



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Coalitional Presidentialism and Corrupted Coalitions: The Case of Brazil

Moreno, Andre

Citation

Moreno, A. (2022). *Coalitional Presidentialism and Corrupted Coalitions: The Case of Brazil*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master thesis in the Leiden University Student Repository](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3250154>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).



**Universiteit
Leiden**
The Netherlands

Bachelor's Thesis

“Coalitional Presidentialism and Corrupted Coalitions: The Case of Brazil”

Word Count: 7,992

Course: Bachelor Project- Inclusiveness, State-building, and Peacebuilding

Supervisor: Dr. A. R. Rustemi Ph.D.

Second reader: Dr. F. B. Mansvelt Ph.D.

Student: André Moreno (s2497433)

Date: December 24th, 2021

Abstract

Coalition presidentialism is when a minority president must form coalitions in fragmented parliaments to govern. To do this, the president uses formal coalition-building methods, such as agenda-setting power, or informal methods associated with corruption, such as paying bribes. Corrupt practices are normally shielded by the Executive and Legislative from judicial and control bodies, however, sometimes anticorruption operations breach this blockage and shake the Executive-Legislative relations. Literature often covers the Executive-Legislative connection, but the influence of the Judiciary and control bodies on coalition-building methods is little explored. Hence, this thesis asks what the impact of large anticorruption operations on informal methods of coalition formation is. The thesis advances that by understanding such impact, one can better estimate the effectiveness of anticorruption operations and delineate the judicial and controlling bodies' influence on informal methods of coalition-building. A typical case study about Brazil was selected and the method of analysis is theory-testing process-tracing. Furthermore, the thesis explores the development of big anti-corruption operations in each Brazilian presidency from 2003 to 2018: Lula (2003-2010), Dilma (2011-2016), and Temer (2016-2018). In the three governments analyzed, anti-corruption operations led to greater public and judicial attention to some types of corrupt practices, decreasing their attractiveness and leading to political instability. Moreover, billions of dollars were given back to the government because of the operations. The Presidency and politicians had to reinvent themselves on several occasions to sustain governability, but they ended up reinventing themselves in corruption itself: changing the intensity with which they used some coalition-building methods or resorting to innovative methods. As for the presidents, the ability with which they assembled a cohesive coalition was critical for their political survival and the intrusiveness of anti-corruption operations.

Table of Contents

<i>Introduction</i>	4
<i>Theoretical Framework</i>	7
<i>Methodology</i>	10
<i>Lula's Presidency (2003-2010)</i>	12
<i>Dilma's Presidency (2011- August 2016)</i>	19
<i>Temer's Presidency (August 2016-2018)</i>	25
<i>Conclusion</i>	29
<i>References</i>	32

Introduction

Despite the growth of populism and the persistence of autocratic governments, elements of democracy continue to grow worldwide, *ergo* increasing political competition and the plurality of directly elected bodies (Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2018; Haerpfer, Bernhangen, Welzel & Inglehart, 2019). In presidential systems, multiparty national assemblies lead to coalitional presidentialism, that is, when presidents fail to form a majority in Congress and seek political support through durable cross-party alliances (Abranches, 1988).

To prevent minority governments from failing due to legislative gridlock, constitutions transfer certain legislative powers to the Executive in hopes of creating mutual dependence (Chaisty *et. al*, 2018). Raile, Pereira, and Power (2011) call this the “presidential toolbox”, according to which the president stretches its persuasiveness by using agenda-setting power, budgetary allocation, cabinet management, direct influence over one or more parties, and country-specific informal institutions. When a coalitional presidentialism is formed in a context of weak democratic institutions and ongoing widespread corruption, the mentioned tools develop into an exchange of favors, involving practices such as bribery, illegal electoral assistance, lucrative office appointments, and illegal benefit for businesses (Chaisty *et. al*, 2018; Mello & Spektor, 2018).

The Legislative and the Executive branches then collude to shield illicit practices from judicial oversight and weaken control institutions- the latter being all bodies responsible for carrying out activities related to the defense of public property, laws, and increasing transparency in the government (Governo do Brasil, 2021; Mello & Spektor, 2018; Ministério Público Federal, n.d.a). However, sometimes, big anti-corruption operations breach this “blockade”, confronting long-institutionalized exchange of favors and shaking the bonds that hold coalitions together.

In this context, as events form symbols that persist through time, it is relevant to understand Brazil’s- which is this thesis’ case study- political past (Liu, Sibley, Huang, 2014). The First Brazilian Republic (1889-1930) was installed after a military coup against the Brazilian monarchy (Fausto, 2019). This period was marked by systemic electoral fraud and patron-client relations remnants of the monarchical patrimonialism- where the state is a

continuation of royal affairs (Fausto, 2019; Weber, 2013). A weak central government and strong states supported by landowners laid ground to a multiparty system tinted by regional interests that, despite authoritarian interruptions (1930-1945 and 1964-1985), influence politics to date (Abranches, 1988).

In 2005, a large-scale corruption scandal, called *Mensalão*, struck the country and entailed the Presidency making monthly side payments to legislators for their votes (Pereira, Power, & Raile, 2008). Less than 10 years later, in 2014, the *Lava-Jato* scandal broke and arguably contributed to President Dilma's impeachment. Coalitional presidentialism prevailed *vis-à-vis* crises, but it was each president's ability to maintain the coalition cohesive and protect the political class from court convictions that determined the Presidencies' fates.

Along with high levels of institutionalized corruption, the Brazilian experience reveals that individual strategies and political defections play a role in determining the informal methods (toolbox) used by the Presidency. Likewise, non-electoral mechanisms such as protests and anti-corruption investigations lead to reputational costs, potentially changing politicians' incentives for corruption (Balán, 2014). To better comprehend the role of incentives within an institutional framework, Rational Choice Theory (RCT) must be mentioned. RCT predicts that individuals are rational, acting in a utility-maximizing way to yield the highest personal gains when considering available information (Shepsle, 2010). After attributing value to each action and stipulating the involved risks, the actors only change their action plan if the costs of a preferred action rise without a correspondent increase in benefits (Shepsle, 2010). Analogously, new legislation and reframed social norms might change incentives for people to engage in corruption, halt their ability to conceal transgressions, or in cases of endemic corruption, raise rational preference for alternative forms of fraudulency (Carson, 2014).

Although previous literature on coalitional presidentialism explores its mechanisms, and how it relates to corruption studies, it does not cover satisfactorily how the president's coalition-building powers interact with the challenges imposed by judicial and control institutions. Thus, throughout this work, Brazilian presidencies are analyzed under the *aegis* of anti-corruption operations, responding to the following more general research question: How do large anti-corruption operations impact informal methods of coalition formation? And more

specifically: How did the *Mensalão* and *Lava-Jato* impact informal methods of coalition formation in Brazil?

This thesis is presented in seven sections, including the *introduction*. The *theoretical framework* defines the philosophical light under which coalitional presidentialism is analyzed. The *methodology* explains the research design, case selection, and methods of analysis. Sections 4, 5 and 6 analyze the interaction of anti-corruption operations and coalition building methods in three different periods: *Lula's Presidency (2003-2010)*, *Dilma's Presidency (2011-August 2016)*, and *Temer's Presidency (August 2016- 2018)*. This selection corresponds to the periods closely preceding and following the outbreak of large corruption scandals. Lastly, the *conclusion* interprets the findings' implications, concluding the thesis.

Theoretical Framework

In 1990, Linz was the first to heavily criticize presidentialism, arguing it was doomed to fail. In Linz's (1990) view, the president holds considerable powers and is directly elected by the people, so are members of Congress, creating a legitimacy dilemma of who's "will" should prevail. This is worsened by the zero-sum nature of presidential elections (if one side wins, the other loses), whereby presidents become less attentive to smaller parties' needs and embody a sense of power and mission (Linz, 1990). Equally bad, the presidents' fixed terms split the political process into discontinuous periods, and crisis erupt in case of midterm termination of power (Linz, 1990).

In 1992, Shugart and Carey indicated that fixed terms mean predictability, midterm terminations are the exception, and double legitimacy allows for checks and balances. Mainwaring (1993) suggested that presidentialism is problematic to democratic longevity only if mixed with multipartyism, for the latter increases the likelihood of political polarization and legislative deadlocks. According to Mainwaring (1993), bipartidism is better because radical actors are barred by high-entry thresholds, and the president's party usually holds a majority.

Chasquetti (2001) empirically demonstrated that multiparty presidentialism results in effective governance if coalitions are made. As legislators need presidents to advance programmatic concerns and presidents need legislative support to govern, the president is stimulated to assume a coordination role and act as a prime minister when forming a stable majority (Chaisty *et. al*, 2018; Junior, Pereira & Biderman, 2015; Power, 2010). Chasquetti's (2001) findings on the sustainability of coalitional presidentialism give theoretical space for institutions to determine and frame political interactions while admitting strategic behavior by political actors when deciding whether to seek coalitions and how to manage them.

