



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Is there a golden sky at the end of a storm? The IOC and FIFA reform process

Smallenbroek, Bert

Citation

Smallenbroek, B. (2021). *Is there a golden sky at the end of a storm? The IOC and FIFA reform process.*

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master thesis in the Leiden University Student Repository](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3245630>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Is there a golden sky at the end of a storm? The IOC and FIFA reform process

Bachelor Thesis

Name: Bert Smallenbroek

Institution: Leiden University

Studies: International Relations and Organisations (IRO)

Course: Bachelor Project International Organisations and
Complex Global Challenges (WGR 21)

First Reader: Dr. DeRock

Student number 2342103

E-mail: s2342103@vuw.leidenuniv.nl

Date: May 21, 2021

Word count: 7815 (excluding bibliography and appendix)

Version: 1

Table of Contents

Abstract	3
1. Introduction	4
2. Literature review	6
2.1. Grand theories	6
2.2. Principal-Agent theory	7
2.3. Other approaches	8
2.4. Literature gap	9
3. Methodology	11
4. The FIFA case	13
4.1. The FIFA reform process: A timeline	13
4.2. FIFA content analysis	15
4.3. Discussion	18
5. The IOC case	20
5.1. The IOC reform process: A timeline	20
5.2. IOC content analysis	21
5.3. Discussion	24
6. Limitations	26
7. Conclusion	27
Bibliography	28
Appendix A	33

Abstract

The IOC and FIFA can be perceived as the most influential and important International Sporting Associations (ISAs). In the last decade, they both faced unprecedented levels of critique for the admission of big sports events to countries that violate human rights and lack a significant sports tradition. Moreover, both organisations were plagued by allegations of corruption and cost overruns. As a reaction to these controversies, both ISAs asked independent researchers to propose reforms to include human rights in their bidding processes.

This thesis explains why ISAs shifted towards the inclusion of human rights in their bidding process. Combining a rationalist and a constructivist perspective, this research uses qualitative content analysis to come to a Principal-Agent (PA) framework of the stakeholders that influenced the reforms.

The main findings are twofold. The FIFA reforms were mainly caused by pressure from society, media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) combined with the actions of the Swiss and American governments. This pressure forced FIFA's main sponsors to take a stand as well.

On the other hand, the IOC's case is a more complicated one. The main drivers for the reforms were not so much the human rights violations, but the extravagant costs for host cities and the decreasing interest of the public for hosting the event. Only in 2019 (three years after reforms were done by FIFA), the IOC asked an independent researcher to propose reforms. This happened mainly due to pressure from sponsors that feared for their reputation and the influence of FIFA as a competing 'norm setter'. Another driver was the presidential election in 2013, which led to the Agenda 2020, in which cost reductions were proposed.

Overall it can be concluded that external pressure and negative publicity were the key drivers to enforce changes. However, there are significant differences between the IOC and FIFA cases. The cost overruns at the IOC could be a topic for further research.

Keywords: FIFA; IOC; Human Rights; Reforms; Principal-Agent Theory.

1. Introduction

The 2014 Winter Olympics in beach resort Sochi, the 2015 European Games in Baku and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar are all controversial events. They are however part of a broader trend towards big sports events in autocratic states without a significant sports tradition. This shift has various explanations.

For some, sport is a reflection of politics (Boniface, 1998, p. 87) in which the admission of events is a consequence of the shifting power from the ‘West’ towards non-western countries. Others argue that the interest in hosting sports events has decreased in democratic countries due to the lack of trust of citizens in International Sporting Associations (ISAs) (Schnitzer & Haizinger, 2019, p. 2). The main reasons for that are corruption scandals, lack of transparency and cost overruns (p. 14). Autocratic states experience fewer problems with accountability towards their citizens. They use sports as a vehicle to improve their image and to show their ‘soft side’. This is what Giebels (2021) considers as ‘sportswashing’.

A third explanation is what Richau, Emrich and Follert (2019) describe as a focus towards profit maximising and an organisational ‘quid pro-quo-system’ that works on reciprocity (p. 4). Not the best bid, but the highest bidder, wins the voting procedure.

This led to public scrutiny towards the organisers of big sports events. Some plead for a boycott of the World Cup in Qatar (Pattisson et al., 2021), others see these events as a trigger to gain more media attention to enforce real changes regarding human rights (Giebels, 2021). A third group finds it hypocritical to let athletes suffer, whilst trade and arms deals with those countries continue (Woerts, 2020).

Eventually, these critiques led to the shift of various ISAs towards significant changes in their bidding procedures for big international tournaments. The bidding process consists of countries or cities proposing plans on which ISA delegates can later vote. In the past, only a certain amount of FIFA delegates was able to cast votes on a bid, but this changed during the reforms.

Another reform is the inclusion of human rights in the bidding criteria of the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup. But what explains this shift? Did the intrinsic values change? Was it due to external pressure?

This leads to the following research question: *‘What explains the shift by International Sporting Associations towards the inclusion of human rights policies in their bidding procedures?’*

To answer this question a double case study will be done focused on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). These organisations are considered as the biggest and most influential ISAs (Heerdt, 2018, p. 171) and can therefore be identified as typical cases (Gerring & Seawright, 2008). The IOC for example is being described by Schnitzer and Haizinger (2019) as a ‘typical first mover’: an organisation that is a norm setter for other ISAs (p. 16). This makes the outcome of this thesis generalisable for other ISAs.

Given the recent media attention, the process of admission and the internal problems in both the IOC and FIFA have increasingly gained interest in the academic world. This thesis adds to the existing literature an insight regarding the recent reforms through a modified Principal-Agent (PA) framework to analyse the role of the stakeholders. The main findings of this approach are twofold. The reforms at FIFA were externally driven and mainly enforced by pressure from the media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and society. This pressure forced FIFA’s main sponsors to take a stand as well, whereas the IOC started with reforms after the presidential elections. Pressure from external stakeholders came only later.

The big difference between the two cases is the reason for the reforms. Pressure arose for FIFA after human rights violations and the admission of tournaments to autocratic countries, whereas protests against the IOC were mainly focused on the high costs of organising. Human rights only became an issue three years after FIFA’s reforms as some sponsors feared for their reputation and the publicity the FIFA reforms gained.

This paper has the following structure. Chapter 2 conducts a literature review to analyse the existing approaches and describes the gaps in the literature. Chapter 3 introduces the research method, whereas chapter 4 analyses the FIFA case with a timeline and a content analysis to create a PA model. Chapter 5 evaluates the IOC with a similar approach whilst chapters 6 and 7 discuss the limitations and the conclusions of this research.

2. Literature review

The literature review introduces the various approaches regarding organisational changes in general and more specifically changes within the IOC and FIFA. To understand the developments in these organisations, the grand theories of political science are being introduced first. The second part discusses the principal-agent theory and the third part concerns specific approaches to research changes in ISAs. Section 2.4 will describe the existing gaps in the literature.

Following Gift and Miner (2017), it is important to acknowledge that in general research about sports is limited in political science (p. 134). The existing research contains important gaps and is mainly focused on the normative relation between sports and politics (e.g. Næss, 2018). There is however a growing number of scholars outside political science focused on sports and its governing institutions. This trend can be explained by the increased importance of international organisations (IOs) (Gift & Miner, 2017).

