An Alternative Pathway from Authoritarianism: Personalism as an Indicator for State Failure in Autocratic Regimes

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Abstract

Current academic literature falsely assumes that an authoritarian regime can solely transition into a democracy, other type of autocracy or a similar autocracy. This paper shows that there can be a fourth alternative: state failure. This paper conceptualises state failure in Westphalian terms, namely when there is an absence of internal and external sovereignty and the state apparatus fails to provide essential services. The paper hence focuses on possible explanations of state failure in autocratic regimes. Specifically, the paper focuses on personalism as a predictor for state failure, which must be understood as the degree to which an autocratic leader forms the regime to their personal demands. The argument of this paper, consequently, follows that personalism is detrimental to the state's institutions, as these institutions are formed to solely function under the regime's current leader. Additionally, the paper theorised that this effect would be stronger in regimes where regime change was imposed, as these regimes would be especially ill prepared for the sudden change in regime. Through a binomial logistic regression, this paper has found evidence that higher personalism indeed does lead to a higher probability of state failure, but has found no evidence to support the second claim, as the size of the effect of personalism on state failure seems to decrease when only analysing those regimes which experienced imposed regime change.

Keywords: failed state, personalism, autocratic regimes, imposed regime change

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Personalism as an Indicator for State Failure in Autocratic Regimes

The Arab spring of 2011 sparked great enthusiasm amongst Western diplomats and scholars (Brumberg & Heydemann, 2013), as the 'Orientalist' notion supposed a pre-disposition of Arabs to authoritarianism (Santini, 2011) and the region was previously thought to be incapable of generating momentum for democratic change. With the outbreak of protests that enjoyed major societal engagement in the region, this development seemed to democratise the countries or significantly amend the regimes. The outcomes of this spring, however, have been precarious, as we have seen the spring develop into full-scale civil warfare in at least three countries (Libya, Syria and Yemen). As these countries have no effective government providing its citizens with the most basic services and are the battleground for civil or international wars, they are often referred to as 'failed states' (Kuperman, 2015; Anderson, 2011; Werrell, Femia & Sternberg, 2015; Khalaf, 2015).

These states are riddled with deep conflict and have experienced the state apparatus preying on its citizens in an attempt to prevent the protests from amending the regime. Additionally, the countries have experienced the continued presence of international militaries, fighting a war on their territory, indicating that the states have lost their external sovereignty. When combining this preying behaviour and the international presence with the inability to deliver the most basic political goods such as social and economic security, these states should be considered as failed. The question is, however, what conditions have allowed these regimes to have become to failed states.

It is this question that this paper will address. The research will thus question why, under what conditions, authoritarian regimes become failed states. Building on theories explaining the possible pathways from authoritarianism, state failure and regime change, I will argue that the odds that an authoritarian regime will experience state failure following regime change is significantly higher when the regime is highly personalist – i.e. when leaders form the regime's institutions to their personal demands. In doing so, they make it more difficult for their successor to succesfully rule the country, as the institutions have been formed to and have functioned because of the influence of one specific leader. When a regime thus experiences regime change, a personalist regime will be more likely to experience state failure.

The paper will assess the imposition of regime change, as it is in these moments that the future of a regime is decided (e.g. the Arab Spring). In the end, the paper will have scrutinised whether the personalism that is present in an autocracy significantly impacts the probability that a failed state occurs, with a focus on those regimes that have had a regime change imposed.

While most work regarding the regime change and the consequent possibility of state failure has parsed the differences between countries in an attempt to find the root cause for an (un)successful challenge to authoritarian power, this paper will contribute by providing a macro-analysis of personalism in authoritarian regimes. Previous scholars, when researching pathways from authoritarianism, have solely identified the possibilities of an autocracy transitioning into a similar autocracy, a totally different autocracy or a democracy. No academic work has yet focused, however, on the possibility that an authoritarian regime will become a failed state. It is in this gap of current literature that this paper will contribute, as it will attempt to provide the conditions under which an authoritarian regime will transition into a failed state.

Pathways From Authoritarianism

When an authoritarian regime is challenged, Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2012) conclude on three possible outcomes: a transition from (a) an autocracy to another form of, effectively, the same autocracy; (b) an autocracy to an entirely different form of autocracy; or (c), an autocracy to a democracy.

Autocracy to Autocracy

Former Egyptian military President Sadat was succeeded by Hosni Mubarak, another military officer and a prominent figure within Sadat's party. Because Mubarak came from the same party and resembled Sadat's military leadership, the shift in personnel did not result in a shift in ideological orientation, nor did it result in any institutional amendments (Geddes, Frantz & Wright, 2014). When the leadership changes but the ideology or true power does not, it should thus be categorised as a transition from an autocracy into a similar autocracy. This type of transition is particularly likely in countries where the rulers are from a particular elite or a one-party system, where the leadership often changes hands but the ideology and institutions remain the same.

