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**From Serbophobia to Islamophobia: Elite Nationalist Islamophobic
Propaganda and Anti-Muslim Ethnic Violence in the Bosnian Civil War**

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Introduction

In 1898, Freud visited Bosnia and Herzegovina and came up with the term 'Der Narzissmus der Kleinen Differenzen'. This term has often been used to refer to the Bosnian Civil War and the differences between the peoples (Carmichael, 2015, p. 48). Differences were there, but until approximately 1990 there still was a bosnian spirit and acceptance towards each other's religion. Ever since the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995, its population and the international community have tried to understand how the conflict arose out of what used to be a Bosnian unity of blood and brotherhood. With propaganda being an omnipresent political instrument in the Yugoslav Wars, studying the effect of propaganda and elite manipulation is significant in understanding such turning points from brotherhood to bloodbath. Some point out the idea of victimhood through propaganda (MacDonald, 2003) as political justification for ethnic violence, whereas others account the ethnic violence to ancient hatred or the banality of the civil war (Mueller, 2000).

What ancient hatred cannot explain is why only a small fraction of Serbs were aggressors during the Bosnian conflict. What the idea of victimhood cannot explain is how the need to protect turned into the need to kill, rape, and torture. What such explanations cannot tell us, is why specific animosity erupted towards the Islamic faith. In order to fill the research gap, of where propaganda and group-level violence meet each other in a reciprocal manner, all elements of ethnic violence and propaganda need to be studied. Although everyone knows that propaganda was of immense presence, its exact effect on the course of violence remains unclear.

Therefore, the research question is:

To what extent does Islamophobic elite nationalist propaganda in civil war contribute to ethnic violence at the group level?

The aim of this research question is to allow for an all-encompassing, yet detailed description of how the mechanism of Islamophobic propaganda proceeds in relation to ethnic violence. Understanding ethnic violence and propaganda is important, as it extends further than the Bosnian conflict. Propaganda has always been used to instigate violence, and this day and age of extensive media provides for a detailed analysis of its mechanisms.

A literature review will explain the most significant accounts on ethnic violence and propaganda and aims to break down the research question in concepts that need to be clarified. These theories and accounts are accompanied by theories outside of this framework that could influence the mechanisms as well. The theoretical framework will clarify how the theories are combined, of which the methodology shows how this is applied on the case to be studied, in order to measure the reciprocal processes of elite propaganda and group-level violence. An ideological framework will form the baseline of analysis, where the propaganda in the analysis will be measured against observable patterns of ethnic violence.

“The ancient matters only when ideologically reinterpreted into the modern ideal of the nation-state.” (Mann, 2004, p. 361)

Literature Review

As the research question entails numerous aspects and levels it is important to break down its components and dive into the existing literature.

The Myth of Ethnic War

An important overall aspect of the research question is ethnicity, in particular ethnic violence. As for ethnic war, ancient hatred often is described as its roots. The argument of ancient hatred in ethnic war has for example been made by Volkan (1996), especially in light of the sensitivity of ancient hatred to elite manipulation through propaganda. Ancient hatred had been stirred up by propaganda along ethnic lines. Kaplan (1993) makes a similar argument by explaining how ancient hatred was suppressed by communism, until communism collapsed and paved the way for destructive nationalism. However, many scholars contest such ideas of ancient ethnic hatred and other myths of ethnic (civil) war. According to King (2001), ethnic warfare by itself is a myth. In this argument, King (2001, p. 166) does not undervalue the intensity of ethnic feelings, but argues that more than that is necessary to kill each other's neighbours. Kaufman (2017) argues animosity along ancient ethnic lines as a main factor of ethnic war to be an outdated myth as well. Although hatred in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina did have ethnic roots, it was only in the last years prior to war that hatred increased significantly. Ancient hatred is often updated per generation. Not all ancient hatreds stay salient for generations long.

Other scholars argue ethnic violence to not necessarily be a result of ancient hatred, but account violence to rather grim and undeeep reasons. Mueller (2000) argues that the

motivation for violence by nationalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina was shallow, and existing among hooligans and criminals, whose violence was strengthened with alcohol. These individuals were recruited by the elite to obtain elite goals. Mueller (2000) reasons that the argument of ancient hatred in Yugoslavia is fundamentally lacking. The motivations of the hooligans and criminals were mainly to loot and to destroy. However, Mueller (2000) does not fully disagree with the ancient hatred view. Rather, deep animosities and suspicions had been resurfaced due to nationalist media, but alcohol induced hooligans and criminal paramilitaries with looting incentives were necessary recruits in order to actually act upon the hatred.

Mueller (2000) also states that whereas Serb locals in some places during the Bosnian war were amicable towards Bosnian Muslims, the Serb paramilitaries would be the ones who instigated the violence and war atrocities. Mueller thereby proposes that the ethnic element is used more often instrumentally rather than ethnicity being the intrinsic motivation for violence. Kaufman (2017) also argues how ethnic divide is used as justification for ethnic violence. Dragojevic (2019, p. 117) believes ethnically based violence against civilians during war to be a political tactic. This thesis will approach the motivations and justifications for ethnic cleansing in the instrumentalist view as well. Although this thesis adopts an instrumentalist view of the ethnic cleavage, it also takes into account ancient hatred. Especially in the case of the Yugoslav wars, elite manipulation and campaign along ethnic lines could only be effective if it connects with preexisting animosity and preconceptions (Kaufman, 2017, p. 6).

In the literature, several arguments have been made for why the term 'ethnic war' can be problematic. Following the arguments mentioned, several authors such as Mueller (2000, p. 42) contest the idea of a 'hobbesian war' of ethnic groups along strictly ethnically divided lines. King (2001, p. 167) argues 'ethnic war' to be usable for clarity, such as in cases where

combatants identify along such lines. Still, the term remains problematic since it is based on the argument that such ethnic violence is structured around myths.

King (2001, p. 168) identifies the issue to be that often, these myths were not deep or ancient, but rather produced after the war came about. A tricky consequence then, is that one could fuse intrinsic individual-level motivations and rational group-level motivations. Whereas individual motivations can be open to myths and symbolism that stir up hatred, rational group-level motivations, for example in the form of leadership intent for violence, are necessary to act violently.

Mueller (2000, p. 44) mentions the broader issue of international intervention to be due to plain ethnic cleavage arguments. When the conflict appears to be mostly around ethnic divide, the conflict seems impossible to stop from the outside. What can be said is that the ethnic war view puts a halt on intervention and oversimplifies the situation. Kaufman (2017, p. 2) has argued, while criticizing Kaplan's (1993) focus on ancient hatreds, the importance of studying conflict not in such a simplified, ethnicized manner, as mistakes of simplification can result in policy mistakes of stopping ethnic war. As Kaufman (2017, p. 5) points out: "Bill Clinton is reported to have concluded, after reading Kaplan's book, that any sort of external intervention in the Balkans was doomed to failure, since the conflict was driven by uncontrollable "ancient hatreds"."

Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) contest the monolithic view of ethnic war as well. They divide the debate into the 'endogenous-cleavages thesis' and the 'exogenous-cleavages thesis'. The endogenous-cleavages thesis argues that the violence we see during war might not all be due to ethnic cleavages, but rather due to war itself. War may form deeper or new cleavages, resulting in more violence than the initial ethnic cleavage by itself would have created. The exogenous-cleavages thesis is the opposite, and focuses on deep lying hatred and other antecedent cleavages to be the main issue of intra-war violence. The bulk of scholars

organize themselves around these two theses, or in between. This thesis seeks to explore both endogenous as well as exogenous factors and its interplay, which result in violence organized along ethnic lines. The question then is, what the ideal level of analysis would be in order to incorporate the entire spectrum, from individual-level animosity to elite-level manipulation through propaganda, so that the research question can be answered thoroughly.

Ethnification and the level of analysis

First, it is important to note that, besides international intervention and the international community, literature can also be guilty in such '*ethnicization or ethnification of politics or the reification of sectarian or ethnic cleavages*' (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007, p. 205). As individual-level information with regards to violence is often deficient, one can be keen to apply a top-down approach that deduces from the top-level, which can often be from a point of ethnic cleavage (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007, p. 206). Such a top-down approach ignores individual-level motivations for war. Civil wars are then perceived as to how combatants identify themselves and along which ethnic lines they mobilize and justify their actions (Sambanis, 2009, p. 5). Outward motivation and justification are the subject of analysis, while the underlying mechanisms of violence remain untouched.

What can be an unbiased approach is studying mobilization and the elite level who organize themselves into ethnic groups, focusing on the organizational level (Sambanis, 2009, p. 5). This thesis adopts the organizational definition of ethnic war posited by Sambanis, due to lack of individual-level data in the case to be studied, as well as the importance of the group-level in the intensity of ethnic violence. Sambanis (2009, p. 10) posits an instrumentalist view of ethnic war as well, as it should differ from other types of civil war in that ethnic war entails justification and usage of ethnic cleavages and its organization towards violence.

Sambanis (2009, p. 11) considers organization along ethnic cleavages to possibly be easier and more straightforward than other cleavages, due to ethnicity's stickiness and the visibility of ethnic characteristics. The deeper elements of ethnicity as opposed to other cleavages, result in vulnerability to manipulation, due to mechanisms of suspicion, hierarchical changes and more. Both the top-level and group-level need to be examined in order to find out the reciprocal interplay of deep-lying cleavages and elite-level interests and power. Pre-existing ethnic cleavages can be enlarged or reduced, depending on, for example, the strength of elite-level manipulation. This thesis seeks to analyze the interplay and strengthening or diminishing of ethnic cleavages in the violence mobilization aspect of civil war, by analyzing elite-level manipulation and how an ideological framework of ethnic myths lends itself to elite manipulation in the form of propaganda.

The group-level is specifically significant in the study of ethnic violence. By closely analyzing the organizational level, we can point out when change happens, or why something unforeseeable happens (Sinno, 2008, p. 27). Therefore, studying the group-level in the case of the Bosnian civil war is particularly important, as one of the main issues of international intervention was, according to international (intelligence) communities, that the magnitude of the ethnic violence unpredictable. By researching patterns of hatred and propaganda as instruments for group mobilization among Serb perpetrators against Bosnian Muslims, intents of mass ethnic violence might be more predictable. In light of studying the group level, Sinno (2008, p. 27) reasons that simplification can be allowed at the individual-level, by basing the simplifications on rational thought processes. However, this thesis argues that assuming rationality cannot be done in every case. Especially not in the case of the Bosnian civil war. Rationality might have been tainted by the hooligan-behaviour and alcohol use as described by Mueller (2000). Some scholars have written about alcohol and genocide as well, for example in the case of the Holocaust (Westermann, 2016). Alcohol can be a lubricant for

genocide. Furthermore, in the case of the Bosnian as well as the Rwandan genocide, rape was a strategic ordering device by the elite-level, such as leaders of the military (Cohen, 2013). As assumptions cannot be made at the individual-level, an unbiased and unsimplified approach at the group-level is most appropriate. As Kalyvas has mentioned in Kalyvas and Straus (2020, p. 394) on political violence and the meso level: “It’s always a matter of trade-offs: you give up some specificity in order to gain some generalizability.” Furthermore, Straus (2012, p. 556) highlights the significance of focusing on the relationship between the national and subnational level, as it has often been absent in the literature.

Ideological frameworks of emotions

In order to prevent the analysis of this thesis to be a top-down approach, an ideological framework needs to be established that can be deepened or widened by top-level manipulation. Emotions are necessary mechanisms to explain the interplay of ideology and manipulation, and violence towards the other as a possible outcome.

Numerous scholars have identified emotions linked to (ethnic) cleavages at the individual and group level. Such emotions can be triggered by elite level manipulation along ethnic lines. Petersen (2002) summarizes feelings of anxiety, animosity, bitterness and extreme anger. The anxiety as described by Petersen (2002) closely aligns with the security dilemma mentioned by Kaufman (2017), as well as Petersen’s (2002) account of animosity with ancient hatred by Peterson (2002), Kaufman (2017), Volkan (1996) and Kaplan (1993). Bitterness and anger as described by Petersen (2002) connect with group tendencies and psychological accounts of violence and resentment. Bitterness and anger can for example result from feelings of unjustness (Costalli and Ruggeri, 2017, p. 128). Again, as assumptions at the individual-level are difficult to make, connections between emotions and ideology can only be made at what is shown at, at minimum, the group-level.

The main question posed by Petersen (2002) following these emotions, is why people eventually act violently against people of other ethnic groups. He argues that a method based on emotions lends itself to an assessment of the extent of elite-level influence. Equally important, Petersen (2002, p. 35) argues that elite behaviour responds to change, rather than just being the shapers of mass emotion. It goes both ways, and therefore it is important to identify which way prevails. In this regard, the argument Petersen (2002) makes around this emotion-based approach is somewhat similar to the test by Weidmann (2011) of the strength of micro and macro mechanisms of violence. Both scholars attempt to determine which direction is strongest.

Fortunately, literature has shown that many scholars do not ethnify or simplify issues of ethnic violence as much anymore. Ideas of a monolithic ethnic conflict have been eradicated in the literature. We are looking at ethnic cleansing on a spectrum from individual-level emotions and motivations to elite-level manipulation of mass feelings of resentment, hatred and more. Petersen (2002) and (Weidmann, 2011) also argue the urban/rural cleavage to be of great importance in group organization. This shows how individual-level emotions are not the only mechanisms that form a basis prone to elite manipulation. Still, it remains important to dive deeper into emotions that can possibly constitute ethnic violence. In the instance of the Rwandan genocide, McDoom (2012) states that the fear emotion leads to divergence between groups, for example due to narratives of injustice, possibly resulting into violence.

