INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS' SUPPORT TO NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS. POWERFUL OR INEFFECTIVE?

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Abstract

Just as the potential of the nonviolent method becomes clear and records of nonviolent resistance movements increases, data suggests a decline in the effectiveness of nonviolent strategies. It is in the interest of International Organisations to promote and support nonviolent resistance movements. This thesis builds upon the conviction that effective support to nonviolent resistance movements should be focused on increasing popular support, maintaining the nonviolent discipline, bringing out security defections and hindering violence against the movement. To investigate which types of support are given to and valued by the nonviolent movements, a qualitative content analysis of thirteen United Nations reports and interviews with members of resistance movements have been conducted. The results demonstrate the importance of the support by the International Organisations to the nonviolent resistance movements, especially in terms of legal aid and strategic advice. It is recommended for International Organisations to provide more tailor-made support by taking local contexts into account.

Keywords: Nonviolent Strategies, Resistance Movements, External Support, International Organisations

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Explanation
AFRABU	Association of Repatriated Women of Burundi
AIMGI	AIM Group International
APDH	Association pour la Paix et les Droits de l'Homme
CEDAC	Centre d'Encadrement et de Développement des Anciens Combattants
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
IO	International Organisation
MAFOBA	Mama's for Burundi
OHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OMCT	World Organisation Against Torture
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SOL Collaborative	International Solanaceae Genome Project
UN	United Nations
UN WOMEN	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

Introduction

Protests, boycotts, strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins – in the last few years, we increasingly hear about these nonviolent strategies used to challenge political powers worldwide (Chenoweth et al. 2019). More and more, nonviolent strategies have replaced armed struggle as a way to seek political change from outside the political system (Chenoweth 2020, 70). Research on nonviolent resistance movements only recently started from an empirical and analytical perspective (Nepstad 2013b, 591).

Nonviolent resistance is the foremost strategy for social and political change in the face of oppression – that is the dominant conviction in the literature on political violence (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 95). In the long run, nonviolent resistance outperforms violent resistance. Movements that opt for a violent strategy usually realise destruction, fighting and killings, without realising the goals previously determined (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 96). There are multiple explanations for the success of the nonviolent strategy found in the literature.

First, nonviolent resistance movements are more successful in attracting supporters from different backgrounds. Nonviolent resistance movements differ largely in terms of their goals, but all have in common that they gain broad-based support, are able to produce security defections and can employ a multiplicity of nonviolent tactics. Historical records have proven that movements with broad-based popular support have a higher probability to reach their goals (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 96). The bigger the movement, the more likely it is to seriously disrupt the current state of affairs. Second, movements with broad-based support, including women, professionals and religious figures, are also less likely to risk violent oppression of security forces against the movement. Often, security forces are more reluctant to use violence against crowds that could be their neighbours and relatives (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 97).

Third, besides broad-based support and bringing out security defections, the success of nonviolent resistance movements requires careful planning and coordination. Nonviolent campaigns are rarely spontaneous, and success often depends on strategically planning for multiple years ahead (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 97). The use of social media to recruit participants and report actions in real-time also became important to include in the list of tactics (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 98). Fourth, nonviolent resistance movements are more aware of oppressive behaviours because they are often resisting this type of behaviour (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, 275). As argued by Davenport and Trivedi, activism can activate awareness of those who engage in it, but not all forms of activism are of equal likeliness to generate this (2013, 372). Forms of activism that involve a lot of interaction with other activists, increase the awareness of the problem that is being addressed. This is especially the case for nonviolent resistance tactics. This is relevant for recruiting new activists, generating sympathy with the movement and receiving financial donations (Davenport and Trivedi 2013, 381).

Today, nonviolent resistance has become the most common method to challenge regimes. There are multiple reasons for this shift towards using nonviolent methods instead of violent methods. First,

nonviolent resistance is globally recognized as a more legitimate and successful method for creating change. There is a normative shift towards the value of fairness and protection of human rights, which may have increased the interest in nonviolent resistance as a way to advocate for human rights (Chenoweth 2020, 72). In addition, first nonviolent struggle often went unreported, but with the introduction of social media, more people have become aware of nonviolent events seeking political change (Chenoweth 2020, 71).

Besides increased records of nonviolent resistance movements, there are also data suggesting the decline in the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance strategies. Nonviolent campaigns have succeeded less often in the last ten years in comparison to their historical counterparts (Chenoweth 2020, 79). One explanation is the increased understanding of the nonviolent method to seek political change. Governments found ways to suppress the unarmed struggle, without triggering sympathy for the movement (Chenoweth 2020, 76). Another explanation is the overemphasis on mass demonstrations by contemporary nonviolent resistance movements while neglecting other types of nonviolent resistance strategies. Boycotts, strikes and sit-ins are for instance more effective to put pressure on elites because they can disrupt normal life and cause economic concerns (Chenoweth 2020, 78).

There are questions about how responses of the international community to nonviolent resistance movements can shape the resistance struggles. Some argue that international support can be harmful to nonviolent resistance movements (Chenoweth 2011; Nepstad 2013b; Francis 2019). On the contrary, others suggest that resistance movements benefit from international assistance (D. Ritter 2014; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Clifford 2005; Salehyan 2009). And a third position claim that support of International Organisations (IOs) will have no impact on the outcome of nonviolent movements (Stroup and Wong 2017; Jackson 2019).

What has been agreed upon is that it is in the interest of IOs to promote nonviolent resistance movements. Research has shown that civil resistance advances democracy, challenges authoritarianism and promotes democratisation (Chenoweth 2020). The promise of civil resistance suggests a "responsibility" to assist nonviolent activists. The common idea is to support nonviolent resistance movements before confrontations between activists and governments turn into violent conflicts (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 96). In addition, by supporting nonviolent resistance movements, IOs are showing a commitment to the nonviolent strategy. Nonviolence goes beyond the refusal to use violence. At its core is the idea of self-rule and self-government, and the uplift of all, as Gandhi described it (Baldoli and Radaelli 2019, 1167).

By analysing how IOs support nonviolent resistance movements, this research will conclude on which steps IOs can take to be of best support to those movements. The research question will therefore be: *What type of support by International Organisations provided to nonviolent movements will benefit the movements and contribute to peace and state-building?* This introduction explained the success factors of nonviolent movements and justified why it is in the interest of IOs to support nonviolent resistance movements. The first chapter will explain the different viewpoints on how the support of IOs

affects nonviolent movements. After explaining and justifying the research design, the third chapter will analyse the United Nations' support strategy to nonviolent movements, and the fourth chapter will study how effective IOs' support is perceived by the members of the resistance movements, using a qualitative comparative case study. Finally, it will be concluded what types of support are valued by the nonviolent movements and what the lessons learned are for IOs involved in peace and state-building.