Autocracy to Different Autocracy

The ouster of the Shah of Iran led to a radically different autocratic regime, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Geddes et al., 2012). The Shah's White Revolution achieved major technological advancements, but it also created large numbers of farmers that were not loyal to the Shah. These independent farmers eventually, frustrated with the government's failing land reforms and the lack of democratic reforms, organised against the Shah in cooperation with the middle class. These organised protests ousted the Shah and installed Ayatollah Khomeini as the supreme leader of Iran, representing a transition from one autocracy into another. Geddes et al. (2012) conclude that these transitions are underpinned by specific socio-political and cultural conditions and are thus very unlikely to occur.

Autocracy to Democracy

After weeks of protests, the elites who had supported Tunisian dictator Ben Ali were now cooperative to move the country towards democracy, in part caused by Ben Ali's increasingly personalist and corrupt regime (Brooks, 2012). This turn towards a personalist regime caused the military and civil elites to become increasingly wary of the growing liability of retaining Ben Ali in power, as it subverted the military's core organisational interests. When the protests in Tunisia came to a crossroads, the military had to decide to a) receive international critique by deploying troops against the population to continue their support for Ben Ali's or b) withdraw their support – leading to the overthrowal of Ben Ali – with the possibility of them playing at least some role in the post-Ben Ali negotiations. By withdrawing their support for Ben Ali, the dictator was forced to flee the country in fear of being assassinated by the popular uprising, resulting in a shift from autocracy to democracy.

What is Missing?

When taking into account the developments in countries such as Libya and Yemen since the onset of the Arab Spring, a fourth alternative appears for a regime challenge to an autocracy: the transition into a failed state. Geddes et al. (2012) shortly discuss the possibility of a transition into a failed state, but only in the context of a foreign-imposed regime change (p. 21). It is thus with this gap in current literature that this research will focus on under what conditions we see an autocracy transition into a failed state.

The authors make a prediction that the chances of democratisation after regime collapse should be better in states where the dominant party and military hold significant power (e.g. Egypt & Tunisia) than in personalist dictatorships (e.g. Libya & Yemen). The authors question whether this is because of structural factors that gave rise to personalist rule in the first place; the fact that personalist rule transforms domestic institutions so that the prospects of democratisation fall over time; or because personalist leaders will resist transition more forcefully (Geddes et al. 2012, p. 22-23). With the available data in 2012, the authors accurately predicted that the possibility for democratisation was larger in Egypt and Tunisia than in the personalist autocratic regimes of Libya and Yemen, with Libya and Yemen spiralling into civil warfare and Tunisia currently considered 'free' (Freedom House, 2019).

Literature Review

Failed States

Newman (2009), on the basis of the Westphalian concepts of internal and external sovereignty, considers a state be failing when it has: "poor capacity to control the public order within its territory, is unable to consistently control these borders, cannot reliably maintain viable public

institutions or services, and is vulnerable to extra-constitutional domestic challenges" (p. 422). Factors such as poor economic performance, economic distribution, human welfare and levels of conflict can be indicative of state failure. These factors can eventually result in the complete failure of the state apparatus, rendering the public services, institutions, authority and the central control over territory ineffective. State failure, then, per Newman, implies that there is a de facto absence of a central state authority (p. 422).

Rotberg (2002) agrees that the lack of control over territories is indicative of state failure, posing that failed states are contested by warring factions and sometimes face several insurgencies, civil unrest and an overabundance of dissent directed at the state and groups within the state (p. 85). However, a state can endure long-time conflict and still not be considered as failing. It is when the violence cascades into all-out internal warfare (i.e. civil war) that the state is no longer able to provide any of its services, thereby resulting in a massive deterioration of standards of living and the status of infrastructure (p. 86). Subsequently, Rotberg writes that there is thus no failed state without disharmonies between communities.

What is specific to failed states, per Rotberg, is that the ethnic, cultural or linguistic differences within the state lead the central government's control to be limited to one or more ethnically specific zones (p. 86). This lack of control fosters the regime's insecurity, causing the state apparatus to 'prey on its own citizens' by creating an ethnic cultural or linguistic superiority. The state apparatus consequently aims to silence these 'rebel-zones' (the zones where the state apparatus has limited control), superseding the traditional role of the state to effectively become one of the actors in the civil war. This development causes weak states to plunge toward complete failure, as the oppression provokes a countervailing reaction on the part of opposition groups (pp. 86-87). As the state apparatus is too involved with the resulting civil war, it cannot effectively provide the services that a functioning state should, hence resulting in a failed state.

All definitions of state failure hinge on an inability of states to deliver positive political goods to their people that legitimise the state. No longer able to provide these services, the state apparatus is no longer reliable in performing its central task, rendering the state illegitimate and losing its internal sovereignty. As displayed by Newman and Rotberg, this loss of internal sovereignty often goes hand in hand with an inability to control the borders and fight rebels opposing the central state apparatus, which thus relates to the external sovereignty of the state. With both types of sovereignty no longer applicable to the state apparatus, the state has effectively transitioned into a failed state.

