Refugee Camp Militarisation: Analysing the lack of Militarisation in the Dadaab Refugee Complex in eastern Kenya from 1991 to 2005

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Citation

Däberitz, H. (2021). *Refugee Camp Militarisation: Analysing the lack of Militarisation in the Dadaab Refugee Complex in eastern Kenya from 1991 to 2005*.

Version:	Not Applicable (or Unknown)
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Refugee Camp Militarisation:

Analysing the lack of Militarisation in the Dadaab Refugee Complex in eastern Kenya from 1991 to 2005

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May 21st 2021

Word count: 12437

Abstract

The field of migration studies has long assumed migrants to be passive pawns propelled around by forces outside of their control. However, more recently, researchers have emphasised the significant influence migrants can have on economic, social and political developments. Civil war scholarship has recognised the impact refugees can have on conflict. This impact can, for example, take the form of refugee camp militarisation: the involvement of a refugee camp in violent political activity. Many scholars have developed theories explaining this phenomenon. However, most studies concentrate on camps that have militarised. This thesis investigates a refugee complex that has not. Using process tracing, five mechanisms theorized to lead to militarisation are analysed in the context of the Dadaab refugee complex from 1991 to 2005. With this analysis, the thesis aims to answer the research question: Which mechanisms prevent refugee camp militarisation? I find that the mechanisms preventing refugee camp militarisation in Dadaab were a weak common national identity paired with a limited opportunity structure and a missing resource mobilisation structure. However, I also propose a new factor that played a more critical role in preventing refugee camp militarisation in Dadaab: the lack of a common enemy. This idea expands the mechanism of political motivation. A group of refugees can have a broader common identity, but if there is a fragmentation along other societal structures expressed in the CoO's conflict, militarisation is unlikely.

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I. Introduction

The field of migration studies long assumed migrants to be passive pawns propelled around by forces outside of their control (De Haas et al., 2020). However, more recently, researchers have found this assumption to be flawed. They emphasise the significant influence migrants can have on economic, social and political developments (De Haas et al., 2020).

Scholars are applying this knowledge to other research areas, like the study of civil war. Instead of viewing refugees solely as the victims of conflict, newer research emphasises the considerable impact refugees can have on civil wars (Salehyan, 2007). This impact can, for example, take the form of refugee camp militarisation: the involvement of a refugee camp in violent political activity (Lebson, 2013; Lischer, 2005; Song, 2012).

Refugee camp militarisation is usually sparked by contact made with rebel groups active in the Country of Origin's (CoO) conflict or by the formation of military structures within the camp (Lischer, 2005). Militarisation can take different forms, but in all instances, it actively involves the camp in the CoO's conflict and, to varying extent, also the Country of Refuge (CoR), which houses the camp (Lischer, 2005).

While there have been multiple theories developed to explain refugee camp militarisation, most refugee camps do not militarise (Lebson, 2013). In some cases, like the Dadaab complex in eastern Kenya, the biggest and oldest refugee complex in use today, this presents something of a puzzle. Although Dadaab exhibits multiple factors said to increase the likelihood of refugee camp militarisation, this has not occurred (Song, 2012). Therefore, it begs the question of which mechanisms prevented militarisation in Dadaab.

To solve this puzzle, this thesis will pursue the question: Which mechanisms prevent refugee camp militarisation? By investigating this question, I contribute to the understanding of the militarisation process of refugee camps. This phenomenon needs to be studied closely due to the risk that refugee militarisation poses for significant parts of the refugee population and the spread of civil war (Lischer, 2005). More in-depth knowledge could potentially secure

camps more effectively and decrease the risk of the spread of conflict. Additionally, I aim to add to a realistic narrative of refugees that understands them as active agents, however, not as potentially dangerous. For such a narrative, it is crucial to understand under which conditions refugee militarisation is likely to occur and under which it is not. Not only does the world face the pressure of refugee movements at this time, but it is a phenomenon that has been around for a long time and will likely extend into the future (De Haas et al., 2020). A narrative like this is urgently needed to replace false assumptions about refugees and, instead, provide the right kind of support. This thesis will further these goals by providing an in-depth analysis of a camp that did not militarise and the question why.

For this purpose, the next section will review the existing literature surrounding refugee camp militarisation. Afterwards, the theoretical framework presents the theory used, describes the methodology and justifies the case selection. The fourth section analyses the case of Dadaab, followed by the fifth section, which presents the thesis's findings and answers the research question. The last section discusses the thesis's conclusion and limitations.

II. Literature Review

i. Concepts

Refugee and Refugee camp

The public discourse around refugees is filled with factual inaccuracies, starting with the terminology (Den Haas et al., 2020). In European media, the concept of a *refugee* is often confused with the terms *asylum seeker* and *migrant*. Migrant is the umbrella term, describing all persons who change their residence across administrative lines (Den Haas et al., 2020). While there is a broader connection between migration and violence, this thesis will focus on refugees housed in *refugee camps*.

According to the United Nations (UN), a refugee is a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social

group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. " (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, p. 152). A refugee is distinct from an *internally displaced person* (IDP), who, while possibly fleeing similar circumstances, did not cross international borders (Den Haas et al., 2020).

An asylum seeker is a person who is seeking international protection. Not all asylum seekers are refugees, as some might not satisfy the criteria above. However, anyone that fulfils the criteria above is necessarily a refugee and does not need to obtain an asylum decision to become one (Nicholson & Kumin, 2017, p. 18).

According to the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR, n.d.), approximately 40% of all refugees currently live in *refugee camps*. The UNHCR defines refugee camps as "temporary facilities built to provide immediate protection and assistance to people who have been forced to flee due to conflict, violence or persecution" (UNHCR, n.d., para. 1). Refugee camps can house refugees or IDP's. Whereas the latter is located in the CoO because IDPs have not crossed national borders, the former is based on a country's territory distinct from the CoO, the CoR. This thesis will investigate refugee camps housing refugees and use the term accordingly. Of course, some refugee camps' inhabitants might not meet the criteria set out by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and are therefore asylum seekers rather than refugees. However, since this thesis will focus on Somali inhabitants of a Kenyan refugee camp established during the civil war, it is safe to assume that the vast majority qualifies as refugees. Therefore, in the following sections, the camps' inhabitants will be referred to as refugees.

Refugee camp militarisation

Refugee camp militarisation can be broadly described as a refugee camp's involvement in expanding political violence. It is usually sparked by the formation of rebel groups within the camp or cross-border attacks on camps by rebel groups active in the CoO's conflict (Lischer, 2005). Militarisation can lead to residents fighting across borders in the CoO's civil war, fighting between refugees and the CoR or can even expand the conflict to an interstate war between the CoO and the CoR (Lischer, 2005). However, this thesis will not discuss the different forms of conflict following refugee militarisation but rather focus on the militarisation mechanisms themselves.

Muggah and Mogire (2006) distinguish *refugee militarisation* from refugee camp militarisation. Refugee militarisation describes a broader concept of refugees' military activity, independent of refugee camps. Refugee camp militarisation can include refugee militarisation but must happen within the camp or with the camp as its base. It can involve "the combination of military and armed attacks on refugees within camps; the storage and diffusion of weapons, military training and recruitment; the presence of armed elements, political activism and criminal violence within camps; and the exploitative use of relief/development resources by non-refugee residents and their dependents" (Muggah & Mogire, 2006, p. 7). All of these activities are organised around the refugee camp and, therefore, constitute refugee camp militarisation. This thesis will concentrate on a particular camp and therefore uses the term refugee camp militarisation, which will also be referred to as militarisation. It does not refer to refugees involved in violent political activity outside the camp.

Refugee-related violence can have many forms (Lischer, 2005). However, refugee camp militarisation only includes violence that leads to the spread of civil war. It needs to be distinguished from non-political violence occurring in refugee camps (Song, 2012). Therefore, it does not include minor conflicts between residents of a refugee camp and the local population as long as they do not involve the CoR in the original conflict or lead to a new civil war. In her definition, Song (2012) further excludes violence, such as "gender-based violence, rape,

robbery, personal hatred, and revenge" (p. 117). Although it is essential to study this kind of violence, it does not fit this thesis's scope. It does not involve the camp in a broader conflict and, therefore, does not qualify as an indicator of refugee camp militarisation.