Research Question	What type of support by International Organisations provided to nonviolent movements will benefit the movement and contribute to peace and state-building?
Sub-question 1	What type of support do IOs provide to nonviolent resistance movements?
Sub-question 2	What type of support is perceived to be beneficial by the members of the nonviolent movements?
Sub-question 3	What are the lessons learned regarding support to nonviolent resistance movements for IOs and powerful states involved in peace and state building?

Table 1 – Research Questions

Chapter 1 - Theoretical Framework

The Effective Support of IOs to Nonviolent Resistance Movements

Nonviolent resistance is generally defined as "a nonviolent method of struggle people use to achieve collective goals" (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 6). A more extensive definition of nonviolent resistance is the one by Roberts, included in many research projects. Roberts defines nonviolent resistance as "a range of widespread and sustained activities that challenge a particular power, force, policy, or regime – hence the term 'resistance'" (Nepstad 2013b, 591). This research defines nonviolent resistance as the collective activity of fighting for shared civil goals by using nonviolent tactics.

International organisation (IO) is defined as "the institution drawing membership from at least three states, having activities in several states, and whose members are held together by a formal agreement" (Mingst n.d.). IOs include both International Nongovernmental Organisations (INGOs) as well as International Governmental Organisations (IGOs). INGOs are formal private organisations that undertake activities to support people across the world. This includes advocacy organisations and humanitarian organisations, such as Amnesty International. IGOs are multilateral government organisations, such as the United Nations (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 16).

1.1 Five perspectives on IOs support to nonviolent resistance movements

How do IOs affect nonviolent resistance movements? The research findings on this question are contradictory. Chenoweth and Stephan have categorised the literature on external support to nonviolent resistance movements into four perspectives – Optimists, Sceptics, Uncommitted and Strategists. This research proposes one extra perspective – the Non-Believers.

Optimistic perspective

Optimists argue that support of IOs has important and positive impacts on nonviolent actors. First, movements need resources to advance their recruiting strategies and coordinating activities (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 103; Clifford 2005, 5). A combination of funds and assistance from experts can support the setup and the maintenance of social movement organisations (Chenoweth 2011, 23; Clifford 2005, 10; Salehyan 2009, 10). An interesting argument is made by Bunce and Wolchik, claiming that democratic support, such as independent media and education, can be important for the success of the civil resistance movements (2011, 120).

The second positive effect of IOs' support to nonviolent resistance is that assistance makes it harder for autocratic leaders to silence activists. By promoting nonviolent movements and threatening with targeting sanctions and military intervention, autocratic leaders will be less likely to act violently against the movements (D. Ritter 2014, 169; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 34).

Sceptical perspective

On the other hand, sceptics demonstrate the argument that support of IOs can undermine the essence of nonviolent resistance movements. Firstly, because nonviolent resistance movements are reliant on "people power", the power from below, for their success. Activists might perceive the assistance of IOs as tied to foreign interests. As a result, the local roots of legitimacy and essence of people power will be undermined (Chenoweth 2011; Nepstad 2013b, 595).

Second, the support of IOs can undermine another success factor of nonviolent resistance movements, namely defections from military security forces. Research found that external assistance to nonviolent movements makes defections less likely to occur. A possible explanation for this can be the growing belief that the movement is a foreign conspiracy with the intention to undermine the nation (Perkoski and Chenoweth 2018, 23). Third, it has been argued that international support can drive the movement away from its principal goals into the direction of the donor's interests (Francis 2019, 276). Therefore, sceptics argue that movements should be careful to seek or accept external assistance.

Non-Believers perspective

This final point relates to the third perspective – the non-believers perspective. This perspective can be regarded as a side branch of the sceptics, arguing that even though the support of IOs to nonviolent resistance movements can be effective, movements themselves are not willing to accept it. This perspective is distinguished from the other perspectives because it does not look at the (in)effectiveness of IOs support to nonviolent resistance movements but goes one step back looking into the process of resisting the support. Local resistance is an important theme in the practice of international peacebuilding. There are multiple motivations that encourage local resistance to external support, such as the desire to protect their power and interests, and anti-foreign power sentiments (Lee 2015).

Academics have put forward evidence of the friction between international support and local contexts. It is useful to look at the post-liberal peace theory to understand the crackdowns in the cooperation between local and international. It has been argued that international actors and policies have been romanticised, and the local have been displaced. Due to a lack of understanding or agreement between international and local actors, there is resistance at the local level. This problem is being recognized amongst most international actors, emphasizing the importance of working with the local, instead of expecting the local to comply (Richmond and Pogodda 2016, 8).

Post-liberal peace theory suggests that peacebuilding should include a local discourse as well as international wisdom – cooperation between local and international (Richmond 2010, 687). It involves the development of hybrid processes and institutions that engage with security, rights, needs and identity in ways recognisable to both local and international constituencies (Richmond and Pogodda 2016, 13). It is therefore critical for IOs to engage from the ground up and to include local views (Belloni 2012, 34).

Uncommitted perspective

Another group of scholars, the uncommitted, state that it is not possible to examine the effect of external support on movement outcomes. They argue that organisations decide to support movements that are already winning, instead of picking movements at random (Jackson 2019, 18–19; Stroup and Wong 2017, 140).

Strategist perspective

A final and fifth perspective, the strategist, believes that are a few general rules about the effectiveness of external assistance to nonviolent resistance movements (Kinsman and Bassuener 2016, 34; Palmer 2005, 59). This group of scholars looks at the attempts of movements to gain more power, which can be for instance increased popular support and loyalty of security forces. The resistance movements profit both tactically and strategically from these main elements of power (Dudouet 2015). This fifth perspective is concerned with the politics of external assistance and takes both the strategies of the resistance movements and the opponents into account.

Strategists accept that IOs are themselves interest parties. However, instead of seeing this as a challenge to nonviolent resistance movements, they consider it a political fact (Perkoski and Chenoweth 2018, 23–24). The focus must be on increasing the movement's power. As explained in the introduction, nonviolent movements are successful in attracting supporters from different backgrounds (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 96), which consequently makes it less likely to risk violent oppression (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 96-97) and more likely to generate sympathy with the movement (Davenport and Trivedi 2013, 381). Therefore, the assistance must help with increasing popular participation, maintaining the nonviolent discipline, bringing out security defections and hindering violence against the movement (see figure 1). To realize this, IOs must understand which types of support will be effective (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 11).


