Foreign interventions in civil-wars Promoting democracy or chaos?
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Introduction

For centuries, states have been waging wars against each other. Interstate conflicts have been fought over territory, natural resources, ideology, or plain glory. For many centuries, these interstate conflicts were the main type of existing wars. However, since the end of both world wars in the 20th century, there has been a steep decline in interstate conflicts, with intrastate conflicts now being the dominant form of conflict (Gleditsch et al, 2002). While intrastate conflicts or civil wars are fought within a state, it does not mean that the effects of a civil war are limited to the war-torn state itself. As a result of a civil war in one state, refugees leave to seek asylum in neighboring states, inter-state trade can be hampered, and even the fight itself can cross the border to another state. These spillover effects might bring in other parties whose interests are at stake.

International law and most dominantly, the United Nations Charter article 1, dictates that no foreign actor (both states and actors such as the UN) should intervene in internal affairs of another state, there have been numerous occasions of foreign interventions in domestic civil wars.

While The United States may see itself as a bringer of peace and democracy whenever she intervenes in a civil foreign conflict, others see her as a predator that causes havoc on other societies. Scholars, such as Carment and James (2004), argue that with foreign intervention, civil wars do tend to intensify in violence and casualties. Furthermore, previous research has shown that there is a correlation between foreign intervention and prolonged civil wars (Regan, 2000; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). Thus, where scholars see foreign intervention as a facilitator for conflict intensity and prolonged civil wars, interveners see themselves as beacons of hope.

1. Research question

With an international law that actively "forbids" foreign intervention in domestic affairs, and scholars arguing that there is a negative correlation between intervention and civil wars. Therefore, with the possibility of legal repercussions, a long term commitment to violence, the possibility of it backfiring on your own country, should expect a decline in foreign involvement. However, as stated by Regan (2000), in 90 of the 140 civil wars since the end of the second world war, there has been at least one foreign actor involved. Previous studies have extensively studied the effects of foreign intervention on the course and outcome of civil wars. Rather than try to reinvent the wheel, this thesis aims to take it a step further and discover the effects of intervention methods on the post-war. In particular, the effects of different intervention methods on the level of democracy after the civil war ends. Therefore this thesis will aim to answer the research question: *How does foreign intervention affect the level of democracy in a post-civil war state?*

1.1 Research Puzzle

This thesis aims to analyze the possible relationship between foreign intervention and the level of democracy after a civil war concludes. Previous studies on foreign intervention have extensively dealt with the effects of foreign intervention on the civil war itself. Not much has been written on the topic of the period after a civil war has concluded. Furthermore, the research that has been written about the post-war situation is mainly written about the effects of foreign intervention on the quality of life in post-war societies. Scholars such as Pickering & Kisangani (2006;2009) discuss the effects of foreign intervention on the social and economic aspects of post-war development.

Furthermore, Kim (2016) conducted an extensive analysis of the effect of different intervention methods on the quality of life after a civil war concludes. This analysis is both extensive and well justified and gives a framework for future research on post-war development. Kim (2016) concludes that for future research, the focus should be on post-war state-building and democracy. This thesis aims to fill this gap by replication research done by Kim (2016) and adding democracy as the dependent variable to the linear regression model run by Kim (2016).

1.2 Thesis structure

Chapter two of this thesis will deal with examining the existing literature on foreign interventions in civil wars. By examining the existing literature on foreign interventions, one can see the relationships between the motive for foreign intervention, the methods used to intervene, and the effect on the outcome of the civil war. This enables the author of this thesis to understand the mechanism that might lead to one outcome or another and grasp theories on how foreign intervention might affect democracy.

Chapter three will deal with the structure of the analysis conducted in this thesis. First of all, this chapter discusses the hypothesis that recedes the analysis. the hypothesis is drawn from a set of theories based on existing literature regarding foreign interventions. Secondly, the concepts and variables used in the analysis will be explained.

The fourth chapter deals with the analysis itself. Here the analysis is discussed as well as interpreting the results of the analysis. finally, chapter five concludes the analysis. To tie up this thesis, limitations and implications will be discussed, as well as providing an appendix and the bibliography.

2. Literature Review

First of all, to understand foreign intervention in civil wars and its outcome, we must understand what a civil war entails. This thesis will follow Kalyvas (2008) definition of a civil war. Kalyvas (2008) notes:

"Civil war is defined very broadly as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities. This definition encompasses all types of internal conflict, including anti-colonial rebellions and resistance against foreign occupation" (p. 1064).

Secondly, it is important to have a clear definition of foreign intervention itself. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) build on the work of Regan (2000) and define foreign intervention as:

"A unilateral intervention by one (or more) third party government(s) in a civil war in the form of military, economic or mixed assistance in favor of either the government or the rebel movement involved in the civil war" (p. 8).

