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Discourse analysis on collective action and rebel movements in Europe; Analysing collective action in the Irish Republican Army and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

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Discourse analysis on collective action and rebel movements in Europe; Analysing collective action in the Irish Republican Army and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

How can collective action explain the success or failure of a rebellion?

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Abstract

Most studies that examine the relationship between rebel movements and collective action often only tackle a certain dimension of the rebel movement. This being either the creation of a rebellion, the methods that are used to reach the set-out goal by a rebellion, or the way in which collective action can explain the resolution to the conflict. This thesis attempts to provide a clear explanation that is grounded in the study of collective action and is applicable to all the above-mentioned dimensions of a rebel movement. The goal of this thesis is to expose how collective action can explain the success or failure of a rebellion.

In this thesis, a discourse analysis on the relationship between the rebel experience, which encompasses the creation, mobilisation, used tactics and behaviour during attempts at peace by the movement, and the solving of collective action problems which are associated with rebel movements was carried out. This relationship was further assessed by examining two examples of rebel movements who were active in Europe. These cases are the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).

The analysis provided insight into the importance of leaders within a rebel movement. From assessing the cases, it was established that leaders utilised certain collective action solutions, to overcome the associated collective action problems a rebellion deals with. Further assessment into the cases of both the IRA and ETA established that the willingness and capability of leaders to form peace, is instrumental in the ultimate success or failure of a rebel movement. ultimately, the relevance of leaders in solving collective action problems in a rebellion requires more research to explain where and why rebellions fail or succeed.

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Introduction

A rebellion, an "open, armed, and usually unsuccessful defiance of or resistance to an established government" (Merriam-Webster, 2021) is what shapes the history of the world. Rebellions of the past still influence contemporary history. Look for example at BREXIT. Discussions about the borders of Northern Ireland, renewed tension of the infamous conflict, relating to the rebellious movement of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which made the creation of a strong BREXIT deal even more important. (de Mars et al., 2016). The rebel experience, from its creation due to collective dissidence, to the extensive use of violence, and creation of an agreement to end the violence, remains relevant when attempting to move forward.

Aside from shaping history, rebellions are also important due to what rebellions expose. Throughout the course of a rebellious movement, the ineptitude of the adversary government is exposed. This relates to the incapability of governments adequately responding to dissidence, the failure to recognise danger and the failure of diplomacy. In contrast, rebellions showcase the possibility of creating a bottom-up organisation that can be successful in promoting the ideals and goals of the movement.

Rebellions are interesting for another reason: violence. Rebellions are often some of the bloodiest events in history, with many civilian casualties. Furthermore, this violence is, on the side of the rebels, carried out by volunteers. This willingness of voluntarily carrying out such atrocious acts is both worrying and interesting to research.

A social movement can be defined as a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any direction and by any means. The raison d'être of a social movement organisation is founded on certain beliefs and above all normative commitment and active participation (Wilkinson, 1971, p. 27). We can link this definition of social movements to rebellions, seeing as mass rebellions exists as a form of social movement. A significant part of society shows its feelings by actively participating in promoting change. Many would avoid the connection between social movements and rebellions, seeing as most social movements are generally more peaceful, and promote norms, values and methods that are more socially accepted. However, I would argue that the level of extremism does not warrant for a separation but rather opens the possibility of creating a spectrum. As such, we can assume that rebellions are extreme occasions of social movements.

Creating commitment and increasing participation are factors of collective action, which subsequently can create collective action problems. The definition, proposed by Wilkinson

(1971), puts emphasis on commitment and participation. Social movements and collective action are thus inherently linked. The act of creating a movement that asserts itself against the status quo is a collective action and convincing people to join this movement is a collective action problem. Similarly, we can translate the goals of a rebellion into the desire to obtain a collective good. As a matter of fact, the entire rebel experience, from its culmination and creation to the tactics that are used, and the way in which a rebel conflict is resolved, can be explained using the knowledge of collective action. In most literature, collective action is used as tool to explain certain dimensions within a rebellion. This thesis will encompass all areas and experiences of a rebellion, using collective action methods.

The central aim of this thesis is to utilise collective action as a tool through which we can assess the behaviour and associated success or failure of a rebellion. This thesis will outline the key issues and events that create and shape a rebellion which will in turn, be assessed using the lens of collective action. The goal of this thesis is outlined in the research question as follows:

How can collective action explain the success or failure of a rebellion?

Literature review

When assessing the rebel experience, we can establish parameters that encompass this experience. These are the creation of a rebellion, which relates to the mobilisation of individual dissidents, and the organisational structure of a movement, and behaviour and tactics used by rebellions, both during conflict and during attempts at conflict resolution.

The creation of a rebellion

The creation of a rebellion starts with a feeling of dissent towards the government. Usually, the motive for a rebel movement lies either in greed, or in a disliking towards either the whole government, or government policies (Butler & Gates, 2009, p. 335). This disliking or feeling of dissent is explained by Hardin in his argument on government coercion (1968, p. 1247). Hardin explains coercion as a method by the government to uphold the status quo. In layman's terms, coercion means that acts, things, or behaviours are not forbidden, but their utilisation is costly. As a result, people are coerced into acting in the preferred way. Hardin goes further to explain that the most effective way of implementing coercion is by making the methods of coercion be mutually agreed upon by most of the people affected. Hardin calls this 'mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon' (pp. 1247-1248). Hardin makes it clear that by using mutually agreed coercion, the majority will not act in an unwanted manner. Note here that not all people agree with the coercion, just the majority, implying the existence of a minority that does not agree with the coercion. Hardin explains why the majority accepts coercion by stating that the status quo is perceived as being perfect. We can see this in politics. Often, a proposal for reform is shut down once a flaw is found because the alternative which is offered by this reform is seen as imperfect, while the status quo is perfect. Hardin makes it clear that perfection is simply impossible and that we thus cannot accept the status quo. Using this logic, we can explain the rise of rebellions. One could argue that rebel organisations look beyond the shroud of a perfect status quo. They view the status quo not as a baseline, but rather consider accepting the status quo as an action, to more effectively way the pros and cons (Hardin, pp. 1247-1248). Important to highlight here is the position Hardin proposes regarding mutual coercion. Hardin makes it clear that it is better to accept coercion, because it leads to more freedom in the end, stating that freedom is the recognition of necessity. Hardin also makes it clear that rejecting mutual coercion will lead to violence and ruin, which can be confirmed when looking at instances of violent rebellion (p. 1248).