Refugee camp militarisation does not occur in all camps (Lebson, 2013). There is no reason to believe that all refugee camps eventually militarise. Instead, there must be sets of specific circumstances to bring about this phenomenon. Even when a camp does militarise, not all refugees are involved in violent political activities. Furthermore, militant entrepreneurs often coerced those involved (Lebson, 2013; Lischer, 2005).

ii. Migration Agency

The field of migration studies long assumed that migrants have no agency of their own and instead are passive actors influenced by forces outside of their control (De Haas et al., 2020). This assumption was mirrored in other scholarly areas. For a long time, the study of civil wars perceived migrants only as victims of violence. Most analyses of the topic were either concerned with its humanitarian aspect or theorised about the violent causes of migration (Salehyan, 2007). The latter connected political violence to refugee migration (Neumayer, 2005), however, without recognising migrants' decision-making power in this process. Many articles explain the link between political violence and refugees using push-pull models: negative factors 'push' people out of their CoO, while positive factors 'pull' them into the CoR (Schmeidl, 1997). Within these theories, migrants are not portrayed as having a choice but rather as victims to outside forces.

However, newer work emphasises the decision-making process and the agency of migrants. Migrants are not solely pushed and pulled by external factors but make carefully considered decisions, which serve their interests (Davenport et al., 2003; Moore & Shellman, 2004). Not only do they have substantial decision-making power, but migrants can also influence the CoO and the CoR. While migration scholars have offered broader theories of

migrants' impact on economic and social developments in the CoO and CoR (De Haas et al., 2020), civil war scholars have investigated the influence migrants, and more specifically, refugees, can have on conflict.

iii. Refugees' Influence on Civil War

In recent civil war scholarship, refugees have been recognised as active agents in conflict. Although they are still acknowledged as victims, they have also been found to play a significant role in civil war (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Refugee movements can create a spill-over effect, increasing the likelihood that civil war will spread to neighbouring countries. In the CoR, refugees can create competition for resources like jobs, which creates tensions among the native population. They can provide resources for local rebel groups or change the country's ethnic demographics. All these mechanisms can spark a conflict in the CoR (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006).

The latter was observed in Zaire. Following the Rwandan genocide, Tutsi rebel groups overthrew the Hutu government in 1994, forcing many Hutus to flee to neighbouring countries (Lischer, 2005). Perpetrators of the genocide among the Hutu refugees militarised the refugee camps in Zaire. In addition to the attacks they carried out on Rwanda, they also formed alliances with part of Zaire's Hutu population. Just as in Rwanda, the rebel groups attacked the Tutsi population, which mobilised and struck back. The conflict quickly developed into a civil war in 1995. Following the invasion of Rwanda into Zaire, the situation further escalated into an international war that lasted from 1996 to 1997 (Lischer, 2005).

More often than sparking civil wars in the CoR, refugees participate in the CoO's civil war, the original civil war. While on the CoR's territory, refugees can get involved in the original civil war by supporting armed groups with resources like food, healthcare, equipment or recruits (Lischer, 2005). The concept of *refugee warriors* is one of the best-known mechanisms behind this phenomenon. Already in 1989, Zolberg, Shurke and Aguayo used this

idea to describe how combatants recruit refugees to fight in conflicts, thereby extending the original conflict to the CoR.

While refugee warriors are individually recruited refugees, scholars have also found whole refugee camps entangled in civil wars (Salehyan, 2007). Scholars agree that refugee camp militarisation constitutes a significant security issue. Apart from the risk, it poses to the CoR (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), refugees themselves are put in immediate danger (Johnson, 2011). For the signatories of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, this is of great importance since, under the convention, refugees' safety is the direct responsibility of the CoR (Nicholson & Kumin, 2017).

Despite the chance of refugee camp militarisation, scholars in this field of stress that there are no "deterministic links between refugees and conflict" (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006, p. 360). Most refugees remain uninvolved in political violence even if their camp militarises, while many others are coerced to participate (Lebson, 2013).

vi. Explanations of Refugee Camp Militarisation

Multiple theories of refugee camp militarisation exist. Humanitarian literature has primarily focused on socioeconomic explanations (Lischer, 2005). Factors such as proximity to the border, percentage of young men, the living conditions, the size and the amount of time spent in the camps are often cited to explain the occurrence of militarisation (Lischer, 2005). Humanitarian literature has found links of socioeconomic factors to either an increase in the likelihood of attacks by armed groups or the occurrence of social problems likely to lead to rebel group formation (Crisp, 2001; Lischer, 2005). The role of the protraction of a camp, defined as 25,000 refugees living in the same camp for more than five years (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 2004), is debated: Some scholars believe a protracted refugee camp situation will increase the likelihood of militarisation because it creates heightened tension (Lischer, 2005). Lebson (2013) agrees, however he explains the

impact of protraction differently. He states that social differences within refugee groups will diminish over time, simplifying mobilisation. Conversely, Song (2012) argues that it can also decrease militarisation's likelihood since, having grown up in the CoR, later refugee generations are less interested in the original civil war.

Scholars using the latent pressure theory have built on these socioeconomic factors. However, they are explaining militarisation by investigating the causes of attacks on camps (Song, 2012; Johnson, 2011). Therefore, they assume refugee militarisation to be caused by armed groups' attacks, leaving out the possibility of militarisation from within. This strand of theory argues that armed groups' attacks on a refugee camp happen when the group requires resources to survive. Armed groups need financial resources, food and recruits to sustain their activities. Refugee camps can be good targets to obtain such resources. Many people live in little space, providing plenty of resources for recruits. Furthermore, humanitarian aid provides camps with food and healthcare equipment, easily lootable due to the often-lacking security. However, for militarisation to take place, the armed groups need to be associated with the CoO's civil war (Johnson, 2011).

An opportunity and willingness approach is used to explain armed attacks with a cost and benefit calculation. The calculation is based on socioeconomic factors like the proximity to a border, the camp's demographic makeup, and additional ones, like the existence of lootable resources provided by humanitarian aid (Song, 2012). However, some of these mechanisms work in directions contrary to those expected by humanitarian literature. For example, the presence of young men is seen as a cost decreasing the likelihood of attacks, while in humanitarian literature, it is seen as increasing the risk of militarisation. This difference might be explained by the different causes of militarisation analysed. Since the latent pressure theory does not analyse militarisation from within, it does not consider the risk of militarisation caused by a high percentage of male inhabitants.

Explanations of militarisation from within have included factors like the characteristics of refugees. Lischer (2005) distinguishes between three such characteristics: persecuted, state-in-exile and situational refugees. Persecuted refugees were systematically oppressed in the CoO, while state-in-exile refugees have previously engaged in militant activities. These characteristics make them more likely to militarise than situational refugees who fled the living conditions created by the war (Lischer, 2005). Lebson (2013) argues similarly that military entrepreneurs' existence in camps can lead to militarisation. Furthermore, value is placed on refugees' common identity, which is believed to work as a mobilising factor (Lebson, 2013).

Factors in the CoR can also be important. For example, the living standards compared to those in the CoO are theorised to impact militarisation (Lebson, 2013). If living conditions in the CoR are considerably better than those in the CoO before the conflict and accessible to refugees, there is little reason to get involved in the civil war. The prospects of a better life in the CoR diminishes the motivation to return (Lebson, 2013). Already in 1985, Ferris noted that a lack of integration causes refugees' militant activities. Thus, when economic inclusion and integration ensures access to good living conditions, it can counteract militarisation.

Lischer (2005) further argues that CoR's can directly prevent militarisation, depending on their will and capability. Thus, the agenda of the CoR in the original civil war can play an important role. Militarisation is most likely when the CoR supports the militarisation of refugees and has the capability to do so or when the CoR does not have the capability to prevent it (Lischer, 2005).

v. The Role of Humanitarian Aid in Refugee Camp Militarisation

International involvement has also been found to play into refugee camp militarisation. Support from other countries or diasporas can ease militarisation (Lebson, 2013). A much more debated factor, however, is the role of humanitarian services. Some scholars see such services as increasing the likelihood of militarisation. Lischer (2005) argues that external involvement

in the form of humanitarian aid "increase[s] the capability of militant refugees" (p. 11). Aid distributed indiscriminately can provide refugees with the resources necessary to militarise, make refugee camps more attractive to armed groups' attacks, and sustain rebel movements (Lebson, 2013). Famously, this happened in Zaire, when the UNHCR distributed international humanitarian aid to the militarised Rwandan Hutu refugee camps. (Lischer, 2005).