This thesis borrows from Chasquetti's (2001) conclusions while also drawing on a neo-institutionalist perspective, which believes that formal political institutions are composed of a coherent and stable set of norms that constraint political action (March & Olsen, 2008). Furthermore, it acknowledges that individuals' learning capacity and cost-benefit calculations based on personal and structural incentives can change a norms' system under specific conditions (March & Olsen, 2008).

Assuming that present outcomes are dependent on their historical unfolding (path-dependency), disruption of the *status quo* through events that provoke uncertainty on a prevailing institutional arrangement (critical junctures) are needed for rapid and radical changes (Capoccia, 2015; Collier & Collier, 1991; March & Olsen, 2008; Williams & Baláž, 2008). By considering the sudden advent of the *Mensalão* and *Lava-Jato* operations and the imprisonment of important politicians and businesspeople, apparently breaking with a former condition of impunity, the hypothesis advanced by this thesis is that anti-corruption operations impact informal methods of coalition-building.

The alternative hypothesis is that anti-corruption operations have no impact on informal methods of coalition formation. This can happen because although anti-corruption operations increase the perception that corruption is being fought, no real shifts take place as the political elite blocks intrusive regulations and concedes shallow reforms while protecting the distribution of private goods (Mesquita & Smith, 2017; Rupnik, 2007).

This thesis operationalizes large anti-corruption operations as nationwide criminal investigations that seek to oppose or inhibit corruption by identifying and apprehending perpetrators, collecting evidence to support their conviction in court, and determining if a crime has been committed (Reilly, 2019). Investigations are usually conducted by controlling bodies, which in Brazil amount to the *Polícia Federal*- PF (Federal Police), *Ministério Público Federal*- MPF (Federal Public Prosecutor's Office), *Receita Federal* (Federal Revenue Service), *Controladoria-Geral da União*- CGU (Federal Comptroller General), and the *Tribunal de Contas da União*- TCU (Brazilian Audit Court). Additionally, the 1988 Brazilian Constitution provides for the creation of inquiry commissions by the Federal Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (hereinafter: the Senate and the Chamber, respectively) (Siqueira, n.d.). Such commissions are granted with some judicial powers, such as the breach of bank, tax, and telephone confidentiality of those investigated, and should forward their final reports to the MPF (Siqueira, n.d.).

Informal methods of coalition formation are operationalized following the categories delineated by Chaisty *et. al* (2018): (i) electoral assistance through financial and administrative resources, (ii) favorable business treatment, (iii) direct financial inducements, and (iv) lucrative or high-status appointments (pp. 211, 212). To grasp these methods' illicit facets and adequately address the questions raised by this thesis, they are further specified: (i) electoral

favours whereby funds are corruptly sourced, (ii) business perks, fraudulent contracts, and permits, (iii) personal bribes, and (iv) cabinet nomination accompanied by the raising of illicit funds.

Because corruption is a major theme in this thesis, some space is devoted to describing it. Philip (2008) argues that corruption can only be roughly defined because of its normative and descriptive elements. His definition includes three key features: (i) a public official subverting the rules of office; (ii) favoring sectional interests to the detriment of the original beneficiaries; and (iii) usually involving three actors, namely the officeholder, the original beneficiary, and the actual beneficiary (Philip, 2008). To differentiate corruption from theft and other self-serving misdemeanors, it is held that corruption is systematic (Philip, 2008). Kurer (2005) suggests that corruption involves the violation of non-discrimination norms (that is, distinguishing amongst those who should be treated equally following local norms) by a public office holder to achieve private gain.

This thesis credits as corruption public officials' systematic violation of non-discrimination norms of office to achieve partisan gains. Beware that when such benefits refer to the assignment of public offices by politicians or parties to loyal supporters, it is called patronage, while it is political clientelism when there is an iterated and contingent principal-agent distribution of *any* excludable benefits for political support (Berenschot and Aspinall, 2018; Hicken, 2011; Piattoni, 2001; Remmer, 2007; Scott, 1972, 1977; Stokes, 2007, 2011).

A final note is that Presidency, englobes the direct advisory bodies of the President, such as the Cabinet Office and the General Secretariat (Lima-Silva & Loureiro, 2018; Palermo, 2000). This implies that no normative claims regarding the Presidents themselves are made. Similarly, by citing accusations, investigations, and indictments, this thesis reproduces facts of public knowledge without attributing guilt: every person accused of any crime is considered innocent until proven guilty by the competent judicial body.

Methodology

Well-defined theories of coalitional presidentialism and strategic behavior are taken to explore supposed causal mechanisms of large anti-corruption operations in shifting informal methods of coalition building. This requires in-depth knowledge that is best achieved with single-unit studies, which offer empirical observations of how variables interrelate, inductively contributing to general wisdom (Gerring, 2004, 2008). A typical single case is preferred as it yields wide representativeness and is well explained by existing theoretical models (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Within the typical case, this thesis judges the evidence according to a specific theoretic pathway, exemplified here as the change of incentives for corruption, following a pattern-matching investigation (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).

The screening of Brazil as a typical case is theory-based. First, Brazil is a pure presidential State where the president is the main coalition-builder, also called *formateur* (Chaisty *et al.*, 2018). Second, Brazil has constantly been ranked by the Freedom House (2020) as a democracy, meaning that Executive-Legislative dialogue is crucial for governance (Chaisty *et al.*, 2018). Third, the institutionalization of a strong executive and crescent parliamentary fragmentation followed a period of democratic weakness (a negotiated transition from a broadly corrupt military regime to democracy), perpetuating informal practices in its public administration (Assis, 1983; Mello & Spektor, 2018). Fourth, since 1990- the year symbolically ending Huntington's (1991) third wave of democratization- the country had two nationwide politically relevant corruption scandals, the *Mensalão* (2005) and *Lava-Jato* (2014) (Lagunes & Svejnar, 2020). Finally, as the Brazilian coalitional presidentialism remains stable after political and economic crises, it is a solid case of a growing form of presidential democracy, representing particularly well the Latin American context (Pereira & Melo, 2012). Therefore, it is important to study Brazil for its regional representativeness and to expand insights into the potential role of the judiciary and control institutions in rendering highly corrupt regimes more accountable in other coalitional presidentialism regimes.

This thesis employs theory-testing process-tracing to examine sequential events, unpack their causal mechanisms, and arrive at a midrange theory bound within the specific context of corrupt coalitional presidentialism. (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Falletti and Lynch, 2009). By applying process-tracing, one is expected to disaggregate a temporal sequence of key events, analyze consecutive changes and possible intervening causal processes, and relate

such changes to an explanatory narrative (Beach, 2016; Collier, 2011; Gerring, 2004). In this manner, a theoretical framework and a hypothesized causal mechanism are deduced from literature, and then empirical evidence is used to determine whether the hypothesized causal mechanism was present and functioned as theorized. (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Putting this into context, process-tracing might explain the impact of large anticorruption operations (X-theorized cause) on informal methods of coalition formation (Y- predicted effect) by dissecting and analyzing the set of phenomena and supposed causal mechanisms that link X to Y (Beach, 2016).

Data from 2003 to 2021 is analyzed, following source triangulation from official governmental documents, reports from renowned Brazilian newspapers (mainly, *G1*, *Estadão*, *Folha de São Paulo*, and *Veja*), and academic articles from recognized searching engines (Polit & Beck, 2012). Reports and articles are found through purposive sampling and exponential discriminative snowballing. The former allows for the identification of available and information-rich sources from experts (Patton, 2015). The latter is the selection of citations used in other articles, after scrutiny of the researcher to find relevant information (Oregon State University, 2010).

The study's main limitation revolves around the nature of informal mechanisms: they are not registered, their ethics are subjective, and when perceived as corrupt they are secretive. To alleviate these issues, findings are inferred and tested indirectly while contemplating standards of plausibility. Indirect evidence includes corruption allegations *in tandem* with shifts in cabinet representation, ideological alignment with the governing party, concessions on policy preferences, and transfers of particularistic resources (Pereira *et al.*, 2008).

Lula's Presidency (2003-2010)

Lula's first presidential term (2003-2006)

In 2003, President Lula's Working Party (PT) was ideologically split upon assuming power. The President and his Chief of Staff, José Dirceu, were part of the dominant political right within the party, predominantly vote-seeking (Pereira *et. al*, 2008). Nevertheless, about one-third of the PT's deputies represented the radical left factions, predominantly policy-seeking, meaning that social welfare programs would be on the agenda regardless of President Lula's electoral promises of sustaining austerity policies (Pereira *et. al*, 2008; Sant'Ana, 2020). To free up resources for welfare, the Presidency advanced the tax and pension system reforms, contradicting the interests of the PT's leftist faction, and reinforcing the need for a large coalition (Pereira *et. al*, 2008).

Although presidents prefer making winning coalitions with a minimal number of parties to retain a tighter agenda control, *formateurs* expand their coalitions when a substantial number of votes is necessary to approve an unpopular political agenda (Carrubba and Volden, 2000). Moreover, as a traditionally combative party, the PT comes from an historically hegemonistic and suspicious political culture (Sant'Ana, 2020). Taken together, these factors influenced President Lula's decision to co-opt a set of smaller political parties rather than costly traditional ones, avoiding altogether the strong influence of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) in the government (Sant'Ana, 2020). Notably, the PMDB was the third-largest party at the Chamber (14,42%) and the largest at the Senate (23,46%), while the PT was the largest party at the Chamber (17,74%) and the third largest at the Senate (17,28%) (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 2003).