Mobilisation

If we go back to the definition of a social movement, an umbrella term which encompasses rebellions, the importance of active participation and commitment must be highlighted further as it exposes the collective action problem associated with the issue of recruiting individuals for a rebellion. The largest problem, associated with this form of collective action, is the problem of freeriding. A large proportion of the population might experience a feeling of dissent towards the government but is not willing to actively be a part of the countermovement. Assuming the rebellion wins the war, this group of freeriding dissidents will benefit from actions of the rebels, just as much as the rebels themselves. This is because the set-out goal, freedom in most cases, is a common good, meaning that everyone in the population will receive it, regardless of the effort one has put in to receive this common good. For a rational individual in a rebellion, it thus makes sense to free ride. Why risk your own life if you know that the rebellion will also be successful without your support? This premise was set out by Mancur Olson, who made the compelling argument that, essentially using the logic of 'somebody else will take care of it', will result in no rebel organisation ever being created (Olson, 1965) (Lowery, 2015).

An important factor to explain recruitment of rebellions, is by comparing it to instances of recruitment for interstate war. Important distinctions relate to the pool from which leaders can pick. Due to its simple nature, leaders in a rebellion only get to pick from their own country, whereas interstate war lends the option of a grander pool of possible recruits. Another factor that explains the even more limited pool of recruits for rebel leaders lies in what Peled calls the 'Trojan Horse' dilemma (2019). The Trojan Horse dilemma entails that a leader of a rebellion fears that possible members are in fact infiltrated enemies. As a result, to ensure that no traitor becomes part of the organisation, the pool of recruits becomes even more limited. As a result of such a limited pool, wars of rebellion become a zero-sum game where leaders are motivated to take riskier measures and adopt riskier tactics (Chaudhry et al., 2021, pp. 918-919). As such, limited mobilisation explains the risky behaviour associated with rebellions.

Tactics and behaviour during conflict and during attempts at peace

A rebellion distinguishes itself from other movements, but also from governments, in its tactics. Rebellious conflicts provide an example of asymmetric warfare. The two sides in a conflict are not evenly matched in power, with the rebel side generally being weaker, which results in rebellions often utilising non-conventional methods of warfare, with the most

notorious method being terrorism. Terrorism is defined as "(…) a violent tactic employed by a non-state actor against non-combatants targets designed to instil fear and intimidation among a wider audience to further a political agenda" (Butler & Gates, 2009, p. 332).
As mentioned before, mobilisation determines the behaviour of rebel movements. This also relates to rebel tactics. Butler and Gates (2009) describe three zones of predominant tactics that fit along the relative-power scale. These are terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare. Important for understanding this model, is the assumption that the rebel organisation has more information than the government (p. 333). In practice, this explains why rebel organisations remain in existence. If the government had more information, this government would have no trouble arresting the dissidents and prematurely ending the rebellion.
In the first zone of this model, the only available tactic is terrorism. The rebellion is relatively weak and limited in resources. The tactic of terrorism can be exercised as an attempt to decrease this asymmetry of power (Butler & Gates, 2009, pp. 333-334). Important to note is that under circumstances of extreme power asymmetry, rebel organisations should rationally speaking be inclined to respect the status quo, seeing as doing the opposite is extremely costly (Olson, 1965). From this we can assume that rebel organisations who use terrorism are operating under some form of incomplete information.
In zone two, the government observes the capability by a rebel group to use guerrilla tactics, signalling that the rebel group has increased its power. The use of guerrilla tactics requires more manpower, more resources, and more professionalism. The explanation for this apparent increase in power by the rebels, can be explained by assessing the 'paradox of power' (Hirshleifer, 1991). The paradox of power states that weaker combatants are motivated to fight harder and invest more in activities related to violence. This rising line of power continues until both parties are equal in power (p. 177). This paradox of power occurs between zone one and two of the model (Butler & Gates, 2009).
In the second zone, rebels gain a lot from fighting and even more from negotiations, which is largely motivated by the paradox of power. The incentives for the government to stop fighting are at its peak and thus, the government overcompensates, providing a more lucrative deal for the rebels (Butler & Gates, 2009, p. 334). This can lead to either successful negotiations, or more violence from the rebellion, which is where we move into the third and final zone.
In zone three, both sides are evenly matched in power. The rebel organisation here, observes a higher likelihood of winning. Their resources are matched with those of the enemy, and

their resolve and motivation are generally greater. Rebellions are subsequently less inclined to accept negotiations (pp. 334-335).

Important to note about this model, is the fact that the rebels have the highest likelihood of succeeding in reaching their goal, assuming the rebels surpass zone one, which is likely if we assume that the paradox of power is true. If the rebels accept negotiation in zone two, it is likely that they will receive favourable terms. The government, in this stage, has high incentives to seize violent action, and will thus concede on terms. If the rebels reject negotiation in zone two and progress to zone three their situation is favourable because their power is in parity with that of the adversary, again assuming that the paradox of power holds true. While parity does not outright translate into a victory, the rebels are more inclined to invest heavier in their war effort, making a rebel victory more likely.

Solving collective action problems

Solving collective action can be done through different dimensions. These dimensions are determined by the ontology and deliberation of the solution. If a solution is unplanned and spontaneous, this is a market solution to the collective action problem. If a solution is unplanned and contingent, this is a community solution to the collective action problem. If a solution is planned, then it is a contract solution if the solution is also spontaneous, and it is a hierarchy solution when the solution is contingent (Lichbach, 1994, p. 10).

Market

Market solutions assume that a state of nature or anarchy exists. The market solutions aim at invisible hand processes that ultimately lead to the voluntary provision of public goods (Lichbach, 1994, p. 11). The invisible hand entails that greater social benefits are unintentionally found as the result of self-interested behaviour by individuals. The market solutions, put forward by Lichbach (1994), relate to the nature of goods, the cost of goods, supply and demand of goods, and the associated benefits. The most relevant market solutions relate to the productivity of tactics, the increased probability of making a difference, and the amount of risk taking (pp. 11-12). Lichbach makes it clear that one should increase the means of gaining public goods and thereby solve the collective action problem. This, in the context of rebellions, relates to what the means are to reach the goals of a rebellion. This translates into what method of violence yields the best results. As discussed earlier, this relates back to the model proposed by Butler and Gates (2009), who make it clear that a rebellion only really has two options when it comes to tactics: terrorism of guerrilla warfare. To solve the

collective action problem, a rebellious collective would have to come to an agreement on what tactic is most fruitful (Lichbach, 1994, p. 12).

