasise the importance of differentiating climate migrants from economic migrants. Traditionally, climate migrants have been viewed fundamentally as individuals seeking to improve their economic prospects and quality of life by moving away from a place with worsening economic resources. More recent catastrophic events resulting from climate change have been stretching the definition away from an inherently economic interpretation, however (ibid.).

To stimulate this change, the authors present three factors that can be used to differentiate climate migrants from economic ones, namely (1) the instancy of migration decisions, (2) the lack of knowledge about potential destinations, and (3) the likelihood of decreasing one's quality of life by migrating (Ahsan et al., 2014). Based on the experiences of climate migrants in Bangladesh and the argument that “both the absolute and relative sizes of these groups are likely to change dramatically as the twenty-first century unfolds” (ibid., pp. 11), the authors claim that a reassessment of the definitions and categories of migrants, climate migrants, and climate refugees is necessary (ibid.).

### *Example: reconsideration of legal boundaries*

A third example of a paper following the logic of the Copenhagen School is one by Burkett (2011), who argues that “time is running out for millions living in Asia Pacific coastal and island communities” as the consequences of climate change are becoming increasingly aggravating (pp. 1). With storms and floods becoming more frequent and intense, sea levels rising, and desertification becoming a growing threat, residents of such communities will increasingly lose their homes in the next half-century or may even lose their entire nations (ibid.). In line with the arguments made by Mayer (2011) and Ahsan et al. (2014), Burkett (2011) argues that the legal boundaries of climate-induced migration are the stumbling block in avoiding a humanitarian disaster and that a reconsideration of these boundaries is called for. Hence, once more, a speech act that proposes novel

legal regulations on climate-induced migration by following the logic of the Copenhagen School can be distinguished.

### *The flipside of the Copenhagen School: keeping borders closed*

In spite of the efforts of papers including those addressed above, Trombetta (2014) stresses that the efforts of the Copenhagen School did not bring about the desired results in practice. Instead of achieving or legitimising more pro-active environmental measures and policies, the alarmist framing of climate-induced migration became subject to “the already existing European machinery of managing and controlling migration” in reality (ibid., pp. 144). Indeed, Boas et al. (2019) argue that academia and (EU) policy reports typically predict alarming numbers of climate migrants or refugees to frame climate-induced migration as an impending security crisis that can be prevented by keeping affected populations in their country of origin. In other words, climate-induced migration is used as a common rationale to create a sense of fear of ‘the other’ and to introduce or preserve “measures to strengthen and protect national and regional borders in the Global North” (ibid., pp. 902).

Boas et al. (2019) argue that climate change certainly can threaten lives and disrupt livelihoods but critique the relatively weak scientific evidence supporting the prediction of an alarming security crisis. Therefore, the scholars consider narratives about mass migration resulting from climate change to be misleading. Rather than being challenged in practice, however, the narratives on border securitisation – that aim to avoid harm to (potential) destination areas – continue to be used for policy developments on international, national, and regional scales. As the authors call attention to the need for an innovative approach that “properly captures the complex, mobile and interconnected nature and key challenges of climate change and migration” (ibid., pp. 902), a research agenda is presented that consists, among others, of moving beyond simplistic securitised assumptions on climate-induced migration by better including (the knowledge of) affected communities (ibid.). All in all, with Boas et al. (2019) critiquing the quantitative alarmist predictions and accentuating the complexity of climate-induced migration, the use of a minimalist discourse on the issue is evident.

## **2.2.2 Minimalism and resilience**

### *Critiquing alarming predictions*

According to Wyman (2013), the criticism on alarming predictions, including “that climate change could generate hundreds of millions of human migrants by the middle of the century” (pp. 171), is justified as the assumptions these predictions are based on leave substantial room for more in-depth analysis. Not only do the methodologies underlying the predictions of large numbers typically receive a notable amount of critique, considerable uncertainty about localised impacts of climate change, about human capacity in adapting to climate change through migrating or choosing not to, and about the role of relevant demographic, economic, political and social factors in affecting migration

decisions remains as well. Hence, the scholar argues that large predicted numbers of climate migrants convey a false sense of certainty. Wyman (2013) acknowledges that migration could be a method for humans to adapt to climate change but argues that two main gaps in existing law and policy hinder their ability to do so. First, as reflected upon by Mayer (2011) and Ahsan et al. (2014), a ‘rights gap’ exists with climate migrants unlikely to be perceived as refugees and subsequently not enjoying the right to remain indefinitely in another country (Wyman, 2013). Second, partly due to the exceptional difficulty in estimating the (potential) costs related to climate-induced migration, a ‘funding gap’ exists. This gap is characterised by a lack of dedicated international funding to assist developing countries in coping with (internal) climate-induced migration (ibid.).

In order to alleviate the effects of these gaps, Wyman (2013) argues that the focus should be on “increasing the resilience of communities especially vulnerable to climate change” (pp. 167). Several measures that rely primarily on already existing legal tools are proposed to stimulate such change. In essence, these measures aim to minimise existing climate vulnerabilities by supporting “increasing immigration levels from countries thought to be vulnerable to climate change” (ibid., pp. 169) and by promoting “better-financed versions of existing sources of development assistance and migration and disaster relief funding” (ibid., pp. 214). The measures are argued to be more likely to effectively address the identified rights and funding gaps and the vulnerability of humans to climate change than a proposal for a new multilateral instrument on climate-induced migration (ibid.).

### *Shifting towards a focus on resilience*

Interestingly, Methmann and Oels (2015) argue that a shift towards resilience has already reframed the academic debate on climate-induced migration. Accordingly, climate-induced migration is currently presented as a rational adaptation strategy for populations that face inevitable consequences of climate change. As a result, the current debate is attentive to the heterogeneous factors and characteristics that shape affected populations’ decisions to migrate or not, rather than climate-induced migration predominantly being presented as an alarming security or human rights issue (ibid.). Likewise, Bettini (2014) argues that the alarmist narratives on climate-induced migration – either to legitimise more pro-active environmental measures or to keep (European) borders closed – are already in the past. Instead, the ‘new’ narrative shaping the debate on climate-induced migration is focused more on human security, resilience, and the diversity of scenarios in which the decision to migrate represents a possible adaptation strategy (ibid.).

### *Example: migration thresholds*

The ‘new’ type of resilience discourse is indeed found in and supported by numerous studies that reflect the complexity and country-specific nature of climate-induced migration. By illustrating the presence of specific thresholds for populations responding to changing climatic conditions or

climate hazards, McLeman (2018), for instance, shows that migration is certainly not always considered a desirable method of adaptation. Specifically, the scholar identifies the following thresholds: “(1) a need for adaptation arises, (2) adaptations cease to be effective, (3) land use or livelihoods undergo fundamental change, (4) migration replaces in situ adaptation, (5) migration becomes non-linear, and (6) non-linear migration ceases” (ibid., pp. 333). The ability or necessity for an individual or population to move across these thresholds is said to be primarily driven by rather context-specific characteristics. These include characteristics of the social environment, the climate risk at hand, and the subsequent climate-related changes in natural systems (ibid.).

In line with this context-specificity, in the case of slow-onset climate risks, for instance, it may take years for a non-linear increase in previously existing migration patterns to emerge (threshold five) – let alone for non-linear increases to become the ‘new normal’ (threshold six) (McLeman, 2018). On the other hand, sudden-onset climate hazards may create a higher potential for non-linear migration, especially if certain key community members drive migration initiatives. Overall, the scholar argues that claims about abrupt alarming numbers of climate migrants tend to be baseless as they disregard the complexity and context-specificity of climate-induced migration. Hence, for now, “the potential for global scale, non-linear population movements depends heavily on future greenhouse gas emission trends” (ibid., pp. 319).

### *Examples: country-specific nature and impact of economic factors*

The findings of a study by Mueller et al. (2020) also highlight the complex nature of climate-induced migration. By studying climate-migration relationships in Botswana, Kenya and Zambia from 1989 to 2011, the authors found that climate exposures influence (internal) migration differently in all three countries. Temperature increases, for instance, had limited migration effects in Kenya and Zambia, whereas in Botswana, such an increase was associated with declining mobility. In the case of precipitation shortfalls, migration increased in Botswana and Kenya but decreased in Zambia. While the underlying mechanisms of these effects differ by country, in general, the findings suggest that decreases in migration may be explained by more local employment opportunities to counteract production risks resulting from climate change. In turn, increases in migration may indicate better economic opportunities elsewhere. As other risk-affected decisions – including choices regarding marriage or schooling – were also found to likely drive migration decisions, Mueller et al. (2020) highlight the complex and contextually specific nature of climate-induced migration. Correspondingly, one of the authors' main conclusions is that “claims that climate change is driving urbanisation in Africa should be avoided, as they do not have a strong evidentiary base” (ibid., pp. 8).

A relatively similar study by Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava (2017) explores climate-migration relationships in Senegal and Burkina Faso. Rather than focusing on internal migration, however, the authors investigate the likelihood of international outmigration by households. First, their findings

show that adverse climatic conditions in heatwaves inhibit international migration in Burkina Faso. Second, they show that beneficial climatic conditions in excessive precipitation enable such migration in Senegal. These findings provide evidence for what the authors call the ‘climate inhibitor mechanism’. At the heart of this mechanism is the argument that adverse climatic conditions may result in a climate-related economic recession and negatively affect households’ (financial) resources. Consequently, households are less likely to migrate internationally in the context of adverse climatic conditions as financing such a move becomes more difficult. All in all, Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava’s (2017) findings reflect the country-specific nature of climate migration and stress how different types of climate hazards affect migration decisions in different ways.

The preceding mechanisms by Mueller et al. (2020) and Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava (2017) that may underly people’s decisions of whether or not to migrate in the context of climate change are predominantly economic. Correspondingly, Thomas and Benjamin (2018) argue that the ability to use migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change is typically reserved for the more economically privileged people in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Bhatta et al. (2015) also found that households with higher income in Bangladesh, India and Nepal are generally more likely to use migration to adapt to climate change. However, in the case of adverse climatic events, the authors found that the probability of migration is higher for more economically deprived households as leaving their home is more likely to be a matter of survival.

### *Examples: impact of other non-economic factors*

Despite the impact of economic factors on the ability to use migration as an adaptation strategy, Thomas and Benjamin (2018) emphasise that climate-induced migration is still a highly complex phenomenon that also involves non-economic “issues of national sovereignty, cultural identity and a sense of place” (ibid., pp. 99). As a result, affected populations may also be reluctant towards migration due to strong cultural, historical, or social ties with their roots. As the authors stress the need for low-elevation SIDS to prevent significant damage and loss in the face of climate change by ensuring that households relocate to less exposed locations, such reluctance might even result in social conflict (ibid.).

By investigating the views of local residents in Kiribati – a low-lying island nation in the Pacific – towards using migration to respond to the consequences of changing climatic conditions, Allgood and McNamara (2017) indeed found that several respondents were strongly opposed to migration due to non-economic reasons. The most common reasons indicated by the respondents were the “strong connection to their land, way of life and the potential loss of culture and traditions” instead (ibid., pp. 381). The respondents that were not strongly opposed to migration also indicated they would favourably remain in Kiribati. However, most of them understood the impossibility of doing so in the long run. Hence, most of the study respondents considered migration as an adaptation strategy to the



gradual or sudden impacts of climate change. If such migration would ever become necessary, most agreed that international migration would be more beneficial than internal migration. Nevertheless, even the respondents who indicated to consider migration and resettlement stressed the devastating nature of these processes for them (ibid.).

### *The flipside of a political focus on resilience*

Besides proclaiming the shift towards a resilience discourse in the debate on climate-induced migration, Methmann and Oels (2015) also critique the use of the discourse in global political arenas as it triggers the framing of climate-induced migration as a solution rather than a problem. Due to the focus on the empowerment and resilience of groups, migration is more easily presented as an ordinary and inevitable response, or perhaps even an opportunity, for displaced populations. Accordingly, the current political debate is said to place the responsibility for resilience and climate-induced migration on the people most vulnerable to climate change. As argued by the authors, this means that the use of the resilience discourse provides an opportunity for the major developed economies in the West to present climate-induced migration “as a matter of fact rather than as a social problem that could still be tackled by significant emission reductions” (ibid., pp. 51). In other words, the discourse enables such countries to avoid responsibility and limit any form of (financial) assistance to the countries most affected by climate-induced migration (ibid.).

Bettini (2014) critiques the political use of the resilience discourse for a different reason by stressing that it preserves a fantasy of climate migrants as self-entrepreneurs that are doubtlessly able to adapt and be resilient not only to changing climates but also to neoliberal economies. Governments are said to use the discourse to frame climate migrants as individuals who can foster economic development. As a result, the discourse facilitates government efforts to create a ‘good circulation’ of migrants – that is, to selectively welcome those who are responsive to the needs of the labour market – rather than to recognise the actual vulnerability of climate migrants. With migration options being normalised and “the resilient climate migrant ... supposed to be responsive to market signals” (ibid., pp. 190), Bettini (2014) stresses the need for more progressive and democratic approaches to climate-induced migration (ibid.). Methmann and Oels (2015) also conclude that the current problematisation of the issue does not consider the specificity of climate-induced migration and the actual vulnerability of climate migrants.

Table 1 below summarises the various existing maximalist and minimalist discourses on climate-induced migration outlined in the previous two sections (2.2.1 and 2.2.2) in a tabular format to provide a more transparent overview.

**TABLE 1**

*Types of maximalist and minimalist discourses on climate-induced migration*

Main discourse	Sub-discourse	Definition of the sub-discourse	Theoretical example of the sub-discourse
<b>Maximalism</b> (predicting alarming numbers of climate migrants)	<b>1. Securitisation to increase international policy pressure</b> (Copenhagen School)	Climate-induced migration is presented as a self-evident threat and security issue to promote pro-active environmental measures and policies (Trombetta, 2014).	Mayer (2011) Ahsan et al. (2014) Burkett (2011)
	<b>2. Securitisation to keep national borders closed</b> (Flipside of Copenhagen School)	Academia and policy reports typically (falsely) predict alarming numbers of climate migrants to frame climate-induced migration as an impending security crisis that can be prevented by keeping affected populations in their country of origin (Boas et al., 2019).	N/A
<b>Minimalism</b> (critiquing alarming predictions of climate migrants)	<b>3. Resilience: climate-induced migration as a possible adaptation strategy</b> (Focus on resilience)	The debate on climate-induced migration focuses on human security, resilience, and the diversity of scenarios in which the decision to migrate represents a rational adaptation strategy for populations facing inevitable consequences of climate change (Bettini, 2014; Methmann and Oels, 2015).	McLeman (2018) Mueller et al. (2020) Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava (2017) Thomas and Benjamin (2018) Allgood and McNamara (2017)
	<b>4. Resilience: avoiding political responsibility</b> (Flipside of political focus on resilience)	The resilience discourse enables major developed economies to present climate-induced migration as an ordinary response or opportunity for displaced populations. Hence, the political debate places the responsibility for climate resilience on the people most vulnerable to climate change (Methmann and Oels, 2015).	N/A
	<b>5. Resilience: creating a ‘good circulation’ of migrants</b> (Flipside of political focus on resilience)	The resilience discourse preserves a fantasy of climate migrants as self-entrepreneurs. Governments use the discourse to frame climate migrants as individuals who can foster economic development and selectively welcome those migrants responsive to the needs of the labour market (Bettini, 2014).	N/A

### 2.2.3 Which discourse prevails in which debate?

Even though the debate about climate-induced migration is divided, Baldwin et al. (2014) argue that, overall, arguments associated with the minimalist discourse seem to dominate the academic debate. The authors also argue that the notability of the discourse in international policy circles seems to be growing, partly because of its connection with the concepts of resilience, adaptation and human security since the mid-1990s (ibid.). Indeed, Rothe (2017) found that “recent European policy proposals ... promote migration as an adaptation strategy to increase the resilience of communities vulnerable to the environmental crisis” (pp. 40).

Then again, however, a recent study by Remling (2020) on how the EU and development actors in SIDS in the Pacific frame climate-induced migration sketches a different image. First, the findings show that the discourse promoted by the EU is characterised by the argument that residents of the islands do not have sufficient capacity to adapt to the impacts of climate change meaningfully. Subsequently, the EU assumes that these residents will eventually be forced to migrate to another country, likely resulting in a humanitarian crisis. Second, while the EU expressly acknowledges and promotes labour migration as an adaptation strategy for these residents, the scholar found that the supranational organisation solely calls on the role of neighbouring countries, including Australia and New Zealand, to develop appropriate migration schemes. The EU does not offer “any suggestions for migration schemes elsewhere, for instance to the European region” (ibid., pp. 10).

Although the discourse promoted by the EU can, to some extent, be considered minimalist as it acknowledges migration as an adaptation strategy for those who are not able to increase their resilience in other ways, it predominantly reflects maximalist arguments (Remling, 2020). In fact, with the EU presenting climate-induced migration in SIDS as a crisis and not taking any action in developing migration schemes to Europe, a connection with the maximalist discourse set forth by Boas et al. (2019) – entailing the use of alarming numbers of climate migrants to keep affected populations in their country of origin and out of Europe – can be found. The use of a maximalist discourse by the EU, in this case, corresponds with the general argument that the framing of climate-induced migration as a security issue dominates in ‘high politics’ or international (climate) politics and negotiations (Baldwin et al., 2014). Such politics are said to be governed by claims that alarming numbers of climate-induced migration will lead to instability – including that “climate refugees have migrated into areas already inhabited by people with different cultures, religions, and traditions, increasing the potential for conflict” (ibid., pp. 122-123).