Lischer (2005) identifies four ways in which humanitarian aid can "exacerbate conflict: feeding militants, sustaining and protecting militants' dependents, supporting a war economy, and providing legitimacy to combatants" (p. 6). Aid in the form of food, healthcare or equipment can directly support rebels or their families and supporters and finance their militant activities. Further, when a refugee situation is deemed to be a humanitarian disaster, this portrays the refugees as victims and provides legitimacy to their cause when they militarise.

This argument is also used in the latent pressure approach, arguing that humanitarian aid can increase armed groups' benefits of attacking a refugee camp (Song, 2012). However, this approach finds that humanitarian agencies can also increase the cost of attacks by providing services in the form of protection. Refugee camps are often vulnerable, especially when host states are not able or willing to provide protection. When humanitarian agencies step in to provide such security, this might decrease the likelihood of militarisation. The protection offered must be weight against the distribution of humanitarian aid in resources (Song, 2012).

As laid out above, many factors can play a role in refugee camp militarisation. Some are less widely acknowledged than others. For example, Lischer (2005) heavily criticises the socioeconomic factors used by humanitarian literature for ignoring the larger context of the camp and conflict. Instead, she emphasises mechanisms like the characteristics of refugees or the interests of the CoR (Lischer, 2005). While Lischer's (2005) theory is more widely acknowledged, it leaves out some mechanisms like the economic motivation to stay in the CoO or the mobilisation possibilities of refugees. Therefore, Lebson (2013) presents the most

comprehensive theory of the ones discussed above. It uses parts of Lischer's (2005) mechanisms while also adding new ones concerning economic, mobilisation and external support possibilities. Using a theory that combines many mechanisms makes it less likely that important factors that could prevent refugee camp militarisation are overlooked.

Furthermore, while the latent pressure theory provides interesting insights, it only concentrates on militarisation through armed groups' attacks without engaging with the possibility of militarisation from within. As the latter is the focus of this thesis, Lebson's (2013) theory is best suited.

vi. Discussion of Language

When moving within migration studies, it is essential to assess and discuss the terms used critically. In this thesis, I chose to use *country of origin* to describe the country from which the refugees left and *country of refuge* to describe the country in which they currently reside. These are only two of the many available terms. Most of these are charged with assumptions. Instead of country of origin, one could have used *sending state* or *home state* (De Haas et al., 2020). Sending state implies the non-agency of migrants by assuming that the state sends migrants instead of that migrants choose to leave. Home state, meanwhile, implies that a refugee can never be at home in their new place of residence and will always be a guest who can be 'sent home'. While country of origin also implies that one can only be of one origin and that this origin is static, I chose to use this term since it best describes the place where a refugee came from, but not necessarily where his or her home is.

I found the selection of the term country of refuge more troublesome. The alternatives *receiving state*, *country of destination*, and *host state* all carry unfavourable implications (De Haas et al., 2020). Similarly to sending state, the term receiving state takes away migrants' agency. Country of destination implies that refugees chose this state to migrate to, which creates the false image that refugees can choose their destination among all states. In

reality, this is heavily influenced by their financial resources and countries' border policies. It also implies that the refugees want to stay in this country, which is often not the case.

Host state, the term primarily used in this kind of literature, is, in my opinion, the worst choice. The word host makes it seem as though firstly, refugees are welcome, secondly well cared for and lastly, can never make that state their home since they will always be guests. The first and second assumptions are, in many cases, wrong. Therefore, this thesis uses the term country of refuge. Although it too implies that the current country of residence will never be the home country, it fulfils the purpose of describing the country in which the refugees found a temporary residence. None of these terms provides a sufficiently neutral and assumption-free description. However, for lack of better ones, I have chosen the two discussed above.

This section has summarised the most important strands of literature dealing with refugee camp militarisation. While there has been quite some work on refugee camp militarisation, case studies of camps that have not militarised are rare. Some exist using the latent pressure theory (Song, 2012). However, none investigate the lack of militarisation from within. This thesis aims to provide just that. The following section will introduce this thesis' approach. It will present the theory, methodology and case used to answer the research question.

III. Theoretical Framework

i. Theory

This thesis will analyse the mechanisms that Lebson (2013) expects to lead to refugee camp militarisation in the Dadaab refugee complex. The author presents five mechanisms to explain refugee camp militarisation: political and economic motivation, military entrepreneurs, permissive opportunity structure, and resource mobilisation structure. Lebson (2013) suggests that a refugee camp will only militarise if all factors are in place. Thus, this thesis hypothesises

that one or more mechanisms were not present in the Dadaab refugee complex between 1991 and 2005, which prevented its militarisation.

Political Motivation

The mechanism of political motivation is divided into two parts—the 'war of exclusion' and the 'ethnic-nationalist project' (Lebson, 2013). The war of exclusion factor developed by Lischer (2005) is asking if the refugees in a camp can be classified as situational or persecuted. Persecuted refugees would have escaped "ethnic cleansing, genocide, or other oppressive policies that target them on the basis of ethnic, religious, linguistic, or political identity" (Lischer, 2005, p. 10). These refugees are only safe in their CoO if their persecutors are no longer in power. Thus, for these refugees to return home, the government of their CoO has to change. Situational refugees flee the conditions the war created (Lischer, 2005). They are not persecuted but are no longer safe in their CoO and therefore decide to leave. According to Lischer (2005), these refugees can return home as soon as the situation in their CoO has stabilised. Therefore, she argues that persecuted refugees are more likely to engage in militant activities. For them to return, the government has to be overthrown, while for situational refugees, any victory suffices as long as it brings peace to the region. Thus, persecuted refugees are more likely to support a rebel group that will overthrow the oppressive government to ensure their return (Lischer, 2005). However, Lebson (2013) argues that this is not a necessary condition for militarisation since situational refugees have militarised in the past.

The second aspect of this mechanism, the ethnic-nationalist project, asks if the refugees share a common national identity and place value on their homeland (Lebson, 2013). Lebson (2013) sees this as an essential factor in refugee camp militarisation. If a refugee group shares a national identity and acknowledges their 'homeland' as an essential part of this identity, they are more likely to fight for it. However, when they define themselves as a national group unattached to their homeland, they are less likely to militarise. They might find it easier to build

a new life in the CoR. Least likely to militarise are refugees that do not share an identity, as they are much less likely to mobilise for the cause (Lebson, 2013). However, the factor describing the attachment of a refugee group to their homeland remains somewhat ambiguous. Lebson (2013) does not name examples of refugee groups that do not place value on their homeland, and it is difficult to imagine such exist. Thus, this thesis will try to find evidence of the relationship of the wider Somali diaspora to their homeland to investigate if this factor is present in Dadaab. However, more emphasis will put on the more precise, first part of the ethnic-nationalist project, the shared identity.

Economic Motivation

This mechanism argues that refugees are likely to militarise when they are economically oriented towards their CoO instead of the CoR (Lebson, 2013). Lebson (2013) outlines multiple factors on which this depends. On the one hand, refugees are likely to be economically oriented towards their CoO if they are not integrated into the CoR. Limited access to "courts, citizenship, free movement and residence" (Lebson, 2013, p. 140), as well as the labour market, denies refugees the possibility to build a livelihood in the CoR. Without integrating into the CoR, refugees might want to return to their CoO and militarise to achieve this goal. The longer refugees live in a CoO where they are denied such rights, the more likely this becomes. Over time social cleavages like class distinctions become less critical, and formerly opposing population groups can form social cohesions, likely to foster mobilisation (Lebson, 2013, p. 140). Hence, protracted refugee situations are likely to lead to militarisation (Lebson, 2013).

