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Coercive Theories of Global Redistributive Justice: Statism or Cosmopolitanism - Which is the More Accurate?

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**COERCIVE THEORIES OF GLOBAL
REDISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: STATISM OR
COSMOPOLITANISM –
WHICH IS THE MORE ACCURATE?**

BSc Thesis – International Relations and Organisations

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Contents

Introduction	3
The Current Coercive Landscape	5
Rethinking Coercion	14
Finding the Correct Coercion Account	17
Conclusion	21
References	22

Introduction

Much like most concepts in the field of Political Science, the criteria something must meet to be identified as coercion is contested. Further, there is also competition over what the true account of coercion is, with specific regard to global redistributive justice. The aim of this thesis is to seek clarification on the criteria of coercion and then investigate which account of coercion theories of global distributive justice is correct.

To pursue these aims, some background to the concept of coercion is required. The accounts of coercion theories of global distributive justice are based upon liberal ideology - this is logical given that this branch of global distributive justice stems from Rawls own theory of distributive justice (Nagel, 2005, p. 114) which itself is based off of liberal political thinking (Hittinger, 1994). Political liberalism centres around the idea of liberties, rights, and equality (Rawls, 2005, p. 4). Within these liberties, rights and equality is the idea of the autonomous agent...

whose perspective and interests are fundamental for the derivation of liberal principles.

The autonomous citizen acts as a model for the basic interests protected by liberal principles of justice as well as the representative rational agent whose hypothetical or actual choices serve to legitimize those principles (Christman & Anderson, 2005, p. 1).

From this it is clear to see the importance of the link between autonomy and liberal political thought, which is the underlying foundation for coercion theories of justice. The reason why autonomy is so integral to liberalism is due to:

the ideal of personal autonomy [allowing] “the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny,” such that they are able to set and pursue their own projects and see themselves as “part creators of their own moral world,” and not simply “subjected to the will of another” (Abizadeh, 2008, p. 39).

But what has autonomy got to do with coercion or its theories of justice? In his explanation of what constitutes an autonomous life, Raz (as cited in Abizadeh, 2008) says three conditions must first be met:

the person (1) has the appropriate mental capacities to formulate personal projects and pursue them, (2) enjoys an adequate range of valuable options, and (3) is independent, that is, free from subjection to the will of another through coercion or manipulation (Abizadeh, 2008, p. 39).

In the final condition, there is mention of freedom from coercion - which provides the link between autonomy and coercion. To be autonomous is to be free from coercion, and to be coerced is to have your autonomy violated. That said, there are times when one's autonomy must be infringed upon – within the state this constitutes an attempt in making life and society as fair and balanced for everyone involved. While an invasion of autonomy goes against liberal values, the otherwise free reign of individuals to do as they please would result in the violation of other people's autonomy. While a violation of autonomy, in this respect, may be necessary it does not negate the fact that a violation of autonomy has nevertheless taken place. As Hardin (1990, p. 79) rightly points out coercion can be necessary but, in these circumstances, it must be justified. Alas, with this information the investigation into the varying accounts surrounding coercive theories of distributive justice can be looked into.

This thesis will aim to answer the following research question in order to fulfil the aim: *which account of coercion theories of justice is correct?* In search for the answer to this question, this thesis will first lay out how the current literature portrays coercion, as a standalone concept, in the literature review. From this, this thesis will go on to present the current accounts of theories that are in contestation with each other. Once this has been done, a debate over how to identify coercion will provide a framework for identifying coercion. This will allow then a debate to be had about the various accuracies and inaccuracies of the accounts of coercion theories presented in the literature review, resulting in an answer to the research question at hand.

The Current Coercive Landscape

There are two categories into which the dominant accounts of coercion theories in global distributive justice can be split – statism and cosmopolitanism. On a fundamental level, statist argue that the most important coercion, that ought to be justified, happens within the state. Cosmopolitans argue that all coercion, both inside and outside the state, should be justified. This chapter will first lay out how the differing literature views coercion generally, before going on to state what separates the statist from the cosmopolitans.

Coercion as a concept

The concept of coercion is intertwined with the concept of autonomy - as coercion, in the confines of this thesis means little without autonomy itself being violated. Raz's third condition of autonomy - freedom from coercion (Abizadeh, 2008, p. 39) - is evidence of this. But what does it mean to say that something is coercive? Here there is debate as to where the line falls on what counts as a coercive practice and what does not. Not all the literature that provides the main accounts of coercion theory in redistributive justice have developed their own conceptions of coercion, and so this part of the literature review will provide the coercion conceptions of Blake (2001; 2011), Risse (2006), Abizadeh (2008), Anderson (2008) and Miller (2010).