An important distinction is the difference between a failed state and a collapsed state, as a collapsed state experiences a lack of services provided by the state in its entirety: a collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state (Rotberg, 2002, p. 90), which experiences a vacuum of authority. In these collapsed states, security essentially regresses to the rule of the strong, often causing warlords or substate actors to gain control over a region with their own security apparatuses and mechanisms. This rule by warlords or even terrorists consequently further decays the state's institutions (p. 90).

Rival Explanations of State Failure

Having defined failed states, it is now essential to analyse existing explanations of state failure.

Resource-based Explanations.

A resource-based explanation of state failure comes in two variants. The first is what Di John (2008, p. 13) calls the 'honey pot' or rent-seeking argument. Essentially, what this entails is that less developed countries with vast amounts of oil generate valuable rents taking the form of 'greed-based' insurgencies (p. 13). What this means is that the state pursues the rents in such a violent manner that it behaves as an insurgency aiming to monopolise valuable resources to consequently profit from them. What this will thus cause is that the government of a regime essentially behaves as a greedy insurgency in pursuit of economic improvements to escape its status as 'less-developed', thereby neglecting its duties to protect and provide for its citizens (Hoeffler & Collier, 2004, p. 564). The consequent economic decline, dependence on primary commodities and low-income increase the risk of civil war onset (Di John, 2008, p. 13). As discussed, the onset of civil war consequently results in state failure, as the state apparatus is unable to provide its citizens with any political services, rendering the apparatus ineffective.

The second type of resource-based explanation of state failure is the rentier state model. This theory poses that when a state earns a large share of its revenue through external sources, such as resource rents, the state apparatus becomes increasingly less necessary. As the state is no longer reliant upon taxes to gather revenue, decision-makers become less accountable to groups and individuals within the society (p. 13). Essentially, this theory ascertains that a state relies on 'unearned' income in the form of mineral rents or aid, thereby not developing a set of reciprocal obligations with its citizens through domestic taxation (p. 16), thus no longer feeling the need to account for itself. This rentier-state model is especially likely in oil states, as they do not need to create strong and lasting bureaucracies to raise revenue for governance (p. 13). The fact that there is no strong bureaucracy, consequently, translates to weak state structures and institutions in general, rendering the state apparatus illegitimate in the eyes of the citizens

and making the state more vulnerable to insurgency which can overthrow a regime or contribute to the failing of a regime by taking away a state's external sovereignty.

No Security as State Failure.

Other academic work regarding state failure mainly concerns itself with civil war causing state failure (e.g. Rotberg, 2010; Milliken & Krause, 2002). Although the view of this paper is that civil war can be a consequence, symptom or phenomenon of state failure, Rotberg argues that it is actually the lead cause. According to Rotberg, the most important task that a state has is the provision of security. Civil warfare, which Rotberg defines as the state preying on its own citizens and an omnipresence of ethnic or intercommunal hostilities, causes the state to not be able to provide the most basic service (i.e. security) to its citizens, rendering its apparatus futile (p. 6). Rotberg does not specify, however, how this civil warfare can be caused, apart from stating that it finds its roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity.

Because of its engagement in civil warfare, the government is unable to provide its citizens with basic services and governance. Because of this lack of governance and control, it cannot prevent crime syndicates from rising and taking over the streets (p. 6). As criminal violence rises, all types of criminal activities become more common, resulting in a further decay of the state's capabilities, as ordinary police forces become paralysed. To attain some minimal level of protection, citizens naturally turn to warlords to offer the possibility of security when the state is crumbling (p. 6). Rotberg thus concludes that high rates of urban crime and the presence and rise of criminal syndicates testify to an underlying anarchy and desperation, nearing state failure.

Where Rotberg and I disagree is that whereas Rotberg sees civil war as a precondition for state failure, I argue that state failure could, in turn, cause civil war too. As a state's institutions are flawed, it becomes increasingly reliant on one particular ethnicity/community for its support, thereby initiating the process of 'preying' on its own citizens. Consequently, the 'prey' organises against the state, thereby serving as some sort of insurgency. This organised insurgency consequently starts a civil war with the state apparatus, evidencing that civil war can be a consequence of state failure too, instead of it being the other way around. Additionally, civil warfare relates to the requirement of state failure regarding internal sovereignty. This leaves external sovereignty to yet be determined. Although all-out civil warfare can be of such a violent and long-lasting nature that it also deprives a state of its external sovereignty (i.e. when the state is no longer able to control its borders against foreign forces, terrorists or insurgencies), this does not need to necessarily be the case.

Imposed Regime Change

Regime change in authoritarian regimes is often involuntary. Rather than evolving naturally into a different type of state, autocrats often hang onto power despite contests, resulting in an all-out campaign against their rule and an imposed regime change. As identified by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014, p. 325), there are four ways in which a regime change can be imposed/coerced: an ousting through 1) popular uprising; 2) military coup; 3) insurgents or 4) foreign imposition.