On the other hand, the economic situation in the CoO plays a role. Rather than absolute poverty, Lebson argues that "relative deprivation compared to the CoO" (Lebson, 2013, p. 140) matters. If the refugees led a better life in the CoO than they do in the refugee camp and believe that they will do so again after the war, they are motivated to secure this future by getting involved in the civil war. Moreover, it is harder for refugees with non-transferable property

and skills to build a livelihood in the CoR since they will not find work quickly and, thus, might also be more inclined to want to return (Lebson, 2013). Lastly, Lebson (2013) includes a ‘greed mechanism’ arguing that rent-producing natural resources in the CoO increase refugee’s motivation to return and, hence, the likelihood of militarisation (p. 140).

Military Entrepreneurs

The mechanism of military entrepreneurs is similar to the state-in-exile category presented by Lischer (2005). It asks if individuals are present in or associated with the camp “who see the potential to mobilise refugees to support or engage in militant activity” (Lebson, 2013, p. 141). These individuals could have already enacted military action on behalf of the inhabitants before becoming refugees. Sometimes they also only develop in exile. Military entrepreneurs increase the likelihood of militarisation since they will actively try to mobilise refugee groups. (Lebson, 2013, p. 141).

Permissive Opportunity Structure

Refugee camp militarisation is most likely to happen in a permissive opportunity structure. A permissive opportunity structure is a structure that allows for mobilisation and does not prevent militarisation (Lebson, 2013). If refugees are allowed to move among camps or organise, it is easier to create militant structures. Thus, domestic and international actors can create a permissive opportunity structure if they allow for unrestricted movement and organisation of refugees or ignore the exploitation of humanitarian aid for militant activities. Conversely, they can also sustain a prohibitive structure and thus prevent militarisation by securitising the camp. Furthermore, pressure to establish peace in the CoO can decrease the likelihood of militarisation since the country will be under international scrutiny (Lebson, 2013). However, Lebson (2013) points out that this might only have a temporary effect based on the stability of the peace agreement (p. 141).

Resource Mobilization Potential

Resource mobilisation potential asks if actors are supporting the militarisation of the camps (Lebson, 2013). These actors could be the host state, other states, diasporas or co-ethnic minorities providing financial resources or weapons to the camps. Outside actors are likely to provide support when they are interested in a specific outcome of the original civil war. As touched upon in the previous section, resources can also be provided as humanitarian aid, distributed without close monitoring. Support by outside actors makes it easier for refugees to obtain the resources needed for militarisation and, therefore, increases its likelihood (Lebson, 2013).

ii. Methodology

This thesis conducts an in-depth case study of the Dadaab refugee complex in eastern Kenya, investigating the period from its founding in 1991 until 2005. It uses process tracing to find the mechanism or mechanisms that prevented refugee camp militarisation in Dadaab. Therefore, it analyses the occurrence of each of Lebson's (2013) mechanisms in Dadaab to see if its absence prevented militarisation. To do this, I use scholarly articles, newspaper articles and reports by humanitarian organisations such as the UNHCR and the Human Rights Watch (HRW) to gather information on Dadaab. Many studies have focused on analysing camps that did militarise. Therefore, the analysis of a case that has not militarised can contribute important insights to the field by identifying the mechanisms that successfully prevent militarisation.

The time frame from 1991 to 2005 limits the analysis to the first influx of Somali refugees to Kenya, following the fall of Somalia's government (Chkam, 2016). There was a second significant refugee movement caused by new outbreaks of fighting between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Islamic Courts Union (ICU) militia in 2006

(Ikanda, 2008). These refugees might have different motivations than those that arrived before 2006 and are therefore excluded from this thesis.

In 2012, Song analysed the Dadaab refugee complex and provided explanations for its lack of militarisation. However, in her article, Song concentrates on militarisation through armed groups' attacks, using the latent pressure theory (Song, 2012). Lebson's (2013) theory, however, focuses on militarisation from within a camp. Such a theory has, to the best of my knowledge, not yet been applied to Dadaab. Furthermore, this thesis' time limit excludes several of Song's (2012) explanations. As two main mechanisms, the author names third-generation refugees' missing interest in the civil war and the security-first approach by Kenya exhibited through its border closure in 2007 (Song, 2012). This thesis's temporal scope excludes the third generation of refugees and the closing of the borders in 2007. Instead, it investigates why the camps did not militarise before these factors came into play.

iii. Case Selection

The Dadaab refugee complex in eastern Kenya was first established in 1991 to house the thousands of refugees fleeing the Somali civil war (Abdi, 2005). At this time, the refugees initially hosted in seventeen camps in Kenya were redistributed to live in either the Dadaab complex or the Kakuma camp (Abdi, 2005). While the complex was built for 90,000 people (Song, 2012), it already hosted about 128,000 refugees in 2000 (UNHCR, 2002). The inhabitants are distributed among its three camps: Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley (Ikanda, 2008). Today, Dadaab is the biggest and oldest refugee complex still in use (Kron, 2010).

The vast majority of Dadaab's refugees fled the Somali civil war. The war is now known as a conflict, divided along the major unit of political organisation in Somalia: the clan. However, there is some disagreement on when the war began. Indeed, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2015) code the conflict as two civil wars: one from 1988 to 1991 and one ongoing war starting in 1991. Although there were many different reasons for, what is coded

as the first civil war, the main one was the oppressive and corrupt nature of the government led by General Mohamed Siad Barre (Adam, 2008). In response to the government suppression of particular clans, various clan-based rebel groups formed. The conflict between these warlord-led groups and the government lasted until 1991, when the militias were able to overthrow the government. Here Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2015) code the end of the first civil war. However, in the new power vacuum, conflict emerged between the different militias about the future of Somalia's leadership, which is coded as a second civil war. This conflict caused the first significant refugee movement to Kenya. Despite many attempts at peacebuilding, the power conflict among the militias has continued until now (Adam, 2008).

However, there have been attempts to build a new government: the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the TFG. While the UN recognised the TFG, it could never establish long-lasting peace (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Since 2006, multiple non-clan-based groups have also emerged. Both the ICU and its split-off group Al-Shabaab have become major actors in the continuing conflict (Hoehne, 2015). The fighting between the ICU and the TFG in 2006 caused the second significant refugee movement to Kenya (Ikanda, 2008). Most of these refugees were housed in Dadaab with the refugees from the first movement. This second influx only worsened the overcrowding and underfunding of the camps.

The Dadaab camps are located in Kenya, 80km away from the border. The UNHCR deems this far enough to discourage cross-border attacks on camps and raids from militarised camps into the CoO. The distance exceeds the 50km suggested in the UNHCR camp planning standards (UNHCR, 2021). However, scholars suggest that a 50km distance does not deter attacks (Johnson, 2011). The high occurrence of cross-border banditry in Dadaab reinforces this argument (Chkam, 2016).

Following its resistance to house any refugees, Kenya's government practically transferred all its responsibility for the camps to the UNHCR (Kagwanja, 2002). The UNHCR, however, has provided the complex with humanitarian services over its entire existence.

Nevertheless, humanitarian agencies have reported horrendous living standards in the camps (HRW, 2009). They are overcrowded, plagued by malnutrition and disease, and exhibit many instances of non-political violence (Chkam, 2016). Even the UN has gone as far as admitting Dadaab to be a failure (BBC, 2009).

Dadaab's demographics have been more or less stable from 1991 to 2005. The percentage of male inhabitants has been around 50%. With the second generation born into the camps, Dadaab had a considerable part of young inhabitants (UNHCR, 1995; UNHCR, 2002; UNHCR, 2005). Among the population have been prior leaders of rebel groups (Song, 2012) and families of Somali warlords (Ikanda, 2008).

Various theories suggest all these factors to increase the likelihood of militarisation. Indeed, violence is a common characteristic of the Dadaab camps. The camps are grounds for sexual violence, clan rivalries, violent conflict with locals (Ikanda, 2008), and banditry (Song, 2012). All of these instances of violence, however, cannot be defined as indicators for militarisation. Sexual violence, minor conflicts and attacks by bandits fall in the category of non-political violence. The armed groups that are active here are not involved in the Somali civil war but are only interested in stealing the camps' resources (Song, 2012). Therefore, the definition of militarisation used in this thesis excludes these instances of non-political violence.