2.1. Grand Theories

Political science consists of many different approaches and subgroups. This paragraph describes some of the most influential and relevant approaches to study changes in IOs.

For constructivists, IOs can become autonomous sites of authority from two sources. They can use the rational-legal authority they embody and have specialised knowledge that gives them authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 707). IOs make rules and therefore create social knowledge which gives them autonomy from their founders (p. 708).

With their internal focus, Constructivists argue that changes in IOs can occur by bureaucracies that develop an independent agenda (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004, p. 2). They often behave in different ways than initiated by their founders. IOs have the freedom to ‘constitute and construct’ the world (p. 700). However, sometimes this leads to dysfunctional organisations (Bauer & Ege, 2016, p. 4).

Realists on the other hand assume that IOs reflect the interests of big states (Chwieroth, 2008, p. 482). States only join IOs when the benefits are higher than the costs. IOs are created to serve the state’s interest and IOs therefore cannot develop changes without the permission of their founders (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 703). Abbott & Snidal (1998) state similarly that changes in IOs only occur on behalf of big states since they cannot constrain them (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 8).

Rationalists argue that IOs reflect the interests of self-interested members (Snidal, 1996, 122). States are the key actors in world politics (p. 87) and member states only join institutions when they foresee rewards (Gehring & Faude, 2014, p. 476). Members are likely to remain in an IO when they expect benefits from the actions of the institution (p. 476). Changes in IOs are explained by rationalists as the seeking of IOs staff to ‘secure their survival through an increase in resources or authority (Cortell & Peterson, 2021, p. 3).’ Rationalists mainly focus on the institutional conditions that give IOs the freedom to occur changes (p. 2).

2.2. Principal-Agent theory

This research uses the PA theory. This method – derived from rational choice - explains the relationship between the principal (often member states) and agent (often IOs). It argues that the principal delegates’ authority to the agent to carry out the principal’s designs (Gutner, 2012, p. 271). This means that changes within IOs are being ordered by member states or other important stakeholders. In that sense, IOs are performers of the task stakeholders give them. Members give IOs autonomy since they need the knowledge and specialisation of IOs. This reduces transaction costs and generates gains from specialisation (Pevehouse & von Borzyskowski, 2016, p. 10).

The PA theory argues that there is a tension between states and IOs over delegation and autonomy (Clegg, 2010, p. 476). Gains can be achieved by states’ delegation of authority to IOs through specialisation and the division of labour (p. 476), but this autonomy can lead as well to tensions and pathological behaviour in which the agent takes more freedom than the original mandate prescribes (Elsig, 2011, p. 498).

Gütner (2012) has two problems with the PA model. First, it often blames the agent for poor outcomes (p. 271) and therefore ignores the fact that the agent can derive autonomy from the principal. Second, the concept of agents is much broader than just IOs (p. 271). IOs can have a dual role by being both the principal and the agent. This makes it very complicated to define the amount of autonomy for an IO. Finding the right balance between delegation and control is therefore a challenge for any principal (Baumann, 2018, p. 630).

For Mason, Thibault and Misener (2006), the traditional PA approach applies not to FIFA and the IOC. ISAs have autonomy since their resources are not derived from state contributions but sponsors and events. Moreover, states cannot become members of the IOC and FIFA. This means that a PA relation with an ISA as an agent could only exist with sponsors, media or big national sports associations as principal.

Mason, Thibault and Misener (2006) therefore apply the PA theory differently. Instead of using the theory to describe the external relation between principal and agent, they approach the problems within the IOC by using the agency theory internally. By focusing on the incentives of individual members, they explain the behaviour and the attempts to reform the IOC (p. 54).

Grell (2018) uses a PA framework to show the relationship between the host city and the IOC. In this relation is the IOC the principal that delegates authority to the host city. The principal requires the agent to respect the norms and values the principal has (p. 164).

2.3. Other approaches

There are various other approaches to study changes in ISAs. Bützler and Schöddert (2020) use Teubner's theory of societal constitutionalism (Teubner, 2012) to explain organisational changes through external pressure. Societal forces shape the possibility for legal enforcement, by constitutionalising a change towards legal enforceability.

Follert, Richau, Emrich and Pierdzioch (2020) use the Buchanan-Tullock model derived from Public Choice theory to explain decisions in IOs. They aim to explain corruption within the FIFA organisation, by describing the internal conflict between individual freedom and collective coercion (p. 5). The model states that there is a tension between decision-making costs to convince others and the external costs for individuals that lose from that decision. High decision-making costs explain the persistent corruption in the FIFA organisation.

Richau, Emrich and Follert (2019) focus on the importance of stakeholders. In the '90s, key sponsors enabled President Blatter to expand this 'unofficial exchange system' (p. 4), but recently they demanded reforms. In general, ISAs are in danger of corruption due to the increasing market orientation and the lack of powerful control bodies (p. 3). There is a permanent trade-off between staying in power and the risk of negative publicity.

Næss (2020) highlights the important role of the stakeholders as well. Due to the pressure from 'stakeholder democracy,' the founding principles of neutrality and autonomy can no longer be defended. With the rise in status and importance, their responsibility towards the public and stakeholders has grown as well. Without normative legitimacy from stakeholders, the survival of the organisation could be at risk (p. 135).

The recent changes at the IOC and FIFA are often approached for their legal consequences. Pielke (2013) approaches the legal consequences from a different angle, by focussing on the question of accountability of ISAs. He analyses older reforms of FIFA with seven mechanisms

of accountability. Pielke (2013) finds that the legal possibilities to hold FIFA accountable are almost absent (p. 264). This means that from a legal angle, efforts to reform FIFA are unlikely to result in any significant changes (p. 265). Informal mechanisms such as media attention or boycotts could however be a possibility to enforce reforms.

Instead of a legal perspective, Flyvbjerg, Stewart and Budzier (2016) focus on the financial aspects of organising a big event. They argue that the Olympics have the highest average cost overrun of any type of megaproject (p. 1) and that limiting costs is a crucial part of the reforms of the IOC since fewer states are willing to take financial risks.

Overall, most theories only approach a limited part of the research question. Some scholars explain how external pressure influences IOs, whereas others focus on the internal pressures that led to changes. This thesis tries to combine both focuses. A main topic in the literature is corruption scandals that plague ISAs. This falls outside the scope of the research question but can be seen as a driver towards previous reforms. The legal approaches on the accountability of ISAs are as well something that does not touch upon the research question, while the financial approach of Flyvbjerg, Stewart and Budzier can be an interesting way to explain the IOC reforms.

2.4. Literature gap

The literature review indicates the wide variety of approaches. It shows however as well that there are few political science attempts to approach ISAs. The existing theories have either a focus on internal struggles (e.g. Mason, Thibault and Misen, 2006) or explain changes as the result of a PA relationship (e.g. Grell, 2018). It is also salient that no realist or liberalist approach has been published so far.

The approach that is the most useful to answer the research question of this thesis is the applied PA framework by Mason, Thibault and Misener (2006). Acknowledging that the relationships of ISAs are far more complicated than a single PA model could explain, it is a useful tool to explain the power relations between the ISA and the stakeholders.