As a result, the way in which most academics seem to perceive climate-induced migration contrasts with popular perceptions of the issue (Baldwin et al., 2014). Whereas the academic debate seems to be dominated by a suspicion of large predicted numbers of climate migrants, the political and public debates are still shaped by alarmist tones. Although such tones have long received criticism “for being methodologically unsound” (ibid., pp. 125), they remain prominent. Boas et al. (2019) explain

this contrast by arguing that political actors and the media tend to interpret models on climate-induced migration incorrectly. For instance, they frequently focus merely on the maximum numbers in such models. Such a selective focus enables them to support the politics aimed at border securitisation and is argued to result in a bias of public discourse and policy negotiations on climate-induced migration (ibid.).

## 2.3 The political influence of the media

As highlighted in the introduction of this thesis, it appears that the Dutch government does not have a clear policy stance on climate-induced migration, despite the international pressure on the issue. Meanwhile, the introduction has also mentioned that the issue is covered in multiple Dutch newspaper articles. In finding out whether the Dutch media framing of climate-induced migration may explain why the issue is not (yet) explicitly addressed in Dutch policy areas, this thesis is concerned with the previously found political influence of media coverage. Theoretically speaking, due to the notable role of mass media in modern societies, the relationship between the media and politics has been a central issue in political science and communication research for several decades (Fawzi, 2018). Studies on the influence of news media on politics have resulted in the general view that the role of the media matters, particularly in the policy agenda-setting stage.

### *Overarching theory on the media's political impact*

Combining the evidence of previous studies on the media's political agenda-setting power, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) provide a first (preliminary) overarching theory on the matter. The scholars' theory is built on three conditions that are expected to enhance the media's influence in the agenda-setting stage. First, the larger the obtrusiveness of an issue covered by the media, the more influence that coverage has. This influence has to do with the fact that obtrusive issues are more likely to remain unobservable without the news coverage that addresses them. Second, the clearer the responsibility of a political actor on an issue covered by the media, the greater the pressure and urgency for the actor to act upon that news coverage. Third, the more recent the occurrence of an issue covered by the media, the less information will be available for a political actor. Subsequently, in a more uncertain environment, a political actor will be more likely to act upon that news coverage (ibid.).

More generally, the scholars' theory assumes that news covering adverse events – which can more easily be portrayed as a crisis – is more likely to have an agenda-setting impact than news covering favourable events (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). In the case of negative news, political actors will feel more pressured to address the covered issue with some form of policy reaction. The theory also assumes that unambiguous coverage clearly defining and proposing solutions to an issue

has a more considerable agenda-setting impact than ambiguous coverage. Lastly, the authors speculate that newspapers might influence policy agendas more significantly than television coverage (ibid.).

Ten years after their preliminary theory, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2016) emphasise that the literature on the media's agenda-setting impact has expanded. Once more, the authors analyse the evidence of previous studies on the matter and found a consensus that media coverage increases the attentiveness of political actors to the covered issues. This effect is most substantial on the parliamentary agenda, implying that politicians use the news to learn about society (ibid.). Generally speaking, such a strong agenda-setting influence of the media is appraised positively since it enables the media to communicate the demands and opinion of citizens to policy-makers (Fawzi, 2018). At the same time, mass media can also amplify or sustain an issue to make the public aware of its importance – eventually pushing the need for a government response (Langer and Gruber, 2021).

Different to their previous theory, this time, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2016) found the media's influence to be contingent mainly on two factors that were not addressed sufficiently before. First, a parliamentary actor in the government opposition is more likely to be prone to media influence than one in the coalition. Whereas an actor in the opposition seeks information and media coverage that challenges the government, a coalition member must be more careful not to destabilise their government. Second, political parties react more strongly to issues they 'own' in the public's eyes. That is, they particularly react to or promote news covering issues they possess expertise over. Overall, the scholars now found that the agenda-setting influence of newspapers does not seem to differ much from that of television news coverage (ibid.).

### *Studies on the political impact of Dutch media*

Some studies focus specifically on the media's agenda-setting influence in the Netherlands – the country of interest in this thesis. For instance, Van der Pas et al. (2017) investigated the relationship between Dutch newspaper coverage and parliamentary questions on immigration and European integration issues. The Netherlands is an interesting case for this study due to its "high levels of journalistic professionalisation and independent media" (ibid., pp. 491). Interestingly, the findings show that political parties respond predominantly to issues brought up by newspapers their voters are likely to read. Simultaneously, newspapers predominantly base their coverage on the agenda of political parties their readers are likely to vote for. Hence, the authors speak of a so-called 'media-party parallelism' in the Netherlands, in which newspapers and political parties influence the agenda-setting of the other. This parallelism is likely to endure as both actors benefit from it. On the one hand, politicians are granted space in the media to disseminate their issues to a specific segment of the population that is more likely to vote for them. On the other, journalists benefit as their news coverage is more likely to be adopted and thereby legitimised by members of parliament (ibid.).

Similarly, Dekker and Scholten (2017) analysed how the media coverage of certain focusing events – “sudden, attention-grabbing events” that are important in “advancing issues on the agenda and as potential triggers for policy change” (Birkland, 1998, pp. 53) – influenced the Dutch policy agenda on immigration. The study's findings demonstrate that the amount of media attention on an issue and the frame consonance in the media – whether the framing of an issue in the media corresponds – are essential determinants of change on the policy agenda (Dekker and Scholten, 2017). However, the findings also show that both indicators are influential solely when the dominant media framing of an issue challenges the current policy frame on that subject. This effect is explained by the fact that policy-makers will assume a dominant media framing to represent the public opinion. When such a framing contests a current policy, political actors face more pressure to alter the policy agenda (ibid.).

Lastly, by investigating the impact of conflict framing on the media’s agenda-setting influence, Sevenans and Vliegenthart's (2016) findings are relatively similar. Conflict framing is defined as newspaper articles presenting “at least a two-sides depiction of disagreement between individuals or groups of people about an issue” (ibid., pp. 189). Hence, an example of conflict framing is when news coverage is used to critique a current policy frame. After analysing media coverage and parliamentary questions in the Netherlands and Belgium, the scholars found that conflict framing strengthens the agenda-setting influence of the media in both countries. Thus, media coverage framing an issue in a conflictual manner is more likely to be politically consequential than media coverage framing the same issue more neutrally. The authors clarify this effect by stressing the conflictual nature of politics. In essence, the political debate revolves around controversy and disagreement about policies. Such debate enables political parties to present their opposing positions on a particular issue – with the ultimate goal of informing and attracting voters. As media coverage setting forth a conflict provides political parties with an opportunity to differentiate themselves from others, such coverage is more likely to influence the political agenda (ibid.).

## 2.4 Theoretical expectations

### *Prevailing discourse in the media and policy areas*

Based on the insights touched upon in the previous sections, several expectations for the findings of this thesis can be outlined. First, as the political and media debates on climate-induced migration are primarily shaped by alarmist tones (Baldwin et al., 2014), a maximalist framing of such migration as a security issue is expected to prevail in Dutch newspaper articles and in Dutch and EU policy areas. More specifically, with the alarmist framing being subject to the (European) machinery of controlling and limiting migration (Trombetta, 2014; Boas et al., 2019), a *securitisation to keep borders closed* discourse– the second sub-discourse in Table 1 – is expected to prevail in the

newspaper articles and policy areas. A *securitisation to increase policy pressure* discourse aimed at achieving or legitimising more pro-active environmental measures and policies – the first sub-discourse in Table 1 – may also be found in the newspaper articles and policy areas but is not expected to be dominant. Additionally, in line with the argument that a minimalist framing of climate-induced migration seems to be growing in international policy circles (Baldwin et al., 2014), the third, fourth and fifth sub-discourses on resilience in Table 1 are expected to be found in Dutch and EU policy areas to a small extent.

### ***Similarity between the media and Dutch policy areas***

Due to the general view that the news media influences the policy agenda-setting stage (Fawzi, 2018) and the finding of Van der Pas et al. (2017) that Dutch newspapers and political parties influence each other's agenda-setting, a similarity between the discourses used in Dutch newspaper articles and Dutch policy areas is expected. As explained above, a maximalist framing to keep borders closed is most likely to dominate in both. If a different discourse is found to prevail in the newspaper articles, however, the framing of climate-induced migration in policy areas is expected to differ accordingly. Still, it should be mentioned that the amount of policy agenda-setting influence of the newspapers is likely to be contingent on several factors. As shown in the previous section (2.3), these factors include the amount of media attention (on climate-induced migration) and conflict framing, the consonance of the used frames, the extent to which Dutch policy frames (on climate-induced migration) are challenged, whether climate-induced migration is regularly presented as an adverse event or crisis, and whether the newspaper coverage is unambiguous and clearly defines and addresses the issue of climate-induced migration (Dekker and Scholten, 2017; Sevenans and Vliegthart, 2016; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006).

### ***Discourse corresponding best with the climate migrant stories***

Opposed to the likely dominance of the maximalist discourse in the policy and media debates, the minimalist discourse on climate-induced migration that seems to dominate the academic debate (Baldwin et al., 2014) is expected to correspond best with the stories of climate migrants. Since the stories and experiences of various individuals or families from a broad range of countries will be analysed – as further touched upon in chapter 3.1.2 – it is expected that they will highlight the complexity and country-specificity of climate-induced migration. In line with the previous findings of Mueller et al. (2020) and Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava (2017), the stories might, for instance, show that the effects of climate change on migration differ from country to country. Congruent with other previous findings, they might also show that migration is not always affordable, possible or desirable for affected populations in the first place (Allgood and McNamara, 2017; Bhatta et al., 2015; Thomas and Benjamin, 2018). Lastly, they might reflect on affected populations' resilience and adaptation

strategies and the possible existence of previously found thresholds to climate-induced migration (McLeman, 2018). Due to the likely to be found complexity and diversity of the climate-migration relationship, a *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* discourse – the third sub-discourse in Table 1 – is expected to correspond best with the stories of climate migrants. The stories might also highlight the experienced (political) existence of the table’s fourth and fifth sub-discourses on resilience.



## 3. Research design

The following chapter, divided into four sections, outlines the design of the conducted research. The first section (3.1) indicates how the data of this study – Dutch newspaper articles, climate migrant stories, and Dutch and EU policy documents – was collected. In the second section (3.2), the research method of critical discourse analysis (CDA) is explained. The section also describes which framework of CDA was adopted for this study. Third (3.3), the operationalisation of the research in terms of empirical guiding questions and the utilised coding system is clarified. The final section (3.4) sheds light on the reliability and validity of the research.

### 3.1 Data collection

#### 3.1.1 Dutch newspaper articles

To analyse the type(s) of discourse on climate-induced migration used in Dutch media, newspaper articles were accessed from the NexisUni database. Besides articles, editorials and columns were also included in the search as these may reflect which discourses are given a podium. Based on a number of keywords, media coverage on climate-induced migration was selected for both the online and print versions of *Het AD*, *De Telegraaf*, *De Volkskrant*, and *De NRC* (including *Het NRC Handelsblad*). The keywords used for this selection were *climate migration* (klimaatmigratie), *climate migrant* (klimaatmigrant), *climate migrants* (klimaatmigranten), *climate refugee* (klimaatvluchteling), and *climate refugees* (klimaatvluchtelingen). Accounting for exact copies in the NexisUni database, 166 newspaper articles were found in total.

Some of the found articles proved to be not relevant for the aim of this thesis since they covered climate migration in terms of flora and fauna, promoted new (fictional) books, theatre plays or documentaries on climate migration, focused on the addition of the word climate refugee (klimaatvluchteling) in Dutch dictionaries, or used the concept of climate refugees to jokingly refer to people that moved out of the Netherlands because of the weather. Upon leaving out these non-relevant articles and some still found copies, 116 newspaper articles were analysed. In the chapter on the analysis of Dutch newspaper articles (chapter 4), 49 articles are specifically referred to. These articles are separately clustered at the end of the bibliography of this thesis. The articles' content and quotations used in chapter 4 were translated from Dutch to English by the researcher. The original content and quotes can be found in the references.

The choice to analyse newspaper coverage specifically from *Het AD*, *De Telegraaf*, *De Volkskrant*, and *De NRC* was based on two factors. First, all four belong to the most prominent national newspapers in the Netherlands. Each year, the Dutch newspaper market is monitored by the

Commissioner's Office for the Media (Commissariaat voor de Media). The results of this yearly practice are presented in the Dutch Mediamonitor (Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, n.d.). The most recent publicly available data on the societal reach of Dutch newspapers in 2019 shows that Het AD, De Telegraaf, De Volkskrant, and De NRC belong to the five national newspapers with the most extensive reach (Mediamonitor, n.d.). The second reason to specifically analyse coverage from these four newspapers has to do with the differences in their political leanings. Het AD and De Telegraaf are centre-right newspapers typically read by a less educated segment of the Dutch population than the other two newspapers (Roggeband and Vliegthart, 2007). Both are popular editions. By contrast, De Volkskrant and De NRC are more quality editions. Whereas De Volkskrant originally had a Catholic background, it can now be characterised as a left-leaning newspaper. De NRC is a more conservative, neo-liberal newspaper that is right-leaning (ibid.).

Due to time constraints, not more than the selected amount of four newspapers could be analysed for this thesis. Still, because of the extensive societal reach of the selected newspapers and their differences in political leanings and the extent to which their articles are sensation-oriented or more thorough, it is assumed that the findings will reflect the variety of discourses on climate-induced migration in the Dutch media.

### **3.1.2 Climate migrant stories**

Personal stories of climate migrants demonstrating their experiences, opinions and needs were found by searching through Google software. For this search, the following keywords were used: *climate migrant interview*, *climate refugee interview*, *climate migrant story*, *climate refugee story*, *the voice of climate migrants*, and *the voice of climate refugees*. In total, 22 data sources relevant to this thesis were found. Five of these are reports – four from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), specifically on internal migration, and one from the Climate Outreach and Information Network (COIN). A further ten data sources are newspaper articles – six from Euronews and four from The Guardian. The last seven data sources are documentaries on climate-induced migration from Al Jazeera English, ARTE Documentary, TRACKS, The Atlantic, Michael P. Nash, and two from DW Documentary. The links to five documentaries were found on two websites (Human Rights Careers, n.d.-a; Human Rights Careers, n.d.-b). The other two documentaries were found through the software of Google. All 22 data sources and the two websites on which the links to most of the documentaries were found are separately clustered at the end of the bibliography. Due to time constraints, the search for data sources was terminated after finding these 22 relevant ones.

As the effects of climate change vary across borders, including specifically on migration, attention was given to selecting stories of climate migrants from a large variety of countries. By subsequently analysing a diverse range of stories from a large variety of countries, the reliability of arguments made on the experiences and needs of climate migrants in this thesis increases. Accounting

for some overlap, the reports, newspaper articles and documentaries together focus on stories of migrants in the following 27 different countries across the world: Alaska, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mexico, Moldova, Palau, Portugal, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, The Philippines, Tuvalu, and Uganda. In total, 80 stories from either an individual or a family living in one of these countries were analysed. In the chapter on the analysis of climate migrant stories (chapter 5), stories from an individual or a family from 17 different countries are specifically referred to.

Most of the data sources consist of stories of people who migrated and people who decided not to (yet) for various reasons. As the stories from people who did not migrate (yet) are expected to provide relevant insights into the adaptation possibilities and strategies of affected communities to climate change, the choice was made to analyse both types of stories. A better understanding of the adaptation possibilities of people is expected to shed light on *when* exactly climate-induced migration is typically considered as desirable or necessary and when not – a distinction for which the thresholds for populations responding to changing climatic conditions or climate hazards suggested by McLeman (2018) may function as a sound theoretical background.

### 3.1.3 Dutch policy areas

To explore if and how the Dutch government recognises the impacts of climate change on migration, a search for relevant data sources was conducted through Google software. For this search, the following keywords were used: *Dutch government climate migration* (Rijksoverheid klimaatmigratie), *Dutch government climate refugees* (Rijksoverheid klimaatvluchtelingen), *Dutch government migration policy* (Rijksoverheid migratiebeleid), *Dutch government climate policy* (Rijksoverheid klimaatbeleid), and *Dutch government development cooperation policy* (Rijksoverheid ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbeleid). 18 relevant documents or web pages from the government on the current Dutch migration, climate or development cooperation policy were found. No relevant data sources from other policy areas were encountered.

In addition, three advisory reports on climate-induced migration, from which the Dutch government directly requested two, were found as well. One of these reports was published by the Dutch Advisory Committee for Immigration (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, ACVZ), an independent committee advising the Dutch government and parliament on migration (ACVZ, 2018). The second report was published by the Dutch Planning Agency for the Living Environment (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, PBL), the national institute for independent and scientific policy-analysis on the environment (Bouma et al., 2020). The last report is based on a study of a Dutch consultancy, Futureconsult, that is generally focused on forward-looking research and future-proof strategy development (Futureconsult, 2020).

The choice to additionally analyse these advisory reports was based on two factors. First, as the reports are all directly aimed at the Dutch policy agenda on climate-induced migration, they may have, or already had, an influence on said agenda. Two of the reports may particularly be or have been influential as the Dutch government explicitly requested them. Second, the recency and, therefore, assumed relevance of the reports shaped the decision as all three were published between 2018 and 2020. For the two requested reports, this recency may indicate that the Dutch government is increasingly considering (the effects of) climate-induced migration a policy issue that requires action.

The combined total of 21 data sources is separately clustered at the end of the bibliography of this thesis. Once again, due to time constraints, the search for relevant data sources was not extended after finding these 21 relevant ones. The content and quotations of the data sources used in the sub-chapter on the analysis of Dutch policy areas (chapter 6.1) were translated from Dutch to English by the researcher. The original content and quotes can be found in the references.