Increasing the probability of making a difference in a rebellion (Lichbach, 1994, p. 13), comes with the interesting notion of creating subjective information. This solution relates to the collective action problem of people not joining the movement. Lichbach makes it clear that to increase the number of members, one must, in essence, deceive potential dissidents with the goal of making them believe that their contribution will make a valuable change. A solution that ties into this, which was also brought forward by Lichbach, is the usage of incomplete information (p. 13). Incomplete information relates, in the context of a rebellion, to the costs and benefits of joining a movement, with potential volunteers not being fully aware of the risks and benefits that truly await them. This overcomes the problem of freeriding, although a possible risk that comes with this practice, is the fact that when dissidents find out that they have, in essence, been lied to, there is a strong possibility that they will desert the cause.

The last market solution that Lichbach proposes relates to increasing the taking of risks (1994, p. 13). Leaders attempt to make it so that not acting becomes riskier than acting. This relates back to the notion of mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by Hardin (1968, p. 1247). As Hardin made clear, the alternative, adhering to the status quo, must be less interesting than the preferred coerced action. This mutual coercion mutually agreed upon can most likely be established with the help of the other market solutions put forward by Lichbach, such as using incomplete information.

Community

The community solutions, put forward by Lichbach (1994), are more realistic solutions in the context of a rebellion. These relate to the creation of a community in which there is common knowledge, or there are common values. Alignment within and between organisations has proved to be a fruitful way in which a rebel organisation can be managed, and fruitful peace settlements can be created, as it establishes clarity both between members of the rebel organisation, and between the rebel movement and the adversary government (Lichbach, 1994, p. 15). For this reason, it is instrumental to establish a basis of common knowledge within a rebel organisation.

Secondly, there is the solution of common values (p. 16). There needs to be alignment on the ideals, goals, and ideology of a rebellious group, especially a rebellious group aimed at self-determination. These common values can also be used to improve methods of coercing, thereby overcoming collective action problems relating to mobilisation. Furthermore, when

common values are established, these can be used in combination with other collective action solutions to make these solutions more believable, by appealing to those common values.

Contract

Lichbach's contract solutions are the most obvious out of the proposed solutions on a surface level. However, in the context of creating a rebellion, they are hard to determine from an analytical perspective, and hard to pull off from an organisational perspective. If there are any deals made or contracts established, we would not know due to the underground nature of a rebellion. Furthermore, both self-government and tit-for-tat agreements, solutions put forward by Lichbach, require a degree of alignment that is hard to reach within a rebellion, and the capability to institutionalise. A rebellion lacks this capability due to the illegality of the very organisation (Lichbach, 1994, pp. 16-17).

Hierarchy

Lichbach's hierarchy solutions relate the most to the creation and managing of rebellion. These solutions assume that the dissident organisation, here the rebellion, has already been created (Lichbach, 1994, p. 17). The hierarchy solutions describe collective action happening to the fact that an entity within the organisation has sufficient power or sufficient resources to bring collective action about. Lichbach puts forwards the solution of creating leaders or seeking entrepreneurs. These prominent figures within the organisation are best equipped to create an organisation that can pool common resources. In the context of a rebellion, leaders or entrepreneurs are best equipped to mobilise people and carry the costs of the movement (Lichbach, 1994, pp. 17-18).

Another hierarchy solution of Lichbach is the solution of reorganising the movement (p. 18). This relates strongly to rebel movements. Lichbach makes it clear that movements can reorganise in three ways. A movement can firstly create a level of exclusivity, which limits the membership. This will result in the marginal benefits reaching equality with the marginal costs, which will yield the most beneficial outcome. In the context of a rebellion, this is straightforward. Less members equals a lesser likelihood of freeriding and less disagreements on alignment. A movement can secondly become more effective and locate efficacious subgroups. These subgroups will be able to provide public goods more easily due to their limited size. A movement can thirdly decentralise and create federal groups or cells, which operate locally. These independent cells will have less trouble overcoming collective action problems, but there is the associated risk of having less alignment between the cells of the 'mother organisation'.

Theoretical framework

When assessing collective action in rebellions, we can see that leaders are of vital importance. The basis for this position is highlighted in the model put forward by Mill. The Millian model proposes that individual interest lead to individual actions, which in turn lead to collective actions. These three steps are each influenced by decisions (Tilly, 1977, p. 2.6). Here we can highlight the importance of leaders as decision-makers. The behaviour of a rebellion can thus be explained through the decisions and actions of their respective leaders. This becomes apparent when assessing different ways in which collective action problems can be solved. However, the Millian model does not account for the initial feeling of dissent, which jumpstarts the creation of a rebel movement. As such I would argue that we use the explanation of dissent by Hardin (1968) to explain the differing interests, both collective and individual. Hardin's model is to be used to explain why interests arise that differ from the status quo. These interests, in turn, form central components to the model proposed by Mill (Tilly, 1977), as these formulated interests influence decision-making. Using a combination of both propositions, a clear and comprehensive explanation for why rebellions act and behave in the manner they do can be formed. From this, we have to explain what decisions are made. Here we apply the collective action solutions, put forward by Lichbach. These solutions are all influenced in their utilisation, by leaders. Leaders take the decision to utilise one of the possible solutions to the collective action problems a rebellion inefitably faces during the course of its existence. Furthermore, the way in which the solution is carried out, can be done subjectively and is thus influenced by leaders. As an example, the most prominent solution to a collective action problem, is the use of incomplete information (Lichbach, 1994, p. 13). Incomplete information can relate to the meriad of different situations. It is then up to the leader to pick and choose where to provide incomplete information. The leader can opt to be incomplete about possible risks or benefits, the manpower that the rebellion holds, or the value that a possible dissident holds for the movement (p. 13).

Based on the assessed literature, we can expect that leaders are at the center of all nodes of collective action within a rebellion. As such, my expectation is as follows:

> *Collective action can explain the success or failure of a rebellion, by assessing the influence a leader has over the way in which collective action is established.*

Methodology

Discourse analysis

The present thesis carries out a discourse analysis on the relationship between the rebel experience, which encompasses the creation, mobilisation, used tactics and behaviour during attempts at peace by the movement, and the solving of collective action problems which are associated with rebel movements. The thesis further assesses this relationship by focusing on two examples of rebel movements who were active in Europe. These are the case of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). Both the case of the IRA and ETA are, in broad terms, similar in their beliefs, ideologies, and goals. These being self-determination and the protection of marginalised groups. Both ETA and IRA can be classified as being violent rebellions, since the tactics of terrorism, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare have been utilised by both organisations. The IRA and ETA are classified as rebellions since both organisations seek to evade authority. In the case of the IRA, this relates to the oppression of Northern-Ireland, with special attention to the Catholic population. In the case of ETA, this relates to the Basque people, an ethnic group, situated in Northern Spain and Southern France. The goal of ETA was to gain independence for the Basque country, while the IRA promoted one united Ireland. Both movements sought independence from a larger and oppressing authority.

