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Saudi Arabia's policy towards Syrian refugees: The role of Saudi Iranian conflict

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The voting behaviour of the permanent members of the UNSC and their economic incentives to do so



**Universiteit
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Abstract

The voting behaviour in the UNSC is sometimes illogical and unpredictable. However, we know that states do whatever is in their power to maximize their gains in their effort to survive. This thesis tries to find evidence that states vote according to their domestic interest by conducting a logistical regression analysis of the voting behaviour of the permanent members of the UNSC and their bilateral trade relationship with the states that are subject to the vote. I hypothesize that states would vote differently whenever the vote concerns a justice-intervention then if it concerns a peace-intervention. The logistic regression results show that an increase in bilateral trade significantly increases the chance of a veto being used by one of the permanent members of the UNSC. Furthermore, significant evidence was found that dyads which are both non-democratic are nine times more likely to use a veto than democratic dyads. However, no significant difference between justice- and peace-interventions was found when comparing UNSC votes. The findings illustrate that there is a potential link between trade and voting behaviour of the permanent members of the UNSC.

Key words: UNSC, Bilateral trade, Peace, Justice, Interventions, Democracy, Non-democracy, Veto.

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Introduction

The justice and peace debate encompasses numerous causal effect relations. In this thesis I will focus on investigating how international trade influences this debate, more specifically, how this factor is able to shape voting behaviour of international justice and peace interventions by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The relevance of this subject is shown by Kersten (2020). His view of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad illustrates how dictators can rule over ruins as long as the patronage structure in the dictatorship reigns supreme. This tactic used by non-democratic states to bribe the most influential people in the country in order to stay in power is heavily dependent on International trade. However, not only countries in conflict are dependent on international economic relations; some countries are dependent on other countries that are in conflict. An example of this is the relation between Russia and Syria. The fact that Russia has vetoed every UNSC resolution which potentially could result in negative consequences for Syria can be directly linked to the economic dependency of Russia on Syrian oil (Kersten 2020). In 2019 the Syrian government handed contracts for the exploration of oil over to two Russian companies. The Syrian minister of oil, Ali Ghanem, admitted that these contracts were directly influenced by the friendly behaviour of Russia towards Syria (Reuters, 2019). This behaviour could suggest that the votes of UNSC members can directly be linked to their domestic economic interests. In the example above, the suggestion would be that Russia deliberately blocks UNSC resolutions in order to improve their economic relation with Syria.

This thesis will try to explain this behaviour in a quantitative manner by measuring the economic interdependence between UNSC member states and states that are the subject of the UNSC resolutions. I hypothesize that there is a statistically significant relation between voting behaviour in the UNSC on resolutions involving international justice- and peace-interventions and the economic interdependence between the voting states and the states which are subjected to the vote. I chose to measure the voting procedure in the UNSC as my dependent variable because the votes are structurally recorded and thus clearly measurable. Furthermore the UNSC can be seen as the most prominent international body when it comes to deciding on international justice- and peace-interventions. It should be said that politics is by definition not easy to explain, many factors come into play when trying to explain why states make certain decisions. Because of this fact I will not only be looking at the economic influence on UNSC voting behaviour but will also be controlling for common religion, relative power and the level of democracy to see if these factors can be related to the UNSC vote or indirectly influence this process.

In this thesis I make a deliberate distinction between peace-interventions and justice-interventions because the interests of states are different in both of these situations. Let me illustrate

this with the use of an example. For instance, the United States (US) is unlikely to intervene in cases of a violation of justice in a state like Saudi-Arabia because they are highly dependent on the oil trade with the country. This interdependence deters any form of justice-intervention by the US. For the same reason however, one could argue that the US could also be more likely to support a peace-intervention in Saudi-Arabia. This would be because they have more interest in a more reliable trading partner, therefore the US preferably wants a stable Saudi-Arabia over an unstable one. If we follow this logic of self-interest when it comes to peace and justice interventions I would argue that states are more likely to use a veto when it concerns a justice-intervention and less likely to use their veto on peace-interventions when the UNSC vote concerns significant trading partners. In other words, when there is a vote in the UNSC about a state which is a crucial trading partner, states are incentivised to protect the status quo. When UNSC members do not have as much economic interest in the state which is subject to the UNSC resolution they would more likely support change. This idea shows that there could potentially be a significant difference between peace-interventions and justice-interventions when it comes to the voting behaviour of the permanent members of the UNSC. This led me to the following research question: “How does the economic interdependence of states influence the likelihood of international peace- and justice-interventions by the UNSC”.

I will start this thesis by conceptualizing the difference between peace- and justice-interventions to create a valid framework for categorizing UNSC resolutions. Then I will dive into the most common literature on the subject of economic interdependence and UNSC voting behaviour while simultaneously identifying possible control variables which can explain the possible relation between bilateral-trade relations and UNSC voting behaviour. In the Methodology section I will give an extensive explanation on the case selection, how I have selected my variables and how the variables are coded. After that I will share the results of my statistical analysis followed by a discussion of those results. In the conclusion I will summarize the thesis and its most important findings.

Conceptualization

Because the two main variables used in this thesis are peace and justice interventions these variables should be conceptualised first. This creates a good understanding and transparency of why I chose to group some UNSC resolutions into the peace category and others in the justice category. With the use of the most common conceptualizations of peace, justice and interventions from the literature I will create my own conceptualizations of “international justice interventions” and “international peace interventions” which are summarized in table 1.