### 3.1.4 EU policy areas

Equivalent to the previous sections, data sources reflecting if and how the EU recognises and presents climate-induced migration in its policy areas were found by searching through Google software. The following keywords were used for this search: *European Union climate migration*, *European Union climate refugees*, *European Union migration policy*, *European Union climate policy*, and *European Union development policy*. 22 relevant data sources on EU migration, climate, or development policy were found. Whereas web pages of the Council of the EU (Council) or the European Commission (EC) make up ten of these sources, three communication documents from the EC, two EC staff working documents and EC policy proposals, and one Directive, Regulation, joint statement, partnership agreement and EC report were obtained. No relevant data sources from policy areas other than the three mentioned above were found.

Additionally, three studies (requested) by the European Parliament (EP) on climate-induced migration, published in 2011, 2019 and 2020, were encountered. The choice to include these studies in the data of this thesis was based on their recency and the simple fact that they reflect that climate-induced migration is seen as an agenda issue. Moreover, with two of the studies presenting policy recommendations on addressing climate-induced migration, they may have, or already had, an influence on the EU policy agenda.

The combined total of 25 data sources is separately clustered at the end of the bibliography chapter of this thesis. Once again, due to time constraints, the search for data sources was terminated after finding these 25 relevant ones.

## 3.2 Research method: critical discourse analysis

### *Critical discourse analysis in a nutshell*

To analyse how climate-induced migration is perceived and framed in Dutch newspaper articles, in documents that set forth stories and experiences of global climate migrants, and in policy documents and agendas at the Dutch and European level, this thesis uses the qualitative research method of critical discourse analysis (CDA). Fundamentally, CDA is a tool to understand the (hidden) meanings of the various forms of semiosis, including language, visual images and body language (Fairclough, 2001). CDA, a political approach to discourse analysis, is typically used to understand the pressing social issues addressed in written and spoken texts (Mogashoa, 2014). The method “challenges us to move from seeing language as abstract to seeing our words as having meaning in a particular historical, social and political condition” (ibid., pp. 105).

CDA deems language a social practice and typically starts from social problems and their semiotic dimensions (Fairclough, 2001). On the one hand, language plays a role in constituting, contesting, and transforming social problems and processes of social change (Mulderrig et al., 2019). CDA can be used to investigate how language *shapes* “social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and belief” (Fairclough, 1993, pp. 134). On the other hand, the method is concerned with how language is socially and historically *shaped* (ibid.). By analysing the interconnectedness of discursive practices with broader societal and cultural values, relations, beliefs, processes, and (institutional) structures, CDA aims to explore how discursive practices “arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power” (ibid., pp. 135). CDA, in other words, focuses on how power and hegemony are secured through discourse (ibid.).

With language functioning as a social practice, its use privileges particular ways of thinking, doing and being over others (Mulderrig et al., 2019). On its own, however, discursive practices are not necessarily powerful (Wodak, 2002). Only through its use by influential actors does language gain power (ibid.). As the views of powerful actors tend to be perceived as self-evident truths, contrary to the views of those without power, which tend to be dismissed as unrealistic or irrelevant, CDA is often used to highlight the societal perspectives considered to be secondary (Mogashoa, 2014). A key concern of CDA is, therefore, to emphasise how discourses compete in “generating and/or replacing naturalised (i.e. dominant or hegemonic) meanings” of a societal issue (Rogers-Hayden et al., 2011, pp. 135). A discourse is considered hegemonic when its beliefs appear as the ‘natural’ ones in society and contribute to the ‘deactivation’ of opposing discourses (ibid.).

### *The critical aspect of critical discourse analysis*

Altogether, the critical aspect of CDA is two-fold (Rogers-Hayden et al., 2011). First, the method aims to discover which discourses sustain hegemony to subsequently “denounce the social,

cultural or political wrongs” perpetuated by these dominant discourses (Carvalho, 2008, pp. 162). In other words, CDA is concerned with a critique of semiosis within social processes of domination (Fairclough, 2001). Second, the method investigates how (non-hegemonic) discourses generate social change by challenging dominant beliefs (Rogers-Hayden et al., 2011). Hence, CDA is simultaneously concerned with a more ‘positive’ exploration and analysis of new forms of semiosis (Fairclough, 2001). Accordingly, CDA can be used to give a voice to the ones without power, explaining why the method often adopts the perspective of those who are excluded or suffer and critically analyses how the powerful – “who are responsible for the existence of inequalities and who also have the means and the opportunity to improve conditions” – use their language (Wodak, 2002, pp. 10).

### *Adopted framework of critical discourse analysis*

Among CDA approaches or methodological forms, this thesis builds upon Fairclough’s (1992) analytical framework to analyse the semiotic dimensions of social issues. Fairclough’s (1992) framework consists of three dimensions that shape a discursive event. The framework is shown in Figure 1 on the next page. The *textual dimension* of the framework, which Calliari (2018) refers to as micro-scale analysis, focuses on the form and meaning of a text (Fairclough, 1993). Both form and meaning can be explored by analysing an overall textual structure, including the headline, opening and closing paragraphs, the selected views of social actors, and the cohesiveness of sentences. Other linguistic choices in terms of vocabulary and grammar – including questions of modality, mood and transitivity – also influence the structure of a text (ibid.). Additionally, Huckin (1997) stresses that the genre and register of a text, as well as the extent to which it uses framing or manipulation through loaded words, visual aids, presupposition, labels, metaphors or by foregrounding or backgrounding information, are important factors that can be analysed in the textual dimension.


Of central concern in the *discursive practice dimension*, referred to as meso-scale analysis by Calliari (2018), is the socio-cognitive side of text production and interpretation (Fairclough, 1993). Here, the discursive practices a text draws upon to create and disseminate a particular representation of reality are analysed to discover how the discursive event (i.e. the analysed language use) relates to the order of discourse (i.e. the totality of discursive practices in a social domain) (ibid.). Essential in such a comparison is to explore how power relations are presented in a text, thereby investigating the hegemonic processes underlying that text (Calliari, 2018). To put it more simply, the discursive practice dimension analyses whether the discourses in a text are used to give a voice to those without power or to uphold hegemony. Such analysis sheds light on the actors controlling the discursive practices in a concerned social domain (ibid.).

In the overarching *social practice dimension*, or macro-scale analysis in the words of Calliari (2018), the levels of social organisation, entailing “the context of situation, the institutional context, and the wider societal context” of a text, are analysed (Fairclough, 1993, pp. 137). As a result, the

societal and cultural processes of change that (different) discursive practices are associated with can be identified (ibid.). By exploring how the discursive practices in a text “reproduce or restructure the existing order of discourse and how this translates into social change”, the social practice dimension goes one step further than the intermediary discursive practice one (Calliari, 2018, pp. 729). Still, both dimensions may give rise to questions of power and ideology (Fairclough, 1993).

**FIGURE 1**

*Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional framework*



### 3.3 Operationalisation

#### *Empirical guiding questions*


In analysing how climate-induced migration is framed in the data sources of this thesis, empirical guiding questions based on the three-dimensional framework of Fairclough (1992) were used. These questions are outlined in Figure 2 on the next page. As shown in the figure, regarding the textual dimension of the framework, the guiding question reads as follows: “*What kind of language is used to describe climate-induced migration?*”. Through this question, the researcher investigated how climate-induced migration is framed on the level of words, sentences and paragraphs. Attention was given to the use of metaphors, loaded words, headlines, opening and closing paragraphs, the selection of views of societal actors, and the overall mood of the data source.

In respect of the intermediate discursive practice dimension, the guiding question – “*How does the description of climate-induced migration draw on existing or new discourses on the issue?*” – enabled the researcher to explore the point of view from which a data source defines or represents climate-induced migration related to the order of discourse. In other words, the question was used to analyse whether the data source was produced or can be interpreted along the lines of one or more of the theoretical sub-discourses outlined in Table 1. When a description of climate-induced migration did not correspond with any sub-discourse, a new discourse was constructed. The section on coding below addresses this inductive character of the thesis in more detail.

Concerning the overarching social practice dimension, the guiding question reads as follows: “*What are the social and political implications of how climate-induced migration is described?*”. To some extent, such social and political implications are automatically shaped by how a theoretical sub-discourse(s) a data source may be produced or interpreted by aims to transform the existing order of discourse. Notwithstanding, more textually specific factors also shape the implications. Therefore, attention was given to the causes of or (policy) solutions to climate-induced migration put forward in a data source. When such causes or solutions were not specifically brought up, the researcher aimed to identify the more general societal or cultural processes of change a data source may be argued to strive for. Regarding Dutch newspaper coverage on climate-induced migration, the different political leanings of the newspapers (mentioned in section 3.1.1) are expected to impact the processes of change they strive for.

**FIGURE 2**

*Empirical guiding questions based on Fairclough’s (1992) framework*



### ***Coding: a blended approach***

While keeping the empirical guiding questions in mind, the Dutch newspaper articles, climate migrant stories, and Dutch and EU policy areas were analysed through the tool of coding (using the ATLAS.ti software). More specifically, the choice for a combination of deductive and inductive coding – what Linneberg and Korsgaard (2019) refer to as a ‘blended approach’ – was made. Deductive coding, which “helps focus the coding on those issues that are known to be important in the existing literature” (ibid., pp. 13), was used to analyse the existence and share of the theoretical sub-discourses summarised in Table 1 in the data sources. The five deductive codes that were created for this are highlighted in Table 2 below.



However, as mentioned in the previous section, not all of the descriptions of climate-induced migration found in the data sources corresponded with a theoretical sub-discourse. Therefore, inductive coding, which is relevant “when no theoretical concepts are immediately available to help ... grasp the phenomenon being studied” (ibid., pp. 12), was used to develop codes directly from the data. The three inductive codes that were created are also highlighted in Table 2 below. Equivalent to their deductive counterparts, the inductive codes represent a particular discourse on climate-induced migration. The exact meaning of the inductive discourses is explained in the chapter on the analysis of Dutch newspaper articles (chapter 4).

**TABLE 2**  
*Coding framework*

Type	Code
<b>Deductive</b>	1. Securitisation to increase policy pressure
	2. Securitisation to keep borders closed
	3. Resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity
	4. Resilience: avoiding political responsibility
	5. Resilience: good circulation of migrants
<b>Inductive</b>	6. Mentioning climate-induced migration as a non-securitised issue
	7. Defining climate migrants differently
	8. Trivialising climate-induced migration

Whereas the coding framework presented in Table 2 was helpful in coding Dutch newspaper articles and Dutch and EU policy areas, it was not convenient for the stories of climate migrants. This unsuitability has to do with the fact that climate-induced migration is presented from a different point of view in such stories. In the newspaper articles and policy areas, climate-induced migration is framed *in an overarching way*. As argued in the previous section, such a framing, or code, corresponds directly with either a deductive or an inductive discourse on the issue. In the case of climate migrant stories, however, climate-induced migration is presented *in a personal way*. As the stories highlight the experiences of an individual or a family, they do not frame the general phenomenon of climate-induced migration along the lines of a particular discourse. For that reason, different (inductive) codes were created to analyse and differentiate the experiences of climate migrants. These codes are based on the factors that an individual or family indicated to have shaped their (forced) decision to migrate or their (forced) decision not to migrate (yet) in the face of climate change. The codes are outlined in Table 3 below.

Ultimately, the amount to which the different migration and non-migration codes of Table 3 will be found in the stories will present an overall perspective on the (personal) nature of climate-induced

migration. In other words, whereas the codes cannot directly be linked to one of the codes or discourses of Table 2 individually, the general findings of the codes can. If, for instance, a far majority of the stories underline that (forced) migration was the only option to survive (the third code in Table 3), the findings may correspond best with an alarmist framing of climate-induced migration (the first or second code in Table 2). Then again, if a majority of the stories underline that people did not migrate (yet), for instance due to a personal desire to stay (code 14 in Table 3), the findings may correspond better with a minimalist discourse stressing the complexity of climate-induced migration (the third code in Table 2). Hypothetically, a significant amount of associations between the general findings of the codes of Table 3 and the best corresponding code or discourse of Table 2 are possible. The chapter on the analysis of climate migrant stories (chapter 5) will address the association that was found in the data.

**TABLE 3**

*Additional coding framework for climate migrant stories*

Type	Code
<b>Migration</b>	1. Internal
	2. International
	3. Necessary to survive
	4. Fleeing from trauma
	5. Searching for better opportunities
	6. Because of lacking government support
	7. Possible due to government support
	8. Desire to move back
	9. Negative consequences on quality of life
<b>No migration</b>	10. Due to a lack of resources
	11. Because of lacking government support
	12. Due to government support
	13. Not welcome in another country
	14. Desire to stay for personal reasons
	15. Not necessary or desirable due to adaptation efforts

### 3.4 Reliability and validity

The traditional criteria used to evaluate qualitative research are internal validity, external validity and reliability (Devers, 1999). Together, the three criteria can be conceptualised as the quality, trustworthiness and rigour of research (Golafshani, 2003). In terms of reliability, or “the extent to

which findings can be replicated or reproduced by another investigator” (Devers, 1999, pp. 1157), first, this study’s strength lies in a precise clarification of how the utilised data was collected. Indeed, chapter 3.1 has emphasised which keywords were used to search for Dutch newspaper articles, climate migrant stories and Dutch and EU policy areas, and how many data sources were selected for each. Second, the clarification of how the collected data was analysed to result in findings strengthens this study’s reliability. Whereas chapter 3.2 has illustrated which exact framework of CDA was used, chapter 3.3 has highlighted which empirical guiding questions the analysis was based on. Third, chapter 3.3 has also reflected upon the coding system of this study – a strategy proposed by Morse (2015) to ensure reliability. During the process of coding, each data source was coded twice to leave no room for uncertainty.

Besides ensuring reliability, the development of a coding system also strengthens this study’s internal and external validity. On the one hand, internal validity signifies the credibility of research or “the degree to which findings correctly map the phenomenon in question” (Devers, 1999, pp. 1157). External validity, on the other, signifies “the degree to which findings can be generalised to other settings similar to the one in which the study occurred” (ibid., pp. 1157). Generally speaking, the use of a coding system strengthens both types of validity as it enhances the certainty of the findings of a study (Morse, 2015).

Another factor ensuring both internal and external validity is the use of triangulation – a procedure where two or more data sets or methods are used in answering a research question (Morse, 2015). To increase this study’s scope and depth, triangulation is realised on three different levels: data, methods and theory. In terms of data, over one hundred articles from four different newspapers will be analysed to ensure that the findings are not arbitrary. For the climate migrant stories, a lack of arbitrariness will be ensured by analysing 80 stories from an individual or family living in 27 different countries. Additionally, the policy stances of both the Dutch government and the EU will be investigated by analysing a total of close to fifty policy sources.

In terms of methods, triangulation is realised using a blended coding approach that is not limited to theoretical expectations (see chapter 3.3). Moreover, as quantifications in percentages and numbers will be used to signify the influence of certain codes or discourses in the chapters on the analysis of Dutch newspaper articles (chapter 4) and climate migrant stories (chapter 5), both a qualitative and quantitative approach to data analysis is taken. Lastly, a triangulation of theory is realised by having employed a variety of theoretical perspectives on prevailing discourses on climate-induced migration that underlie the analysis of this study (see chapter 2).

A final aspect ensuring the (internal) validity of this study is the peer review that was available and taken advantage of – another strategy proposed by Morse (2015). Through peer review, alternative viewpoints were taken into consideration. Such consideration empowered the researcher to see patterns in the data, supported the conceptual development of the study, and prevented bias.

## 4. Analysis of Dutch newspaper coverage

The first analysis chapter of this thesis is divided into five sections. First (4.1), some overall findings on the coverage of the four newspapers on climate-induced migration are introduced. Afterwards, the use of several discourses on the issue is analysed per newspaper. This analysis starts with Het AD (4.2), followed by De Volkskrant (4.3), De Telegraaf (4.4), and last De NRC (4.5). In each of these sections, a figure indicates the percentage to which extent a particular discourse was found. Besides, in each, quotes are used to emphasise why a highlighted article fits a specific discourse.

### 4.1 Overall coverage

With Het AD, De Telegraaf, De Volkskrant, and De NRC all covering climate-induced migration since between 2006 and 2008, the issue is not new anymore in the Dutch media. However, as the majority of the analysed articles, especially of Het AD and De Volkskrant, were published in more recent years (since 2015), one could argue that Dutch newspaper coverage on climate-induced migration is still evolving. The fact that the issue is not new anymore is also visible when looking at the publication dates of the several articles that speak of ‘the first’ international climate refugees. Whereas all newspapers have published such articles more than once between 2008 and 2016, no such article can be found in the last five years.


The overall differences between the four newspapers are insightful as well. Regarding Het AD and De Telegraaf, climate-induced migration is not often the main topic of an article. The issue is frequently addressed in one sentence or paragraph of an article on the broader impacts of climate change instead. Generally speaking, the analysed articles of Het AD and De Telegraaf are shorter than those of De Volkskrant and De NRC. Besides being longer, the articles of the latter two newspapers typically delve into the topic of climate-induced migration more thoroughly. As a result, the topic is more often the main focus of an article of these two newspapers. These differences between the newspapers fit their more general characteristic of being a rather popular or quality edition. They also fit the variation in the amount of articles analysed for each newspaper: for Het AD this was 27, for De Telegraaf 13, for De Volkskrant 37, and for De NRC 39.