This highly fragmented scenario and President Lula's coalitional choices led to a large and ideologically heterogenous coalition, making it difficult to conceal divergent interests (Martin & Vanberg, 2014). Seeking to promote coalitional discipline, the Presidency turned to cabinet management and expanded the number of ministries and secretaries with ministerial status (Barbosa & Pompeu, 2017). This distribution yielded 24 out of the 35 ministries and special secretaries to the PT, which also placed partisans in lower offices to guarantee the coalition's discipline through a process called politicization (Lima-Silva & Loureiro, 2018; Silva & Barbosa, 2019).

The overrepresentation of the PT is explained by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), who see it as a benefit of the *formateur's* party. More unusual, however, is that the other parties were not represented proportionally to their legislative weight, something called low *coalescence*. Coalescence is measured from 0 to 1, being that a higher number equals more representation and satisfaction among the coalition (Bertholini & Pereira, 2017). President Lula started the government with a 0.64 coalescence, lowering it to 0.50 by early 2004 (Pereira *et. al*, 2008). Allies such as the center-right Progressive Party (PP) and the Brazilian Worker's Party (PTB) demanded compensatory representation in key state-owned companies, e.g., the *Banco do Brasil*, and the National Development Bank (BNDES) (Congresso Nacional, 2006; Neto, 2007). In the first semester of 2004, these parties immobilized the Chamber until their appointee was nominated the director of Petrobras (Brazilian state-owned oil multinational) (Congresso Nacional, 2006).


Despite the Presidency's efforts to make political transfers through cabinet allocation, the coalition guaranteed it only 213 of the 308 votes needed to pass strategic reforms (Pereira *et al.*, 2008). Valuing to maintain autonomy over political decisions, the government decided to distribute budget amendments to the opposition- tactic that is politically cheaper and helps these politicians in their reelections (Pereira *et al.*, 2008). The opposition received 40.63% of the total money transfers destined to political parties, 75.70% of the total amount destined to individual legislators, and 89.43% of the total amount destined to state governors (Pereira *et al.*, 2008). Budget distribution to legislators' districts in exchange for votes is called pork-barrel (Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005). The use of pork-barrel certainly worked to approve legislation but caused discomfort within the coalition as allied politicians would compete against the same opposition legislators in the future.

Bertholini and Pereira (2017) indicate that the coalition's size, coalescence, and ideological heterogeneity impact the costs of governance, operationalized by the Governing Costs Index (GCI) on a 0-100 scale. Such costs involve the cabinet portfolios that the Executive allocates, and the legislative amendments it includes in the federal budget (Bertholini & Pereira, 2017). According to the index, the governing costs skyrocketed from a 37.2 GCI in former President Cardoso's second presidential term to 63.3 in President Lula's first term (2003-2006). If neither nominations nor budget allocations was able to give President Lula a solid majority, the question of how by the end of 2003, 11 out of 15 parties in the Chamber,

and 73% of the deputies supported the government suggests additional coalition-building methods (Congresso Nacional, 2006). In May 2005, the *Mensalão* corruption scandal unveiled at least some of these methods. The investigations discovered the following (see *Figure 1*):

Figure 1

Simplified scheme of the Mensalão and Lava-Jato corruption mechanisms



Key directors and managers of the *Correios* were indicated by politicians (Congresso Nacional, 2006). The *Correios* hired certain companies which offered from 3% to 10% of the overpriced transaction's values in bribes to officeholders (Junior, 2005). Two of these companies owned by Mr. Marcos Valério de Souza also had fraudulent contracts with the *Banco do Brasil*, *Eletronorte*, Ministry of Labor, and Ministry of Sports (Congresso Nacional, 2006). A congressional inquiry commission regarding denounces of vote-buying found that Mr. Dirceu (Chief of Staff of the Presidency) authorized the monthly financial transfers made by the PT's treasurer to legislators (Congresso Nacional, 2006).

The congressional inquiry commission of the *Correios* revealed that Mr. Souza raised funds in public and private banks and redistributed them to politicians under the guidance of the treasurer of the PT, to be used to cover electoral campaign costs and to buy votes in Congress already in January 2003 (Congresso Nacional, 2006). Due to Mr. Souza's proximity

to the Presidency, banks also offered him better terms so that he intervened with the Presidency in their favor (Congresso Nacional, 2006).

When considering this “system of bribes”, one can easily note the institutionalization of corruption in the Brazilian public administration (Ribeiro, Alves, Martins, Lenzi & Perc, 2018). *Mensalão* exposed the use of lucrative appointment-making envisioning the illicit collection of public funds, direct financial inducements (bribes), electoral favors (electoral donations of illicit money), and favorable business treatment (Mr. Souza’s companies) as informal methods of coalition-building (Força Tarefa Lava Jato, 2016; Congresso Nacional, 2006). The support garnered by the Presidency through the patronizing distribution of influential positions and vote-buying served for two coalition-building purposes: increasing the coalition size, which due to party migration went from 254 to 325, and approving the government’s agenda, which suffered only eight defeats in 134 polls during Lula’s first term (Força Tarefa Lava Jato, 2016; Sant’Ana, 2020).

The *Mensalão* operation caused the PT’s leadership to step aside from the party and convicted 24 out of the 40 defendants by 2014 (G1, 2012; Michener & Pereira, 2016). It is puzzling that the congressional inquiry commissions, sprouting from the legislature itself, and the Supreme Court, having judges who had been appointed by the Presidency, investigated and charged high-level politicians for crimes (Michener & Pereira, 2016). Yet, facts suggest that the constant flow of evidence brought by *Mensalão* allowed for numerous agencies to assist and oversee legislators in their investigations: the Federal Police, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Federal Revenue Service, and the Brazilian Audit Court (Michener & Pereira, 2016). The scandal’s revelations further attracted intensive media coverage and popular demand for transparency, conveniently meeting the needs of a fragmented and opportunistic legislature willing to use concrete evidence to destabilize the government (Michener & Pereira, 2016; Pereira *et al.*, 2008). Hence, several coalition leaders fell in Congress to accusations of corruption, and a weakened presidency had to increase the use of resources to sustain governability.

In this way, the development of *Mensalão* raised the costs of coalition formation. The Presidency resorted to methods that were beyond the perimeter of investigations and provided a higher amount of money, e.g., *Lava-Jato*. Moreover, to overcome the political crisis the Presidency reduced its hegemonic character of cabinet allocation and redistributed important

offices to the PMDB (Força Tarefa Lava Jato, 2016). Ultimately, the Presidency recovered its political capital and was able to approve important legislation, freeing funds to social policies and harvesting the benefits of a booming economy (Balán, 2014).

By joining judicial and controlling bodies under its umbrella, *Mensalão* improved institutional coordination and enhanced information flows, which combined with intense media coverage, promoted procedural transparency in the investigations and consolidated the idea that high-level officials are accountable for their actions (Michener & Pereira, 2016).

In response to the progress of the operation, Congress passed a series of anti-corruption laws: most notably, the 2010 Clean State Law, the 2011 Freedom of Information Law, and the 2013 Criminal Organizations Law (Michener & Pereira, 2016). The latter, together with harsh sentences and consideration of spontaneous revelations in reducing the defendants' sentences, strengthened the institution of plea bargain- widely used in *Lava-Jato* (Assessoria de Comunicação Social, 2014; Filho, 2017). Nevertheless, accompanying political stabilization, Congress retaliated against the judiciary by approving amendments limiting the investigative powers of the MPF and subjecting constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court to the Congress' conditional approval (Michener & Pereira, 2016).

On one hand, the approval of substantial legislation that proved crucial to *Lava-Jato* shows the inability of Congress to contain the effects of the operation and popular demand for transparency. On the other hand, the aggressive reaction of most legislators against judicial and control bodies once political stabilization was achieved, make it clear that *Mensalão* impacted the dynamics of Congress, and, in a way, made political alliances more costly due to the shutdown of some sources of illicit funds, and the political erosion of being associated with figures investigated for corruption. This reaction by the political elite contrasts with those predicted by Rupnik (2007) because in Brazil legislators passed important laws and actively sought to mitigate the political consequences of the operation, confirming the operation's relevance.

Lula's second presidential term (2007-2010)

Reelected for his second term (2007-2010), Lula's GCI reached 69.1 points, and proof of the rising costs of the government coalition surfaced with the advent of the 2014 *Lava-Jato* operation, explained next (Bertholini & Pereira, 2017). At least since 1990, a cartel of contractors worked together with the federal government in bypassing public bidding in exchange for articulating the payment of bribes (Força Tarefa Lava Jato, 2016). This cartel involved the nine biggest Brazilian contractors, and operated fully and consistently at least between 2004 and 2013 (Força Tarefa Lava Jato, 2016). In 2006, seven other contractors were admitted to the cartel, increasing the availability of illicit resources and number of actors committed to that end (Força Tarefa Lava Jato, 2016).