1) The regime is ousted by popular uprising (widespread, mostly unarmed demonstrations, riots and/or strikes).

A popular uprising entails organised protest with widespread civil engagement (Anderson, 2011). Popular uprisings often hinge on a catalyst such as the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia, which became a symbol for the oppressiveness of the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali (Engelbrekt, Mohlin & Wagnsson, 2013, p. 4). These protests consequently become increasingly organised, allowing them to pressure the regime through strikes or violence, aiming to overthrow the regime or attain significant amendments.

2) The regime is overthrown by a military coup.

A military coup is when the military forcibly removes the sitting executive using unconstitutional means, most often because of inefficient ruling or because of the desire to gain a more advantageous position (Derpanopoulos, Frantz, Geddes & Wright, 2016; Powell & Thyne, 2011). A military coup can lead to three outcomes: no regime change; the establishment of a new dictatorship; or democratisation (Derpanopoulos et al, 2016, p. 2).

3) The regime is ousted by insurgents, revolutionaries or combatants fighting a civil war.

Insurgents, revolutionaries or combatants use organised, violent means to achieve their political agendas (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 88). These groups are often warring over a perceived disadvantage (i.e. ethnical, linguistic or cultural) or pursue a specific ideological change (i.e. Islamic fundamentalism). Referring to this paper's conceptualisation of a failed state, insurgencies are what Newman refers to as 'warring factions contesting the regime's legitimacy'.

4) The regime changes through foreign imposition or invasion.

Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) is a process where an international actor forces a target-state to change its government (Nomikos, Downes & Monten, 2014; Reiter, 2017). A FIRC-imposer might either a) seek to remove the target's government or political leader without thereby seeking to change the target's institutions, thereby only deposing the leadership of the country; or b) intervene and consequently impose a political philosophy, thereby changing the target's leadership and institutions.

Drawbacks of Imposed Regime Change.

The drawback of an imposed regime change is the unpreparedness to govern amongst the actors imposing the regime change, as overthrowing leaders is unlikely to enhance democracy and might instead contribute to chaos and civil war (Downes & Monten, 2014, p. 130). Thus, although the imposition of a regime change might be motivated by the concern for democratisation, this interference might actually cause more harm than good. Additionally, (e.g.) FIRCs are especially unlikely to work in the places where it is most likely to be employed. Especially in 'weak states' that have little experience with democracy and experience significant societal divisions (e.g. Syria), FIRCs may help to trigger a civil war (p. 130). Moreover, if a regime changes through (e.g.) an insurgency, this will cause this ethnical, linguistic or culturally-specific group to assume the governing position. However, this group will again only represent a minor fraction of the general population, causing the insurgency to consequently face many contestations to its power (Fearon & Laitin, 2003), as many other groups now feel disadvantaged. A military coup, relies on the intent of the coup's plotters. If the plotters deposed the leader to consequently install a new, be it different, authoritarian leader, the citizens might not experience any changes. However, if the plotters depose a leader to democratise the nation, a coup d'état might prove to be a very effective way to bring about change.

Personalism in Autocratic Regimes

Autocratic regimes can vary in the degree to which they allow political competition and electoral participation, depending on the institutional developments (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007, p. 145-148). However, one of the most defining characteristics of an autocratic regime, and the trait that this research will focus on, is the degree to which a regime is considered to be personalist. Although personalism was initially considered to be, and by some accounts still is, a regime type of its own, Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and later Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2017), have increasingly considered it a trait that is more or less present in a regime (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007, p. 149).

Personalism as a trait in autocratic regimes is illustrated by the case study of Tunisia's dictator Ben Ali by Brooks (2012). Upon taking reign, Ben Ali maintained the distance created between the military and the regime, as both Ben Ali and his predecessor had invested in the security services and policing force as the coercive forces of the regime, whereas other autocracies relied on the military to perform this task (p. 207-208). This absence in the regime's political institutions gave the military a marginal role, limited responsibilities and a lack of a role in the day-to-day management of the regime (p. 208). Brooks argues that this limited role

of the military was designed by Ben Ali in an attempt to localise the centre of power in his clique, which, per Brooks, was accomplished in two complementary tactics.

First, Ben Ali marginalised the military through continuous underfunding, disabling it to equip more personnel than the current capacity or purchase the required technology and defence equipment needed to modernise. Furthermore, Ben Ali ensured that personal enrichment was virtually impossible for the military elite, preventing them from creating any influence on political networks and regime institutions. Because of the corruption in Tunisia under Ben Ali, this lack of personal resources within the military elite caused it to be unable to achieve any political advancements.

Second, the military was thus not involved in the day to day security activities, as this job was reserved for the policing force and the security services, causing the military to remain a military institution, with daily security activities performed by the police and security services managed by the interior ministry – which was controlled by Ben Ali and his clique. Although this division was thus successfully created to eliminate the political influence of the military, it also caused the military to not be associated with the oppressive security apparatus. Whereas the security services were thus feared by Tunisians, the military was not necessarily linked to the oppressive regime (p. 208).