Peace

Peace has been conceptualised in many different forms but one of the most well known conceptualizations of peace has been created by Galtung (1969). He creates the suggestion that there are two ways to look at peace. He describes these two ways as a two sided coin. On one side of the coin, peace is the absence of personal violence; on the other side peace is the absence of structural violence. These two ways are referred to as “negative” and “positive” peace. The idea is here that the absence of personal violence does not instantly lead to a positive condition, so this is defined as negative peace. Positive peace on the other hand is linked by Galtung with social justice, giving it a positive definition (p. 183). In practice, peace is most often described as negative peace. Positive peace is usually a successor of negative peace (Richmond, 2006, p. 368)

Justice

International justice is described by Armstrong (2004) as the philosophical framework which describes moral, human rights violations and international law as well as the international legal system and institutions that are created with the use of this philosophical framework (p. 590). McCargo (2015) uses the term “transitional justice” to describe the process of justice within a state. More specifically to describe the creation of special courts with sentencing power and truth and/or reconciliation councils (p. 5). The International Center for Transitional Justice (2018) defines it as followed: “Transitional justice is a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse. In some cases, these transformations happen suddenly; in others, they may take place over many decades.” The aims of these justice processes can be versatile, examples include: creating community cohesion, creating a common memory, resolving conflicts, political transition, creating a moral basis, closure, transparency, punishing criminality etc (McCargo, 2015, p. 7).

International-interventions

Andler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) described international interventions as “a negotiation of different understandings of sovereignty” or “as the result of ideological dominance” (p. 892). The different understanding of sovereignty is linked to the ‘responsibility to protect’. In 2000, the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) created a report called “The Responsibility to Protect” in which they propose that state sovereignty should be conditional on the ability of the government to protect the human rights of its population (Krasner, 2005, p. 95). The ideological dominance perspective focuses more on what ‘should’ be done. For example, someone who has killed someone else ‘should’ go to jail. These two reasons for international-interventions, “ideology” and “sovereignty” in short, create two different ways of looking at an intervention. First, the sovereignty intervention is an intervention to do what ‘must’ be done, to protect human rights and save lives. Second, the ideological intervention is an intervention to do what you think ‘should’ be done, it is an intervention to promote justice, truth and/or reconciliation. In addition, Autesserre (2014) conceptualised interventions as the use of military or civilian efforts to stop violence or prevent the recurrence of violence. These efforts would be carried out by a state, intergovernmental organisation or non state actor (p. 10)

International peace- and justice-interventions

Using the conceptualizations of peace, justice, and interventions from the literature I will summarize the main two concepts of my thesis (international justice-interventions and International peace-interventions) as follows. International peace-interventions are based on negative peace, they are interventions to stop violence and are incentivised on the basis of protecting the lives of innocent people. International justice-interventions are based on positive peace, they are interventions to promote what ‘should be’ according to the intervenor and are primarily focused on prevention of the recurrence of violence. These justice interventions include criminal-justice procedures, the creation of truth commissions and reconciliation councils. In both the international justice- and international peace-interventions, the intervening actor could be a state, an international organisation or a non-state actor. However the main intervening nature of international-peace interventions would be military, whereas by international-justice intervention this nature would mainly be civilian (see Table 1).

(Table 1, distinction peace- and justice-interventions)

Concept	International-peace intervention	International-justice intervention
<i>Peace theory</i>	positive peace	negative peace
<i>Connection to violence</i>	stop violence	stop the recurrence of violence
<i>Main goal</i>	save lives of innocent people	bringing people to justice / creating a common truth / create reconciliation
<i>Intervening nature</i>	military	civilian
<i>Intervening actor</i>	another state / international-organisation / non state actor	another state / international-organisation / non state actor

Table 1 will be used during case selection to determine which cases of UNSC resolutions are considered as peace- and which as justice-interventions.

Literature review

The research question is based on the idea that there is a link between how states vote on international peace- and justice-resolutions in the UNSC and their domestic economic interest. It is important to get to know what these domestic economic interests of states are in order to be able to measure their presence in security council voting. Furthermore it is also important to explore what is known about the voting behaviour of states in the UNSC. With the research question: “How does the economic interdependence of states influence the likelihood of international peace- and justice-interventions by the UNSC” I assume that states vote according to the interests of the government. In this literature review I will analyze what the main ideas about domestic economic interests and security council votings are in the literature in relation to my research question.

Economic interest

In democracies the ultimate goal of a political party is to win the elections, assuming that voters are rational actors, this would mean that political parties try to maximize their popularity (Alesina, 1988, p. 796). Increasing the overall welfare of the population would likely make a politician rather popular. Because of this the international behaviour of democratically elected state leaders would be inseparable with their economic incentive to increase domestic welfare. This connection can also be made for authoritarian leaders. These leaders rely on their economic power to maintain power. For instance, they need to fund a larger army to suppress the population and/or maintain a patronage relationship with influential groups or persons in society, both of which require large amounts of money. This makes authoritarian and democratically elected leaders both dependent on international trade. This realist way of states trying to maximize their power through trade and money is widely visible. For example, countries like China constantly try to maximize their influence in other states by influencing important groups and people in other states with economic aid (Hein, 2020, p. 387).

In addition, Aydin (2012) describes how the economic interest of the US, among others, shaped their interventions in both world wars (p. 2). These interventions by the US have likely altered the outcomes of the wars, which shaped the world as we know it. The incentive to intervene in an international dispute is possibly linked with the economic interdependence between the intervener and the state that is intervened in. Freysinger (1991) gives an example of this interdependence by describing how the lack of oil and steel in first world countries has created interdependence between these countries and some third world countries which have an abundance of these commodities (p. 331). This economic interdependence can influence the likelihood of peace interventions by the dependent state because their domestic welfare is dependent on the access of these commodities. A study by Bove et al. (2016) tested this hypothesis by looking at the connection between third party interventions in conflicts and the size of the oil reserve of the country which was intervened in. They found empirical support for their

hypothesis that both the supply and demand of oil likely increase the incentives for third country military involvement (p. 1272).