Blake (2001) defines coercion as an act of contempt against an individual due to its nature of inhibiting the autonomy of X, which is sacrosanct to liberal political thinking (p. 267). He makes a distinction between X choosing a decision because it seems the best option to X or because other individuals (Y for example) have made it more difficult or impossible for X to pursue any other option than what X has 'chosen' to follow (Blake, 2001, p. 270). The latter is an example of coercion because the options laid out for X to choose from have been consciously manipulated by Y and is in line with how Abizadeh (2008) sees coercion, at a macro level. Abizadeh (2008) says that any disruption to the autonomy of X is coercion, irrespective of the success of Y's actions in coercing X's behaviour (p. 57).

Risse (2006) follows a similar line to these two scholars, defining coercion as possessing two distinct characteristics: where X has no alternative but to pursue A; and involving a threat being made (p. 680). Abizadeh (2008) disagrees with the idea that a threat must be issued for coercion to be identified. Instead, he makes a distinction between coercive threats and coercive acts. Threats constitute the announcement of Y's intention to carry out a

particular act on X, should X choose or continue to pursue an option that Y does not want X to take. Acts involve X not choosing or continuing to pursue a particular option to avoid the threat that Y has said they will commit to X, if X were to act in a certain way (Abizadeh, 2008, pp. 58-59). At this point it is important to note that it is sufficient for Y to use physical force against X for it to count as coercion, but not necessary - the necessary factor is Y's threat invading X's autonomy. Building on this further, whether or not X has any intention of pursuing the option that Y seeks to prevent X from pursuing has nothing to do with identifying coercion, according to Abizadeh. His argument is, if Y's proposed conduct makes X disregard an option before X even considers the option as one an option within the choice set, then X has already been coerced by Y (Abizadeh, 2008, p. 59). To make sense of this, this example follows: if a slave is well looked after by their owner and so has no intention of escaping, there is still coercion as if the slave would wish, or actually go through with the act of escaping, punishment would ensue (Abizadeh, 2008, p. 59).

Coming back to Risse (2006), he takes more of his conception of coercion from part of the criteria presented by Blake (2011) – the need for the immediacy of coercion for it to be genuine coercion (Risse, 2006, pp. 684-685). Immediacy of coercion is mentioned with relation to the relationship between coercer and coercee - the idea is that if X were to step out of line, then Y would have to immediately follow through with whatever threat was issued to make X not pursue the initial choice that they had made. If Y is unable to do this, then what is making X adjust its actions is not coercion, but some other phenomenon.

Already, from this there are three main takeaways - Y must be narrowing down the options that X can choose from, Y must be doing this by doing something that makes X disregard certain options, and Y must be able to follow through on whatever threat was issued to X in the event that X opts to pursue an option that Y has sought to make unavailable to X.

So far there has been general agreement on how to identify coercion, however Miller (2010) complicates things by introducing prevention into the mix of concepts. He states there must be an intention by Y to direct X towards a certain option for Y's actions to be considered coercive (p. 118) but, goes further in saying that a reduction in the options available is only sufficient to be able to identify coercion, not necessary. This runs contrary to what Blake, Abizadeh find. Miller (2010), instead takes the view that a choice set must be reduced to option 'A' or nothing for a practice to be coercive, otherwise it is simply preventive (pp. 113-114), which is closer to what Risse argues.

Outside the general conception of coercion is Anderson (2008), and his introduction of two types of coercion into the debate: the “enforcement approach” and the “pressure approach” (p. 3). The enforcement approach sees a power differential between coercer and coercee, enabling the coercer to inflict their will unto the coercee through force and violence (p. 8). In other words, coercion is identified by the necessary use of force (violent force is sufficient but not necessary in this regard) or necessary issuance of a threat that acts to prevent or compel the coercee from or into carrying out a particular choice (Anderson, 2008, p. 11). Something interesting that Anderson (2008, p. 11) mentions is that prevention is the main mode through which coercion is built upon under this scheme of coercion - which directly contradicts Miller (2010) in his differentiation between coercion and prevention.