Sources are based on academic literature pertaining to the issues a rebellion deals with. This literature is compiled to create one coherent theoretical framework that explains the entire rebel experience though a collective action lens. Information on these cases will come from books, articles, news outlets and documentaries, that provide an understanding of how this rebellion faired throughout time. Experiences will be weighed against the literature and theoretical framework to see whether the entire rebel experience can be adequately assessed using the collective action lens.

Cases

<u>The Irish Republican Army</u>

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was originally created around 1917 as a paramilitary organisation with the intend of seeking freedom of Northern Ireland from British rule and a unified Irish republic. Since its culmination, the IRA has had political presence in the form of the political party Sinn Féin. The Sinn Féin party had been elected for British parliament in 1918, but actively boycotted the Westminster parliament as it was not recognised in its manifesto, and instead formed its own unicameral parliament, named the Dáil Éireann. The

creation of the Dáil Éireann, can be seen as the start of the Irish war for independence (Sanders, 2011, pp. 2-3). This conflict, which mainly saw the utilisation of terrorism and guerrilla tactics, was resolved with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. This treaty established partial autonomy for Ireland, while Northern Ireland opted to remain part of the United Kingdom. The nature of the treaty resulted in a civil war within the IRA, with a split occurring between pro- and anti-treaty IRA members. This internal conflict was decided in favour of the pro-treaty side (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008, pp. 52-53). After the civil war, the IRA saw a change in its agenda as it opted to focus more on the rights of marginalised Catholics. It also sought the independence of six of the Northern Irish counties. The 1950s marked a move away from violence and a move into the political sphere. Here the importance and degree of intertwinement between the IRA and the Sinn Féin was highly relevant. This turn in tactics and agenda can best be explained due to the change in leadership of the IRA becoming more left-wing (Whiting, 2018). However, the British government remained indifferent towards Northern Ireland, most notably towards Catholic struggle. In response to the lack of non-violent success, political violence ensued once again. The IRA started attacking border posts and installations of the British military (Van Engeland & Rudolph, pp. 53-54).

The 1970s would prove to be another bloody chapter in the Irish conflict. After a schism on the use of violence and the political direction of the IRA, the 'Provisional IRA' (PIRA) continued its violent struggle to protect the catholic citizens from repression, the liberation of Northern Ireland, and the unification of the Irish Free State, while the 'Official IRA' opted for a more passivist and left-wing approach. The Official IRA would sign an indefinite cease-fire shortly after its creation and was thus no longer relevant after that (Rekawek, 2008, pp. 362-363). The PIRA's methods included assassination attempts, (car) bombings, while also participating in crimes such as racketeering, smuggling, robbing, and kidnapping. The targets of the PIRA did not differ much throughout history, with the notable exception of the PIRA also targeting protestant civilians and protestant paramilitary organisations. It must be noted again that this violence ensued due to the lacklustre attitude by the British government towards the problems in (Northern) Ireland (pp. 54-55).

This period, in which the PIRA established itself as a violent organisation, is better known as 'the Troubles', as this period saw some of the most extreme and extensive bloodshed in the Irish conflict, with the best-known event being 'bloody Sunday'. During a protest march in the city of Derry, the British army opened fire on unarmed catholic civilians. 14 people were killed. This 'massacre' led to amplified support for the PIRA and recruitment for the

organisation increased. The events of Bloody Sunday also gave the PIRA a sense of legitimacy in using violence themselves. The sentiment of having to protect the catholic citizens increased, while the killings also strengthened the notion of the PIRA that politics had failed (Bosi, 2012) (Van Engeland & Rudolph, pp. 56-57).

In 1986, there was yet another split when the PIRA ended its policy of political abstention. This tactic of abstention and boycotting had been present since the creation of the Dáil Éireann, but members of the PIRA recognised the necessity of using proactive politics rather than continued violence. Like the splits before it, a more hard-line cell of the organisation disagreed, stating that violence is the only way forward. This organisation is known as the 'Continuity IRA' (CIRA) and is, to this day, branded as an illegal organisation under British law, and is internationally recognised as a terrorist organisation. The ideals of the CIRA relate back to the Irish Civil war, their sentiments aligning with the anti-treaty IRA members (Van Engeland & Rudolph, p. 55).

The connection between the IRA and Sinn Féin has been apparent from the beginning. While Sinn Féin never participated in political violence, their ideals and goals are similar. Furthermore, it is important to note that Sinn Féin has never denounced any connection, nor has it ever condemned the use of violence by the IRA. This proved to be problematic for Sinn Féin's legitimacy, and many attempts have been made to bar the party from British politics. However, like the PIRA, Sinn Féin abandoned its tactic of abstention, accepting that there is more change to be found from within. Together with ceasing the boycott of British politics, Sinn Féin distanced itself from any violent actions by the IRA.

In the 1990s, negotiations opened to end the violence. These negotiations provided Sinn Féin with the chance to play a meaningful part. While these first negotiations failed, later negotiations, in which Sinn Féin participated, would see the creation of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. This agreement, among other issues, meant that violence was no longer an option in seeking self-determination and unification for Northern Ireland. The negotiations highlighted the high degree of fragmentation, as hard-line members of the IRA still participated in violent actions, showing that the IRA was still not unified in the decision to lay down its arms and pursue its goals in a non-violent manner. After a few more years of tension, in 2005 the IRA published a statement in which they exclaimed the intend to disarm. Despite this, tensions still exist as the IRA never formally disbanded and is extremely fragmented, with a relevant likelihood of another cell deciding to reignite the violent flame (Van Engeland & Rudolph, pp. 62-65).

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna was formed out of the previously existing Basque National Party (Eukzo Gaztedi Indarra) and a nationalist student group (Ekin). These organisations were formed in 1952 and 1953 respectfully. ETA was formed a few years later, in 1959, when more radical students broke away after disagreeing with the mainstream policy of the Basque National Party and the lack of condemnation from the party for the Franco dictatorship.

ETA bases its ideology of self-determination on the culture of the Basque region and people. The Basque people generally perceive themselves as culturally separate from both Spain and France, as the cultural Basque region stretches beyond borders. It must be noted that the Basque people have, throughout history, continuously blurred the cultural heritage of the Basque people, which calls into the question the legitimacy of their struggle (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008, p. 68).

ETA's main tactic for pursuing self-determination and protection for the Basque people was terrorism, although guerrilla tactics were also exercised, but to a limited degree. The utilisation of these tactics was determined and agreed upon during one of the many assemblies ETA orchestrated. The first assembly determined that terrorism would be the best tactic to pursue self-determination. Later assemblies also discussed the training and professionalisation of their fighters.