Religion / ideology

In contrast, it is also plausible that the decision to support international interventions can have other incentives than just economic ones. The choice to support interventions can be used as a diversionary tool to refocus the domestic focus towards a common enemy and away from the domestic problems of a government (Bass, 2000, p. 16), as is the popular narrative for British involvement in the Falkland war (Harvard, 2016, p. 44). Another incentive for peace or justice interventions can be an ideological one. Leader Maynard (2015) describes how a (usually small) group of ideological fanatics can alter the behaviour of a larger group in society (p. 80). This can result in a third party state pursuing an international intervention because of the will of the society in this state. Bass (2000) creates the idea that ideologies that rise above the idea of sovereignty, like religion or nationalism for example, can create an incentive for international interventions. He gives the example of many Muslim countries supporting the Muslim population during and after the conflict in Bosnia (p. 22). This resulted in many of the so-called Muslim countries to not support the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which primarily focused on the Muslim population in the former Yugoslavia as the main perpetrators of the conflict. This example shows how religion can be just as influential of a factor as trade as an incentive for states to support foreign interventions.

military spending

Another possibility is that relative power between states influences the decision to intervene or not. This idea of power is older than political science itself. As Thucydides claimed “The stronger exact what they can, and the weak concede what they must” (Cornford, 1972, p. 176). This idea implies that stronger states are able to impose their will upon the weaker ones, The weaker the state that is supposed to be intervened upon is the more likely it is the stronger states vote in favour of this intervention.

level of democracy

Other than beliefs and power, the cause of voting behaviour in the UNSC could also be linked to democratic values. As Immanuel Kant suggested in his work “toward Perpetual Peace”, peace is the logical outcome between states which are primarily governed by its citizens. This idea led to the creation of the democratic peace theory which suggests that democracies do not fight one another (Bass, 2000, p. 17). This widely acknowledged political science theory could explain why certain states veto certain resolutions. For example, according to this theory, France will veto a military intervention in Canada because both states are democratic and thus avoid conflict with each other.

UNSC voting

The dependent variable we will be looking at is voting in the UNSC. Because of their veto power the five permanent members are practically immune to resolutions that negatively target themselves (Chan, 2013, pp. 901-902). This results in them being de facto inviolable to international peace or justice interventions. This untouchability of the permanent members together with fact that the UNSC is made up of different states with their various domestic interests, results in a system where most potential resolutions that are destined to fail because one of the permanent members would oppose it never come to a vote in the first place (Dreher & Vreeland, 2014, p. 8). Ali (2019) found that when referring cases to the ICC, the UNSC's decision is influenced by geo-political considerations (p. 669). This theory is supported by the fact that UNSC referrals to the ICC exclusively involve people from African nations. This seemingly political approach to a justice process can be seen as unethical and unjust (Ali, 2019, p. 669).

Raykers and Smeets (2015) give an example of the political nature of the UNSC by explaining the role of France during the UNSC voting procedure in the case of military intervention in Libya. It is suggested that the national agenda of the then president of France, Sarkozy, was the main driving factor in the push for an intervention. The cause for this was among others the positive economic spillover effect for France in the region of North-Africa (Reykers & Smeets, 2015, p. 377). This example illustrates how states follow domestic interest during the UNSC voting procedures. The political game goes further than just the vote of one state. It is widely accepted that the votes of non-permanent members of the UNSC are "bought" by the more influential permanent members of the UNSC. The average aid a state receives during their service as a non permanent member of the UNSC is significantly higher than when the same states are not a member of the UNSC (Dreher & Vreeland, 2014, p. 8). This theory becomes clear when analyzing the resolution to intervene in Iraq. This intervention was supported by the US and UK and opposed by France, China and Russia. Both sides promised rewards and or punishment for the non permanent members in the UNSC at the time (Pakistan, Mexico, Chili etc) if they did or did not vote accordingly (p. 8). Poorer and smaller states are more likely to be influenced by this form of foreign aid or punishment than richer and bigger states (p. 36).

In the literature, many different causes for international interventions can be found. The cause can have political, economic and/or ideological causes. However, In this thesis we will primarily be focusing on the economic causes. Nevertheless the other possible explanations will be included as control variables. This gives me the ability to see whether our independent variable is not influenced by these other possible explanations. Furthermore, because of the fact that most resolutions which are doomed to fail never get to a vote in the UNSC, only focussing on researching the resolutions that actually get to a vote would thus result in some sort of selection bias.

In addition, the literature suggests that countries which are non permanent members get more economic aid on average. This implies that these states are easily manipulated or pressured by the permanent members of the UNSC, this is why we do not include non permanent members, because their vote is probably not linked to the intervened country but to the influence of the permanent members. Including the non permanent members into the analysis would thus make the research less internally-reliable. Because bigger and richer states are less influenced by these factors we can consider their votes as more independent and thus include them in the analysis.

Theoretical framework

The research in this thesis will be quantitative. The main independent variable is the economic interdependence between states. The dependent variable I will investigate is the UNSC voting behaviour. We will control for other potential causes for the dependent variable by investigating its relation with religion, military spending and the level of democracy. The main idea is that we will look if there is a significant difference between the voting behaviour when the vote is about a justice dilemma or a peace dilemma. A logistic regression analysis will be done to accomplish this goal. To find out how reliable the results are, different tests will be executed to control for the assumptions which need to be met for a proper logistic regression analysis such as the assumption of independent errors and influential observations.