The pressure approach does not rely on power at all, but merely the ability for the coercer to pressure the coercee into a particular action - as force and violence are seen as distinct activities separate from coercion. Whereas, in the enforcement approach, attention is paid to the actions of the coercer towards the coercee, the pressure approach identifies coercion according to the action of the coercee. If the coercee does something that they would not have otherwise done, had the coercer not intervened, then this would be how to identify coercion under the pressure approach (Anderson, 2008, p. 9). To clarify the distinction, the pressure approach would identify coercion to have occurred in the instance where X would have kept their phone without intervention, but as a result gave it away (p. 9). Whereas the enforcement approach would identify coercion to be the act of Y threatening violence on X, if X were to not hand over their phone. The pressure approach has more focus on solely the coercee, whereas the enforcement approach looks at the actions of both coercee and coercer.

As already stated previously, the next chapter will seek to further investigate the stances made here and question their ability to stand up to scrutiny.

Statism

Blake (2001, 2011), Nagel (2005), and Risse (2006) represent the dominant statist accounts of coercion with respect to global distributive justice. This subsection will highlight their main arguments.

Blake concedes that there may be cases where an invasion of one’s autonomy may be justified. Despite the liberal sacrosanctity of autonomy, Blake (2001) explicitly mentions the application of criminal law (pp. 273-276) and civil law (pp. 276-285) for the preservation and smooth-running of a peaceful society within a state – providing a path where coercion can be carried

out without the complete rethinking of liberal values. Blake (2001) explains his statist position, stating that one of the reasons why state coercion has a greater demand for redistributive justice than coercion witnessed anywhere else is because of the inherent bond between citizens in a country created by the political and legal institutions that constitute said country (p. 258). That said, Blake is not completely opposed to the idea that where there is economic inequality internationally that leads to such grave amounts of poverty, redistribution can exist to correct this extreme imbalance (2001, p. 259). But the scale upon which one can be considered poor or rich in the same country, compared to that between countries is different due to the “shared liability of a coercive state” (Blake, 2011, p. 555). In other words, only the state has the power to set-up a really strong welfare net that ensures a minimum or even non-existent level of poverty, through enforcing various laws. The state is able to do this because of its coercive nature which is backed up by the legal apparatus, of which citizens are invested in because it works in their overall favour. States have the power to coerce because the citizenry legitimise the state by abiding by the rules made by the state (Blake, 2001, p. 279).

Accepting that poverty internationally should be corrected is the not the only extent to which Blake makes reference to international actions relating to the topic at hand. Despite Blake’s assurance that state coercion is the only coercion that needs to be justified, he does recognise that coercion does occur on the international stage. He recognises that more powerful states coerce smaller states on the international stage but dismisses the supposed subsequent assumption that this would then give rise to these coercive events being justified on the basis that this type of international coercion should simply be eliminated (Blake, 2011, p. 557). He also explains that internationally there exists no institution that is as complex and effective in maintaining order and being able to coerce than that of the state, irrespective of the links, treaties, or agreements that exist between countries - this links back to the idea that coercion must be immediate for it to be genuine (Blake, 2001, p. 265) (p. 280). Where some may point to International Organisations (IOs) as examples of institutions that could be considered just as coercive internationally, Blake (2011) points out that membership of these institutions are voluntary, whereas membership of the state is not (p. 565). Risse (2006) though holds firm on the prospect that IOs can be coercive in their actions. He explains that if the autonomy principle is the way through which coercion is justified, then any constraint on autonomy should in turn give rise to a justification (p. 680). Despite this omission by Risse (2006) taking the view on international coercion that he does, he still maintains that the integrity of the relationship between state and citizen is integral for maintaining rights which allow a justice system to operate (p. 685), creating a greater claim for justice in the domestic sphere. Further, he goes on

to say that citizenship and the network of rules that maintains the order in a society give rise to claims of justice when coercion occurs (p. 688).

Risse (2006) reaches two answers regarding the relation that exists between the state and coercion – one strong and one weak. The strong answer emphasises the necessity of three conditions for justice to be triggered: coercion must have occurred, a national legal system must be in place, and the country must abide by its political and legal systems (p. 690). Conversely, the weak answer requires the same three conditions – but crucially this weak version of coercion allows for coercive action outside of a state and therefore requires IOs to fill the gap that is absent in the form of a world state structure (Risse, 2006, p. 691). His solution to the issue of international coercion is to see it as coercion, but to recognise that a differing form of justification is therefore required to that of domestic coercion (Risse, 2006, p. 679).