Other political science theories such as societal constitutionalism have mainly an external focus and are directed to the consequences. They are less likely to explain how the reforms occurred. The Public Choice theory on the other hand is more useful. Follert et al. (2020) explain with this theory why stakeholders insisted on the reforms. Their approach is however too focused on

corruption and does not explain why stakeholders decided to demand changes. The scope and the answers are too narrow and this leaves a gap.

Most academic literature on reforms in ISAs has a legal focus. They are interested in the enforceability of the recent reforms or the possibility of remedies. Other directions are a financial focus on the costs of big sports events or explanations for corruption in ISAs. Except for Follert et al. (2020), no research comes close to the main approach of this thesis.

3. Methodology

The reforms of the IOC and the FIFA are being researched with the following research question:

‘What explains the shift by International Sporting Associations towards the inclusion of human rights policies in their bidding procedures?’

This thesis conducts a double case study since FIFA and the IOC must be perceived as norm setters. This makes the results generalisable to a wider population of ISAs. To answer the research question this thesis starts with a timeline to have a clear overview of the reform process. This is based on official documents, newspapers and academic papers. It is important to do so since many media publications only focus on the big events (e.g. arrest of Blatter), whereas the underlying causes are often neglected. The combination of media publications and scientific contributions will overcome this problem.

To create a PA framework the literature is applied by creating themes and codes to conduct a qualitative content analysis. The themes are organised by different hypotheses derived from the literature review to find if these are supported. The different hypotheses are:

- The reforms are heavily influenced by pressure from ISA sponsors;
- The reforms are influenced by media attention and NGO pressure;
- The reforms are a reaction to reforms of other IOs;
- The reforms reflect a power struggle within ISAs;
- The reforms are influenced by the actions of big states.

Woods and Stokes (2019) use a multi-case study to get more generalisable research. Their approach follows the textual analysis process as guided by Creswell (2013) (Woods & Stokes, 2019, p. 60 & 61):

1. Read the data intensively, with notes capturing initial impressions and early analysis;
2. Organise the data by themes and relevance, reflecting a deductive approach;
3. Form preliminary codes based on emerging themes without applying preconceived categories, reflecting an inductive approach;
4. Place the codes within larger themes based on their relationships;
5. Analyse the themes following existing research to connect the findings to the larger meaning of the data and derive implications.

The used literature is being derived from the Web of Science database using the keywords “IOC” and “FIFA” in the timespan of 2012-2021 (IOC) and 2010-2021 (FIFA), combined with

articles found at Google Scholar and references from other articles. From the more than 1000 hits on the keyword “FIFA”, only a few were accurately addressing the reforms and their underlying problems. Most research is targeting domestic themes (e.g. discrimination during the World Cup) or uses the word FIFA differently (e.g. FIFA as the EA videogame). The IOC has similar problems with 500 hits on the keywords “IOC”. It turns out that most research is either focussing on the gender discussion in sports or focusses on a specific Olympic game. These were manually filtered out. For a complete list, see Figure 3 and 5.

This thesis makes several contributions to the literature mentioned in the literature review. It focuses on both the IOC and FIFA, instead of researching one of them. Moreover, the qualitative content analysis is applied in combination with a focus on the influential stakeholders. Thirdly, various classical political science hypotheses are tested to answer the research question.

4. The FIFA case

This chapter starts with analysing the roots of the FIFA reform process with a timeline. The second part is a study of the literature after which a PA framework is created and discussed.

4.1. The FIFA reform process: A timeline

The problems of FIFA started around November 2010 and are to date (May 2021) still heavily being discussed. This thesis considers allegations by journalists of corruption in the host bid race for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups in November 2010 (Gill, Adelus & De Abreu Duarte, 2019) as the driver for the reform process. Since then, scandals, revelations and FIFA efforts to retain control followed each other quickly.

To restore its reputation, FIFA asked Ruggie in 2016 to develop recommendations on what FIFA should encounter to include human rights in its organisation. His recommendations can be summarised in the following subgroups (Ruggie, 2016, p. 4):

- FIFA needs to translate its commitment to respect human rights into its daily activities;
- FIFA needs stronger internal systems to address the increasing human rights risks;
- FIFA needs to provide greater transparency in managing human rights risks and improve access to remedy.

After Russia and Qatar were awarded the organisation of the World Cups in December 2010, many protests emerged. Allegations of corruption in the bidding process forced Blatter to announce reforms against the widespread corruption (Pielke, 2013, p. 255). FIFA asked researcher Pieth to propose reforms, but these were only partially implemented and made members of the corruption watchdog decide to cut ties with FIFA (BBC, 2011).

The bidding process for 2018 and 2022 was being investigated by Garcia. After two years of investigation FIFA only published a summary that cleared Russia and Qatar of any wrongdoing. Garcia resigned therefore in September 2014 by stating that ‘no one can change the culture of such an organisation (Heaston, Mitchell & Kappen, 2020, p. 418).’

The next wave of critique started in December 2014, when the Dutch Football Association pleaded for a ‘treaty of Amsterdam’, that proposed the implementation of human rights in the bidding process (Van Steenberghe, 2021). Another initiative to reform was the FIFA Now initiative that existed out of politicians, football professionals and fans (Onwumechili & Bedeau, p. 409). FIFA Now proposed reforms from the outside by pressuring important sponsors and governments to enforce changes in FIFA.

The most critical moments were the arrests of high FIFA officials during the congress in May 2015. This ‘global embarrassment’ did further harm FIFA’s reputation (Gift & Miner, p. 144). Instead of apologising, Blatter started a media campaign to dissociate the blame from FIFA to regional associations and to stress the importance of his recent reforms (Onwumechili & Bedeau, 2017). This led to more critique and FIFA sponsors demanded him to immediately resign as he was an obstacle to reforms (Richau, Emrich & Follert, 2019, p. 5). This made the FIFA board decide to suspend Blatter and other officials a few days later in October 2015 (Van Steenberg, 2021).

Ruggie’s recommendations were accepted by the extraordinary FIFA congress in February 2016, which also elected Gianni Infantino as the new President (Richau, Emrich & Follert, 2021, p. 5). The congress committed to the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights as well, which were perceived by Ruggie as the ‘authoritative standard’ (p. 11). Big sponsors demanded not only the approval but a concrete implementation of Ruggie’s report (Gibson, 2016).

The implementation of human rights in the FIFA statute happened officially in April 2016. The independent human right committee was however brought back under the control in May 2016 (Gill, Adelus & De Abreu Duarte, 2019, p. 1044). In the same period, several trade unions sued FIFA for the poor working conditions in construction works for the Qatar World Cup (Bützler & Schöddert, 2020, p. 52).

In March 2017, the FIFA’s Human Rights Advisory Board was being established, but members of a different committee (FIFA’s Governance and Review Committee) were fired, despite their independent positions in what is being called FIFA’s ‘Night of the Long Knives’ (Ahmed, 2017). A concrete success was the adoption of new bidding requirements for the 2026 tournament, which expressly mentions the protection of human rights in November 2017.



Figure 1: Timeline of FIFA's reform process.

4.2. FIFA content analysis

The content analysis aims to provide an overview of the influential external actors of the IOC, grouped by the five hypotheses as described in the methodology chapter.