Dadaab is also known to be a nerve point for arms trafficking (Song, 2012). According to Muggah and Mogire (2006), arms trafficking can be an indicator of militarisation. However, Song (2012) shows that Dadaab has not seen any instances of sustained political violence. There are no military structures or cross-border attacks on Somalia, with the Dadaab complex as its base (Song, 2012). Further, although there have been conflicts between Dadaab's inhabitants and the local Kenyan population (Ikanda, 2008), there are no signs of more significant conflicts with the Kenyan government.

Therefore, the Dadaab complex makes a compelling case worth investigating to pinpoint the mechanism behind its lack of militarisation. The next section of this thesis presents

the information relevant to investigate Lebson’s (2013) mechanisms in Dadaab. In the following Findings section, Lebson's (2013) theory is applied to the information presented in the Analysis to judge the presence or absence of each mechanism.

IV. Analysis

i. Political Motivation

Over 90% of Dadaab's population are Somali refugees who fled the Somali civil war after the government was overthrown in 1991(Ikanda, 2008). Siad Barres tyrannic regime from 1969 to 1991 suppressed Somalia's population with excessive force and drove the state into collapse (Adam, 2008). Following the restructuring of the government to solely include members of his clan, Siad Barre also targeted ‘enemy’ clan groups. Under his leadership, whole villages were destroyed, causing numerous IDPs and multiple waves of refugee migration to the neighbouring Djibouti and Ethiopia. The fighting did not stop after clan militias were able to overthrow the government in 1991. The power conflict between the clans only caused new refugee movements to Kenya (Adam, 2008).

As stated above, the oppressive policies by the Siad Barre regime did produce persecuted refugees. Members of specific clans who were oppressed and targeted fled to neighbouring countries. However, these differ from the refugees in Dadaab. Since most Somali refugees in Dadaab arrived after the regime’s fall in 1991, it is unlikely that they fled its oppression. Instead, for many refugees, the reason for leaving the country was the circumstances created by the war (Kumssa et al., 2014). The population was in constant danger due to the extensive fighting among the multiple militias (Chkam, 2016). Further, looting of farmers’ resources by rebel groups produced devastating famine, which created a food shortage for 4,5 million people (Besteman, 1996). These are the primary reasons for the Somali refugee flow towards Kenya in 1991 (Chkam, 2016, p. 82).

It is likely that these refugees, now housed to a great extend in the Dadaab refugee complex, shared a common national identity. Many scholars agree that the Somali people are a very homogenous society (Laitin & Samatar, 1987). The majority of the population shares the same language, myth of ancestry and most important, the same religion (Laitin & Samatar, 1987). While the country did not experience state formation before colonisation, Ahmed (2018) suggests that their common religion created a sense of nation that was effective enough to mobilise against attacks from the outside. Still, the central unit of political organisation among ethnic Somalis remains the clan which trumps national identity internally (Ahmed, 2018). Somalia has six prominent clan families and more fragmented sub-clans and sub-sub-clans (Ssereo, 2003). The clans are organised along patrilineal lines. Thus, they are based on one common ancestor of the members.

Siad Barre's regime created many tensions between these different clans. Adam (2008) argues that it encouraged inter-clan fighting through the favouritism of Siad Barre's clan, the Marehan of the Darod, and the violent attacks on other opposing clans. As the Somali people were already previously inclined to identify with their clan over their nation, the tensions led to the disintegration of clan relationships and a weakening of the national identity (Adam, 2008). These tensions were further amplified after 1991. The power conflict led to fighting between the more prominent clans and the fragmentation of previously cohesive clan militias (Vinci, 2006). The hostilities are even continued within Dadaab, expressed through fights between members of different clans (Ikanda, 2008). Thus, it can be argued that the Somali refugees in Dadaab are likely to understand themselves as one nation. However, they are also likely to subordinate this identity to their clan belonging.

Whether the Somali nation is attached to a homeland is a different question. Before colonialism, Somalia did not experience extensive state formation (Ahmed, 2008). Although the Somali people understood themselves as a nation, they were organised along clan lines instead of as one state (Ahmed, 2008). During colonialism in the late 19th century, the Somali

inhabited land was divided among Britain, Italy and France (Besteman, 1996), which established British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and French Somaliland (which later became Djibouti). Therefore, the nation-state Somalia with the territory we now know did not exist until the independence of British Somaliland and the unification with Italian Somaliland in 1960 (Besteman, 1996).

However, ethnic Somalis have inhabited modern Somalia and parts of modern Ethiopia and Kenya for centuries (Laitin & Samatar, 1987). They have protected their territory towards outside forces and have fought to unite it again after independence (Ahmed, 2008). Therefore, it is likely that the Somalis, like most other nations, acknowledge their homeland as an integral part of their identity and worth protecting. The ties that the widespread diaspora has kept with Somalia exemplify this. Somalis all over the world are still in close contact with their homeland (Osman, 2017). Evidence shows visits to Somalia, media facilitated engagement and remittances, which uphold their connection and identification with the country.

ii. Economic Motivation

The refugees in the Dadaab camps were not integrated into Kenya economically, socially or politically (Lindley, 2011). Although Kenya signed the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, it has been unwilling to host Somali refugees from the beginning of the influx (Ikanda, 2008). The country almost entirely ceded its responsibility towards the refugees to the UNHCR. Moreover, the protracted nature of the camps has led to what Ikanda (2008) calls 'hosting fatigue': the total neglect of the Dadaab complex by Kenya.

Unsurprisingly, given Kenya's unwillingness in this regard, the government's refugee policies discourage integration. For example, it is complicated for refugees to gain access to Kenyan citizenship (Lindley, 2011). The conditions for an application are set very high. Therefore, most refugees cannot become citizens and do not have access to any political institutions (Lindley, 2011). They also do not have the right to free movement (Ikanda, 2008).

Kenya is employing an encampment strategy, officially confining all refugees to the remote, barren land around the refugee camps in Dadaab and Kakuma. To leave this area, refugees need official movement passes. These are only obtainable with good reason, such as access to higher education or health care. Any other movement outside of Dadaab, let alone the permanent move outside the camps, is punishable (Ikanda, 2008). Further, although refugees should legally be able to obtain work permits, these are rarely issued (Lindley, 2011, p. 37). Therefore, if refugees find work without a permit, their illegal status makes it easier for employers to apply for sub-legal pay and employment standards. However, most refugees in Dadaab cannot find employment, as the camp is located in one of Kenya’s poorest and least developed (Ikanda, 2008).

Thus, officially, the refugees living in Dadaab are not integrated into Kenya. However, since many have lived there since 1991, they have found unofficial ways to integrate (Lindley, 2011). Kenyan ID cards and movement passes are sold illegally, which some refugees have used to move out of the camps and into urban areas, where employment rates and living standards are higher. However, most refugees are left in Dadaab and have found ways to make an extra income there. Many need such additional economic activities since humanitarian aid is scarce and often does not cover basic needs. The decrease in donations that the UNHCR faced in the late 1990s has only worsened this situation (Lindley, 2011). Thus, refugees sell food rations distributed by the humanitarian agencies, trade animal products, sell clothes or run restaurants (Ikanda, 2008). These activities have developed a rudimentary infrastructure around the camps, in which refugees trade with the locals (Ikanda, 2008). However, Abdi (2005) points out that this development should not be overstated. These activities produce a meagre income for only a part of the population and do not enable them to become independent of humanitarian aid. The majority of the complex's inhabitants have been plagued by malnutrition even with these additional economic activities (Abdi, 2005).

Further, Dadaab is left in a 'state of limbo' (Abdi, 2005). As refugee camps are created for temporary purposes, they are not designed for the inhabitants to integrate. Refugee camps are supposed to be the exception, and their inhabitants resettled, repatriated or locally integrated as fast as possible (Crisp, 2001). None of these solutions has successfully been applied in Dadaab. The UNHCR has acknowledged that in a protracted situation, refugees' “basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled” (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 2004, p. 1). Dadaab is experiencing a protracted refugee situation, which has politically and physically removed the inhabitants from the rest of Kenyan society and kept them from integrating.