Nagel (2005) follows along with a similar train of thought to that of Blake (2001; 2011) and Risse (2006), re-establishing early on the ideas of Hobbes, that justice can only be maintained amongst a group of people with a monopoly on the use of force, a key component in state sovereignty (Nagel, 2005, p. 115). He follows this up with the notion that these laws must not be forced onto a people, but instead serve in everyone's interest which creates a mutual recognition of common interest over a voluntary agreement to abiding by the law (Nagel, 2005, p. 115). Nagel (2005) makes reference to the arbitrary nature of state boundaries but dismisses this aspect by reiterating the statist line - the duty towards justice is created among a citizenry through the "legal, social, and economic institutions" that they share, there is an associative obligation (p. 121). This obligation is inseparable from societal membership because to not engage is not an option. You are coerced into participating if you try to opt out (p. 128) - which Blake agrees with. Put even more simply, if this associative obligation does not exist, there are no obligations until one were to find themselves in such a situation as to be obliged to redistribute. Nagel explains that this is only the case for socioeconomic justice due to it depending upon positive rights¹ which we do not owe to all persons - reversely negative rights like freedom of expression we owe to all people irrespective of what state they may find themselves in (Nagel, 2005, p. 127). Positive rights can only be maintained through membership of strong institutions that gives rise to other benefits such as equal citizenship, non-discrimination and social goods.

¹ meaning that there is a duty to help those that are owed these rights, as opposed to something that they are free to attain (Badie, Berg-Schlosser & Morlino, 2011).

Whereas Blake (2011) accepts that international coercion exists and that it should be eliminated because it is egregious, Risse (2006) claims that international coercion should have other justification offered in place of the type of justification offered within the state, Nagel (2005) retorts with other issues that should be of greater concern: internal injustice of some sovereign states, or world misery (p. 121). To remedy this, there should be promotion of just institutions internationally (p. 121), nonaggression between peoples, abiding by treaties struck, and providing “some” assistance to those who live below what is considered “favourable conditions” (p. 124).

Cosmopolitanism

Cohen and Sabel (2006), Cavallero (2010), and Abizadeh (2008) hold cosmopolitan views in the debate surrounding coercion theories of redistributive justice.

Cohen and Sabel (2006) launch their argument as a direct rebuttal to the “strong statist” (p. 148) position of Nagel. Their main objection to the statist approach to justifying coercion is the fact that statist largely take international coercion as just one type of relationship – as Cohen & Sabel (2006) rightly point out there are “different cases or types of relation[ships]” (von Gierke, 1960, as cited in Cohen & Sabel, 2006, p. 149) which exist in the international sphere. On top of this, they make note of the state of contemporary international interconnectivity and the mistake of statist to ascribe such an integral role to the state in formulating and upholding political, moral, and legal norms which give rise to coercive practices that should be justified (Cohen & Sabel, 2006, p. 149). They provide seven explicit ways in which international relationships can be just as coercive as those observed domestically (pp. 164-165):

1. Economic integration - the economies of the world are largely interlinked as a result of communications, trade and movement of capital to name a few. This may not directly equate to the exact same level of economic institutionalism, but it is unmistakably present in the international sphere.
2. Political, cultural, and economic cooperation - while there is variety between states in these three sectors, there is also variety within states - albeit to a lesser extent.
3. Legal consolidation - increasingly there is greater international standardisation of rules in certain legal domains such as labour, food safety or economic regulation. While states maintain an essential part, regulatory actors are not always *prima facie* the state and its judicial system.

4. Consolidation of conduct and welfare standards - the standards set internationally have an effect on all aspects of a state. From the individual right up to the state itself. Rules made within the state are also subjected to other factors that have been agreed to above state level.
5. Transnationality of politics - civil issues within one state are no longer addressed only within said state, organisations that are based in other states can raise the issue with the aim of addressing the issue from outside the country where the issue is found.
6. Omnipresence of IOs in making decisions and pursuing goals - no agents, including states, expect these organisations to suddenly cease existing which would otherwise give rise to only short-term gains being sought by all actors.
7. Omnipresence of IOs in providing incentives and sanctions to maintain compliance - while these organisations may lack an immediacy of coercion, other tools are used to ensure compliance. Agents are also aware that cooperation leads to greater gains in the long term than deliberate sabotage of a cooperative system.

From this they conclude that relations in the international sphere, just like domestic relations are “enduring and institutionally dense” (Cohen & Sabel, 2006, p. 166). This directly refutes the claim of statist that only in the domestic sphere can there be relations that give rise to justice that are continual, persuasive, and consisting of institutions that maintain norms allowing society to work in the best interest of all parties involved (be they states, other IOs, other international agents – like companies – or in an indirect sense, individuals).

