Nuclear disarmament in domestic politics: Understanding the effects of the nuclear positions on political parties in Norway and Sweden

Røed, Emma Christina

Nuclear disarmament in domestic politics: Understanding the effects of the nuclear positions on political parties in Norway and Sweden

Student: Emma Christina Røed (s2173336)

Bachelor Thesis

BAP: Cooperation on Global Challenges and Crises

B.Sc. International Relations and Organisations, Leiden University

Course coordinator: Dr. Agha Bayramov

Wordcount: 7820

Date: May 21, 2021

Reference style: APA 7th edition

Abstract

This thesis seeks to dive into the nuclear disarmament debate as expressed around the negotiations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). It applies a comparative case study design to investigate nuclear disarmament on the domestic level, answering the following research question: *How do the nuclear positions of Norway and Sweden affect their political parties' motivations towards nuclear disarmament?* The findings show that nuclear disarmament does not constitute a prevalent debate in the countries. There is no evidence indicating a relationship between the nuclear positions of the states and the motivations of the political actors. However, there is a common understanding among the political actors that the states should have a capable and modern military force as well as close connections to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet, these military decisions are not related to nuclear weapons or nuclear threats. Therefore, this thesis finds hope for more states, even nuclear umbrella states, to join the TPNW in the future.

Key words: Nuclear disarmament, deterrence theory, TPNW, NATO, Norway, Sweden

Table of Contents

I. List of abbreviations

AP	Arbeiderpartiet (Norwegian Labour Party)
C	Centerpartiet (Swedish Centre Party)
FrP	Fremskrittspartiet (Norwegian Progress Party)
H	Høyre (Norwegian Right/Conservative Party)
IHRC	International Human Rights Clinic
KD	Kristdemokraterna (Swedish Christian Democratic Party)
KrF	Kristelig Folkeparti (Norwegian Christian Democratic Party)
L	Liberalerna (Swedish Liberal Party)
M	Moderaterna (Swedish Conservative Party)
MDG	Miljøpartiet De Grønne (Norwegian The Greens Party)
MP	Miljöpartiet De Gröna (Swedish The Greens Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NNWS	Non-nuclear weapons state
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NRK	Norsk Rikskringkasting (Norwegian National Broadcasting)
NUS	Nuclear umbrella state
NWS	Nuclear weapons state
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
R	Rødt (Norwegian Left/former Communist Party)
S	Socialdemokraterna (Swedish Social Democratic Party)
SD	Sverigedemokraterna (Swedish Sweden Democrats Party)
SP	Senterpartiet (Norwegian Centre Party)
SV	Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Norwegian Socialistic Left Party)
SVT	Sveriges Television AB (Swedish National Broadcasting)
TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty)
UN	United Nations
US	United States
V	Venstre (Norwegian Liberal Party)
Vä	Vänsterpartiet (Swedish Left Party)

> "We escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust by some combination of skill, luck, and divine intervention, and I suspect the latter in greatest proportions"
>
> - George Lee Butler, Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command, 1992-1994 (cited in Fetter et al., 2018, p. 34)

1. Introduction

In August 1945, the world witnessed the emergence of a new and highly destructive force as the first nuclear bombs were dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As the destructive force increased as well as more states acquired nuclear weapons, there have been multiple international attempts to minimally control, if not to abolish, the spread and usage of the weapons (Datan & Scheffran, 2019). The latest addition to the nuclear disarmament regime is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force January 2021 (UN, n.d.a). The treaty is seen as a product of the non-nuclear weapons states' (NNWS) growing impatience as they wait for the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to fulfil their commitments to nuclear disarmament as spelled out in Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (Müller & Wunderlich, 2020; UN, n.d.b). As a result, the TPNW imposes a legal obligation on its members to disarm and abstain from any activities related to nuclear weapons (Hajnoczi, 2020; Müller & Wunderlich, 2020; Ritchie, 2019; Sagan, 2009). Although the proponents of the TPNW see the treaty as a victory, academia is reluctant to classify it as such. The main limitation of the TPNW, according to academia, is the lack of participation by the nuclear-armed states and their allies, whose involvement is commonly understood as the key to extensive nuclear disarmament (Graham, 2020; Müller & Wunderlich, 2020; Paxton, 2019). Accordingly, the TPNW highlights a crisis in the nuclear disarmament regime in which states are divided into two camps.

Aligned with the arguments used, the camps have been named *the real* and *the ideal* (Datan & Scheffran, 2019). The states adhering to *the real* advocate a realpolitikal view claiming that the current realities do not allow for nuclear disarmament (Evangelista, 2011; Müller & Wunderlich, 2020; Paxton, 2019; Roberts, 2019; Sagan, 2009). As major geopolitical tensions between nuclear-armed states are present, there is a need for nuclear weapons to credibly deter military confrontations as to protect the state and its allies (Fuhrmann, 2018; Kim, 2019a; Krause, 2015; Schulte, 2015; von Hlatky, 2015). Subsequently, for *the real*, nuclear disarmament is associated with insecurities, leaving its advocates to remain in a vicious cycle where they continue to rely on nuclear weapons for security purposes as long as the

weapons stay present in the world. In contrast, *the ideal* seeks to break this cycle by de-emphasising realpolitik. These states are attempting to change the normative environment surrounding nuclear weapons to achieve disarmament. While some of *the real*-states argue that nuclear weapons are key to great power status (Datan & Scheffran, 2019; Paul, 1995; Sagan, 1996), *the ideal*-states aspire to stigmatise the weapons. They do so by advocating a humanitarian perspective that underlines nuclear weapons as a threat to the existence of humanity and that states therefore are obliged to commit to nuclear disarmament (Kim, 2019a; Müller & Wunderlich, 2020; Paxton, 2019). This obligation was included in international law following the passing of the TPNW (Furrow et al., 2018; Graham, 2020). In sum, the nuclear disarmament regime is characterised by polarised debate rendering the world to rely on other mechanisms than skill to prevent nuclear war.

1.1 Bringing nuclear disarmament to the domestic level

As illustrated above, the key to nuclear disarmament according to *the ideal* lies in the dynamic and ever-changing nature of norms (Müller & Wunderlich, 2020; Sagan, 1996). However, normative change requires actors and actions. According to Putnam (1988), international and domestic politics influence one another through a two-level game. In other words, a state's political actors agree on the state interest through political bargaining, whose interest is later used to bargain international agreements (Putnam, 1988). Writing from the context of nuclear weapons, Sagan (1996), through his domestic actors' model, argues that domestic actors and their motivations affect the state's decision to pursue or give up nuclear weapon ambitions. Following, Paxton (2019) underlines that to achieve nuclear disarmament, civil society must demand it. In the case of the TPNW, the negotiations were characterised by the civil actors, who played a crucial role in initiating and formulating the treaty, more than with any other previous nuclear disarmament agreement (Kim, 2019a; Paxton, 2019; Ritchie, 2019). Thus, understanding the domestic level of nuclear disarmament politics has become more relevant with the TPNW.

1.2 Gaps in the literature

This research deals with three weaknesses found in the literature. First, despite analyses from the domestic level becoming increasingly relevant in the study of nuclear disarmament, this level of analysis is disregarded by the literature. Most works study the phenomenon from either the international level treating states as unitary actors (Datan & Scheffran, 2019; Paul, 1995) or

from the individual level looking at decision-making processes of important persons or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Pelopidas, 2015; Ritchie, 2019, Roberts, 2019). Second, the interests and motivations of nuclear umbrella states (NUS) are largely neglected despite nuclear deterrence being well explored in academia. While NUS are states benefiting from nuclear protection from an NWS without having their own nuclear weapons programme, they are inconsistently grouped as NWS and NNWS in the literature (Lodgaard, 2010; Müller & Wunderlich, 2020). It is also argued that the NUS constitute one solution to the nuclear disarmament crisis as their opposition to extended nuclear security commitments would weaken the realpolitikal case (Sagan, 2009). Last, comparisons of different nuclear positions are missing in the literature. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to dive deeper into the nuclear disarmament debate as expressed around the negotiations of the TPNW by comparing Norway and Sweden to understand the motivations of their political parties. Norway and Sweden are selected as part of the most similar system research design allowing to single out the influence of their nuclear positions. Thus, this paper asks:
How do the nuclear positions of Norway and Sweden affect their political parties' motivations towards nuclear disarmament?