The Tunisian military's independence, combined with their absence in securing the leadership position of Ben Ali and his clique, secured relative trustworthiness amongst Tunisian civilians, causing military officers and personnel to value the institution's organisational integrity and its position as free from civilian interference (p. 208). Moreover, the militaries placed value on the social prestige accompanying this integrity in the corrupt regime. This mentality and focus on institutional integrity, per Brooks, are key to take into consideration when assessing the costs related to sustaining Ben Ali's position of power when the popular uprisings attempted to overthrow the dictator. Representing perhaps the sole Tunisian institution that carried some degree of public trust within the Ben Ali regime, the military leaders thus had a lot to lose if they were to obey the orders from the regime to fire on the protestors. All these factors created an opening for the military leadership to "seize the high ground and abstain from assisting the police" (p. 208) when the increasingly violent protests reached the Tunisian capital, thereby disobeying direct orders from the Ben Ali regime.

What this history of the role of the Tunisian military under Ben Ali displays is the influence of personalism within an autocratic regime on the country's institutions. Although the Tunisian military was thus eventually able to uphold its organisational integrity, this was in part because that the regime was not entirely conceived under Ben Ali. While Ben Ali's

predecessor already initiated the process of eliminating the influence of the military's influence in the political spheres, neither attempted to integrate the military as an institution within the personalist regime's spheres. Forces in other autocratic regimes, however, were thus transformed by personalist regimes into a sort of law enforcement apparatus, whose main purpose was to preserve the balance of power and prevent the regime from any potential insurrection of power (De Maio, 2006, p. 23), indicating that personalism in autocratic regimes can cause the corrosion of state institutions.

Typology of Personalism

Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2017) have studied 'latent personalism over regime duration', analysing eight questions to assess the degree of personalism in a regime. These questions are consequently combined, with the result indicating the degree of personalism in a regime.

1. Does access to high office depend on personal loyalty to the regime leader?
2. Did the regime leader create a new support political party after seizing power?
3. Does the regime leader control appointments to the party executive committee?
4. Is the party executive committee absent or simply a rubber stamp for the regime leader's decisions?
5. Does the regime leader personally control the security apparatus?
6. Does the regime leader promote officers loyal to himself or from his ethnic, tribal, regional, or partisan group, or are there widespread forced retirement of officers from other groups?
7. Does the regime leader create paramilitary forces, a president's guard, or new security force loyal to himself?
8. Does the regime leader imprison/kill officers from groups other than his own without a reasonably fair trial?

According to the authors, then, personalist regimes have a tendency to be averagely personalist at the start of the regime, but turn increasingly personalist over time (p. 12). Long-lived personalist regimes hence tend to have very high personalism scores, indicating a concentration of power amongst the leader of the regime and their personal elite. This concentration of power is combined with a dependency on the regime's leadership and the leader's clique, as the institutions will have been transformed to uphold and maintain that specific balance of power.

What this section and the previous have thus theorised is that personalism can cause the corrosion of a state's institutions. Because a personalist leader will transform the state's institutions to their personal demands, the institutions will only function at full capacity as long as this leader is in place. If the balance of power supporting the regime's leader is consequently

challenged and the institutions do not manage to sustain the leadership position, resulting in the regime's downfall, this can lead to the complete destruction of the state's institutions, as they were all loyal to and working for the regime's leader. If the institutions are thus destroyed, a new regime will have to restart the entire process of state building, indicating a vulnerable and weak state.

Hypotheses and Expectations

As becomes clear in the previous section, a potential consequence of high personalism in an autocratic regime will be the corrosion of the state's institutions. Consequently, when this regime falls, the institutions will no longer be strong enough to support the central apparatus' most important tasks (i.e. the provision of essential services). Because of this potential development, the main question and hypothesis of this paper are the following:

> H1. Personalism will significantly influence whether an autocratic regime will become a failed state.

Consequently, as outlined in the section regarding imposed regime change[1], regimes where regime change is imposed will possibly fare worse than regimes that did not experience an imposed regime change, as they had not had the opportunity to prepare for the fall of the regime. Additionally, because of the corroding effect of personalism on institutions, the paper hypothesises the following:

> H2. Personalism will have a larger effect on whether a regime will become a failed state if the regime undergoes imposed regime change.

Research Design

To establish a variable measuring the personalism in a regime, we return to the eight questions of personalism by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (henceforth GWF). To be able to perform a statistical analysis, dummy variables for each question were created so all questions are answered with 0 (representing no personalism in that question) or 1 (representing personalism in that question). Consequently, the scores of these eight questions are then collected into one new variable, *personalism,* representing the degree of personalism that is present within an autocratic regime. As there are eight questions and each is coded binary, the range of the variable lies between 0 and 8. These eight questions are thus all incorporated in the dataset from GWF (2017), on which this thesis will rely for the rest of its analysis accordingly.