Cavellero (2010) focuses on the international property regime and its coercive nature which should give rise to global redistribution. The overall argument of Cavellero (2010) is that individuals the world over have the same claim to socioeconomic equality as that which statist claim is only pertinent within the state (p. 17). Whereas statist argue that the institutions that exists domestically provide the justification as well as means by which redistribution can occur, Cavellero contends that the domestic and international institutions should be working together in order to fulfil the international redistribution that is necessary as a result of the coercive nature of the international property regime (2010, p. 17). Cavellero (2010) takes the notion from Blake’s argument that within the system of institutions that make the state, and so domestic coercion, what it is - namely property rights (p. 18) - and superimposes three observations. Individuals can hold property in more than one state, a sizable proportion of global property holdings are transnational, and the transnational nature of said property holdings presuppose the integrated international system of property norms that we

have today (p. 19). As a result of citizen X having multiple interactions with the legal systems of many differing countries, the legal systems in place to protect X's holdings internationally are not cleanly lineated by the legal system of only one country. Instead, different legal systems are involved in having to enforce the judgements or laws of other legal systems (Cavellero, 2010, p. 20). All of which is dependent upon a vast foundation of international agreements, treaties, laws, and organisations which maintains the systems integrity (p. 20). Here, Cavellero (2010) addresses the statist rebuke that domestic legal systems are the only systems that can directly coerce an individual. However, if an individual has holdings in more than one location, then the individual can be coerced through the issuance of threats against their interests in the location other than that in which they reside (p. 21). As for the matter of immediacy of coercion - if an IO rules in favour of a foreign land holder, creating a situation in which a domestic land worker can no longer work a piece of land that would have provided food for X's family, it would be the responsibility of X's government to enforce the ruling of the IO. X's country would, in theory, have full control as to whether they abide by the ruling and so increase the hardship on their population, in favour of foreign interests or ignore the ruling. But that is assuming the decision by X's government was a decision made without external coercion to agree to the original agreements that may either result in an imbalance of gains in favour of the more powerful state or result in an overthrow of the current government in favour of a government that will be more sympathetic to the suggestions made by the more powerful countries (Cavellero, 2010, pp. 22-23). The latter is not something that has been a rare occurrence in the past, as Cavellero provides seven explicit examples of this exact practice occurring between 1953-1988 across South America, Africa, and Asia (p. 24).

Abizadeh (2008) makes the cosmopolitan case through the lens of border controls. He argues that under democratic theory, one would be compelled to either eliminate the coercion at hand ("reject the unilateral right to close borders", Abizadeh, 2008, p. 38) or to justify the coercion to all found to be subjected to it, citizens and foreigners. As has already been agreed in previous discussions in this thesis over liberalism and the requirement to justify power - specifically coercion - Abizadeh (2008) holds that under the guise of popular sovereignty that the use of political power is legitimate only when it is justified by those who are exposed to it (p. 45). Abizadeh (2008) does not intend to advocate for all matters within a sovereign state to be up for discussion between all individuals around the world, only in the cases where the political regime subjects individuals to coercion (p. 45). From this, he constructs the idea of an unbounded demos - this meaning that there is a selected demos of whom justification for

coercion can be automatically applied, but this demos is not found within one set territory (p. 45). He argues this by explaining the flaws in the concept of democratic theory: who were the people that decided that they were going to create their own group of people and make their will the legitimising will of the people? As borders are the most coercive tool of wielding political power (crossing a border results in an instant change to your rights and legal obligations) they must be legitimised, but if there was not consensus initially, on whose will was supposed to legitimise the border, then how can that border itself ever be legitimised (Abizadeh, 2008, pp. 45-46)? It is this lack of logic that Abizadeh compounds on to make the case of legitimising border controls through all who are coerced by it, as opposed to just those who are said to currently legitimise it under democratic theory.

Rethinking Coercion

Based on what was presented in the first subsection of the literature review, it is clear that there are some aspects of coercion that are accepted, and some aspects that are contested. In this chapter, this thesis will look to settle on one framework for coercion that can then be applied to the accounts of coercion theories to determine which of the two are more accurate to what is observed in reality.