Differentiating between the cases, it is further asked:
I. *How does being a NUS affect the Norwegian political parties' motivations towards nuclear disarmament?*
II. *How does being a NNWS affect the Swedish political parties' motivations towards nuclear disarmament?*

This paper is structured in the following way: First, the theory of deterrence is explored. Following is the section on the methodology and the data selection, while the cases are analysed thereafter. Further, this paper discusses the results. Lastly, a conclusion and the limitations of the research are presented.

2. Theoretical framework: Nuclear deterrence in an international and domestic perspective

Deterrence theory is found in the realist framework, and it is the principal international relations theory explaining why states seek nuclear weapons. It is born out of the notion that survival is the ultimate goal of the state, and that nuclear weapons are understood to be effective means to

ensure this goal (Pelopidas, 2015). This section first explores the theory of deterrence before discussing the concepts in the research question presented above.

2.1 Deterrence theory: Origins and main components

The theory of deterrence is much older than nuclear weapons. In fact, deterrence as a military policy or strategy is as old as the use of force itself. What changed with the introduction of nuclear weapons was the detrimental consequences of failed deterrence (Brodie, 1985; Buzan, 2018; Sigal, 2015). Though the strategy of deterrence belongs in the militaristic sphere, the theory of deterrence has been developed by civilians, with influential scholars being Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Thomas Schelling (Sigal, 2015). The principles of the theory have remained the same with time. However, with changing geopolitical contexts, the relevance of the theory is being debated (Pelopidas, 2015; von Hlatky, 2015). This aspect is further elaborated on below.

The main theoretical idea of deterrence is that by threatening to use military force against an adversary, states deter the adversary from attacking (Buzan, 2018; Fuhrmann, 2018; Pelopidas, 2015; Sigal, 2015; von Hlatky, 2015). This way, states signal that attacking, or simply going against their national interests, involves high costs for adversaries. Nuclear weapons amplify this effect as nuclear retaliation implies great costs both for the deterring and deterred state (Brodie, 1985; Buzan, 2018). Paradoxically, it is the threat of destruction that ought to hinder destruction (Lodgaard, 2010; Sigal, 2015). In order words, the theory of deterrence balances preparations for war with the goal of not deploying the military forces.

For the strategy of deterrence to be successful, it is crucial that the threat of military force is perceived as credible. Credibility is built on three factors. First, the deterring state must have the capabilities to execute the threat if necessary (Krause, 2015; Larsen, 2015; von Hlatky, 2015). The destructive power of nuclear weapons reduces the needed military capacity thus enhancing the credibility (Blechman & Hart, 1982; Kristensen, 2015). Second, the deterring state must be willing to execute the threat in the event the adversary crosses the red line (Sigal, 2015). The credibility is increased by portraying the interests at stake as important national interests. Again, due to the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, a nuclear threat signals high-stake interests (Fuhrmann, 2018; Roberts, 2020). Last, the two previous factors are, through communication, subject to interpretation by the adversary, thereby adding a psychological effect to deterrence (Durkalec & Kroenig, 2016; Larsen, 2015). However, this is not to say that communication is based on disclosing the truth. The lack of transparency creates uncertainties

in the adversary's calculations (Fuhrmann, 2018). As the stakes are unknown the threat is enhanced, but the uncertainties may also lead to miscalculations in the response strategy of the adversary. The deterring state should therefore be prepared to possibly enter a war, despite not having intended to do so. Accordingly, the theory of deterrence is divided into two camps regarding nuclear weapons. The minimum deterrence camp advocates a limited nuclear force which is enough to use for deterrence purposes. They argue that a larger nuclear force is not increasing the deterring effect (Buzan, 2018; Roberts, 2020). Contrastingly, the maximum deterrence camp acknowledges the uncertainties and possibility for miscalculations and, therefore, advocates a large nuclear force that may be necessary if deterrence fails (Buzan, 2018). In sum, the policy of deterrence is complex and involves the perceptions of multiple actors.

Nuclear deterrence, as explained up until this point, assumes the deterring actor to be a nuclear-armed state. However, nuclear deterrence has also been extended to allies of NWS introducing another category of states: Protégés or NUS. By granting the NUS a guarantee of nuclear protection, extended deterrence simply broadens the threat of nuclear retaliation to include the interests of these states (Kim, 2019b; Kristensen, 2015; von Hlatky, 2015). Extended deterrence is as credible as "normal" deterrence as the nuclear guarantee is a costly signal in the sense that the protecting state has agreed to intervene even when its own national interests are not at stake (Fuhrmann, 2018; Larsen, 2015). Accordingly, the theory of nuclear deterrence extends beyond the nuclear-armed states.

2.2 Limitations of nuclear deterrence theory

The main criticism of deterrence theory is that the threat of military might does not necessarily deter military confrontations. Few threats are of the magnitude where deploying nuclear weapons is the reasonable counteraction as well as first-use-policies are internationally frowned upon. Thus, nuclear threats, in most events, simply constitute bluffs or excuses for nuclear proliferation (Blechman & Hart, 1982; Datan & Scheffran, 2019, Fetter et al., 2018; Roberts, 2020; Sagan, 2009). Further, deterrence theory is not capable of explaining the many cases of nuclear disarmament as well as the adherence to the NPT by the NNWS. Moreover, deriving from the same basis as deterrence theory – survival as the ultimate state interest – Sagan (1996) argues that states too can advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons as they perceive the weapons themselves to constitute a threat. Also, normative models have been proposed to explain both nuclear weapons acquisition and opposition by connecting nuclear weapons to

norms of identity and prestige (Lodgaard, 2010; Sagan, 1996). Thus, alternative explanations to deterrence theory are necessary to keep in mind when researching nuclear disarmament.

Despite the limitations, this paper applies nuclear deterrence theory to the analysis below for three reasons. First, according to Sagan (1996), national interests still play an important role in the debate on the acquisition of or the opposition to nuclear weapons. Second, following the research question, nuclear deterrence theory has yet to be extended to domestic actors in NUS. Last, deterrence theory advocates a tempting policy; to secure national interests without committing to the use of force, thereby avoiding the deployment of national troops (Krause, 2015). While this thesis acknowledges that states are complex actors whose motivations and actions are hard to predict (Putnam, 1988; Sagan, 1996), when controlling the environment and comparing an NUS and an NNWS, the theory of deterrence should prevail. Therefore, it is assumed that deterrence theory holds explanatory power in this research.

2.3 Conceptualisation

The concepts studied in this paper are as follows. First, the nuclear position of a state refers to its legal, or even illegal, (non-)possession of nuclear weapons. The NPT divided states into two categories, NWS and NNWS. The NWS are the five states[1] that conducted tests of nuclear devices prior to 1967 (UN, n.d.b). These states are under the NPT allowed to possess nuclear weapons. The rest of the states were categorised as NNWS and, in contrast to the NWS, were not allowed to acquire nuclear weapons according to this treaty. However, certain states have developed nuclear weapons programmes outside this framework[2]. They are therefore not recognised as NWS and constitute a special category NNWS following the NPT framework. These states, together with the five NWS, are included in the term nuclear-armed states. Moreover, NUS constitute another category of NNWS defined as states benefiting from nuclear protection by an NWS without having their own nuclear weapons programme. Such arrangements involve a bilateral agreement between the NWS and the protégé state or organisation (IHRC, 2018). Due to the limited scope, this paper compares an NUS and an NNWS.

The second concept is the motivations of political parties. Motivations are defined as the reasons for pursuing an action or advocating a stand (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.), and they are closely linked to the theories presented above. For instance, following deterrence theory, as

[1] US, France, United Kingdom, Russia, and China
[2] Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

states seek nuclear weapons as a means of national security, the political parties should advocate positions favouring nuclear weapons or minimally not advocate for short-term abolition of nuclear weapons. The relevant motivations and proxy measurements are presented below in the coding framework.

The last concept is nuclear disarmament – the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons with the goal of elimination of the weapons. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are closely connected but simultaneously different as non-proliferation refers to the reduction in the number of actors having nuclear weapons (Pelopidas, 2015). Nuclear disarmament cannot exist without the principle of non-proliferation, which has led to non-proliferation being an indicator of a first step towards nuclear disarmament.

3. Methodology

To best single out the effect of the nuclear positions, this paper has chosen a comparative case study using the most similar system design comparing Norway and Sweden in the period between 2016 and 2019. Further, a qualitative content analysis is applied to party programmes gathered from both states to best understand the motivations of the political parties. To account for the positions of the states, this thesis also analyses state-of-the-art speeches delivered by the Prime Ministers and Ministers of Defence. This section describes the research design and method applied as well as the coding framework used in the analysis.