As is outlined in *pathways from authoritarianism*, there are three options for a transition from autocracy: autocracy to democracy, autocracy to (a different) autocracy, or autocracy to

[1] See page 9

failed state. This is also how GWF have coded this (variable: *gwf_case_fail_subsregime),* with 0 representing a regime that has not yet fallen, 1 a regime that has turned democratic, 2 a regime that has transitioned to an autocracy and 3 a regime that is neither autocratic nor democratic. The case selection of this research is thus when this variable is coded as 3, as this represents a period in which a country has no government or has multiple governments of which none controls most of the resources of the state. As the value of 3 is the only one of interest, let us create a dummy variable indicating whether the value for this variable is 3 for a regime-case. In the section *case selection*[2], we will determine which of these regimes truly are failed states and identify any possible other failed states. Additionally, as will be explained in further detail in *case selection*[3], we will analyse our data with two different models for each analysis, models A and B. For model A, we will only rely on the data as provided in GWF. However, as the latest data in GWF is from 2010, we recode the values of the relevant variables for Model B, enabling us to analyse our research question with up-to-date data[4].

As soon as the cases of state failure have been identified, we can perform several analyses which will help us to find an answer to our research question. This paper will begin by running a t-test, testing if the mean of *personalism* is significantly different in the group of regimes that we consider failed states and those we do not. This test thus allows us to asses whether failed states are significantly more personalist than non-failed states. Consequently, we will run a binomial logistic regression analysis with *personalism* as the independent variable and *failedstate* as the binary dependent variable. With this analysis, we can scrutinise whether *personalism* increases the odds that a failed state occurs, thus answering our main research question and hypothesis. The regression will provide us with an odds ratio, indicating the increase or decrease in Odds that a failed state occurs if *personalism* increases with 1.

Thereafter, we will divide the cases into whether they have had a regime change imposed. For this, GWF have a variable for the type of regime change (*gwf_fail_type*), with the values 4, 5, 6 and 7 representing different forms of imposed regime change (GWF, 2017). Accordingly, we will create a dummy variable (*impsd_regime*) indicating whether a regime change has been imposed (i.e. whether *gwf_fail_type* is equal to 4, 5, 6 or 7). Consequently, we will run another t-test, analysing whether the mean *personalism* is significantly different in regimes that have had a regime change imposed than regimes that did not. We will then run another binomial logistic regression, testing whether *personalism* increases the odds that a

[2] See page 15
[3] Ibid.
[4] See the appendix for the step-by-step recoding

failed state occurs. Because the regimes are divided into whether they have had a regime change imposed, it allows us to analyse whether regimes with an imposed regime change are more likely to transition into failed states than regimes with a non-imposed regime change.

Moreover, for the last two models, the binomial logistic regressions (i.e. four in total, A & B), we will analyse our question with control variables attached. The first control variable is *monoethnic*, scrutinising whether the party elite is dominated by one specific ethnicity, religion or region. If the party elite is monotonous, there might be protests against the regime, as the population will feel distanced from the elite. The second and third control variables are *leadermil* and *leaderrebel* which question whether the regime's leader was a military or a rebel, respectively. This could influence our research as a part of the population might perceive this leader as illegitimate, as they represent a specific group in society. This would consequently result in a fiercer contestation of the regime. The variables *seizure_coup* and *seizure_rebel*, control whether the current regime came into place through either a military coup or a rebellion. This could influence our research as the population might perceive the leadership as having obtained power through illegitimate means, resulting in a fiercer contestation of the regime.

The research hypothesis poses that some authoritarian states become failed states because a regime change causes its personalist institutions to become ineffective or even destroyed. We will thus examine the effect of authoritarian regimes with personalist regimes on state failure under the condition that regime change has occurred. In this case, we can take the last observation of the previous regime in GWF (2017), representing the previous regime's personalism. We will thus issue a command that retains only the last observation within each regime case. Consequently, we can run a regression with this data, knowing that all of these cases have experienced regime change. With our case selection, we will thus solely analyse regimes that have experienced regime change. Accordingly, we know that the failed state occurred in the period following this latest regime change. Knowing that the last observation of the regime represents the personalism score of the regime and having coded the failed state occurring in the following regime, validates the regression analysis.

Case Selection

When we analyse which regime, according to GWF, earns the value of 1 for the newly coded variable *failedstate* and thus possibly represents a failed state, we find the following result:

Country	***Year***	***Fail type***
South Vietnam	1963-1975	State ceases to exist
Chad	1975-1979	Regime ousted by insurgents

Yugoslavia	1944-1990	State ceases to exist
South Yemen	1967-1990	State ceases to exist
Liberia	1980-1990	Regime ousted by insurgents
East Germany	1949-1990	Incumbent lost election and allowed winning party to take office
Somalia	1969-1991	Regime ousted by insurgents
Soviet Union	1917-1991	State ceases to exist
Afghanistan	1978-1992	Regime ousted by insurgents
Afghanistan	1996-2001	Regime change through foreign imposition
Iraq	1979-2003	Regime change through foreign imposition

What stands out are the Soviet regimes (Yugoslavia, East Germany and the Soviet Union) and nations that merged with other nations (South Vietnam and South Yemen). As these five regimes are not cases of failed states but rather ceased to exist, we will recode these five regimes to no longer have the value of 1 for our variable *failedstate*. Let us ascertain whether the remaining six states indeed could and should be considered to be failed states, by relying on Goemans, Gleditsch & Chiozza (2009), who have assembled data on leaders from 1875-2004, including a detailed description of all countries' leaders and their entry and exit to power.