The first feature of coercion that should be solidified, is the idea of whether an act towards an individual, a threat made to someone, or the actual behavioural change in the coercee is what should count as coercion. From the literature it can be said that there is a stronger case to be made for acts and threats to be the detail that identifies coercion. A majority of the literature (Abizadeh, 2008; Anderson, 2008; Blake 2001, 2011; Miller, 2010; Risse, 2006), talks about an act or a threat being a necessary condition for coercion to be identified, whether it is mentioned implicitly or explicitly. It is only the pressure approach provided by Anderson (2008) that talks about the actions of the coercee changing being a necessary feature identifying coercion. The issue with looking at the changed behaviour of the coercee is that it leaves open the potential that one could claim that one is being coerced, without there being an actor creating the behavioural change. Technically speaking, there being a coercer is not a necessary condition for this conceptualisation of coercion. For this reason, it is evident that acts and threats issued by an agent (coercer) must be targeted at another agent (coercee) in order for coercion to be identified in the first instance.

The next feature would require figuring out whether narrowing down of options is a necessary part of coercion. Again, there is a slim consensus within the literature (Abizadeh, 2008; Blake 2001, 2011) that sees a narrowing down of options available to an actor as a necessary feature of coercion. Given the definition of autonomy, this makes sense. As Raz's third autonomy condition (see Introduction) says, autonomy is compromised if an agent is unable to make a decision on an option without outside interference - of which, someone narrowing down your options for you, is a blatant example of such. The debate on this feature does not end there though.

Risse (2006) and Miller (2010) try to show that a necessary feature of coercion is having an agent's options limited to A, or nothing at all. This is a faulty conception of coercion when identifying coercion through the lens of a violation of autonomy. If X has a full option set when

X first sets out to make a choice (with a choice set A - G), and overtime fewer and fewer options remain available for X to choose - and vitally this is a result of Y's conscious decision to make X not choose some options - then it is completely illogical to not identify the actions of Y, on X, as coercive. There is no doubt that the strongest coercion is witnessed when X has only option B to choose from or no option at all, but the process of Y whittling down the options before X only has B to choose from, is just as coercive as the end result because there is a clear identifiable interference in X's choices.

Conversely, Abizadeh (2008) makes the claim that if Y issues threats to no one in particular, then this should also be identified as coercion as this could have implicit effects on how decisions are made. This argument should also be disregarded for the fact that in the previous paragraph, there was agreement that there must be an identifiable coercee - in the same way that the pressure approach was disregarded for not having the necessary feature of a coercer, here the necessary feature of a coercee is absent.

Something that is almost inherent to the idea of coercive relationships is the power differential that exists between coercer and coercee. Anderson (2008) makes explicit reference to power within a conceptualisation for coercion, but across all conceptualisations in the literature there is implicit indication. In statist arguments, the power differential comes from the state holding a monopoly on the use of force (*a prima facie* identifier of power) and having vast institutions that maintain that monopoly, while their citizens are subjected to said power. If they object, they are coerced until they no longer have an objection or have freedoms removed. In cosmopolitan arguments, power differentials are a little more on-the-surface - Cavellero (2010) references the various successful actions of powerful countries to control the governance of weaker countries in favour of the powerful, Abizadeh (2008) references the power of borders over everyone. The point that is being made here, is that without a power differential between two actors it cannot be said that coercion exists. As Anderson (2008, p. 14) points out, there must be a reason why the coercee feels compelled to change their actions, more so than just the option no longer being available. This feeling must be backed by the idea that the coercee feels unable to counter the threat or act that is being done unto the coercee by the coercer, because they simply lack the power (money, tools, physical strength, cognitive ability, *etcetera*) to retaliate.

The final feature of coercion to be discussed is the immediacy of coercion, something that is referred to by Risse (2006). It could be argued that there is either a partnership or

dichotomy between the idea of immediacy and power differentials. One could argue that immediacy of coercion comes only with the ability to enforce one's will on another without fear of any recriminations. On the other hand, it could be argued that just having power alone is not enough. One must also be able to possess the ability to act at the exact moment that the coercee has decided to ignore the threats issued or acts undertaken, and that power does not equate for that. To visualise the second point think of a horse race. If A has the strongest, fastest horse on paper but is unable to turn up to the race resulting in another weaker, slower horse winning that race - it makes no difference how much power A's horse had in theory. It only matters what power A was able to wield when the time comes to wield that power. This is where immediacy comes into the picture, the coercer needs to be able to act coercively at the exact time that the coercee has stepped out of line, otherwise there is no consequence for not abiding by what the coercer has demanded, thus no more coercion through which control can be maintained.

That said, when immediacy is a feature that one can claim is a part of the coercion that is to be utilised, then it is necessary for that immediacy to be backed up by power. While the two can exist in parallel to one other, to get to a coercion that is closest to its truest form, the two features must be concurrently operational.