While they only define foreign intervention as biased unilateral intervention, this thesis will also include neutral and biased multilateral interventions as part of the definition. Therefore, foreign interventions will be defined as an external intervention by one or multiple third party governments in a civil war, consisting of either military, economic or mixed assistance, in favor of the government, insurgents, or both. With this definition, foreign interventions can entail a wide range of interventions, including non-military interventions.

As stated in the introduction, civil wars have become the dominant form of war since the end of the 2nd world war. A large body of literature has been written about the causes that started a civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) researched the link between regime type, income, and the probability of a civil war emerging, while Collier and Hoeffler (2004) focused their research on the presence of natural resources as a cause of civil strife. Other researchers have focused their research on the motives, ranging from political instability to economic hardship, that shape insurgents' decision to take up arms (Hegre et al., 2001, Salehyan, 2006).

While this body of research has contributed widely to the knowledge about the origins and causes of civil wars, it focusses solely on the domestic causes within a civil war. Regan (2000) states that 90 out of 140 civil wars since the end of the second world war onto 1999 have endured an intervention by at least one external actor. Therefore, literature should focus on both the domestic and foreign actors to grasp the causes, duration, and ending of a civil war.

Cunningham (2006) calls this the international dimension of a civil war, the essence of this is, that there are the government, the insurgent and foreign actors that all determine the outcome of a civil war. The internalization of civil wars brings an unwarranted side effect, the lines between interstate and intrastate (civil conflicts) wars have diminished. Gleditsch (2007) notes that insurgents might flee to neighboring countries. As a result of this, governments might want to take action across their borders, to stop the regrouping of feeing insurgents. Furthermore, refugee migration from the war-torn state towards other states can bring on economic hardship and instability in neighboring countries (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Therefore, Gleditsch (2007) argues that civil wars endure a form of "externalization".

2.1 Motives for Interventions

An old saying in the Star Wars universe states that it is not a matter of what is right to do, but it is a matter of who has the power to do so. While cold-war superpowers might have sometimes intervened in external conflicts just to show their dominance and military power. Generally, there are substantial underlying motives for states to intervene in civil wars.

Past studies of foreign intervention discovered that there are two major motives for intervening in a civil war.

First of all, the strategic interests of foreign actors are a key determinant for foreign intervention (Lemke & Regan, 2004). Gartzke and Gleditsch (2001) argue that motives for foreign interventions are driven by the desire of foreign actors to influence the outcome of a conflict on their terms. Lemke and Regan (2004) use the international influence model to state that the goal of most of the foreign interventions is to expand the amount of influence the intervener has. They argue that "civil conflicts are situations in which many states may have powerful incentives to try to influence the outcome" (Lemke & Regan, 2004, p. 148). As a result of this, civil wars maybe an easy opportunity for foreign actors to increase their regional or global influence. Furthermore, greater powers can influence domestic issues and even change the structure of the state by their preference (Gent, 2007).

Another strategic interest could be undermining their rivals. Gent (2007) claims that during and even post-cold war, greater powers have actively intervened in civil wars to undermine their rivals rather than directly benefitting their interests. An example of this is that during the cold war if one actor in a civil war is communist, there is a higher chance that the US would intervene (Yoon, 1997). Further strategic interests, such as economic or political ties, colonial history, alliances, and resources are all reasons for foreign actors to intervene and secure their interests.

Humanitarianism is another grand motive for foreign intervention. The US intervention in the Somalian civil war is a great example of humanitarian motives. Months before the intervention, the US government ruled out an intervention because there were no strategic interests for the US (western, 2002). However, after more than 300.000 civilian casualties, the US, with authorization from the UN, did intervene under a humanitarian motive. Furthermore, the UN actively encourages humanitarian interventions, to protects civilians form civil conflict (Barnett & Weiss, 2008). Thirdly, humanitarian motives can also be drawn from strategic interests. Jakobsen (1996) argues that by broadcasting images of civil conflicts in Rwanda or Somalia, there was a public outcry for intervention. Politicians or governments can use this as an opportunity to win popularity among voters by intervening in a humanitarian crisis.