3.1 Research design and case selection

The goal of this paper is to understand the underlying motivations of political parties towards nuclear disarmament. Following, a comparative case study applying the most similar system design is a suitable approach as it allows for the needed depth as well as to isolate the independent variable (Halperin & Heath, 2017; Ryan, 2018). The most similar system design implies that the cases are selected based on as similar attributes as possible except for the independent variable (Bennet & Elman, 2007; Toshkov, 2018). Unlike Bennet & Elman (2007), this paper follows Halperin & Heath (2017) and does not choose cases based on the dependent variable as the theoretical argument should hold no matter which cases are selected. As a proper most similar system design is close to a natural experiment, it is rare in social sciences given that no states are identical. However, when all theoretically important variables are included, this design is an effective method to investigate complex phenomena (Halperin & Heath, 2017; Toshkov, 2018).

The cases of Norway and Sweden are selected due to their many similarities except for their nuclear position, with Norway being an NUS and Sweden an NNWS. First, both states are constitutional monarchies scoring a perfect score on the Freedom House Index (Freedom House, n.d.). Thus, the role of the domestic actors in politics, as well as the importance of political parties and national elections, is near identical. Second, both states are located north in Europe and are expected to experience similar geopolitical tensions. Third, none of the states have ever stored or developed nuclear weapons (Egeland, 2019; Jonter & Rosengren, 2014; OECD, 2001, 2003). Last, both states are internationally recognised for their humanitarian and peace-bringing work implying that they face comparable loss of recognition (Witoszek & Midttun, 2018). Though, Norway risks a greater loss of international reputation if contradicting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), this motivation is part of the independent variable. Consequently, Norway and Sweden together fit well into the comparative research design.

3.2 Data analysis: Qualitative content analysis

Qualitative content analysis is a standard method for analysing motivations, ideas, and preferences for a wide range of actors, and it is therefore applied in this thesis. The method allows for an unobtrusive study of preferences that is particularly efficient in the case of sensitive matters, such as nuclear weapons, and when the actors are unavailable or hard to reach (Erlingsson & Brysiewicz, 2017). Further, by conducting a content analysis, the research avoids biases related to subjectivity that arise from interaction with the study object (Neuendorf, 2017). However, this is also the weakness of content analysis; the research is limited to the information in the documents (Halperin & Heath, 2017). Certainly, the researcher may opt for interviews as a method to clarify positions, but due to the limited scope, this thesis applies a pure qualitative content analysis. The analysis is executed manually by the author, ensuring coder stability, using the programme Dedoose. The coding protocol can be found in Appendix A while the data selection and codes are elaborated on below.

3.3 Data selection

The selected data are official speeches and party programmes from the relevant actors. Due to the similarities in the political systems, the documents were created to fulfil similar purposes in both countries and thereby allowing for an extensive comparison. The timeframe is set between 2016, the year the official United Nations (UN) negotiations of the TPNW began, and 2019, to

cover the year after the TPNW was concluded and opened for signatories (UN, n.d.a). The following documents are analysed: First, representing the motivations of the political parties, the party programmes of the parties elected to parliament are used. In Norway, the national election took place in 2017, and nine parties were elected to parliament (NRK, 2017). While in Sweden, the elections took place in 2018 with eight parties being elected to parliament (SVT, 2018). Second, portraying the political position of the militaries, the state-of-the-art speech given by the Minister of Defence of both states in the years 2016 to 2019 are analysed. Last, the Christmas and New-Year-Day speeches given by the Swedish and Norwegian Prime Minister, respectively, are analysed to account for the posture of the states regardless of the political parties. Accounting for the difference in times of the speeches, the analysed speeches are selected from 2016 to 2018 for the Swedish Prime Minister and 2017 to 2019 for the Norwegian Prime Minister. As the author is fluent in both languages the documents are studied in their original form to better evaluate the language used.

These documents are chosen because they represent the official statements of the different political actors. They are also unobtrusive and available for studying in contrast to the actors themselves. Further, personal opinions and perceptions are avoided, thus allowing the research to shed light on the more general motivations of the actors on this sensitive topic. However, the documents were not designed to give any particular statements regarding nuclear weapons, which may result in vague statements or no statement at all. Yet, such statements or lack thereof in these documents help illustrate the extent of the debate regarding nuclear weapons.

3.4 Operationalisation: coding framework

In conducting an extensive content analysis, this paper has developed a series of codes used to evaluate the documents. The codes are pre-defined and developed based on the literature presented in the introduction and the theoretical framework. Each code is further divided into either two or three subcodes to count for present/not present or framed positively, negatively, or missing from the text. More extensive definitions of the codes are found in the coding protocol in Appendix A. Furthermore, while text segments are coded as they appear, each document is also evaluated as a whole to account for the lack of statements. This approach illuminates the general debate on nuclear weapons adding to the main analysis of the research questions.

The coding categories are as follows: First, the nuclear posture of the political actors is established through investigating statements regarding the positions on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament as well as references to the NPT, TPNW, NATO, and nuclear energy. The latter code is a control variable substituting the limited nuclear energy sector in the states. The second category of codes operationalises deterrence theory by defining the national security motivation framing nuclear weapons as a general threat, threat against humanity and/or threat against the state. Also included are statements referring to the need for deterrence and fear of almost-accident. Lastly, this thesis operates with three control-code categories: (1) the military sphere, controlling for military spending, militarily perceived threats, and position of the military; (2) the public sphere involving statements referring to non-state actors and the will of the public; and (3) international reputation, here operationalised as perceptions of great-power status, adherence to international law, and references to humanitarian values, international cooperation, and democracy.

4. Analysis: Understanding the motivations

This section displays the findings of the analyses regarding the cases of Norway and Sweden. It presents the results country-wise, beginning with Norway. Each of the sub-sections first recaps the nuclear history of the state to allow for a better understanding of the results and the discussion. An overview of the results is found in Appendix B.

4.1 Norway: Nuclear umbrella state

4.1.1 Norway's nuclear history

Norway has been under the United States' (US) nuclear umbrella since the beginning of NATO, an organisation it helped found (Permanent Delegation of Norway to NATO, n.d.). Though the country initially planned to pursue a nuclear weapons programme in the 1940s and 50s, the Norwegian government quickly shifted its position (OECD, 2001). Since the 1960s, Norwegian law has prohibited the storage of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory, and the country has therefore not hosted American forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Norway has opted for a reputation as a humanitarian state eager to participate in international humanitarian and peace-bringing work, a reputation it maintains today (Egeland, 2019). However, concerning international cooperation on nuclear disarmament, the efforts have been mixed. Despite the leftist government initially having been active in the pre-negotiations of the TPNW, the change of government in 2013 implied a 180-degree turn on the topic (Kim, 2019a). Consequently,

Norway has not participated in the later and official negotiations of the TPNW alongside the other NATO members, and, at the time of writing, it has not joined the treaty (Egeland, 2019; UN, n.d.a). Yet, in a recent poll, 78% of the Norwegian population favoured Norwegian participation in the TPNW (Norsk Folkehjelp, n.d.). In other words, the nuclear posture of Norway has been dynamic and subject to change.

4.1.2 Findings

When looking at the results of the analysis, it becomes clear that the debate on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament is far from prevalent in the Norwegian society. For instance, the Prime Minister and Ministers of Defence do not mention these topics in their speeches (Bakke-Jensen, 2018, 2019; Solberg, 2017, 2018, 2019; Søreide, 2016, 2017). The political parties, despite the majority mentioning nuclear weapons and disarmament, also fail to elaborate on the topic in their party programmes. However, there is a common understanding among the parties that Norway should advocate for a nuclear-weapons-free world and contribute to international disarmament. Five parties also advocate a ban on nuclear weapons much like the TPNW, though it is important to note that the TPNW is not mentioned explicitly by any party (Kristelig Folkeparti [KrF], 2017; Miljøpartiet De Grønne [MDG], 2017; Senterpartiet [SP], 2017; Sosialistisk Venstreparti [SV], 2017; Venstre [V], 2017). Moreover, there is a strong positive feeling towards NATO, with only the two most leftist parties being against the organisation (Rødt [R], 2017; SV, 2017). From the documents, Norway will continue to seek deep cooperation with NATO. Some of the parties, as well as the Minister of Defence, explicitly stated that Norway is dependent on NATO to have a credible military force (Arbeiderpartiet [AP], 2017; Høyre [H], 2017; SP, 2017; Søreide, 2016, 2017). Next to the two parties against Norwegian NATO membership, Miljøpartiet De Grønne and Venstre advocate a non-nuclear NATO (MDG, 2017; V, 2017). In sum, there is a general understanding, though far from constituting a major debate, that Norway should advocate for nuclear disarmament and even abolitions of nuclear weapons. A greater understanding, however, is that Norway belongs in NATO.