However, even though such emotions at the individual level can lead to violence, these are hard to link with group mobilization towards ethnic violence. In groups, individuals can have highly differing emotions and motivations. The group level can steer such emotions into one direction, and mobilize a framework of emotion towards violence (Nussio, 2017, p. 928). Still, group frameworks of emotion do not necessarily shape emotions at the individual

level, as its effect remains uncertain. The group-level can build joint emotions through violence against the other. It can unlock reciprocity and strengthen brotherhood, and distrust towards the out-group (Nussio and Oppenheim, 2014, p. 1002). By studying the group-level, this thesis surpasses opposing and strongly differing emotions at the group level by looking at the “behavioural net effect” (Nussio, 2017, p. 930). The idea of an ideological framework has also been stressed by McDoom (2012, p. 126), as such frameworks help individuals with identifying within a certain group. Consequently, one can feel threatened by for example, cultural identity. In this thesis, such frameworks are of great importance in identification along ethnic lines. Ideological frameworks in particular are the ones that apply to armed organizations (Nussio, 2017, p. 929).

Straus (2012, p. 546) argues the arguments of ancient hatred, blaming and tyranny to be “first generation” analysis of genocide. A more recent wave of literature relates to strategic and ideological mechanisms of violence. The ideological view of leaders determines (violent) strategy. Similar to Straus (2012) this thesis argues both waves of literature to be of importance and be correlative in the analysis of ethnic violence. Emotions of ancient hatred, for example, can lay the foundation for ideological frame shaping. Kaufman (2006) addresses the importance of such ideological frames within armed mobilization and feelings of hostility based on myths. This thesis adopts a definition of ideology that encapsulates its meaning and effect: “a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the identification of a referent group (a class, ethnic, or other social group), an enunciation of the grievances or challenges that the group confronts, the identification of objectives on behalf of that group (political change - or defense against its threat), and a (perhaps vaguely defined) program of action” (Gutierrez and Wood, 2014, p. 215). The referent group of the case study in this thesis will evidently be the Bosnian Muslims. The program of action to be discussed will be steps that had to be taken according to the Serb elite level and group leader level. Framing through

ideology can often entail blaming and identifying the enemy, which puts them into the category referent group. By identifying the enemy, mobilization can be easily directed towards attack rather than defend, as differing emotions such as feelings of unjust and fear can transform into anger (Petersen, 2017). This transformation has been highlighted by Sternberg and Sternberg (2008), who argues that threat against supremacy can change fear into violent hate. Propaganda, as a form of elite manipulation, can travel down to the group level and possibly shape ideological frameworks or change existing frames.

Propaganda and myth shaping

As nationalist propaganda at the elite level is the independent variable of the research question, a clear definition of the concept is necessary. This thesis adopts the definition of propaganda by Thomson (1977) as mentioned in MacDonald (2003, p. 11): “the manipulation of public opinion’ and the ‘management of collective attitudes’ by use of both ‘political’ and ‘significant symbols’, those symbols that represent state power and national culture.’ Thomson argued that it includes ‘any means of projecting or transmitting images, ideas or information which influences behaviour in every active or passive sense. This covers every aspect of art and communication, because nearly all messages have either deliberately or accidentally some persuasive content.” Similar to MacDonald (2003, p. 12), this thesis is not adopting any forms of accidental persuasive content, as this would not fit the political-instrumentalist few this thesis adopts. In the case of the Bosnian civil war, different media outlets were boycotted by Slobodan Milosevic, and most forms of communication were deliberately taken over by nationalist propaganda (MacDonald, 2002). In order to understand the relationship between such deliberate propaganda and ethnic violence, a substantive amount of literature exists to explain possible effects on the group level and how these evolve.

Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) evidently shows that the impact of mass media can be significant (at least in the case of the Rwandan genocide) in terms of participating in violence. Mass media has direct effects on people, as well as indirect through interlinkage and the effect of propaganda spill-over. Falling subject to mass media can significantly change motivation or belief systems. Such belief-based approaches assume individuals to make rational decisions, which are updated when new information arrives, conforming to a Bayesian model. Similar to Mueller (2000), Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) presses the differing motivations of violence such as looting of Tutsi resources and properties in the Rwandan genocide. Strongly differing motivations such as looting versus ethnic resentment, make it impossible to assume rationality, as mentioned before. By focusing on the effect of propaganda on the group level, this thesis is able to surpass the debate of intrinsic individual emotions versus rationality-based behaviour.

According to De La Brosse et al. (2015, pp. 22-23), the people in power in the case of the Bosnian civil war weaponized the media. Religious and historic accounts were also used for alienation from “the Other”. De La Brosse et al. (2015, p.25) also explains how propaganda is used for justification of violence. It can account one's own sins to the enemy, the referent group. It leads to attack being perceived as a necessary tool of defence against the enemy. MacDonald (2003) discusses the idea of victimhood, framed by nationalist propaganda, often leading to violence out of ‘necessity’.

For propaganda to be persuasive, there has to be a foundational framework that is susceptible. Often, mythology inflames animosity and other feelings stemming from for example historic events. Propaganda feeds into pre-existing ideas and stereotypes, and is therefore compelling in influencing mass feelings and beliefs (De La Brosse et al., 2015, p. 26). They also argue that a thin line exists between ideas of victimhood, and propaganda that instigates feelings of a particular nation-state. In the case of Serbian propaganda, the idea

became increasingly instilled that the state was for Serbs. The idea of a greater Serbia emerged, and surpassed the idea of defending against the implied threat of Bosnian muslims. Repeating language within the propaganda campaigns emphasized the need for action against Bosnian Muslims. De La Brosse et al. conceptualize the instrumentalization of nationalist propaganda for military goals as 'war media'. Media played upon foundational mythology and laid the groundworks for psychological nationalistic animosity, which eventually became a weapon during the war. Similar to propaganda of the Nazis, myths mobilized the public.

Common for the period after the Yugoslav break-up, was the emergence of violence through nationalist propaganda, top-down (Zimmermann 1996, pp. 151-53). Smith (1997) explains how history is reshaped or selectively picked out and used by nationalists to achieve their goals. It is important to note that Smith's summary of historic based myths is focused on nationalism. Even more, it ignores ethnic cleansing, genocide and other ethnic incidences (MacDonald, 2003). Smith's account on myth framing and myth useability for nationalism still remains significant, if this thesis aims to be all-encompassing in explaining the role of propaganda in violence, as nationalist propaganda had a big role in the case study. However, according to MacDonald (2003, p. 25) Smith focuses too much on positive ways of nationalist myth making and symbolism. A negative image of the other is just as important for propaganda to be effective. For instance, animosity towards an identified other, creates more cohesiveness. Strong nationalism depends on a strong national identity, for which an "Other" is a necessity.

Theoretical Framework

In the case of the Bosnian civil war and its Bosnian muslim victims, it is often argued that victimhood and blaming propaganda were key mechanisms in the ethnic violence that followed. Others argue Serb nationalism to be of major importance. As Sternberg and

Sternberg (2008) have argued, threat perception can transform from a reaction of fear and defence, to violence. In the case of Bosnia, Petersen (2011) has identified a change from strategic violence to indiscriminate violence. This thesis seeks to understand how that transformation came about and how Islamophobic propaganda played a role in the mobilization for ethnic violence against Muslims. Therefore, the following hypothesis has been formed:

H1: When elite nationalist Islamophobic Serb propaganda reinforced Islamophobic ideological frameworks, ethnic violence against Bosnian Muslims was more likely.

Although all Serb propaganda in the Yugoslav conflicts had a nationalist base, anti-muslim hate speech was particular for the Bosnian case. Studying anti-muslim discourse by isolating it from the nationalist propaganda it came with, is important as the study of this mechanism is applicable to conflicts outside of the Yugoslav realm as well. Islamophobia will be used in its most general sense, as a fear, predisposition or animosity against the Islam or Muslims.

The instrumentalist propaganda theory by De La Brosse et al. (2015) was adopted, as it looks at how propaganda is used for political incentives by Milosevic and his regime. However, according to Kaufman (2017, p. 6), a focus on the elite level as a top-down approach oversimplifies the conflict. A situational and historical framework needs to be established that lends itself to elite Islamophobic propaganda. Therefore, the propaganda analysis will follow an ideological framework that includes nationalism and Islamophobia.

This framework is an extension of a systemic general theory of ethnic conflict by Kaufman (2017): myths based on injustice, threat and reprisal result into divide. A theory

needs to encompass all elements of ancient hatred, elite manipulation, economic hardship and security dilemma.

For an all-encompassing ideological framework to be intensified, abated or left as it is by Islamophobic propaganda, this thesis uses the emotion-based theory of ethnic conflict by Petersen (2002, p. 23), to take into account such elements and the group emotions.


An altered version of the emotion-based theory (Petersen, 2002, p. 23) will be used as a theoretical framework for analysis in accordance with Islamophobia.

The change in elite propaganda from nationalist Serbophobia (fear of survival of the Serbs) to Islamophobia fits within the 'structural change' element of Petersen's (2002, p. 23) figure. The 'information' in the updated theory will be 'propaganda' at the group-leader level. 'Belief' will be an ideological framework of recurring and recycled Islamophobic myths, divided into positive myths of Birth and Renewal, and negative myths of Fall and Persecution as identified by MacDonald (2003). These myths, based on biblical teleology, relate to the research question and the case to be studied, as biblical history and myths have often been partly responsible for ethnic nationalism. Positive myths are connected to nationalist propaganda, as such myths are not about hate, fear or prejudice against Muslims, but mainly about birth and renewal of a Greater Serbian state. Negative myths relate to Islamophobic propaganda, as this is about fall and persecution of what the Muslims 'have done to the Serbs'. These emotions, as shown in Petersen's (2002, p. 23) figure lead to certain desires.

These desires will depend on the hostility triad identified by Rozin et al. (1999). For example, anger, contempt and disgust towards Bosnian Muslims could lead to seeking de-Ottomization, safety from the Muslims or purity. Purity is added as a desire coming from Islamophobia, as the hostility triad does not explain a 'fear of pollution' as identified by Chirot and McCauley (2010, p. 86).

The theoretical framework inspired by Petersen (2002, p. 23) but applicable to the research question will be as follows:

Figure 1 *Theoretical Framework*



The action that can lead from the desires and ideological framework is identified in the hypothesis:

H1: When elite nationalist Serb propaganda reinforced Islamophobic ideological frameworks, ethnic violence against Bosnian Muslims was more likely.

Methodology

First, some considerations are necessary to point out. Bergholz (2016) has noted how much of the literature on the Yugoslav conflicts is coming from a point of ethnic selectivity. Therefore, I will refer to ‘Serb propaganda’ or ‘Serb paramilitaries’, but not ‘the Serbs’. The choice of Serb violence and propaganda as the subject of analysis, is due to the vastness of violence by Serb paramilitaries and the amount of detailed documentation that this vastness and intensity brought. Furthermore, of the 83 paramilitary groups of all Yugoslav parties, 56 of them were Serb nationalists and criminals (Kaldor, 2006, p. 57).

The ideological framework as baseline for the reader will be explained through the theory of negative myths of Fall and Persecution, and positive myths of Birth and Renewal. This framework will be summarized in accordance with the propaganda campaign of Milosevic.

The Milosevic campaign exercised immense control over the media by blocking oppositions from pressing or making appearances (De La Brosse et al, 2015). However, MacDonald (2003) has noted how Milosevic was just one of the Serbian nationalist devotees, as many intellectuals, authors and paramilitary leaders were greatly active in pushing the nationalist agenda of a Serbian state as well. Therefore, the ‘Milosevic propaganda campaign’ is only stated as a shorthand for the wide-ranging amount of Serbian nationalist propaganda.

Many authors stress the intensity of propaganda and its grip on media in Yugoslavia.

However, this still does not explain its effect. As the literature review concluded, the group level is deemed most appropriate for this analysis. Therefore, the elite level manipulation of the Milosevic propaganda campaign will form a baseline for the ideological framework of positive and negative myths that constitute Islamophobia or Nationalism, or both. This

propagandized baseline that existed shortly prior to the outbreak of the Bosnian civil war, is then deemed susceptible to propaganda of another elite level: the paramilitary leader.

Vojislav Seselj is a great example of a paramilitary leader who also campaigned and propagandized politically. The trial of Seselj has been most detailed, providing for a more extensive approach. To evaluate the effect of elite propaganda on group level ethnic violence, speech act and writings by Vojislav Seselj will be studied.

Anthony Oberschall (2006) has content analyzed Seselj's speeches and writings. As most of these sources are not available for the public, or are in Serbian language, I have retrieved all information from ICTY (International Court Tribunal of Yugoslavia) transcripts. Oberschall used a search engine to look for Serb-Croat and Serb-Muslim relations. However, by using a search engine, loss of context is unavoidable. For this thesis, the entire trial case of Seselj, starting from February 2003 and ending March 2016 has been read, in order to account for cross-examination of statements that eventually did not add up. Furthermore, although specific for my decision of using the ICTY transcripts, if a search engine had been used, it would not have picked up on leading questions by the prosecutor or accused.

The main limitation of the report of Oberschall, was that it could not directly show the direct effect of the propaganda by Seselj on paramilitary mobilization and instigation of ethnic violence. Oberschall's report on Seselj's propaganda was not significantly used in the prosecution of Seselj, as mere content analysis of speeches was deemed not sufficient enough in concluding whether Seselj actively instigated ethnic violence. Unfortunately, Oberschall was one of the first expert witnesses to occur in the trial case of Seselj, which meant that Oberschall had received no information prior to his content analysis of propaganda about the group level. This thesis was able to do so, as the ICTY records provide detailed transcripts of

the trial case, including witness, victim and volunteer interviews. Although integrity could be questioned, cross-examination of the witnesses and their statements happened frequently.