2.2 Methods of intervention

Multiple scholars have argued that the motive for intervention influences the method of intervention (Finnemore, 2003; Regan, 2000). Finnemore (2003) argues that humanitarian motives are often followed by a multilateral intervention, while strategic interest and thus self-interests are often followed by a unilateral intervention. A multilateral intervention is when multiple, often under UN authorization, intervene in a conflict. On the other hand, a unilateral intervention is an intervention by one country, without official authorization to do so. Furthermore, Finnemore (2003) argues that multilateral interventions are often neutral, meaning that the interveners take no side in the conflict. While unilateral interventions are often biased and aimed at increasing the power or capabilities of one side (Lockyer 2010). However biased humanitarian interventions do exist, biased interventions can be justified by only punishing the violators in the conflict and to protects those in need (Weiss, 1999).

2.3 Effects of foreign intervention on civil wars

Previous research has shown that scholars agree on the notion that intervention aims to reduce conflict intensity and to promote peace. Scholars such as Regan (2000), Gartzke, and Gleditsch (2006) argue that foreign involvement is beneficial for peace. However, according to research, different types of intervention have different effects on the civil war itself. Neutral interventions are relative successful because it does not intervene with the balance of power, but rather promotes communication between the sides, facilitates peace talks, and helps monitor agreements between the parties (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004). Furthermore, Regan (2000) argues that neutral interventions increase the chance of a negotiated settlement between the two parties. On the other hand, biased interventions are aimed at increasing the capabilities of one side in the conflict, to increase the possibility of that side winning. Therefore, a biased intervention will often lead to a victory for the supported party.

Research on the effects of different foreign interventions on the duration of a civil-war demonstrates a general negative relationship. Gleditsch (2007) argues that biased intervention leads to a faster victory for one side and thus a shorter civil war span. Regan (2000) argues that by supporting the government side, foreign intervention prolongs a civil war because it replenishes the strength of the government, while insurgents can still hide and live to fight another day.

Regan (2000) notes that by supporting the insurgents, insurgents can be overconfident in their odds. They might be capable of sustaining a fight due to assistance by the intervention, but might not be able to win directly, thus creating a stalemate. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) analyzed foreign intervention and the duration of civil wars and claim that civil wars with foreign interventions have a mean duration that is substantially higher than civil wars without foreign intervention.

2.4 Foreign interventions and post-war development

Earlier research on post-war peace and state-building suggests that different outcomes, thus how a civil war ends, can differentiate the post-war strength of the new government. As well as determine the government's access to resources and its power to extract them. Those two factors can extensively influence the post-war development and especially the quality of life of its citizens. Kim (2016) implies that therefore, different civil war outcomes affect the capabilities of the state and thus affect the quality of life in the post-war situation. Furthermore, by drawing on earlier literature that suggests that different methods of foreign intervention affect the outcome of a civil war, Kim (2016) suggests that different intervention methods affect the quality of life post-war in different ways. Pickering and Kisangani (2006) argue that foreign interventions positively affect the post-war quality of life because the economic situation in war-torn states increases after a civil war conclusion.

2.5 Foreign intervention and post-war democracy

The topic of this thesis is the relationship between foreign intervention and the levels of post-war democracy. While a lot of research is written about the effects of foreign intervention on the human aspect of society (Pickering & Kisangani, 2006; Kim, 2016). There is a significant gap in the literature on the effects of foreign intervention on the post-war levels of democracy. Most current literature is not directly linked to foreign intervention and levels of democracy but rather linked to factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of democracy.

Levitsky and Way (2005) claim that successful foreign interventions lead to a government that has ties with the intervener states. The government, being the old government or a new government, aims to keep being supported by the interveners. Therefore, it will try to please the intervening state and act on its behalf.

Pevehouse (2002) argues that if states that have experienced a successful foreign intervention by a democratic state with multiple IO memberships (EU, UN, etc.) there is double the chance that the target state will transition towards a more democratic state. Finally, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) argue that unilateral interveners aim to bring their interests in a target state, and when successfully intervened, it is the only external party that influences the post-war strategies. While this can mean that unilateral interveners can easily impose democracy in targets states due to little competition, it also means that non-democratic interveners have a higher likelihood of imposing a non-democratic regime. Furthermore, the two authors argue that UN-authorized multilateral interventions do increase the post-war level of democracy, but not substantially since two of the five permanents security council members are non-democratic.

3. Methodology

This thesis will draw on previous research done by Kim (2016) who analyzed the effects of different methods of foreign intervention on the post-war quality of life. However, as Kim (2016) in the conclusion, future research should be focused on state-building. Since the level of democracy is widely regarded as an indicator for state-building (Carbone, 2013), a quantitative replication study will be conducted to analyze how different foreign intervention methods affect the level of democracy after a civil war concludes. Therefore, This thesis is a quantitative replication study.

The following chapter deals with the theories the analysis is built on, the expectations or hypothesis as well as the explanation of the variables included.