Additionally, few documents indicate a perception of threat related to nuclear weapons (AP, 2017; Bakke-Jensen, 2018; KrF, 2017; MDG, 2017; SV, 2017). Concerning these threats, the parties are equally divided between describing nuclear weapons as a perceived threat against humanity and against the state or international system, with Kristelig Folkeparti and Miljøpartiet De Grønne advocating both stands (AP, 2017; KrF, 2017; MDG, 2017; SV, 2017).

Further, the Minister of Defence perceives a nuclear threat as a consequence of neighbouring Russia, which too is highlighted by certain political parties. Nonetheless, if mentioned, the political actors advocate a cooperative rather than a militaristic approach to counter the Russian threat, and thereby deviate from deterrence theory (AP, 2017; Bakke-Jensen, 2018; SP, 2017; SV, 2017; Søreide, 2016, 2017; V, 2017). Moreover, four parties referred to the deterring effects of the military. However, it is important to note that none stated the need for nuclear weapons to achieve this effect (AP, 2017, H, 2017; KrF, 2017; V, 2017). Yet, the Minister of Defence stresses that the US remains the guarantee for Norwegian national security, though without mentioning nuclear weapons (Bakke-Jensen, 2018; Søreide, 2017). Lastly, none of the documents describes any threats related to almost-accidents concerning nuclear weapons or nuclear energy. Consequently, the perception of nuclear threats is low among the political actors in Norway.

However, this is not to argue for weak military capabilities. Half of the political parties advocate for an increase in the defence budget (AP, 2017; H, 2017; KrF, 2017; MDG, 2017; SP, 2017). According to the Ministers of Defence's speeches, this policy has been implemented by the conservative coalition governing (Bakke-Jensen, 2018, 2019; Søreide, 2016, 2017). No party explicitly promotes a decrease in the budget. This observation may be related to the fact that all documents except for the Prime Minister's speech of 2017 and Rødt refer to military threats endangering the Norwegian society (R, 2017; Solberg, 2017). While, as mentioned, nuclear weapons constitute a limited threat perception, threats such as, but not limited to, hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, automatic weapons, terrorism, and political extremism make up most of excerpts (AP, 2017; Fremskrittspartiet [FrP], 2017; H, 2017; KrF, 2017; Søreide, 2016, 2017). Thus, a strong and modern military force is commonly advocated for among the political actors.

Lastly, all the actors favour a great state based on a flourishing civil society and international cooperation. Most documents are positive to civil society and its wide range of actors, but none explicitly refer to the will of the people. Further, a few documents portray Norway as a great power, though this position is held within technology and investment and are not related to military might (AP, 2017; Bakke-Jensen, 2018; H, 2017; SV, 2017). Another proudness of Norway is its commitment to uphold and advocate international law, human rights, democracy, and international cooperation. These categories make up the majority when looking at the codes quantitatively (FrP, 2017; R, 2017; SP, 2017; Solberg, 2017; Søreide, 2016, 2017; V, 2017). Concerning nuclear weapons and disarmament, an additional observation is that three parties, Arbeiderpartiet, Kristelig Folkeparti, and Venstre, advocate the fulfilment of the NPT

(AP, 2017; KrF, 2017; V, 2017). Thus, it is observed that Norwegian political actors are seeking to construct a reputation of Norway as a humanitarian, international law-abiding state eager to participate and lead international cooperation.

In sum, though there is a clear majority for nuclear disarmament among the political actors in Norway, the nuclear debate is not prevalent. Despite having a nuclear-armed neighbour, the political actors perceive newer threats, such as terrorism and hybrid warfare, as more significant than nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Norwegian NATO membership and a strong defence remain the dominant opinion seen in the party programmes. However, ultimately, the Norwegian political actors mostly express concerns regarding building and maintaining an international reputation of the state underlining the Norwegian dedication towards international law, humanitarian and democratic values, and international cooperation.

4.2 Sweden: Non-nuclear weapons state

4.2.1 Sweden's nuclear history

Sweden has been advocating for a militaristic non-alignment policy since the nineteenth century, and it takes pride in sustaining this position (Khorrami, 2020). Today, Sweden is not a member of any security alliances but is a close ally of NATO as well as the other Nordic countries (NATO, 2021). Like Norway, Sweden has never stored nuclear weapons on its territory, but the country was close to develop its own nuclear weapons programme in the 1960s. This programme was later discontinued due to national interests and considerable US pressure (Jonter & Rosengren, 2014). Since then, Sweden has had a major nuclear energy sector which was set to be phased out in the 1980s, a policy later reversed (OECD, 2003). Today, three reactors are in use, while three more are scheduled to open soon (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, n.d.; World Nuclear Association, 2020). Like Norway, 78% of the Swedish population believes that Sweden should join the TPNW (Olof Palme International Center, 2019). Despite that the country did actively participate in the treaty negotiations (Müller & Wunderlich, 2020), Sweden has not yet signed the TPNW (UN, n.d.a). In short, the nuclear history of Sweden, except for the NATO membership, is much similar to the Norwegian one.

4.2.2 Findings

The results for Sweden resemble the Norwegian findings with two exceptions. First, there are even fewer statements by the Swedish political actors regarding their position towards nuclear weapons, disarmament, and energy. Solely Vänsterpartiet is explicitly against nuclear weapons

while two parties, Socialdemokraterna and Miljöpartiet De Gröna, also advocate nuclear disarmament (Miljöpartiet De Gröna [MP], 2018; Socialdemokraterna [S], 2018b; Vänsterpartiet [Vä], 2018). Like Norway, no party explicitly mentions the TPNW, but Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet advocate a ban on nuclear weapons (MP, 2018; Vä, 2018). Though having a nuclear energy sector, only half of the Swedish parties state a position on the topic (Liberalerna [L], 2018; Moderaterna [M], 2018; MP, 2018; Sverigedemokraterna [SD], 2018). Second, in contrast to Norway, the Swedish political actors are divided on whether Sweden should apply for NATO membership. The findings of this paper indicate a negative stand towards Swedish NATO membership but generally positive sentiment towards cooperation with the organisation (Hultqvist, 2016, 2017, 2018; S, 2018b; MP, 2018; SD, 2018). Accordingly, while Swedish non-alignment policy is present, it is hard to conclusively report on the Swedish political actors' position on nuclear weapons and disarmament.

Given the few statements regarding nuclear weapons and disarmament, it is no surprise that solely three out of fourteen documents refer to nuclear weapons as a threat. While Vänsterpartiet perceives nuclear weapons to pose a threat against humanity, the Minister of Defence perceives the threat as general and slightly directed at states in case of a nuclear-armed Russia (Hultqvist, 2016, 2017; Vä, 2018). Furthermore, like Norway, the few statements regarding deterrence are related to the purpose of the military to avoid international confrontations and are not mentioned in settings involving nuclear weapons (Hultqvist, 2018; SD, 2018). Ultimately, other than Vänsterpartiet briefly mentioning the possibility of accidental nuclear wars (Vä, 2018), no document mentions almost-accidents as a reason for nuclear disarmament. Therefore, also the nuclear threat perception of Swedish political actors is unclear due to a lack of statements.

Regarding the military, like Norway, the Swedish actors advocate for a strong national defence. The four political parties that mention the defence budget all underline an increase in the budget (Centerpartiet [C], 2018; L, 2018; M, 2018; SD, 2018). Though this constitutes only half of the parties, all parties except for Kristdemokraterna as well as the Prime Minister speeches identify one or more military threats to the Swedish society. Again, like Norway, these threats are based on hybrid warfare, terrorism, extremism, and cyberattacks (Hultqvist, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019; L, 2018; M, 2018; S, 2018b; Vä, 2018). Somewhat in contrast to Norway, the Swedish political actors perceive Russia as a national threat. There are multiple statements from several party programmes as well as the speeches by the Minister of Defence indicating a worrisome trend of increasing instability as Russia continues to push the limits of sovereign

states, engage in cyberattacks, and expand its military capabilities (Hultqvist, 2016, 2017; M, 2018; SD, 2018; Vä, 2018). Still, the response to Russia relies on international cooperation rather than nuclear weapons (Hultqvist, 2017; M, 2018). Thereupon, the Swedish political actors identify various threats to the Swedish society and seek to counter these by a strong and modern national defence as well as international cooperative initiatives.