ETA's struggle became internationally recognised in the 1970s when many high-ranking ETA members were tried and convicted, with six receiving the death penalty. This, combined with the systematic prosecution of the Basque people by the Franco regime was used as the legitimisation of the extensive violence used by ETA (p. 69).

When Franco died in 1975, the dictatorship ended in Spain and democracy was established shortly after. For the highly fragmentated ETA, this was the opportunity to start working towards their goal in a non-violent manner. For a while this worked. In 1978, the political wing of ETA, *Herri Batasuna,* was formed with the intend of separating the politics from the violence within ETA, thereby making way for the political wing to gain legitimacy on legal grounds. 1979 would prove to be an instrumental year when a referendum was held and accepted about the Basque region receiving autonomy. Despite this supposed success, ETA was not satisfied. The coming years saw the killing of hundreds. This highlights the political ineptitude of ETA as it was apparently incapable of adapting to the new political climate.

This persistence of violence can be explained when we look at the leadership. As ETA became more diluted, with more and more people opting to seize violent measures, the pool of volunteers willing to continue the violent struggle, consisted of relatively young people

who were filled with hatred through their upbringing. This young leadership had strong and perhaps naïve ideals and was intend on street guerrilla activities (pp. 69-71). This violence would eventually die down as more and more members opted for politics. Meanwhile, the logic that political violence or terrorism would yield the best results in the struggle for self-determination, started to falter after the Qaida attacks on 9/11, and the simple fact that the Spanish people were fed up with the bloodshed (Aizpeolea, 2017).

As violence started to die out, Batasuna, started becoming more relevant. And with its increasing relevance, the question of its legitimacy also came up. ETA and Batasuna were undeniably linked, in part due to Batasuna never formally condemning the violent actions by ETA, in a process called social cannibalism (Feit, 1972) (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008, p. 79). These issues would throughout the years halter any progress that Batasuna was intend on.

Discussion

Creation and mobilisation of the IRA and ETA

The creation and mobilisation of rebellions can be explained through the apparent solving of one of the best-known collective action problems, freeriding. We can establish that the problem of freeriding is solved due to the utilisation of a combination of solutions, put forward by Lichbach (1994). The community solution of establishing common values is highly relevant. Within both the IRA and ETA, we can see that common values are the very motivation behind the movement. These common values are the self-determination of the Northern Irish counties for the IRA, and the Basque region for ETA. ETA established its goals, norms, values, and tactics during their assemblies, which were held for the first time in 1962. These assemblies determined that culture and language would be used to rally the Basque people around the cause of ETA. Assemblies would also establish the tactic of terrorism as the best means to reach the goal of self-determination for the Basque region. Furthermore, these assemblies would also create common knowledge, another community solution to collective action problems. It must be said however, that these assemblies also proved troublesome, as it was the location where many schisms within ETA occurred (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008, p. 69). Moreover, these assemblies also lead to less information asymmetry between the rebel movement and the adversary government. Here I refer to the arrest of many prevalent ETA members in 1970. Holding grand assemblies, provides the adversary government with information, as it is 'above ground', which ultimately jeopardises the organisation.

Going back to the solution of common values, another relevant common value of both ETA and the IRA was the protection of marginalised groups from the adversary government. The increase of members for both the IRA and ETA can be directly linked to the prosecution and use of violence against Catholics in (Northern) Ireland and the Basque people in Spain. I refer here to the event known as 'Bloody Sunday' (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008, pp. 56-57), and the prosecution and execution of various high-ranking ETA members (Van Engeland & Rudolph, p. 69). In both cases, the violence used by the respective governments was perceived as excessive, which increased the feeling of dissent towards that government. These instances where the government shows its bad side, explains the initial bursts of support for both movements, but when emotions are taken out and reality sets back in, how are people motivated to remain? Here, rebel leaders employ the method of coercion (Hardin, 1968). For coercion to be successful, the alternative to acting in the preferred way must

appear as being more costly than adhering to the status quo. In the context of rebellions, this means that deserting the rebellion should prove to be more costly than remaining loyal. This is hard to establish in a rebellion, seeing as from a rational standpoint, the costs far outweigh the benefits (Olson, 1965). Ultimately, we can see another collective action problem being manifested. Here, the importance of leaders comes up. Leaders make use of incomplete information to deceive their followers. This can be done either by making the costs appear not as great as they truly are, increasing the benefits from not deserting the movement, most likely via selective benefits (Olson, 1965), appeal to common values, or increase the supposed influence a member has (Lichbach, 1994). The solution of appealing to common values is the most likely, due to the nature of events that increased the number of volunteers. When appealing to one's ethics, combined with the promise of rewards for staying with the organisation, it becomes unlikely for a volunteer to defect. In the case of the IRA and ETA however, we can assume that more adverse methods of coercion are used. Throughout the course of their respective histories, people who did not adhere to the wishes of the rebel organisation, would either be found dead later, or their families would receive similar punishment, being either murdered or kidnapped (ICLVR, 2021). This method is known as the exit solution and falls under the market solutions of collective action (Lichbach, 1994, p. 14).

Tactics and behaviour of the IRA and ETA

High risk taking

We can prescribe the high amount of risk taking by rebellions when looking at their pool of members. This pool is limited, due to freeriding, and the fact that your enemy consists of your own countrymen and women. Compared to intrastate conflict, rebel leaders have a smaller pool to pick from. A situation which is furthermore explained by the 'Trojan Horse dilemma' (Peled, 2019). Ultimately, the limited pool of members leads to what is called a zero-sum game, which is played by leaders. The nature of a zero-sum game entails that players will resort to more risky behaviour. When it comes to rebellions, this relates to the utilisation of tactics which are high in risk, such as terrorism.

Terrorism

Both the IRA and ETA primarily use terrorism as their main tactic in establishing self-determination for respectively the Northern Irish counties and the Basque region, and the protection of Irish Catholics and Basque people against the respective governments which affect them. The establishment of using this tactic is the result of another collective action

problem being solved. As discussed before in the context of mobilisation, from a rational standpoint, such risky and reckless behaviour would never occur (Olson, 1965). We can thus assume that this collective action problem has been overcome in a similar fashion as the solution to the collective action problem relating to mobilisation. The solutions that were most likely used, relate to increasing the probability of making a difference (Lichbach, 1994, p. 13) combined with the usage of incomplete information (p. 13) to make the previously named solution credible, the appeal towards common values (p. 15) and coercion (Hardin, 1968). We can see that ETA used the solution of common values and common knowledge, as it was during one of their assemblies, that the usage of terrorism tactics was decreed to be the designated method of reaching self-determination for the Basque region (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008, p. 69).