4.2.1. Influence of big sponsors

Most literature stresses the importance of the sponsors since they started to call for reforms when corruption allegations reached a fever pitch. For the chairman of the English Football Association, the involvement of sponsors was a ‘game-changer’ (Fortunato, 2017, p. 75). Fortunato (2017) describes the responses of sponsors as twofold: on the one hand, they underlined the importance and urgency for reforms, but none of the sponsors decided to terminate their partnership with FIFA (p. 74). More pressure came when Blatter announced his retirement but wanted to wait until the next elections. Big sponsors urged him to leave immediately (p. 75). Fortunato (2017) concludes that ‘FIFA engaging in corrective action is the best outcome for sponsors as they can maintain their partnership and continue to accrue the business benefits of this sponsorship (p. 76).’

In the same period, four FIFA sponsors announced their disapproval of FIFA’s corruption dilemma and called for immediate reforms (Heaston, Mitchell & Kappen, 2020, p. 421). Ruggie (2016) describes this as salient, since ‘even normally reticent FIFA sponsors felt the need to speak out (p. 8)’.

Richau, Emrich and Follert (2019) observe a dichotomy between the traditional Western sponsors and new sponsors with non-western roots. They argue that ‘while traditionally Western companies have been more hesitant in cooperating with FIFA due to the ongoing corruption investigations, firms such as Gazprom (Russia), Wanda (China) and Qatar Airways (Qatar) took their place (p. 5).’ This weakens the effects of calls for reforms since it demonstrates ‘that FIFA puts its objective of revenue maximisation above potential democracy concerns in the sponsors’ home countries (p. 5).’ This indicates that sponsors were not the first to insist on reforms, but still had the influence to enforce reforms.

4.2.2. Influence of media, society and NGOs

Another explanation for the reforms is the effect of media attention and pressure from society. The public outrage increased significantly since 2010. Transparency International was the first to stand up against FIFA, by prescribing reforms to bring its organisational practices in line with common IO standards (Heaston, Mitchell and Kappen, 2020, p. 421).

During the entire crisis, various NGOs maintained pressure on FIFA (Bützler & Schöddert, 2020, p. 42). They monitored FIFA’s compliance with previous statements, thus forming a ‘layer of reflexivity’ (p. 43). The pressure increased towards ‘unprecedented levels of public condemnation (Heaston, Mitchell and Kappen, 2020, p. 404).’ Bützler and Schöddert (2020) describe this as ‘the translation of social norms into rules (p. 53).’

Blatter has been the target of various media publications and NGO critiques, which eventually forced him to resign. Gill, Adelus and de Abreu Duarte (2019) describe how external pressure from the public led to the arrests of FIFA officials and the banning of Blatter from football (p. 1043). This affected the reputation and trust in FIFA and even questioned integrity and legitimacy (Richau, Emrich and Follert, 2019, p. 1).

Another NGO that insisted on reforms was the Dutch labour organisation FNV. They informed football officials about human rights violations in Qatar (Giebels, 2021). This increased the pressure to maintain reforms.

Another attempt to reform FIFA from the outside was the FIFA Now initiative. They showed sponsors and other stakeholders that FIFA has a long way to go to fulfil its reform promises (Heaston, Mitchell & Kappen, 2020, p. 421). Moreover, a debate emerged whether the Qatar World Cup must be boycotted (Hulshof, 2021). Some argue that sports and politics should be separated, whereas others consider it as the ultimate pressure tool to enable reforms in the FIFA organisation. Overall there can be concluded that the media and NGOs must be perceived as

important principals. They were the first to reveal the problems with the bidding process. They lacked however concrete power to enforce reforms themselves.

4.2.3. Other IOs as norm setters

The influence of other IOs as norm setters is not being seen as the most likely explanation for the reforms. Van Steenberghe (2021) stresses the influence of the Dutch FA and its proposal for a 'treaty of Amsterdam'. Moreover, the treaty aimed to come to a new bidding process, with more attention for human rights and sustainability. He argues that this influenced the reforms, despite FIFA's refusal to engage in a treaty. Overall, the role of other IOs has been very limited. There was no significant influence on the reforms noticeable.

4.2.4. Internal power struggles

Some explain the reforms as a reaction to internal disparities, clashes or newly constructed insights. For Gill, Adelus and de Abreu Duarte (2019), the FIFA Ethic Committee played a big role in the reforms (p. 1060). They gained the freedom to propose reforms and eventually brought Blatter down, in what they call Blatter's 'own goal' (p. 1055).

Heaston, Mitchell & Kappen (2020) describe the FIFA culture as 'organisational filtering' that neglects internal critique to avoid significant reforms (p. 418). Whistleblowers lost their jobs and internal actors did not dare to propose changes (p. 419). FIFA's internal reform process did a better job of showcasing the deep rootedness of its problems than it did of addressing them (p. 409). Bützler and Schöddert (2020) add that the reforms coming from FIFA's inside can be seen as 'counter-movements that counteract self-destructive tendencies from within and prevent further scandalisation in the public sphere (p. 45).' This means that the internal reform efforts were perceived as problematic for the continuation of the FIFA organisation. There can be concluded that the role of whistleblowers and the internal organisation cannot be perceived as crucial to enforce reforms. They might have however some influence by leaking information to the media, but there is no evidence so far.

4.2.5. Influence of big states

Some argue that the reforms were enforced by the power and influence of big states. Fortunato describes the arrests of officials by the Swiss authorities as one of the key moments in the reform process. He argues that the formation of the Reform Committee was a direct consequence of the Swiss actions (p. 70). Something similar is being argued by a former member of the reform committee. The arrests and the US state intervention were 'moments of hope' that received a lot of media attention (Anonymous, 2019, p. 1039). Gill, Adelus and de

Abreu Duarte (2019) state similarly that the ‘culture of corruption’ and the need for reforms only gained significance after the actions of the US (and Swiss) government (p. 1044). To conclude, the US and Swiss governments must be seen as the main principal in the reform process. Their actions led to the arrests of officials and eventually to the emergence of the reform committee.




Figure 4: Textual analysis of the FIFA reform process.

4.3. Discussion

The content analysis shows that the reforms were mainly externally driven. The bidding process in 2010 and the arrests of FIFA officials in 2015 have led to unprecedented levels of critique and have significantly damaged the image of FIFA.

Neither internal motivations, nor new leadership were drivers for the reforms. Instead of welcoming critique from whistleblowers, FIFA tried to keep negative publicity as much as possible inside the organisation, to avoid self-destructive tendencies. This can be seen as an opposite PA relation, in which FIFA itself tries to influence the discussion internally and as a consequence externally. It is however possible that whistleblowers had some influence by

leaking information to the media and NGOs. The anonymous paper this thesis uses is an example of that.

The FIFA organisation was forced to act however after a coalition of media actors and NGOs revealed details about corruption and human rights violations. Sponsors feared getting involved in the negative publicity and started to insist on reforms. This is considered a game-changer and an important catalyser for reforms. Moreover, NGOs used previous statements and declarations of FIFA to hold them accountable for violations of these. Previous statements were translated into rules for the first time.

Other IOs had a minor influence on the reforms according to the literature. The Dutch FA influenced the climate in which FIFA was forced to adjust the bidding process, but it seems unlikely that such a small association would have an important influence on a big ISA like FIFA.

The most influential stakeholders with the biggest influence on the emergence of the reforms were the American and Swiss governments. The investigations of the Swiss led to the emergence of the reform committee, which eventually brought Blatter down, whereas the American intervention exposed a culture of corruption and increased the pressure for significant reforms. Altogether, the pressure from different groups led eventually to the independent report of Ruggie with implementations towards the inclusion of human rights procedures.