The research question can best be answered with a method of process tracing, as the research question is one with a mechanism-oriented approach. As Chandra (2006) explains, a mechanism-oriented approach is about a chain of micro-correlations that constitute the macro-correlation. The micro-correlations pave the way for a detailed way of tracing the process of elite level manipulation to group level ethnic violence against Muslims. It also does not force generalizability of the case in terms of outcome. Rather, it makes it possible to evaluate how microdynamics work in different cases of violence in civil war (Weidmann, 2011).

Analysis

Appendix A will provide the reader with information on Serb-Muslim relations in a Serbian ideological framework, according to Kaufman's (2017) systemic general theory that should encompass all elements of ethnic violence, together with a summary of the Milosevic propaganda campaign, which lends it self to further elite manipulation.

Appendix B contains nationalist propaganda of Seselj. Appendix C contains nationalist group-level violence against non-Serbs. Appendix D contains Islamophobic propaganda of Seselj. Appendix E contains Islamophobic group-level violence against Muslims.

Analysis of Nationalism: Positive Myths of Birth and Renewal

B1¹: June 1991, is an example of Seselj speech act calling for Serb unity and war against non-Serb enemies. Serb unity is a positive myth of Renewal.

B2: Seselj boosted the morale of Serb soldiers and his men by visiting them with speeches. This shows the connection Seselj had with the group-level.

B3: Seselj called for a homogenous unified “all Serbian lands”, by defining borders of the “Greater Serbia”, a positive myth of Birth and Renewal.

B4: (November 1991) Seselj addressed his volunteers in Vocin. Directly after, the volunteer units committed violence against Croats.

C3: After these meetings with volunteers, local witnesses noted that the volunteers became more aggressive and that crimes against Croat civilians increased.

B5: The volunteers were inspired by the tradition of Serbian Chetniks. The tradition was a nationalist one, of which the rethorics were mirrored in the volunteer group of Seselj.

C2: Volunteers followed the Chetnik tradition. Extreme Chetnik rethorics attracted criminals and violent men.

C5: Volunteer explains how he was inspired by Chetniks, and how he was familiar with the concept of a Greater Serbia. Media was one of the elements influencing his decision to volunteer.

¹ Referrals to appendixes and excerpts are shortened. For example, ‘B1’ refers to Appendix B, excerpt 1

B6: (September, 1993) Seselj talks about Serb innocence. The myths of Birth and Renewal focused on territory and innocence of demanding that territory, as it simply belonged to them.

B7: Seselj has been clear in wanting to create a unified Greater Serbia.

B8: Seselj in speeches referred to Serbian borders being the Karlobag line. WWII and Serb martyrdom and suffering were instrumentalized myths to instigate feelings of birthright and territorial rights. The map of that line is similar to that of the older Serbian Chetnik Movement, by which many Seselj volunteers were inspired (see B5). Seselj and his followers saw themselves as Chetnik successors, and wanted to continue with the “honourable patriotic traditions of the volunteers and Chetnicks of the Serbian liberation rebellions” (line 21-22). Here, heroism as part of positive nationalist myths is highlighted, as well as the birthright to a Greater Serbia.

C13: A volunteer explains how he wants to take back what is from Serbia, and is going for the people of Serbia.

B9: (17th April, 1991) Seselj speech highlights how it is Serbian land, and how it will stay their forever. It also mentions how ‘Serbian heads have rolled, struck down by the Ustasha hand in the Serbian Krajina’ (line 15-16). Then, revenge for the Serbian blood is instigated, of which the Audience answers: “we will” (line 19). This shows ideas of martyrdom and Serbia as a nation which belongs to them. Revenge-seeking at the group-level follows.

B10: (21st April, 1991) Highlighting Serbian territory, and how Serbs have been victims. The speech does not instigate violence against Croats, but does focus on how they should leave.

B11: (September 1991) Highlighting the goal of the Karlobag. If force is needed, then so be it.

C9: Volunteers explain how Serbian people must live free in the Karlobag territory, and ‘clean up with the Croats’ (line 24). The speech and volunteers are seeking a Greater Serbian state, while getting rid of non-Serbs if necessary.

B12: (1991) The Serbian cause is in danger, due to Ustasha attacks. The Ustasha are attempting to ‘finalise the genocide of the Serbian nation.’ (lines 16-17). This speech refers back to Serbian martyrdom, and instills fear that the Serbian nation might be attacked.

B13 (1991): Seselj calls for revenge of Serb deaths, implies that Ustasha are attempting a Serb genocide. Similar to B12, Seselj refers to Serbian martyrdom, but this time calls for revenge.

B14 (May 1991): Seselj connects the entirety of Croatian people to being Ustasha, again referring back to times that instigate feelings of fear and Serbian martyrdom.

B15 (1991): Seselj highlights the heroism of the ones defending Serbdom, and how Chetniks will help them. These leaders at the frontlines are framed as heroes of the Serbian will, and that Chetniks want to follow their footsteps as ‘their forebears’ (line 2). Positive myths of Renewal and birthright in the form of heroism are the focus.

B16 (1991): Seselj highlights the threat the Serbian people are up against, namely the ‘crazed Ustasha beast’ (line 9).

B17: (July 25, 1991): Seselj states that ‘Yugoslavia is only possible under a Serb dominance (line 7). He also states that ‘there should be no concessions’ (line 14-15).

B18 (July 25, 1991): Seselj says that no-Serbs should also be able to live peacefully. But they should not question the territory of Serbia and its integrity. In this sense, Seselj does not instigate direct ethnic violence in the name of nationalism.

B19 (May 13, 1993): Seselj here states that Croats and Muslims are not a threat at the moment, but Serbs should be ready for a strike, and strike back.

B20 (April 14, 1992): They call for unity of Serbian territory and a Greater Serbia .

B21: In Seselj’s book the Croats are described as cruel, as bloodthirsty, as barbaric and “a blind tool of the Vatican” (lines 24-25). Again, Seselj is instilling fear of non-Serbs.

B22 (1991): Seselj stated that there might be a genocide against the Serbs by Croats. If Croats would go away, Croatia would be the right of the Serbs. Seselj instills fear and refers to Serbian martyrdom and how the Croatian territory is a Serbian right.

B23 (1991): Seselj described Chetniks as patriots, and Croats as Ustashas.

C6: Derogatory terms and nationalist heroic feelings were present at both group level and propaganda level.

B24 (1991): Seselj warned for the Ustashas and threat of genocide of Serbs.

C7: a witness tells how he/she was warned of the danger of Ustasha, as vampires, committing genocide. The witness felt like doing something to protect Serbia. But it was not that speech alone that made the witness to volunteer.

B25: Seselj states that the territory belongs to Serbs.

B26: Due to cross-examination, it is known that Seselj, in certain speeches, ordered to fight with chivalry and behave humanely. Direct instigation of ethnic violence was absent.

B27: The Serbian borders identified by Seselj, were focused on including historical Serbian graves, massacre sites and suffering within its own territory. This refers to historic Serbian martyrdom, and how Serbia as a state will always exist.

B28: The Serbian Chetnik Movements has many similarities with the movement of Seselj: a “Greater Serbia”, by restoration of Serbian borders, distressed by World War II, where Serbs were the victims. This is a positive myth Renewal, by restoring Serbian borders, referring back to WWII Serb martyrdom and the non-Serbs as perpetrators.

B29 (1994): Seselj highlights how the Kingdom of Serbia is the only state that “can be the legal successor of Yugoslavia” (line 25).

B30: Cross-examination shows how Seselj’s speech focused on avoiding civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that even though he wanted victory, he wished for peace where there was no war. He was not instigating ethnic violence.

B31: Volunteers and Vojvodas were inspired by Serb nationalism. They felt the necessity to protect Serbs from Turks and Ustashas, being derogatory terms for Muslims and Croats.

C8: An SRS volunteer group talks of a Serbian uprising against Ustasha and balijs

C14, C15: Victims were made to sing Chetnik songs. Their 'balijs and Ustasha mothers' (line 23) were cursed, and swore at Turkish mothers.

B32: Units who liquidated Ustashas as 'units could serve as a model to all those defending Serbdom' (line 25). They were valued for defending the Serbian people and territory.

B33: Seselj visited Sarajevo, supporting the 'liberation struggle of the Serbian people' (line 10-11). Seselj stresses the power of Serbia, the belief in the Serbian cause and the goal of a Greater Serbia unification.

B34: This shows how leaders including Seselj kept repeating the threat to Serbia. That they would be exterminated by Muslims and Croats (line 7-8). They repeated: "All Serbs in a single state" (line 21). Seselj represented himself as a defender of Serbia, a chaser of Serbian unity.

B35: Seselj told on television that Serb patriots should be defending Serbian people.

C4: A volunteer explained how she saw on television what was happening and how helping was worth the sacrifice of life. by defending 'Serbia of ours' (line 24).

C10: volunteer explains how their motto was patriotism and freedom for Serbian people and defending its land, its children and mothers. Heroism and martyrdom were instigated through speeches.

B36 (6 May 1992): Seselj called for Croat eviction. Right after the speech, the SRS and Chetniks started ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs. This shows the direct effect of speech and ethnic violence.

B37: It is not sure whether Seselj also sang these songs.

C11: Victims were made to learn and sing Chetnick songs while being hit.

C12: Nationalist Serb symbolism was spread and was a tool of ethnic violence.

Although some instances show the direct effect of Seselj nationalist propaganda on the ethnic violence that followed, many instances of ethnic violence seem to be a result of the Milosevic propaganda campaign as a whole. In this sense, Seselj's propaganda was merely an echo, present in an echo chamber of nationalist propaganda that already existed. However, the appearances and speeches of Seselj that focused on certain territories, did activate ethnic violence in those specific territories, or at least mobilization of volunteers through positive myths of Birth and Renewal due to feelings of heroism, martyrdom and entitlement of the territory.

Analysis of Islamophobia: Negative Myths of Fall and Persecution

D1: Seselj does not want the Muslims to have a nation status. If they would seek that, they would be expelled to Anatolia., which is a reference to the ottoman empire and 'Turks'.

E9: Cursing at Turkish mothers, and how they should "Go back, go back" (line 16).

E13: If they were not loyal, they would be sent back to Turkey. Bijeljina was to stay ethnically pure. The degenerateness of Muslims is highlighted here, as a myth of Fall (by referral to the ottoman empire and ‘Turks’) and Persecution.

D2 (March 1992, Zvornik), Seselj addresses his Chetnik brothers as brave. He calls muslims pagans, and how they will show them to the East, as they do not belong in Bosnia.

E1: Shows how in Zvornik, civilians were attacked. They also forced victims to make a cross sign as blessing, and saying Our Father. They had to pray to God, not Allah, because they were Serbs. Negative myths of Fall and Persecution are mirrored here, as Seselj highlights how Muslims do not belong in Zvornik. The Islamic faith is not accepted at the group level.

D3 (Bosanski Samac): the destruction of mosques is not a strategic necessity.

E10: All muslims were gone, yet they felt the need to destroy the mosque.

E14: There was no combat anymore, yet they destroyed the mosques.

E16: Destroying mosques and churches was a tit for tat not necessarily instigated by Seselj. These excerpts show an apparent specific animosity towards the Islamic faith, as such ethnic violence was not strategic.

D4: cartoon depicts the swiping away from mosques.

E2: This shows the animosity towards the Islamic faith, and mocks mosques.

E3: This shows animosity towards Islamic symbolism by cutting off the symbol of moon and star.

E5: Again the violent removal of Islamic symbolism occurs at the group level.

D5: Discourse of radio and television as analysis of Seselj speech act shows that Muslims were called many derogatory terms that also depicted them as a threat. Here, the Fall myth is highlighted by Seselj in relation to Muslims as a threat.

D6: Vojvodas, created against the Ottoman Empire, were armed Christians and Serbs. ‘They were military chiefs of irregular armed units’ (page 2869, line 1). The men of Seselj, including Seselj and other commanders or leaders could also be upgraded to being a ‘Vojvoda’ for being brave. Vojvodas refer back to the Ottoman Empire of which Serbs fell victim. Heroes would stand up against Muslims.

D7: Seselj states that the Muslim nation is a fake nation. This is also a negative myth, as it is argued through the fakeness of the Muslim nation, that they could have never experienced a Fall like Serbia had.

D8: Seselj speaks of Muslims as actually being Serbs of the Islamic faith. Those Serbs have fallen, and should be rescued from the Islamic faith, again, a negative myth of Fall and Persecution.

D9: Radio reported that Arkan’s and Sesel’s men freed Bijeljina from Muslims. Here again, propaganda portrays the Muslims as the perpetrators of violence, and how Bijeljina does not belong to Muslims.

D10: Seselj called muslims ‘balijas and Turks’ and that they should be hit by the Serb brothers. Leaving nothing alive.

E8: volunteers killed muslims, cursed their balija mothers, that all of them should be killed.

E11: He was 'shot at only because he was a Muslim' (line 8).

E12: The men were hit and called Turks.

E17: They were cursed for their balija mothers, that they would be slaughtered, and are guilty of being Muslim.

D11: Croats and Serbs should throw all Muslims into a river. Here, ethnic violence is instigated.