Figure 1 - Theoretical Framework

This study will position itself in the strategist perspective, and also links to the post-liberal peace theory. Strategic forms of support can be important for the movement's successes in the long run and it is a challenge for IOs to adopt local contexts into their program's views (Belloni 2012, 30). This research will build upon a mixed-method research project by Chenoweth and Stephan. They examined the effect of different forms of external support on the outcome of maximalist nonviolent movements. These are movements with revolutionary goals to either overthrow an incumbent government or seek independence of colonial power, and for this type of movements, it is easy to determine whether it succeeded or not. This research will investigate the impact of IOs' support on non-maximalist nonviolent resistance movements. These movements do not have revolutionary goals as been studied by Chenoweth and Stephan (2021, 6). They use nonviolent methods like protests and strikes to achieve more diverse and collective goals, such as racial justice and the improvement of human rights.

Chapter 2 - Research Design

The theoretical framework set out in the previous section gives some predictions about when the support of IOs is effective for nonviolent resistance movements. The objective is to develop an in-depth understanding of the types of IOs' support given to and valued by non-maximalist nonviolent resistance movements, and to develop these findings into recommendations for IOs. Deriving from the theoretical framework, the following hypotheses have been constructed (see table 2):

Factors (IV)	Hypotheses
Increase popular support	If the support of the IO is focused on increasing broad-based popular support, it is expected that the nonviolent resistance movement will benefit from the assistance (Clifford 2005; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Salehyan 2009; Chenoweth and Stephan 2014; 2021).
Maintain nonviolent discipline	If the support of the IO is focused on maintaining the nonviolent discipline, it is expected that the nonviolent resistance movement will benefit from the assistance (Chenoweth 2011; Chenoweth and Stephan 2021).
Bring out security defections	If the support of the IO is focused on bringing out security defections, it is expected that the nonviolent resistance movement will benefit from the assistance (Perkoski and Chenoweth 2018; Chenoweth and Stephan 2021).
Hinder violence against movements	If the support of the IO is focused on hindering violence against the movement, it is expected that the nonviolent resistance movement will benefit from the assistance (D. Ritter 2014; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Table 2 – Factors, Hypotheses and References

The study approach is qualitative because it seeks to grasp the underlying motivations and strategies, and effectiveness of IOs' support to non-maximalist nonviolent movements. The effectiveness of the support to non-maximalist campaigns cannot simply be measured by looking at statistics. The movements' objectives are plural and diverse, going beyond revolutionary goals for which success can more easily be determined (Clifford 2005, 9–10). Qualitative research allows for these deeper insights and understandings about the effectiveness of IOs' support to nonviolent resistance movements. The hypotheses will be tested through a qualitative comparative case study. A qualitative comparative case study is "a research design that entails the logic of comparison of two or more cases in order to generate theoretical insights" (Bryman 2016, 689). This qualitative study aims to generate a more in-depth understanding of the strategist theory.

2.1 Case selection

The strategist theory will be further explored and developed into concrete recommendations for IOs. This will be done by looking at the United Nations (UN) support strategy to nonviolent resistance movements. The UN's role in world politics is irreplaceably by any other international body, since it is the largest and most representative IO in the world today, counting 193 member states from all continents (United Nations n.d.). The UN has made significant contributions to international peace and security, as well as respecting and promoting human rights. Scholars argue that what happens at the UN

affects agendas and focuses global attention and assumptions. In the long run, the patterns and rhetoric that emerge within the UN have global ramifications, influencing relationships and agendas of other IOs (Kirkpatrick 2007, 97; Gordenker 2017, 4). Therefore, focusing on the UN is a justified choice for this research, since the UN's support strategy can generally be taken as a guide for other IOs. This research will focus on four UN bodies that are dealing with the promotion of human rights and are actively supporting nonviolent resistance movements; the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN Women and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Supplementary, a case comparison of five nonviolent resistance movements in Burundi will be conducted. Since the country's independence, it has been marked by massive political instabilities and numerous outbreaks of violence. The situation continues to affect the lives of the most vulnerable, resulting in a rise of development and humanitarian needs, as well as an intensification of external and internal displacement (Chaturvedi 2019, 12). Human rights violations are common in Burundi. The UN and other IOs strive to protect and promote human rights. For example, in collaboration with partners, the UN developed a national network of mediators in Burundi to prevent conflict and promote human rights (Chaturvedi 2019, 18).

The case study movements in Burundi have been selected based on a most similar system design (MSSD). The focus of MSSD is on cases that are as similar as possible with respect to as many features as possible, except for some important differences that are found in otherwise similar cases (Przeworski and Tuene 1970, 32). The selected case study movements are similar in terms of geography and regional contexts, and also in terms of their goals – using nonviolent strategies to defend and promote human rights in Burundi. The movements differ on the amount and types of international support they receive (Dependent Variable). The research study will focus on the movements' activities and support from 2010 until 2020.

2.2 Methods of data collection and analysis

Effective support of IOs to human rights nonviolent resistance movements measurement
The effectiveness of IOs' support to the nonviolent resistance movements will be measured by looking at how the nonviolent resistance movements perceive external support. Support can only be effective when it is accepted by the beneficiaries. Therefore, it must first be analysed how the activists responded to the external support. For this, statements by the movements regarding international support will be analysed, using insights from interviews with members of the movements. Second, manifestations of the selected case study movements will be used to identify the movements goals. The members of the movements will be asked about the current state of affairs and whether the goals have been achieved.

Increase popular support measurement

Does the support by the UN have the aim to increase broad-based popular support of the nonviolent resistance movement? For this, a content analysis of thirteen UN reports will be conducted. This will be done by systematically and rule guided classifying text segments to codes within the developed coding scheme (Burla et al. 2008, 113). The coding scheme contains ten different categories of types of support (see Appendix A.2). According to Chenoweth and Stephan, pre-campaign training, technical support, and safe passage for defectors, and peak-campaign training, moral/symbolic support and sanctions against the regime are effective types of support to increase popular support (2021, 95–96).

Second, it will be investigated if the case study movements also gained broad-based popular support within the established time frame. For this, insights from interviews with members of the movements will be used.

Maintain nonviolent discipline measurement

Does the support by the IO have the aim to maintain the nonviolent discipline of the nonviolent resistance movement? Again, a content analysis of the thirteen UN reports will be conducted as explained above. Pre- and peak-campaign technical support are both effective types of assistance to help nonviolent movements maintain their nonviolent discipline (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 95–96). In addition, records of violent conflicts with the involvement of the selected case studies will be set out. For this, insights from the members of the movements will be used.

Bring out security defections measurement

Does the support by the IO have the aim to bring out security defections? Again, a content analysis of the thirteen UN reports will be conducted as explained above. Pre-campaign training and safe passage for defectors, and peak-campaign technical support and preventing/mitigating repression are identified by Chenoweth and Stephan as effective types of support to bring out security defections (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 95–96). Second, security and military support of the selected case studies will be examined using the insights from interviews with members of the movements.