3.1 Theories and Hypothesis

As mentioned earlier, this thesis aims to empirically understand the relationship between foreign intervention and the level of democracy. This section will examine the theories that explain the relationship between different methods of foreign interventions and levels of post-war democracy.

3.1.1 Hypothesis one

First of all, the relation between unilateral interventions and the level of post-war democracy. Bueno and Downs's (2006) theory is that unilateral interventions tend to make target states less respondent to the citizens. In other words, the target state's leadership will listen to the external intervener rather than to the demands of its citizens. Even though an intervener might be democratic, the aim of unilateral interventions is predominantly focused on expanding or preserving their own interests. Therefore, if a non-democratic state-structure is more rewarding for an intervening state, they would preserve that rather then democratize it. An example of this would be the US incursion in Guatemala in the 1950s. Rather than supporting the new democratic government in Guatemala, the US aimed to overthrow the regime by a military coup to protect an economic multination, the UNITED FRUIT COMPANY (Schlesinger & Kinzer 2005). By claiming that unilateral interventions are more prone to make the target states less respondent to citizen voices. Furthermore, if democratic interveners could gain more interests by maintaining a non-democratic regime, they will opt for this strategy. Therefore, this thesis argues that unilateral interventions do no improve a target countries democracy. The first hypothesis will be:

H1: Unilateral interventions decrease the post-war level of democracy in the target state.

3.1.2 Hypothesis two

The second method of intervention is a multilateral intervention. The literature review discussed the motivations for a multilateral intervention. Most notably, humanitarian concerns, rather than self-interest. While there have been instances of mutual self-interest for multilateral interventions, such as during an oil crisis, most of the multilateral interventions are out of human concerns.

Multilateral interventions are most dominantly authorized by the United Nations. Since the United Nations is a normative body that promotes freedom of rights for all people, they also promote democracy. According to Fortna (2008), the United Nations can help with distributing resources to the target state. With not having to focus on keeping peace or extracting enough money, the target state has more room and resources to promote other things such as quality of life and democracy. Levitsky and Way (2005) argue that the proximity of IO organizations, such as with a UN-authorized intervention, increases the leverage interveners have to demand democratization. However, Voeten (2001) argues that all multilateral interventions need to go through the permanent security council, which includes two non-democratic regimes, Russia, and China. Therefore, there needs to be a compromise on how the United Nations Intervene in conflict, resulting in a mixed intervention regarding the democratization of the target state (Voeten, 2005). While Voeten (2001;2005) does argue that multilateral interventions do not always aim to improve democracy in a target state, he does add that since the United Nations is such a normative body, there will always be a form of democratization. Therefore the second hypothesis will be:

H2: Multilateral interventions under UN authorization increase the level of democracy after a civil war concludes.

3.2 Concepts and Variables

To analyze the relationship between different methods of intervention and the post-war level of democracy, this thesis will run a linear regression model. The dependent variable will be the level of democracy in the post-war period, while the dependent variables will be unilateral interventions and multilateral interventions. The next paragraph will deal with explaining the variables. To grasp all possible interventions and to accurately analyze all variables, two linear regression models will be produced to differentiate between the different methods of intervention. First of all, a general model of unilateral interventions not differentiating whose side the intervention supported (Government or insurgents). Secondly, a linear regression model will be run that analyzes the relationship between multilateral interventions and postwar democracy. Each of the two regression models will also be controlled by two control variables. Therefore each model consists of a model with and without control variables.

3.2.1 Dependent variable

The following paragraphs will deal with the included variables. First of all, the dependent variable. Since this thesis runs a replication analysis, it makes use of the existing data set created by Kim (2016). The data set created by Kim (2016) is a data set consisting of variables from multiple data sets from other scholars. The dependent variable of this thesis, *the level of democracy* is included in the data set created by Kim (2016). The level of democracy is coded as polity2 and is based on the polityIV data set created by Marshall et al. (2010). The level of democracy is coded on a scale of -10 to 10, with -10 being least democratic and 10 being the most democratic. The grading for this scale is taken from the

score a country receives in democratic indicators minus the score a country receives in autocratic indicators.

3.2.2 Independent variables

The independent variables are the variables unilateral intervention and multilateral intervention. Kim (2016) created data regarding different methods of foreign intervention by using data by Regan (2002) and Doyle and Sambanis (2006). The independent variable *unilateral intervention* is based on a data set created by Regan (2002). It is coded on a dichotomous scale, with 1 indicating that there has been a unilateral intervention while 0 indicates no presence of unilateral intervention. The data set created by Kim (2016) also presents two variables that differentiate between which side the unilateral intervention supported. One variable being support for the government, and the other variable being support for the insurgents. Both variables are coded the same way as the main variable of unilateral intervention.