D12: Seselj called his men Chetniks, and they called Seselj hero. He wants to give Balijas 'tit for tat' (line 8-9). And that the Drina river is from the Serbian state, not a boundary. Seselj called the muslims Turks and Balijas, and wanted to show them "the green transversal, the direction to the east" (line 17).

E15: A victim received a letter from Chetniks, being called Turk, and addressing a tit for tat. Here, propaganda instils the need for revenge, for the Fall that Serbia has experienced due to 'the Turks and balijas'.

D13: Propaganda on television told her that Muslims would kill all men and that women would be sex slaves in harems, to make Muslim babies. She was not afraid of neighbouring Muslims, but the Muslims from television.

E6: Another witness of television propaganda was tricked into volunteering to go to Zvornik, as they said that the Serbs there were in danger from the Muslims.

E4: The syndrome as described by someone who threw a grenade towards a mosque, shows in-war revenge seeking.

E7: This excerpt shows in war revenge seeking as well. Anti-animosity increases, and the other way around.

The last two excerpts show an important limitation of analysis: in-war revenge seeking. Not all ethnic violence can be accounted to propaganda. It is a regular occurrence in war, that one seeks revenge for what the other has done to them during war.

Furthermore, some excerpts show how Seselj's speeches do not call for violence against Non-Serbs, while other Seselj speeches do instigate violence, such as throwing all Muslims in a river. What can be concluded from the analysis on Islamophobia, is that the repeating of derogatory terms by Seselj did travel down to the level of his volunteers, as well as fear from Muslims. Unfortunately, many victims do not recall exact dates of speeches, which makes it hard to pinpoint and correlate speech acts with ethnic violence. However, volunteer accounts do show how they were inspired by Seselj's Islamophobic propaganda.

Conclusion

It will remain difficult to answer the research question due to multiple issues. Although trial transcripts are detailed, they cannot provide sequential information to a sufficient extent. Still, the group-level and its ethnic violence has served as a connecting point of reciprocal Islamophobia between elite level propaganda and individual level feelings of resentment, fear, and anger. Referring to Figure 1, the processes of nationalist and Islamophobic propaganda, its ideological framework and the desires were visible on the elite level, the group level, and even the individual level in some instances. Islamophobic propaganda

cannot be entirely isolated from nationalist propaganda, as they reinforce each other. Further research on the reciprocal mechanism of Islamophobic propaganda and preexisting anti-Muslim frameworks, might be best studied with sources that are more primary and closer to the instigators of ethnic violence against Muslims, and translated by experts. By studying more closely the exact effects of propaganda, prosecution can be made less complicated, as 'instigation of violence' is still a vague concept. Furthermore, studying propaganda in a more detailed manner during civil war, can possibly make (mass) ethnic violence more foreseeable, and more open to international intervention.

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APPENDIX A: IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

This ideological framework will establish the pre-existing framework of negative and positive myths that lend themselves to elite manipulation. An example of mythology applicable to the case of the Bosnian civil war, is symbolism of the battle of Kosovo Field.

This battle is symbolized as an instance of Serbian victimhood and sacrifice, and heroism and defense of Christendom against the Turks. Symbolisms such as the Kosovo battle, become a recurring myth, invoked or recycled in order to instigate certain emotions related to that myth (King, 2001). The emotions that such myths instigate, can for example be resentment, which ultimately lead to violence against Muslims (Petersen, 2002).

Political Security Dilemma and Economic Hardship

One of the major issues of fear and resentment came from feelings of political and hierarchical unjust. In 1970 the 'Islamic Declaration: A Programme of the Islamisation of Muslims and Muslim Peoples' was written by Izetbegovic. It entailed that the realization of an Islamic order was so important, that it could not be voted out by anyone. 20 years later, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) by Izbetgovic had become a pioneer Islam-oriented party in Yugoslavia, after the second World War. Dominance was not its apparent goal, but gaining a certain amount of power did seem to be one goal (Petersen, 2002). As the goal of a Greater Serbia by Serbian nationalism erupted, before that, the SDA already had the goal of a greater Muslim area. This would be Bosnia and Herzegovina together with Sandjak, with the Muslims as majority. Due to the SDA's successes in elections after the Yugoslavia break up, losing political status as Serbs was a real threat. It felt unjust, as the Bosnian Muslims were not even a nation before 1968, as opposed to the Serbs and Croats. This feeling of unjust turned into resentment, especially due to the history of the Ottoman empire and its Islamic

conversion of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina it brought about. To have a status beneath them seemed disgracing (Petersen, 2002). This threat against status was not an irrational fear by the Serbs. The SDA preferred there to be in majority as a Muslim nation, and the Islamic Declaration by Izetbegovic fuelled the hazardous image of the Bosnian Muslims. The majority of the Serbs were not keen to approve of a Muslim majority (Petersen, 2011). However, this threat, being politically there, has been exaggerated and transferred to the military realm. Serbs have dominated for a long time both in the political and military realm, and ultimately have been the majority in the police, in political institutions, and in the military. Still, Serbian dominance had been in danger before, as Bosnian Muslims worked together with the Nazis in the Second World War as well as some Croats. Furthermore, there had been a decrease in demographic make-up in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Serbs dropped 12 percent while Muslims rose 18 percent as population. Economically, the political and demographic changes of status would also indicate economical problems. As the economy was declining, scarcity would mean that such status would be paramount against economic hardship. Whereas Serbs used to dominate, the decline of the economy would pose a problem when power would not be in the centralized hands of the Serbs anymore (Mann, 2004).

Greater Serbia

Fear and resentment were not the only elements of the ideological frameworks of Serbs. Some aimed for more than fairness and economic and political safety. Some aimed for a "Greater Serbia". 1990 elections resulted in nationalist leader dominance that would seek such a Greater Serbia, especially by highlighting the hardship under communist rule (Mann, 2004).

The Islamic Threat

Shortly before the Bosnian civil war, increased Serbian nationalism evolved into specifically identifying a global imminent Muslim threat, by instrumentalizing an idea of Muslim fundamentalism. This instrumentalization did not make sense with what happened historically, and what the Serb-Muslim relations were like throughout history (Petersen, 2002).

In relation to the historic precedents of Islamic conversion, some believe that Serbs committed violence against Muslims from a point of Christoslavism. In this sense, Muslims are not a threat but rather traitors. Slavs are historically Christian and should remain Christian. The Slavs that converted, being the Bosnian Muslims, were traitors and may get rid of (Petersen, 2002).

Ancient Hatred and Heroism

Some Serbs or Serbian propaganda stuck to a wider idea of ancient divide. For example, World War II and the Kosovo Battle were greatly highlighted as instances of Serbian martyrdom and heroism. Such heroism was often produced in recycled myths. For instance, nationalists reproduced a myth of a heroic Serb overthrow by Turks, which became education material in Serbia. Later on, more recycled stories would be produced on the atrocities that the Ustashas and Muslim Sandzak committed against the Serbs (Mann, 2004).

Milosevic Propaganda Campaign

As Kaufman (2017) has highlighted, all elements and explanations of theories that seek to understand the Yugoslav conflict, should be combined as they all explain part of the story. As ancient hatred, the (political) security dilemma, economic hardship, the Islamic threat and the idea of a 'Greater Serbia' have been summarized, one remains: elite level manipulation. This

elite level propaganda baseline will be summarized through negative myths (fall and persecution) and positive myths (birth and renewal) in relation to the Islamic faith and nationalism.

Positive myths of birth and renewal relate, in Milosevic propaganda campaign, to the broader nationalistic idea of a 'Greater Serbia', where the Serbs are the holy ones, chosen by God to exist as a nation. History was recycled and instrumentalized, to instigate feelings of Serbian heroism and martyrdom. This also highlighted the argument that Bosnia and Herzegovina was never from Muslims, but either from the Serbs or Croats (MacDonald, 2003). Important here is that nationalist myths of birth and renewal were more about territory, and not necessarily the Islamic faith. Nationalist positive myths pushed the idea that Bosnia and Herzegovina belonged to the Serbs, which should be regained and renewed as a Serbian place (MacDonald, 2003). Positive myths of birth and renewal highlighted the territories that were of ancient Serbia, which should be regained and renewed (De La Brosse et al., 2015)

Negative myths of Fall and Persecution relating to the mechanism Islamophobia, highlight the fall of Serbs by falling victim to Muslims. There is some interconnectedness between the positive and negative myths, as the negative myth of victimhood refuels the idea of a 'Greater Serbia', to protect oneself against the Muslims and regain power. Furthermore, some nationalists argued Bosnian Muslims to be fallen victims of the Ottoman Empire as well, and that they needed to be 'saved'. However, this often seemed to be an outward justification of what most call ethnic cleansing that still happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Still, the majority of nationalist propaganda thought negatively of Muslims, and framed them as being traitors, as a faux nation constructed by Tito and the Muslims, or as an international imminent threat in the form of Islamic conspiracy. Being a faux nation, they could never have suffered

a Fall like the Serbians did. Another specific negative myth against Muslims was that they were weaker due to their community practices. Their idea of collectiveness was seen as denigrate compared to harsher nationalistic ideals. Negative myths instigated fear of Muslims, as propaganda framed stories of Serbs slaughtered by Muslims, and heroic stories of standing up against them. Milosevic and other politicians circled around a biblical symbol of Christendom, where the Islamic faith is symbolized as Goliath, and the Serbs are the heroic David who is here to save men from the Muslims. The Serbs defended Europe from another Ottoman invasion (MacDonald, 2003).

All ICTY transcripts were retrieved from the official website of the International Court Tribunal of Yugoslavia: <https://www.icty.org/en/case/seselj>. Case Number: IT-03-67

APPENDIX B: NATIONALIST PROPAGANDA SESELJ

Excerpt 1

THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL AGAINST VOJISLAV SESELJ.

INDICTMENT. Retrieved from: <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/ind/en/ses-ii030115e.pdf>

February 2003

Page 9

21 In June 1991, he was

22 elected a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. In almost

23 daily rallies and election campaigns, he called for Serb unity and war

24 against Serbia's historic enemies, namely the ethnic Croat Muslim and

25 Albanian populations within the territories of the former Yugoslavia.

Excerpt 2

THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL AGAINST VOJISLAV SESELJ.

INDICTMENT. Retrieved from: <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/ind/en/ses-ii030115e.pdf>

February 2003

Page 42

6 Vojislav Seselj visited Bosnia and Herzegovina before and during

7 the period of the armed conflict to boost the morale of the participants.

8 In October 1991, he visited Serb soldiers in Trebinje gathered in

9 preparation for the attack on Dubrovnik. In May and August 1992, he

10 visited Gacko and Zvornik respectively. In May 1993, he gave a speech in

11 Banja Luka.

12 In September 1993, Vojislav Seselj had a conflict with Slobodan

13 Milosevic during which he challenged Milosevic's leadership and called for

14 a vote of no confidence in the government of Serbia. Between October and

Excerpt 3

2005 October 03

page 435

10 9. Vojislav Seselj, as President of the SRS, was a prominent
11 political figure in the SFRY/FRY in the time period relevant to this
12 indictment. He propagated a policy of uniting "all Serbian lands" in a
13 homogenous Serbian state. He defined the so-called
14 Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitca line as the western border of this new
15 Serbian state (which he called the "Greater Serbia") which included
16 Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and considerable parts of Croatia and
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Excerpt 4

2005 October 03

page 443

In November 1991 Vojislav Seselj visited Vocin and
19 addressed the volunteers. Incited by Vojislav Seselj's speeches, the
20 volunteer units, in particular ""Seselj's men,"" started burning houses
21 of Croat citizens and killing Croat civilians in the villages of Vocin,
22 Hum, Bokane, and Kraskovic until their withdrawal from the region on
23 13 December 1991. They went from house to house and killed whomever they
24 found, in total 43 civilians.

Excerpt 5

2005 October 03

Page 848

1 people, following in the tradition of the Serbian Chetniks."

5 The SRS/SCP volunteers, in fact, considered him to be their

6 commander.

25 up a party army that pursued this course brutally. Through his extreme

Page 849

1 rhetorics, the accused attracted many young men who volunteered and became

2 part of the thousands of SRS volunteers who participated in the conflict

3 in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of them undisciplined, violent

4 and even criminal.

Excerpt 6

2005 October 03

Page 852

8 "And in a Radio B-92 interview, on the 30th of September, 1993,"

9 and I refer here to Exhibit 772, "a listener asks whether Seselj ever

10 worries about the non-Serbian population that is innocent and suffering

11 due to his views, and Seselj answers: 'Why would I have a guilty

12 conscience? So many innocent Serbs suffered in this war, and I need to

13 worry about those who belong to another enemy people, if possibly there

14 was an innocent one among them that suffered. You know, in war one

15 experiences great turmoil, great troubles, and I, in war, above all, worry

16 about those who belong to my own people.'"

Excerpt 7

2005 October 03

Page 853

24 Vojislav Seselj left no doubt about what his goal was at the
25 beginning of the conflict. It was a homogeneous Greater Serbia

Excerpt 8

2005 October 03

page 856

9 Vojislav Seselj, in his many speeches, referred to the western
10 borders of the Serbian state as the Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica
11 line.

15 The accused and his associates did not only claim territory in
16 which Serbs constituted the majority population, but also areas such as
17 Dubrovnik and other locations in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina where
18 Serbs were in a minority. To this end, the Serb suffering during the
19 Second World War was utilised by the accused and others not only to instil
20 fear in the Serb people, but also to revoke a birthright to certain
21 so-called historical lands.