Figure 7: PA framework FIFA reforms.

5. The IOC case

The first part of this describes the roots of what led to the IOC reforms. The second part consists of a content analysis after which a PA framework is created and discussed.

5.1. The IOC reform process: A timeline

The IOC has received less attention from the media recently compared to FIFA. There were however crucial events that first led to the Agenda 2020 and later to the inclusion of human rights in the 2024 Olympic Host City contract. These reforms have received many critical remarks and are even to date (May 2021) contested.

Agenda 2020 has its basis in the controversies in the aftermath of the 2012 London Games and the concerns about the high costs of hosting the Games. The 2012 Olympics were perceived as a significant benchmark for human rights challenges in which for the first time sustainability, an enduring legacy for the city and construction safety were important themes (Institute for Human Rights and Business, 2013, p. 5). The struggle for reforms eventually led to an Independent Report by Ra'ad Al Hussein and Davis in March 2020. Their five pillars of recommendations that the IOC should incorporate are (Ra'ad Al Hussein & Davis, 2020, p. 24):

- Articulating the IOC's human rights responsibilities;
- Embedding respect for human rights across the organisation;
- Identifying and addressing human rights risks;
- Tracking and communicating on progress;
- Strengthening the remedy ecosystem in sports.

In December 2013, Thomas Bach was elected as the new IOC President with the promise to reduce the cost of bidding and hosting (BBC, 2013). Human rights were no main topic during this election. Therefore the Swedish watchdog Swedwatch urged sponsors to pressure for a 'more offensive strategy on human rights (Bang, 2014).'

With more critique arising, President Bach announced in December 2014 Agenda 2020. It existed out of forty reforms, including a stakeholder consultation process and other human rights policies (Deutsche Welle, 2014). This was in line with the adoption of a new vision that integrates core human rights concepts by the IOC in February 2015 (Ra'ad Al Hussein & Davis, 2020). The open letter of NGOs, sports groups and trade unions, to include human rights in the 2024 Olympic Host City contract in February 2015, did not lead to concrete results (Play the Game, 2015).

After China in July 2015 won the contest for the Olympic Games of 2022, the IOC felt pressure for reforms. The criteria for the 2024 Games were announced in September 2015 but were a disappointment for not incorporating concrete human rights obligations (Heerdt, 2018, p. 176). Only in February 2017, human rights were included in the host city contract (Grell, 2018, p. 161).

The next problem arose when in October 2017 the bidding process for the Games of 2026 opened. This is being labelled the Game nobody wants, which made it harder for the IOC to be strict on human rights criteria. To formalise human rights inclusion, the IOC started in May 2018 to work together with Shift to review and oversee the human rights reforms (Ra’ad Al Hussein & Davis, 2020, p. 1). This led in December 2018 to the creation of a new Human Rights Advisory Committee and a month later to the report of Ra’ad Al Hussein and Davis. These recommendations were partly approved by the IOC in March 2020. Meanwhile, senators from the United States (US) urged the IOC in December 2019 to speed up reforms towards China (Lesniewski, 2019).




Figure 2: Timeline of IOC's reform process.

5.2. IOC content analysis

The content analysis aims to provide an overview of the influential external actors of the IOC, grouped by the five hypotheses as described in the methodology chapter.

5.2.1. *Influence of big sponsors*

The role of sponsors to enforce reforms were significant. Since sponsors fear for their reputation, they are likely to speak out for human rights policies. Bang describes how the Swedish human rights watchdog Swedwatch urged big sponsors to take more responsibility and to push for concrete reforms. The Institute for Human Rights and Business (2013) states that the IOC faced growing demands to reform to reflect emerging international standards and respond to new sponsor expectations on a range of sustainability issues (p. 4).

Another trend emerging is that companies commit themselves more and more to human rights and sustainability standards. It is therefore important that the relationship with ISAs should include these standards as well. Ra'ad Al Hussein and Davis (2020) observe that 'businesses are looking at their sports sponsorship relationships and asking how human rights risks are being handled by their partners (p. 21).' There can be concluded that the role of the sponsors was significant. They were the main principal with the push for human rights reforms since they feared for their reputation and as a result of higher sponsor expectations.

5.2.2. *Influence of media, society and NGOs*

The most common explanation for the reforms points to the role of the media. Since the London Games in 2012, big sports events have come under unprecedented media and campaigning scrutiny (Amis, 2017, p. 135). Moreover, citizens have become more critical of the costs of the Games and the IOC itself. This is an important reason for the emergence of the 2020 Agenda (Derom, Pentifallo Gadd and VanWynsberghe, 2021, p. 5). The world has changed and the IOC should engage in this to remain relevant.

Grell (2018) describes that the IOC 'ceased to ignore human rights concerns only in response to multiple reports exposing severe human rights (p. 160).' Serious abuses that took place were documented by human rights organisations whose reports sparked public outrage (p. 163). In these circumstances, the IOC could no longer turn a blind eye to human rights risks related to the execution of the Games and decided to take action (p. 163).

Critique by Sport and Rights Alliance before the Rio Olympics led to a discussion with the IOC concerning the abuses of human rights and how to prevent this in future events (Amis, 2017, p. 139). This led to a human rights clause within the code of ethics, which was recommended by a coalition of NGOs, sports groups and trade unions (Play the Game, 2015).

Grell however states that civil society demands more reforms than Agenda 2020 consists (p. 160). Hulshof describes the call for boycotts and the actions individual sporters took during the Olympics. This is as well being mentioned in the independent report by Ra'ad Al Hussein and Davis (2020), stating that media reports and protests of other stakeholders influenced the need for reforms (p. 9). Overall, NGOs can be seen as the main principal (together with the sponsors) since they were the first to address the issue of human rights violations.

5.2.3. Other IOs as norm setters

According to Derom, Pentifallo Gadd and VanWynsberghe (2021), the IOC perceives itself as 'a leader in global sports (p. 6).' This means that the IOC cannot risk that other IOs have a more progressive human right policy. To retain this legitimation, the IOC developed Agenda 2020.

Heerdt (2018) observes that FIFA, UEFA and the IOC all made human rights commitments in the same period. She goes along with Derom, Pentifallo Gadd and VanWynsberghe (2021) that these ISAs face rising commitments from society (p. 172) and that they do not want to lose their position (p. 173). In other words: they influence each other. This gives that other IOs had some influence, but not as the main principal.

5.2.4. Internal power struggles

Some explain the reforms as the consequence of internal developments. The Ra'ad Al Hussein and Davis (2020) report hints slightly towards it. The IOC already faced the consequences of the lack of internal mechanisms to measure the performance of human rights and was seeking solutions for that (p. 8). Schnitzer and Haizinger (2019) observe internal frustration about the lack of resources to change processes (p. 14). The role of the elections that brought Bach in power, had however some influence on the reforms.

5.2.5. Influence of big states

A few scholars explain the reforms as pressured by big states. Lesniewski (2019) describes how US senators urged the IOC to speed up the timeline for reforms to protect human rights in host countries. This pressure had however a geopolitical purpose since they were mainly targeted to human rights violations in the preparations of the 2022 China Olympics.