The independent variable *UN-authorized multilateral intervention* is based on the dataset by Doyle and Sambanis (2006). It is coded as UN intervention in the data set by Kim (2016). UN-authorized multilateral is coded on a dichotomous scale, with 1 indicating that there has been a multilateral intervention while 0 indicates no presence of a multilateral intervention. The reasoning for using two different authors and their data is because Regan (2002) did not include all multilateral interventions, mainly those under United Nations authorization. Doyle & Sambanis (2006) did include them, as well as using the framework presented by Regan (2002), thus expanding his work. This thesis will solely focus on UN-authorized multilateral interventions because the United Nations is a beacon of democratic norms and therefore an interesting predictor for democracy in a post-war situation, as well as differentiation issues while separating them.

3.2.3 Control Variables

By only using the two independent variables, the analysis would not be sufficient enough. Therefore, this thesis will make use of control variables to strengthen the analysis of the relationship between our variables. The reason for using control variables is that control variables help reduce the noise of the analysis by reducing the residual variance, as well as reducing the standard error, resulting in a more precise predictor coefficient (Field, 2013).

The first control variable included in this thesis is, *level of democracy before the start of the civil war*. Countries with a higher level of democracy are less likely to democratize then countries with a lower democracy score because there no more room for democratization increase. Therefore, control variable onsetpolity2 is included to take this into account. Onsetpolity2 is based on the data set by Marshall et al. (2010) and uses the same scale as dependent variable Polity2.

The second control variable included will be *elapsed years since the war has ended*. Countries whose civil war have concluded for longer years have had more chance to democratize. Furthermore, in those extra years, other reasons for democratization might have occurred rather than foreign intervention. Elapsed years are created by Kim(2016) and coded as YRS. The scale of YRS is counted as how many years have gone by since the end of the war.

4. Analysis of the linear regression model

As stated in the last chapter, four different regression models have been run to account for different types of intervention. The next chapter deals with the explanation of each model and examines the meaning of the findings. The data set used for the regression model is created by Kim (2016). The dataset consists of 950 post-war years after seventy civil wars in fifty countries, in which at least one intervention has taken place, in the period 1944-1998.

4.1 Unilateral intervention

Table 1	Model 1	Model 1A
(Constant)	-2.386***	-1.544***
	(0.382)	(0.365)
Unilateral intervention	2.488***	1.054**
	(0.478)	(0.362)
Elapsed years since civil war end		0.106***
		(0.014)
Democracy score before the civil war		0.684***
		(0.027)
R^2	0.028	0.470
Adj. R^2	0.027	0.468
N	950	950

Note: OLS-regression coefficients with standard errors between brackets.
   ***$p < 0,001$; **$p < 0,01$; *$p < 0,05$

4.1.1 Model 1

The first regression model which was conducted in SPSS is to examine the effects of a unilateral intervention on the post-war level of democracy. Model 1 presents the regression without the control variables, while model 1A presents the control variables included. The dependent variable in a linear regression model is predicted by the formula $Y=a+bX$. A is the intercept value or the constant, thus when the dependent variable is 0, the constant will be this value. X is the independent variable and b is the slope. For model 1 this is: level of democracy $(Y)= -2.386$(constant) $+ 2.488$(unilateral) $* X$.

The effects of a unilateral intervention (independent variables) on the post-war level of democracy are visualized in table 1. The constant or starting position of the level of post-war democracy is given as -2.386 on a scale of -10 to +10.

Unilateral interventions (b = 2.488): This value indicates that as the target state has experienced a unilateral intervention, the dependent variable will increase by 2.488 units on a scale of -10 to +10. This value is significant, (T=5.202, P<0.05).

4.1.2 Model 1A

Since control variables have been added in model 1A, the formula for predicting the post-war level of democracy changes. The formula for model 1A is: level of democracy (Y)= -1.544(constant) + 1.054(unilateral) * X1 + 0.106(Elapsed years) * X2 + 0.684 (Democracy score onset) * X3. Furthermore, the coefficients are different now. The constant or starting position of the level of post-war democracy is now given as -1.544 on a scale of -10 to +10. Unilateral interventions (b = 1.054): This value indicates that as the target state has experienced a unilateral intervention, the dependent variable will increase by 1.054 units on a scale of -10 to +10. This value is significant, (T=2.908, P<0.05).

Control variable elapsed years since war end (b = 0.106): This value indicates that as if one year goes by since the war ended, the dependent variable will increase by 0.106 units on a scale of -10 to +10. This value is significant, (T=7.760, P<0.05).