22 The accused himself, during the testimony in the Milosevic case,
23 and I refer here to transcript 437 -- 43275, said the following:

24 "The SRS made a geographical map of Greater Serbia, and from that
25 map, which we published countless times on the cover page of the colour

Page 857

1 back side of our magazine, one can say that the western borders of the
2 Greater Serbia is on the Karlobag-Ogulin-Virovitica line. That does not
3 contain only territories where Serbs are in the majority. It contains
4 also many territories where Croats, Macedonians and Muslims are majority
5 populations."

6 Not accidentally is the map with the

7 Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line very similar to the territories
8 of the old Serbian Chetnik -- that the old Serbian Chetnik Movement
9 pursued before during the First and the Second World War.
15 The accused and his followers saw themselves as successors of this
16 old Serbian Nationalist Movement. In relation to the volunteers of the
17 SRS, a document, "Basic Military Organs of the Serbian Radical Party
18 Volunteers," you'll see here, adopted by the SRS Main Board in June 1991.
20 "The volunteers of the Serbian Radical Party are continuing the
21 honourable patriotic traditions of the volunteers and Chetniks of the
22 Serbian liberation rebellions, uprisings and wars until the end of 1918;
23 Chetnik organisation 1902-1918; and Serbian Chetniks in World War II ..."

Excerpt 9

2006 November 28

page 900

1 taken on the 17th of April, 1991, at a place called Plitvice, in Croatia.

2 This is Prosecution Exhibit 3155.

3 [Videotape played]

4 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

5 "JOURNALIST: In such an atmosphere, vojvoda Seselj announced

6 already at the beginning of the meeting, started his speech.

7 AUDIENCE: Voja! Voja! Serbia! Serbia! Serbia! Serbia!

8 Serbia! Serbia!

9 VOJISLAV SESELJ: Here Serbian people live, this is Serbian land

10 and it will remain Serbian forever.

11 AUDIENCE: That's right! That's right!

12 JOURNALIST: Instead of calming then down, Seselj sent a message

13 to the gathered people at the end.

14 VOJISLAV SESELJ: We are sending a message to the new Ustasha head
15 of state and Ustasha regime in Croatia: Serbian heads have rolled, struck
16 down by the Ustasha hand in the Serbian Krajina. A Serbian head has
17 rolled down in Serbian Western Srem and Slavonia, as well - we will avenge
18 Serbian blood.

19 AUDIENCE: We will."

Excerpt 10

2006 November 18

page 901

3 This next video clip was made on the 21st of April, 1991, and it
4 shows the accused speaking in the town of Jagodnjak, in Croatia.

5 [Videotape played]

6 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "As far as we are concerned, the
7 Croats can leave Yugoslavia any time they want, but we are letting them
8 know openly that they will not take an inch of Serbian territory, not a
9 piece of land on which there are Serbian villages, demolished churches,
10 caves in which Serbs were butchered, Serbian camps, Serbian killing
11 fields, such as Jasenovac. Should we permit that, we would be unworthy of
12 our glorious ancestors and shamed before our descendants. The Croats may
13 create their new state, but only to the west of the
14 Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line. Everything to the east of that
15 line ..."

Excerpt 11

2006 November 28

Page 903

4 Prosecution Exhibit 747. It shows the accused speaking before the Serbian
5 parliament in September 1991.

6 [Videotape played]

7 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica
8 has to be our goal, and that is the border where the army has to withdraw
9 its troops. If the army is unable to move its troops from Zagreb to this
10 line without a fight, then they should do this with force and with the
11 bombing of Zagreb. The army still has capacities which it has not yet
12 used. If its troops are endangered, it has the right to use napalm bombs
13 and anything else they have available in their warehouses. We cannot play
14 games here. It is more important to save one army unit than to worry if
15 there will be some accidental victims. Who is to blame here? They wanted
16 war. Now they have it."

Excerpt 12

2006 November 28

Page 906

10 This was originally part of the BBC documentary "The Death of
11 Yugoslavia," and it shows the accused speaking in front of the Federal
12 Assembly in Belgrade during the summer of 1991.

13 [Videotape played]

14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] The very roots of the Serbian cause
15 are under threat. Hoards of Ustashas are attacking Serbian villages,
16 Serbian women and children. The Ustasha hordes are trying to finalise the
17 genocide of the Serbian nation."

Excerpt 13

2006 November 28

Page 908

15 the accused's speech in Jagodnjak, Croatia, in April 1991.

16 [Videotape played]

17 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] The new Ustasha chief and Josip

18 Broz's general Franjo Tudjman, and the new Ustasha government in Croatia

19 have again put the kama under its throat. Should they attempt a new

20 genocide against the Serb people, we say to them we shall take revenge for

21 each Serb life and we shall also ask to pay up for past crimes ... also

22 for crimes in recent history. No deed will be unpunished. And we will

23 not allow ..."

Excerpt 14

2006 November 28

Page 909

4 The next exhibit is from 569 and it's part of the interview that

5 the accused gave to a magazine called "On" on the 24th of May, 1991. The

6 accused said on that day, among other things, "How is one supposed to

7 negotiate with the Ustasas? Did you see today that the Croatian people

8 are entirely Ustasha? There are very few exceptions."

Excerpt 15

2006 November 28

Page 909

14 This next exhibit that you will see in front of you is from

15 Prosecution Exhibit 1836. It's an excerpt from an article that was

16 published in the newspaper of the Serbian Radical Party, Velika Serbia,
17 No. 10, from 1991, and it records the accused saying, with respect to the
18 Croatian Serbs:

19 "We greet their heroic leader, Milan Babic, who is in the front
20 lines of the defence of Serbdom, whose intelligence and courage have
21 placed him amongst the greatest sons of the Serbian people. And we would
22 tell him that thousands of Chetniks will jump to his aid every time he
23 seeks help. We also greet the SDS of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its clever
24 leader, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, who stood in the front lines in the defence
25 of national interests through the will of the Serbian people. We would

Page 910

1 tell them all that they will not stand alone as long as Serbian Chetniks
2 are ready to follow the glorious example of their forebears."

Excerpt 16

2007 December 11

Page 1983

8 "It is the
9 obligation of all Serbs to help defend from the crazed Ustasha beast."
16 "The Serbian people are existentially endangered. Then the new Ustasha
17 leader and Tito General, Tudjman, has unsheathed an Ustasha Kama and put
18 it under the Serbian people's throat."
20 "Serbian men and women over there are trying to save their bare
21 lives,"

Excerpt 17

2007 December 11

Page 1987

23 This is 65 ter exhibit number 6021. The date is July
24 25, 1991. And it is a television interview aired on TV Politika.
25 This corresponds with example number 51.

Page 1988

1 [Videotape played]
2 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Look, under Tito, Yugoslavia was an
3 artificial state. It was a grotesque and imposed construct. It will
4 never exist like that again. It could be like that only under the
5 communist dictatorship. In actual conditions, those who are bigger and
6 stronger will dominate. That is the way it is in the whole world. The
7 next Yugoslavia is only possible under a Serb domination.

Page 1990

10 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] [Previous translation continues] ...
11 Live together in one state, provided that this state is democratic. And I
12 believe that finally all the Serbs have come to realize that. As for our
13 western borders, they stretch along the line
14 Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Vitrovica, and I think there should be no
15 concessions there.

Excerpt 18

2007 December 11

Page 1997

14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] I still haven't answered the other
15 question, how I see the peoples that comprise today's Serbia. Serbia
16 today is comprised of the Serbian peoples, and national minorities also
17 live in Serbia. In my opinion, they need to enjoy all civil rights and

18 full freedom, full civil equality on the condition that they do nothing to
19 bring into question the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
20 Serbian state; that is to say, provided that they act as loyal citizens of
21 the country in which they live. Those who bring into question the
22 sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Serb state, like the majority
23 of Siptars do, will not have a place within the borders of present-day
24 Serbia.

Excerpt 19

2007 December 12

page 2058

12 this is dated May 13, 1993, produced by

13 Srpska Radio Television. And it's a report on the Serbian Radical Party

14 leadership visiting Banja Luka.

15 [Videotape played]

16 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] There are no borders among Serbs, as

17 was said. There are no frontiers, as was said in Banja Luka. The

18 Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina are the pride of all

19 Serbdom. The Serbian people west of Drina is a victor in the battlefield

20 and cannot lose the battle at the green negotiating table, as their

21 enemies and foreign agents would desire. The Drina will never be a

22 border, since the Drina is a river running through the centre of Serbia,

23 said Vojvoda Seselj.

24 Drina will never be the border. Drina is a river running through

25 the centre of Serbia. Muslims and Croats do not represent a threat to us

Page 2059

1 for a long time already. Only brothers and sisters Serbs, there should be

2 no hesitating, waiting, or truce. The next time they strike, we should
3 finish them off so they never strike back again.

Excerpt 20

2007 December 12

Page 2060

4 Q. Let me show you another speech. This one is from April 14, 1992.

5 It is clip B from 65 ter number 6058.

6 [Videotape played]

7 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] We, the Serbian radicals, swear once
8 again here before you that we will not allow the Drina to be the border,
9 that Drina will be the river running through the centre of Serbia.

10 Brothers and sisters Serbs, with joint forces, with our harmony and unity,
11 we will unite the Serbian territories and create a Greater Serbia. And
12 now, Serbian brothers and sisters, let's go peacefully and proudly to the
13 Serbian Drina, to the Sepacki Bridge.

14 And at the end we have to say the people were today honoured to be
15 protected at the Drina Bridge by strong police forces. Truly a real
16 people's police.

Excerpt 21

2007 December 12

Page 2204

16 Q. Could you please read the characterisations of Mr. Seselj in his
17 subchapters and then comment in the coding analysis

19 A. Well, here -- here are the subchapters' titles: "Europe horrified
20 by the Croat's bloodthirstiness," "Incredible criminal effluence of the

21 Croatian mindset creates as a paradigm of cruelty," "Croatian barbarity in
22 folk songs," "Croatian massacre -- massacres in Ham [phoen]," "Croatian
23 history abounds with savagery, robbery and murder as a primordial feature
24 of the Croatian national character," "Croats as a blind tool of the
25 Vatican," "The bestial urges of the Croatian ethnic being."

Excerpt 22

2008 January 15

Page 2311

13 Q. Do you -- have you ever heard speeches by Mr. Seselj during 1991?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What were the subjects of the speeches you heard from Mr. Seselj?

16 A. In 1991, Mr. Seselj held many speeches. He held many speeches in

17 his political career. In 1991 he explained - how can I put this

18 briefly? - that there might again be a genocide against the Serbs. He

19 spoke of the separation of Croatia, the status of the Serbs in Croatia.

20 That was it in general.

21 Q. Are you familiar with a concept called Greater Serbia?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What is it?

24 A. What it is exactly, I don't know, but I do know that it was one of
25 the standpoints in the programme of the Serbian Radical Party.

Page 2312

20 A. What did he say? Well, everybody knows what he said. He said
21 that the Serbs were imperilled, that the new Croatian authorities did not
22 have good intentions as regards the Serbs, that if the Croats were leaving
23 Yugoslavia, the Serbs in Croatia had the right to remain in Yugoslavia.

Excerpt 23

2008 January 15

Page 3224

15 Q. And how did he describe Chetniks?

16 A. Chetniks, in a word: Patriots.

page 2338

10 Q. Did he refer to Croats by the name of Ustasha?

11 A. Yes, we referred to them by that name as well.

Excerpt 24

2008 January 16

Page 2440

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can say - I can't quote him - but

14 I can say how I felt after hearing Mr. Seselj's speech and what I

15 thought. That's how I can best describe what he said. As a listener, he

16 warned me of the danger of the resurrected Ustasha - I'm using my own

17 words now, Your Honour - who had risen like vampires from the grave. He

18 spoke of the threat of a new genocide. He said we were under threat, that

19 there were actual situations which had already led to murders and

20 expulsions.

Page 2441

1 simply, listening to his speeches at the time, I came to understand

2 certain matters in my own way.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is your recollection?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was in 1991.

Excerpt 25

2008 January 16

Page 2451

6 Q. And what are the political borders that Mr. Seselj was advocating?

7 A. They're not political borders, they're state borders, territorial

8 borders. Maybe it was interpreted as political borders. It was Serbia,

9 Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, parts of Dalmatia, Lika, Banja,

10 Kordun, Western Srem. He explained this by mentioning the

11 Karlobag-Karlovac-Ogulin-Virovitica line. I am not sure I remember it

12 correctly, but that was the ethnic territory Dr. Seselj believed belonged

13 to us Serbs.

Excerpt 26

2008 January 22

Page 2592 (on speech Vukovar)

13 Did I say at the front line, Fight like heroes, but show chivalry,

14 behaving humanely towards prisoners, civilians on the other side, women

15 and children like the Serb Knights did through history? Was that roughly

16 what I was saying?

17 A. I am aware of such speeches of yours. Now, literally whether it
18 was in that order, well, I wouldn't mind saying that that's the way it
19 was.

Excerpt 27

2008 January 29

Page 2929

10 Q. And I'm referring to the paragraph that begins: "We Serbs in

11 Yugoslavia must define our national goals ..."

12 "We Serbs in Yugoslavia must define our national goals, our

13 national programme, and the borders of our state, while allowing our

14 supposed northern brothers, the Croats and the Slovenes, can express

15 themselves in full freedom whether they want to live in such a state or

16 not. The Serbian people is not a priori opposed to the existence of

17 Yugoslavia. I'm deeply convinced that the Serbian people is in favour of

18 the existence of Yugoslavia, but it does not want Yugoslavia at any price.

19 "It only wants a Yugoslavia whose frontiers would respect the

20 borders of Serbian statehood, as guaranteed by the Treaty of London.