The economic situation that the Somali refugees experienced before fleeing was not considerably better than the conditions in Dadaab. In the 1980s, unemployment in Somalia was very high due to a rapid increase in population numbers and the lack of economic infrastructure to absorb the new workforce (Gray, 1989). Not only that, but the economy was volatile: production levels changed dramatically from one year to the other. A likely cause for this is Somalia's extreme weather causing many droughts detrimental to the 75% of the populations that relied on farming and livestock (Gray, 1989, p. 122). Further, Somalia's industrial sector was very underdeveloped (Metz, 1993). Industries like mining were nearly non-existent. Although Somalia has rent-producing natural resources such as uranium and iron, in 1988, mining only made up 0.3% of the GDP (Metz, 1993).

However, analyses have also found that Somalia had an unconventional economy often overlooked in the official numbers (Metz, 1993). Metz (1993) argues that the agricultural sector “produced sufficient grain and animal products (mostly milk) to sustain the country’s growing population” (p. 142). Additionally, many labourers left the country for surrounding Arab states, sending back remittances not registered by official data. With the outbreak of fighting in 1991, however, the economy broke down completely. Resources were looted or controlled by militias, which lead to severe famine, affecting most of the population (Compagnon, 1992).

iii. Military Entrepreneurs

No evidence suggests that military entrepreneurs have developed within the camps. However, Song (2012) points out that Dadaab is “home to several former and active rebels” (p. 122). Most famously, Alice Lakwena, the leader of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), a guerrilla group fighting against the Museveni government in Uganda, lived in Dadaab during her exile in Kenya (Nyanzi, 2007). According to Song (2012), she mobilised a group of followers until her death in January 2007. Furthermore, Dadaab’s inhabitants have treated wounded rebel fighters in the camps. However, they usually return to Somalia instead of staying in the camps (Song, 2012, p. 123).

Additionally, Ikanda (2008) reports that Dadaab houses families of Somali warlords, which visit the camps regularly. In the examined time period, most of the factions in the Somali conflict were led by warlords (Elmi & Barise, 2006, p. 43). As the leaders of militias, the warlords were actively involved in the Somali war (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Some scholars like Compagnon (1992) argue that warlords are one of the main reason for the prolonged conflict, as most will never agree to a power-sharing scheme that will reduce their influence. Since warlords gain from sustaining the war, they could be interested in supporting a militarisation of Dadaab. Dadaab’s militarisation could provide recruits to militias and, since militarisation is likely to extend the civil war, could maintain a situation in which they can consolidate their power.

iv. Permissive Opportunity Structure

In 2006 the Department of Refugee Affairs in Kenya introduced elections of refugee leaders in Dadaab to encourage the political participation of refugees (Nasrullah & Mwancha, 2013). However, in the time frame analysed here, namely from 1991 to 2005, no such organisational structures were present. Nevertheless, movement among the different camps in

Dadaab was possible for all refugees and mobilisation allowed. The mobilisation around Alice Lakwena, for example, was tolerated by the Kenyan government as it was believed to stabilise the camp's population (Song, 2012).

However, the Kenyan government has not done considerably more to securitise the camps (Kagwanja, 2002). Instead, Kenya's "'abdicationist' position in regard to security" (Kagwanja, 2002, p. 106) resulted in further shifts of responsibility towards the UNHCR. The UNHCR, in contrast, has taken several measures to ensure security and demilitarisation in the Dadaab complex: Between 1992 and 1997, it allocated funds to establish and equip a police station (Song, 2012, p. 124). Furthermore, the UNHCR is employing the "ladder of options" (Song, 2012), a response tool developed to ensure the security and "humanitarian character" of refugee camps (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 2000, p. 2). The ladder of options refers to the different measures the UNHCR has operationalised in response to different levels of security concerns within a camp. These range from minor, unlawful acts to the formation of militant structures. The ladder of options tool is meant to help UNHCR staff assess a situation and take appropriate steps to re-establish security (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 2000).

However, as Song (2012) points out, the protection of the UNHCR is often ineffective. The inadequate monitoring of the police station established by the UNHCR exemplifies this. There have been numerous reports of human rights violations enacted by Kenyan police officers in the camps (HRW, 2010). Although the UNHCR ensures regular contact with the police station to undermine such behaviour, they have not been able to do so (HRW, 2010). The continued presence of sexual violence and banditry in the camps further suggest that the protection offered by the UNHCR is not effective.

Considering the complete breakdown of the Somali state and the mass number of refugees and human rights violations caused by the war, it is no surprise that there has been international involvement pressing for a peace agreement. Until 2006, fourteen peace

agreements were reached during various conferences. Five of these received significant support from the international community (Elmi & Barise, 2006, p. 38). However, none was able to create sustainable peace.

v. Resource Mobilisation Potential

Like in many civil wars, there are numerous external actors interested in the outcome of the Somali war. The main external actors in this war are the neighbouring countries Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Arab states, and the US (Farah et al., 2007; Møller, 2009). All actors supported either one or multiple fractions involved in the war, except for Kenya. In the examined time period, Kenya has represented itself as neutral (Farah et al., 2007). However, Farah et al. (2007) have argued that it, too, has shown biases towards some factions.

Most actors like the US, Djibouti and Egypt supported the TNG and its successor, the TFG (Farah et al., 2007; Møller, 2009). However, the support lent by external actors is much more complex. In response to the formation of the TNG, which it did not recognise as legitimate, Ethiopia helped establish and fund the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Committee (SRRC) (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Mostly to oppose Ethiopia, Eritrea supported the ICU, another paramilitary organisation involved in the war.

As shown above, the interests of external actors in the Somali war are numerous and complex. It is beyond this thesis's scope to detangle and explain them. However, what is essential is that even though many external actors were involved, there is no evidence of support flowing into the Dadaab refugee complex. None of the external actors targeted the camps. There is also no evidence for military support by the Somali diaspora. Resources in the form of remittances are mostly sent to sustain refugees' and IDPs' livelihoods rather than as resources for militarisation (Møller, 2009).

As alluded to in previous sections, the Dadaab refugee complex did receive support from non-state actors in the form of humanitarian aid. In 1991 when Dadaab was founded, the

UNHCR allocated around $35 million per year to the camps (Song, 2012, p. 125). It is also known that the resources provided to the inhabitants are not always used in the intended matter. Many refugees sell or trade their rations for other products at the local market (Ikanda, 2008). However, there is no evidence for the use of humanitarian aid for military purposes. Furthermore, the amount of aid needs to be understood in relation to the more than 120,000 inhabitants of Dadaab and the three camps it needs to sustain. Even before the UNHCR's humanitarian aid decreased in the late 1990s (Song, 2012), there were not enough resources to feed the vast amounts of refugees. Malnutrition has plagued the camps since day one, and the resources by the UNHCR are not enough to cover the most basic needs of the inhabitants (Chkam, 2016).

Table 1.

Overview of Mechanisms

Mechanism	Theoretical predictions	Empirical Evidence in Dadaab
Political Motivation	• Persecuted refugees have a higher risk of militarisation than situational refugees because the CoO's oppressive regime needs to be overthrown for them to return home. • Refugees that share a national identity and are attached to their homeland are more likely to militarise.	• The Somali refugees in Dadaab fled the fighting and famine caused by the conflict in 1991. • The Somali people share a common identity, although clan affiliations and rivalries can undermine that bond. • The Somali diaspora remains very engaged in their homeland.
Economic Motivation	• Refugees are more likely to want to return to their CoO and, thus, militarise if: they are not integrated into the CoR, live in a protracted situation, the economic situation in the CoR is worse than in the CoO prior to the conflict, the refugees have non-transferable skills/property, and the CoO is rich in rent-producing natural resources.	• Somali refugees are not integrated or allowed to work and are dependent on insufficient humanitarian aid. • In their protracted situation, some have found ways to make extra income by trading with locals. • The Somali economy before the war was small and volatile. • 75% of the population were farmers, and the mining industry was minuscule.
Military Entrepreneurs	• A refugee camp is more likely to militarise when it houses or is associated with individuals interested in the camp's involvement in a civil war or knowledge of military actions.	• The leader of HSM lived in Dadaab for multiple years and mobilised a group of followers. • Warlords' families live in Dadaab. • Wounded Somali rebels are treated in the camps.
Permissive Opportunity Structure	• Militarisation requires a structure in which refugees can move, organise and where humanitarian organisations ignore military structures. • Pressure for peace limits the opportunity structure.	• Refugees are allowed to organise and move among the camps. • The UNHCR employs tools to prevent militarisation, although their protection is often ineffective. • All peace negotiations in Somalia have failed.
Resource Mobilisation Structure	• Militarisation needs resources from states interested in the civil war, diasporas, co-ethnic minorities, the CoR or unmonitored humanitarian aid.	• There is no evidence of foreign support for militarisation. • The UNHCR controls humanitarian aid, using the ladder of options.