We will consider a state failed if it has a lack of internal and external sovereignty no effective state apparatus. With this in mind, we can see that there was no effective government in place in Chad (1979), Liberia (1990), Somalia (1991) and Afghanistan (1992) because of civil wars between several armed factions and a complete absence of any type of governance, rendering the state apparatus futile in providing its population with any services. In Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), there was no central government following an intervention by the United States, which overthrew the present administrations and failed to install a functioning government. All these six cases should thus be categorised as failed states.[5]

Missing Cases

These six cases are hence the states that GWF have identified as failed states. However, when analysing the aforementioned literature on failed states (i.e. Rotberg, 2002 & Newman, 2009), one concludes that GWF's dataset might display a discrepancy between the conceptualisation of a failed state according to this paper v. that of GWF. As GWF's 'failed state' variable is merely concerned with whether the "country has no government or has multiple governments, no one of which controls most of the resources of the state" (GWF, 2018, p. 4), it identifies

[5] For a more extended analysis of all countries, I recommend reading the appendix for my extensive notes on assessing failed states.

failed states only when the government that is in place falls and there is a subsequent situation of a lack of provision of services by the central apparatus (i.e. GWF only code collapsed states as failed). However, the fall of the government is not a necessary precondition for a state to be considered 'a failed state' (i.e. failed vs. collapsed state). [6]

With that limitation in mind, let us resort to Newman and Rotberg for possible other failed states. Newman (2009) relies on (amongst others) the Failed States Index (which has been renamed to the Fragile States Index) to list the 40 lowest countries (representing a high degree of failure) to rank state failure.:

1. Somalia
2. Sudan
3. Zimbabwe
4. Chad
5. Iraq
6. DR Congo
7. Afghanistan
8. Cote d'Ivoire
9. Pakistan
10. Central African Republic

Rotberg (2002), states explicitly: "this decade's failed states are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan" (p. 90). Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan are thus identified as failed states by both authors, indicating a structural flaw in the states' apparatuses, as the two papers are written seven years apart.

Having analysed the two papers, we now have new states that have been identified by Newman and Rotberg as potentially failed states. As the authors have written their respective articles in different years, I have added the 'year for nomination' between brackets, or both if the writers agree. For this paper, however, as we are analysing autocratic regimes, whether the regime should be considered to be failed is only relevant if the state is an autocratic regime. For this, we can once again rely on the GWF dataset. Additionally, I have identified whether, if both authors identify a state as a failed state, the regime has changed significantly.

1. Somalia (both) – autocratic in neither
2. Sudan (both) – autocratic in both years
3. Zimbabwe (2009) – autocratic in both years

[6] As displayed in the typology of failed states on page 7

4. Chad (2009) – autocratic in both years
5. Iraq (2009) – not autocratic
6. DR Congo (both) – autocratic in both years, but different regimes
7. Afghanistan (both) – already listed for 2001, no data for 2009
8. Cote d'Ivoire (2009) – autocratic in both years
9. Pakistan (2009) – autocratic in both years (although 2008 was the last year, per GWF)
10. CAR (2009) – autocratic in both years
11. Angola (2002) – autocratic in both years
12. Burundi (2002) – autocratic only in 2002
13. Sierra Leone (2002) – autocratic in neither

We can hence drop Somalia (both), Iraq (2000) and Sierra Leone (2002) from consideration, as these countries were not considered autocratic by GWF (2017). Additionally, we can drop Afghanistan, as we have already listed 2001 above and we do not have data for 2009. This thus leaves us with the following countries, which we will shortly examine to verify whether they are indeed worthy of the label of 'failed state'.

Again, we will consider a state to be failed if it has a lack of internal and external sovereignty as well as the absence of an effective state apparatus. We can see that we should not consider Chad (2009), Pakistan (2009) or Burundi (2002) failed states, as there has been an increase in international aide preventing the state from failing in Chad and there has not been a legitimate threat to the country's external sovereignty in Pakistan and Burundi. In Angola (2002), the Central African Republic (2009) and Cote d'Ivoire (2009), there was both a contestation to and lack of internal and external sovereignty. Additionally, all three countries experienced leadership that was unwilling to provide essential government services, all the while refusing to relinquish their power, instead opting to gather personal wealth. In Sudan (both 2002 and 2009) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2002), there was immense domestic opposition to the regime, leading to contestations through insurgencies and opposition movements respectively, paralysing the states' ability to maintain its borders. Both governments were unable or unwilling to provide its population with essential services such as infrastructure or health care. The leader of the Central African Republic (2009) seized power through a military coup in 2003, after which a civil war erupted because of the leader's inability to draft a new constitution. During this period after the coup, there was an all-out civil war, resulting in a lack of government services and governance altogether.[7]

[7] For a more extended analysis of all countries, I recommend reading the appendix for my extensive notes on assessing failed states.