Below, the framing of climate-induced migration in the articles of the four newspapers is analysed per newspaper. In some sub-chapters, not all of the discourses shown in the figure the section starts with are addressed. In some cases, when a specific discourse was only found to shape a newspaper’s coverage to a minor extent, this use of discourse is mentioned in a sub-chapter of a different newspaper.

## 4.2 Het AD

FIGURE 3

*Discourses found in the 27 articles of Het AD*



### *Securitisation for policy pressure (52 per cent)*

In the coverage of Het AD, the *securitisation to increase policy pressure* discourse is dominant. Belonging to the broader maximalist discourse that typically predicts alarming amounts of future climate migrants (Baldwin et al., 2014) and in line with what Trombetta (2014) referred to as the Copenhagen School, this discourse is used to promote pro-active environmental measures. Correspondingly, in an article headlining “Climate rapidly becoming more extreme, action is very urgent”, for instance, Het AD uses the prediction and metaphor of 142 million climate refugees in 2050 “rattling at our gate” to stress the need to invest in renewable energy (Het AD, 2018-b). Similarly, another article based on an interview with the director of a Dutch NGO states that if we do not rapidly move away from fossil fuels, our planet will become a very uncomfortable place (Het AD, 2015). For the planet to do so, we are metaphorically waiting for “streams of climate refugees, or even wars” (ibid.).

Het AD also uses the discourse for other policy ends. For instance, by claiming that Europe can prepare for the arrival of hundreds of thousands of climate refugees, the newspaper pressures rich countries to keep their promises regarding financial climate support for poorer countries (Het AD, 2018-a). Furthermore, in line with the call of Ahsan et al. (2014) to formally recognise climate refugees, another article argues that, since moving is not a choice but a matter of survival,

“... the current refugee convention urgently needs to be adjusted for people fleeing climate catastrophes” (Het AD, 2013).

Lastly, the newspaper also uses the discourse to promote policy pressure more generally by underlining the need for Dutch politicians to prepare for future climate refugees – a perhaps much larger refugee stream than the one Europe has been witnessing in recent years (Het AD, 2019-a).

### *Mentioning the issue of climate-induced migration (32 per cent)*

Although not dominant, numerous articles of Het AD also use the inductive *mentioning climate-induced migration as a non-securitised issue* discourse. This discourse is typically used to recognise the existence of climate-induced migration, sometimes as a possible (future) policy issue, but it does not present any predictions or further details of the issue. Most of the articles using this discourse present the views of others, usually in the form of an interview. For instance, one article adopts the message of the founder of a Dutch NGO that the increasing number of weather disasters such as droughts and floods are predicted to lead to more conflicts over water, more famines and growing streams of climate refugees (Het AD, 2019-c). In another, quotes of an interview with a water activist are used, including that “the new refugee is a climate refugee” (Het AD, 2020). The newspaper also interviewed the mayor of Cologne, who stressed that we must be aware that there will also be climate refugees (Het AD, 2016-b). Her non-securitised reply on the question of whether Europe can handle such refugees was, “Of course. If only Europe and Germany would learn to give up some of our prosperity” (ibid.).

### *Securitisation for border closure (eight per cent)*

Surprisingly, in two recent articles from 2019 and 2021, Het AD frames climate-induced migration in a way that could be argued to resemble the maximalist *securitisation to keep borders closed* sub-discourse. By using an alarmist framing to predict a large security crisis that can be prevented by keeping affected populations in their country of origin, as recognised by Boas et al. (2019), this discourse evidently differs from the newspaper’s dominant one that is used to promote better environmental policies. In one article covering the immigration surplus in the Netherlands, the podium is given to a reader of Het AD who stresses that it is hard to imagine that the immigration surplus will decrease, especially in view of the huge increase in the number of climate refugees and the large migrant families (Het AD, 2019-b). Using loaded words, the reader indicates to “pity the children of today” (ibid.). The second article that stimulates a sense of fear of ‘the migrant’ highlights that 62 per cent of the Dutch fear migration pressure resulting from climate change, and that

“For some of the climate sceptics, climate policy only becomes important when it can prevent climate refugees from coming here” (Het AD, 2021).


Instead of challenging these thoughts, Het AD underlines that this view is shared by voters of all major political parties (ibid.). Hence, it fosters the framing of climate refugees as a threat that should be prevented.

**Resilience: avoiding responsibility (four per cent)**

Lastly, it is interesting to note that in 2009, when climate-induced migration was still making its entrance in the Dutch media, Het AD framed the issue in a way that corresponds with the minimalist *resilience: avoiding political responsibility* discourse. As Methmann and Oels (2015) clarified, this discourse presents climate-induced migration as an ordinary solution rather than a problem to downplay the responsibilities of the major developed economies. Accordingly, the newspaper published an article headlining “Indonesian islands for rent to refugees”, in which it focuses on the fact that the country has “sufficient land area” to consider renting out part of its island kingdom as a place of refuge for so-called climate refugees (Het AD, 2009). Hence, instead of focusing on the vulnerability of affected populations around the world and their possible need of receiving assistance, the newspaper framed climate-induced migration in a way that seems Western countries do not have a responsibility that should be acted upon. As indicated above, however, Het AD changed its framing of climate-induced migration in the following years.

**4.3 De Volkskrant**

**FIGURE 4**  
*Discourses found in the 37 articles of De Volkskrant*



### *Securitisation for policy pressure (55 per cent)*

Similar to Het AD, for De Volkskrant, the dominant framing of climate-induced migration corresponds with the maximalist *securitisation to increase policy pressure* discourse. In line with Burkett (2011), who argued that the legal boundaries of climate-induced migration are the stumbling block in avoiding a humanitarian disaster, the newspaper, for instance, presents the views of a photographer arguing that

“It is time to (formally) recognise climate refugees as an international problem, 50 million are predicted to be displaced in Bangladesh alone” (De Volkskrant, 2015-b).

Some other articles of the newspaper are more clearly used to critique and pressure Dutch policy efforts. An NGO director is interviewed for one of them, who indicates that she would like to talk to Dutch Prime Minister Rutte to accelerate the transition to an economy that runs on 100 per cent renewable energy (De Volkskrant, 2021-b). Such a transition is necessary to “prevent the world from becoming extremely uncomfortable” due to increasing food shortages and climate refugees (ibid.).

Interestingly, whereas a column of Het AD securitising climate-induced migration by using the prediction of one billion climate refugees in three decades solely focuses on the responsibility of consumers to fight climate change and global pollution (Het AD, 2016-a), De Volkskrant published two articles using the discourse that are strongly opposed to such a framing of individual responsibility. One of them addresses that the emphasis has come to be placed on green, ethical consumption because

“... the Dutch government attempts to outsource the responsibility for climate policy to citizens, companies, and their interest groups” (De Volkskrant, 2019).

While arguing that the ten most polluting companies in the Netherlands emit three times more CO<sub>2</sub> than all Dutch households combined, the newspaper stresses that the solution is simple: changing the economy “starting with a serious carbon tax that forces companies to innovate” (ibid.). This message opposes the well-intentioned tips provided in the column of Het AD, namely to buy fewer new things and as few animal products as possible (Het AD, 2016-a).

### *Mentioning the issue of climate-induced migration (20 per cent)*

Unlike Het AD, the maximalist *securitisation to keep borders closed* discourse is used in none of the articles of De Volkskrant. The newspaper does use the *mentioning climate-induced migration as a non-securitised issue* discourse in some articles. One of those articles covers the fact that the more than six hundred inhabitants of the Alaskan village of Shishmaref are forced to flee because of the



changing climate (De Volkskrant, 2008). Another editorial of the newspaper calls upon the Dutch Prime Minister to state clearly and unconditionally that the Netherlands is prepared to generously take in refugees, because we have to remember that

“... the flow of refugees may only increase in the future if, for example, ... the first climate refugees arrive” (De Volkskrant, 2015-c).

A third example of the use of the discourse to shed light on the broader context and implications of (non-securitised) climate-induced migration can be found in a column on the conflict in Syria. According to the author, in 2010, roughly one million Syrian farmers, shepherds and their families were forced to leave the countryside and move to the already overcrowded cities due to the worst drought in forty years (De Volkskrant, 2014-a). Here, these climate refugees, as they are referred to in the article, joined the already existing million Iraqi war refugees and provided the Syrian democrats with an abundance of recruits (ibid.).

### ***Resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity (20 per cent)***

Remarkably, ever since 2014, the minimalist *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* discourse can also be found in the coverage of De Volkskrant. Instead of presenting climate-induced migration as an alarming issue, this discourse focuses on the diversity of scenarios in which the decision to migrate (or not) represents a rational adaptation strategy for affected populations (Bettini, 2014; Methmann and Oels, 2015). One of the newspaper’s articles using the discourse focuses on Bangladesh. First, the article covers the story and adaptation strategy of a previous farmer now living in the largest slum of Dhaka, who, despite losing everything, does not want to return to her village (De Volkskrant, 2015-d). Second, the article highlights the Bangladeshi adaptation plans to prepare the population for the effects of climate change and, thereby, to reduce the need to flee. These adaptation plans range from water management and agricultural reform to disaster relief. With the Bangladesh Delta Plan, for instance, it is hoped that

“within twenty years, more than ten thousand square kilometres of land can be reclaimed from the sea” (ibid.).

A second article of De Volkskrant using the discourse underlines that SIDS have long insisted on a global climate fund to mitigate the effects of global warming (De Volkskrant, 2015-a). The newspaper stresses, however, that even with such a fund, “not all islands in the Pacific can be saved” (ibid.). Hence, for the population of the smallest and most vulnerable islands, which may eventually have to be abandoned, migration may still be the most appropriate adaptation strategy.

More generally, De Volkskrant acknowledges that internal, rather than international refugees make up the vast majority of climate-induced migration (De Volkskrant, 2014-b). Moreover, in an article on the rising sea levels in the Marshall Islands, the newspaper highlights that people may be strongly reluctant towards migration even in the most vulnerable places (De Volkskrant, 2018). Corresponding with Thomas and Benjamin's (2018) argument that affected populations may be unwilling to migrate due to strong cultural, historical, or social ties with their roots, the newspaper presents the views of a twenty-two-year-old man living in Majuro, the capital of the islands, indicating:

"I will not become a climate refugee. I will stay here and keep fighting" (De Volkskrant, 2018).

Lastly, a 2020 article of the newspaper headlining "It is not that extreme" clearly shows a critique of maximalist predictions of climate migrants (De Volkskrant, 2020). In the article, the newspaper critiques how disaster scenarios regularly prevail among climate predictions. As a result of this prevalence,

"... climate-induced migration seems far more apocalyptic than the underlying science can justify".

Still, the newspaper states that the critique of alarming predictions should not be interpreted as a message to be content with three degrees of global warming, but that we can neither ignore the process we have made (ibid.).

### ***Resilience: avoiding responsibility (two per cent)***

Surprisingly, in a 2017 article of De Volkskrant, climate-induced migration is framed along the lines of the minimalist *resilience: avoiding political responsibility* discourse. The article addresses a major famine in Somalia, where over six million people depend on humanitarian aid, millions flee, and hundreds of thousands die each year (De Volkskrant, 2017). Rather than acknowledging the extreme drought in the country as a factor shaping the problem, the most important determinants are considered to be overpopulation – "a Somali woman has an average of 6.5 children" – and Somalia not being a stable state with a legitimate government. Since

"... any climate agreement is a drop in the ocean at the current rate of reproduction",


the newspaper recommends the Dutch government to put all its efforts into birth control around the world (ibid.). Regardless of the extent to which overpopulation might be an issue, the article undermines the importance of international climate agreements and the existence of climate migrants.

Equivalent to Het AD, however, the use of the discourse to trivialise political responsibility does not recur in the coverage of De Volkskrant.

## 4.4 De Telegraaf

FIGURE 5

*Discourses found in the 13 articles of De Telegraaf*



### *Trivialising climate-induced migration (eight per cent)*

In the coverage of De Telegraaf, the newspaper with the smallest amount of articles on climate-induced migration of the four, no dominant discourse could be found. The first article of the newspaper on the phenomenon, published in 2006, uses the inductive *trivialising climate-induced migration* discourse that simply dismisses the existence of climate-induced migration. Strikingly, out of all 116 analysed articles, this is the only article that does so. In critiquing the wide variety of existing climate change predictions, the article quotes a Dutch meteorologist and geophysicist stating that

“... many scientists are dependent on financiers and therefore often draw conclusions too hastily” (De Telegraaf, 2006).

Until climatologists and meteorologists come to judgements in all objectivity and can reach something of a consensus, they should finally “apply a form of self-censorship”. For the time being, the article claims that the message that there will be climate refugees in 2050 is madness (ibid.).

### ***Mentioning the issue of climate-induced migration (eight per cent)***

In 2007, the second article of De Telegraaf on climate-induced migration took a different approach by framing the phenomenon in line with the *mentioning climate-induced migration as a non-securitised issue* discourse. Covering the island group of Tuvalu, the article states that its citizens are part of “the first total nation likely to be displaced as a result of climate change” (De Telegraaf, 2007-b). Now recognising the impact of climate change on migration, the period in which the newspaper trivialised climate-induced migration was not long-lived.

### ***Securitisation for policy pressure (34 per cent)***

All of the newspaper’s articles published in the following period between 2007 and 2013 even utilise the maximalist *securitisation to increase policy pressure* discourse. Headlining “The next crisis is called climate asylum”, one of these articles suggests that, by the time the climate crisis is underway,

“... the great migration at the beginning of the Middle Ages will seem like nothing more than a local procession” (De Telegraaf, 2008).

Upon predicting hundreds of millions of climate refugees, the article conveys hope that new world leaders – including Obama and Sarkozy but leaving out the Dutch Prime Minister – will tackle the climate problem with the same urgency as the financial crisis is now being dealt with (ibid.).

Another article securitising climate-induced migration assumes that introducing “measures such as an eco-tax on products that emit a relatively large amount of CO<sub>2</sub>” only seems a matter of time (De Telegraaf, 2007-a). As climate change may result in tens of millions of climate refugees, the article also expects consumers to increasingly demand environmentally friendly products (ibid.). Underlining the need for more pro-active environmental measures in a more far-reaching way, De Telegraaf criticises the functioning of the system of free-market capitalism in another article (De Telegraaf, 2012). While referring to free-market capitalism as a wasteful attrition resulting in global warming and disasters such as climate refugees, the newspaper suggests that very soon, we might be asking ourselves how we have possibly sustained this system under the heading of growth (ibid.).

### ***Securitisation for border closure (25 per cent)***

In the articles published in the subsequent period between 2015 and 2019, the newspaper’s maximalist framing of climate-induced migration to increase policy pressure surprisingly shifted towards the maximalist *securitisation to keep borders closed* discourse. An example is an article covering the argument that trees are our most powerful weapon in the fight against climate change (De Telegraaf, 2019-a). Even if future knowledge would show that human CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are not the only

cause of climate change, afforestation is argued not be a cause for regret as it prevents erosion, helps biodiversity and provides food and income for millions of small farmers. As a result of the latter implication, the newspaper states, in a somewhat derogatory way, that

“... these (millions of) farmers will no longer come here as climate refugees” (ibid.).

Although not directly promoting the closure of national borders, the article does foster the creation of a sense of fear of ‘the climate refugee’.

A similar creation or upholding of fear of ‘the other’ can be found in an article in which De Telegraaf stresses that most of its readers are not (yet) convinced that humans can do something about global warming (De Telegraaf, 2015). According to these readers, the climate is big business and, unfortunately, far too much of a left-wing hobby. However, to still promote climate measures to better be safe than sorry, one reader indicates we could bring the message closer to home by metaphorically explaining that danger is lurking: “climate refugees will soon be on our doorstep” (ibid.). In another article spotlighting readers’ ideas, one reader argues that the belief of the Green Party in Germany that climate refugees should automatically be granted asylum would literally and figuratively mean:

“All of Africa, come to the EU” (De Telegraaf, 2019-c).

Reflecting a narrative on border securitisation to avoid a threatening amount of climate migrants coming to Europe, the reader assumes that, due to the Brexit, the British must soon be very happy that they will no longer belong to the same European ‘club’ as the Germans (ibid.).

### ***Different definition of climate migrants (25 per cent)***

In 2019 and post-2019, De Telegraaf surprisingly started using the concept of climate refugees in a different context than how climate-induced migration is typically defined – as individuals or groups that migrate due to climate processes or climate events (Mayer, 2011). In its most recent articles, the newspaper uses the concept of climate refugees to refer to individuals deciding to move within the Netherlands due to noise and health issues from nearby wind farms. Hence, the inductive *defining climate migrants differently* discourse has recently become most influential in the newspaper’s coverage.

One of the articles belonging to this category covers a couple that left the province of Flevoland a few years ago because they became fed up with the low-frequency humming of wind turbines about six hundred metres away from their house (De Telegraaf, 2019-b). The article does not only critique Dutch noise regulations, according to which there was nothing wrong, but mathematical climate

models in general as well, which are referred to as complex official devices that seem far more superior than real temperature measurements (ibid.).

Similarly, an article headlining “First Dutch climate refugees a fact” refers to a family who moved to escape the severe health issues a family member developed from a wind farm’s unbearable noise (De Telegraaf, 2020-a). The article also focuses on the health effects of biomass plants, about which “the Dutch Lung Foundation is concerned and regularly receives complaints”. The Foundation’s (expert) position is used to legitimise the critical conclusion that energy interests outweigh others for the Dutch government. As a result, the article argues that “our health is at stake” (ibid.).


The growing resistance to the noise of windmills is defended in another article by De Telegraaf by arguing that

“Our country is too small for all its green dreams” (De Telegraaf, 2020-b).