Hinder violence against movement measurement

Does the support by the IO have the aim to hinder violence against the nonviolent resistance movement? For this, a content analysis of the thirteen UN reports will be conducted as explained above. Training and civilian protection are the most effective types of support to hinder violence against movements (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 95–96). Moreover, insights from the members of the movements will be used to determine whether there has been massive violence against the movement.

2.3 Content analysis

As explained above, this research will use qualitative content analysis of the case study movements' manifestations and UN reports. The thirteen UN reports from four different UN bodies published between 2010 and 2020 (see Appendix B) will be used to analyse the UN's support strategy to nonviolent resistance movements. In particular, it will be analysed if the UN's support strategy is aimed at increasing popular support, maintaining the nonviolent discipline, bringing out security defections and hindering violence against the movement (see Appendix A.2), based on the literature (Salehyan 2009, 10; D. Ritter 2014, 169; Dudouet 2015; Chenoweth and Stephan 2014, 96–97; Davenport and Trivedi 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 95–96). This will be done by systematically and rule guided classifying text segments to codes within the developed coding scheme (Burla et al. 2008, 113).

To analyse the UN reports, excel tables have been created, containing the types of support, coding examples, and text fragments of the reports. The categories in this study were developed using a deductive methodology (Bengtsson 2016, 10), which implies that they are based on past research and theories, mainly the recent study by Chenoweth and Stephan (2021). Text fragments have been categorised into ten types of external support; namely financial support, moral/symbolic support, technical support, training, nonviolent civilian protection, sanctions against regime, safe passage for defectors, preventing/mitigating oppression, unspecified and other (see Appendix A.1 and A.2.). Before categorising the text fragments, a list of previously defined words and examples for which suit each foundation has been created (see Appendix A.1). The analysis employs paragraphs as recording units to perform the categorization. Examining paragraphs has the advantage of not being solely reliant on words, which allows for broader interpretation (Halperin and Heath 2017, 346). Content analysis is a robust tool, and therefore, the possibility of biased outcomes cannot be excluded. Awareness of this pitfall during the analysis of the UN reports should have minimalized this bias. Content analysis does capture general trends, on which further implications can be drawn (Davis, Love, and Fares 2019, 270).

2.4 Interviews

To understand how the support by the UN and other IOs is perceived by the members of the resistance movements, several interviews have been requested at the start of the research project. The semi-structured interviews ask about what type of support the movements have received, and if they thought it benefited the movement and in what way (see Appendix C.1). In total, over 35 nonviolent resistance movements have been contacted in several ways.

Unfortunately, the interview recruiting process did not go as planned, and many individuals did not respond to the emails and messages via Facebook/LinkedIn. In the end, five interviews via conference call and conversations via email have been conducted. The insights from these exchanges will be used as primary data. The qualitative interview method also carries the potential of biased outcomes, but by adding extra interviews, this pitfall has been minimized. The interviews do not aim to generalize findings but rather to get an insider's perspective.

Chapter 3 – United Nations' Support Strategy

This chapter aims to determine what types of support the UN provides to nonviolent resistance movements (sub-question 1). Lastly, the types of support will be linked to the hypotheses to conclude on which aspects the UN's support strategy is (in)effectively helping movements with increasing popular support, maintaining nonviolent discipline, bringing out security defections and hindering violence against movements.

1. **Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders (OHCHR)**
2. **United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**
3. **UN Women**
4. **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

3.1 Focus of support 2010-2020

The UN's support strategy to nonviolent resistance movements remained largely the same in the last decade. In all thirteen reports, technical support, legal aid specifically, is the most dominant type of support to nonviolent resistance movements. In terms of protective accompaniment, the examples given in the reports are similar over the years, being mediation between conflict partners and monitoring local conditions. In almost all reports there is very little emphasis on putting sanctions against the regime and providing safe passage for defectors (see Appendix B).

There are however some changes in terms of main goals and focus. First, more collaboration between different UN bodies has been realised, as mentioned in almost all thirteen reports. The desire for inter-organisational cooperation as well as a call for the UN structure to be more efficient and coherent is frequently addressed (U. United Nations 2008, 12; S. R. United Nations 2008, 7; U. W. United Nations 2011, 14; O. United Nations 2013, 7). There is a commitment of UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UN Women and OHCHR to work in closer collaboration to protect civic space and human rights defenders, and to develop joint programmes (U. United Nations 2017, 3; U. W. United Nations 2017, 20; S. R. United Nations 2018, 16; O. United Nations 2016, 9). In addition, some reports brought up the commitment to work in closer cooperation with other relevant partners, such as FAO, World Bank and WFP (U. W. United Nations 2017, 21; O. United Nations 2016, 9). The Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund (WPHF) is an example of a joint programme and closer collaboration between different UN bodies and other relevant partners (U. United Nations 2017, 15).

The second development in the UN's support strategy is the frequently mentioned opportunity of using new digital technologies. UN social media outreach platforms have been launched to reach more human rights activists globally (O. United Nations 2013, 2). Looking at social media as a powerful

and effective communication tool is also present in other recent reports (O. United Nations 2020b, 3) Nevertheless, online space and digital technologies can also have negative impacts on civic space. Opposing voices can be intimidated and censored through the use of surveillance technology, and misinformation and hateful messages can be disseminated (O. United Nations 2020a, 3).

Finally, the phrase *"leaving no one behind"* is mentioned in almost all recent reports as a call for more inclusive participation (United Nations 2020, 2; O. United Nations 2020b, 2; U. W. United Nations 2017, 12; WPHF 2019, 8; U. United Nations 2017, 3). It means that the most vulnerable in society must be prioritized in receiving protection and support. An example of this is the support given by WPHF to local community-based organisations in the most fragile countries around the world.

3.2 Types of support 2010-2020

Besides these changes in terms of goals and focus described above, there are also shifts in how technical support, training and moral/symbolic support are provided to the nonviolent resistance movements.

Technical support

Looking at the reports published around 2010, there is a great emphasis on the legal framework provided by the UN bodies to support the movements (S. R. United Nations 2008, 6). For instance, it is often mentioned that the UN should work to "*support the adoption and implementation of constitutional reforms and other measures in laws and policies*" (U. W. United Nations 2011, 16). Similarly, OHCHR mentions the importance of "*appealing to Governments for full implementation of the Declaration on human rights defenders*" (S. R. United Nations 2008, 7). Legal aid is a type of pre-campaign technical support, which can be effective to increase participation and maintain the nonviolent discipline, according to Chenoweth and Stephan (2021, 95).