22 Therefore, should a federal Yugoslavia remain in existence, the Serbian
23 federal unit should comprise within its borders not only the current
24 territory of Serbia and the current provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and
25 Metohija, but Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dubrovnik,

Page 2930

1 Dalmatia, Lika, Banija, Kordun, Eastern Slavonia, and Baranja.

2 "These borders are not guaranteed by the Treaty of London but were
3 drawn by Ante Pavelic during World War II. He drew them with Serbian
4 graves, Serbian mass burials, Serbian suffering, camps, massacre sites,
5 and pits, and I think that the Serbian people must on no account allow a
6 single Serbian mass grave to remain outside the borders of the Serbian
7 state."

Excerpt 28

2008 January 30

Page 2968

14 A. The programme of the Serbian Chetnik Movement envisaged the
15 restoration of Serbia within ethnic borders, and this would include

16 Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dubrovnik, Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banja,

17 Slavonia, the region of Baranja. Therefore, roughly speaking the

18 territories that were affected during the Second World War, that is where

19 the Serbs were victimised in the regions, that is the military borders,

20 the Krajinas, which included Lika, Kordun, Banja.

21 Q. Would you compare, please, the party programme of the

22 Serbian Chetnik Movement with regard to the creation of Greater Serbia?

Page 2969

2 A. It is perhaps more precise regarding the definition of

3 territories, but globally the two movements envisaged the same thing, that

4 is the creation of a Greater Serbia. The Serbian Renewal Movement placed

5 greater emphasis on the Serb victims during the Second World War, which

6 would later on be done also by the Serbian Chetnik Movement.

Excerpt 29

2008 January 30

Page 2989

13 This was published in a book he wrote with

14 the title "Brankovic came out of his grave," published in 1994.

15 This is a rather lengthy text written by Mr. Seselj himself, and

16 it seems to say the following -- with your help, I would like to

17 understand what he meant to say.

18 His premise was that Yugoslavia had stopped existing and ceased to

19 exist, and he added "Only Serbia will remain." So this sentence conveys

20 the impression that the Yugoslav state, as it existed at -- ceased to

21 exist since Slovenia had become independent and Croatia was on the

22 horizon, and he added this: "Serbia will remain. The Kingdom of

23 Yugoslavia is the legal successor," he said, "of the Kingdom of Serbia."

24 And he proceeds in his legal demonstration saying this: "Only Serbia as a

25 state can be the legal successor of Yugoslavia."

Page 2990

1 And of course this is his Yugoslavia, he says: "There is no

2 Yugoslavia any longer since Yugoslavia no longer existed as it became

3 Yugoslavia in 1945. Now we have the Kingdom of Serbia," he said.

9 And he says: "It can follow the Karlobag line if we want it to be a

10 historical and strategic border."

Excerpt 30

2008 February 13

Page 3507

24 you remember that a great part of my speech was focused on saying that a
25 civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be avoided?

Page 3508

1 A. Yes, I remember that.

2 Q. Do you also remember that I said that the only chance to preserve
3 peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was for Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain
4 within the composition of Yugoslavia?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Do you remember my saying that that was the only chance for both
7 the Serbs and the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina to avoid
8 what was happening in Croatia?

9 A. Well, I think you said something along those lines, yes.

10 Q. So although I was belligerent in the areas that there was a war
11 going on, that is to say I wanted victory, but where there wasn't a war

12 going on I wished for peace? Is that the conclusion that you could draw

13 from my speech?

14 A. Yes, you could put it that way.

Excerpt 31

2008 February 27

Page 4186

5 while preparing this report, volunteers who joined groups affiliated to
6 the SRS/SCP were driven by Serb nationalism. At least that is what I can
7 conclude from, for example, the interviews that are -- or the articles
8 published in "Velika Serbia," the party magazine of the SRS, where, for
9 example, Vojvodas or other volunteers are interviewed, and they all talk
10 about the requirement to protect the Serbs, the threats by the Ustahas
11 and the Turks, I mean these are derogatory terms, and so on. They don't
12 talk about the requirement to defend Yugoslavia, so that is the problem.

Excerpt 32

2008 March 20

Page 5126

16 some video footage taken by Serbian Krajina television. This is 65 ter
17 number 6055.

18 [Videotape played]

19 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Reporter: One of the reasons of
20 our visit was the successful action a few days ago in which 16 Ustashas
21 were liquidated. In connection with this, the commander of the Republic
22 of Serbian Krajina army Main Staff, General Mile Novakovic, and Minister
23 Milan Martic visited the Serbian volunteers. General Novakovic
24 congratulated the soldiers on the successful action, stressed that their
25 unit could serve as a model to all those defending Serbdom.

Page 5127

1 "Novakovic: The Serbian army's Main Staff particularly values
2 the Serbian volunteers who have come to these western Serbian states to
3 defend them, to defend and protect both this people and this territory of
4 ours. We value you because we know that you have not come here to fight
5 for the sake of appearances, in order to seek glory for yourselves in war

6 or for any selfish, egoistical reasons but you have come to fight for the

7 freedom and honour of the Serbian people.

8 "Reporter: Vojvoda Jovo Ostojic, who leads this elite unit,

9 appealed to all Serbs who have not done so to join the defensive ranks

10 because Serbdom is not defended either in Belgrade or in Knin but

11 everywhere where Serbs have been attacked. The Serbian volunteers

12 include members of all parties but at this moment none of them are

13 interested in politics and they're all fighting under the unified command

14 of the Republic of Serbian Krajina army Main Staff.

Excerpt 33

2008 March 20

Page 5130

7 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Announcer: Dr. Vojislav Seselj,

8 chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, visited Sarajevo and going around

9 the streets of Sarajevo he visited the front lines. Dr. Vojislav Seselj

10 stressed again that the Serbs east of the Drina River think and empathise

11 with the people in Republika Srpska and support the liberation struggle

12 of the Serbian people in these territories.

13 "VS: I am very happy, first of all, because of the very, very

14 high morale of the Serbian fighters to end this liberation war with

15 complete Serbian victory. And today I am more than ever convinced that

16 the whole of Sarajevo will finally be Serbian. We are here now in

17 Serbian Hadzici, Hadzici which from the first day of the war resisted

18 violent Muslim attacks but also Hadzici which triumphed in this war which

19 managed to save everything that is Serbian. Even the entire Mount Igman

20 was liberated but Muslims returned afterwards under UNPROFOR aegis with

21 which UNPROFOR actually showed whose side it was on in this war. Igman

22 will remain Serbian. I am convinced of that because of the strength of

23 the Serbian fighters, because of their faith in the Serbian cause, and

24 because of their faith in a Greater Serbia. Here the people created a

25 state which is strong, functions well and notwithstanding poverty, the

Page 5131

1 hard life the Serbian people of Republika Srpska will be triumphant.

2 They will be victorious. The destiny of Serbian Krajina is most of all

3 linked to Republika Srpska not to those rulers from Dedinje. The future

4 of the Serbian Krajina is in the unification with Republika Srpska,

5 unification now. Unification tomorrow, straight away.

6 "Announcer: At the end of his visit to Srpska Sarajevo,

7 Dr. Vojislav Seselj told citizens and combatants to endure in the

8 righteous struggle and that Serb radicals will help as much as they're

9 able to, that the Serbian people in Republika Srpska achieve final

10 victory and freedom."

Excerpt 34

2008 October 01

Page 10130

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So 20 per cent came because

2 they were patriots. Other people came for other reasons. Some because

3 they were interested in war profiteering or 20 per cent as you said were

4 patriots. So I'm sure you were able to talk to these people. What were

5 the reasons for their patriotism?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, they talked about the Serbs

7 being under threat as a nation. They said that the Serbs were about to
8 be exterminated by the Muslims and the Croats. Also, they were saying
9 that Serbia was to be defended in Croatia and Bosnia; beforehand in
10 Croatia and now in Bosnia, because if the war were allowed to spill over
11 into Serbia, there would be no Serbia any longer.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I understand. What motivated
13 these patriots, did they ever mention the names of high-profile
14 characters, like Slobodan Milosevic? Did they identify with political
15 figures in any way, or was it a personal form of patriotism which didn't
16 have much to do with political figures?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Actually, these are the words
18 of the top people at the time, the people who were in power then.
19 Actually, this is just repetition of their words.

20 At that time, there was this sentence that was repeated time and
21 again that turned into a slogan, "All Serbs in a single state"; that is
22 to say, all Serb territories had to be in a single state.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What politician actually said

24 that?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Seselj and the

Page 10131

1 rest.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And you said "as well as the

3 others." Which others?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, other politicians who were in

5 power in Serbia. I don't know all of their names exactly.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] My last question, because I'm

7 going directly to the point now: Those people that talked about

8 Mr. Seselj, were they great in number or did this pertain to a minority.

9 of patriots?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, there were quite a few of

11 them. He has many supporters and many sympathisers. His word carried a

12 great deal of weight then among the people of Serbia because he portrayed

13 himself as one of the great defenders of the Serb name.

Excerpt 35

2008 October 02

Page 10197

2 Q. Are you familiar with how the Radical Party was recruiting

3 volunteers?

4 A. Well, there was propaganda broadcast on television. All

5 officials, headed by Mr. Seselj, in all of their public appearances said

6 that every Serb patriot needed to put himself in the service of the

7 defence of the Serbian people, and along those lines everybody knew that

8 the Serbian Radical Party was sending out its volunteers, and it was very

9 easy to join volunteers via them. This took place through various of

10 their speeches and public appearances, and there was a lot of that in the

11 media.

12 Q. Did you hear Mr. Seselj give a call to arms for Serb patriots?

13 A. Yes, I heard that many times, that each Serbian patriot needed to

14 go and defend the Serbian people. It was no secret that his party sent

15 volunteers to the war zones; not that it was not a secret, he was proud

16 of that, and he bragged about that; so it was no secret whatsoever.

17 Q. And to be clear, these were Serb people in war zones outside of

18 Serbia?

19 A. Yes.

Excerpt 36

2008 October 08

Page 10406

10 "On 6 May 1992, he gave an inflammatory speech in the village of

11 Hrtkovci, calling for the expulsions of Croats from the area, reading a

12 list of individual Croat residents who should leave for Croatia.

13 "As a result of this speech, a number of Croat residents decided

14 to leave Hrtkovci. After the speech, supporters and associates of the

15 accused, including members of the SRS and the Serbian Chetnik Movement,

16 began a campaign of ethnic cleansing directed to non-Serbs, particularly

17 Croats in Hrtkovci.

Excerpt 37

2008 December 03

Page 12584

2 there was a song by a Croatian pop singer, Tajci, "Let's Get Crazy
3 Tonight, Pluck Some Croats Eyes." You know, they adapted the versus to
4 their purposes. There was Vila Velebita. Then a Muslim girl vowed
5 before the mosque that she loves the Serbs the best in the world. Then
6 we were made to pray Pater Noster, et cetera.

7 Then there was another song about a bird, a popular song.
8 Whenever they ordered us to sing some regular folk songs, that was heaven
9 compared to what we were made to sing otherwise.

10 Q. Was there also a song which was called "We Will Slaughter
11 Muslims"?

12 A. Yes, there were. Well, the general effect of those songs were,
13 "We will slaughter, We will kill." Those were all songs that used to be
14 sung by the Chetniks during World War II and which were prohibited during
15 the communist Yugoslavia time. Whoever tried to sing those songs then
16 would be put to jail.

APPENDIX C: NATIONALIST GROUP-LEVEL VIOLENCE

Excerpt 1

2005 October 03

Page 458

12 plunder of public and private property of the Croat, Muslim, and other

13 non-Serb populations, acts which were not justified by military necessity.

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosanski Samac (hundreds of homes and a

21 mosque destroyed), Zvornik (hundreds of homes, four mosques and a

22 religious archive destroyed) Greater Sarajevo (homes, mosques, and a

23 Catholic church destroyed in the municipality of Ilijas; homes, mosques,

24 and a Catholic church destroyed in the municipality of Vogosca); Bijeljina

25 (the Catholic church desecrated and five mosques destroyed in the town of

Page 459

1 Bijeljina; two mosques destroyed in the village of Janja and four mosques

2 destroyed in other villages); Mostar (hundreds of homes and several

3 mosques destroyed) and Nevesinje (dozens of homes and seven mosques

4 destroyed).

Excerpt 2

2005 October 03

Page 848

1 people, following in the tradition of the Serbian Chetniks."

5 The SRS/SCP volunteers, in fact, considered him to be their

6 commander.

25 up a party army that pursued this course brutally. Through his extreme

Page 849

1 rhetorics, the accused attracted many young men who volunteered and became

2 part of the thousands of SRS volunteers who participated in the conflict

3 in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of them undisciplined, violent

4 and even criminal.

Excerpt 3

2005 October 03

Page 881

1 Witnesses will tell us that at times the SRS transferred

2 volunteers of its party and other volunteers together to the front lines.

3 For the local population, the volunteers were just the same. Their
4 presence created a climate of fear by looting, threatening, abusing and
5 killing civilians. And what is important: They all considered themselves
6 Chetniks and associated themselves with the accused's goal of Greater
7 Serbia.
8 Again, in relation to Vocin, in November 1991, the accused visited
9 Vocin and met his volunteers, and we will hear from local witnesses that
10 the volunteers, after meeting Seselj, became more aggressive and there was
11 a sharp increase of crimes against Croat civilians after this visit.