Methodology

Variables

In this section a more detailed elaboration of the variables will be given. Including how they are selected, coded and their sources.

UNSC voting

The United Nations Digital Library (2021) recorded the votes of 2575 security council resolutions from 1945 until the present day. Out of these resolutions I chose to only include the votes of the five permanent members of the UNSC in the analysis because the literature suggests that the votes of the ten non permanent members are not independent. Since none of the cases I selected include abstaining votes there are two voting possibilities; Yes or no. These two possibilities will be coded as “no veto” or “veto” in my dataset. In the Case selection part of this thesis I will explain how I chose which resolutions out of the 2569 needed to be included in the dataset.

Economic interdependence

The economic interdependence will be measured by combining both the import and export between the five permanent members of the UNSC and the country which is subject to the resolution. This bilateral trade will be measured, because of data restrictions, for the closest year prior to the resolution which ends on a 0 or 5 (the bilateral trade for a resolution which was voted for in 1997 will be coded for the year 1995 for example). This way I control for a possible reduction in trade between the states because of a possible conflict which causes the UNSC resolution while simultaneously being able to get representable data for religion which was only measured every five years. The bilateral trade data is acquired from the Correlates of War Project (Barbieri et al, 2009). In some exceptional cases there is no data of trade between states, these cases will be coded as N/A and will not be excluded from the final analysis.

Religion

I will be controlling for the possible link between economic interdependence and UNSC intervention by common religion between the UNSC permanent members and the state that the resolution is about. This variable will represent the suggestion in the literature that there is potentially a causal relation between the main religions / ideology of a dyad and the voting behaviour of these states towards each other in the UNSC. For this variable I will be using the dataset of the Correlates of War Project which includes the percentage of religion in every state (Maoz & Henderson, 2013). I will calculate how strong the three main religions in the world (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) overlap between the dyads measured (permanent member in the UNSC state and the state that is subject to the UNSC resolution) to see if this is a potential influence on the voting behaviour in the UNSC.

Military spending

As described in the literature, it is plausible that stronger states are able to impose their will more easily on weaker states. To control for this possibility in my research I will include the control variable of military spending into the analysis. This will control for the theory that interventions are directly influenced by the military power of the states involved. For this variable I will be using the dataset of the Correlates of War Project dataset containing national material capabilities (V5.0) (Singer et al, 1972). The military spending of the state that is subject to the UNSC vote will be subtracted from the amount that the permanent members of the UNSC spend on their military. I will investigate this number which represents the relative difference in power between the measured dyads to look if there is a reason to believe that it can influence the potential link between bilateral trade and the UNSC voting behaviour

Level of democracy

To control for the democratic peace theory I computed a variable which tells us whether the states were democratic or not at the time of the resolution. Subsequently I coded three possible relations between the UNSC states and the states that were subject to the UNSC vote: “dem” if both states are democracies, “non dem” if both states are not democratic and “mix” if one state is democratic and the other is not. This variable will allow me to see if there is a potential relation between the level of democracy of the dyads and the potential link between bilateral trade and the UNSC voting behaviour. The data is acquired from the V-Dem institute which is specialized in collecting data about democratization and is based in Gothenburg, Sweden (Lührmann et al, 2020).

Case selection

As explained before I will focus on two different distinctions of international interventions by the UNSC and compare these two versions. I will make a distinction between these two versions using the table in the conceptualization part of this thesis (Table 1). Because of the complexity and diversity of international relations not every case will fit perfectly into the created model. The final results of which cases were included in which category can be seen in Appendix B. Since almost all UNSC resolutions result in all fifteen states voting in favour of the resolution I will exclusively be looking at cases where one or more of the permanent members used its veto. This is the only way of gathering a somewhat representative sample of “veto” votes necessary for a valid research. Because of the restrictions in data I was only able to gather data from before 2008, Because of this I collected data from 1945, when the UNSC was first formed, until 2008. In the dataset every resolution where at least one “veto” was used is included in the dataset. To make the dataset more representable and less susceptible to the problem of individual votes not being independent of each other, every state that was subject to the vote was only included once (the most recent one). Furthermore, cases in which more than one country or no

country at all was subject to the UNSC vote were excluded because there is no measurable bilateral relation in these cases. More information about the selected cases can be found in Appendix B.

Data analysis

The datasets containing the bilateral trade relations from the Correlates of War Project (Barbieri et al, 2009) is used as the foundation for the final dataset used in the analysis. I used R to filter out the combination of countries in the right year for the security council votings. For example, for resolution number s/2009/310 I filtered out the bilateral trade between the five permanent members of the UNSC and Georgia for the year 2005, Then I added the variable “peace” to all of these cases because the resolution was placed in the peace category. This is followed with the coding of the veto variable with “veto” for Russia and “no veto for all other countries. This is then done for all twenty five resolutions I have selected, which were then combined into one big dataset. This is followed by the creation of the democratic relation variable which indicates the democratic relationship of the measured dyads. Here the relation is computed as democratic, non-democratic or a mix. In addition, the dataset containing military expenditure for the states is added and filtered to be linked to the UNSC resolution cases which were selected earlier. The military expenditure of the state that is subject to the UNSC is then subtracted from the voting state to create a new variable containing the absolute difference in military expenditure between the two states. Lastly, the dataset containing data on a country’s religion as percentage of the total population is added. Again, this data is only added for the relevant cases selected earlier. A more detailed elaboration on how I added and calculated certain variables can be found in the appendix A.

Results

Preliminary findings

A multiple logistic regression with a generalised linear model was calculated to predict veto behaviour of the permanent members of the UNSC based on the trading relation, the type of vote, the democratic relation, the difference in military expenditure and the difference in religion between these states and the states that were subject to the vote. A total of 106 cases of trading relations between permanent members of the UNSC and states that were subject to the UNSC vote were used in the measurement.