Behaviour during attempts at peace

In the definition of a rebellion, an "open, armed, and usually unsuccessful defiance of or resistance to an established government" (Merriam-Webster, 2021), one word jumps out. This being the fact that rebellions are usually unsuccessful. While both the IRA and ETA have had some partial success, with both Ireland and the Basque region receiving some form of autonomy, we cannot say that these organisations were successful in reaching their goal. The question that remains is how this is possible. Borrowing from the model of Butler and Gates (2009), we would assume that once a rebel movement has succeeded in establishing a movement, and succeeded in using political violence, it would also succeed in reaching its goals. However, this is not the case as both the IRA and ETA have been dissolved, without reaching true self-determination for respectfully Northern Ireland and the Basque region. We can prescribe this failure to a number of factors.

Throughout the course of history for both the IRA and ETA, there have been several splits, or schisms, which resulted in less manpower. These splits, for both the IRA and ETA, related to the question of politics versus violence, and the political direction the organisation was promoting, being either socialism or communism. As mentioned before, here the creation of fora to create common knowledge and establish common values, worked counterintuitive, as these fora were the location where these splits occurred. Sadly, here we cannot contribute these occurrences to the failure of collective action, as ideological differences cannot be overcome with the help of collective action solutions, such as offering certain goods or creating deals. These splits are instrumental in understanding the behaviour during attempts at peace. It must me noted that both the IRA and ETA were heavily fragmented when

attempts at ending the conflicts were made. Not only did the rebel movements lose followers due to schisms, the organisational structure of these organisations would also prove problematic. The IRA structured its organisation in a cell-structure, with different chapters scattered throughout the counties. This cell structure is part of a hierarchy solution to collective action. The solution pertains to reorganisation of the movement (Lichbach, 1994, p. 18). The solution suggests that by decentralising, collective action problems are more easily overcome. However, due to this decentralisation, there was more dealignment on ideas, goals, and tactics. This experience is shared by both the IRA and ETA as during their respective experiences of attempting at reaching a resolution, there were terrorist attacks by suborganisations, which threatened a credible peace deal.

The failure of alignment and failure of creating peace can also be credited to the lack of credible and good leadership. As mentioned before, the IRA but especially ETA started to lose followers and volunteers quickly because of a generally adopted value of pacifism. Members who opted to remain, were often young, naïve, idealistic, and having been brought up with hatred and a yearning for violence (Feit, 1972) (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008). Here, we can once again credit the importance of good leadership, as leadership, incapable of peace, will lead to unnecessary violence and bloodshed.

Finally, we can explain the apparent failure to make peace, by the political wings of these rebel movements. Both the IRA and ETA have, since their creation, been linked to a political party. These parties, Sinn Féin and Batasuna, were created to promote the goals and values of the IRA and ETA respectfully, in a political and non-violent matter. In a sense, these parties would be the future for the rebel movements, when violent action and behaviour would end. An extensive issue that arises however, is that of legitimacy. While Sinn Féin had denounced and condemned actions performed by the IRA, Batasuna did no such thing, stating that if the violent actions performed by ETA had to be condemned, the same had to be done for the actions performed by the Spanish government. This stance, often associated with the term of ‘social cannibalism’ made Batasuna illegal, as Batasuna could not be perceived as a peaceful and democratic party.

Alternatively, Sinn Féin managed to distance itself from the violent behaviour of the IRA and gained legitimacy, after the party was legalised by the British government in 1974 (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008, p. 59). This despite the fact that Sinn Féin never formally condemned the violence of the IRA. Why Sinn Féin gained legitimacy and Batasuna did not, relates to differing laws between countries. Sinn Féin had to abandon many of its initial tactics and values to become a legitimate political actor. Despite this, both Sinn Féin and the

IRA managed to reach alignment on the fact that both wanted peace. Here, the main difference between the IRA and ETA, or Sinn Féin and Batasuna for that matter, comes to the surface. The Irish dissidents were more capable of creating peace, whereas the Basque movement sustained the use of violence. this again relates back to incapable leadership within ETA, but also the political ineptitude of Batasuna. Collective action solutions for this are to be sought under common values, as there clearly was no alignment or clear idea for that matter on how ETA or Batasuna wanted to establish peace.

Conclusion

The main purpose of this thesis was to establish how collective action can explain the success or failure of a rebellion. The discourse analysis in this thesis established that collective action explains the success or failure of a rebellion when assessing the ways in which the leaders of a rebellion can solve the collective action problems, that are associated with the different dimensions pertaining to a rebel movement. Leaders are instrumental in the creation of a rebellion. When looking back to the model proposed by Mill (Tilly, 1977), we can see that the move from individual dissent to collective dissent and eventually collective action, is influenced by decision rules, which are, in turn, established by leaders. Leaders make the decisions that turn individual dissent into collective action. Leaders are also instrumental in the mobilisation and recruitment of volunteers for the rebel movement, as many of the collective action solutions, pertaining to mobilisation, can be utilised only with the help and capability of good leaders. This relates most strongly to the provision of incomplete information and the establishment of common values (Lichbach, 1994). Mobilisation is made even more instrumental, and leaders with it since mobilisation influences the available tactics for a rebel movement. The capability of leaders to mobilise determines the utilisation of certain tactics (Butler & Gates, 2009). The importance of leaders is highlighted in the opposite direction, as the lack of good leadership exposes the lack of capability to create peace.

Looking back on the research, the selection of the IRA and ETA as cases was fruitful, as both their struggle and experience was similar, to the extend where any findings can no longer be attributed to having an anecdotal or unreliable basis. Furthermore, the distinction in capability of peace-making allows the possibility of highlighting the difference between a relatively successful and unsuccessful rebellion. For both the IRA and ETA we cannot claim that their endeavour was fully successful, but the IRA managed to create a political basis, which ensured the longevity of their struggle by means, more appropriate to the relevant political climate. In turn, ETA and its political wing did not manage to gain political legitimacy, while persisting in the utilisation of political violence. This resulted in the struggle eventually having less and less relevance, which can be perceived as the rebellion having failed, especially when compared to the IRA. (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2008).

Despite their obvious importance and relevance in solving collective action problems, leaders are often forgotten about since rebel leaders, conform the nature of a rebel movement, operate in secret. When reviewing the literature pertaining to collective action within

rebellions, the importance of leaders is similarly ignored. As such, this research illustrates the importance of good and capable leadership. These findings do however raise the question of what good leadership makes, and whether the competency of good leadership for a rebel movement could be determined purely on the capability to solve collective action problems.