Ultimately, Sweden also seeks to portray itself as a humanitarian state engaged in international cooperation with an active civil society. Most Swedish political actors regard a prospering civil society as essential for the Swedish state. Further, the Minister of Defence and Vänsterpartiet refer to the public will. Yet the statements are made in the context of no Swedish NATO membership and the fight against climate change, leaving the great majority of Swedes supporting the TPNW unacknowledged (Hultqvist, 2017; Vä, 2018). Moreover, the Swedish actors, though not to the same extent as their Norwegian counterparts, stress the adherence to international law and humanitarian values as well as that Sweden shall actively participate in international cooperative initiatives (C, 2018; L, 2018; M, 2018; Socialdemokraterna, 2018a). Accordingly, there is a common understanding that Sweden shall be involved in international politics.

Altogether, the Swedish political actors mostly show the same motivations as the Norwegian actors, though they make considerably fewer statements, particularly considering nuclear weapons, disarmament, energy, and threats. Consequently, due to a lack of statements from the Swedish actors, a true domestic position on nuclear weapons in Sweden cannot be established.

5. Discussion

Returning to the research question – how do the nuclear positions of Norway and Sweden affect their political parties' motivations towards nuclear disarmament? – this discussion seeks to answer it. The section is divided into three parts discussing the results related to the research question and deterrence theory as well as debating the lack of statements as observed in the analysis.

5.1 Answering the research question

In general, there is no clear evidence that the nuclear position affects the motivations of the political actors towards nuclear disarmament. The political actors in Norway and Sweden show similar motivations and positions through the few statements made concerning nuclear weapons

and disarmament. Concerning the lack of comprehensive statements, it is assumed that nuclear weapons and disarmament were not prevalent topics in the everyday debate in Norway and Sweden between 2016 and 2019.

Nevertheless, there is a common understanding among the Norwegian political parties that Norway seeks nuclear disarmament and even abolition of nuclear weapons (KrF, 2017; MDG, 2017; SP, 2017; SV, 2017; V, 2017). There is a similar trend among the Swedish political parties (MP, 2018; S, 2018b; Vä, 2018), but there are not enough statements made by the parties to robustly conclude a domestic position as in Norway. It is worth noting that solely a few documents referred to the NPT while none explicitly mentioned the TPNW (AP, 2017; KrF, 2017; V, 2017). Also, none of the speeches given by the Prime Ministers and Ministers of Defence made any references to nuclear weapons or disarmament (Bakke-Jensen, 2018, 2019; Hultqvist, 2018; Socialdemokraterna, 2016, 2017, 2018a; Solberg, 2017, 2018, 2019; Søreide, 2017). Furthermore, when looking at the threat perception, there is an equal number of statements indicating that nuclear weapons are perceived as a threat against both the state and humanity (AP, 2017; MDG, 2017; SV, 2017; Vä, 2018). However, when accounting for the other military threats identified by the actors, nuclear weapons are perceived by both states as a minimal threat next to, for instance, cyberattacks and terrorism (Hultqvist, 2017, 2018; C, 2017; FrP, 2017; KrF, 2017; L, 2018; SP, 2017). Consequently, there is no evidence that a state's nuclear position influences the threat perception of nuclear weapons of the political actors or their motivations towards nuclear disarmament in the case of Norway and Sweden.

5.2 Deterrence theory: A strong military and NATO

Although there is no relationship, the analysis highlights two interesting observations regarding deterrence theory. First, about every political actor advocate for a strong military capable of protecting the state with a few documents additionally referring to the principles of deterrence theory. Though no documents relate these principles to nuclear weapons, they stress that the purpose of the national military is to prevent conflicts through traditional military force (AP, 2017; H, 2017; SD, 2018; V, 2017). It is in this light that both Norwegian and Swedish political actors advocate for a modernisation of the military and its equipment (H, 2017; Hultqvist, 2016, 2017; Søreide, 2016). In other words, despite advocating a humanitarian position, both states see the need for strong military force to counter threats. Accordingly, deterrence theory remains relevant for the political actors of both states, but the theory is not necessarily linked to the possession of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the second observation is of no surprise: NATO remains a dominant actor in both countries' defence politics. Among the Norwegian political actors there is a wide acceptance that Norway is to remain a NATO member as well as continue to partake in the organisation actively (AP, 2017; H, 2017; SP, 2017; Søreide, 2016, 2017; V, 2017). Similarly, the Swedish political actors also seek close cooperation with NATO, though there is an understanding among the majority that Sweden shall continue its non-alignment position (MP, 2018; S, 2018b, Vä, 2018). However, the non-alignment position is not set in stone as a conservative party coalition is currently working towards Swedish NATO membership (C, 2018; L, 2018; M, 2018). Consequently, the policies of NATO will remain impactful on the political actors' decisions regarding defence and military.

The second observation is of importance as NATO continues to have nuclear weapons as part of its arsenal. This fact remains largely unacknowledged among the political actors, including those indicating a favourable position towards nuclear disarmament (AP, 2017; H, 2017; Hultqvist, 2016, 2018, 2019; S, 2018b). Solely two small Norwegian parties, Miljøpartiet De Grønne and Venstre, explicitly stated in their party programmes that they seek to work for a NATO not relying on nuclear weapons (MDG, 2017; V, 2017). In contrast, the grand majority of political actors in Norway and Sweden seek another position (AP, 2017; FrP, 2017; H, 2017; MP, 2018; S, 2018b). By downplaying the debate about nuclear disarmament and maintaining a close relationship with NATO, the political actors allow themselves to advocate for nuclear disarmament while still benefiting from the nuclear protection of NATO. It is therefore hard to tell whether the political actors also see a value of nuclear deterrence.

Consequently, one cannot conclude that deterrence theory is irrelevant. There is, according to the documents, evidently an attraction towards an organisation that is capable of providing the needed defence capabilities to deter adversaries. As this effect is present in both states, the nuclear position of the states is unrelated. Other factors, such as the size of the countries and the placement between Russia and the US, better explain this observation. Therefore, this paper concludes that the nuclear position solely affects the Norwegian and Swedish political actors' motivations regarding the question whether to remain (non-) members of NATO and not their nuclear disarmament posture.

5.3 Main limitation of the results

The main limitation of the results is the limited number of statements made in the documents. Given the lengths of the political party programmes, at least the Norwegian party programmes,

it is curious how the parties solely devote a few sentences to cover nuclear weapons and disarmament and that the Prime Ministers and the Ministers of Defence avoid the topic. An explanation for the missing statements could be that it is better for the actors not to mention a position that can be perceived as an unpopular opinion. Nuclear weapons and disarmament are sensitive topics, and explicitly stating that one favours nuclear weapons as deterrence strategy might lower public support. Accordingly, it is possible to read the missing statements as a sign that nuclear weapons are becoming stigmatised. Generally, both the Norwegian and Swedish actors argue for the maintenance of the reputation of the states as humanitarian, international law-abiding, and active participants in international cooperation. Explicitly favouring a defence based on nuclear weapons would contradict this reputation (Bakke-Jensen, 2018, 2019; AP, 2017; H, 2017; Hultqvist, 2016, 2017; M, 2018; S, 2018b; Solberg, 2017, 2018, 2019). In sum, this thesis assumes the lack of statements to indicate the stigmatisation of nuclear weapons to the extent that political actors provide limited information about their motivations to avoid backlashes from the public.

6. Conclusion

This thesis has sought to dive deeper into the debate regarding nuclear disarmament to answer the question: *How do the nuclear positions of Norway and Sweden affect their political parties' motivations towards nuclear disarmament?* It has applied the theory of deterrence in a comparative case study using the most similar system design to compare party programmes of the political parties as well as speeches by the Prime Ministers and Minsters of Defence of an NUS (Norway) and an NNWS (Sweden).