Table 2. Results of logistic regression

Estimation of veto uses	estimate	exp(estimate) = odds ratio	std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(intercept)	-2.297e+00	0.10054	8.753e-01	-2.625	0.00868 **
flow	3.572e-04	1.00036	1.603e-04	2.228	0.02588 *
intervention.type	-1.006e-01	0.90427	5.004e-01	-0.201	0.84063
milex.diff	2.683e-10	1.00000	2.234e-09	0.120	0.90443
religion.diff	-1.122e+00	0.32550	1.354e+00	-0.829	0.40702
dem.rel/mix	1.282e+00	3.60502	7.919e-01	1.619	0.10540
dem.rel/non dem	2.198e+00	9.01024	8.737e-01	2.516	0.01186 *


*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

The only statistically significant differences in voting behaviour were found for bilateral trade and for the democratic relation between the measured dyads.

I found a statistically significant relation between the chance of a veto being called by a UNSC member and the increase in bilateral trade ($P=.026$). The chance of a veto being used was increased by 0.036% for every 1 million dollar increase of trade between the measured dyad. This measurement is significant on the 95% confidence interval with $P<.05$.

I found a statistically significant relation between the chance of a veto being called by a UNSC member and the democratic relation of the particular dyad ($P=0.12$) The chance of a veto being used was just more than 9 times higher when the state that is voting and the state that is subject to the vote are both non-democratic compared to when they are both democratic. This measurement is significant on the 95% confidence interval with $P=< .05$.



(Figure 1, bilateral trade, democratic relation & veto uses)

Figure 1 shows the influence of bilateral trade on voting behaviour in the UNSC when comparing the three variations of democratic relations between the measured dyads (all three significant values of the logistic regression analysis). As the relation between the mix group and democratic relation is not significant this line can be ignored. The significant difference between the democratic relation and non-democratic relation is clearly visible here. For both groups the chance of a veto being used goes up whenever there is an increase in the bilateral trade relation between the two states. However, this influence of trade is significantly stronger when both states are democratic than when both states are non-democratic.


Assumptions

Independence of errors

To measure the autocorrelation between the measured variables in the generalised linear model I conducted a Durbin-Watson test. This resulted in a DW value of 2.05 on a 0-4 scale with a p-value of .4046. As the Durbin-Watson value lies between 1 and 3 and is thus not significantly different from 2 the assumption of independence errors is met. This means that the errors are independent enough.


Normality of the residuals

The assumption of normality of the residuals measures whether the underlying residuals are normally distributed. In a perfect dataset the data points would follow the dotted line perfectly in the Q-Q (quantile-quantile) plot (see Figure 2). This is not the case with my dataset which means that the dataset is slightly skewed and is thus not normally distributed.



(Figure 2, Q-Q plot)

No influential observations



(Figure 3, Cooks Distance for Influential Observations)

Figure 3 shows the influence of individual observations on the dataset with the use of a Cooks Distance test. The standard threshold for a case being too influential is $4/n$ so this would be $4/106$ in my dataset. This results in a threshold of 0.0377 (represented by the blue line in Figure 3) This results in seven cases falling above the threshold and thus violating the assumption of no influential observations.

Discussion

Implications

The results of the analysis were not entirely according to expectations. Although the bilateral trade relation between the dyads seemed to influence the UNSC voting behaviour, this behaviour is not significantly different when the vote concerns justice- or peace-interventions. The expectation was that the probability of the use of a veto by UNSC members would increase whenever the vote concerned a justice dilemma and the particular dyad had a high amount of bilateral trade. On the contrary, whenever it concerned a peace dilemma the chance of a veto would increase whenever the bilateral trade between the dyad was lower. The idea was that stability (peace) is favoured whenever trade is high between the dyad. On the other hand, promoting justice dilemmas in a foreign country could hurt trade and thus a veto on justice dilemmas whenever trade is high was expected. However, no significant difference between these two groups (peace- and justice-interventions) was found.

As mentioned before the bilateral trade relation between two states does seem to influence the voting behaviour. The results tell us that whenever the trade between a dyad is higher, the chance of a veto being used by state A (permanent member of the UNSC) on state B (state subject to the UNSC resolution) seems to increase as well. This relation could have many different explanations. The most likely scenario is that UNSC states try to maintain the status quo whenever trade between them and the subject of the vote is high. I hypothesized that this status quo meant that they would support peace in a region and are thus less likely to veto a peace resolution. However, states might not care for peace in a region as long as the trade numbers are high. Why change a profitable situation? This leads to the bilateral trade number, separately interpreted from the peace and justice variable, being a significant influence on the voting behaviour of the permanent members of the UNSC,

The influence of the democratic relation between dyads is notable. With the chance of a veto being used whenever both states are democratic being nine times smaller than whenever both states are non-democratic. non-democratic states seem to have very limited support for foreign intervention on peace- and justice-dilemmas when it concerns a fellow non-democratic state. Democracies do however not hesitate to support these types of interventions when it concerns a fellow democracy. If we look at democratic peace theory, I suggested earlier in this thesis that democracies would be more likely to veto interventions in other democracies because they tend to avoid conflict among each other. However, the outcome of the analysis would suggest that in situations like this, democracies tend to be less likely to use a veto. This is opposite to the expectation, so democracies tend to be more supportive on foreign interventions among each other than their non-democratic counterparts.