Control variable democracy score at the start of the war (b=0.684). This value indicates that if the pre-war democracy score increases by 1 on a scale of -10 to +10, the dependent variable will increase by 0.684 on the same scale of -10 to +10. This value is significant (T=25.802, P<0.05).

4.1.3 ANOVA

A simple linear regression was run to predict the post-war level of democracy by unilateral interventions, pre-war levels of democracy, and the number of years passed. A significant regression equation was found ($F(3,946) = 279.302$, $p < 0.000$). This significant equation means that this model is a good fit to predict the level of post-war democracy.

4.1.4 assumptions and model fit

Looking at the R^2 is another way of checking if the model being used is a good fit to predict the dependent variable. In the regression run for this model, and as seen in the output section in table 1, R^2 has a value of 0.470. This means that our model can explain 47% of the variance in the level of post-war democracy. Therefore this thesis argues that the model 1A is a good fit to predict the level of post-war democracy. While model 1A is a good fit to predict the post-war level of democracy, model 1 without the control variables is not a good fit. Without accounting for control variables, model 1 only has a R^2 of 0.028. In other words, it can only account for 2.8% of the variance in the post-war level of democracy.

The adjusted R^2 gives a value of 0.468. The adjusted R^2 has a 0.002 lower score, meaning that if this model would be derived from the population instead of a sample, it would account for 0.4% less variance in the dependent variable. Therefore, the cross-validity of this model is very good.

While testing for statistical assumptions a few things worthy of notice were found. First of all, while analyzing multicollinearity, the independent variable and the two variables all had a VIF of <2.5 and tolerance levels all between 0.9 and 1. This means that there is no to little multicollinearity in the model used. (Field, 2013)

Secondly, the Durbin Watson in this model has a value of 0.267, meaning that the value is between below 2.0 and there is a possible positive autocorrelation (field, 2013). A possible explanation is that the level of democracy is rather robust. Due to the existence of checks and balances, it cannot be eroded or increased substantially in a short period of time.

4.2 Multilateral intervention

Table 2	Model 2	Model 2A
(Constant)	-2.029***	-1.485***
	(0.243)	(0.271)
UN intervention	6.443***	2.974**
	(0.556)	(0.449)
Elapsed years since civil war end		0.642***
		(0.027)
Democracy score before the civil war		0.103***
		(0.013)
R^2	0.123	0.470
Adj. R^2	0.124	0.468
N	950	950

Note: OLS-regression coefficients with standard errors between brackets.
    ***p < 0,001; **p < 0,01; *p < 0,05

4.2.1 Model 2

Model 2 presents the regression without the control variables, while model 2A presents the control variables included. For model 2, the dependent variable in a linear regression model is predicted by the formula Y=a+bX. Again, A is the intercept value or the constant, thus when the dependent variable is 0, the constant will be this value. X is the independent variable and b is the slope. For model 1 this is: level of democracy (Y)= -2.029(constant) + 6.443(multilateral) * X.

The effects of a multilateral intervention (independent variables) on the post-war level of democracy are visualized in table 2. The constant or starting position of the level of post-war democracy is given as -2.029 on a scale of -10 to +10.

UN intervention (b = 6.443): This value indicates that as the target state has experienced a multilateral UN intervention, thus coded X=1, the dependent variable will increase by 6.443 units on a scale of -10 to +10. This value is significant, (T=11.589, P<0.05).

4.2.2 Model 2A

Just as with model 1 and 1A, control variables have once again been added in model 2A. Therefore, the formula for predicting the post-war level of democracy changes. The formula for model 2A is: level of democracy (Y)= -1.485(constant) + 2.974(multilateral) * X1 + 0.103(Elapsed years) * X2 + 0.642 (Democracy score onset) * X3. Furthermore, the coefficients are different now. The constant or starting position of the level of post-war democracy is now given as -1.485 on a scale of -10 to +10.

Multilateral intervention (b = 2.974): This value indicates that as the target state has experienced a multilateral UN intervention, thus coded X=1, the dependent variable will increase by 2.974 units on a scale of -10 to +10. This value is significant, (T=6.626, P<0.05).

Control variable elapsed years since war end (b = 0.103): This value indicates that as if one year goes by since the war ended, the dependent variable will increase by 0.103 units on a scale of -10 to +10. This value is significant, (T=7.754, P<0.05).

Control variable democracy score at the start of the war (b=0.642). This value indicates that if the pre-war democracy score increases by 1 on a scale of -10 to +10, the dependent variable will increase by 0.642 on the same scale of -10 to +10. This value is significant (T=23.822, P<0.05).

4.2.3 ANOVA

A simple linear regression was run to predict the post-war level of democracy by multilateral UN intervention, pre-war levels of democracy, and the number of years passed. A significant regression equation was found ($F(3,946) = 301.384$, $p < 0.000$). This significant equation means that this model is a good fit to predict the level of post-war democracy.