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Appendixes

Appendix A: Coding Frame

Category	**Subcategories**	**Description**
Creation of a rebel movement	Ideology	The goals, beliefs, and ideals of a rebellion.
	Dissent	A difference of opinion, often associated with unhappiness, and in the context of rebellion, associated with dissatisfaction towards the enemy government.
	Mobilisation	Ways in which people with dissident feelings towards the government are recruited into the rebel organisation.
Tactics and behaviour of a rebel movement	Terrorism	a violent tactic employed by a non-state actor against non-combatants targets designed to instil fear and intimidation among a wider audience to further a political agenda.
	Guerrilla warfare	Irregular warfare performed by small groups, where military tactics are utilised with the advantage of mobility over the lager, less mobile and more traditionally organised military of the enemy government.
Resolution of a rebel conflict	Successful resolution	A rebellion can be construed as successful when the goals, set out by the movement, have been reached to a certain extend.
	Unsuccessful resolution	A rebellion is construed as unsuccessful when the goals, set out by the movement, have not been reached.
Solving collective action	Market solutions	Solutions to collective action problems that seek invisible hand processes which

		ultimately lead to the voluntary provision of public goods.
	Community solutions	Solutions to collective action problems that involve the creation of a community in which an agreement can be established. Agreements relate to information, ideals, and values.
	Contract solutions	Solutions to collective action problems by creating rules. Contract solutions involve the assumption that there is a form of self-organising or self-government.
	Hierarchy solutions	Solutions to collective action problems that seek visible hand processes, used by rebel organisations to plan for public goods. Hierarchy solutions involve the assumption that some form of a dissident organisation is pre-existing.

Appendix B: Operationalisation of the subcategories

Subcategories	
Ideology	'We don't have an IRA battalion in Belfast, we have a battalion of armed Catholics'.14 Indeed, the IRA was now struggling for the rights of Catholics in Northern Ireland as well as for the self-determination of the six counties. (…) the occupying force did not take the rights of Catholics into account; Catholics were second-class citizens in their countries (…). Hard-line members of the IRA supported a traditional republican ideology and were opposed to the Official IRA's leftist views. Their [(P)IRA] aim was to protect Catholic civilians from British repression. The respective States did not listen to these requests and tried to muzzle the groups. The turning point happens when the movements realize they are not being heard; they turn to violence. It is at this point legitimate to wonder whether State repression justifies the use of violence. ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – Basque State and Freedom) had a lot of credibility among people and was perceived as a self-determination group with political influence. ETA leads a self-determination struggle for the following provinces: Biscaye, Araba, Gipuzkoa, Navarre, Labourd, Basse-Navare and Soule. The battle relies on cultural factors. The Basques (Euskadis) are one of the oldest European ethnic groups. They have their own

	language (Euskera) and nationalists have always fought for its survival and protection. In 1967, ETA decided to focus on four domains – military, culture, politics and work – in which the movement would organize its actions. Electoral participation was a rational choice by republicans to pursue their goals through a new means in the hope of avoiding marginalisation. Elections were also pursued to allow them to implement their policy vision in a way that violence was hindering them from achieving, embracing reformism and accepting the status quo as a route through which to pursue their goals. This occurred in spite of republicans rejecting the legitimacy of the electoral institutions to govern Northern Ireland.
Dissent	A rebel group could (1) aim to replace the government or the regime, (2) have policy differences with the government, or (3) be motivated by greed. (…) the rebel group may be genuinely pursuing long-term policy aims short of government replacement or regime change. This may be political autonomy or secession, but may include other policy aims. (…) they [ETA members] believed that the party was not sufficiently critical of the Franco dictatorship. The government's response was harsh as many suspects were arrested and tortured; the prisons at the time were full of Basques and some of those still free had to leave Spain for France. In 1970, during the Bargos trial, 16 ETA militants were condemned and 6 of them were condemned to the death

	penalty.17 This verdict shocked the international community: ETA's struggle was therefore acknowledged at the international level. The use of violence was justified by the threat represented by Franco.
Mobilisation	Voluntary recruit- ment is where individuals enter the military as a matter of choice different sides have specific pre- ferences for recruitment, narrowing the pool even more for any one given side, potentially leading to high-risk behavior by leaders precisely because the pool is smaller (…) a 'Trojan horse dilemma', which occurs when one side fears that members of the enemy will infiltrate their own side. As a result, the pool of recruits during a civil war may be smaller for any one given side than during an inter- state war. Even in highly polarized civil wars, competition for recruits may be more zero-sum than inter-state wars because the pool of eligible recruits remains within the same country. Even if a rebel group enjoys low civilian support, civilians may join them if the dangers of remaining a civilian exceed the dangers of fighting
Terrorism	We define terrorism as a violent tactic employed by a non-state actor against noncombatant targets designed to instill fear and intimidation among a wider audience to further a political agenda. terrorist tactics offer the chance for the signifi- cantly weaker side to fight despite being woefully outmatched. By adapting

	asymmetric warfare tactics, a rebel group in a civil conflict can overcome the relative balance of power problem. Indeed, (P)IRA believed in violence as a way to achieve self-determination: its methods included bombings (particularly car bombs), assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion, smuggling and robberies.19 The targets were the British military and officials but also Protestant civilians and Protestant paramilitary groups. From the beginning, ETA was constituted as a separatist clandestine organization, using armed struggle and terrorism in order to have the independence of the Basque country acknowledged by Spain and France. Bombing remained the main tactic of ETA, and has continued throughout its history.
Guerrilla Warfare	Guerrilla warfare is characterized by small groups of combatants employing mobile and surprise tactics, such as ambushes, raids, and sabotage in an effort to cripple the state, particularly the military capacity of the state (…) the government observes that the rebel group can also engage in guerrilla tactics. This provides a signal to the government that the rebel group is a stronger type. But by shifting to guerrilla tactics, rather than switching directly to conventional tactics, the rebels do not overconcentrate their forces and thereby risk annihilation in a single encounter with the government.