One explanation out of the democratic peace theory for this voting behaviour could be that it is born out of the assumption of the democracies that peace and justice interventions through the UNSC is a tool to prevent the necessity of actual “military” intervention. Thus preventing war among democracies and indirectly supporting democratic peace theory. Furthermore democracies are held to a higher standard of international peace and justice by their population than their non-democratic counterparts. Liberal theory suggests that the population in a democracy expects its government to vote in the international scene according to their domestic norms and values (Bass, 2000, pp. 17, 20). The voting behaviour of democratic states can have a direct impact on their legitimacy because of the backlash it can have on the constituency. This potential backlash might be a motivation for leaders of democracies to not veto interventions in fellow democracies. An example of the impact of domestic norms and values on the international level is when Churchill decided not to execute top Nazis after world war two because he did not trust the British population to be able to tolerate such killing (p. 21). When we look at the incentives for non-democratic states to use their veto more often the possibility exists that these non-democratic states are less keen to intervene in peace and justice dilemmas which are just as present in their own state. For example, if Russia would support a justice intervention, which usually represents some progressive norms and values, it would indirectly delegitimize its own non-democratic and non-progressive form of governance.

Reservations

Because the dataset contains measurements from many different years it is possible that they are not independent from one another. In a perfect quantitative research you would like the measurements to be taken at the same time so they are not able to influence each other or be influenced by an external factor. The nature of the research made this imperfect scenario unavoidable but it should be taken into account when trying to create conclusions using the results from the dataset. To avoid this violation of the assumption of independence as much as possible I included only one case from every state that has been subject to the UNSC vote. This way the chance of a vote being influenced by another vote is limited as much as possible. In addition, the bilateral trade numbers were not compared to the total trade of a state. This can be problematic because a bilateral trade number of 100 million might not be significant for the US but can be highly significant for France. However, because every one of the five permanent members of the UNSC is included in almost identical amounts this problem should be accounted for.

The amount of data points is relatively small for a quantitative analysis. This causes some of the assumptions that need to be met for logistical regression to be violated. Unfortunately because of the lack of resolutions that have been vetoed it is impossible to create a huge dataset on this topic without violating the assumption of independent measurements. This is because if I would have used

more than one resolution per state that was subject to the vote, the voting outcomes would be influenced by prior voting outcomes. It would be interesting to see if it is possible to incorporate some of the cases where there has never been a vote because of the lack of support for the resolution in the first place. This would make it possible to create a bigger dataset, however, it would be hard to do this in a scientific way because of the lack of information.

Another important reservation is the fact that the dataset was not complete and some cases had to be excluded because of the lack of data. Because of the small scale of the dataset, this exclusion could have a significant impact on the results. Along with this, because of the limitations of the religion dataset used for this thesis, only the years ending on a 0 or 5 could be taken for the analysis. Although bilateral trade does not change a lot in just a few years, the fact that the year 1990 is taken for a resolution which was voted for in 1993 could mean that the data is not as accurate as it could be. Furthermore, some of the assumptions for a logistic regression were violated like the assumption of normality of residuals and the assumption of no influential cases.

Future directions

Overall, the link between bilateral trade, the democratic relation between the dyads and their voting behaviour in the UNSC is interesting. However, because of the small amount of reliable cases that were measurable and the violation of some of the assumptions, we should be cautious in drawing conclusions from this thesis. In addition, further research should be done expanding on the possible relations between the dyads measured in this thesis and the politics within the UNSC in order to achieve impermeable evidence for the possible link between bilateral trade and use of vetoes in the UNSC.

Conclusion

The hypothesis expected a significant difference in voting behaviour for UNSC resolutions which concerned peace- and justice-interventions with bilateral trade relations as the main predictor variable. During the data analysis no significant relation between these three groups was found. However, a significant relation was found between the two variables of bilateral trade and voting behaviour. With UNSC states being more likely to use their veto whenever they have higher bilateral trade numbers with a state compared to when they have lower bilateral trade numbers. This is likely caused by UNSC states being more likely to protect the status quo within a state when their trade relation is more essential than when their trade relation is viewed as non-essential.

Another significant relation was found when comparing the voting behaviour between non-democratic dyads and democratic dyads. If the voting state and the state which is voted upon are both democratic then the chance of a veto being used is more than nine times smaller than when both states are non-democratic. This is likely caused by democratic states keeping other democratic states more accountable for their mistakes than non-democratic states. On the other side, non-democratic states might want to veto interventions in other non-democratic states to legitimize their own non-democratic form of governance. Other variables which were controlled for when looking at the voting behaviour of the five permanent members of the UNSC, like the difference in military expenditure and similarity of religion between the voting state and state that is voted upon, turned out to have no significant influence.

The results are promising in getting to understand more about the voting behaviour in the UNSC. There is likely a relation between bilateral trade and voting behaviour in the UNSC. However, more research should be done in order to draw hard conclusions about these economic incentives to vote.

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Appendix A

List of variables used for the data analysis and how they are calculated.

Variable	Description
year	Year of data analysis
importer 1	State A
importer 2	State B
flow	Import of country A from country B in current US millions of dollars + Import of country B from country B in current US millions of dollars = total bilateral trade in current US millions of dollars
intervention.type	Type of intervention (selected according to Table 1): justice = justice intervention peace = peace intervention
veto	Has a veto been used by the permanent member of the UNSC: veto = veto power was used no veto = no veto power was used
dem.rel	What is the democratic relation between state A and state B: dem = both states are democratic non dem = both states are non-democratic mix = one state is democratic and the other is not
milex.diff	What is the difference in military power between state A and state B: Military expenditure of country A - Military expenditure of country B Because the intervening country has a higher expenditure in every case, the fact that x and y are not fixed for “UNSC member” and “intervened in” does not matter. the absolute outcome is always how much is the military budget of the UNSC state bigger than the intervened state
religion.diff	Percentage of similarity religions between country A and B: (Percentage of population that is christian in state A - Percentage of population that is