The newspaper stresses that the Netherlands struggles with a significant lack of space, explaining why it is not abnormal that the country dangles at the bottom of green energy lists (ibid.). Remarkably, besides one letter from a reader published in De Volkskrant – posing the question of whether he should choose for his health or the climate in light of the noise pollution from wind turbines (De Volkskrant, 2021-a) – no other newspaper defines climate refugees as (Dutch) people that need to flee the noise or health issues of green energy initiatives.

### 4.5 De NRC

**FIGURE 6**  
*Discourses found in the 39 articles of De NRC*



### *Mentioning the issue of climate-induced migration (37 per cent)*

Regarding De NRC, the newspaper with the most considerable amount of (relevant) articles covering climate-induced migration of the four, a slight majority of both recent and older articles uses the *mentioning climate-induced migration as a non-securitised issue* discourse. One of those articles covers the story of a man from Kiribati who saw his request of becoming the first officially recognised climate refugee being declined by the New Zealand Supreme Court, which decided to send him and his family back to the island group (De NRC, 2013). Climate-induced migration is recognised mainly as a future issue in the article by stressing that for several years, the government of Kiribati has been preparing its approximately 100,000 inhabitants for “future evacuation if the island group becomes uninhabitable” (ibid.). Another article goes one step further than recognising the future existence of the issue by highlighting that New Zealand is already considering giving “special status to climate refugees from Pacific islands” (De NRC, 2017). In yet another article using the non-securitised discourse, climate-induced migration is presented as a future possibility again. The article presents the views of a climate striker in Tunisia, where it can get up to 55 degrees in some places, who wonders whether Tunisians will also become climate refugees if global warming continues (De NRC, 2019).

### *Securitisation for policy pressure (26 per cent)*

Over the years, De NRC has also frequently made use of the maximalist *securitisation to increase policy pressure* discourse. Whereas about half of its articles using the discourse frame climate-induced migration as a security issue to stress the need for more dedicated international climate policies, the other half is directly aimed at the Dutch policy agenda. An example of the latter type is a 2021 article headlining “Climate must be top priority of new cabinet” (De NRC, 2021-b). The article critiques that Prime Minister Rutte often talks about progress in combatting climate change on the world stage, while his political party (the VVD) and the Dutch cabinet do not take the topic seriously in their policies. By underlining that

“Almost three-quarters of the Dutch population is concerned about the climate”,

the newspaper finds it not understandable that the Netherlands subsidises the fossil industry by billions of euros rather than using that money to accelerate the transition towards becoming a leading sustainable economy (ibid.). A largely securitised article from 2015 stressing that scientists expect “millions of climate refugees to come to Europe” by 2020 criticises the VVD’s politics as well (De NRC, 2015). However, rather than critiquing the climate policy efforts of the political party, the article uses the alarmist prediction to stress that when the VVD continues to prefer accommodating refugees in their country or region of origin only, it must make a grand gesture in the financing thereof (ibid.).

The articles of De NRC underlining the need for better international climate policies suggest, among others, a thorough investigation of the opportunities and ethical frameworks of geo-engineering (De NRC, 2020-b). The investigation of this technology that could deliberately influence the climate on a large scale is proposed because “entire parts of continents are becoming uninhabitable as we speak” (ibid.). An article reflecting the arguments of Oxfam Novib is directly aimed at the European Union (De NRC, 2009-b). According to Oxfam, from 2020 onwards, the EU should allocate 35 billion euros a year to help developing countries combat climate change. If not,

“Europe risks being flooded with climate refugees from the Third World” (ibid.).

In this quote, the use of a flooding metaphor to frame climate-induced migration as a looming security crisis is evident.

### ***Resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity (21 per cent)***

Similar to De Volkskrant, a framing of climate-induced migration along the lines of the minimalist *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* discourse can also be found in several articles of De NRC published over the years. A number of those articles emphasise that the majority of climate-induced migration is internal. Covering Tanzania, where farmers can no longer rely on the yield from their fields, one article stresses that “many young people flee to Dar es Salaam, the capital, where they hope to find work” (De NRC, 2008-c). Besides focusing on internal migration as an adaptation strategy, the article also highlights the argument of the major of Dar es Salaam that

“Whereas nothing can be done about the drought itself, we can ensure that its effects are mitigated”.

Examples of mitigation efforts to increase the resilience of farmers given by the major are providing electricity to irrigate the soil and crops that are more resistant to the new climate (ibid.).

Remarkably, whereas one previously addressed article published by De Volkskrant specifically critiqued alarming quantitative predictions of climate migrants, half of the articles of De NRC using the minimalist discourse do so. The following quote summarises the central message of these articles well:

“The choice to migrate usually arises from a complex interplay of economic, social and political factors. These factors can differ from one country, region or family to another. Gender, education, income and status all play a role” (De NRC, 2021-a).



In essence, the main point of the articles comes down to the lack of a simple connection between climate change and migration. The message that affected populations may, for instance, decide not to migrate due to cultural reasons, as well as the message that people may not be prosperous enough or not have the right contacts to plan a move are presented (ibid.). As alarming predictions are argued to typically be based on simple calculations and the mistaken idea that affected populations cannot influence the consequences of climate change, the newspaper argues they should be avoided (De NRC, 2008-a). This call is strengthened by underlining that securitised predictions of climate migrants are “ammunition in the hands of politicians who advocate the further construction of Fortress Europe” (ibid.) – corresponding with Trombetta’s (2014) argument that the alarmist framing is subject to the European machinery of controlling migration.

Due to the overall complexity of the processes forming climate change, one article of De NRC using the resilience discourse indicates that, as the International Red Cross already does, we should use the term climate-induced migration instead of climate refugee (De NRC, 2020-a). Remarkably, this is the only article out of all 116 calling for this definition.

### ***Resilience: avoiding responsibility (16 per cent)***

Lastly, a framing of climate-induced migration along the lines of the minimalist *resilience: avoiding political responsibility* discourse is present in the coverage of De NRC as well. Whereas this framing mainly dates back to when climate-induced migration was still a new topic in the Dutch media landscape, it is also visible in two articles published more recently in 2018. Although not highly influential in the coverage of De NRC, the discourse is surprisingly found in a far more significant part of the newspaper’s coverage than in that of the other three newspapers. One of the articles of the newspaper utilising the discourse covers the president of the Maldives stating his will to buy a new homeland elsewhere as the country is in danger of being flooded (De NRC, 2008-b). Instead of being focused on the vulnerability of the country and the responsibility of other countries to alleviate this vulnerability, the article is centred on the fact that “the Maldives is one of the most prosperous countries in South Asia” and “a popular destination for wealthy tourists”. With no country voluntarily relinquishing any part of its sovereignty and simply buying a piece of land being difficult, the article stresses that regardless of its wealth,

“... the Maldives will have to search hard for a suitable place for a new country” (ibid.).

Through this sentence and the focus on the relative wealth of the Maldives, the message being sent to the newspaper’s readers suggests that it is acceptable that the country is on its own in tackling climate-induced migration.

Another article using the discourse covers the inhabitants of the Alaskan island of Shishmaref, the Inupiaq, who are preparing to move to the mainland due to land erosion (De NRC, 2009-a). After shortly mentioning that the Inupiaq find it sad and worrisome to leave their houses and the graves on the island, the article downplays the emotional impact of the move by stating that the inhabitants are historically “used to moving their hunting and fishing grounds as nature dictates”. Whereas the newspaper argues that every crisis can give rise to changes that are not necessarily worsening, in the case of the Inupiaq the newspaper’s believe is that

“If you cut yourself off from the world, you are surely screwed” (ibid.).

Hence, the fact that the Inupiaq soon need to migrate due to a slow-onset climate process is considered a logical consequence of their own decision to live on Shishmaref in the first place. The article does not mention the impact of greenhouse gas emissions and the responsibility of other (rich, industrialised) countries on the fact that Shishmaref is sinking.

## 5. Analysis of climate migrant stories


The second analysis chapter of this thesis is divided into two sections. First (5.1), the different migratory responses found in the analysed stories are thoroughly examined and presented through figures. The section addresses the factors that were found to shape a (forced) decision to migrate and those that were found to shape a (forced) decision not to do so (yet). Second (5.2), the theoretical discourse that corresponds best with the overall findings of the analysis of the climate migrant stories is specified.

### 5.1 Different migratory responses

Upon coding and analysing the data sources indicating how people respond to climate change, significant differences in the migratory responses of people were found. Figure 7 below highlights to what extent affected populations decided to or were forced to undertake an internal or international move or not to move away (yet).

**FIGURE 7**

*Types of migratory responses found*



As Figure 7 shows, most individuals or families (48 per cent) indicated to have migrated within their country, typically to a larger city, to cope with the consequences of either slow-onset climate change or sudden climate hazards. An international move to do so was found to be far less common (eight per cent). Simultaneously, almost equalling the share of an internal migration response, a notable amount of affected individuals or families (44 per cent) could not or did not feel the desire to


migrate (yet). Although these percentages can function as an interesting source of debate, it should be noted that they unlikely reflect the true nature of climate-induced migration for two reasons.

First, a large part of the analysed data on climate-induced migration in African countries – specifically the data from the IDMC reports – is solely based on internal migration. Hence, it is almost self-explanatory that internal migration was found to be a significant response. Second, despite originating from twenty-seven different countries, stories were only analysed for eighty individuals or families. With climate-induced migration shaping the lives of a far more considerable amount of people, in reality, stories of climate migrants are likely much more diverse and complex than this section will show. Still, the remainder of this section is highly relevant as it shows how diverse the factors shaping a migratory response to climate change are already found to be when only analysing a limited number of stories.

The first part below (5.1.1) elaborates which factors climate migrants indicated to have affected and influenced their move elsewhere. Internal and international migration are grouped in this part for the two reasons indicated above. The second part below (5.1.2) elaborates the factors people who did not migrate (yet) indicated to have shaped their (forced) decision to stay. Both parts start with a figure (Figures 8 and 9) summarising the factors that were pointed out. Due to the likely biased reflection of the overall picture of climate-induced migration, both figures do not utilise percentages but absolute numbers instead.

### 5.1.1 Forced to or deciding to migrate

**FIGURE 8**  
*The story of migrating elsewhere*



### *Necessary to survive (16)*

Many people who migrated due to the consequences of climate change stressed that moving was their only option to survive. A former farmer in Somalia affected by continuous drought, for instance, indicated that

“Over the four years this drought has lasted, we have planted, but the harvest has failed. For a while, we survived by working for others, but then we decided to flee to the city. We could not continue living in the village because of the drought” (IDMC, 2020-a).

That moving to a city can be necessary to survive is also underlined by a former farmer and now government employee in Iraq who had to move due to water stress (IDMC, 2020-b). By arguing that many in his old village “had no choice but to leave ... to Basra (the city) to work in anything they could find”, he highlighted that, for them, moving was not a free choice but a forced effort to find any means of income to pull through (ibid.). A woman who fled the drought in her village in China stressed the absolute necessity of her family’s move by stating that the drought and subsequent crop failures forced them “to run like animals in search of water” (Nash, 2010). The woman is sad as her family had to split up in their move and does not live together anymore (ibid.).

Sometimes, the decision to split up has to be made when only some family members flee to the city while others attempt to postpone following them until absolutely necessary. A male pastoralist in Ethiopia, for instance, indicated that he and others had to send their wives and children to the city due to a lack of access to water (IDMC, 2019-a). The pastoralist himself decided to stay to feed his animals for as long as possible (ibid.). A Bangladeshi family had to make a somewhat similar decision to split up. Living on Bhola Island, the father of the family indicated that

“Because of river erosion and flooding, we had to move to another village. More than a hectare of my land is underwater here” (DW Documentary, 2019-b).

For him, the flooding and the move meant that he had to give up farming and become a fisherman. Being one of the few of the 2,000 residents of his old village who could find a new home, he considers himself lucky to rent some land from a local where he built a new house. Meanwhile, two of his sons already had to move further away to a slum in Dhaka, the capital, for the sake of the family’s (economic) survival. One of the sons states that

“If my parents’ land had not been flooded, I would still be in the village going to school. We had to move three or four times because of flooding. My parents finally ran out of money. That is why I had to come to Dhaka”.

Although the family can currently survive by sending its sons to Dhaka to work, the father stresses that they cannot finance rebuilding their house again after another flooding. They will all have to move to the capital in that case (ibid.).

### *Searching for better opportunities elsewhere (14)*

In another notable amount of the stories, climate migrants indicated they moved predominantly in search of better (economic) opportunities and an increased quality of life elsewhere – rather than migration being the only option left for them to survive. An Iraqi family basing their decision to leave their village on the stories of others who already did is an excellent example of such a story (IDMC, 2020-b). The father of the family explained the following:

“My neighbours moved to Zubair (the city) three or four months before we did and started to work on farms or in construction. They told us their decision had brought good benefits, more than staying in our home village ... so we decided to leave to look for work as day labourers” (ibid.).

For a family in Tuvalu, the plan to leave the country in the next two years is not mainly based on improving their work opportunities and conditions, but instead on the thought of their children growing up in a different place with a better quality of life (Ainge Roy, 2019). As the family feels scared of the rising ocean and the thought that Tuvalu will disappear one day, they are preparing to migrate to New Zealand (ibid.). Similarly, a female pastoralist in Ethiopia who moved to the city with her family due to drought indicated that

“We would like to stay here because we have better education and better services. We have access to a better life here” (IDMC, 2019-a).

Hence, seeking to improve the living conditions of children can be a critical determinant of the decision to migrate. For a family living in Bavaria, Germany, improving the quality of life of their son meant the ability to pass their house on to him in the future (Martinez and Monella, 2020-e). Being afraid of another major flood taking place in the future, the family’s mother explains they moved to a different village just four kilometres away, but out of the area with a high risk of flooding. As insurance is much cheaper here, she stresses that the family can now afford house insurance and is assured of passing something on to their son (ibid.).

### *Fleeing from trauma (two)*

Two European couples decided to migrate internally to cope with the trauma they developed after experiencing an environmental disaster. Upon experiencing deadly wildfires, a couple in Portugal

migrated to a colder area on the country's coast initially decided to stay in their home region (Marques, 2020). However, over time, the "constant anxiety and fears of another fire" changed their minds (ibid.). Similarly, soon after being confronted with a storm that flooded their entire village, a French couple decided to migrate to a different town as they could not live with the idea of something similar happening again (Martinez and Monella, 2020-b). Both stories underline that people may decide to move due to the psychological consequences of an environmental disaster rather than, for instance, the economic impacts of it.

### ***Because of lacking government support (two)***

Others specifically underline that the lack of government support and efforts to increase the resilience of affected communities triggered their decision to leave. A former farmer who left Mousuni Island in the Sundarbans region in India due to rising sea levels argued, for instance, that:

"The government is not doing anything at all. For the last five years, they have been saying they will fix the embankment. We have been in a horrible condition without it" (The Atlantic, 2019).

He now lives and works in Kolkata, but his wife still lives on Mousuni Island. When asked about the possibilities of living together with his wife, the man stated he lost hope in the government properly rebuilding the embankment and, therefore, in joining his wife on the Island (ibid.). Comparably, an Iraqi farmer who had to abandon his agricultural livelihood also critiques (local) government efforts (IDMC, 2020-b). Whereas the former farmer expected to be financially compensated to overcome the impacts of water stress, he did not receive anything. "It is almost as if the government wants us to give up", he argued (ibid.).

### ***Possible due to government support (three)***

Opposite to a lack of government support, some others indicated to have migrated after receiving (financial) support from the government. For two families in France whose houses were destroyed by a flood – from which one, as mentioned above, decided to move due to the psychological consequences of the flood – internal migration to a nearby village was possible after the French government bought what was left of their houses from them (Martinez and Monella, 2020-b). The story of a woman living on the other side of the world in Alaska covers the fact that the (local) government is moving the whole village of Newtok to higher ground (Al Jazeera English, 2019). Due to land erosion, the village and its 350 residents are slowly sinking into the ocean. Without the government's support, the entire project – costing around one hundred million dollars – would not have been possible (ibid.).

### *Negative consequences on quality of life (seven)*

Besides elaborating on the factors that forced or shaped their decision to migrate, in several stories, climate migrants highlighted that their move negatively affected their quality of life. For most who indicated this, the adverse effects were mainly felt in terms of prosperity. A quote from a Bangladeshi man who was forced to move his family to the capital, Dhaka, summarises these stories well. The man – who used to be wealthy and possess five houses for his family before they were all destroyed in a cyclone and subsequent flooding – explains that

“The things we lost we could not make again even if we tried for fifty years. All I can think about is what we will do, what will happen to our children. I cannot eat, I cannot sleep because of thinking about all of this” (Grant, 2009).

His family now lives in huts on the edge of the city’s airport. Because of the high living costs, even the family’s children have to work – instead of going to school as they used to before their forced move (ibid.).

For a small number of others, the adverse effects of migrating were instead felt in terms of their (psychological) health. A pensioner in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, who had to move three times before international donations made it possible for him to relocate downhill after his house was destroyed in a mudslide, stressed that “it is not how it used to be. Me and my wife needed psychological assistance for quite a while” (Martinez and Monella, 2020-c). Hence, although for some migration can result in better opportunities or can function as an escape from trauma, it should not be overlooked that it can also economically or psychologically worsen the lives of people who already had to experience a possibly forced move in the first place.

### *Desire to move back (eight)*

Lastly, a reasonable number of climate migrants expressed a general desire to move back to their homeland one day. In all cases, this desire had to do with a strong emotional connection to their homeland where, in many cases, part of their family stayed behind. One of the people telling this story was a Honduran man now living in the United States to earn money for his family back home dealing with crop failures (ARTE Documentary, 2019). Despite being in a better financial position now, the man indicated:

“Sometimes it hurts to be here. I dream of going home. As soon as I can. But at the moment, that is not really an option. Our families still desperately need the money” (ibid.).