Moving onto the next chapter, the four necessary features that create a framework for coercion are: a threat or action aimed at an agent by an agent, that seeks to narrow the options available to the coercee, the coercer holds a strong positive power differential over the coercee, and the coercer must be able to immediately inflict their power should the proposed coercee not abide by the conditions set out by the coercer.

Finding the Correct Coercion Account

In the literature review there was the divide between statist and cosmopolitans. This chapter will look at the two accounts and debate which arguments are logical or illogical based on the contemporary world. Two points of contention shall be analysed: the differences in the institutions found domestically compared to internationally, and the differences in the types of membership seen internationally compared to domestically.

Statists argue that the reason why coercion seen within the state is of such importance to justify, is because this coercion is backed by strong institutions that contain all four necessary conditions identified in the previous chapter. The fact there is a legal apparatus that maintains the law, authoritative arms of the state that maintain order, legislative arms that provide legitimacy to the system and maintain applicability of the laws to the citizenry, and an economic system that seeks to distribute wealth within the borders of the state is all well and good. But what the statist disregard is the idea that this can exist outside the state as well. It does not have to be independent of the state at an international level - something the statist disregard in their approaches, but instead incorporates the institutions seen on a domestic level across the various countries that engage in the practices. Nagel (2005) draws on the point of Hobbes that laws and societal order does not exist in spite of the citizenry, but for the citizenry in order to maintain the most suitable conditions for prosperity (whether that be economical, social, cultural or otherwise). The same can be said for the network of international cooperation and interconnectedness. There must either be a benefit for those states that engage in the international structure of rules, norms and practices, otherwise they would not engage. If one day the benefits ceased, then the cooperation would cease – it is not solely dependent on the institutions. Just like if state institutions were to vanish overnight, there would not be a direct dissent into chaos (Sangiovanni, 2016, p. 274). Similarly, if a state had just and fair institutions that benefitted all citizens one day, and the next they were replaced with institutions that were unfair and unjust it would stand to reason that this system would no longer be legitimised, and the system would change - either democratically or through revolution.

While Blake (2011) would point to the idea that the state is the only actor capable of being able to redistribute wealth due to its ability to tax, it should be known that where holdings, goods, or services even are traded across a border, the country into which the item is being imported, coerces through tax (unless there is exemption from this due to prior arrangements like a Customs Union or a Free Trade Agreement). In the case where an individual citizen

refuses to pay their share of tax, they would be dealt with through the respective institutions within the state and if all else fails they would be removed from society. In the case of items crossing a border that are liable to duties and taxes, if these are not paid then the item is kept out of society, they are not allowed to cross the border. While small on scale, it is an example of where taxation (which leads to the redistribution of wealth under coercive theories of redistributive justice) occurs not just domestically but outside the state as well, coercing non-citizens.

For these reasons it would stand to reason that Risse (2006) has the approach closest to reality. His acceptance that there is coercion internationally but that it is different from that seen within the domestic and so should be justified differently, makes more sense. That is until you take into consideration the seven international relationships provided by Cohen & Sabel (2006). To go back to the point made earlier, the international system is not trying to replace the domestic system of institutions but complement it and reinforce it. In this respect therefore, it would stand to reason in the instances where domestic institutions do align perfectly with the international institutions and they complement each other, there is a clear claim to justice that is owed. But in the instances where there is no complementariness between institutions, then this should not give rise to equal claims to justice that are seen domestically. In the event of complementary institutions there is also the ability for the immediacy of coercion to be acted upon - an international tribunal may be unable to directly enforce its own rulings but based on agreements and overall benefit in compliance over non-compliance, institutions within the state will act on behalf of the tribunal and enforce the judgment made.

Membership is a big talking point in the realm of coercion and the institutions that allow coercion to exist. Nagel (2005), Blake (2001), and Risse (2006) argue that membership of a state is non-voluntary. Their argument is, if you choose not to engage in a meaningful way in society (abiding by the laws, paying your fair share, engaging in your duties) you will not have full access to the benefits of the society in which you live, through coercion. As it is not as easy as just saying you do not agree with how things are turning out in a state and handing over your citizenship, you are therefore compelled to engage. Further they argue, although it is Nagel (2005, p. 140) who makes the point most precisely, that this form of membership simply does not exist on the international level - he says that there is a distinction between a desire to see gains from membership over a distinct use of force designed to keep members locked-in and behaving. Blake (2011, p. 566), takes the approach that IOs do not coerce through force, but

offer opportunities of freedom that states benefit from and so get involved, but otherwise do not.