Schnitzer and Haizinger (2019) explain the reforms by the reduced credibility of the IOC and socio-political reasons that make the Games unattractive for democratic countries (p. 11). This is similar to what Flyvbjerg, Stewart and Budzier (2016) argue by stressing the relationship between the high costs and decreased reputation of the event (p. 3). Overall states were not a

main enforcer of the reforms. There is no clear PA relationship visible between pressure from states and the IOC reforms.




Figure 6: Textual analysis of the IOC reforms.

5.3. Discussion

The reforms of the IOC were compared to FIFA less driven by human rights violations, but mainly by the high costs of hosting the Games. As a result of this, only non-democratic countries with leaders without democratic responsibilities are willing to host the Games anymore.

Agenda 2020 however concerns human rights reforms as well. These were mainly enforced by sponsors who feared their reputation, NGOs and media attention. Relationships between IOs and sponsors have changed with the increased importance of human rights and sustainability. Sponsors make commitments themselves and demand similar actions of their sponsor associations.

The media published some articles about IOC problems, which influenced sponsors and the IOC to engage in reforms. Human rights violations were however not as common as at FIFA tournaments. The IOC did therefore receive less attention. NGOs and public coalitions such as the Sport and Rights Alliance significantly influenced the debate by organising protests, which eventually led to the human rights clause in the new bidding criteria. The call for boycotts and other civil society demands had some influence as well.

A difference between the stakeholders that enabled the reforms at FIFA and the IOC is the role of other IOs. Whereas they barely influenced FIFA, IOs had a role in the reforms of the IOC. An explanation for that is the perceived role of the IOC as the leader in global sports. This means that when others make changes, the IOC has to react to not lose that position. The Ra'ad Al Hussein and Davis report must therefore be perceived as a reaction to the Ruggie report of FIFA.

The IOC organisation had some influence on the reforms as well. The elections in 2013 were the first step towards Agenda 2020, in which many reforms were announced. It took however until 2019 before an independent report with recommendations was written. By then, many reforms were already pushed through via other channels.

The role of big states is marginal. The reason that some states opted for reforms had less to do with concerns about human rights and more with the high costs of hosting the event or with geopolitical reasons. Only in 2019, US senators called for quicker reforms, but that must be seen in the context of the US-China trade conflict.




Figure 8: PA Framework IOC reforms.

6. Limitations and future research directions

It is important to acknowledge that this thesis has several limitations. In particular, human rights violations have not stopped. Only three months ago (February 2021), the Guardian revealed that more than 6500 migrant workers for the World Cup have died in Qatar (Pattison et al., 2021). This illustrates that incorporating reforms is something entirely different from subscribing to them.

Moreover, there are crucial differences in the incentives for the IOC and FIFA to reform. Where the IOC faced criticism on the increasing size and costs of the Games, FIFA was mainly criticised for the bidding procedure and the human rights violations. This signifies that the cases, despite both being typical cases with a norm-setting function, cannot be answered in a single, general conclusion. The question remains whether the research question can be answered for the IOC since there are other explanations for the reforms.

Thirdly, given the recent date of the reforms and the lack of openness of both ISAs, no internal sources were available for research (except for Anonymous, 2019). Repeating the same approach in a few years might lead to different results since more evidence will become available.

Fourthly, this paper argues from a combined rationalist and constructivist point of view. It is however likely that someone who argues from a realist perspective will come to different conclusions. This could be an interesting research topic for further research. Moreover, this research considers the ISAs solely as the agent since this research focuses only on the reforms. However, it is important to acknowledge that both the IOC and FIFA can have a dual role by being both principal and agent in the bidding and organising process with organising countries as agents.

Another interesting topic for further research is the case of UEFA. They are a regional organisation that faced criticism for hosting the European Championship in human rights-violating countries. Another research angle could be a comparison between the human rights policies between a global and a local ISA.

Overall, several important questions have not been answered: how to redirect the trend of autocratic states being the only ones willing to host big sporting events? Is it a consequence of a global shift in power from the 'west' to non-western countries? Will the reforms solve this problem?

7. Conclusion

The reform process in both FIFA and the IOC has been complicated. Including human rights in the bidding process is something entirely different from the actual compliance after the bidding procedure. The effects of the reforms (not within the scope of this thesis) might therefore only be visible in five to ten years.

Another complication is the big difference between the IOC and FIFA. Where the IOC primarily faced problems with cost overruns and the lack of good candidate cities, FIFA faced criticism for human rights abuses. The question to explain the reforms can therefore not be answered simultaneously for both ISAs.

Between 2010 and 2015, FIFA faced unprecedented levels of critique from stakeholders. The most influential critics were media outlets and NGOs, whereas big sponsors remained mostly silent. Sponsors only engaged in the debate once they started fearing loss of reputation. The most influential actors were however the American and Swiss governments' judicial actions. This combined pressure led to the reforms as suggested by Ruggie.

The IOC on the other hand is a more complicated case. As mentioned before, human rights violations were not the key driver for reforms within the IOC as much as costs were. A further complication of this is that the reforms were implemented at multiple points in time. The Ra'ad Al Hussein and Davis report was only published in 2020 and therefore less influential than the Agenda 2020 created years before. The IOC reforms were mainly driven by pressure from sponsors who feared a loss of reputation and further inquiry. The role of the media was less influential in the IOC's reforms, considering the low-profile positioning of the IOC.

Overall it can be concluded that external pressure and negative publicity are key drivers to enforce changes. But have these ISAs changed? Or is it mere window-dressing to satisfy the stakeholders?

The storm might have blown over, but critique has not gone away. Let us be hopeful:

'At the end of a storm

There's a golden sky

And the sweet silver song of a lark.'

(Gerry & the Pacemakers, 1963).

Bibliography

- Abbott, K., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), 3-32.
- Ahmed, M. (2017, May 10). *FIFA ousts governance chief in 'night of long knives'*. Financial Times. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/79ed66e2-3504-11e7-bce4-9023f8c0fd2e>.
- Amis, L. (2017). Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights—A Time for More Teamwork? *Business and Human Rights Journal*, 2(1), 135-141.
- Anonymous. (2019). FIFA – The Beautiful Game – The Ugly Organization. *European Journal of International Law*, 30(3), 1039-1040.
- Bang, S. (2014, February 3). *Olympic sponsors must push for human rights, report recommends*. Play the Game. Retrieved from <https://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2014/olympic-sponsors-must-push-for-human-rights,-report-recommends/>.
- Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4), 699-732.
- Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2004). Chapter 1. Bureaucratizing World Politics. In *Rules for the World*, 1-15.
- Bauer, M., & Ege, J. (2016). Bureaucratic autonomy of international organizations' secretariats. *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(7).
- Baumann, M. O. (2018). Forever North–South? The political challenges of reforming the UN development system. *Third World Quarterly*, 39(4), 626-641.
- BBC. (2011, December 2). *Transparency International cuts ties with FIFA*. BBC News. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15996806>.
- BBC. (2013, September 10). *Olympics: Thomas Bach named new IOC president*. BBC Sport. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/24028786>.
- Boniface, P. (1998). Football as a factor (and a reflection) of international politics. *The International Spectator*, 33(4), 87-98.
- Bützler, B., & Schöddert, L. (2020). Constitutionalizing FIFA: Promises and challenges. *Tilburg Law Review*, 25(1), 40-54.