In the following ten years, technical support remained the dominant type of support to nonviolent resistance movements by the UN. Besides providing legal aid, the UN has become more committed to providing strategic advice to nonviolent resistance movements. UNDP and OHCHR also mentioned that there is no one-size-fits-all advice to nonviolent resistance movements. Instead, it is important to provide tailor-made advice (U. United Nations 2017, 10). A solution must be built for each particular situation, looking for new ways to resolve problems and trade-offs in the face of uncertainty (O. United Nations 2020b, 17). This idea is in line with the post-liberal peace theory. Complex problems can have varying effects on different groups of people, necessitating a tailored approach to ensure that no one is left behind (U. United Nations 2017, 8).

Training

Besides legal aid, the emphasis of the UN's support strategy is on providing and facilitating training. As mentioned in the UN Women Strategic Plan, it is important to "*develop a strong learning culture*

founded on results-based management, reporting, knowledge management and evaluation" (2011, 13). The UN assists program countries to increase the capacity of human rights defenders by providing training on how to design and execute development plans that are tailored to their particular national circumstances and goals (U. United Nations 2008, 21).

In the reports from 2018, 2019 and 2020, there is great attention on skills development and leadership training of staff at local UN offices and leaders of civil society movements (WPHF 2019, 31; U. W. United Nations 2017, 18; O. United Nations 2016, 15). For instance, UN women developed an online training curriculum for its local-based staff and implementing partners on programming and results-based management (U. W. United Nations 2017, 24). Other training examples include the OHCHR-supported specialist programs aimed at preparing civil society actors to engage in public relations, introducing them to international meetings, and improving their advocacy and negotiating skills (O. United Nations 2016, 15).

Moral/symbolic support

Concerning moral/symbolic support, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights emphasised the importance of country visits and relationship building in its 2008 report. By visiting countries, the Special Rapporteur engages in meaningful conversations with governments and collaborates with national authorities (S. R. United Nations 2008, 7). Its main objectives are to raise awareness on the human rights violations, monitor local conditions, and protect human rights defenders (S. R. United Nations 2008, 8).

Country visits is still an important way to support human rights defenders, however, this strategy is less frequently mentioned in the 2018 report in comparison to the 2008 report. Instead of visiting vulnerable countries, social media has become an important communication tool to provide this type of moral/symbolic support. Since 2013, the OHCHR has started to set up multiple social media participation platforms to engage the public at large to initiate or participate in discussions that concern them (O. United Nations 2016, 11). Awareness-raising via social media is a strategy found in the 2013, 2016 and 2020 OHCHR reports, and the 2018 UN women report. Country visits and relationship building are examples of pre-campaign moral support. With the introduction of awareness-raising via social media, moral support also has become peak-campaign support.

Nonviolent civilian protection

The UN's support strategy in terms of protection has not changed significantly over the years. Similar to the 2008 report, nonviolent civilian protection receives most extensive emphasis in the 2018 Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights report. By advising governments to ensure the protection of the human rights defenders with the implementation of a social and institutional framework, the Special Rapporteur largely gives the responsibility to states. Other UN bodies frequently mention mediation between states, businesses and different segments of civil society as a form of supporting

civilian protection (United Nations 2020, 12). Acting as bridges between states and civil society groups, facilitate dialogue between the different stakeholders (O. United Nations 2016, 12) and expand programmes of protection, such as temporary relocation initiatives, are examples of how the UN supports nonviolent civilian protection.

Preventing/mitigating oppression

Strengthening protection mechanisms to provide safe havens for human rights defenders is a pre- and peak-campaign strategy dominantly present in the 2008 and 2018 Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights reports. Also in other reports, it is mentioned to "*support the establishment of assistance for victims of human rights violations*" (O. United Nations 2013, 43) and to "*build a tolerant culture to address threats and attacks targeting civil society actors*" (O. United Nations 2016, 8). More recent reports also address online protection. The 2020 OHCHR report highlights the complex safety needs and challenges faced by various population groups, emphasizing the importance of ensuring digital security for civil society (2020b, 15). Multiple reports do not mention support focused on preventing/mitigation oppression, such as the UNDP reports and the 2020 Secretary-General report.

Financial support

There is very little emphasis on financial support in all UN reports, only in terms of "*the legal right to funding*" (S. R. United Nations 2008, 7), helping movements developing "*funding strategies*" (United Nations 2020, 14) and "*advocating for increased investments*" (U. W. United Nations 2017, 19).

Sanctions against regime

Sanctions against regimes as a strategy to support nonviolent resistance movements is not often adopted by UN bodies. It is only mentioned very limited in the 2018 Secretary-General report and the 2013, 2016 and 2020 OHCHR reports. It is peak-campaign support since the UN only gives sanctions against regimes when national authorities fail to protect their populations (O. United Nations 2013, 44). Only minimal use of sanctions against regimes is in contrast with the literature, stating that by threatening with targeting sanctions, autocratic leaders will be less likely to act violently against the movements (Ritter 2014, 169).

Safe passage for defectors

In the OHCHR report, it is stated that those who cooperate or seek to cooperate with the UN, receive reprisal (O. United Nations 2020b, 4). These are incentives to concede and is therefore an example of the type of peak-campaign support categorised as safe passage for defectors. This strategy to protect nonviolent resistance movements is absent in most reports.

3.3 Conclusion

The UN's supporting strategy is largely focused on providing pre-campaign technical support, specifically legal aid and strategic advice. These are effective types of assistance to help nonviolent movements maintain their nonviolent discipline (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 95–96). This also holds for peak-campaign technical support, such as providing warnings of imminent repression, physical space and logistics, which is not frequently mentioned in the UN reports.

Pre-campaign technical support is also effective to help increase popular support for the movements, together with providing and facilitating training. Training is mentioned in almost all reports, with an increasing emphasis on skills development and leadership training. There is very little emphasis on financial support and also the strengthening of protection mechanism to provide safe havens for human rights defenders is discussed very limited (S. R. United Nations 2018). This is in line with the literature, claiming that both these types of support are arguably ineffective to promote popular participation in the nonviolent movement (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 95–96).

Pre-campaign training and peak-campaign preventing/mitigating repression are present in the UN's support strategy and are effective types of support to promote security defections together with peak-campaign technical support. Research claims that external support in general makes security defections less likely to occur because it can spread the belief that the movement is a foreign conspiracy with the intention to undermine the nation (Perkoski and Chenoweth 2018, 23).

The most effective types of support to hinder violence against movements are training and civilian protection, which are present in the UN reports. Peak-campaign moral/symbolic support such as awareness-raising via social media can be ineffective to prevent violence against the movements (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021, 95–96). Recently, this type of support has become more important in the UN's supporting strategy.

Chapter 4 – Case Study Analysis

The following section describes the manifestations of the case study movements, and aims to determine what types of support the movements receive and which types of support the members perceive to be beneficial to increase popular support, maintain nonviolent discipline, bring out security defections and hinder violence against the movement (sub-question 2). The case study movements share the objective to promote and improve human rights in Burundi.