Cavellero (2010) has the perfect retort to both these points, which is backed by one of the necessary features of coercion identified in the previous chapter - power differentials. Unless there is an out-and-out military invasion, trade war, or the like imposed on a country, it is difficult to ascertain under what conditions a country might have signed up to an international agreement. Applying rationality alone, if Country A has x amount of gold and Country B wants that gold, then Country A has the ability to set the price (up until the point at which B no longer feels as though the gold is worth what A is willing to sell it for). If A has a poorer overall population than B, and the government has been democratically elected by the people of A (to satisfy Nagel's assumption that distributive justice can only be present in countries with strong institutions, including political institutions), it stands to reason that A would seek to get the best outcome to permit redistribution among its population. In reality, we may see a deal being struck that is imbalanced in favour of the richer, more powerful country (Cavellero, 2010, pp. 22-23). Now, that does not sound like the opportunity of freedom that Blake tries to sell as the non-coercive realm of international trade. To counter Nagel's point, Cavellero goes further in stating that if a weaker country would try to just walk away from a situation where they are being exploited, then that government could find themselves in a position where they are deposed of by a foreign power. The world in which statisticians find themselves, is one where they take literally the concept that every state is sovereign and holds equal rights when interacting with one another. In reality, this is inaccurate.

On the topic of membership, Abizadeh's account stands out with his argument of increasing the demos beyond the border that was supposedly legitimised by those within the border. If that is the case, then who decided that they were to be included and who decided that they were not to be included? If, a long time ago, a decision was made about a boundary, what makes that decision made back then so permanent? These are questions that statisticians fail to answer in their assertion that the state is the most important unit and membership of the state is the token through which redistributive rights are granted. In the same way that in the time before strict border controls, if a people felt threatened or felt as though there was nothing more for them in a particular place they would migrate freely. While this may not be a practise available to all states involved in IOs - just as leaving where you were when danger occurs was not an option to all even back then, because of power differentials present - the more powerful states can pick and choose which memberships they intend to keep over which ones they intend to reject. If the current domestic system we have now, was built on the system where it was

once possible to relinquish membership, then it makes sense that sometime in the future the same will be the same for the international sphere. Much like there were foundations of the full system we have today that still gave rise to redistributive rights back then, even if these rights were small compared to what they are today, it would stand to reason that there is a claim to redistributive justice to be had on the international arena.

To conclude this chapter, it would stand to reason that statist are unable to fully rebut the points made by cosmopolitans in their arguments that there are parallels to be seen between coercion occurring domestically compared to coercion occurring internationally. But it also stands to reason that cosmopolitans fail to show the equal level of coercion across the board in terms of the type of coercive practices experienced on the international stage.

Conclusion

Weighing up which account meets all the necessary features of coercion, aides in locating the truest account of coercion based on the reality in which we all find ourselves in. The domestic coercion touted by statist to be the only justifiable coercion, meets all four features. The state is the coercer, and the citizen is the coerced. The state narrows the options of citizens to act in the way they like - you are not allowed to kill whoever, nor take property you would like to, nor to opt-out of duties like taxes. The state holds the power over citizens in ensuring compliance in society's best practices (like obeying the law and paying taxes). The state is also able to enforce its desires onto any citizen immediately via its authoritative arms.

The international coercion touted by cosmopolitans to be included with domestic coercion in requiring justification, also meets all four features but not in the same way as under domestic coercion. A state or IO can be a coercer and an individual citizen, group of citizens, or state can be the coerced. The coercer is able to restrict your options - if there is non-compliance this can result in sanctions, expulsion from agreements to name but a couple of responses - but this is not universally applicable across all branches of international coercion. The coercer is more powerful than the coerced, otherwise there would be no coercion to answer for - as there is not just one agent who is always the coercer in international coercion, each instance of 'coercion' must be assessed independently. The coercer may be able to enforce its desires with immediacy, but this is dependent on the type of international action that is being coerced - there is no automatic immediacy that can be drawn from coercion in the international sphere with the current levels of international institutionalism.

What this creates is the conclusion that while cosmopolitanism is not to be completely disregarded, statism does not create such a strong argument where it alone can be accepted in place of cosmopolitanism. The contemporary international institutionalism is not yet strong enough to be able to lay claim to the full bill of rights that is taken from domestic coercion, but nor is it so weak that no claims can or should be made in the name of redistributive justice at all. In order to fully answer the question, and ascertain the truest account of redistributive justice, it would be advisable for further research to look at the branches of international coercion that do provide an equal to justice as to that which is seen domestically, and to further identify what is lacking in the cases where international coercion does not meet the same standards as domestic coercion.

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