Overall, there is no evidence indicating a relationship between the nuclear position of the two states and their political actors' motivations towards nuclear disarmament. Generally, nuclear weapons and disarmament are mentioned minimally in the documents analysed, but when referred to, the documents advocated positions favouring nuclear disarmament. Moreover, nuclear threats are barely acknowledged. Other threats, such as terrorism and hybrid threats, are perceived as much more prevalent. However, this is not to disregard deterrence theory. The theory holds a somewhat explanatory power as most of the actors in both states advocate strong militaries and a close relationship to NATO to protect the states. The principles of deterrence theory are therefore present but, importantly, not mentioned in the context of nuclear weapons. Yet, it is worth noting that next to advocating for nuclear disarmament and NATO, these arguments are rarely combined with the principles of deterrence. Accordingly,

this thesis observes a reality where the political parties seek to portray themselves, as well as the state, as humanitarian. Yet, the states ensure to remain under nuclear protection by minimising the nuclear disarmament debate and maintaining relations with NATO. Though, as the nuclear positions of Norway and Sweden, to a certain extent, correlates with a preference for NATO membership, any extensive conclusions cannot be drawn.

Contributing to this issue is the few statements made in the speeches and party programmes. In the case of Sweden, there are not enough statements to properly conclude that there is a general trend favouring nuclear disarmament, though no documents stated the opposite. However, there are plenty of statements regarding maintaining the reputation of the Norwegian and Swedish state as humanitarian and leading advocators for international law, democracy, and international cooperation. Consequently, this thesis reads the missing statements as somewhat successful stigmatisation of nuclear weapons as none of the political actors seek to be associated with them, though a proper relationship remains to be studied.

Furthermore, this thesis faces two limitations. First, the generalisability of the research is limited. This paper has conducted an in-depth investigation of two small states with political systems comparable solely to Denmark and somewhat Finland and Iceland (Freedom House, n.d.). Accordingly, the findings in this paper are not to be translated to other countries without proper research. However, the findings illustrate that nuclear deterrence theory should not be assumed to explain the motivations of NUS as well as that not all NNWS are explicitly in favour of nuclear disarmament. In other words, though this research cannot be generalised to other cases, it illustrates the importance of addressing the assumptions of domestic motivations based on the interests displayed by the state in the international arena. The second limitation is that intercoder reliability cannot be determined as solely the author has analysed the documents. Although having one coder creates perfect coder stability, the personal biases of the author are not revealed.

Lastly, this paper shows that favouring nuclear disarmament in party programmes does not necessarily translate into a state policy. In both states, there is a mismatch between the will of the public, the posture on nuclear disarmament among the political parties and the official stand of the states. This mismatch indicates that an extensive debate on the topic of nuclear weapons and disarmament is absent in the public sphere. Yet, there is optimism concerning the advancement of nuclear disarmament; First, aligning the findings with the theory of Putnam (1988), increased salience of the topic among the public should be met by a change in the national nuclear posture in Norway and Sweden; and second, this thesis also finds deterrence

to exist without nuclear weapons, making the TPNW compatible with security alliances, such as NATO. In sum, this thesis illustrates that the nuclear positions of Norway and Sweden do not predetermine whether they participate in international nuclear disarmament allowing for aspirations that the states one day will decide to join the TPNW, and the world moves from divine intervention to skill to avoid nuclear war.

7. Bibliography

Arbeiderpartiet [AP]. (2017). *Partiprogram 2017-2021, Alle skal med*. https://res.cloudinary.com/arbeiderpartiet/image/upload/v1/ievv_filestore/712bd5b874e24958b84c14fbef5b1a98afbfc8ae1e464cac9bcad06f24f2a85f

Bakke-Jensen, F. (2018). *OMS-talen: "Vi må bygge et strekt og mostanddyktig samfunn", Forsvarsministerens tale i Oslo Militære Samfund 8. januar 2018*. Regjeringen.no. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/forsvarsministerens-tale-i-oslo-militare-samfund-8.-januar-2018/id2584171/

Bakke-Jensen, F. (2019). *Forsvarsministerens nyttårstale i Oslo Militære Samfund.* Regjeringen.no. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/forsvarsministerens-nyttarstale-i-oslo-militare-samfund/id2624220/

Bennet, A., & Elman, C. (2007). Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield. *Comparative Political Studies, 40*(2), 170-195.

Blechman, B. M., & Hart, D. M. (1982). The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons. *International security, 7*(1), 273-297.

Brodie, B. (1985). The Development of Nuclear Strategy. In S. E. Miller (Ed.), *Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence* (pp. 3-22). Princeton University Press.

Burla, L., Knierim, B., Barth, J., Liewald, K., Duetz, M., & Abel, T. (2008). From Text to Codings. *Nursing Research, 57*(2), 113-117.

Buzan, B. (2018). Deterrence. In G. W. Brown, I. McLean, & A. McMillian (Eds.), *A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations* (4th ed.). Oxford University Press.

Cambridge Dictionary. (n.d.). *Motivation*. Retrieved from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/motivation

Centerpartiet [C]. (2018). *Valplattform 2018 för Centerpartiet, Nytt ledarskap för Sverige*. https://www.centerpartiet.se/download/18.3ebc896a160b99834804931/1517573152282/Valplattform%202018.pdf

Datan, M, & Scheffran, J. (2019). The Treaty is Out of the Bottle: The Power and Logic of Nuclear Disarmament. *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 2*(1), 114-132.

Durkalec, J., & Kroenig, M. (2016). NATO's Nuclear Deterrence: Closing Credibility Gaps. *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 25*(1), 37-50.

Egeland, K. (2019). Oslo's "new Track": Norwegian Nuclear Disarmament Diplomacy, 2005 2013. *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 2*(2), 468-490.

Erlingsson, C., & Brysiewicz, P. (2017). Commentary, A hands-on guide to doing content analysis. *African Journal of Emergency Medicine, 7*, 93-99.

Evangelista, M. (2011). Nuclear Abolition or Nuclear Umbrella? Choices and Contradictions in U.S. Proposals. In C. Kelleher, & J. Reppy (Eds.), *Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament* (pp.296-316). Stanford University Press.

Fetter, S., Garwin, R. L., & von Hippel, F. (2018). Nuclear weapons dangers and policy options. *Physics Today, 71*(32), 32-39.

Forrow, L., Ruff, T., & Thurlow, S. (2018). The 2017 Nobel Peace Prize and the Doomsday Clock – The End of Nuclear Weapons of the End of US? *The New England Journal of Medicine*, 2258-2261.

Freedom House. (n.d.) *Countries and Territories*. Retrieved March 24, 2021 from https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores

Fremskrittspartiet [FrP]. (2017). *Fremskrittspartiets handlingsprogram 2017-2021*. https://www.nsd.no/polsys/data/filer/parti/10392.pdf

Fuhrmann, M. (2018). On Extended Nuclear Deterrence. *Diplomacy & Statecraft, 29*(1), 51-73.

Graham, K. (2020). The TPNW Conference of Parties: What Is to Be Discussed? *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 3*(2), 234-252.

Hajnoczi, T. (2020). The Relationship between the NPT and the TPNW. *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 3*(1), 87-91.

Halperin, S., & Heath, O. (2017). *Political Research, Methods and Practical Skills* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Hultqvist, P. (2016). *Tal av Peter Hultqvist på Folk och Försvars Rikskonferens 2016.* Regeringskansliet. Retrieved from https://www.regeringen.se/tal/2016/01/tal-av-peter-hultqvist-pa-folk-och-forsvar-rikskonferens-2016/

Hultqvist, P. (2017). *Tal av Peter Hultqvist på Folk och Försvars Rikskonferens 2017.* Regeringskansliet. Retrieved from https://www.regeringen.se/tal/2017/01/tal-av-peter-hultqvist-pa-folk-och-forsvars-rikskonferens-2017/

Hultqvist, P. (2018). *Tal av Peter Hultqvist på Folk och Försvars Rikskonferens 2018.* Regeringskansliet. Retrieved from https://www.regeringen.se/tal/2018/01/tal-av-peter-hultqvist-pa-folk-och-forsvars-rikskonferens-2018/

Hultqvist, P. (2019). *Tal av Peter Hultqvist vid Folk och Försvars rikskonferens 2019.* Regeringskansliet. Retrieved from https://www.regeringen.se/tal/20192/01/tal-av-peter-hultqvist-vid-folk-och-forsvars-rikskonferens/

Høyre [H]. (2017). *Vi tror på Norge, Høyres program for 2017-2021*. https://www.nsd.no/polsys/data/filer/parti/10378.pdf

IHRC. (2018). *Nuclear Umbrella Arrangements and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*. International Human Rights Clinic, Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School. Retrieved from http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Nuclear_Umbrella_Arrangements_Treaty_Prohibition.pdf

Jonter, T., & Rosengren, E. (2014). From nuclear weapons acquisition to nuclear disarmament – the Swedish case. *Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30*(1), 46-63.