Excerpt 4

2007 December 12

Page 2066

3 She is dressed in a military outfit which the volunteers actually
4 dressed in. She's not dressed in street clothes. She's not going there
5 to do some -- to take her children to school. I mean, she's boarding the
6 bus that the volunteers are taking to Belgrade. That's why
7 Madam Prosecutor said that she's a volunteer.
14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] This is rather unusual. A young

15 woman going to war. Is it or isn't it? What do you think about that?

16 I don't think it is. We need to answer the call to arms. I'm a

17 mother of two small children.

18 Where are you from?

19 I'm from Pirot.

20 How old are you?

21 33.

22 What made you decide to go?

23 Well, when I watch television I see what's going on and I want to

24 help and it's worth sacrificing my life for this here Serbia of ours.

Excerpt 5

2008 January 15

Page 2311

9 A. In 1991 I simply decided to become a volunteer. How? Well, there

10 were different factors influencing my decision. The political situation,

11 the situation in society, the media. I considered that my people were

12 under threat.

21 Q. Are you familiar with a concept called Greater Serbia?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What is it?

24 A. What it is exactly, I don't know, but I do know that it was one of

25 the standpoints in the programme of the Serbian Radical Party.

Page 3224

17 Q. Were you inspired by his view of Chetniks?

18 A. Of course.

Excerpt 6

2008 January 15

Page 2327

4 that Mr. Seselj organized volunteers and the Serb Radical Party did too.

5 We called ourselves Chetniks. There was also a section in the Serb

6 Radical Party that was called the Serb Chetnik Movement, but I cannot say

7 at that time in Vukovar whether that is the way it was all organized.

Page 2328

1 Q. Did you see civilians being mistreated?

2 A. Well, yes, I did.

3 Q. Can you describe that?

4 A. Well, I have already said that to mistreat a civilian, that was
5 something that the individual who found them in a basement did. There was
6 simply evil people and they could not be controlled always. The situation
7 could not always be under control.

Page 2338

10 Q. Did he refer to Croats by the name of Ustasha?

11 A. Yes, we referred to them by that name as well.

Excerpt 7

2008 January 16

Page 2440

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can say - I can't quote him - but
14 I can say how I felt after hearing Mr. Seselj's speech and what I
15 thought. That's how I can best describe what he said. As a listener, he
16 warned me of the danger of the resurrected Ustasha - I'm using my own
17 words now, Your Honour - who had risen like vampires from the grave. He

18 spoke of the threat of a new genocide. He said we were under threat, that
19 there were actual situations which had already led to murders and
20 expulsions.

21 Listening to Mr. Seselj I concluded that that was actually the
22 situation, and as a man, a Serb and a citizen, I had to play an active
23 role. I would have to participate sooner or later. I didn't think it
24 would be the very next day. And let me stress that it was not
25 Mr. Seselj's speech alone that prompted me to become a volunteer.

Excerpt 8

2008 February 28

Page 4305

17 "to move, with the assistance of the air force, to the area around
18 Bosanski Samac in order to organise a Serbian uprising against the joint
19 Ustasha," and then it uses the term "balija," which is translated as a
20 derogatory term for BH Muslims, "authorities." And so on and so on.
21 This is just one example of an SRS volunteer detachment which has
22 been formed in Serbia. It is still in existence in April 1992, and then
23 it acts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosanski Samac

Excerpt 9

2008 March 11

Page 4683

20 REPORTER: What steps do you, as the Serbs, need to take before

21 the war is over?

22 INTERVIEWEE: The war will be over when we have our limits,

23 Karlobag-Karlovac-Ogulin-Virovitica. All place where Serbian people live

24 must be free, you know. We must clean up with the Croatians."

Excerpt 10

2008 March 20

Page 5127

15 "Ostojic: The motto of our fighters is patriotism and freedom

16 for the Serbian people and nothing else. We want to defend the Serbian

17 lands, to defend Serbian children and Serbian mothers, and to counter the

18 Ustasha devils militarily and heroically. And I would send this

Excerpt 11

2008 March 25

Page 5248

22 that broke my shoulder. Roki made us learn Chetnik songs. We had to
23 know them off by heart. And whenever he turned up, we had to get up,
24 stand up, and he would point to some that he called -- some of us who he
25 called the singers and who had made -- memorised the songs. We had to

Page 5249

1 sing the Chetnik songs out loud and he would hit us. He loved doing
2 that.

Excerpt 12

2008 April 22

Page 6316

1 A. While we were making the list, he went from one person to the
2 other and he made a cross on the forehead of some men with a knife.

3 Q. Was a cross made on you?

4 A. That didn't happen to me.

5 Q. Do you know approximately how many men had a cross made on their
6 forehead?

7 A. I think roughly about 10. I'm not quite sure.

Page 6335

20 Q. From -- in the period between Bajram day and the holiday called
21 Vidovdan Day, were more people being killed inside -- were more people
22 that were detained in the room killed?
23 A. I don't think so, not during that period from Bajram until
24 Vidovdan or St. Vitez Day, but on one occasion a group came in, whether
25 it was Zoks' group or a mixed group I'm not quite sure, and they also

Page 6336

1 beat us and would draw -- or, rather, cut into our skin the four "S"
2 signs on our backs.

3 Q. What would they cut the sign with?

4 A. With a knife.

5 Q. Did they cut that on the back of everyone?

6 A. Well, no, just one person. They carved the four "S" signs on his
7 back.

Excerpt 13

2008 April 22

Page 6390

9 "My son is going there because he's Serbian and because he's

10 having a hard time watching the Serbian people suffering over there.

11 "Are you the son?

12 "I am the son.

13 "Why are you going? Let me hear it from you.

14 "I'm going there for the Serbian people and for Serbia. I

15 believe it is my duty, one I have inherited from my father and my

16 grandfather. They are unable to. They are quite old. It is up to me.

17 I shall take back what belongs to Serbia. I'm going there because all my

18 family was killed at Jasenovac concentration camp during World War II. I

19 come from Banja. My origins are there. I grew up in Srem. Understand?

20 I'm going there just because of that, because I know what they are

21 doing -- what they have done during the war from 1941 to 1945."

25 "I feel great, great. And I am going there with resolve and

Page 6391

1 enthusiasm. They do not know any fear. They have said they are only of

2 their own desire to end the tragedy of the endangered Serbs as soon as

3 possible and of their own willingness to help them in it."

Excerpt 14

2008 June 25

Page 8704

18 actually Arkan's men. But judging by their uniforms, and we were able to
19 distinguish all these paramilitaries, I would say that was them.

20 Anyway, when he entered, he went wild in the hall. He made a lot
21 of noise, shouted. He said, "Come on, balija, on your feet, all of you."
22 He started swearing. He used all kinds of swear words, and then he said,
23 "Now I want to hear a song." And we looked at him, and he said that he
24 wanted us to sing the song about General Draza Mihajlovic. And we knew
25 that was a Chetnik song.

Page 8710

21 And then suddenly there was a noise of something hitting
22 something or falling down, and somebody said out loud, "Lift your heads
23 up," cursing our balija and Ustasha mothers in those seconds. We raised
24 our heads, and in that moment I saw some men whom I hadn't seen up until
25 then in the hall, and I felt that they were behind us as well and that

Page 8711

1 they were coming in from the left side. And what I saw at that moment
2 was people wearing olive-green uniforms, the SMB type, but different from
3 the ones who were already there, they looked a little different. They
4 had some wide trousers to above the knees, and some of them had some
5 insignia, cockades. And I also saw on their shoulders some badges, and
6 they looked similar to what they had on their heads.

Page 8712

12 at them. They cursed their mothers and everything else. They often
13 referred to us -- well, swore at our Turkish mothers and so on.

Excerpt 15

2008 July 01

Page 8779

"I can't get up. Kill me here in the van." Then he swore at my

Page 8780

1 Ustasha mother.

APPENDIX D: ISLAMOPHOBIC PROPAGANDA SESELJ

Excerpt 1

2008 February 12

Page 3400

"And if Muslims oppose the attempt to be deprived as a

6 nation status." And the answer was: "In that case they will be expelled

7 from Bosnia." The question: "To where?" The answer: " To Anatolia."

Excerpt 2

THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL AGAINST VOJISLAV SESELJ.

INDICTMENT. Retrieved from: <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/ind/en/ses-ii030115e.pdf>

February 2003

Page 21

7 In March 1992, Vojislav Seselj gave a speech at a rally in Mali

8 Zvornik, located across the Drina River from Zvornik. Vojislav Seselj

9 said: "Dear Chetnik brothers, especially you across the Drina River, you

10 are the bravest ones. We are going to clean Bosnia of pagans and show

11 them a road which will take them to the east, where they belong," thus

Excerpt 3

THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL AGAINST VOJISLAV SESELJ.

INDICTMENT. Retrieved from: <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/ind/en/ses-ii030115e.pdf>

February 2003

Page 28

24 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosanski Samac (hundreds and homes and a

25 mosque destroyed) and Zvornik (hundreds of homes and dozens of mosques

Page 29

1 destroyed)

2 By his participation in these acts, Vojislav Seselj committed:

3 Count 12: Wanton destruction of villages, or devastation not

4 justified by military necessity

Excerpt 4

2006 November 28

Page 915

This cartoon was published next to an article

25 entitled "There is No Co-Existence with Islam." The cartoon depicts a

Page 916

1 large Serb Orthodox church and a man with a broom who is sweeping small

2 mosques away from the area around the church.

Excerpt 5

2007 December 13

page 2186

6 A. What I wrote is that a group of writers analysed the discourse on
7 the radio and television of Belgrade and Serbia about the Bosnian war, and
8 that's what they concluded. The theme was the Muslims are Jihad warriors,
9 criminals, slaughterers, Islamic Ustashas, Mujahedin, terrorists, and
10 extremists. So yes, that's -- that's in my report.

Excerpt 6

2008 January 29

Page 2869

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in the course of the
23 centuries, in the course of the Ottoman Empire, there were armed units
24 consisting of Christians, of Serbs. They existed during this period of
25 time, and they were under the command of men who were called "Vojvodas."

Page 2869

1 They were military chiefs of irregular armed units; they weren't part of
2 the army of a state.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But these armed bands that had
4 been established against the Ottoman Empire, these Vojvods, were they
5 present in the field of military actions, were they there? This Vojvod,
6 as to be understood as Mr. Seselj, does that mean that he was present in
7 the military field or not?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He was, indeed, present. This title
9 as a Vojvod was given to him by Momcilo Djujic in June 1989. Momcilo

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As a rule, Vojvods are appointed for
23 their military bravery, therefore, always in a context of clashes or
24 fighting, of armed conflict, of small or major intensity. It is always
25 within a military context. It would be a paradox if somebody was

Page 2870

1 appointed a Vojvod precisely if there was no war situation. --

Excerpt 7

2008 January 29

Page 2928

20 Q. Did Dr. Seselj express a view on the Macedonian or Muslim nations?

21 A. He believes that the Macedonian nation is an artificial one

22 created by the communist regime in Yugoslavia. This goes for the Muslim

23 nation which was recognised in 1968. He believes, too, that it is an

24 artificial nation.

Excerpt 8

2008 February 12

Page 3396

18 Q. Can you tell us how he spoke about Muslims and Albanians?

19 A. He spoke about Muslims that they were Serbs of the Muslim faith.

20 I don't remember what he said about Albanians, but he said the same thing

21 about the Croats as well.

Excerpt 9

2008 February 27

Page 7818

5 A. Well, every day news came of crimes committed. Television

6 broadcasts showed dead bodies in the streets of Zvornik. It was quite
7 clear that one should run away. The radio reported -- I remember one
8 specific thing, that Arkan's and Seselj's units entered Bijeljina and
9 freed the town from Muslims, as they put it.

Excerpt 10

2008 June 12

Page 8229

10 Q. Did you hear what this person which you've identified as being

11 Mr. Seselj said?

12 A. Well, he was saying, "Hit the balijas and Turks in their flesh.

13 Go ahead, brother Serbs, hit them. Don't leave anything alive in front

14 of you." That's what he said.

15 Q. Was Vaske there?

16 A. Yes, he was.

Excerpt 11

2008 July 03

Page 9003

22 Q. In light of the speeches or in light of what you'd heard --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.

24 MR. DUTERTRE: [Interpretation]

25 Q. -- in the shelter, somebody came to talk to you for a whole

Page 9004

1 night. Did you think that what was happening in Sutina was a direct

2 consequence of that? What were your feelings about this?

3 A. Well, it was genocide to destroy us Muslims, nothing else, just

4 as they had agreed with the Croats, that Croats should do it on one side

5 and they on the other and that they should throw all of us Muslims into

6 the Neretva River -- well, it was made public in speeches, it was said on

7 TV. So that was what they wanted to do, but they failed to create

8 Greater Serbia.

Excerpt 12

2009 February 04

Page 13993

20 Suddenly, Mr. Seselj came in with his bodyguards, and from the
21 door he literally said, "God help you, brother Chetniks," and everybody
22 traditionally replied the return greeting, "God help you, hero." They
23 said that altogether. I can still hear Mr. Seselj saying that. He took
24 his place where he was meant to sit, and then after briefly consulting
25 with his associates, he stood up and he began to speak. He said that he

Page 13994

1 was sorry that the meeting -- the rally could not be held outside, for
2 objective reasons, probably meaning for security reasons, and that he
3 hoped that people who were present inside would literally convey to their
4 home organisations what his message was. He underscored again, "I hope
5 that you are true representatives of the groups that were formed in your
6 home units, entities." I can still hear his words in my years that I
7 will never forget, "Brothers, Chetniks, Chetnik brothers," he literally
8 says -- had said, "The time has come for us to give the balijas tit for
9 tat." I will explain. "Balijas" is a derogatory word for Muslims.
10 You've probably had the opportunity to hear this word before in prior
11 testimonies. "The Drina, the River Drina, is not a boundary between

12 Serbia and Bosnia. It is the backbone of the Serbian state. Every foot
13 of land inhabited by Serbs is Serbian land. Let's rise up, Chetnik
14 brothers, especially you from across the Drina. You are the bravest."
15 These are literally his words. I will never forget them, "let us show
16 the balijas, the Turks and the Muslims," he said all of those words in
17 one context, "the green transversal, the direction to the east. That's
18 where their place is."