The scheme worked as follows: political parties nominated Petrobras' board members, who then approved overpriced contracts offered by the cartel (Ministério Público Federal, n.d.b). The bribes equaled from 1% to 5% of the contract and were sent to money launderers who transformed them into licit money (Ministério Público Federal, n.d.b). In a first moment, contractors transferred cash to money launderers through overseas accounts or shell companies, while in a second moment the money went from the financial operator to the beneficiary in cash, by transfer abroad or through the payment of goods (Ministério Público Federal, n.d.b). The beneficiaries included Petrobras' directors and their political patrons, political parties, and government officials. The main objectives were illicit enrichment, buying political support for the government's agenda, and illicit campaign funding for perpetuation in power (Força Tarefa Lava Jato, 2016). In this context, the distribution, by the Presidency, of senior positions in the federal public administration to politicians was, in several situations, linked to a scheme of diversion of public money before, during, and after *Mensalão*.

In addition to lucrative cabinet allocation, documents discovered by the MPF in 2015 indicated that a decree issued by Lula's Presidency in 2009 was "purchased" by lobbying in Congress and corruption to favor automobile assemblers (Matais & Fabrini, 2015). In 2017, the Presidency and other actors were accused of receiving bribes from the currently called J&F group (a Brazilian private investment holding company involved in *Lava-Jato*) to facilitate loans from the BNDES since 2009 (Serapião, 2017).

The increase of PMDB's cabinet share in the government, persistence of monthly payments to legislators, and expansion of the contractors' cartel in Petrobras following *Mensalão* shows an apparent change of strategies in cabinet allocation and a shift in the preference order of informal methods- from direct financial inducements to a more complex system of mixed strategies exposed at *Figure 1*. Furthermore, innovative methods such as the selling of presidential decrees and facilitation of loans to interest groups emerged.

Dilma's Presidency (2011- August 2016)

Dilma's first presidential term (2011-2014)

After serving as Minister of Mines and Energy (2003-2005), whereby she presided over the Petrobras' board of directors, and as Chief of Staff under Lula's Presidency (2005-2010), Dilma became the first Brazilian female president in 2011. She gathered a big coalition that went from right-wing parties (PP) to left-wing parties (Communist Party of Brazil-PCdoB), occupying 338 out of the 513 Chamber seats and 48 out of 81 Senate seats (de Santi, 2010; G1, 2011).

As seen, large coalitions ease the approval of government-backed legislation at the cost of higher complexity of policy persuasion. By default, the coalition's ideological heterogeneity implicates a sort of pragmatic governability, where ideologically distant parties trade vote alignment with the government's preferences for benefits through participation in the government (Uribe, 2011). Cabinet allocation is used to accommodate divergent interests, gaining even more attractiveness in Brazil where such positions often represent opportunities to collect illicit funds.

Dilma's Presidency maintained the PT's hegemonic tradition, which got 17 out of 37 offices as opposed to the 6 allocated to the PMDB (Ribeiro, 2010). The lack of representativeness of other parties in executive cabinets is corroborated by a low coalescence of 0.59 in 1, and a high GCI of 71 points in 100 (Bertholini & Pereira, 2017). News reports from the period indicated that PMDB's Congressmen complained about PMDB's low representation, and that the replacement of four key directors of Petrobras in 2012 displeased the PP, PMDB, and PT, causing important defeats for the Presidency in Congress (Madueño, Lopes & Samarco, 2010; Oswald, Jungblut & Ordoñez, 2012). Amid political struggles, Dilma created two more secretaries with ministerial status, reaching 39 executive departments by 2015.

Before completing a full year in government, President Dilma saw six ministers fall, all of them denounced for corruption (Estadão, 2011). The crimes were committed under the previous administration but clearly revealed lucrative cabinet appointments as a key informal coalition method. The Republican Party (PR) left the government once its leader was removed

from the Ministry of Transport, proving the pragmatic character of the alliance (Júnior, 2019). Nevertheless, as the bargaining utility of cabinet management fell with the occupation of vacancies, the Presidency explored the use of executive decrees (agenda-setting power) and budget amendments (budgetary powers).

The annual average of decrees increased from 36 in Dilma's first term (2011-2014) to 43 in Dilma's second term (2015- August 2016), while the conversion rate into ordinary laws dropped from approximately 83% to 79%, the lowest being of 52% in 2014 (Matsui, 2017). For being a way of temporarily bypassing Congress, the overuse of vetoes or decrees might indicate less Executive-Legislative cooperation (Bedritchuk, 2021). In Dilma's Presidency, a higher issuing of decrees coincided with her loss of political capital over the years due to a stagnating economy and the outbreak of the *Lava-Jato* operation. In what confirms this perception, President Dilma was often accused of "governing by decree" and criticized for not dialoguing enough with Congress (BBC, 2016).

It was later discovered in 2015 by Operation Zelotes, branching from *Lava-Jato*, that private interest groups that financed congressional election campaigns bribed high-ranking figures in Congress and the Executive for the preparation of favorable decrees (Bomfim, 2015). Dilma's Presidency's former Chief of Staff estimated that of the thousand decrees enacted in the four PT governments, in at least nine hundred there was the translation of exotic amendments into bribes (De Campos, 2018). If these allegations prove truthful, there was the consolidation of the sale of presidential decrees in Lula's and Dilma's Presidencies.


Furthermore, President Dilma used her budgetary powers to safeguard party loyalty. In June 2013, huge protests against corruption and the costs inferred by the 2014 World Cup spread in the country. In one month, President Dilma's popularity fell from 57% to 30%, leading her to propose an anti-corruption package of laws in Congress and a political reform informed by a public plebiscite (G1, 2013; Veja, 2013). Opposing a deep political reform, the PMDB, PP, and other allies formed a block to achieve a higher bargaining power (Júnior, 2019). Under pressure, the Presidency liberated a record number of budget amendments for legislators (Patu & Costa, 2013).

In March 2014, the *Lava-Jato* operation started at the Federal Court in Curitiba. Its task force, guided by the MPF, revealed that Petrobras' director positions were distributed among

the PP, PT, and PMDB (G1, 2015a). Moreover, Petrobras was divided into four cores. Whereas the political core involved the politicians responsible for nominating Petrobras' directors, the administrative core referred to the board of directors (G1, 2015a). The board of directors, in turn, received bribes from the cartel- also known as the economic core- which passed on bribes to money-launderers- a.k.a. the financial core, - and then finally to politicians (see *Figure 2*) (Lima, 2017).

Figure 2

Petrobras' 4 cores



Modified from Força Tarefa Lava Jato (n.d.).

President Dilma publicly supported the operation, which from the perspective of the Chamber's and Senate's presidents (both from the PMDB and under investigation) was a direct attack on them. Despite a divided PMDB, and the wear and tear of some coalition parties to whom the PT rejected support in local elections, President Dilma was re-elected- even if politically weaker than in the beginning of her first term (Bonin, 2014).

The definition of the 39 officeholders of the ministerial team for President Dilma's second term reflected the political weariness of the government. The PT had to cede three portfolios and the PMDB gained one (Salomão, 2014). Despite the Presidency's effort, the more conservative wing of the PT complained about having lost influence in Dilma's government, while the PMDB assessed that it had no visible ministries.

The rise of *Lava-Jato*, combined with President Dilma's somewhat permissive behavior towards it, hampered the Presidency's political articulation capacity. Furthermore, in his plea bargain, Petrobras' former director of supply denounced 25 deputies, 6 senators, and three governors, adding an element of tension to the Executive-Legislative relations (G1, 2015b). When drawing a parallel with Lula's Presidency's accommodation of the PMDB after *Mensalão*, it appears that *Lava-Jato* weakened President Dilma's support base, leading her to grant ministries to other parties to retain her coalition's cohesion.

Dilma's second presidential term (2014-August 2016)

At the end of 2014, the Petrobras' former supply director further revealed a substantial part of the *Lava-Jato* scheme, incriminating the PT, PP, and PMDB (Otoboni & Freire, 2020). In the first half of 2015, the presidents of all Brazilian largest contractors, other Petrobras' directors and prominent figures of the PT were arrested (G1, 2015b). In the second half of 2015, the government's leader in the Senate was arrested accused of attempted obstruction of justice, and denunciations against the Chamber's president gained more consistency (G1, 2015b).


Cornered by circumstances of political, popular, and economic pressure, the Presidency extinguished eight ministries to reduce costs, and the PT remained with only two more portfolios, 9, than the PMDB, 7 (Matoso, Alegretti & Passarinho, 2015). This unusual move in any PT government shows President Dilma's necessity to please the government's coalition. At the same time that the Presidency saw its *formateur* powers significantly decrease caused by the arrest of key political leaders and the dismantling of the contractors' cartel, a set of corruption schemes bolstered the president of the Chamber, Mr. Eduardo Cunha (PMDB).