Similarly, for a third son of the earlier mentioned Bangladeshi family living on Bholá Island having to join his brothers already living in Dhaka, there is only one purpose of his move. “I am going to have to move to Dhaka to find a job so I can afford to come back here, buy some land and rebuild my parents’ home”, he explained (DW Documentary, 2019-b). Sometimes, the only motivation for moving away is the thought of coming back sooner rather than later.

### 5.1.2 Forced to or deciding to stay

**FIGURE 9**

*The story of not migrating elsewhere (yet)*



#### *Desire to stay for personal reasons (16)*

In more than half of the non-migration stories, an individual or family indicated they chose to stay in their homeland and desired to continue doing so despite feeling the effects of slow-onset climate change or the consequences of a climate disaster. In line with the findings of Thomas and Benjamin (2018) and Allgood and McNamara (2017), all explained that this decision was shaped by their cultural, historical, or social ties with their roots – instead of rather economic factors. Most of these stories fit the following quote from a farmer in Honduras dealing with crop losses: “We love this place, and we want to fight for it” (ARTE Documentary, 2019). A young woman in Tuvalu, for instance, who could have tried to stay in New Zealand after her university studies there, said that family obligations and a feeling of responsibility to give something back to the archipelago drew her back (Ainge Roy, 2019). She explained:

“When I came back, I immediately noticed the difference. The heat is sometimes unbearable now, and the erosion is also dramatic. Some of my favourite spots have disappeared. (But) I feel like this is part

of who I am, and I should not just run away from it, even though it is disappearing. To just abandon it at such a time as this, when it is hurting – I do not feel comfortable. I do not feel like I can do that” (ibid.).

A villager in Ndem, Senegal, who decided not to migrate to the city (yet) in the face of increasing desertification, also reflected on how a strong connection to their homeland can prevent people from moving (IDMC, 2019-b). When asked about the future behaviour of other villages, he argued:

“I think they will stay. Because their ancestors are here and the attachment towards the land is very intense. In the village people do not want to move” (ibid.).

For a French woman from the same village as the two families mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, La Faute-sur-Mer, the connection to her homeland that made her stay was strongly influenced by the death of family members (Martinez and Monella, 2020-b). After her husband and grandson passed away due to a flood, she decided never to leave her village again – contrary to the around 400 of the 1,000 residents who left after losing their homes. For her, moving would feel like “abandoning the members of my family who died here” (ibid.).

### *Due to a lack of resources (six)*

By contrast, some others specified that staying was not their free choice but that they had no other option to do so as they did not possess enough (economic) resources to move away. In other words, although their desire to migrate was evident, they could not find a possibility of actually doing so. A villager living in Palau provided an example of such a story by explaining the difficulty of migrating internally for the less prosperous people living on the archipelago (Al Jazeera English, 2019). As he described:

“I have lived here for more than forty years, I would say. This is the first time I have seen this kind of high tide coming in. It is hard because you have to find another place to move to, and if you do not have the money to build a new house, you will not be able to do that. So people are pretty much stuck” (ibid.).

For a couple living in Reitoca, Honduras, the lack of money to leave the country even resulted from their initial plan and investment to migrate (ARTE Documentary, 2019). Upon paying 2,500 euros to an agency that had promised them a visa for Canada, a plane ticket and a secure job, the couple – like many others – got scammed and did not receive anything. As they had to go into debt for

this expenditure, the couple currently feels stuck. The wife of the couple described their situation as follows:

“I would like to leave this country. To offer my children a better life. But with this debt, I cannot sleep at night. I pray for my husband to find a better job to pay off our debt” (ibid.).

A small number of others desiring a move away indicated that a lack of contacts might also be a factor preventing such a move from happening. The former farmer and now government employee in Iraq, referred to in the previous section, for instance, stressed that some of those who stayed in his previous village were not able to leave “because they do not know anyone in the city” (IDMC, 2020-b). Comparably, a woman stating she would like to leave her village in Burkina Faso to search for a better place to live felt like she did not have the option to leave in the first place as she would not know where to begin her search (TRACKS, 2020). Hence, besides having ill-natured contacts solely after someone’s money, not having any relevant contacts can also obstruct the planning of a move away.

#### *Because of lacking government support (one)*

Whereas some climate migrants highlighted that the lack of government support triggered their decision to leave, a pensioner living in Bosnia and Herzegovina underlined that the lack of financial support of the government forced her to stay (Martinez and Monella, 2020-c). After a landslide damaged her house in the village of Domaljevac, she and many others “did not receive a single Mark” as the authorities were not financially prepared for such a disaster. As a result, she belongs to the majority of the village’s residents that had no other option than to stay put. Only a minor part of the residents could move a few kilometres away (ibid.).

#### *Due to government support (two)*

At the same time, the opportunity to receive financial support from the government after an environmental disaster can also be an incentive to choose not to migrate. For a German couple whose house was destroyed in a flood, for instance, rebuilding their house and staying in their village was only possible due to the financial support from the regional Bavarian government (Martinez and Monella, 2020-e). Another person who decided to stay believed that the majority of the inhabitants of the affected village only decided to keep living there because of the support. The local assumed the following:

“I believe that if people had not received those 80 per cent state funds, they would have all left the village” (ibid.).

### *Not welcome in another country (two)*

Two Tuvaluans indicated that, although they desired to do so, migrating internationally to New Zealand to flee the rising sea levels is not an option because they do not fit the right profile to be granted citizenship (Nash, 2010). One of them, a grandmother, stressed that

“New Zealand has offered to take Tuvaluans. But a person like me, who is over forty-five years old, New Zealand will not take me. We need to go there when we have a job, when we are offered to get a job, (we can) not just automatically go there. They have criteria, set criteria for people to migrate. They need employment, opportunities to be offered. But an older woman like me? No chance at all”.

With the other Tuvaluan similarly critiquing that New Zealand classifies climate migrants based on what they can offer, it seems that the country aims to establish a ‘good circulation’ of migrants (ibid.). As explained by Bettini (2014), such a circulation implies selectively welcoming those who are responsive to the needs of the labour market. The Tuvaluan man argued that the selection system is unfair (Nash, 2010). He did not understand why New Zealand does not want to accommodate and subsequently “educate this man so that he can learn something for his life” (ibid.).

### *Not necessary or desirable due to adaptation efforts (two)*

Finally, in two stories, adaptation efforts to the consequences of climate change were mentioned as the reason why migration was not considered desirable or necessary. One of these stories covers a farmer in Burkina Faso, who highlighted that the technique of drip irrigation made her and others’ lives significantly easier and took away the necessity to migrate (TRACKS, 2020). She explained the following:

“Once, it never rained enough here. We did not know what we would do about it. About ten years ago, this all changed, and people learned how to adapt, even though we still have insufficient rain. Since then, our families have enough food, and children are going back to school” (ibid.).

The second story covers a coffee farmer living in a village in Java, Indonesia, where nearly half of the local farmers had already given up and moved away (DW Documentary, 2019-a). Despite coffee not being as safe of a cropping choice as it used to be anymore, the farmer aimed to find a suitable adaptation strategy to stay. He clarified:

“I cannot imagine doing anything else. I will stay here as long as possible. I am a farmer, that is who I am. I am going to try to somehow adapt to climate change” (ibid.).

## 5.2 Overall compatibility with discourse

All in all, the minimalist *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* sub-discourse is argued to correspond best with the stories analysed in the previous sections of this chapter. As the stories have shown that migration is a possible but certainly not the only possible or desirable adaptation strategy to the inevitable consequences of climate change, they reflect on the diversity and complexity of climate-induced migration. Due to the emphasis on this diverse nature and, correspondingly, the fact that only part of those who migrated indicated they were forced to do so as their only option to survive, it is argued that a maximalist discourse securitising climate-induced migration is too simplified to cover the stories thoroughly. While acknowledging the heterogeneity of scenarios in which the (forced) decision to migrate or not represents a rational adaptation strategy, the *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* sub-discourse, on the other hand, does cover the complexity of climate-induced migration reflected upon in the stories and Figures 8 and 9.


## 6. Analysis of policy areas

The third and last analysis chapter of this thesis clarifies how climate-induced migration is framed and addressed in Dutch and EU policy areas. The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first (6.1), Dutch migration, climate and development cooperation policies are analysed. The section also describes how climate-induced migration is approached in (requested) advisory reports to the Dutch government. In the second section (6.2), EU migration, climate and development policies are analysed. The section also focuses on research by and for the EP on climate-induced migration. Both sections make use of a figure to highlight the utilised discourses. In contrast to the previous two analysis chapters, these figures do not present any percentages or numbers. This lack of quantification has to do with the found disregard of climate-induced migration in several policy documents that is not shown in the figures. Hence, quantifying the discourses that were found would be misleading.

### 6.1 Dutch policy (agenda)

FIGURE 10

*Discourses used by the Dutch government*



#### *Dutch migration policy*

In the words of the Dutch government, the Netherlands currently has a “wide-ranging, comprehensive approach” on migration in place that aims to protect those “who truly need protection” (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-a, para. 1 and 3). In the letter to the Parliament introducing the migration approach, or policy, climate change is mentioned as one of the factors determining why “the number of people migrating worldwide is expected to grow” (Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security,

2018, pp. 1). Hence, the discourse of *mentioning the issue of climate-induced migration* can be recognised.

Upon analysing the more detailed six pillars upon which the Dutch migration policy is based, the first pillar, ‘preventing irregular migration’, was also found to mention the impact of climate change on migration (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-c). More specifically, the Dutch government states that to tackle the leading causes of irregular migration in countries of origin, “measures to increase the resilience of populations to the effects of climate change can be considered” (ibid., para. 2). As argued, these measures could give rise to better opportunities for affected communities, making them feel less compelled to leave their country (ibid.). Based on this focus on the adaptation strategies of populations that may decrease their necessity to migrate in the face of climate change, at first glance, it seems as though the Dutch government promotes the *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* discourse.

The other five pillars of the country’s migration policy sketch a different picture, however. None of these pillars mentions or recognises how the policy areas of climate change and migration are connected (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-d; n.d.-e; n.d.-f; n.d.-g; n.d.-h). In the second pillar on ‘improving reception and protection for refugees and displaced persons in the region’, for instance, the government calls for a “better allocation of responsibilities between countries of origin, transit and destination for receiving refugees” (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-d, para. 4). No attention is given to the role or responsibility of the Netherlands in terms of receiving (future) climate migrants or refugees (ibid.). Besides, in the fifth pillar on ‘promoting legal migration routes’, legal migration is defined as migration for work, study or family reasons, and refugee resettlement (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-g). Hence, the specific existence of climate migrants or climate refugees is not acknowledged as a (legal) issue for the government.

Overall, whereas the Dutch government recognises that increased empowerment and resilience of vulnerable communities can prevent or limit irregular (climate) migration, it does not mention that staying in their home country may be impossible or far from desirable for some. In other words, it seems as though the government attempts to downplay the existence and vulnerability of climate migrants – and thereby, their potential need of receiving protection in other countries such as the Netherlands – by framing climate-induced migration along the lines of the *resilience: avoiding political responsibility* discourse. Correspondingly, in a web page on ‘how and why people migrate’, the Dutch government once again does not mention climate change as a possible migration source (Government, n.d.-i).

### ***Dutch climate policy***

Following most of the Dutch migration policy, the Dutch climate and development cooperation policies also disregard climate-induced migration. For instance, the country’s comprehensive ‘Climate

Plan’ – containing the outlines and economic impacts of the Dutch climate policy over the years 2021 till 2030 and addressing the latest scientific insights on climate change, technological developments, and international policy developments – does not devote one sentence on (future) migration or refugees due to climate change (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate, 2020). The Dutch ‘Climate Law’ that entered into force in 2020 and upon which the country’s Climate Plan is based does not do so either (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-b). Similarly, web pages on climate adaptation, the key climate plans for 2021 of the Netherlands, and the Dutch climate policy disregard the existence of climate-induced migration as well (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-j; n.d.-k; n.d.-l).

### ***Dutch development cooperation policy***

Similarly, although the Dutch cabinet acknowledges that developing countries are hit the hardest by climate change and that “development cooperation remains necessary as there are more conflicts, refugees and migrants than ever”, no direct link between climate change and migration is made in the country’s development cooperation policy (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-m, para. 3). The same goes for the specific sub-headings of ‘refugees and migration’ – in which the government stresses it wants to improve the reception and protection of refugees and displaced persons in their home region – and ‘international food security, sustainable agriculture and water management’ of the policy (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-n; n.d.-p). In the sub-heading of ‘climate in developing countries’, the government underlines it supports such countries with measures that counteract climate change and helps them to adapt to the consequences of a changing climate since “climate change may undermine development achievements”. Still, the impacts of climate change on migration are not considered (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.-o, para. 1).

Altogether, by barely mentioning the climate-migration relationship and not acknowledging the existence and needs of current or future climate migrants or refugees in its policy areas, the Dutch government takes no serious notice of climate-induced migration. Paradoxically, it does mention that increasing one’s resilience to the effects of climate change may limit irregular migration. By only recognising climate-induced migration when it comes to keeping affected populations in their countries of origin, this paradox implies that the government may aim to avoid its political responsibility and place it in the hands of other countries and climate migrants themselves instead. For that reason, it is argued that the *resilience: avoiding political responsibility* discourse prevails in Dutch policy.

### ***Dutch advisory reports***

Whereas the Dutch government seems to disregard climate-induced migration, three recent (requested) advisory reports to the government were found to thoroughly investigate the issue. For




instance, in a 2018 report for the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security, the Dutch Advisory Committee for Immigration (ACVZ) stressed that without international agreements on the reception and relocation of climate migrants, uncontrolled migration will significantly increase (ACVZ, 2018). Additionally, in 2020, the Planning Agency for the Living Environment (PBL) found that the majority of Dutch citizens believe that current (international) climate policy does not suffice in tackling climate change (Bouma et al., 2020). The study also found that, in terms of the effects of climate change, Dutch citizens particularly worry about the potential arrival of climate refugees. Lastly, a Dutch consultancy, Futureconsult, advised the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment on future societal diversity scenarios resulting from migration (Bosch et al., 2019). Although their report emphasises the current uncertainty in quantifying future climate migrants, the authors stress that in the case of large amounts of climate migrants applying for asylum in the Netherlands, this will pose serious challenges for the Dutch integration policy and for maintaining societal support for welcoming migrants (ibid.).

In their own ways, all three reports prepare, stimulate or pressure a policy response of the Dutch government on (the effects of) climate-induced migration.

## 6.2 EU policy (agenda)

FIGURE 11

*Discourses used by the EU*



### *EU migration policy*

Unlike the Dutch migration policy, which was found to mention the climate-migration relationship to a small extent, the relationship is absent in its EU counterpart. In three web pages of the European Council and the Council on (1) the EU’s migration policy, (2) a timeline of the key policy

developments of the supranational organisation since 2015 to respond to migratory pressures, and (3) the rules and frameworks adopted by the organisation to manage legal migrations flows, no connection between the two policy areas is made (General Secretariat of the Council, 2021-b; 2021-c; 2021-d). The same goes for a web page and factsheet on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), a system established in 1999 to set out common standards and cooperation on the treatment of asylum seekers in Europe (European Commission, n.d.-b; 2014). In the Qualification Directive clarifying when the EU grants international protection to third-country nationals or stateless persons – one of the legislative instruments governing the CEAS – no attention is given to the consequences of climate change or environmental factors in general on migration either (Directive 2011/95).

A disregard of climate-induced migration was also found in the EC's proposal for a New Pact on Migration and Asylum issued in September 2020. Providing for "a comprehensive common European framework for migration and asylum management", the Pact consists of five new legislative proposals reforming the CEAS (General Secretariat of the Council, 2021-e). Neither the official proposal of the Pact nor its accompanying working document mentions the impact of climate change (Proposal 2020/610; Commission Staff Working Document 2020/207). This disregard also applies to the outline of the EC's legislative proposals from 2016 to reform the CEAS that remained unaffected by its 2020 proposal (General Secretariat of the Council, 2021-e) – including the proposal to reform the Qualification Directive mentioned above (Proposal 2016/0223).

### *EU climate policy*

Similar to the web pages on the EU's migration policy mentioned above, a web page highlighting the key policy efforts of the EU against climate change does not address the consequences of climate change on migration (General Secretariat of the Council, 2021-a). Adopted in June 2021, the very first European Climate Law setting into legislation the goal to achieve a climate-neutral EU by 2050 does not do so either (General Secretariat of the Council, 2021-f; Regulation 2020/0036). Hence, it seems as though the EU might seek to disregard climate-induced migration to avoid taking a political stance on the issue.

Then again, the European Green Deal, a proposal of the Commission "aiming to set Europe on the path of transformation to a climate-neutral, fair and prosperous society" upon which the European Climate Law is based, does mention the climate-migration relationship (General Secretariat of the Council, 2021-g, para. 6). Specifically, the EC's communication document of the proposal, presented in December 2019, states that the EU recognises global climate and environmental challenges as a source of instability and crucial threat multiplier (Communication from the Commission 2019/640). To "prevent these challenges from becoming sources of conflict, food insecurity, population displacement and forced migration", it stresses that the EU and its partners will work to increase climate resilience globally (ibid.). By acknowledging that climate change can result in displacement

and forced migration, the use of the *mentioning the issue of climate-induced migration* can be recognised in the document. However, as the Commission only focuses on preventing these effects of climate change, it still seems to disregard the current existence of climate-induced migration.