- Chwieroth, J. M. (2008). Organizational change “from within”: Exploring the World Bank’s early lending practices. *Review of International Political Economy*.
- Clegg, L. (2010). Our Dream is a World Full of Poverty Indicators: The US, the World Bank, and the Power of Numbers. *New Political Economy*, 15(4), 473-492.
- Cortell, A., & Peterson, S. (2021). Synthesizing Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches to International Organizations: Lessons from the WTO and WHO.
- Creswell, J. (2013). *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Derom, I., Pentifallo Gadd, C., & VanWynsberghe, R. (2021). Legacy and sustainability in the Olympic Movement’s new norm era: When reforms are not enough. *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 1-18.
- Deutsche Welle. (2014, December, 8). *The 40 planned Olympic reforms in overview*. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/the-40-planned-olympic-reforms-in-overview/a-18115897>.
- Elsig, M. (2011). Principal–agent theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex agency and ‘missing delegation’. *European Journal of International Relations*, 17(3), 495-517.
- Enns, C. (2015). Knowledges in competition: knowledge discourse at the World Bank during the knowledge for development era. *Global Social Policy: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Public Policy and Social Development*, 15(1), 61-80.
- Flyvbjerg, B., Stewart, A., & Budzier, A. (2016). *The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Games* [Working Paper]. Said Business School.
- Follert, F., Richau, L., Emrich, E., & Pierdzioch, C. (2020). Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice. *The Economists' Voice*, 17(1).
- Fortunato, J. (2017). The FIFA Crisis: Examining Sponsor Response Options. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 25(2), 68-78.
- Gehring, T., & Faude, B. (2014). A theory of emerging order within institutional complexes: How competition among regulatory international institutions leads to institutional adaptation and division of labor. *Review of International Organizations*, 9(4), 471-498.

- Gerring, J., & Seawright, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 294-308.
- Gibson, O. (2016, February 5). *FIFA sponsors want human rights at heart of reform process*. The Guardian. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/feb/05/fifa-sponsors-human-rights-reform-process>.
- Giebels, R. (2021, March 20). *De Grenzen van het speelveld* [the boundaries of the playingfield]. De Volkskrant.
- Gift, T., & Miner, A. (2017). Dropping the ball. *World Affairs (Washington)*, 180(1), 127-161.
- Gill, S., Adelus, E., & De Abreu Duarte, F. (2019). Whose Game? FIFA, Corruption and the Challenge of Global Governance. [Review Essay]. *European Journal of International Law*, 30(3), 1041-1066.
- Grell, T. (2018). The International Olympic Committee and human rights reforms: Game changer or mere window dressing? *The International Sports Law Journal*, 17(3-4), 160-169.
- Gutner, T. (2012). When “doing good” does not: the IMF and the Millennium Development Goals. In *Who Governs the Globe?* (pp. 266–291). Cambridge University Press.
- Heaston, W., Mitchell, M., & Kappen, J. (2020). Institutional Reflections on Organizational Corruption Control, *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 26(3), 403-427.
- Heerdt, D. (2018). Tapping the potential of human rights provisions in mega-sporting events’ bidding and hosting agreements. *The International sports law journal*, 17(3), 170-185.
- Hulshof, A. (2021, March 13). *Loze beloftes van de sportbobo’s* [loose promises by the sport officials]. Trouw. Retrieved from <https://www.trouw.nl/sport/sport-als-bijdrage-aan-een-betere-wereld-de-loze-beloftes-van-de-sportbobo-s~bcfe3186/>.
- Institute for Human Rights and Business (2013). *Striving for Excellence: Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights*, 2.
- Lesniewski, N. (2019, December 5). *Targeting China, senators want Olympics to move up human rights timeline*. Roll Call. Retrieved from

<https://www.rollcall.com/2019/12/05/targeting-china-senators-want-olympics-to-move-up-human-rights-timeline/>.

- Mason, D., Thibault, L., & Misener, L. (2006). An Agency Theory Perspective on Corruption in Sport: The Case of the International Olympic Committee. *Journal of Sport Management, 20*, 52-73.
- Næss, H. E. (2018). The neutrality myth: why international sporting associations and politics cannot be separated, *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, (45)2*, 144-160.
- Næss, H. E. (2020). The Normative Legitimacy Gap: International Sports Associations, Human Rights and Stakeholder Democracy, *Sport, Ethics and Philosophy (14)2*, 129-145.
- Onwumehili, C, & Bedeau, K. (2017). Analysis of FIFA's Attempt at Image Repair. *Communication and Sport, 5(4)*, 407-427.
- Pattison, P., McIntyre, N., Mukhtar, I., Eapen, N., Owasim Uddin Bhuyan, M., Bhattarai, U., & Piyari, A. (2021, February 23). Revealed: 6,500 migrant workers have died in Qatar since World Cup awarded. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/23/revealed-migrant-worker-deaths-qatar-fifa-world-cup-2022>.
- Pevehouse, J., & von Borzyskowski, P. (2016). Part I Introduction, Ch.1 International Organizations in World Politics. In *The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations*. Oxford University Press.
- Pielke, R. (2013). How can FIFA be held accountable? *Sport Management Review, 16(3)*, 255-267.
- Play the Game. (2015, February 25). *Coalition urges the IOC to include labour and human rights*. Play the Game. Retrieved from https://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2015/0018_coalition-urges-the-ioc-to-include-labour-and-human-rights/.
- Ra'ad Al Hussein, Z., & Davis R. (2020). *Recommendations for an IOC Human Rights Strategy*.
- Richau, L., Emrich, E., & Follert, F. (2019). Quid Pro Quo! Organization Theoretical Remarks about FIFA's Legitimacy Under Blatter and Infantino. *The Economists' Voice, 16(1)*.

- Ruggie, J. (2016). "For the Game for the World." *FIFA and Human Rights*. Corporate Responsibility Initiative Report, 68.
- Schnitzer, M., & Haizinger, L. (2019). Does the Olympic Agenda 2020 Have the Power to Create a New Olympic Heritage? An Analysis for the 2026 Winter Olympic Games Bid. *Sustainability (Basel, Switzerland)*, 11(2), 442.
- Snidal, D. (1996). Political economy and international institutions, *International Review of Law and Economics*, 16(1), 121-137.
- Teubner, G. (2012). *Constitutional fragments: Societal constitutionalism and globalization* (Oxford constitutional theory). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van Steenberghe, E. (2021, April, 4). *Waarom de mensenrechten altijd verloren in het topvoetbal* [Why human rights always lost in football]. De Volkskrant. Retrieved from <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/04/02/waarom-de-mensenrechten-altijd-verloren-in-het-topvoetbal-a4038367>.
- Woerts, C. (2020). *Waarom de keuze van Ajax en PSV voor Qatar wél de juiste is* [Why the choice for Qatar by Ajax and PSV is the right one]. Sportnext. Retrieved from <https://www.sportnext.nl/overig/waarom-de-keuze-van-ajax-en-psv-voor-qatar-wel-de-juiste-is/>.
- Woods, C., & Stokes, A. (2019). 'For the game, for the world': An analysis of FIFA's CSR initiatives. *Public Relations Inquiry*, 8(1), 49-85.