	<p>christian in state B) + (Percentage of population that is jewish in state A - Percentage of population that is jewish in state B) + (Percentage of population that is Islamic in state A - Percentage of population that is Islamic in state B) : 3 = score of difference in religion between state A and state B (with a score of 0 being perfect overlap and 1 being completely different</p>
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Appendix B

Cases used in the analysis.

case:	resolution nr:	peace / justice:	veto states:
Georgia	s/2009/310	peace	Russia
Zimbabwe	s/2008/447	Justice	China + Russia
Myanmar	s/2007/447	peace	China + Russia
Israël	s/2006/878	Peace	US
Cyprus	s/2004/313	Justice	Russia
(Northern) Macedonia	s/1999/201	Peace	China
Israël	s/1997/241	Justice	US
Guatemala	s/1997/18	Peace	China
Yugoslavia/bosnia	s/1994/1358	Peace	Russia
Panama	s/21048	Justice	France + UK + US
Libya	s/20378	Peace	France + UK + US
South Africa	s/19585	Justice	UK + US
Nicaragua	s/18428	justice	US
Lebanon	s/16351/Rev.2	Peace	Soviet Union
Grenada	S/16077/Rev.1	Peace	US
Iran	S/13735	Peace	Soviet Union
Afghanistan	S/13729	Peace	Soviet Union
Vietnam (excluded from the analysis because there was no trade data available)	S/13162	Peace	Soviet Union
Comoros	S/11967	Justice	France
Czechoslovakia	S/8761	Peace	Soviet Union
Jordan	S/7575/Rev.1	Peace	Soviet Union

Malaysia (excluded from the analysis because there was no trade data available)	S/5973	Peace	Soviet Union
Congo	S/4567/Rev.1	Peace	Soviet Union
Hungary	S/3730/Rev.1	Justice	Soviet Union
Thailand	S/3509	Peace	Soviet Union
Egypt	S/3188/Corr.1	justice	Soviet Union
Greece (excluded from the analysis because there was no trade data available)	S/552	Peace	Soviet Union
Spain	S/PV.49	Peace	Soviet Union
Syria (excluded from the analysis because there was no trade data available)	S/PV.23	Peace	Soviet Union

Appendix C

Complete data frame used in the analysis.

year	importer1	importer2	flow	intervention.type	veto	dem.rel	milex.diff	religion.diff
1980	Grenada	United Kingdom	21,07	peace	no veto	dem	26757394	0,0135
1985	Nicaragua	United Kingdom	12,09	justice	no veto	dem	23498000	0,0501
1985	Panama	United Kingdom	30,61	justice	veto	mix	24103531	0,039033
1995	Guatemala	United Kingdom	62,98	peace	no veto	dem	33256000	0,0517
1945	United States of America	Spain	109,47	peace	no veto	mix	89880278	0,0757
1955	France	Hungary	34,1	justice	no veto	mix	2763372	0,005367
1955	United Kingdom	Hungary	21,9	justice	no veto	mix	4179056	0,013767
1955	United States of America	Hungary	2,2	justice	no veto	mix	40333372	0,033633
1965	United Kingdom	Czechoslovakia	89,3	peace	no veto	mix	4648007	0,056433
1965	France	Czechoslovakia	62,1	peace	no veto	mix	3983065	0,048033
1965	United States of America	Czechoslovakia	46	peace	no veto	mix	50642382	0,0477
1995	United Kingdom	Macedonia	28,6	peace	no veto	dem	33363420	0,176667
1995	France	Macedonia	98,22	peace	no veto	dem	47725420	0,145033
1995	United States of America	Macedonia	151,4	peace	no veto	dem	2,78E+08	0,182233
1990	United States of America	Yugoslavia	1651,16	peace	no veto	mix	2,86E+08	0,087
1990	France	Yugoslavia	2116,35	peace	no veto	mix	31270000	0,0516

1990	United Kingdom	Yugoslavia	763,66	peace	no veto	mix	35000000	0,073333
2000	United States of America	Cyprus	425,4	justice	no veto	dem	3,03E+08	0,103233
2000	France	Cyprus	484,47	justice	no veto	dem	33692000	0,057367
2000	United Kingdom	Cyprus	732,41	justice	no veto	dem	35294000	0,068867
1955	Hungary	Russia	260,3	justice	veto	non dem	29357468	0,235267
1980	Grenada	Russia	0,14	peace	no veto	mix	2,01E+08	0,2333
1985	Nicaragua	Russia	306,2	justice	no veto	mix	2,74E+08	0,284667
1985	Panama	Russia	0,34	justice	no veto	non dem	2,75E+08	0,2736
1990	Yugoslavia	Russia	5462,6 2	peace	veto	non dem	1,25E+08	0,170867
1995	Guatemala	Russia	0	peace	no veto	mix	81850000	0,282567
1995	Macedonia	Russia	169,25	peace	no veto	mix	81957420	0,214133
2000	Cyprus	Russia	193,16	justice	veto	mix	51639000	0,032233
2005	France	Georgia	113,49	peace	no veto	dem	52967000	0,057933
2005	United States of America	Georgia	354,41	peace	no veto	dem	4,95E+08	0,0645
2005	Russia	Georgia	541,34	peace	veto	mix	18554000	0,0598
2005	United Kingdom	Georgia	105,61	peace	no veto	dem	56708000	0,078567
1960	France	Congo	41,7	peace	no veto	dem	3896600	0,007033
1960	United Kingdom	Congo	1,4	peace	no veto	dem	4632855	0,0132
1960	United States of America	Congo	4,2	peace	no veto	dem	45379600	0,0276
1960	Russia	Congo	0	peace	veto	mix	36959632	0,234733
1980	United States of America	Grenada	10,03	peace	veto	dem	1,44E+08	0,024467
2005	United Kingdom	Zimbabwe	123,2	justice	no veto	mix	56786000	0,050767
2005	France	Zimbabwe	22,47	justice	no veto	mix	53045000	0,0652
2005	Russia	Zimbabwe	19,69	justice	veto	non dem	18632000	0,0712