Khorrami, N. (2020). *Small and Non-Aligned: Sweden's Strategic Posture in the Arctic (Part II)*. The Arctic Institute. Retrieved from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/small-non-aligned-sweden-strategic-posture-arctic-part-ii/

Kim, H. (2019a). A Theoretical Account of the International Multilateral Negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 31*(3), 349-374.

Kim, J. (2019b). No-First-Use Policy and a Credible Nuclear Umbrella: Paradox or Possibility? *SAIS Review of International Affairs, 39*(2), 57-63.

Krause, J. (2015). Chapter 1, Threat Scenarios, Risk Assessments, and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence. In A. Wanger, & S. von Hlatky (Eds.), *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO and Beyond* (pp. 19-29). Georgetown University Press.

Kristdemokraterna [KD]. (2018). *Valmanifest, Du ska kunna lita på Sverige*. https://kristdemokraterna.se/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Valmanifest-2018.pdf

Kristelig Folkeparti [KrF]. (2017). *KrFs stortingsprogram 2017-2021, Det handler om mennesker*. Retrieved from https://krf.no/politikk/politisk-program/

Kristensen, H. M. (2015). Chapter 5, Nuclear Weapons in NATO's Deterrence Posture: Status Quo or Change? In A. Wanger, & S. von Hlatky (Eds.), *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO and Beyond* (pp.135-151). Georgetown University Press.

Larsen, J. A. (2015). Chapter 2, US Extended Deterrence and Europe: Time to Consider Alternative Structures? In A. Wanger, & S. von Hlatky (Eds.), *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO and Beyond* (pp. 41-69). Georgetown University Press.

Liberalerna [L]. (2018). *Försvara friheten. 2018 års vägval för Sverige och Europa. Liberalernas valmanifest*. https://www.liberalerna.se/wp-content/uploads/valmanifest.pdf

Lodgaard, S. (2010). *Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation towards a nuclear weapon free world?* Routledge.

Miljöpartiet De Gröna [MP]. (2018). *Nu, Klimatet kan inte venta. Valmanifest 2018*. https://www.mp.se/sites/default/files/nu_valmanifest_a5_webb_.pdf

Miljøpartiet De Grønne [MDG]. (2017). *Ta vare på framtida, Arbeidsprogram 2017-2021*. https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/mdg/pages/309/attachments/original/1548161094/Arbeidsprogram-2018.pdf?1548161094

Moderaterna [M]. (2018). *Nu tar vi tag i Sverige, valmanifest 2018*. https://moderaterna.se/sites/default/files/page_attachments/2018-08/Valmanifest%20H%C3%96G%20180818_0.pdf

Müller, H., & Wunderlich, C. (2020). Nuclear Disarmament without the Nuclear-Weapons States: The Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty. *Dædalus, The Journal of The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 149*(2), 171-189.

NATO. (2021). *Relations with Sweden*. Retrieved April 26, 2021 from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52535.htm

Neuendorf, K. A. (2017). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. SAGE Publications.

Norsk Folkehjelp. (n.d.). *Massive støtte til atomvåpenforbud i befolkningen*. Retrieved April 26, 2021 from https://folkehjelp.no/nyheter/massiv-st%C3%B8tte-til-atomv%C3%A5penforbud-i-befolkningen

NRK. (2017). *Valgresultat 2017*. Retrieved from https://www.nrk.no/valg/2017/resultat/

OECD. (2001). *Nuclear Legislation in OECD Countries: Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities, Norway*. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

OECD. (2003). *Nuclear Legislation in OECD Countries: Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities, Sweden*. Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Paul, T. V. (1995). The Paradox of Power: Nuclear Weapons in a Changed World. *Alternatives, 20*(4), 479-500.

Paxton, B. (2019). 2017 saw 122 countries – but none of the nuclear-weapons states – support the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Why is nuclear disarmament so difficult and what should be the next steps for those aiming for prohibition?* *Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 35*(4), 336-343.

Pelopidas, B. (2015). Chapter 3, The Nuclear Straitjacket: American Extended Deterrence and Nonproliferation. In A. Wanger, & S. von Hlatky (Eds.), *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO and Beyond* (pp. 73-105). Georgetown University Press.

Permanent Delegation of Norway to NATO. (n.d.). *Norway and NATO*. Retrieved April 26, 2021 from https://www.norway.no/no/missions/nato/norway-nato/

Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International organisation, 42*(3), 427-460.

Olof Palme International Center. (2019). *Svenska folket är för ett kärnvapenförbud.* Retrieved from https://www.palmecenter.se/svenska-folket-ar-for-ett-karnvapenforbud/

Ritchie, N. (2019). Inventing nuclear disarmament. *Critical Studies on Security, 7*(1), 73-77.

Roberts, B. (2019). On Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament: Past Lessons, Future Prospects. *The Washington Quarterly*, *42*(2), 7-30.

Roberts, B. (2020). On Adapting Nuclear Deterrence to Reduce Nuclear Risk. *Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 149*(2), 69-83.

Ryan, M. (2018). The Comparative Method. In V. Lowndes, D. Marsh, & G. Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (4th ed., pp. 271-289). Palgrave.

Rødt [R]. (2017). *Rødts arbeidsprogram 2017-2021*. Retrieved from https://roedt.no/arbeidsprogram

Sagan, S. D. (1996). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb. *International Security, 21*(3), 54-86.

Sagan, S. D. (2009). Shared responsibilities for nuclear disarmament. *Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Fall*, 157-168.

Schulte, P. (2015). Chapter 4, NATO's Protracted Debate over Nuclear Weapons. In A. Wanger, & S. von Hlatky (Eds.), *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO and Beyond* (pp. 107-133). Georgetown University Press.

Senterpartiet [SP]. (2017). *Prinsipp- og handlingsprogram 2017-2021, -Vi tar hele Norge I bruk*. Retrieved from https://www.senterpartiet.no/politikk/vedtatt-politikk/program/senterpartiets-program-2017--2021

Sigal, L. V. (2015). Deterrence. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences* (6th ed., pp. 247-249). Elsevier.

Socialdemokraterna. (2016). *Jultal 2016*. Retrieved from https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/vart-parti/vara-politiker/tal/jultal-2016#0

Socialdemokraterna. (2017). *Jultal 2017*. Retrieved from https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/vart-parti/vara-politiker/tal/jultal-2017

Socialdemokraterna. (2018a). *Jultal 2018*. Retrieved from https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/vart-parti/vara-politiker/tal/jultal-2018

Socialdemokraterna [S]. (2018b). *Valmanifest 2018, Det största trygghets-programmet I modern tid*. https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/download/

Solberg E. (2017). *Jeg har tro på Norge*. Virksomme ord. Retrieved from http://virksommeord.no/tale/12011/

Solberg, E. (2018). *Forandring kan være vanskelig, men leder ofte til noe bedre*. Virksomme ord. Retrieved from http://virksommeord.no/tale/12273/

Solberg, E. (2019). *Norge trenger flere barn!* Virksomme ord. Retrieved from http://virksommeord.no/tale/13016/

Sosialistisk Venstreparti [SV]. (2017). *SVs arbeidsprogram, 2017-2021*. Retrieved from https://www.sv.no/politikken/arbeidsprogram/

Sverigedemokraterna [SD]. (2018). *Valmanifest, Sverigedemokraternas valmanifest 2018*. https://sd.se/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Valmanifest-2018

SVT. (2018). *Valresultat 2018*. Retrieved from https://valresultat.svt.se/2018/10000.html

Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. (n.d.). *Nuclear power*. Retrieved April 26, 2021 from https://www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/en/areas/nuclear-power/

Søreide, I. E. (2016). *En ny langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren – vårt utgangspunkt og våre valg*. Virksomme ord. Retrieved from http://virksommeord.no/tale/11204/

Søreide, I. E. (2017). *"Kampkraft og bærekraft i usikkerhetens tid": Forsvarsministerens OMS tale 9. januar 2017*. Regjeringen.no. Retrieved from https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/forsvarsministerens-oms-tale-9.-januar-2017/id2526665/

Toshkov, D. (2018). Research Design. In V. Lowndes, D. Marsh, & G. Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (4th ed., pp. 219-236). Palgrave.