Mr. Cunha's office endowed him with agenda-setting and regimental powers. He decided the Chamber's daily agenda and appointed the chairs of special and standing committees. The Antonov, Sépsis, and *Lava-Jato* operations; J&F's plea bargain; and President Dilma's interview to *Carta Capital*, indicate that Mr. Cunha received millionaire bribes from companies to promote favorable legislation (Correio Braziliense, 2021; Estadão, 2017a; Estadão, 2021; G1a, 2017; Kaniak, 2020). The money was used to buy votes for his election and support for his agenda. During the period in which Mr. Cunha presided over the Chamber, the votes taken to the plenary by the Legislative reached their highest number so far,

416 (De Carvalho, Viana, Carlomagno, 2019). The shift from a more reactive Brazilian Legislative, often occupied with proposals brought by the Executive, to a more active role reflects the changes in the Executive-Legislative relations (see *Figure 3*).

Figure 3

Roll call votes taken to the plenary by the Chamber's Presidencies (2003-2017)



Modified from De Carvalho et al. (2019).

In addition to the resources brought by interest groups, President Dilma's impeachment became a bargaining chip. The revelations of the J&F and Mr. Cunha show that votes in favor of President Dilma's impeachment had a monetary value, which would turn into political gains and protection against investigations in the case of an impeachment (G1, 2017a). Vice-President Temer (PMDB) helped Mr. Cunha, and once in the Presidency, nominated ministers who were cited in the investigations carried at the Curitiba Federal Court- in Brazil, ministers, and legislators can only be tried by the Supreme Court (Costa, 2016; Jornal Nacional, 2017). This characterizes a temporary method of coalition formation, namely "impeachment for political protection and resources".

In December 2015, in face of evidence from *Lava-Jato* against Mr. Cunha, the PT voted for the continuation of his own impeachment process before the Chamber's Ethics' Council (Bragon & Uribe, 2015). Next, Mr. Cunha authorized the advancement for voting of an impeachment request over financial crimes against President Dilma in the Chamber (Júnior, 2019). In March 2016, President Dilma announced former President Lula as her new Chief of Staff to protect him from the jurisdiction of the Curitiba Federal Court. Declaring public interest as former President Lula was under investigation, Judge Moro leaked a conversation between President Dilma and former President Lula confirming attempted obstruction of justice (G1, 2016). In response, the Brazilian Republican Party (PRB) and the PMDB left the government. The Supreme Court suspended former President Lula's nomination (Falcão, 2016).

Without being able to credibly name ministers, President Dilma's impeachment had its way paved towards the final decision of the Senate in August 2016. To that point, around twenty ministers of Dilma's Presidency had been accused, charged, or condemned for embezzlement of public money, favoring companies, and obstruction of justice (IstoÉ, 2016).

These dynamics may infer that *Lava-Jato* impacted President Dilma's coalition-building tools. First, by attracting enormous popular and media attention to the government, *Lava-Jato* spurred changes in public tolerance for corruption, and it became politically costly to be aligned with the Presidency- lessening the President's political influence. Second, the demise of the contractors' cartel reduced the value of lucrative cabinet distribution to legislators while increasing its risks, diminishing the incentives to join the cabinet coalition. Third, the downfall of the Presidency's *formateur* tools incited a partisan realignment within Congress to overthrow the government and return to the *status quo* of impunity existent before *Lava-Jato*.

Testifying the importance of *Lava-Jato*, a political backlash followed political stabilization. In 2019, the Senate approved a bill on abuse of power, which expanded the possibility of accusing judges and prosecutors (International Monetary Fund, 2020; Lagunes, 2020). Moreover, the Supreme Court prohibited the imprisonment of people convicted of crimes by the appealing court, allowing defendants to appeal once more and freeing already convicted politicians, among which, former President Lula (Campos, 2019; International Monetary Fund, 2020).

Temer's Presidency (August 2016-2018)

Upon officially assuming the Presidency on August 31, 2016, Temer faced the lowest popularity rates of any presidency (reaching 3% in September 2017) and a polarized Congress (Veja, 2017). Aware of having to pass difficult economic reforms, he focused on building a strong coalition. In the beginning, the government had strategic victories in Congress, where ally legislators of the Democrats (DEM) and PMDB won the House and Senate presidencies respectively (De Carvalho *et al.*, 2019). This normalized the Executive-Legislative relations, which is explained by some of the Legislative's disadvantages relative to the Executive. For instance, the Legislative cannot operate as a coordinating actor between Powers under normal conditions because legislative commissions are unstable and have little power.

In a polarized context, where left-wing parties were isolated after being in the center of corruption scandals, twenty parties transitioned to the Presidency's sphere of influence (Ribeiro, 2018). President Temer reduced the number of cabinets to 23 and opted for a homogeneous center-right coalition, whose hardcore members were the PMDB, PP, DEM, Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), and Social Democratic Party (PSD) (Ribeiro, 2018). The PMDB abandoned the PT's hegemonistic tradition and allocated visible and resource-rich offices to allied parties, such as the ministries of Health (PP), Economy (PSD), and Education (PSDB) (Ribeiro, 2018). This distribution yielded Temer the highest coalescence rate since democratization (0.80), a 70% majority in Congress, and a GCI of approximately 15 (on a 0-100 scale) (De Carvalho *et al.*, 2019; Ribeiro, 2018).

Alston and Mueller (2006) believe that presidents are more concerned with national policies as they are held directly accountable for them, while legislators try to collect resources for their constituencies. Before taking office, President Temer presided three times over the Chamber and knew of the "policy for pork" practice to pass important reforms (Ribeiro, 2018). From 2015 to 2016 the value in budget amendments released by the Presidency increased around 43.2%, while from 2016 to 2017, the increase was of 48%, reaching 10.7 billion BRL (Brazilian reais) (Estadão, 2018). The coalition received 72.8% of the amendments, and counting with high loyalty from the allied base, the government "won" 76% of the times in Congress, which is above the historical average (Menegat, 2020; Ribeiro, 2018). As presented in *Table 1*, the values of budget amendments were substantially higher every time corruption allegations by the J&F or the Prosecutor's Office placed the President in an unfavorable

condition, matching the vote-buying allegations made by the opposition (Passarinho & Shalders, 2017).

Table 1

Budget amendments according to important events in 2017

Date	Event	Description	Monthly values in Congress	Senate
			budget amendments	
			(in BRL)	
22.03.2017	Outsourcing Reform.	Allows the outsourcing of any activities of a company.	5,2 million in March.	Approved. -
27.04.2017	Labor reform.	Makes labor laws more flexible.	5,5 million in April.	Approved. Approved.
06.05.2017	Privatization reform.	Privatization of infrastructure sectors.	89,5 million in May.	Approved. Approved.
18.05.2017 (Effects felt in June and July)	J&F's plea bargain.	Corruption accusation against Presidents Lula, Dilma, Temer, and a series of high-rank personalities.	4,266 billion in June/July.	- -
02/08/2017	Denounce against President Temer.	Passive corruption.	199,2 million in August.	Denied. Denied.
04/10/2017	Political reform.	New campaign financing rules.	2,273,9 billion in September/October.	Approved. -

05/10/2017	Political reform.	Prohibition of electoral coalitions.	Approved.	Approved.
25/10/2017	Denounce against President Temer.	Obstruction of justice.	Denied.	Denied.

Modified from Faria and Perón (2018) and Ribeiro (2018).

J&F's plea bargain revealed that from 2007 to 2010, the JBS (the founding company of the J&F) received 8 billion BRL from the BNDES, which is the National Development Bank, from which part went to buying foreign companies with public money and part went to bribe politicians (Estadão, 2017b). The Brazilian champion donated 65 million BRL to many parties in the 2010 elections, and 366 million BRL in the 2014 elections through undeclared funds or bribes disguised as donations (G1, 2017a). In 2016, the J&F allegedly bought votes against the impeachment of President Dilma, whereas in 2017 the company allegedly bribed President Temer to approve the decree No. 9.048/2017, favoring the company Rodrimar S/A (G1, 2017b; Serapião & Fabrini, 2017). Besides financing the campaign of 35% of Congressmembers, the J&F bribed Mr. Cunha and the former Minister of Economy, through whom the group had privileged access to the BNDES (G1, 2017c).

The dynamics brought by the J&F indicate that after *Lava-Jato* started, the group influenced politics in favor of its partisan interests through direct bribes and loans facilitated by the BNDES for political favors. In this sense, private companies from sectors other than civil construction influenced the choice of positions of trust, e.g., ministers and presidents of companies, the issuing of decrees, and the purchase of votes in Congress. This strongly suggests that the use of lucrative cabinet appointments persisted in areas other than Petrobras and, together with direct bribes (in a process resembling to *Mensalão*), strengthened the Presidency's bargain powers and met some Congressmembers' "funding needs".

Temer's Presidency started the government with strategic coalitional and congressional victories, being able to shield key allies from justice and pass important reforms. The unfolding of *Lava-Jato* contributed to rendering the Congress more expensive as, in 2017, the Presidency

spent 4.5 billion BRL more than the previous administration in budget amendments. With the recovery of stability within the coalition, measures against controlling bodies and the centralization of legal proceedings in judicial bodies based in Brasília- over which politicians have more influence- followed both *Mensalão* and *Lava-Jato*.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to identify the mechanisms through which anti-corruption operations may impact informal methods of coalition formation. Based on a typical single-unit study analyzed through theory-testing process-tracing, it can be concluded that, at least in contexts similar to that of the case under study, anti-corruption operations impact the informal methods of coalition formation in two ways.