2005	United States of America	Zimbabwe	147,39	justice	no veto	mix	4,95E+08	0,0177
1985	United Kingdom	South Africa	2562,5	justice	veto	mix	22053000	0,0309
1985	Russia	South Africa	0	justice	no veto	non dem	2,73E+08	0,209
1985	United States of America	South Africa	3384,5	justice	veto	mix	2,43E+08	0,030933
1985	France	South Africa	1030,1	justice	no veto	mix	14569000	0,023633
1975	France	Comoros	15,6	justice	veto	mix	13034714	0,598733
1975	United Kingdom	Comoros	0,1	justice	no veto	mix	11475228	0,616867
1975	United States of America	Comoros	0	justice	no veto	mix	90948000	0,618967
1985	France	Libya	1044,28	peace	veto	mix	16716009	0,580433
1985	Russia	Libya	24,85	peace	no veto	non dem	2,75E+08	0,365267
1985	United States of America	Libya	389,41	peace	veto	mix	2,45E+08	0,6006
1985	United Kingdom	Libya	734,47	peace	veto	mix	24200009	0,598033
1980	France	Iran	1219	peace	no veto	mix	23038081	0,5841
1980	Russia	Iran	819,1	peace	veto	non dem	1,98E+08	0,373067
1980	United Kingdom	Iran	1040	peace	no veto	mix	23370478	0,6022
1980	United States of America	Iran	501	peace	no veto	mix	1,41E+08	0,5953
1950	France	Egypt	107,3	justice	no veto	mix	1400554	0,5277
1950	United Kingdom	Egypt	230,8	justice	no veto	mix	2287430	0,531667
1950	Russia	Egypt	42	justice	veto	non dem	15421709	0,291333
1950	United States of America	Egypt	94,2	justice	no veto	mix	14470276	0,5011
1965	United States of America	Jordan	23,7	peace	no veto	mix	51766801	0,594233
1965	Russia	Jordan	3,4	peace	veto	non dem	45939793	0,3664

1965	United Kingdom	Jordan	19,9	peace	no veto	mix	5772426	0,5965
1965	France	Jordan	5,1	peace	no veto	mix	5107484	0,583433
1995	United Kingdom	Israel	3435,01	justice	no veto	dem	24108000	0,580967
1995	France	Israel	2044,51	justice	no veto	dem	38470000	0,546
1995	Russia	Israel	457,3	justice	no veto	mix	72702000	0,3501
1995	United States of America	Israel	11122	justice	veto	dem	2,69E+08	0,576533
2005	Russia	Israel	1387,81	peace	no veto	mix	8023000	0,4932
2005	United Kingdom	Israel	4412,93	peace	no veto	dem	46177000	0,513633
2005	United States of America	Israel	23170,6	peace	veto	dem	4,85E+08	0,5467
2005	France	Israel	2214,94	peace	no veto	dem	42436000	0,4992
1950	Egypt	China	4,4	justice	no veto	non dem	2469276	0,321433
1955	Hungary	China	65,5	justice	no veto	non dem	2390372	0,303967
1965	Jordan	China	3,6	peace	no veto	non dem	13727373	0,321933
1975	Comoros	China	0,5	justice	no veto	non dem	28500000	0,326433
1980	Grenada	China	0,24	peace	no veto	mix	28500009	0,2794
1980	Iran	China	101	peace	no veto	non dem	25113093	0,320033
1985	South Africa	China	0	justice	no veto	non dem	4203000	0,248367
1985	Nicaragua	China	0,35	justice	no veto	mix	5648000	0,321433
1985	Libya	China	62,56	peace	no veto	non dem	6350009	0,3213
1985	Panama	China	3,48	justice	no veto	non dem	6253531	0,310367
1990	Yugoslavia	China	221,97	peace	no veto	non dem	2540000	0,262933
1995	Macedonia	China	4,78	peace	veto	mix	32886420	0,296033
1995	Israël	China	254,99	justice	no veto	mix	23631000	0,325067
1995	Guatemala	China	38,65	peace	veto	mix	32779000	0,307667

2000	Cyprus	China	169,03	justice	no veto	mix	41639000	0,287433
2005	Zimbabwe	China	300,91	justice	veto	non dem	29737000	0,253167
2005	Georgia	China	50,63	peace	no veto	mix	29659000	0,2907
2005	Israel	China	6614,0 2	peace	no veto	mix	19128000	0,311833
2005	United Kingdom	Myanmar	83,24	peace	no veto	mix	49978000	0,202467
2005	United States of America	Myanmar	5,83	peace	no veto	mix	4,88E+08	0,245
2005	France	Myanmar	59,34	peace	no veto	mix	46237000	0,225033
2005	Russia	Myanmar	3,02	peace	veto	non dem	11824000	0,2485
2005	China	Myanmar	1386,1 2	peace	veto	non dem	22929000	0,012333
1995	United States of America	Guatemala	3110,4 5	peace	no veto	dem	2,78E+08	0,056133
1985	United States of America	Nicaragua	120,72	justice	veto	dem	2,44E+08	0,063133
1985	United States of America	Panama	904,94	justice	veto	mix	2,45E+08	0,052067