	If the internal structure of the IRA was political, the actions led by the group were violent: it led a guerrilla war against the Crown forces of Ireland until 1921.
Successful rebellion	As the weaker group becomes comparatively weaker, it will devote more and more resources to warfare to continue the fight. This "paradox of power" or the "nothing left to lose" argument has significant implications for negotiation. Given that the government has more to lose from fighting than the rebels, a negotiated deal that favors the rebel group is better for the government than con- tinued conflict. There were new negotiations in the summer of 1997 following the election of Tony Blair as prime minister. After the announcement of a second IRA ceasefire in July 1997, Sinn Féin was allowed to participate in the multi-party talks in September 1997. The Good Friday Agreement in April 1998 was the most important of all agreements: the IRA agreed to work towards a united Ireland only in peaceful terms. Violence was not an option anymore.
Unsuccessful rebellion	However, this first political step taken by the IRA was not greeted with success. The IRA did not want its armoury to be decommissioned and called off the ceasefire in February 1995, accusing the government of John Major of doing its best to hamper the dialogue.62 This did not end the peace process that went on with other parties. In 1995, ETA made a peace proposal known as the Democratic Alternative.31 It offered a ceasefire in exchange for self-determination. It also requested amnesties for political prisoners and members in exile. The offer was rejected by the government. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, it is clear that terrorism as a strategy is not working anymore. Most groups have understood that and the challenge for them is reconversion. A group like ETA

	has issues in accepting the reality that terrorism has become the instrument of nihilist groups like Al Qaeda with no political claims, just that of destroying a civilization that does not respond to their expectations. The lack of autonomy of Batasuna is also incriminated: if Batasuna could act without ETA, the party would be therefore be differentiated from ETA. When Batasuna was prohibited in 2003, some experts declared this was an opportunity for the party to become independent from ETA. It could have been a chance for Batasuna to stop its 'social cannibalism'.
Market solutions	Use incomplete information. In general, "if individuals are not perfectly informed about the costs and benefits of political success and when individuals base decisions on their subjective estimates of such quantities, the inducement value of politics may be greater than Olson claims" Increase the probability of making a difference. Potential dissidents will rebel if they are convinced that their individual participation in collective dissent will help achieve the PG they seek. A type of individual efficacy, the belief that one's personal involvement can make a difference in obtaining a PG, is involved here. This solution to the Rebel's Dilemma is often challenged because it is thought to be based on an irrational expectation: in a large group of dissidents, one dissident never really matters. A rebel, however, could in fact believe that he or she personally does make a difference because either all dissidents are needed, or some subset of all dissidents are needed, or his or her contribution is unique, or his or her contribution clearly adds something to the PG, or because his or her contribution will affect everyone else's contribution.

	Increase risk taking. Collective endeavors are risky undertakings. Another solution to the Rebel's Dilemma is to increase a rebel's propensity to take risks to the point where the risks of inaction outweigh the risks of revolt. (...) this would happen if each individual becomes convinced that his contribution makes the difference between success and failure of the movement. Another model is based on the idea that if people are uncertain about others' contributions, and if they are risk averse, they are likely to contribute to a PG. Nationalists have built a myth around the language and the blurred origins of the ethnic group to explain why the Basque country has nothing in common with Spain. The implication of such ideas is that if a potential dissident's exit option is cut off, his or her voice option looks relatively more attractive. Expect, in other words, emigration to act as a safety valve for protest.
Community solutions	Common knowledge. One part of a communal belief system is common knowledge that overcomes mutual ignorance. Potential dissidents might share a common understanding that they will, in fact, act together. (...)rebels who see things similarly are more likely to rebel together. However, simultaneous choice can be a poor assumption to make about a dissident's decision-making situation. Common knowledge can thus come, secondly, in the form of mutual expectations of sequential action. If we allow a rebel to contribute at different times, then his or her contribution may depend on previous (non)contributors. Those who arrive early to collective dissent thus influence the late comers.

	Common values. The other part of a communal belief system is common values that overcome pecuniary self-interest. Potential dissidents will participate in CA if they have a process orientation; a rebel might value protest as a self-actualizing political experience, attach an entertainment value to his or her participation, seek to make his or her actions conform with the actions of other rebels, see his or her means of protest as an end in themselves, and/or think of his or her costs of participation as benefits. Potential dissidents will also participate in CA if they move "beyond self-interest": a rebel's enlightened self-interest might include altruism, the desire to express an ethical preference, Kantian ethics, fairness, group consciousness, and/or social incentives. (…) the difficulty of working together is illustrated in all these movements: in the case of Sinn Féin/IRA, when the political party wanted to become a full political actor in Northern Ireland, it had to face and bear responsibility for the IRA's past actions. Eventually though, Sinn Féin did not directly encourage violence, it endorsed it and supported it. The view that Sinn Féin is 'subordinated' to the IRA is the weakest point of the political party. This is why the first assembly of Basques in 1962 took place in France in order to decide what strategies would be adopted.14 During this assembly, language and culture were put forward as elements to gather all the Basques around an objective and symbols. During this meeting, it was decided that self-determination fighters would be trained like 'professionals'.
Contract solutions	The problem that dissidents in the canonical PG-PD game face is that they act independently in an interdependent situation. The result is the adverse outcome of individual action, or the negative externalities attached to independence. One solution is for the

	dissidents to organize, manage, and govern themselves so as to reach Pareto optimality, achieve joint gains, and hence overcome their Rebel's Dilemma. Dissidents will thus devise their own rules,institutions, and processes to avoid free riding, shirking, and opportunistic behavior.
Hierarchy solutions	(…) hierarchy approaches assume that a dissident organization already exists. Hierarchy solutions then seek the visible hand processes used by these organizations to plan for a PG. CA thus comes about, according to these explanations, because some entity has sufficient might to bring it about. Locate agents or entrepreneurs. Potential dissidents will participate in CA if leaders arise, the leaders create organizations, and the organizations pool common resources. Locate principals or patrons. The Rebel's Dilemma can be overcome if well-endowed outsiders, for whatever reasons, subsidize the costs of participation. Three important observations about conflict follow from this solution. Local civil rights demonstrations were more effective when a national civil rights organization assisted local efforts. Foreign patronage of internal political conflict intensifies domestic conflicts. Finally, outsiders are an important factor in peasant rebellions. Reorganize. This solution is composed of three separate solutions. The first way a dissident group may recognize is to become clubish and form an exclusionary club. A dissident group might be able to limit its membership such that the marginal benefits just equal the marginal costs of the last member. The second way a dissident group may reorganize is to become effective and locate an efficacious subgroup. Some subgroup of dissidents might be willing to provide the PG. For example, a dissident organization could rely on its zealots.

	The final way a dissident group may reorganize is to become decentralized and create a federal group. (…) terrorist groups (e.g., Irish Republican Army [IRA]) are thus composed of local groups. These chapters or cells can more easily solve the CA problem than can the organization as a whole. This means that organizations with smaller numbers of potential members and/or pursuing larger stakes are more likely to mobilize than those with fewer potential memberships and/or smaller stakes. One of the main dilemmas leaders face during conflicts is how to resolve their collective action problem. However, here again, the young members of ETA refused peaceful politics and picked up their arms again, fuelling the intergenerational conflict described by Edwards Feit. He explains that one of the reasons why it is sometimes so difficult to end the cycle of violence, even though the main branch of the movement is ready to become a political actor, is the energy of youth: 'youth, reacting against the political failures of their immediate elders, often take up the tactics of the more distant past'.