First, reflecting the effects of critical events as proposed by Capoccia (2015), the *Mensalão* and *Lava-Jato* operations influenced the adoption of innovative methods of coalition formation in addition to the forms described by Chaisty *et al.* (2018). In Lula's administration, an alleged scheme of sale of decrees and fraudulent loans favoring interest groups was adopted. Dilma's and Temer's Presidencies used cabinet management with an innovative justification: protecting political allies. This means that anti-corruption operations forced Presidencies to resort to alternative coalition-building methods by lowering the likelihood of impunity and changing the incentives of being aligned with the government. The more fragile the president or the more exposed the informal coalition-building mechanisms, the more strategies are needed for the coalition's cohesion (March & Olsen, 2008). Here, institutionalized corruption determined the corrupt character of the new informal methods, but individual strategies reacting to changing incentives were responsible for their forms.

Second, *Mensalão* and *Lava-Jato* impacted informal methods of coalition formation by changing the preference order between coalition methods. Lula's Presidency increased its reliance on cabinet management and complex systems of mixed informal strategies (e.g., the scheme discovered by *Lava-Jato* consisted of several informal methods). Dilma's Presidency used cabinet management, budget amendments, and decrees *vis-à-vis* the shrinkage of resources previously retrieved from state-owned companies under investigation. Temer's Presidency dealt with corruption accusations by intensely using budget allocation to get favorable votes in Congress. These results demonstrate that the increased cost of being associated with corrupt activities promoted by the government, caused in part by anti-corruption operations, led the presidents' political agendas to be exchanged for activities related to patronage, clientelism, and pork-barrel in order to expand their coalitions and sustain them in power (Carubba & Volden, 2000).

Dilma's Presidency's failure to secure its coalition's stability led to a further finding, exceptional to this case, which is a political realignment in Congress to return to the *status quo* of impunity preceding the *Lava-Jato* operation. During this period when Congress controlled some informal coalition-building methods, two behaviors should be highlighted. First, interest groups funded Congress members for favorable legislation. Second, voting for President Dilma's impeachment became a bargaining chip whereby legislators could guaranty bribes, political support, and space in the next government. President Dilma's impeachment, much related to her loss of control of coalition-building methods and low support in Congress, recall Chasquetti's (2001) parallel between coalitional presidentialism and parliamentarism, and more specifically, the vote of confidence.

The alternative hypothesis does not find ground as, contradicting Rupnik (2007) and Mesquita and Smith (2017), instead of passing shallow anti-corruption laws, Congress approved substantial legislation that reinforced judicial and controlling institutions. Corroborating the operations' importance, legislative efforts were made to curtail the operations' legacies once political stabilization was reached.

Following the cost-benefit reasoning proposed by March & Olsen (2008), such findings suggest that, by constraining the Presidency's coalitional powers, large anti-corruption operations alter incentives for the investigated corrupt practices. The operations represent a micro-level turning point within the prevailing political system, whereby the Presidency and legislators must reinvent themselves- even if not precluding the methods' illegality.

Based on these considerations, further research could explore how coalition stability interacts with street protests. Despite significant drops in popularity and corruption allegations against both administrations, stable coalitions under Lula's and Temer's Presidencies coincide with the lack of huge street demonstrations, which does not hold for President Dilma's experience.

The repercussions of this thesis' findings to highly corrupt countries holding a coalitional presidentialism system are that large anti-corruption operations potentially alter the order or form of informal coalition-building methods. Nevertheless, should the political culture stay the

same, anti-corruption operations alone are not able to breach a country's overarching historical trend as predicted by path dependency (Collier & Collier, 1991; Rupnik, 2007).

References

- Abranches, S. H. H. (1988). Presidencialismo de coalizão: O dilema institucional brasileiro. *Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 31(1), 5-34.
- Alston, L. J., & Mueller, B. (2006). Pork for policy: Executive and legislative exchange in Brazil. *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 22(1), 87-114.
- Assessoria de Comunicação Social. (2014). *Delação premiada*. Tribunal de Justiça do Distrito Federal e dos Territórios. Retrieved from <https://www.tjdft.jus.br/institucional/imprensa/campanhas-e-produtos/direito-facil/edicao-semanal/delacao-premiada>
- Assis, J. C. (Ed.). (1983). *A chave do tesouro: Anatomia dos escândalos financeiros no Brasil: 1974/83*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Paz e Terra.
- Balán, M. (2014). Surviving corruption in Brazil: Lula's and Dilma's success despite corruption allegations, and its consequences. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 6(3), 67-93.
- Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. *American Political Science Review*, 83(4), 1181-1206.
- Barbosa, S. C. T., & Pompeu, J. C. (2017). *Trajatória recente da organização do governo federal* (Report No. 12). Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. Retrieved from http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8094/1/BAPI_n12_Trajjet%20c3%b3ria.pdf
- BBC. (2016, August 29). *De aprovação recorde ao impeachment: Relembre os principais momentos do governo Dilma*. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-37207258>
- Beach, D. (2016). It's all about mechanisms- What process-tracing case studies should be tracing. *New Political Economy*, 21(5), 463-472.

- Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (Eds.). (2013). *Process-Tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines*. Ann Arbor, United States: The University of Michigan Press.
- Bedritichuk, R. B. (2021). *Medidas Provisórias e seu papel no presidencialismo de coalizão*. Instituto de Estudos Legislativos e Políticas Públicas. Retrieved from <https://www.ielp.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Medidas-Proviso%CC%81rias-e-seu-papel-no-presidencialismo-de-coaliza%CC%83o.pdf>
- Berenschot, W., & Aspinall, E. (2018). How clientelism varies: Comparing patronage democracies. *Democratization*, 27(1), 1-19.
- Bertholini, F., & Pereira, C. (2017). The price of governing: Coalition management costs in Brazil's presidential system. *Revista de Administração Pública*, 51(4), 528-550.
- Bomfim, C. (2015, October 26). *Zelotes apura pagamento de propina para edição de 3 medidas provisórias*. G1. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/10/zelotes-apura-pagamento-de-propina-para-edicao-de-3-medidas-provisorias.html>
- Bonin, R. (2014, October 23). *Dilma e Lula sabiam de tudo, diz Alberto Youssef à PF*. Veja. Retrieved from <https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/dilma-e-lula-sabiam-de-tudo-diz-alberto-youssef-a-pf/>
- Bragon, R., & Uribe, G. (2015, December 2). *PT decide votar contra Cunha, que pode deflagrar impeachment de Dilma*. Folha de São Paulo. Retrieved from <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2015/12/1713918-bancada-petista-decide-votar-contra-cunha-no-conselho-de-etica-da-camara.shtml>
- Campos, J. P. (2018, October 1). *Houve propina de 90% das MPs nos governos Lula e Dilma, diz Palocci*. Veja. Retrieved from <https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/houve-propina-em-90-das-mps-nos-governos-lula-e-dilma-diz-palocci/>

- Campos, J. P. (2019, November 8). *Lula deixa a cadeia após 580 dias preso em Curitiba*. Veja. Retrieved from <https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/lula-deixa-a-cadeia-apos-580-dias-presos-em-curitiba/>
- Capoccia, G. (2015). Critical junctures and institutional change. In J. Mahoney & K. Thelen (Eds.). *Advances in comparative- historical analysis* (pp. 147-179). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Carrubba, C., & Volden, C. (2000). Coalition politics and logrolling in legislative institutions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2), 255-271.
- Carson, L. D. (2014). *Deterring corruption: Beyond rational choice theory*. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520280
- Carvalho, V. R., Viana, J. P. S. L., Carlomagno, M. C. (2019). Presidencialismo de coalizão em tempos de crise institucional: Relação executivo-legislativo nos governos Dilma (2015-2016) e Temer (2016- 2018). *Revista Política Hoje*, 28(2), 59-78.
- Chaisty, P., Cheeseman, N., & Power, T. J. (Eds.). (2018). *Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective: Minority presidents in multiparty systems*. New York, United States: Oxford University Press.
- Chasqueti, D. (Ed.). (2001). *Democracia, multipartidismo y coaliciones en América Latina: Evaluando la difícil combinación*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales.
- Collier, R. B., & Collier, D. (Eds.). (1991). *Critical junctures and historical legacies*. Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press.
- Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. *Political Science and Politics*, 44(4), 823-830.