Appendix A

Author	Title	Type
Anonymous. (2019). FIFA – The Beautiful Game – The Ugly Organization. <i>European Journal of International Law</i> , 30(3), 1039-1040.	FIFA – The Beautiful Game – The Ugly Organization	Research paper
Bützler, B., & Schöddert, L. (2020). Constitutionalizing FIFA: Promises and challenges. <i>Tilburg Law Review</i> , 25(1), 40-54.	Constitutionalizing FIFA: Promises and challenges	Research paper
Fortunato, J. (2017). The FIFA Crisis: Examining Sponsor Response Options. <i>Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management</i> , 25(2), 68-78.	The FIFA Crisis: Examining Sponsor Response Options	Research paper
Gibson, O. (2016, February 5). <i>FIFA sponsors want human rights at heart of reform process</i> . The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/feb/05/fifa-sponsors-human-rights-reform-process .	FIFA sponsors want human rights at heart of reform process	Newspaper article
Giebels, R. (2021, March 20). <i>De Grenzen van het speelveld</i> [the boundaries of the playingfield]. De Volkskrant.	The boundaries of the playing field	Newspaper article
Gill, S., Adelus, E., & De Abreu Duarte, F. (2019). Whose Game? FIFA, Corruption and the Challenge of Global Governance. [Review Essay]. <i>European Journal of International Law</i> , 30(3), 1041-1066.	Whose Game? FIFA, Corruption and the Challenge of Global Governance	Review essay
Heaston, W., Mitchell, M., & Kappen, J. (2020). Institutional Reflections on Organizational Corruption Control. <i>Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations</i> , 26(3), 403-427.	Institutional Reflections on Organizational Corruption Control	Research paper
Heerdt, D. (2018). Tapping the potential of human rights provisions in mega-sporting events' bidding and hosting agreements. <i>The International sports law journal</i> , 17(3), 170-185.	Tapping the potential of human rights provisions in mega-sporting events' bidding and hosting agreement.	Research paper
Hulshof, A. (2021, March 13). <i>Loze beloftes van de sportbobo's</i> [loose promises by the sport officials]. Trouw. Retrieved from https://www.trouw.nl/sport/sport-als-bijdrage-aan-een-betere-wereld-de-loze-beloftes-van-de-sportbobo-s~bcfe3186/ .	Loose promises by the sport officials	Newspaper article
Næss, H. E. (2018). The neutrality myth: why international sporting associations and politics cannot be separated. <i>Journal of the Philosophy of Sport</i> , (45)2, 144-160.	The neutrality myth: why international sporting associations and politics cannot be separated	Research paper
Onwumechili, C., & Bedeau, K. (2017). Analysis of FIFA's Attempt at Image Repair. <i>Communication and Sport</i> , 5(4), 407-427.	Analysis of FIFA's Attempt at Image Repair	Research paper
Richau, L., Emrich, E., & Follert, F. (2019). Quid Pro Quo! Organization Theoretical Remarks about FIFA's Legitimacy Under Blatter and Infantino. <i>The Economists' Voice</i> , 16(1).	Quid Pro Quo! Organization Theoretical Remarks about FIFA's Legitimacy Under Blatter and Infantino	Research paper
Ruggie, J. (2016). "For the Game for the World." <i>FIFA and Human Rights</i> . Corporate Responsibility Initiative Report, 68.	"For the game. For the world." FIFA and human rights	Organisational report
Van Steenberg, E. (2021, April, 4). <i>Waarom de mensenrechten altijd verloren in het topvoetbal</i> [Why human rights always lost in football]. De Volkskrant. Retrieved from https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/04/02/waarom-de-mensenrechten-altijd-verloren-in-het-topvoetbal-a4038367 .	Why human rights always lost in football	Newspaper article

Figure 3: List of literature about the FIFA reforms.

Author	Title	Type
Amis, L. (2017). Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights—A Time for More Teamwork? <i>Business and Human Rights Journal</i> , 2(1), 135-141.	Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights—A Time for More Teamwork?	Research paper
Bang, S. (2014, February 3). <i>Olympic sponsors must push for human rights, report recommends</i> . Play the Game. Retrieved from https://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2014/olympic-sponsors-must-push-for-human-rights-report-recommends/ .	Olympic sponsors must push for human rights, report recommends	Online article
Derom, I., Pentifallo Gadd, C., & VanWynsberghe, R. (2021). Legacy and sustainability in the Olympic Movement's new norm era: When reforms are not enough. <i>International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics</i> , 1-18.	Legacy and sustainability in the Olympic Movement's new norm era: When reforms are not enough	Research paper
Flyvbjerg, B., Stewart, A., & Budzier, A. (2016). <i>The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Games</i> [Working Paper]. Said Business School.	The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Games	Research paper
Grell, T. (2018). The International Olympic Committee and human rights reforms: Game changer or mere window dressing? <i>The International Sports Law Journal</i> , 17(3-4), 160-169.	The International Olympic Committee and human rights reforms: Game changer or mere window dressing?	Research paper
Heerdt, D. (2018). Tapping the potential of human rights provisions in mega-sporting events' bidding and hosting agreements. <i>The International sports law journal</i> , 17(3), 170-185.	Tapping the potential of human rights provisions in mega-sporting events' bidding and hosting agreements	Research paper
Hulshof, A. (2021, March 13). <i>Loze beloftes van de sportbobo's</i> [loose promises by the sport officials]. Trouw. Retrieved from https://www.trouw.nl/sport/sport-als-bijdrage-aan-een-betere-wereld-de-loze-beloftes-van-de-sportbobo-s~bcfe3186/ .	Loose promises by the sport officials	Newspaper article
Institute for Human Rights and Business (2013). <i>Striving for Excellence: Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights</i> , 2.	Striving for Excellence: Mega-Sporting Events and Human Rights	Organisational report
Lesniewski, N. (2019, December 5). <i>Targeting China, senators want Olympics to move up human rights timeline</i> . Roll Call. Retrieved from https://www.rollcall.com/2019/12/05/targeting-china-senators-want-olympics-to-move-up-human-rights-timeline/ .	Targeting China, senators want Olympics to move up human rights timeline	Online article
Næss, H. E. (2018). The neutrality myth: why international sporting associations and politics cannot be separated, <i>Journal of the Philosophy of Sport</i> , (45)2, 144-160.	The neutrality myth: why international sporting associations and politics cannot be separated	Research paper
Play the Game. (2015, February 25). <i>Coalition urges the IOC to include labour and human rights</i> . Play the Game. Retrieved from https://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2015/0018_coalition-urges-the-ioc-to-include-labour-and-human-rights/ .	Coalition urges the IOC to include labour and human rights	Online article
Ra'ad Al Hussein, Z., & Davis R. (2020). <i>Recommendations for an IOC Human Rights Strategy</i> .	Recommendations for an IOC Human Rights Strategy	Organisational report
Schnitzer, M., & Haizinger, L. (2019). Does the Olympic Agenda 2020 Have the Power to Create a New Olympic Heritage? An Analysis for the 2026 Winter Olympic Games Bid. <i>Sustainability (Basel, Switzerland)</i> , 11(2), 442.	Does the Olympic Agenda 2020 Have the Power to Create a New Olympic Heritage? An Analysis for the 2026 Winter Olympic Games Bid	Research paper

Figure 5: List of literature about the IOC reforms.