The political situation in Burundi is very unstable, marked by a constitutional referendum in 2018 that resulted in clashes between security forces and demonstrators, detention of protestors, large-scale population displacement, and rising tensions throughout the region ('World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Burundi' 2019). In 2019, killings, disappearances, sexual harassment and intimidation of political opponents were committed by the youth league of Burundi's ruling party. This happened in collaboration with local authorities, national intelligence services and the police. Almost 200.000 Burundian refugees coming from Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo were "to return to their country of origin whether voluntarily or not" (Chaturvedi 2019, 12). The UNHCR discourages returns to Burundi because of the insecure environment. Burundians who had returned from abroad were among the key victims of human rights violations. (G. A. United Nations 2015).

1. **Association of Repatriated Women of Burundi (AFRABU)**

2. **Centre d'Encadrement et de Développement des Anciens Combattants (CEDAC)**

3. **Mama's for Burundi (MAFOBA)**

4. **Association pour la Paix et les Droits de l'Homme (APDH)**

5. **World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)**

4.1 Association of Repatriated Women of Burundi (AFRABU)

AFRABU is a non-profit association founded in 2002 by nine repatriated and displaced women. Currently, AFRABU counts 238 members. The idea that prompted the women to set up the association was the not-so-warm welcome they received on their return to their homeland and not wanting other repatriated women to have similar disastrous experience. The vision of the association is a peaceful Burundi, characterised by respect for both national and international rights and inclusivity (AFRABU n.d.). The movement's goals include defending the rights of women, promoting women's leadership and consolidating peace. AFRABU organises training on topics such as leadership, culture and project management. Besides, the movement organises events to raise awareness about women's rights violations (Women Connect n.d.).

External Support

According to the chairperson and legal representative of AFRABU, Godeliève Manirakiza, the association is pleased with the government's efforts to improve the status of Burundian women, while also acknowledging the involvement, and technical and financial support of the UN (de Dieu 2020). AFRABU's technical and financial partners are the European Union, SIDA, Global Human Rights, XOERSE, Urgent Action Funds and Cordaid. In addition, AFRABU receives institutional programmes and support from UN Women since 2018 and UNDP since 2020.

According to Manirakiza (2021), AFRABU needs support from IOs. The programme and institutional support are focused on capacity building, women's rights advocacy and peace-building. The support from the UN helps AFRABU to act with confidence and reduces the likelihood of violence against the movement (Manirakiza 2021). The UN's legal framework is regarded as a tool for advocacy and defence of women's rights in all pillars. According to Godeliève, more support should be focused on the functioning of AFRABU, especially support in material and rolling stock to keep the programmes and activities that receive UN support running (Manirakiza 2021). This perceived lack of peak-campaign technical support and attention to context-specific needs is also found in the analysis of the UN reports.

4.2 The Centre d'Encadrement et de Développement des Anciens Combattants (CEDAC)

CEDAC is a non-partisan organisation with the mission to help retired soldiers reintegrate into society. The organisation works to address the scarcity of projects for female ex-combatants. Women who were previously active in the war are starting to gain attention as a result of research and the development of a framework for their inclusion in civil society (CEDAC n.d.; DIFO n.d.).

CEDAC organises several meetings with ex-combatants and establishes committees. Participants of the programmes receive training on peaceful coexistence and organisational management. They are also given legal information about for instance the UN Resolution 1325. Between 2005 and 2015 CEDAC helped 25.000 beneficiaries across the country. To raise public awareness about the problem, CEDAC uses media, particularly local radio, organises peaceful protests and lobbies for ex-combatants' rights (Niagira 2021).

External Support

CEDAC receives moral support from the national government and financial support from UNDP, UNIFEM, USAID and Australian Aid. In total, CEDAC received 1 million USD for different projects from UNDP between 2010 and 2014. Besides financial support, CEDAC has benefited a lot from the technical support that helped CEDAC become part of a worldwide network. There has not been any violent conflict with the involvement of CEDAC. CEDAC works in correct collaboration with security forces (Niagira 2021).

According to Eric Niagira, founder and president of CEDAC, the UN and other IOs should focus on supporting local organisations instead of regional organisations. The impact of larger organisations

is not the same for local people. In addition, Niagira suggests that the UN should look at the movements' problems and challenges before providing support. By investigating what movements need and taking local contexts into account, movements will be more likely to benefit from support. According to Niagira, large IOs lack an assessment of the needs of the beneficiaries (2021). This is in line with the post-liberal peace theory, the shift by the UN towards more tailor-made support and the desire from AFRABU to receive more context-specific support.

4.3 Mama's for Burundi (MAFOBA)

MAFOBA is a non-profit association initiated in 2015 by Burundian women. It works for the promotion of socio-economic rights, peace, leadership and integration. Their target group are particularly women and girls in rural areas, victims of social inequalities and gender-based violence. All MAFOBA's actions aim at social cohesion, socio-economic reintegration and sustainable community development (MAFOBA n.d.). The movement's goals and strategies include advocating for citizen unity and nonviolence through activism, the empowerment of women by assisting, training, and raising awareness, and preventing gender-based violence. Amongst MAFABO's activities are awareness-raising about women's rights within the community, supporting victims of human rights violations and facilitating training in leadership and development to empower women (MAFOBA n.d.).

External Support

MAFOBA does not receive support from the national government or foreign states, but rather receives support from several organisations and foundations, such as Aflatoun International, AIM Group International, SOL Collaborative and Peace Direct (MAFOBA n.d.). The type of support is mainly financial support and training. MAFOBA has not received support from the UN, besides the fact that the organisation is participating in several regional data collection lobbies. In addition to financial support and training, MAFOBA would like to receive more training, books and donations of materials (Denise 2021).

4.4 Association pour la Paix et les Droits de l'Homme (APDH)

APDH is a community-based organisation in Burundi founded in 1998 (Peace Insight n.d.). Its mission is to promote education of peace and human rights for the well-being of the community in general, and of women and youth in particular, in order to have a just and peaceful society (Bosco 2021). APDH takes specific action in response to any violation of the rights of individuals, communities, or adolescents. It also aims to create public awareness about the importance of peaceful conflict resolution and grassroots reconciliation.

APDH membership has grown significantly. Participants generally increase by 15 percent every year (Bosco 2021). The creation of APDH in the context of violent conflict in Burundi defined its

strategy as a nonviolent movement. The movement's activities include community mobilization, lobbying, advocacy, and other different forms of empowerment. APDH makes use of local horizontal networks, as well as communication with middle range and top-level leadership. There have never been violent confrontations between APDH and security forces or outside groups.