4.2.4 Assumptions and model fit

In the same way as model 1 and 1A, examining the R^2 is another way of checking if the model being used is a good fit to predict the dependent variable. In the regression run for model 2A, and as seen in the output section in table 2, R^2 has a value of 0.489. This means that our model can explain 48,9% of the variance in the level of post-war democracy. Model 2, without the control variables, only has an R^2 of 0.124. Therefore, the predictor UN-authorized interventions predicts only 12% of the variance, while including control variables, increases this by more than 30%.

The adjusted R^2 gives a value of 0.487. The adjusted R^2 has a 0.001 lower score, meaning that if this model would be derived from the population instead of a sample, it would account for 0.1% less variance in the dependent variable. Therefore, the cross-validity of this model is very good (Field, 2013).

While testing for assumptions a few things worthy of notice were found. First of all, while analyzing multicollinearity, the independent variable and the two variables all had a VIF that were below 2.5 and tolerance levels all between 0.8 and 1. According to Field (2013), we should expect little to no multicollinearity with these statistics.

Finally, the Durbin Watson in model 2 has a value of 0.261, meaning that the value is between below 2.0 and there is a possible positive autocorrelation. As with model 1 and 1A, this means that if post-war levels of democracy increase or decrease in year A there is a high likelihood that it also increases or decrease in year B.

4.3 Interpretation of the two regression models.

Model 1 and 1A analyzed the relationship between unilateral interventions, control variables elapsed years and pre-war democracy, and the dependent variable post-war level of democracy. Without controlling for control variables, model 1 shows a significant effect between unilateral interventions and the level of post-war democracy.

If a state has experienced a unilateral intervention, the post-war level of democracy seems to be approximately 2.5 points higher on a scale of -10 to +10. Taking into account that the scale is only 20 points, this increase is substantial.

However, if model 1A is interpreted, an interesting phenomenon can be seen. If we control for elapsed years and pre-war democracy levels, the independent variable moderates. Rather than increasing the post-war level of democracy by 2.5 points, model 1A shows that unilateral interventions only increase the post-war democracy level by slightly above 1 point on a -10 to +10 scale. Model 1A demonstrates that for every point of pre-civil war democracy, post-war democracy is increased by approximately 0.7 points.

Two conclusions can be drawn for pre-war democracy as a control variable. First of all, democracy erodes during a civil war. As expected during the war, democracy will be the first victim of war. It is not surprising that countries, democratic or not, tend to look at different priorities during the war. Secondly, it demonstrates that pre-war democracy is a viable predictor for post-war democracy. Since pre-war democracy can be between -10 and +10, it means that its effect on post-war democracy can be -7 (-10*0.7) and +7(10*0.7).

Elapsed years since the civil war end is less influential on post-war democracy in the short run with only an effect of 0.106. However, after decades of peace, each year benefitting a variable of 0.106, it may have a serious effect on post-war levels of democracy.

Hypothesis H1 predicted that unilateral interventions decrease the post-war level of democracy. However, the regression model run in this thesis shows a positive relationship between a unilateral intervention and the post-war level of democracy. While control variables prove that other factors might as well influence the post-war level of democracy, unilateral interventions still prove a substantial and significant predictor. Therefore, H1 will be rejected.

Model 2 and 2A analyzed the relationship between multilateral interventions under UN authorization and the level of post-war level of democracy. UN interventions proved an even stronger predictor then unilateral intervention. Model 2 demonstrates that whenever a UN intervention occurred, the post-war level of democracy is predicted to be approximately 6.5 points higher on a scale of -10 to + 10. While controlling for control variables, the same trend as in model 1A is seen. Independent variable UN interventions get moderated by the two control variables. In model 2A, the occurrence of a UN intervention only increases the level of post-war democracy by approximately 3 points on the same scale.

Another notable observation is that pre-war levels of the democracy control variable, with a coefficient of 0.65, is slightly less influential than in model 1A. A reason for this observation might be the higher level of post-war democracy due to UN intervention. As predicted in the theory section, UN interventions are predicted to bring more democratization then unilateral interventions. Thus making pre-war levels of democracy less relevant for future democratization. The second control variable, elapsed years since the end of the war is

comparable to model 1A. While having a small effect on the short term, with a post-war democracy increase of 0.103 per elapsed year, it may be very influential in the long term.

Hypothesis H2 predicted that the occurrence of a UN intervention promoted the post-war level of democracy in the target state. The regression models 2 and 2A prove that there is indeed a positive relation between a UN intervention and the post-war level of democracy. While control variables moderate the effect of the independent variable, it still has a substantial and significant effect. Therefore, this thesis accepts hypothesis H2.