The Commission's communication on the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change changes this. Endorsed by the Council in June 2021, the Strategy outlines the EU's vision "to become a climate-resilient society that is fully adapted to the unavoidable impacts of climate change by 2050" (General Secretariat of the Council, 2021-h, para. 1). In the accompanying communication document, the EC recognises the current existence of climate-induced migration by arguing that "the EU already is, and will increasingly be, affected by climate impacts outside Europe through cascading and spillover effects on trade or migration" (Communication from the Commission 2021/82). As a result, promoting international climate resilience is argued to be a simultaneous matter of solidarity and self-interest for the EU Member States. Demonstrating the EU's efforts in promoting climate resilience, the document stresses that between 2014 and 2019, the supranational organisation mobilised roughly 3.4 billion euros to support climate adaptation in Africa. It also mentions various projects and initiatives increasing climate resilience the EU's funding contributed to. Lastly, it underlines that "the EU will support and promote partner countries in developing local, national and regional adaptation and strategies for disaster risk reduction" (ibid.).

As the EU focuses on improving the resilience and adaptation possibilities of affected communities while acknowledging that it will increasingly be affected by climate-induced migration, the *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* discourse can be recognised. Whereas this implies that the supranational organisation considers migration as an adaptation strategy for those forced to move, it still does not indicate how it deals with or supports climate migrants. It should also be mentioned that the discourse is certainly not present in every EU climate policy document or web page as many do not mention climate-induced migration at all. Coming back to the Green Deal, for instance, the Commission's recent communication on the 'Fit for 55' proposals delivering the Deal, published in July 2021, disregards the consequences of climate change on migration again (Communication from the Commission 2021/550).

### ***EU development policy***

In terms of European development policy, in 2017, the European Consensus on Development – defining its "shared vision and action framework for development cooperation" – was adopted (European Commission, n.d.-c). In the Consensus, the EU stresses that "environmental degradation, climate change, extreme weather, and natural or man-made disasters can offset development gains and economic progress, especially for the poor" (European Commission, 2017, pp. 20). As these challenges "can increase vulnerabilities and needs, jeopardise peace and stability and cause large-scale migration", it is argued that environmental considerations, including preventive action, need to be

consolidated in all of the EU's development cooperation (ibid., pp. 20). Moreover, the environmental challenges are presented as a reason for the EU and its Member States to “promote resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and production”, for which a responsible private sector and the ‘polluter pays’ principle are argued to be critical (ibid., pp. 20).

Thus, besides mentioning the climate-migration relationship and focusing on the adaptation possibilities of affected communities in its climate policy, the EU alarmingly speaks of potential large-scale migration due to climate change and environmental disasters in its development policy. As it uses this non-quantitative but somewhat securitised prediction to stress the need for more environmentally-friendly policies in its Member States, a framing of climate-induced migration along the lines of the *securitisation to increase policy pressure* discourse was found as well.

Similar to a part of its climate policy, in the more specific ACP-EU partnership – the agreement on development cooperation with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries currently under the name of the Cotonou Agreement (European Commission, n.d.-d) – the EU was found to make use of the *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* discourse again. The sixty-ninth article of the negotiated Agreement – presented as “the most comprehensive partnership agreement ever signed between the EU and third countries” (ibid., para. 2) – states that the needs of displaced persons shall be taken into account “by adopting strategies towards mitigation, adaptation and resilience to natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation” (European Commission, 2021, pp. 53). An equivalent focus on adaptation and resilience was found in the 2019 Policy Coherence for Development report on the EU's development objectives that was reiterated in EU law through the previously addressed European Consensus on Development (Commission Staff Working Document 2019/20).

### ***Research by and for the European Parliament***

Besides being framed along the lines of different discourses in some sections of EU policy, climate-induced migration was also found to be at the heart of three studies (requested) by the EP. One of these is an extensive study on the legal and policy responses to climate-induced migration by the Parliament in 2011. Key to the study's main findings is the complexity and diversity of climate-induced migration as such migration strongly depends on the adaptation capacities and vulnerability of affected populations (European Parliament, 2011). Hence, although climate-induced migration is considered a helpful adaptation strategy to worsening climatic conditions, a significant quantitative prediction of climate migrants by 2050 is critiqued. Still, the study stresses that different policy responses are required at each stage of climate-induced migration, “ranging from actions to mitigate climate change, the offer of protection during the phase of displacement, and (re)integration or resettlement measures in the last stage” (ibid., pp. 10).

One of the study's specific policy recommendations to the EU – namely to assist third countries in dealing with adverse effects of climate change, such as by strengthening their resilience and adaptation capacities – was found to be incorporated in the EU climate and development policies analysed above. Several other recommendations – including those to promote complementary forms of protection for climate migrants, to promote the resettlement of affected individuals, and to support governments of affected countries to facilitate migration – were not found to be embraced (ibid.).

Several years later, in 2020, the EP requested a similarly comprehensive study on the legal and policy challenges concerning climate-induced migration. Whereas the study's main findings essentially correspond to those of its forerunner by underlining the complexity of climate-induced migration, its policy recommendations are slightly different (Kraler et al., 2020). Once again, it could be argued that one recommendation – namely to strengthen diverse forms of EU assistance to countries particularly affected by climate change and environmental disasters – is currently incorporated in the EU climate and development policies through its demonstrated focus on promoting climate resilience and adaptation possibilities. The other three recommendations – to strengthen conceptual clarity and define the EU's position on the impacts of climate change on migration, to establish a coherent EU policy addressing climate-induced migration and mainstream mobility considerations across programs and policies, and to take into account the effects of climate change in EU migration and asylum policies – were not found to be welcomed in current EU policy (ibid.).

The third study by the EP is not so much of a study as it is a 2019 briefing of the European Parliamentary Research Service on climate-induced migration. In line with what the sections above have outlined, the briefing states that “while the EU has so far not recognised climate refugees formally, it has expressed growing concern and has taken action to support and develop resilience in the countries potentially affected by climate-related stress” (Apap, 2019, pp. 1). Being characterised by a purely informative and relatively neutral nature, the briefing does not present any major policy recommendations (ibid.). Still, like the two studies addressed above, the document is relevant for this thesis as it indicates that climate-induced migration is an issue on the agenda of EU institutions.

## 7. Empirical overview and reflection


The following chapter serves as an overview and reflection of the findings presented in the previous three analysis chapters. The chapter is divided into two sections. First (7.1), per discourse on climate-induced migration, an overview of the findings in Dutch newspaper coverage is presented. The section addresses both the theoretical expectations for the maximalist and minimalist discourses and the theoretical contributions of the inductively found discourses of this study. Second (7.2), the compatibility between the framing in Dutch newspapers and policy areas is clarified. This compatibility is then compared with the theoretical expectations on the political influence of the media. Lastly, the section addresses how the framing of climate-induced migration in Dutch and EU policy areas relate.

### 7.1 Findings per discourse

Although chapter 4 has shown that Het AD, De Volkskrant, De Telegraaf and De NRC all frame climate-induced migration differently, the chapter has also shown that the maximalist discourse securitising such migration to push for policy change was found in a significant part of the coverage of all four. Providing an overview of the maximalist, minimalist, and other discourses found in the analysed articles, Figure 12 below highlights the dominance of the discourse.

**FIGURE 12**

*Overview of the discourses found in the Dutch media*



## 7.1.1 Maximalist discourses: theoretical expectations

### *Securitisation for policy pressure*

As shown in Figure 12, not far from half of the newspapers' coverage was published along the lines of the *securitisation to increase policy pressure* discourse. Hence, in line with the theoretical expectation based on the arguments of Baldwin et al. (2014), a maximalist discourse indeed prevails in the coverage. Corresponding with the logic of the Copenhagen School highlighting the distressing consequences of climate change on migration to legitimise pro-active environmental policies more easily (Trombetta, 2014), the articles using the discourse were found to either use alarming predictions or metaphors, such as a flood of climate migrants rattling at our gates, to present climate-induced migration and climate asylum as a future crisis. Generally, the articles used such a framing to stress that more robust climate measures, such as a sweeping CO<sub>2</sub> tax, or a formal recognition of climate refugees (in the Refugee Convention of the UN) are urgently needed. Remarkably, only about 21 per cent of the maximalist articles pushing for policy change was found to be directed at the Dutch climate, migration or development cooperation policy. The remaining majority was directed at the more general international political arena by calling upon world leaders to act.

### *Securitisation for border closure*

Still, whereas a maximalist discourse was, as expected, found to be dominant, not all theoretical expectations for the newspapers' coverage were met. Based on the arguments of Trombetta (2014) and Boas et al. (2019), an alarmist discourse to protect national borders in the Global North was expected to be dominant. Oppositely, Figure 12 shows that the *securitisation to keep borders closed* discourse was found in a mere four per cent of the coverage. Therefore, the findings do not support the scholars' argument that the maximalist framing has become subject to the (European) practice of controlling migration by creating a sense of fear of 'the other'. Interestingly, readers of De Telegraaf might believe differently. With a fairly large percentage (25 per cent) of De Telegraaf's coverage utilising the border security discourse (see Figure 5), its readers may believe the framing to reflect the reality of climate-induced migration more strongly than the readers of the other three newspapers. The far more substantial than average share of the discourse in De Telegraaf may reflect the newspaper's nature of being a popular edition. After all, presenting the climate-migration relationship as a crisis with disturbing effects for the Netherlands and Europe could be considered a search for sensation to attract more readers.

## 7.1.2 Minimalist discourses: theoretical expectations

### *Resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity*

The fact that Figure 12 shows that the two minimalist frames of climate-induced migration found to be used in the newspaper articles make up about 22 per cent of the total coverage can be considered remarkable as well. This number is surprising as a minimalist narrative – typically underlining the complexity of climate-induced migration and thereby challenging vast quantitative predictions of future climate migrants (Baldwin et al., 2014) – was only expected to (slightly) be found in Dutch and EU policy areas.

The most influential minimalist frame in the newspaper coverage – the *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* discourse (15 per cent) – was found almost exclusively in the coverage of De Volkskrant and De NRC only. In essence, the articles using the discourse focused on the consequences of climate change on migration in various countries. Some specifically stressed that the majority of climate-induced migration is internal, that such migration is affected by a range of economic and non-economic factors, that affected individuals may not be able to finance a move or may not desire to migrate due to other (cultural) reasons, or they highlighted the adaptation strategies of affected countries or individuals, including irrigation techniques and the use of more resistant crops.

By using the discourse in some of their articles, the newspapers emphasise the overall complex nature of climate-induced migration. Half of De NRC's and one of De Volkskrant's articles employing the discourse even reflect on this complexity to directly critique the systematic use of maximalist worst-case predictions of climate migrants. This critique and the more general acknowledgement of the intricate nature of climate-induced migration fits both newspapers' character of being more quality, analytical editions. As some of the articles employing the minimalist sub-discourse were found to highlight experiences of individuals strongly affected by the consequences of climate change, it is perhaps not surprising that – as expected and already highlighted in chapter 5.2 – the discourse corresponds best with the stories of climate migrants.

Overall, in a slight majority of the highly diverse stories of climate migrants, an individual or family used migration as an adaptation strategy (see Figure 7). In line with existing theory (Wyman, 2013; Boas et al., 2019), this majority mainly covered internal rather than international climate-induced migration. Figure 8 has shown the various factors shaping a decision to migrate – often forced as a last resort or only option to survive. While a forced move may already have been tragic enough by itself, several climate migrants stressed that fleeing elsewhere negatively affected their (economic) quality of life. Some others indicated they migrated more deliberately, searching for a better life for themselves or their family members. Hence, consistent with the findings of Mueller et al. (2020), increases in climate-induced migration may indicate better economic opportunities elsewhere. Still, despite finding better prospects elsewhere, a reasonable number of those belonging to the latter group expressed a general desire to move back to their homeland one day due to an intensely felt (emotional)



attachment with the land. As shown in Figure 8, in two stories, the motivation to migrate was alternatively based on the need to escape psychological trauma developed by experiencing an environmental disaster in one's homeland.

Figure 9, on the other hand, has reflected upon the various reasons why affected populations decided or were forced to stay. In more than half of the stories shedding light on the resilience of populations, an individual or family deliberately decided to stay for personal reasons. Thus, in conformity with the findings of Thomas and Benjamin (2008) and Allgood and McNamara (2017), cultural, historical or social ties with one's roots may be vital factors preventing migration. In some other stories, affected individuals stressed that they were forced to stay as they lacked the economic resources or contacts to prepare a move. Hence, as found by Thomas and Benjamin (2018) and Bhatta et al. (2015), climate-induced migration may typically be reserved for more economically privileged individuals or households. Another small amount of stories highlighted the adaptation efforts or plans of affected populations regarding farming techniques taking away the necessity to migrate.

In demonstrating the overall diverse and complex nature of climate-induced migration, both Figures 8 and 9 have also highlighted the impact of (a lack of) financial government support in the face of slow-onset climate change or after an environmental disaster on both decisions to migrate and not to. In a small number of primarily European stories, such support was indicated to have made it possible to migrate elsewhere or to have been a critical incentive to stay. In some other primarily non-European stories, the lack of such support was indicated to have made it impossible to stay in a heavily affected area or to have contributed to a general lack of financial resources forcing one to stay. Consequently, (financial) government support mirrors another factor shaping the complexity of using migration as an adaptation strategy to the effects of climate change.

### ***Resilience: avoiding responsibility***

The second minimalist frame found in the newspaper coverage – the *resilience: avoiding political responsibility* sub-discourse (seven per cent) (see Figure 12) – was found to shape a minor part of the articles of Het AD and De Volkskrant and a somewhat more prominent part of those of De NRC. Particularly recognised in articles published in the years when the topic of climate-induced migration was still new in the Dutch media (between 2006 and 2010), the newspapers typically used the frame to present such migration as an issue far away from the borders and (climate policy) responsibilities of Western countries. Simultaneously, the focus in such articles lies solely on the resilience of affected populations and countries in tackling and dealing with the consequences of climate change on migration themselves. Hence, in line with Methmann and Oels' (2015) critique, the minimalist resilience discourse was indeed found to (slightly) be used to avoid political responsibility. Surprisingly though, whereas the scholars stressed the existence of the framing in political arenas, they did not mention its use in media landscapes. In terms of the stories of climate migrants or affected

individuals who decided not to move (yet), none was found to reflect upon the existence of the sub-discourse.

### ***Resilience: good circulation of migrants***

The fact that only two minimalist frames were found in the Dutch media (see Figure 12) means that one sub-discourse – the *resilience: good circulation of migrants* discourse (see Table 1) – was not found to shape any newspaper coverage. This absence may be explained by the expected political rather than public or media use of the discourse essentially aiming to selectively welcome those migrants responsive to the needs of labour markets (Bettini, 2014). At the same time, the stories of two Tuvaluans who highlighted that international migration to neighbouring New Zealand was not possible for them reflected on the political existence of the discourse. Both individuals stressed they did not fit the right profile established by New Zealand to be granted protection from the rising sea levels as they were too old to offer the country something in return in terms of employment. Such a classification based on what climate migrants can offer to foster a country's economic development indeed shows the aim for a 'good circulation' of migrants, thereby downplaying their actual vulnerability. Thus, although no evidence was found for the existence of this practice in other countries, Bettini's (2014) critique of the political use of a resilience discourse on climate-induced migration is slightly supported.

## **7.1.3 Other discourses: theoretical contributions**

### ***Mentioning the issue of climate-induced migration***

Besides highlighting the maximalist and minimalist framing of climate-induced migration in the newspaper coverage, Figure 12 also shows the influence of the three inductive discourses of this thesis (see Table 2). With an overall 27 per cent influence, the *mentioning climate-induced migration as a non-securitized issue* discourse was found to slightly shape the coverage of De Telegraaf and significantly shape that of the other three newspapers. Generally, the articles using the discourse recognise the climate-migration relationship, sometimes as a possible (future) policy issue, but leave any predictions or details of the complexity of climate-induced migration untold. As the discourse is typically used in articles on different topics usually related to climate change, its contribution is argued to be to familiarise readers with the phenomenon of climate-induced migration in broad terms. For that reason, the discourse is not considered to be very informative or a ground-breaking theoretical contribution.

### *Different definition of climate migrants*

Despite almost solely being found in articles of De Telegraaf and only making up three per cent of the total coverage (see Figure 12), the existence of the *defining climate migrants differently* discourse is remarkable. First, by using an alternative definition of climate refugees – namely as individuals deciding to move within the Netherlands due to noise and health issues from green energy projects such as wind farms – articles using the discourse can be argued to downplay the ‘original’ definition of climate-induced migration and thereby deemphasise the vulnerability of affected populations. Second, most articles using the discourse additionally denigrate the Dutch government’s green energy efforts as the cause of the existence of alternative Dutch climate refugees.

Strikingly, all of De Telegraaf’s articles published since 2019 are framed along the lines of the discourse. This recency implies that the influence of the discourse downplaying the existence of ‘original’ climate-induced migration and the need for Dutch green energy measures may be expected to increase in De Telegraaf’s coverage in the upcoming years. Potentially, the discourse may also be picked up by other newspapers. For these two reasons, finding the discourse is considered to be a relevant contribution to the current theoretical understanding of the various ways in which climate-induced migration is framed.

### *Trivialising climate-induced migration*

Almost negligibly, the use of the inductive *trivialising climate-induced migration* discourse was found in one article of De Telegraaf published in 2006. In essence, the discourse was used to stress that without a scientific consensus on climate change and climate-induced migration predictions, worrying about climate refugees only reflects lunacy. Due to its mere one per cent influence on the total newspaper coverage (see Figure 12), the discourse is not argued to provide a critical theoretical contribution. Still, similar to the previously addressed other inductive discourses, it does show that the media debate on climate-induced migration is more fragmented than theoretically expected.