External support

APDH does not get any support from the government, foreign states or the UN. Nevertheless, for the last 20 years, the movement has been able to mobilise support from regional NGOs. According to Jean Bosco, the legal representative of APDH, the support enabled the movement to not only achieve some of the strategic goals but also to strengthen institutional capacity (2021). APDH receives financial support to run projects, training courses and network support. Networking support often comes in forms of participation in national, regional or international platforms either through sharing experiences, or joint initiatives with other organisations at the national and regional level (Bosco 2021).

APDH particularly appreciates the support from The Fund for Global Human Rights. The originality of their support is that, unlike other donors, they provide unrestricted support. That is, the financial support they provide is not tied to any project or program. It is rather used to strengthen the institutional capacity of the movement and fill the gap often left by other partners. Again, this is in line with what is desired by AFRABU and CEDAC, the post-liberal peace theory and the shift by the UN towards more tailor-made support.

4.5 The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)

OMCT collaborates with member organisations to put an end to torture and ill-treatment, support victims, and protect human rights around the world (OMCT n.d.). It has grown from 40 network members to 200 members. Since 2016, the OMCT has been assisting ACAT Burundi and SOS-Torture Burundi in their monitoring of significant human rights violations and abuses (OMCT Burundi n.d.). ACAT Burundi is a non-profit organisation promoting human dignity, and the abolition of torture and death penalty in Burundi (OMCT Burundi n.d.). OMCT supports the work of their network members by international presence at the UN, bringing UN recommendations and trying to help with the implementation of these recommendations.

External support

Important donors for OMCT are the European Union, and the governments of Germany, Denmark and Sweden. The UN is fundamental for OMCT because of the legal framework, country reports on the situation of torture and article 22 (Piletić 2021). OMCT receives 500.000 USD per year from the UN, and an additional 25.000 per year from Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT).

The organisation provides direct legal, medical, economic, and psychosocial assistance to torture victims, and advocates towards specific institutions to raise awareness of the fact that many victims of torture are not treated by the law. The aim is to bring together different aspects of torture and support according to network members' needs and objectives. Instead of calling it support, Radoš Piletić, Director of Development at OMCT, sees it more as a way to "work together" (2021). OMCT looks at how it can collaborate with network members by providing for instance expert review of reports and training to judges and lawyers. All support is context and country-specific. This also links to what is desired by AFRABU and CEDAC, highly valued by APDH, and in line with the post-liberal peace theory and the shift by the UN towards more tailor-made support.

4.6 Conclusion

Most commonly mentioned type of support received by the case study movements are financial support, programme support and training. All case study movements indicated that in general external support benefited them. For instance, support from the UN in its operations and programmes helps AFRABU to act with confidence and reduces the likelihood of violence against the movement (Manirakiza 2021). Pre-campaign technical support, such as the UN's legal framework, is essential for the resistance movements, as expressed by AFRABU, CEDAC and OMCT. Another type of support that is highly valued by CEDAC and APDH is network support. The importance of becoming a member of a worldwide network for nonviolent resistance movements is reflected by the essence of OMCT. This organisation does not only provide support but also works together with its network members. This desire for tailor-made support and advice is expressed by AFRABU, CEDAC and MAFOBA. In addition, support that is not tied to any project but rather to fill in the gaps left by others is appreciated by APDH.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Following the strategist perspective, this thesis builds upon the conviction that effective support to nonviolent resistance movements should be focused on increasing popular support, maintaining the nonviolent discipline, bringing out security defections and hindering violence against the movement. An argument about what type of support is given to and valued by nonviolent movements was made by studying the UN's support strategy and looking at how external support is perceived by members of resistance movements. Based on a qualitative content analysis of thirteen UN reports, it can be concluded that the UN's strategy lacks sufficient support on providing a safe passage for defectors and peak-campaign technical support and training. The UN is actively supporting nonviolent resistance movements with legal aid, strategic support and mediation between conflict partners. This support is also recognized and valued by AFRABU and CEDAC. However, when it comes to peak-campaign support, such as providing warnings of imminent repression, physical space and logistics, the UN does not provide powerful support. This is also mentioned by AFRABU.

Among the recommendations to the UN and other IOs are to keep supporting activists with legal aid, strategic advice and training. These types of support are extremely powerful and highly valued by the activists because it enables them to act with confidence and reduces the likelihood of violence against the movements. In addition, IOs should shift their focus more to incorporating local contexts. This is a strategy already practised by some UN bodies, performed by OMCT and desired by AFRABU, CEDAC, MAFOBA and APDH. Nonviolent strategies depend on specific contexts in which the movements find themselves, and therefore support should fit the strategies, tactics and goals of the movements. This can be explained by the post-liberal peace theory. IOs and powerful states involved in state- and peacebuilding should therefore invest in analytical skills to investigate the challenges and needs of nonviolent resistance movements and take local contexts into account. As a result, movements will be more likely to benefit from the support.

The findings of this research give some indications about which types of support by IOs are perceived to be effective by the members of the resistance movements. Nevertheless, the research results are insufficient to conclude about the effectiveness of the support. For this, a quantitative study should be conducted, looking at a larger number of movements globally. Nevertheless, this research provides a clear understanding of the UN's support strategy and how external support is valued by the members of the resistance movements. To illustrate, the emphasis of the UN bodies on the legal framework to support the movements is also highly valued by the activists. Similar, the goal of the UN to provide more tailor-made support suitable for each organisation is reflected by the desires of the activists.

Within this research study, there was no focus on resistance movements that do not accept external support. To better understand why some organisations refuse international support, future studies are recommended to look at the non-believers perspective mentioned in chapter 1, and see why some movements are reluctant to accept external support. Another suggestion for future research is to

look at how international support affects the potential of nonviolent resistance movements in general. It would be interesting to investigate how support from IOs affects popular support and the nonviolent principle.

To conclude, this thesis demonstrated that support by the UN is of special importance for nonviolent resistance movements, especially in terms of legal aid and strategic advice. The UN's strategy lacks sufficient support on providing a safe passage for defectors and peak-campaign technical support. In general, it is recommended for IOs to provide more tailor-made support by taking local contexts into account. It is important to ask members of resistance movements what they desire to keep their activities and programmes running.