5. Conclusion

This thesis aimed to fill the research gap on foreign intervention and the effect on post-war levels of democracy. First of all, existing literature on foreign interventions has been analyzed to grasp the concepts that make up foreign interventions. Motives for interventions have been discussed, as well as the corresponding methods of interventions and the outcome of the civil war.

In the theory section, the knowledge consisting of the examined literature led to this thesis making two hypotheses that predict the outcome of the two regression analyses. H1 predicted that unilateral interventions decrease the post-war level of democracy in the target state, while H2 predicted that multilateral interventions under UN authorization increase the post-war level of democracy in the target state. The analysis of the regression models proved that H1 is false, the occurrence of a unilateral intervention does increase the post-war level of democracy.

Secondly, the occurrence of an UN-authorized multilateral intervention also increases the post-war level of democracy in a target state. In this case, it means that H2 is accepted since it predicted that UN-authorized multilateral interventions increase the post-war level of democracy.

Thirdly, the two models presented in this thesis also observed the relationship between the two control variables and the post-war level of democracy. While elapsed years since the civil war ended proved that in the long term it may be a substantial effect on post-war democracy, it also proved to be a minor factor in the short term. The pre-war level of democracy proved that democracy eroded during a civil war, but not by a great margin because democracy might be robust.

Finally, by analyzing the R^2 of the different regression models, it demonstrated that including control variables substantially improved the ability to account for the variance in the post-war levels of democracy. While both unilateral and UN-authorized multilateral intervention have a significant impact on the post-war level of democracy score, the two different methods of intervention are not enough to predict variance in the post-war level democracy.

5.1 Implications

While previous research has shown the negative sides of interventions, mainly prolonged conflicts and intensified conflicts, this attempt at research proves a possible upside of foreign intervention. By proving that both unilateral and UN multilateral interventions promote the level of post-war democracy, this implies a few things for policymakers. First of all, interveners might justify their interventions by highlighting the fact that interventions tend to promote the post-war level of democracy.

Secondly, international law has accepted the norm responsibility to protect on the 2005 UN world summit. If democracy has been threatened due to non-democratic governments, and a domestic group revolts for democracy, the international system should protect those who fight for democracy.

Thirdly, Kim (2016) argues that higher levels of democracy promote higher levels of quality of life. Thus foreign interventions not only lead to higher levels of democracy, but they also tend to improve citizens' quality of life. Foreign interventions that motivate their intervention out of democratization (The U.S, etc.,) might justify their intervention with the fact that it also improves citizens' quality of life.

5.2 Limitations and future research

While this thesis has positively surprised the author, I believe there are some limitations. First of all, this thesis did not differentiate between which side of the conflict had been supported by the different foreign interventions. For future research, it might prove beneficial to differentiate whether an intervention supported the government or the insurgents. While current research proves no relation between the intervention target and level of post-war democracy, it might be an interesting pathway to explore.

Secondly, this thesis did not take into account which civil war side did win the war. For future research, I suggest that the civil war outcome should be considered as control variables for the different methods of intervention.

Finally, future research might also control for the different ways of multilateral UN intervention. Out of knowledge limitations, this thesis did not differentiate between different types of UN interventions, as well as not controlling for the use of force. Present theories have proposed that interventions without the use of force, prove to significantly higher levels of post-war quality of life.

Appendix

Table 1: Linear regression model of unilateral interventions

Table 1	Model 1	Model 1A
(Constant)	-2.386***	-1.544***
	(0.382)	(0.365)
Unilateral intervention	2.488***	1.054**
	(0.478)	(0.362)
Elapsed years since civil war end		0.106***
		(0.014)
Democracy score before the civil war		0.684***
		(0.027)
R^2	0.028	0.470
Adj. R^2	0.027	0.468
N	950	950

Note: OLS-regression coefficients with standard errors between brackets.
***$p < 0,001$; **$p < 0,01$; *$p < 0,05$

Table 2: Linear regression model of UN-authorized multilateral interventions.

Table 2	Model 2	Model 2A
(Constant)	-2.029***	-1.485***
	(0.243)	(0.271)
UN intervention	6.443***	2.974**
	(0.556)	(0.449)
Elapsed years since civil war end		0.103***
		(0.013)
Democracy score before the civil war		0.642***
		(0.027)
R^2	0.123	0.470
Adj. R^2	0.124	0.468
N	950	950

Note: OLS-regression coefficients with standard errors between brackets.
***$p < 0,001$; **$p < 0,01$; *$p < 0,05$

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