UN. (n.d.a). *Chapter XXVI Disarmament Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*. United Nations Treaty Collection. Retrieved April 26, 2021 from https://treaties.un.org/pages/

UN. (n.d.b). *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved April 12, 2021 from https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/

Venstre [V]. (2017). *På lag med framtida, Venstres stortingsvalgprogram 2017-2021*. https://www.venstre.no/assets/Stortingsvalgprogram-2017-web.pdf

von Hlatky, S. (2015). Introduction: American Alliances and Extended Deterrence. In A. Wanger, & S. von Hlatky (Eds.), *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO and Beyond* (pp. 1-16). Georgetown University Press.

Vänsterpartiet [Vä]. (2018). *Vänsterpartiets valplattform*. https://www.vansterpartiet.se/assets/Valplattform-2018.pdf

Witoszek, N., & Midttun, A. (2018). *Sustainable Modernity: The Nordic Model and Beyond*. Routledge.

World Nuclear Association. (2020). *Nuclear Power in Sweden*. Retrieved April 26, 2021 from https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/sweden.aspx

8. Appendix A: Coding protocol

8.1 Procedure

The codes are a priori defined based on the different motivations found in the literature as displayed in the introduction and the theoretical framework. The codes are assigned to segments of text with the idea that reading the segments is enough to understand the context and reason for the assignment of the code. This implies that text segments are limited to parts of sentences, whole sentences, and even whole paragraphs. If two paragraphs mention the same code, the code is applied twice. Further, multiple codes can be assigned to the same text segments as the codes may have the same context.

It is important to notice that it is the content of the codes rather than the frequency of codes that is analysed. Therefore, the codes are broader and should include more text than the code words themselves to account for the context helping to identify the themes in the documents. The codes are divided into either positive/negative/missing or present/missing to differentiate between the different positions.

The author is the only coder in this research ensuring coder stability. However, that the results are based on one coders work is also a weakness of this thesis as intercoder reliability cannot be determined (Burla et al., 2008). After all documents have been through the coding process, the codes are read over and doubled checked by the author. Furthermore, the author has a list of all excerpts and their codes, which is available upon request.

8.2 Overview of codes

Table 1: Overview of codes with definitions.

Codes	Name	Operationalisation
C1: Nuclear position		
C1A_NW	Position on nuclear weapons	Statements explicitly referring to a position for or against nuclear weapons as well as indirect statements such as advocating the presence/absent of nuclear weapons in the world or the country
C1B_ND	Position on nuclear disarmament	Statements explicitly referring to positions for or against disarmament of nuclear weapons
C1C_NE	Position on nuclear energy	Statements explicitly referring to positions for or against nuclear energy, including statements regarding a position on nuclear energy reactors
C1D_TPNW	Position on ban of nuclear weapons	Statements explicitly referring to the TPNW or its elements, such as ban and abolition of nuclear weapons.
C1E_NATO	Position on NATO	Statements explicitly referring to a position for or against NATO as well as statements concerning whether to contribute to the organisation in general, for instance, cooperative missions and capacities
C1F_NPT	Position on the NPT	Statements explicitly referring to the NPT
C2: National security		
C2A_NW-thr	Nuclear weapons as threats	Statements claiming that nuclear weapons do/do not pose a threat. Includes under-categories distinguishing the threat as towards states/the international systems and to humanity/the human existence
C2B_det	Deterrence	Statements referring to the notion of deterrence: military might hinders adversaries in attacking
C2C_AA	Almost accidents	Statements referring to almost accidents, both regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear energy

C3: Control variable – Military		
C3A_inc-mil	Increase in military spending/budget	Statements regarding the military budget, categorised as positive if advocating an increase of the military budget and negative if advocating a decrease
C3B_thr	Threat perception	Statements indicating a military threat to the state/humanity
C3C_str-mil	Strong military	Statements advocating a stronger military, including references to modernisation of weapon systems
C4: Control variable – The public		
C4A_NGO	Non-governmental organisations	Statements referring to the actor's relationship with non-state actors
C4B_will	The will of the public	Statements explicitly referring to the will of the people
C5: Control variable - Reputation		
C5A_grt-pwr	Great Power status	Statements referring to the state being a great power/leading actor in international politics
C5B_IL	International law	Statements referring to international law, coded as positive if advocating adherence to international law and negative as seeking to avoid international law or withdraw from a treaty
C5C_HV	Humanitarian values	Statements referring to humanitarian values such as human rights and human security
C5D_IC	International cooperation	Statements referring to international cooperation, either as taking initiative or contribute to existing international cooperation. International cooperation is initiatives involving the participation of two of more states, where the cooperation takes place on the state level involving political actors of the cooperative states
C5E_Dem	Democratic values	Statements referring to protection and adherence to democratic values, excluding human rights as these statements falls into code C5C_HV.

9. Appendix B: Overview of documents

9.1 Explanations

Table 2: Abbreviations and symbols used in Table 3 and 4.

Text abbreviations	**Meaning**	**Sub-categories**	**Meaning**
MoD_YY	Minister of Defence speech year 20YY	X	Present in the document
PM_YY	Prime minister speech year 20YY	-	Not present/missing in the document
PP_XX	Party programme of XX party, with XX being the abbreviation of the party	Pos	Positive/affirmative position (e.g., positive towards nuclear disarmament)
		Neg	Negative/rejection position (e.g., negative/rejecting nuclear disarmament)
		*	The observations are not directly related to nuclear weapons and disarmament

9.2 Norway

Table 3: Overview of results - Norway

Codes/ text	C1A	C1B	C1C	C1D	C1E	C1F	C2A	C2A_hu	C2A_st	C2B	C2C	C3A	C3B	C3C	C4A	C4B	C5A	C5B	C5C	C5D	C5E
MoD_16	-	-	-	-	Pos	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pos	X	X	-	-	-	-	X	-	-
MoD_17	-	-	-	-	Pos	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pos	X	X	-	-	-	X	X	X	X
MoD_18	-	-	-	-	Pos	-	Pos	-	-	-	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	X *	X	-	X	X
MoD_19	-	-	-	-	Pos	-	Pos	-	X	X *	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	X *	-	X	X	X
PM_17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	X	X
PM_18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	X
PM_19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	X	X	X
PP_R	Neg	Pos	Neg	-	Neg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-	X	X	X	X
PP_SV	Neg	Pos	Neg	Pos	Neg	-	Pos	-	X	-	-	-	X	-	X	-	X *	X	X	X	X
PP_AP	-	Pos	-	-	Pos	Pos	Pos	X	-	X *	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	X *	X	X	X	X
PP_SP	-	-	Neg	Pos	Pos	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X
PP_MDG	Neg	Pos	-	Pos	Pos	-	Pos	X	X	-	-	Pos	X	-	X	-	-	X	X	X	X
PP_KrF	Neg	-	-	Pos	Pos	Pos	Pos	X	X	X *	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X
PP_V	Neg	Pos	-	Pos	Pos	Pos	-	-	-	X *	-	-	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X
PP_H	Neg	Pos	-	-	Pos	-	-	-	-	X *	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	X *	X	X	X	X
PP_FrP	-	-	Pos	-	Pos	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X

9.3 Sweden

Table 4: Overview results - Sweden

Codes/ text	C1A	C1B	C1C	C1D	C1E	C1F	C2A	C2A _hu	C2A _st	C2B	C2C	C3A	C3B	C3C	C4A	C4B	C5A	C5B	C5C	C5D	C5E
MoD_16	-	-	-	-	Neg/ Pos	-	Pos	-	X	-	-	-	X	X	-	-	-	X	X	X	X
MoD_17	-	-	-	-	Neg	-	Pos	-	-	-	-	Pos	X	X	-	X	-	X	-	X	-
MoD_18	-	-	-	-	Neg/ Pos	-	-	-	-	X *	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	-	X	-	X	-
MoD_19	-	-	-	-	Neg/ Pos	-	Pos	-	-	X *	-	Pos	X	X	-	-	X *	X	X	X	X
PM_16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	-
PM_17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	-
PM_18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X	X	-	-	-	X	-	X
PP_V	Neg	Pos	-	Pos	Neg	-	Pos	X	-	-	X	-	X	-	X	X	-	-	X	X	X
PP_S	-	Pos	-	-	Neg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X
PP_C	-	-	-	-	Pos	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pos	X	-	X	-	-	-	X	X	X
PP_MP	-	Pos	Neg	Pos	Neg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	-	X	-	-	X	X	X	X
PP_KD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PP_L	-	-	Pos	-	Pos	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	-	-	X	X	X
PP_M	-	-	Pos	-	Pos	-	-	-	-	-	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X
PP_SD	-	-	Pos	-	Neg	-	-	-	-	X *	-	Pos	X	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X