Congresso Nacional. (2016). *Relatório final dos trabalhos da CPMI “dos Correios”*. República Federativa do Brasil. Retrieved from <http://www.senado.leg.br/comissoes/CPI/relatoriofinalVol2.pdf>

Correio Braziliense. (2021, April 27). *Operação Antonov: sete réus por corrupção e lavagem de dinheiro*. Retrieved from <https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/cidades-df/2021/04/4920619-operacao-antonov-sete-reus-por-corrupcao-e-lavagem-de-dinheiro.html>

Costa, F. (2016, May 12). *Articulador discreto, Temer domina engrenagens do Congresso Nacional*. G1. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/politica/processo-de-impeachment-de-dilma/noticia/2016/05/articulador-discreto-temer-domina-engrenagens-do-congresso-nacional.html>

Estadão. (2011, December 18). *Retrospectiva 2011: Faxina ministerial abre espaço para reforma na Esplanada*. Retrieved from <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,retrospectiva-2011-faxina-ministerial-abre-espaco-para-reforma-na-esplanada,812647>

Estadão. (2017a, June 23). *Dono da Carioca Engenharia relata propina a Eduardo Cunha*. Retrieved from <https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/politica-brasil/dono-da-carioca-engenharia-relata-propina-a-eduardo-cunha?amp>

Estadão. (2017b, May 19). *A delação da JBS: Os nomes que já foram citados*. Retrieved from <https://infograficos.estadao.com.br/politica/a-delacao-da-jbs/>

Estadão. (2018, January 15). *Liberação de emendas bate recorde com Temer*. Veja. Retrieved from <https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/liberacao-de-emendas-bate-recorde-com-temer/>

Estadão. (2021, April 27). *Eduardo Cunha vira réu por esquema de lavagem de propinas em combustíveis de aviação*. Retrieved from <https://istoe.com.br/eduardo-cunha-vira-reu-por-esquema-de-propinas-em-combustiveis-de-aviacao/>

- Faria, T., & Perón, I. (2018, January 7). *Liberación de emendas bate recorde com Temer*. Estadão. Retrieved from <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,liberacao-de-emendas-bate-recorde-com-temer,70002141096>
- Falcão, M. (2016, March 18). *Gilmar Mendes suspende posse de Lula e deixa investigação com Moro*. Folha de São Paulo. Retrieved from <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2016/03/1751759-stf-suspende-posse-de-lula-e-deixa-investigacao-com-moro.shtml>
- Fausto, B. (Ed.). (2019). *História do Brasil*. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo.
- Filho, R. S. M. (2017). Do Mensalão à Lava-Jato: A ascensão de barganha e da colaboração premiada no processo penal. *Revista de Ciências do Estado*, 2(2), 411-421.
- Força Tarefa Lava Jato. (2016). *Distribuição por dependência aos autos nº 500661729.2016.4.04.7000/PR e 5035204- 61.2016.4.04.7000/PR*. Ministério Público Federal. Retrieved from <https://www.conjur.com.br/dl/denuncia-lula-apartamento.pdf>
- Freedom House. (2020). *Freedom in the World*. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores>
- G1. (2011, February 1). *Governo Dilma terá novo congresso com ampla maioria governista*. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/2011/02/governo-dilma-tera-novo-congresso-com-ampla-maioria-governista.html>
- G1. (2012). *Relembre o surgimento e a evolução do mensalão*. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/2012/07/relembre-o-surgimento-e-evolucao-do-mensalao.html>
- G1. (2013, June 26). *Dilma propõe 5 pactos e plebiscite para constituinte da reforma política*. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2013/06/dilma-propoe-5-pactos-e-plebiscito-para-constituente-da-reforma-politica.html>

- G1. (2015a, March 7). *MPF divulga estrutura da suposta organização criminosa na Petrobras*. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/2015/03/mpf-divulga-estrutura-da-suposta-organizacao-criminosa-na-petrobras.html>
- G1. (2015b, September 4). *Linha do tempo da Lava Jato*. Retrieved from <https://especiais.g1.globo.com/politica/2015/lava-jato/linha-do-tempo-da-lava-jato/>
- G1. (2016, March 17). *Moro divulga grampo de Lula e Dilma; Planalto fala em Constituição violada*. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2016/03/moro-divulga-grampo-de-lula-e-dilma-planalto-fala-em-constituicao-violada.html>
- G1. (2017a, May 19). *Delacão da JBS: Veja todos os vídeos e os principais pontos*. Retrieved from <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/delacao-da-jbs-veja-os-videos-dos-depoimentos.ghtml>
- G1. (2017a, May 19). *JBS pagou R\$400 milhões em propina a políticos nos últimos anos, diz delator*. Retrieved from <https://g1.globo.com/politica/operacao-lava-jato/noticia/jbs-pagou-r-400-milhoes-em-propina-a-politicos-nos-ultimos-anos-diz-delator.ghtml>
- G1. (2017b, May 19). *Deputado pediu R\$150 milhões para 30 votos contra impeachment, diz delator*. Retrieved from <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/deputado-pediu-r-150-milhoes-para-30-votos-contr-impeachment-diz-delator.ghtml>
- G1. (2017c, May 24). *Veja 8 situações em que os donos da JBS usaram a corrupção para obter vantagens*. Retrieved from <https://g1.globo.com/economia/negocios/noticia/veja-8-situacoes-em-que-os-donos-da-jbs-usaram-a-corrupcao-para-obter-vantagens.ghtml>
- Gerrig, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? *American Political Science Review*, 98(2), 341-354.
- Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection for case-study analysis: Qualitative and quantitative techniques. In J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, & D. Collier. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (pp. 645-684). New York City, United States: Oxford University Press.

- Governo do Brasil. (2021). *Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU)*. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.br/pt-br/orgaos/controladoria-geral-da-uniao>
- Haerpfer, C., Bernhagen, P., Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. F. (Eds.). (2019). *Democratization* (2nd ed.). New York City, United States: Oxford University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy's third wave. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(2), 12-34.
- International Monetary Fund. (Ed.). (2020). *Fiscal monitor: Policies to support people during the COVID-19 pandemic*. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- IstoÉ. (2016, July 29). *A estrutura criminosa do governo Dilma*. Retrieved from <https://istoe.com.br/estrutura-criminosa-do-governo-dilma/>
- Jornal Nacional. (2017, February 13). "*Governo não quer blindar ninguém e não vai blindar,*" diz Temer. G1. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/2017/02/governo-nao-quer-blindar-ninguem-e-nao-vai-blindar-diz-temer.html>
- Junior, P. (2005, May 14). O homem- chave do PTB. *Veja*, 38(18), 54-61.
- Junior, A. M., Pereira, C., & Biderman, C. (2015). The evolution of the theories about the Brazilian multiparty presidential system. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 7(1), 143-161.
- Júnior, R. C. R. (2019). *A crise na coalizão e o impeachment de Dilma Rousseff* (Unpublished master's thesis, University of São Paulo, Brazil). Retrieved from <https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-20112020-212122/pt-br.php>
- Kaniak, T. (2020, September 9). *Eduardo Cunha é condenado a 15 anos de prisão por corrupção passiva e lavagem de dinheiro na Lava Jato no Paraná*. G1. Retrieved from <https://g1.globo.com/pr/parana/noticia/2020/09/09/eduardo-cunha-e-condenado-a-15->

anos-de-prisao-por-corrupcao-passiva-e-lavagem-de-dinheiro-na-lava-jato-no-parana.ghtml

- Kurer, O. (2005). Corruption: An alternative approach to its definition and measurement. *Political Studies*, 53(1), 222-239.
- Kunicová, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005). Electoral rules and constitutional structures as constraints on corruption. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(4), 573-606.
- Lagunes, P. (2020). An interview with Deltan Dallagnol. In P. Lagunes & J. Svejnar (Eds.). *Corruption and the Lava-Jato Scandal* (pp. 113-128). New York City, United States: Routledge.
- Lagunes, P., & Svejnar, J. (Eds.). (2020). *Corruption and the Lava-Jato Scandal*. New York City, United States: Routledge.
- Lima, J. C. (2017, May 4). *PF vê “novo núcleo de corrupção sem pudor” na Petrobrás*. Estadão. Retrieved from <https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/pf-ve-novo-nucleo-de-corrupcao-sem-pudor-na-petrobras/>
- Lima-Silva, F., & Loureiro, M. R. (2018). Ceder e controlar o poder: Estratégias presidenciais para coordenação governamental no Brasil. *Revista do Serviço Público*, 69(3), 529-558.
- Linz, J. J. (1990). The perils of presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy*, 1(1), 51-69.
- Liu, J. H., Sibley, C. G., & Huang, L. L. (2014). History matters: Effects of culture-specific symbols on political attitudes and intergroup relations. *Political Psychology*, 35(1), 57-79.
- Madueño, D., Lopes, E., & Samarco, C. (2010, November 30). *Partilha ministerial já desagradada a parlamentares do PT e do PMDB*. Estadão. Retrieved from <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,partilha-ministerial-ja-desagrada-a-parlamentares-do-pt-e-do-pmdb,647647>

- Mainwaring, S. (1993). Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy: The difficult combination. *Comparative political studies*, 25(2), 198-228.
- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2008). Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”. In S. A. Binder, R. A. W. Rhodes, & B. A. Rockman (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions* (pp. 3-20). New York, United States: Oxford University Press.
- Martin, L., & Vanberg, G. (2014). Parties and policymaking in multiparty governments: The legislative median, ministerial autonomy, and the coalition compromise. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4), 979-996.
- Matais, A., & Fabrini, F. (2015, October 1). *Documentos apontam que MP editada na gestão Lula foi comprada por lobby*. Estadão. Retrieved from <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,documentos-apontam-que-mp-editada-na-gestao-lula-foi-comprada-por-lobby,1772249>
- Matoso, F., Alegretti, L., & Passarinho, N. (2015, December 2). *Dilma anuncia reforma com redução de 39 para 31 ministérios*. G1. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/10/dilma-anuncia-reducao-de-39-para-31-pastas-na-reforma-ministerial.html>
- Matsui, N. (2017, October 31). *Temer tem menos sucesso com MPs do que Lula e Dilma*. Poder 360. Retrieved from <https://www.poder360.com.br/congresso/temer-tem-menos-sucesso-com-mps-do-que-lula-e-dilma/>
- Mello, E., Spektor, M. (2018). Brazil: The costs of multiparty presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy*, 29(2), 113-127.
- Menegat, R. (2020, January 20). *Basômetro: quanto apoio o governo tem na Câmara*. Estadão. Retrieved from <https://arte.estadao.com.br/politica/basometro/>
- Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. (2017). Foreign aid and policy concessions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(2), 251-284.