## **7.2 Findings on the policy influence of the media**

### *Dutch policy areas*

As reflected upon in chapter 6.1 and Figure 10, the way in which the Dutch government addresses or frames climate-induced migration in its migration, climate and development cooperation policies is striking. Whereas the growing impact of climate change on migration was found to be mentioned and therefore recognised in an official government letter to the Dutch parliament, besides this letter, a complete disregard of the existence of climate migrants was stumbled upon. Paradoxically, in a pillar of its migration policy, the government does mention that increasing vulnerable communities’ empowerment and resilience to the effects of climate change could be a way

to tackle irregular migration. Still, no sign of any (possible) assistance of the Netherlands to countries most vulnerable to or affected by climate-induced migration was found.

Altogether, with the Dutch government emphasising the impact of increased climate resilience in preventing migration but not acknowledging that staying in one's home country, region, or area may be impossible or far from desirable in some climate scenario's, the *resilience: avoiding political responsibility* discourse was argued to dominate Dutch policy areas in chapter 6.1. In line with Methmann and Oels' (2015) critique of the use of a resilience discourse, the government presumably disregards the existence and vulnerability of climate migrants to avoid having to deal with pressure for more radical climate measures. The government may also do so to avoid having to act upon the (potential) need of climate migrants in receiving assistance from or protection in other countries such as the Netherlands.

Regardless, the pervasiveness of the discourse and the lack of an official policy stance on climate-induced migration contrast with the (requested) advisory reports that were found to pressure a Dutch policy response on the issue. In terms of the theoretical expectations of this thesis, the discursive influence also contrasts with the expected prevalence of a maximalist framing of climate-induced migration to keep (European) borders close in Dutch policy areas. Moreover, it contrasts with the expected policy influence of the media and therefore, the similarity between the discourses used in the analysed newspaper articles and the policy areas on the issue – further addressed in the section below.

### *Contrasting newspaper coverage*

The fact that the *resilience: avoiding political responsibility* discourse dominating Dutch policy areas was only found to shape a mere seven per cent of the newspaper coverage implies a relatively weak policy (agenda-setting) influence of the media. One may argue that this influence is weak because it may be delayed. That is, the analysed articles may only become influential in upcoming years. However, for two reasons, this assumption is not made. First, previous findings on the media's political influence did not suggest such a delay of influence (see chapter 2.3). Second, at the time of writing, climate-induced migration has already been an issue in Dutch newspapers for fifteen years. Therefore, rather than still assuming an unlikely future influence of the newspaper articles, this section will address some factors set forth by various scholars that may explain the lack of policy influence.

First, however, two factors were found to contrast with the lack of media influence. One of these is the amount of media attention on climate-induced migration, an indicator found by Dekker and Scholten (2017). With over one hundred found and analysed articles on the issue, a strong influence on Dutch policy fields may have been likely. The other factor is the covering of adverse events or a crisis, a determinant found by Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006). Correspondingly, the prevailing *securitisation to increase policy pressure* discourse in the newspaper coverage – framing

climate-induced migration as an adverse (future) issue or crisis – may have been expected to pressure political actors to address such migration more thoroughly.

Nonetheless, multiple other conditions for a strong policy influence were found to be problematic. The most critical one might be Dekker and Scholten's (2017) found (lack of) frame consonance in the media. As shown in Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 and 13, various maximalist, minimalist and other discourses have been used by the Dutch newspapers in framing climate-induced migration. Whereas some similarities between the newspapers in terms of influential discourses were found, overall, the media debate on climate-induced migration is fairly fragmented. This lack of frame consonance is likely to have contributed to the absence of a clear definition and understanding of climate-induced migration for the Dutch public and policy-makers.

The problematic frame consonance is directly related to Walgrave and Van Aelst's (2006) condition of having unambiguous coverage clearly defining and proposing solutions to an issue. As found earlier, most of the discourses shaping the newspaper coverage defined and, in some cases, proposed ways to prevent or address climate-induced migration differently. Articles using the relatively influential *mentioning climate-induced migration as a non-securitised issue* discourse did not clearly define the issue in the first place. Hence, despite finding a dominant media discourse critiquing Dutch policy efforts and pressuring a policy response – thereby meeting Sevenans and Vliegthart's (2016) condition of using a conflict framing – the fragmentation of the media may have obstructed its policy (agenda-setting) impact.

A more general reason for the contrast between Dutch newspaper coverage and policy areas is that Walgrave and Van Aelst (2016) found the media's influence to be more significant on political actors or parties in government oppositions than coalitions as the former more regularly seek information that challenges the government. Therefore, climate-induced migration may be more of an issue in the policies of Dutch political parties that did not actively shape the country's migration, climate and development coordination policies in recent years. The policy positions of opposition parties were not analysed in this thesis, however. Lastly, another potential reason for the low policy influence has to do with Walgrave and Van Aelst's (2016) finding that political actors or parties react more strongly to issues they possess expertise over and 'own' in the public's eyes. In that case, the party expectedly responding to newspaper coverage on climate-induced migration most thoroughly would be the Dutch green party, GroenLinks. In the past decennia, however, GroenLinks has never been in the Dutch government coalition (NU.nl, 2017). As a result, the party has never been able to shape Dutch policy on climate-induced migration actively.

### ***Comparison with EU policy areas***

Interestingly, besides not corresponding with Dutch newspaper coverage for the possible reasons addressed above, the framing of climate-induced migration in Dutch policy areas does not

correspond with that in EU policy areas either. As shown before, the government of the Netherlands exclusively recognises the climate-migration relationship to prevent irregular migration. On the other hand, EU climate policy was found to acknowledge that climate impacts outside Europe already cause an increasing amount of climate-induced migration to Europe. For that reason, in its climate and development policies, the EU stresses its commitment to promote international climate resilience and develop adaptation strategies in affected countries – both as a matter of solidarity and self-interest for its Member States. The supranational organisation also provided examples of projects and initiatives increasing climate resilience that it funded, although these exclusively focus on preventing the need for climate-induced migration in Africa.

Overall, due to the focus and efforts on promoting climate resilience and adaptation efforts in affected countries, the *resilience: adaptation strategy and diversity* discourse was argued to dominate in EU policies (see Figure 11). Once again, this finding is not in line with the theoretical expectation of a prevailing maximalist framing of climate-induced migration to keep borders closed in the policy areas. At the same time, the finding implies that the EU's policy stance on such migration corresponds better with the experiences and needs of climate migrants – particularly the common desire not to move despite feeling the consequences of climate change – than its Dutch counterpart.

Still, by not having any policy arrangement in place to support or accommodate those for whom staying is impossible or far from desirable or to support governments of affected countries in dealing with climate-induced migration, the EU is only concerned with the first step of such migration: prevention. In other words, similar to the Dutch government but contrasting with the policy recommendations of the (requested) studies by the EP, the EU has no coherent policy addressing the climate-migration relationship and its effects on asylum. The protection, (re)integration and resettlement of climate migrants are currently all disregarded.

## 8. Conclusion

The concluding chapter of this thesis is divided into three sections. In the first (8.1), a summary of the findings and an answer to the research question are provided. In answering the research question, policy recommendations to the Dutch government are presented. The second section (8.2) addresses the limitations of this study. Last, in the third section (8.3), possible avenues for future research are outlined.

### 8.1 Summary and answer to the research question

Surprisingly, the CDA performed in this study has shown that different discourses on climate-induced migration than theoretically expected were found to prevail in Dutch newspaper coverage and Dutch and EU policy areas. In both the newspaper and policy coverage, a securitised framing of such migration to create a sense of fear of climate migrants and subsequently protect Fortress Europe was expected. Instead, in Dutch newspaper articles, a discourse alarmingly framing climate-induced migration to stress the urgency of far-reaching environmental policies to combat the effects of climate change (on migration) prevails. Presumably due to the overall fragmentation of the media landscape presenting the issue in various ways, however, the assumed similarity between the Dutch media and policy framing of the issue was not found. In other words, the lack of a consensus on what climate-induced migration exactly entails in the media and assumably for the audience of the newspapers, the Dutch society, may have resulted in a lack of clarity and pressure to politically address the issue in a certain way.

Indeed, instead of acknowledging and acting upon the international policy pressure on climate-induced migration, the Dutch government was only found to recognise the *possibility* of increasing the climate resilience of vulnerable populations in preventing *irregular* migration to its country. Taking this stance enables the government to avoid its responsibility of dealing with the issue in its migration, climate or development policies. By contrast, the EU was found to acknowledge the growing existence of climate migrants moving to Europe and have commitments and (funding) measures in place to promote climate resilience and adaptation efforts (in Africa). Still, similar to the Dutch policy stance, by not having any policy arrangement for people fleeing the inevitable consequences of climate change, the EU only focuses on the first stage of climate-induced migration: prevention.

To some extent, the EU's efforts on preventing or limiting the need of affected populations to use migration as an adaptation strategy resemble the needs or desires of climate migrants. After all, a significant number of people who did not migrate (yet) despite feeling the effects of climate change expressed a desire to stay in their homeland due to various cultural, historical or social reasons. Additionally, some climate migrants specifically indicated they would ideally move back to their

homeland one day. Then again, a more significant amount of climate migrants stressed that staying was impossible or far from desirable. Overall, by highlighting the diversity of factors shaping or necessitating the complex decision of whether to migrate in the face of climate change, the stories of climate migrants have shown that *the* climate migrant does not exist. In the end, everyone's story is different.

Altogether, the previous three paragraphs have provided an answer to the first part of the research question of this thesis, which read as follows: "*How is the concept of climate-induced migration constructed by Dutch newspapers, global climate migrants and in Dutch and EU policy areas, and how can Dutch policy-makers learn from this?*". By presenting six different policy recommendations based on the findings of how climate-induced migration is constructed or addressed, the section below will answer the second part of the research question.

### ***Policy recommendations***

First and foremost, following the EU, the Dutch government should face its task of (1) acknowledging that climate change will cause a growing amount of climate migrants to move to developed countries, including the Netherlands, in its policies related to the issue. Simply said, it is time for the government to officially recognise that, due to the impact of the once unlimited greenhouse gas emissions of those same developed countries, climate-induced migration is an unavoidable, environmentally unjust issue (for developing countries) that needs to be managed.

In line with the needs and desires of climate migrants, part of such management has to do with preventing or limiting the need of vulnerable populations to use migration as an adaptation strategy. Hence, in congruence with the previously mentioned EU's efforts in Africa, the Dutch government is recommended to (2) establish funding schemes to financially assist affected countries in reducing their vulnerability to climate change. The government could also set up projects to increase climate resilience and promote adaptation efforts in those countries, provided such projects are based on the principle of solidarity and the need to act upon its climate responsibilities instead of its economic interests.

Still, prevention is only the first stage of climate-induced migration. Despite a commonly found desire to stay in one's homeland, moving will often be necessary or most desirable. To take (part of) the responsibility of migration out of the hands of climate migrants and countries most vulnerable to or affected by climate-induced migration, the Dutch government should (3) take into account the ability of beneficiary countries to promote and address migration when necessary in establishing the recommended funding schemes. Such a consideration is critical given the (previous) findings of climate-induced migration mainly taking place within national borders and that without support, the less prosperous may not be able to migrate due to a lack of resources.



Then again, internal migration may not always take away the vulnerability of affected communities or may be problematic for other reasons. Therefore, the Dutch government is recommended to (4) become institutionally prepared for international climate-induced migration. To prevent an increase of uncontrolled migration, the issue needs to be addressed in the Dutch migration and asylum policy.

Additionally, (5) climate-induced migration should be mentioned in the Dutch climate policy in an effort to be transparent about the consequences of the country's past and ongoing contributions to climate change. Rather than being mentioned alarmingly to create a sense of fear of 'the climate migrant', climate-induced migration should be presented as an issue that must partly be resolved by becoming climate neutral as early as possible. In that regard, this thesis is a reminder of the urgency to invest in measures combatting climate change and thereby limiting the necessity of forced climate-induced migration (in the future). Essentially, a reminder to give up a destructive, polluted past and move towards a cleaner, more attractive future for all.

Lastly, building upon the recommendations outlined above, the Dutch government is recommended to (6) conduct or fund research on climate-induced migration to better understand the climate-migration relationship on national, regional and local levels. Besides being of general international relevance, such an improved understanding is required for the government to determine which vulnerable countries its financial assistance should be directed towards and to become institutionally prepared for the growing issue of climate-induced migration.

Crucially, with this thesis highlighting the diverse range of (individual) factors impacting a (forced) decision to migrate or not to, such research should include the experiences, needs and desires of vulnerable or affected populations. Only in this manner can (policy) decisions that disregard the perspectives of the exact people whose lives are impacted by these decisions be avoided. Equally crucial is that in conducting such research and adopting the other policy recommendations, it should not be overlooked that climate-induced migration occurs in more countries than only developing ones. Climate change increasingly forces residents of developed countries, including European ones such as the Netherlands, to migrate as well.

Altogether, by embracing the policy recommendations of this study and thereby acting upon its responsibilities in terms of environmental justice, the Dutch government can be a pioneer setting an example for other (European) countries in addressing the complex, unpredictable but critical phenomenon of climate-induced migration.

## 8.2 Limitations

Besides praising the findings and the societal and scientific relevance (see chapters 1.3 and 1.4) of this study, its limitations should also be brought up. Three major limitations are argued to prevail. First, regarding Dutch (and EU) policy areas, due to time constraints, this study did not investigate

whether or how parliamentary questions address the issue of climate-induced migration. Instead, by analysing policy documents, web pages, and reports or studies on the issue, the focus has mainly been on (government) positions that already made it through the policy agenda-setting stage. If the framing of climate-induced migration in parliamentary questions had been explored, the focus could have also been on the actual agenda-setting stage. In other words, whereas this study has only investigated policy positions, broader political positions on the issue of climate-induced migration could have been explored. By doing so, the study's findings on the political impact of the media might have been more in line with those of previous studies as the perspectives of actors and parties in the government opposition could have been investigated as well.

Second, as already touched upon in chapter 5.1, the findings of the stories of climate migrants that were analysed are unlikely to reflect the true nature of climate-induced migration. For this study, stories that were already given a podium in newspaper articles, documentaries or reports were selected. If it had been possible to select the stories randomly instead, the findings of their analysis might have been different. Still, as the stories were not analysed with the purpose of reflecting climate-induced migration in general, this lack of generalisability is not considered to be the main limitation here. Instead, the main limitation is the absence of differentiating the stories of individuals or families who experienced slow-onset climate changes and those who experienced sudden climate hazards. Such a separation may have been fruitful as people experiencing different types of consequences of climate change may also have different stories, needs and desires – for instance, in terms of returning to their homeland or not. Unfortunately, a lack of information prohibited the ability to differentiate the stories.

Third and last, the fact that the researcher was not an experienced or trained discourse analyst before carrying out this study may be a limitation. Due to this lack of experience, the CDA carried out in this study may be less thorough than ideally possible – certain discursive instances may have been overlooked. Additionally, the CDA may, to some extent, have been shaped by what Morse (2015) refers to as 'value-laden bias'. Instead of conducting the research from an entirely neutral stance, discursive instances framing climate-induced migration either in line or in conflict with the researcher's values may have been emphasised unfairly.

### **8.3 Future research**

Two relevant avenues for future research are proposed. First, while this study has contributed to a shift of focus on climate-induced migration from vulnerable sending areas to (potential) destination areas, more research doing so is needed. In other words, more research analysing how the governments of different (developed) countries than the Netherlands frame or address climate-induced migration is required. In terms of societal relevance, such research would help understand whether other actors of the international community responsible for the causes of climate change do, in contrast to the Dutch government, act upon the current policy pressure to address climate-induced migration.

Perhaps, more in line with the EU, other governments already have measures in place that support adaptation efforts in vulnerable countries to prevent the need for migration. Alternatively, they may already have measures in place that address the actual act of climate-induced migration, thereby being more progressive than the EU.

Moreover, in terms of scientific relevance, such future research could investigate whether other governments, unlike the Dutch, frame climate-induced migration more in line with a theoretically expected securitised discourse to keep borders closed. If not, some of the theoretical perspectives used in this study may be proven to be outdated. Such findings would be highly influential as, ultimately, the policy positions of (developed) countries may determine the extent to which climate-induced migration becomes a humanitarian or political crisis. Lastly, it should be mentioned that if future research on such policy positions additionally were to focus on the political influence of media coverage, it should also explore parliamentary questions on climate-induced migration. That way, as explained above in the first limitation of this study, the perspectives of actors and parties in government oppositions can also be investigated.

As regards the second proposed avenue, more research is required to analyse affected populations' stories, experiences, needs and desires. While this study has started to address the deficiency of input of such populations, more research doing so is needed to understand the diverse nature of climate-induced migration. In line with the findings of this study, such research will likely show the broad range of factors influencing a (forced) decision to use migration as an adaptation strategy or to stay in one's homeland. Doing so will also show that climate-induced migration is far more complex than suggested by alarming predictions of climate migrants, which minimalists typically critique for their lack of a sound methodological base.

Subsequently, a more widespread critique of alarming predictions may discourage the framing of climate-induced migration as a crisis or threat, thereby possibly decreasing a barrier perceived by governments to meaningfully address the issue in their policies. Building upon the second limitation of this study, future research addressing the deficiency of input of affected populations should, ideally, differentiate between experiences of slow-onset climate changes and sudden climate hazards.

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