V. Findings

The section above has presented the information relevant for identifying the mechanisms presented by Lebson (2013) in the Dadaab refugee complex. Now, I discuss the implications of this information.

Firstly, I argue that the mechanism of political motivation was present in Dadaab, even if it was weak. Regardless of the oppressive nature of the previous government and the clan-based violence which reigned Somalia starting in 1991, the refugees cannot be classified as persecuted. None of the factors described by Lischer (2005) could be identified as a cause for the refugee migration from Somalia to Kenya starting in 1991. Instead, the refugees can be categorised as situational refugees, fleeing the violence and famine caused by the civil war. However, as Lebson (2013) points out, the 'war of exclusion' is not a necessary condition for militarisation, and therefore, this factor should not have prevented refugee camp militarisation.

Although inter-clan rivalries weaken it, the Somali refugees in Dadaab share a national identity and see their homeland as an integral part of their identity. Lebson (2013) states that if refugees place value on their homeland, they are more likely to fight for it instead of settling in the CoR. The sustained relationship between the Somali diaspora with Somalia shows that this connection exists. Even though significant parts of the Somali diaspora have integrated into the countries they live in now, they uphold the ties to their homeland. However, I will not emphasise this factor, as it is still quite ambiguous. The homeland engagement by the Somali diaspora shows that some of the Somali people are invested in their homeland. Nevertheless, it is not conclusive evidence that the refugees in Dadaab are similarly connected to their homeland and would go as far as risking their lives for it. To provide a robust interpretation of this factor, one would have to conduct interviews with Dadaab inhabitants. However, within this thesis, that was not possible. Therefore, although I mention this factor as an interesting insight, I will focus on the situational nature of the refugees and their shared national identity when analysing the mechanism of political motivation.

Regarding the second mechanism, I argue that Dadaab's refugees are economically oriented towards their CoO. However, the lack of opportunity to return home has led many refugees to build a livelihood in the CoR, Kenya. This should not be interpreted as an economic orientation towards Kenya but rather as necessary for survival.

As shown above, the Somali refugees were not officially integrated into Kenya. Instead, they were actively excluded using an encampment strategy. Most refugees did not have access to political institutions or the labour market. The illegal ways refugees have used to gain this access did not lead to an orientation towards the CoR. No actual integration ensued but rather a condition of illegality, making refugees vulnerable to abuse. Further, the refugees in Dadaab have lived in this situation of denied access for an extended period, which falls under the category of a protracted refugee situation as defined by the UNHCR. Lebson (2013) argues that a protracted refugee situation increases the likelihood of refugees overcoming social distinction to mobilise and, thus, militarise. This thesis has found no evidence that this is the case for Dadaab. There are no reports of decreasing social tensions among the inhabitants (Ikanda, 2008). Especially the clan divide has not weakened due to the protracted situation. However, it seems likely that the extended time for which the refugees have lived in unfavourable conditions strengthened their wish to return home and their willingness to militarise.

Additionally, the dependency on insufficient humanitarian aid that refugees experience in Dadaab does not provide its inhabitants with a better standard of living than Somalia did before the war. In Somalia, the refugees had a degree of self-determination not present in the constant limbo that the camps provide. Further, most of the population are small-scale farmers with non-transferable skills and property, which Lebson (2013) sees as another factor complicating the economic integration into the CoR. However, the greed mechanism he proposes does not affect the refugees of Dadaab. He argues that the existence of rent-producing natural resources in the CoO can increase the chances of militarisation because the possibility

of benefitting from these resources increases the motivation to return to the CoO (Lebson, 2013). However, since the mining industry only made up 0.3% of the economy, the Somali refugees are unlikely to have benefited from Somalia's rent-producing natural resources.

Nevertheless, as shown in the previous section, some refugees still build livelihoods in Kenya. I argue that this is not related to a rejection of their homeland but rather to necessity. Most refugees have lived in the camps for many years and have had no opportunities to return to a safe Somalia. Instead, the violence continues, and one peace negotiation fails after the other. Because the refugees cannot survive on the meagre resources provided by UNHCR, they have to find other ways of sustaining themselves. The confinement to the camps, the dependency on the UNHCR and the lack of acceptance from the Kenyan government could foster a strong wish to return to a peaceful Somalia. This wish to return to how Somalia was could provide a solid foundation for mobilisation and, eventually, militarisation.

Lebson's (2013) third mechanisms, military entrepreneurs, was present as well. No military entrepreneurs developed in the camps, but persons known to be military entrepreneurs were present and associated with Dadaab. It might be less likely that Alice Lakwena would mobilise refugees to fight in the Somali war to which she has little connection. However, the presence of both rebels and warlords involved in the Somali war increases the likelihood of militarisation.

Regarding the fourth mechanisms, I argue that although the UNHCR did not provide a permissive opportunity structure for militarisation in Dadaab, it could not wholly squash the possibility of militarisation. Due to the UNHCR's experience with the militarisation of refugee camps, namely the Rwandan Hutu camp in Zaire, the organisation has become more vigilant in trying to secure camps. The investments in police forces in Dadaab and the employment of the ladder of options show a commitment to demilitarisation, which has not been the case previously (Lischer, 2005).

However, this securitisation is not very effective. The UNHCR does not have enough funding or staff to secure a refugee complex as big as Dadaab (Song, 2012). It cannot prevent banditry, sexual violence, or arms trafficking, so it seems unreasonable that it could prevent the militarisation of refugees. Additionally, the refugees' ability to move among camps and, to some extent, even mobilise adds to the possibility of militarisation. Nevertheless, since there are precautions to prevent militarisation, it does make it more difficult. There would have to be a strong motivation and sufficient support to militarise against the UNHCR's efforts. Lebson (2013) also mentions that international actors' pressure to establish peace decreases the likelihood of refugee camp militarisation. However, due to the failure of all peace negotiations in Somalia, this factor is not present in Dadaab.

Lastly, no evidence of outside support for militarisation could be found and thus, no evidence of a resource mobilisation structure. Although many states supported specific fractions in the war, they did not allocate resources to the refugee camps. Further, although the UNHCR did provide humanitarian aid to the camps, this was hardly enough to feed the population. Thus, it is unlikely that the resources would have sufficed to militarise the camps. Moreover, the allocation of the resources was monitored. The UNHCR was aware of the possibility of militarisation and used the ladder of options to decrease its likelihood. Even if these strategies were not fully effective, it would make militarisation more difficult.

To sum up, following Lebson's (2013) argumentation, it was the weak national identity, the limited opportunity structure and the missing resource mobilisation structure that prevented Dadaab from militarising. Although a shared national identity was present, rival clan relations are likely to have weakened any mobilisation based on this identity. It is likely that the fragility of this mechanism contributed to the prevention of Dadaab's militarisation. Especially, since Lebson (2013) states that the ethnic-nationalist project is critical in refugee camp militarisation. Nevertheless, since the refugees did share a national identity, militarisation was not impossible. If all other mechanisms would have been present, Dadaab might have still militarised.

However, this was not the case. Although economic motivation and military entrepreneurs were present, the limited opportunity structure and the missing resource mobilisation structure did not allow for militarisation.