Michener, G., & Pereira, C. (2016). A great leap forward for democracy and the rule of law? Brazil's Mensalão trial. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 48, 477-507.

Ministério Público Federal. (n.d.a). *Sobre o MPF*. Retrieved from <http://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/sobre-o-mpf>

Ministério Público Federal. (n.d.b). *Caso Lava-Jato*. Retrieved from <http://www.mpf.mp.br/grandes-casos/lava-jato/entenda-o-caso>

Neto, O. A. (2007). O poder executivo, centro de gravidade do sistema político Brasileiro. In L. Avelar, & A. O. Cintra (Eds.). *Sistema político brasileiro: Uma introdução* (pp. 123-133). São Paulo, Brazil: Editora Unesp.

Oregon State University. (2010, September 14). *Snowballing sampling*. Retrieved from <https://research.oregonstate.edu/irb/policies-and-guidance-investigators/guidance/snowball-sampling>

Oswald, V., Jungblut, C., & Ordoñez, R. (2012, April 26). *Partidos se irritam com mudanças feitas por Graça na Petrobras*. O Globo. Retrieved from <https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/partidos-se-irritam-com-mudancas-feitas-por-graca-na-petrobras-4749680>

Otoboni, J., & Freire, D. (2020, March 7). *Relembra todas as 79 fases da operação Lava Jato, que chegou ao fim*. CNN Brasil. Retrieved from <https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/seis-anos-da-lava-jato-relembra-todas-as-fases-da-operacao/>

Palermo, V. (2000). Como se governa o Brasil? O debate sobre instituições políticas e gestão de governo. *Dados*, 43(3), 521-557.

Passarinho, N., & Shalders, A. (2017, October 25). *Com nomeações de R\$1 bi em emendas devem ajudar Temer a enterrar segunda denúncia na Câmara*. BBC News Brasil. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-41741475>

- Patton, M. Q. (Ed.). (2015). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods* (4th ed.). Newbury Park, United States: Sage Publications Inc.
- Patu, G. & Costa, B. (2013, August 19). *Dilma libera lote recorde de emendas para congressistas*. Folha de São Paulo. Retrieved from <https://m.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/08/1328392-dilma-libera-lote-recorde-de-emendas-para-congressistas.shtml>
- Pereira, C., & Melo, M. A. (2012). The surprising success of multiparty presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3), 156-170.
- Pereira, C., Power, T. J., & Raile, E. D. (2008). *Coalitional presidentialism and side payments: Explaining the Mensalão scandal in Brazil* (Occasional paper No. BSP-03-08). Oxford, United Kingdom: University of Oxford.
- Philp, M. (2008). Peacebuilding and corruption. *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (3), 310-327.
- Piattoni, S. (Ed.). (2001). *Clientelism, interests, and democratic representation: The European experience in historical and comparative perspective*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Polit, D.F., & Beck, C.T. (Eds.). (2012). *Nursing research: Generating and assessing evidence for nursing practice*. Philadelphia, United States: Lippincott Williams and Wilkins.
- Power, T. J. (2010). Optimism, pessimism, and coalitional presidentialism: Debating the institutional design of Brazilian democracy. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 29(1), 18-33.
- Raile, E. D., Pereira, C., & Power, T. J. (2011). The executive toolbox: Building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime. *Political Research Quarterly*, 64(2), 323-334.
- Reilly, D. A. (Ed.). (2019). *Finding the truth with criminal investigation: Suspect, subject, defendant*. Lanham, United States: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Remmer, K. L. (2007). The political economy of patronage: Expenditure patterns in the Argentine Provinces, 1983-2003. *The Journal of Politics*, 69(2), 363-377.
- Ribeiro, J. (2010, December 7). *Dilma fecha cota do PMDB no ministério e deve anunciar até 5a. G1*. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2010/12/dilma-fecha-cota-do-pmdb-no-ministerio-e-deve-anunciar-ate-5a-1.html>
- Ribeiro, P. F. (2018). Sobrevivendo a reformas, impopularidade y casos de corrupção: El presidencialismo de coalición del Brasil e Temer. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 38(2), 181-206.
- Ribeiro, H. V., Alves, L. G. A., Martins, A. F., Lenzi, E. K., & Perc, M. (2018). The dynamical structure of political corruption networks. *Journal of Complex Networks*, 6(6), 989-1003.
- Rupnik, J. (2007). From democracy fatigue to populist backlash. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(4), 17-25.
- Salomão, L. (2014, December 31). *Reforma ministerial reduz espaço do PT no segundo mandato de Dilma*. G1. Retrieved from <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2014/12/reforma-ministerial-reduz-espaco-do-pt-no-segundo-mandato-de-dilma.html>
- Sant'Ana, M. M. D. (2020). Por que Lula usou o Mensalão como ferramenta da gestão de coalizão? *Caderno Eletrônico de Ciências Sociais*, 8(1), 108-135.
- Santi, M. (2010). *Definida composição do Senado a partir de 1º de fevereiro de 2011*. Senado Federal. Retrieved from <https://www12.senado.leg.br/radio/1/noticia/2010/11/03/definida-composicao-do-senado-a-partir-de-1o-de-fevereiro-de-2011>
- Scott, J. C. (1972). Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia. *The American Political Science Review*, 66(1), pp. 91-113.

- Scott, J. C. (1977). Patronage or exploitation? In E. Gellner & J. Waterbury (Eds.). *Patrons and clients in Mediterranean societies* (pp. 21-39). London, United Kingdom: Duckworth and Co.
- Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2), 294-308.
- Serapião, F. (2017). *Joseley presta depoimento sobre repasse de US\$ 80 milhões para Lula e Dilma*. Estadão. Retrieved from <https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/joesley-presta-depoimento-sobre-repasses-de-us-80-milhoes-para-lula-e-dilma/>
- Serapião, F., & Fabrini, F. (2017, September 14). *Temer influenciou diretamente a aprovação da MP dos Portos, diz Funaro*. Estadão. Retrieved from <https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/temer-influenciou-diretamente-a-aprovacao-da-mp-dos-portos-diz-funaro/>
- Shepsle, K. A. (Ed.). (2010). *Analyzing politics: Rationality, behavior, and institutions* (2nd ed.). New York City, United States: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Shugart, M., & Carey, J. (Eds.). (1992). *Presidents and Assemblies*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Silva, N., & Barbosa, S. C. T. (Eds.). (2019). *Trajatória da ocupação partidária nos setores temáticos da estrutura do poder executivo (1986-2016)*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada.
- Siqueira, C. (n.d.). *Fala fácil [video file]*. Retrieved from <https://www.camara.leg.br/tv/449946-fala-facil-cpi-cpmi/>
- Stokes, S. (2007). Political clientelism. In S. Stokes & C. Boix (Eds.). *The Oxford handbook of comparative politics* (pp. 604–627). New York City, United States of America: Oxford University Press.

Stokes, S. (2011). Political clientelism. In R. E. Goodin (Ed.). *The Oxford handbook of political sciences* (pp. 648-674). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. (2003). *Relatório das eleições de 2002*. Retrieved from https://www.tse.jus.br/hotsites/catalogopublicacoes/pdf/relatorio_eleicoes/relatorio.pdf.

Uribe, G. (2011, April 9). *100 dias: Dilma manteve diálogo firme com o Congresso*. Estadão. Retrieved from <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,100-dias-dilma-manteve-dialogo-firme-com-congresso,704009>

Veja. (2013, June 29). *Datafolha: Popularidade de Dilma despenca após protestos*. Retrieved from <https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/datafolha-popularidade-de-dilma-despenca-apos-protestos/>

Veja. (2017, September 28). *Ibope: Temer é aprovado por 3% e reprovado por 77% da população*. Retrieved from <https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/popularidade-de-temer-cai-so-3-aprovam-seu-governo-diz-ibope/>

Weber, M. (2013). *Economy and society* (K. Tribe, Ed. & Trans.). Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1978).

Williams, A., & Baláž, V. (Eds.). (2008). *International migration and knowledge*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.