Excerpt 13

2007 December 13

Page 2221

there's a woman who is a refugee with

2 her family, a Serb woman who's a refugee from someplace in what became

3 Republika Srpska, where she left her village to go to a -- another place

4 where the Serbs are in the majority. And the journalist asks her, Why did

5 you leave? And she said, "Because I heard on television that the Muslims

6 are going to kill all the Serb men and all the women will become sex

7 slaves of the -- of the Muslims in a harem to produce, you know, Muslim

8 children."

10 Then the journalist asks her, "Well, what about your neighbours,"

11 who were Muslim. And she says, "Well, they're fine people. I've lived

12 with them in a friendly fashion all my life, but it's not my neighbours

13 that I'm afraid of. It's those Muslims that they are talking about on

14 television."

APPENDIX E: ISLAMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE GROUP-LEVEL

Excerpt 1

2008 March 25

Page 5187

10 Q. Thank you. Moving some years ahead to the spring of 1992. Did
11 you live in Zvornik at that time?

12 A. Yes.

Page 5188

1 Karakaj bridge, I don't know, there were political meetings day and night
2 with showdowns of political parties, and on the eve of the war there were
3 some lorries full of reservists who were being taken to Celopek and
4 Rocevic villages for military training.

11 A. This was approximately at the beginning of March. Actually, I
12 don't know whether it was at the beginning of March or in mid-March, but
13 in any case it was at the beginning of March because we could not
14 understand that this all might lead to -- to a war in the 20th Century.

Page 5194

20 You were talking to your neighbour, and at that moment he jolts
21 you and you realise that there was a bullet impact. How were you dressed
22 then? Were you in civilian clothes? Were you wearing a camouflage
23 uniform? How were you dressed?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was wearing my leather jacket,
25 jeans, and shoes. Civilian clothes.

Page 5237

19 Well, before that they started accusing the father of one of the
20 prisoners, an elderly man who was there, that he had been a Ustasha in World
21 War II, and they said that he had a U branded under his left armpit. They
22 stripped him, and they saw that he didn't have any U tattooed or branded
23 on his skin, and they said he must have had plastic surgery to remove it.

24 And at Ekonomija they kept forcing us to make the sign of the
25 cross, to bless ourselves. There was a Nedjo, a Serb, and he told us how

Page 5238

1 to say the Our Father.

Page 5239

13 Q. And you said that you were all kneeling. Why were you kneeling?

14 A. Vojvoda Cele made us strip to the waist and pray to God, but he
15 said that we mustn't pray to Allah. He said we were Serbs and we had to
16 pray to Jesus and that our fate was being decided. That's why I wanted
17 to talk about this Nedjo who was locked up together with us, because he
18 was the one who taught us the text of the Our Father since we didn't know
19 it. And really, I did say that prayer only so that things would -- that
20 things would pass -- pass by me.

Excerpt 2

2008 March 27

Page 5393

15 Q. And what year was that you think the change took place?

16 A. As far as I remember that was 1990 or 1991, thereabouts.

Page 5466

the -- the Vojvoda makes decision." And when he entered he said, "And

Page 5466

1 what are you doing? Why are you bowing down? This is not a mosque."

Excerpt 3

Page 5475

- 13 Q. Let's move on then. "The aforementioned Pufta took it out on
14 some individuals. On the right arm of a detainee Muslim he carved out a
15 piece of skin with a tattoo of a moon and star." Is that correct?
16 A. Yes, it is.

Excerpt 4

2008 April 02

Page 5682

- 18 Any reasonable judge would wonder who you committed these very
19 serious acts for, on behalf of whom you committed these serious acts.
20 These were perpetrated against religious places, mosques or churches,
21 against property, cars and so on.
22 So did you act on your own behalf or were you acting on behalf of
23 some kind of organisation?
24 A. At that time, I continued socialising and associating with
25 volunteers from the Serbian Chetnik Movement and the Radical Party, and

1 anyone who comes back from the war theatre suffers from a syndrome, and
2 this syndrome remains there for a long time.

3 The state didn't want to integrate us into society and help us.

4 In fact, it hindered us, and we had to struggle with the syndrome on our
5 own. And some people never got cured of the syndrome.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is your explanation? Very
7 well. But my question was more specific.

8 Did you act within an organisation or on your own behalf, being
9 motivated by a post-traumatic syndrome that was a consequence of which
10 you lived through in the war?

11 A. Throwing a hand grenade on a mosque was because a friend of mine
12 had stated the day before that it was his last wish. I didn't even know
13 there was a mosque in Belgrade until he told me that in hospital. And
14 that evening, he died. Nurse Ruska informed us that Vlada had died and
15 that had been his dying wish, so we fulfilled it. We threw the hand
16 grenade, not into the mosque itself but into the yard of the mosque. We
17 didn't throw it inside, but into the yard, in order to avoid injuring

18 anyone.

Excerpt 5

2008 April 09

Page 5884

0 The beatings resumed in Ciglana. It is the same group that had
11 been beating the witness in Ekonomija, but they did not come as often.
12 The witness remembers one beating where they were told to strip down to
13 the waist. Their bodies were inspected for tattoos. One man had a
14 tattoo on his lower arm. The witness thinks that it showed a crescent
15 moon and star, and a crescent moon.
16 Pufta told him to have the tattoo removed by morning. The man
17 tried to burn it off, but it still showed. Pufta then removed the tattoo
18 with a knife. Pufta also cut the ear of a detainee named Ismet Cirak.
19 Pufta then killed Cirak.

Excerpt 6

2008 May 15

Page 7018

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's what they said, that
20 somebody had tricked them and that they set out with the intention of
21 assisting the Serb people, helping them, because they had information
22 saying that Serb people in Zvornik were under threat, that the Muslims
23 were setting fire to houses, raping and so on. And so in solidarity with
24 the Serb people, they set out to protect them, but when they arrived
25 there, they saw that this was not the case and they said that they were

Page 7019

1 tricked. And we said, "Who tricked you?" And they said, "Well, they
2 sent us from up there." They had their staffs or headquarters or
3 whatever in various locations from which they received those directives.

Excerpt 7

2008 May 20

Page 7130

14 Q. And this murder of over 200 soldiers, JNA soldiers in Tuzla, and
15 the huge influx of Serb refugees from Tuzla, could it have intensified

16 the anti-Muslim animosity amongst Serbs in Zvornik?

17 A. Yes, it could have done so.

18 Q. You know that hatred feeds on itself?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Something happens on the Serb side, the Muslims' hatred

21 increases, and then something happens on the Muslim side and then the

22 Serbs' hatred increases, and it's a vicious circle with no end?

23 A. Yes, that's how it is.

Excerpt 8

2008 June 10

Page 7998

14 Q. Can you tell us how Robert was killed and who killed him?

15 A. I learned that later, that they had taken -- that they went to

16 Brne, they had no losses, and Brne ordered all four to be brought to him.

17 And that's when he started cursing our balijas mothers, that all of us

18 should be killed immediately, that they must not take us down there

19 alive.

Page 8004

5 In this commotion, I just heard someone hollering that we should
6 all be killed, and this person was swearing at us, cursing our balija
7 mothers, that Serbs were being killed in Sarajevo and they want to take
8 us alive. I just saw that rifle then, but I don't know who fired it.

Page 8006

6 response by way of swearing, "Go to Golo Brdo, catch yourself some
7 balijas. These are ours," meaning, "our prisoners," their prisoners,
8 because they had taken us prisoner. So until we got down there to that
9 clearing, none of these people who were climbing up Golo Brdo in uniform
10 didn't dare lay a hand on us.

11 Q. What does it mean, "balija"? Can you explain to us?

12 A. It's a Serb derogatory term for Muslims.

Excerpt 9

2008 June 12

Page 8220

And I was running from up there, but at that moment as I was
14 running, Dragan Damjanovic was hollering at the rest of the men, cursing

15 at their Turkish mothers and saying, "I'm going to slaughter all of you,

16 kill all of you. Go back, go back."

Excerpt 10

2008 June 17

Page 8343

18 A. Mr. Vaske Vidovic took part in the beginning when the mosque was

19 destroyed. That's when he came with his artillery and he destroyed the

20 mosque.

21 Q. When was that?

22 A. From 1992 to 1993.

23 Q. End of 1993?

24 A. I cannot remember.

25 Q. End of 1992, I mean?

Page 8344

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Or the beginning of 1993. Were there any Muslims in the village

3 of Svake then?

4 A. There weren't that many Muslims left then, because the Muslims
5 were taken away by force.

Excerpt 11

2008 December 02

Page 12449

4 Galib Hadzic. You said that he was shot at. Was he wounded?
5 A. He was seriously wounded in the leg, and we bandaged it and
6 carried him onto the truck. He lives here now with his family, in
7 Vienna, but he has serious consequences due to that shooting. He was
8 shot at only because he was a Muslim. They brought pressure to bear
9 against our mothers, our sisters.

Excerpt 12

2008 December 02

Page 12466

3 A. Yes. It was difficult to board the train. It wasn't a proper
4 train, it was the trains that are used to transport cattle, so a group of

5 people -- and a group of people arrived, and they threw stones at us and
6 beat us, and said that we were Alija's army and called us Turks.

Page 12467

18 people as well. Ten or twelve persons had been injured by the stones
19 thrown at their heads or backs. We were badly beaten up then. They were
20 saying that we were Alija's soldiers, Turks, whatever.

Excerpt 13

2008 December 04

Page 12720

7 A. Yes. They said that anybody who wasn't loyal to the Serbs and
8 the Serbian Radical Party, and Serbs in general, would be killed,
9 slaughtered, and then the rest of those who weren't loyal should be sent
10 to -- the Muslims to Turkey, the Croats to Croatia, so that the Serbian
11 part of Bijeljina shall remain ethnically pure.

12 Q. Was there a specific expression for the non-Serbs used by these
13 members of the SRS?

14 A. Yes. They referred to us Muslims as Ustashas. They said we were

15 Ustashas and linked to Croatia, linked up to Croats, that kind of thing;

16 that we were balijas, Ustashas, things like that.

17 Q. So also for Muslims, the expression "Ustashas" was used?

18 A. Yes, that's right, that was used.

Excerpt 14

2009 January 28

Page 13702

15 A. Yes, mosques were destroyed. I think long after the clashes had

16 broken out. They were destroyed in areas where there were no combat

17 operations at all. Bijeljina and the entire region, and I'm referring to

18 Muslim settlements.

Excerpt 15

2009 March 04

Page 14311

16 A. Well, I received a letter which scared me, and I fled.

17 Q. What did the letter say that scared you?

18 A. It was just a couple of sentences. It said: "Turk, the time has
19 come for you to pay for what you have done to us." I don't know what it
20 was that I had done to them, and it was signed: "Chetniks," because those
21 who wrote that letter did not want to actually sign their actual names,
22 so it was just signed, "Chetniks."

Excerpt 16

2010 January 12

Page 15017

1 MR. SESELJ: [Interpretation]

2 Q. I mentioned the demolishing of mosques. When were the Zvornik
3 mosques demolished?

4 A. In May or June.

5 Q. None was demolished during the fighting for Zvornik; right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Was the demolishing of any of Zvornik's mosques something that
8 can be -- something between which a connection can be made with me or
9 my -- the -- my volunteers?

10 A. No.

11 Q. But did the Muslims demolish Orthodox churches in the Zvornik
12 municipality?

13 A. Yes, they did.

14 Q. Did you know that the Muslim forces demolished the St. Mary's
15 church at Velim [phoen]?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Do you know that the Muslim forces demolished the Orthodox church
18 of St. Martar [phoen]?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you know that Muslim forces demolished the Orthodox church in
21 Lijesce?

22 A. Lijesce, yes.

23 Q. Do you know that Muslim forces demolished a Serbian Orthodox
24 church of St. Lazarus of Serbia at Rastosnica?

25 A. Yes.

Page 15018

1 Q. Do you know that Muslim forces demolished the Serbian Orthodox

2 church of the descent of the holy spirit at Lijesce?

3 A. Yes, at Lijesce.

4 Q. So there were two churches at Lijesce. Do you know that Muslim
5 forces demolished the Serbian Orthodox church of St. Ilija at Setici?

6 A. Well, they damaged it.

7 Q. Yes, but damaged it badly; right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So the demolishing of religious buildings was something that both
10 sides did, so it was like an eye for an eye?

11 A. Yes, it was along those lines.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, Mr. Seselj asked you
14 to confirm that several religious monuments, Orthodox, were destroyed and
15 you confirmed this. But you added "an eye for an eye," which means that
16 the Serbs have also destroyed mosques?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that was certain reciprocity
18 involved.

Excerpt 17

2010 January 26

Page 17296

23 While they were held, Serb forces and local Serbs taunted the

24 group, saying:

25 "Fuck your balija mothers. We'll kill you, we'll slaughter you."

Page 17297

1 And told one woman:

2 "Shut up, you balija, balinka. You are guilty of being a

3 Muslim."