However, I argue that another, more prevalent reason prevented Dadaab from militarising: the lack of a common enemy. Instead of rebel groups fighting a government, numerous different clans struggled to gain power in Somalia since 1991. This fragmentation along clan lines evident in the war was mirrored in Dadaab. Twelve per cent of the refugees in the complex belonged to the Dir and Hawiye clan, six per cent to the Bantu and more than half to the Darod sub-clans (Hammond, n.d., p. 9). Although the Darod clan fought as one group against the regime before 1991, it fragmented into sub-clans, all of which were in conflict with one another (Vinci, 2006). These conflicts were continued in Dadaab, where no clan majority formed.

Since the refugees in the camps belonged to rival clans, there was insufficient ground to mobilise a large part of the population against a common enemy. Even if their identity connected them enough to act as a group, which clan would they fight against? Which clan would they support? The lack of a common enemy in the form of a government, which makes the Somali war an outlier in the study of civil wars, also makes the militarisation of Dadaab one. It is unlikely that a group of refugees could be convinced to fight against their clan by members of rival clans. Therefore, even if Somali refugees in Dadaab would want to fight in order to be able to return to their CoO, it is unlikely that they would be able to find ground to mobilise enough others.

I argue that this finding extends the mechanism of political motivation by Lebson (2013). It is an essential factor that needs to be examined when looking into the militarisation of a refugee camp. A common national identity does not suffice for mobilisation if there is fragmentation along other societal structures expressed in the CoO's conflict. As Lebson (2013)

argues that political motivation is the most crucial factor, this new factor outweighs the other examined mechanisms. Even if all other four were present, the lack of a common enemy would make mobilisation of the refugee group so unlikely that militarisation would be impossible.

Furthermore, the missing resource mobilisation structure in Dadaab might be related to the lack of a clan majority. If an actor supports a clan that only constitutes a minority of a camp, this actor might find the likelihood of its militarisation too small to actively support it. Especially if the UNHCR also protects this camp, supporting militarisation could be perceived as a waste of resources when considering the hurdles to militarisation. Of course, external actors would have to have sufficient information about the camp, its inhabitants, and protection for this to be true. Needless to say, this is not always the case. Nevertheless, it is an idea worth investigating further.

Like in most long-lasting civil wars, the composition of actors in the Somali conflict has changed over time. Therefore, the importance of this proposed factor in Dadaab has also changed. In the time span following 2005, multiple actors emerged which cut across clan lines. The ICU, a collection of Islamist militias, was founded in 2006 (Ikanda, 2008, p. 30). It quickly became an important actor and gained the upper hand in Mogadishu in June of that year. The ICU disregards clan-based organisation in favour of an Islamic ideology (Ikanda, 2008). This clan-transcending ideology is continued in the split-off group Al-Shabaab which became a significant actor in the conflict in late 2006 (Hoehne, 2015, p. 801). Similarly, the TNG and the TFG were coalition governments made up of members of many different clans. Therefore, instead of representing only one clan, these new actors cut across clan affiliations. Thus, their emergence could shift the dynamics of the Somali conflict. If most refugees in a camp identify with these actors based on characteristics other than clan-belonging, the factor of a missing common enemy would be removed. Indeed, since 2006, workers in Dadaab have reported the recruitment of Somali refugees by both the TFG and Al-Shabaab (Song, 2013).

However, no sustained military structures have emerged within the camp (Song, 2013). Song (2013) has offered some explanations for this, naming the disinterest of third-generation refugees in the conflict, Kenya's security-first approach starting in 2007, and the UNHCR's protection as the main ones. Hoehne (2015) has also argued that neither the ICU nor Al-Shabaab were as neutral to clan rivalries as they presented themselves to be. Al-Shabaab's leadership, for example, was dominated by members of majority clans (Hoehne, 2015, p. 801). Further, the absence of the mechanisms analysed in this thesis might extend into this period and add to the prevention of militarisation. However, a thorough analysis of the mechanisms present in Dadaab after 2005 is necessary to explain this in more detail.

VI. Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer the question: Which mechanisms prevent refugee camp militarisation? Multiple theories that explain refugee camp militarisation have been presented. The circumstances surrounding the refugee complex Dadaab were analysed and interpreted to investigate the occurrence of Lebson's (2013) five mechanisms. However, this thesis also proposes a different factor that played a more critical role in preventing refugee camp militarisation in Dadaab than Lebson's (2013) mechanisms: the lack of a common enemy.

Lebson's (2013) first mechanism of political motivation was present in Dadaab, even though it was weak. Dadaab's refugees can be classified as situational, which decreases the likelihood of refugee camp militarisation. However, Lebson (2013) points out that this is not a decisive factor. More crucial is the common national identity among the Somali people, weakened by internal camp rivalries caused by Somalia's clan-based conflict. Although it is assumed that the Somali people place value on their homeland, due to the ambiguity of this factor, it is left out of the interpretation. The second mechanism, economic motivation, was also present. Due to the lack of integration, the human rights-violating conditions, and the dependency on aid, Dadaab's inhabitants likely fostered a wish to return to Somalia.

Nevertheless, many started to build livelihoods in Kenya by establishing small businesses or conducting trade. I argue that this should not be seen as an economic orientation towards Kenya but rather the only way to sustain oneself in the camps. Therefore, the camps' inhabitants were economically oriented towards the CoO and had a higher chance of militarising. Military entrepreneurs were also associated with the camps. Rebels and warlords are known to have had contact with the complex, which is thought to increase the likelihood of refugee camp militarisation. The permissive opportunity structure is a bit more ambiguous. Although the UNHCR used the ladder of options to prevent militarisation, its protection in Dadaab was inefficient. Therefore, it is likely that if militant structures were to form, the precautions in place would not have prevented them. Nevertheless, because other mechanisms, such as political motivation, were weak, the limited opportunity structure contributed to the prevention of militarisation. Lastly, Lebson (2013) discusses the resource mobilisation structure, arguing that militarisation will only occur when refugees receive support from external actors or in the form of unmonitored humanitarian aid. As laid out above, both were not the case on Dadaab.

Thus, the mechanisms preventing refugee camp militarisation were a weak common national identity paired with a limited opportunity structure and a missing resource mobilisation structure.

However, this thesis brings forth another argument. It argues that the lack of a common enemy in the Somali war was a more influential factor in preventing militarisation in Dadaab than the ones mentioned above. The fragmented nature of the conflict in Somalia was mirrored in the camps' population. No majority identified with one militia fighting in the war and could mobilise to support it. Instead, the clan rivalries were continued in the camps. This idea expands Lebson's (2013) mechanism of political motivation: A group of refugees can have a broader common identity, but if there is a fragmentation along other societal structures expressed in the CoO's conflict, militarisation is unlikely. Since Lebson (2013) finds political motivation to be the most important mechanism of refugee camp militarisation, I argue that even if Lebson's

other mechanisms would have been present in Dadaab, the camp would not have militarised due to the lack of a common enemy.

This thesis was conducted with the limitations of a bachelor thesis. Without the possibility to travel to Dadaab, I had to rely on descriptions and interpretations of other scholars. Therefore, some information was difficult to obtain. For example, questions of national identity and homeland belonging are better answered using surveys and interviews with the persons affected. Further, knowledge about outside support to militant structures in Dadaab is hard to find if states do not advocate this openly. Therefore, it is possible that such support did exist but was kept secret. Additionally, the limited information collected before the 2000s by the UNHCR made it challenging to get a clear picture of Dadaab's demographics and refugees' sentiment. Lastly, one cannot make sure that all essential factors preventing militarisation were considered in this analysis. However, I have tried to provide the most detailed picture possible within the limited scope of a bachelor thesis.

The analysis of this thesis contributes to the studied area by introducing a new factor that prevents refugee camp militarisation. Moreover, by producing a research that shows the many mechanisms that need to be in place for refugee camp militarisation, I hope to add to a narrative that does not portray refugees as dangerous. Refugees do not breed violence. The non-political violence common in camps should be seen with reference to the human rights violating, unstable and protracted situation that these people are placed in. A narrative like this can help reduce the marginalisation of refugees and make states more willing to take on the responsibility of creating sustainable refugee policies. However, further research is necessary to include the voices of Dadaab refugees. Interviews or surveys with persons affected are necessary to understand the full dynamics at work in the camps. Additionally, more case studies are needed to test if the proposed extension of political motivation applies to other cases.

VII. References

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