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Appendix A - Instrument Format for Textual Analysis and Results

A.1 Coding Rules

Type of support	Definition	Coding Rules
Financial	Small and large grants, scholarships, cash, loans, strike funds, legal funds, food, medication, and debt relief are examples of financial assistance. This may be in the form of direct assistance or by intermediaries.	• small and large grants • scholarships • cash • loans • strike funds • legal funds • food • medication • debt relief
Moral/ symbolic support	Nonviolent solidarity activities (e.g., digital activism or lobbying, mobilization on behalf of a party in one's own country, highlighting activists' causes and work, offering awards, visiting the country, and directly engaging in the country's campaign).	• digital activism or lobbying • mobilization on behalf of a party • highlighting activists' causes and work, • offering awards, • visiting the country • directly engaging in the campaign.
Technical	Assistance with campaign-related tasks (e.g., putting activists in contact with one another, providing warnings of imminent repression, providing physical space for training and organisation without actually performing the training, etc.) as well as planning, logistics, information, communication, convening activists, conducting and delivering background research, and the execution of campaign-related tasks (e.g., putting activists in touch with one another, providing warnings of impending repression, providing a strategic assessment of the situation, direct legal aid, and direct medical assistance). Provision of materials and equipment (e.g., mobile phones, computers, and cameras, printing, books, articles, and translations). Relationship-building or convening for the purpose of relationship-building are examples of this.	• putting activists in contact with one another • providing warnings of imminent repression • providing physical space for training and organisation without actually performing the training • planning • logistics • information • communication • convening activists • conducting and delivering background research • the execution of campaign-related tasks • providing a strategic assessment of the situation • direct legal aid • direct medical assistance • provision of materials and equipment • relationship-building or convening for the purpose of relationship-building
Training	Leadership development, organisational capacity building, labour organizing, nonviolent action or campaign preparation, legal training, and medical training are all services provided. It's worth noting that this category allows the supporter to train	• leadership development • organisational capacity building • labor organizing • nonviolent action or campaign preparation

	the activists (not just provide space for training, which is coded as technical support).	• legal training • medical training
Nonviolent civilian protection	Monitoring regime actions, ceasefires, and other local conditions. Protective accompaniment, nonviolent interpositioning, mediation between conflict participants, and other local conditions.	• monitoring regime actions, ceasefires, and other local conditions. • protective accompaniment • nonviolent interpositioning • mediation between conflict participants
Sanctions against regime	Imposing active sanctions (e.g., tangible bilateral or multilateral penalties) in retaliation for the regime's campaign-related conduct. Travel bans, exclusion from gatherings, asset freezing, enforcing weapons embargoes, and other interventions are examples (e.g., multinational corporations withdrawing from South Africa in opposition to apartheid).	• imposing active sanctions (e.g., tangible bilateral or multilateral penalties) • travel bans • exclusion from gatherings • asset freezing • enforcing weapons embargoes
Safe passage for defectors	Providing regime elites with asylum, amnesty, "golden parachutes," or other incentives to concede to the campaign or flee the government.	• asylum • amnesty • "golden parachutes," • other incentives to concede to the campaign
Preventing / mitigating repression	Providing safe havens for activists, offering asylum or refugee status to activists, requesting the release of activists from jail, issuing demarches in response to activist violations, issuing indictments, prosecuting / trying war criminals, banning or delaying military aid shipments, and so on.	• Providing safe havens • offering asylum or refugee status to activists • requesting the release of activists from jail • issuing demarches in response to activist violations • issuing indictments, prosecuting / trying war criminals • banning or delaying military aid shipments
Unspecified	There is proof of support, but the available information is too general to identify the type of support.	• proof of support, but not specified
Other	Other form of assistance.	

A.2 Coding Themes

Category/theme	Description	Type of support: effective	Type of support: ineffective
Increase popular support	The larger the movement, the more likely it is to seriously disrupt the current state of affairs, increase the costs of government oppression and provoke security defections.	*Pre-campaign support* - Training - Technical support - Safe passage for defectors *Peak campaign support* - Moral/symbolic support - Training - Sanctions against regime - Preventing/mitigating repression	*Pre-campaign support* - Preventing/ mitigating repression *Peak campaign support* - Financial
Maintain nonviolent discipline	When using multiple nonviolent methods such as protests and boycotts to generate disobedience and disruption, opponents will have a hard time in suppressing a movement.	*Pre-campaign support* - Technical support *Peak campaign support* - Technical support	
Bring out security defections	Security forces are more reluctant to use violent against crowds that could be their neighbours and relatives.	*Pre-campaign support* - Training - Safe passage for defectors *Peak campaign support* - Technical support - Preventing/mitigating repression	*Pre-campaign* - Moral/symbolic support - Nonviolent civilian protection - Sanctions against regime
Hinder violence against movement	When movements receive support from economic elites and members of the state media, it will also be more likely to not face violent oppression.	*Pre-campaign support* - Training *Peak campaign support* - Nonviolent civilian protection	*Pre-campaign support* - Technical support - Sanctions against regime *Peak campaign support* - Moral/symbolic support - Sanctions against regime - Safe passage for defectors - Preventing/ mitigating repression

Appendix B – Content Analysis

The supplementary file *Content Analysis* includes a brief summary of the thirteen UN reports and the content analysis data on which the findings in the reports are drawn.

Appendix C – Interview Analysis

C.1 Questions for Semi-structured Interviews

1. I would like to get to know you, can you tell me a bit about yourself? For instance, what is your background in terms of education? What are your topics of interest? Are you interested in politics and why? Please feel free to share anything you want.

2. You are a member of the X movement, can you describe what the objectives of the movement are?

3. When is X found?

4. Do you know the circumstances in which X is found? For instance, who was the founding member, what was the main reason for founding the organisation?

5. Since when are you a member of the X?

6. Has X grown over the years? For instance, if you compare the number of participants between 2010 and now?

7. What do you find most important for the movement to strive for? What do you hope that X has achieved for instance within 2-5 years?

8. X can be classified as a nonviolent resistance movements, striving for human rights. What do you think makes X a nonviolent resistance movement? Which nonviolent tactics are undertaken by members of X?

9. Is there a lot of security support by the national and regional police for X?

10. Have there been any violent confrontations between X and security forces since 2010 and now? And if so, why do you think this escalated into violence?

11. Besides violent confrontations between X and security forces, has there been any violence against the movement from outside groups? And why do you think this happened?

12. Does X get a lot of external support, from for instance the national government, Nongovernmental Organisations, foreign states, or International Organisations?

13. Can you describe what kind of support X receives? Is this for instance mainly financial, or also support for training and legal aid?

14. Does the movement get any support from the United Nations, and since when?

15. What type of support does the United Nations provide?

16. Do you have the feeling that X benefits from the support given by the United Nations?

17. Does the support help with increasing mass popular participation of X?

18. Does the support contribute to maintaining the nonviolent discipline of X?

19. Is the support helping with bringing out security defections?

20. Is the support actively contributing to hindering violence against X?

21. Are there any other types of support that your movement receives for instance by other organisations that you perceive to be effective or ineffective?

22. If you were part of the United Nations Human Rights team, and you could decide on a strategy to which types of support to nonviolent movements they should invest, what would be your advice?

23. Is there anything else you would like to share with me?

C.2 Informed Consent

The supplementary file *Informed Consent* includes all signed informed consents for research participation of all participants.