With these newly established failed states, this is now our list of failed states, with the year representing the ruling period of the regime previous to the failed state as in GWF (2017):

Country	***Year***
Chad	1975-1979
Liberia	1980-1990
Somalia	1969-1991
Afghanistan	1978-1992
Zaire	1960-1997
Afghanistan	1996-2001
Iraq	1979-2003
Angola	1975-NA
Sudan	1989-NA
Democratic Republic of Congo	1997-NA
Cote d'Ivoire	2000-NA
Central African Republic	2003-NA

Cases Outside GWF

However, besides these twelve cases of state failure that occurred within the parameters of the GWF dataset, there are other possible, current, cases of state failure: Libya (post-Qadhafi), Myanmar (accused of genocide by the Gambia), Syria (civil war), Venezuela (international cooperation with the rival government), Yemen (civil war) and Zimbabwe (military coup against Mugabe). Having occurred outside the parameters of the GWF dataset, they will, if there are any, be admitted to a second model, as their *personalism* score is not from the moment that the failure occurred. In this case, the last reported values for this country will stand as if they represent the country's current values (e.g. Venezuela's current president Maduro was not yet in power in 2010, but as we do not have current data, we will take the data of his predecessor).

Again, we will consider a state to be failed if it has a lack of internal and external sovereignty as well as the absence of an effective state apparatus. Libya, Syria and Yemen have experienced all-out civil war, international interventions and international soldiers partaking in warfare. Additionally, all countries have experienced internal turmoil with terrorist groupings proclaiming sovereign regions. During this period, neither country has been able to provide its citizens with basic services, resulting in the categorisation of a failed state. Although the government of Myanmar has thus been accused of genocide, the country's economy and other

government services are performing at a sufficient level. This leads Myanmar to not be a failed state, despite the perilous situation. The Zimbabwean government has been unable to provide economic policies, infrastructure or any type of healthcare security since 2002. Taking into account the coup d'état against President Mugabe, the country also experienced a lack of internal sovereignty, resulting in a categorisation as a failed state. Lastly, the Venezuelan regime under Maduro should be considered a failed state, as it is contested or even declared illegitimate by the international community and domestic actors. Additionally, the regime has proven to be unable to provide any essential services to its citizens. [8]

Analysis

Two Models of Failed States

With all failed states now accurately described and categorised as such, let us list all once more, divided into the two models. Additionally, let us introduce the variable of personalism (based on Geddes et al., 2017) into the table. The variable of *personalism* is thus a collected score of how personalist an autocratic regime is. As there are eight questions and each is coded binary, the range of the variable lies between 0 and 8. The year represents the ruling period of the regime previous to the failed state as in GWF (2017).

Models A	Models B	Year	Personalism
Chad		1975-1979	3
Liberia		1980-1990	7
Somalia		1969-1991	7
Afghanistan		1978-1992	5
Zaire		1960-1997	7
Afghanistan		1996-2001	3
Iraq		1979-2003	6
Angola		1975-NA	7
Sudan		1989-NA	5
Democratic Republic of Congo		1997-NA	8
Cote d'Ivoire		2000-NA	7
Central African Republic		2003-NA	7
	Syria	1963-NA	6
	Libya	1969-NA	7
	Yemen	1978-NA	7

[8] For a more extended analysis of all countries, I recommend reading the appendix for my extensive notes on assessing failed states.

Zimbabwe	1980-NA	6
Venezuela	2005-NA	5

The next step is concluding on whether the average degree of personalism is significantly different in the regimes preceding the group of states we consider failed and the group that we do not consider to be failed. We will hence compare the mean of the variable *personalism* that is present in these failed states with the mean of *personalism* that is present in non-failed states by running a t-test, to compare whether the two groups are significantly different.

Model A1: T-test *personalism*, by *failedstate*

Group	Observations	Mean personalism	Std. deviation
Failed states	12	6.000	1.65
Non-failed states	268	3.817	1.98

What this t-test analysed was whether regimes preceding the failed states knew a higher personalism than non-failed states. The answer is yes, as the mean personalism in regimes preceding the failed states is significantly different from the mean personalism in non-failed states (p<0.001). Now that we know that the two means of personalism are significantly different, we must analyse to what degree we can consider *personalism* to increase the odds of a failed state occurring. For this, we run a binomial logistic regression.

Model A2: binomial logistic regression, effect of *personalism* on *failedstate*

failedstate	Odds ratio	Std. Error.	P> |z|	95% Conf.	Interval
personalism	1.9765	0.4151	0.001	1.3096	2.9831
_cons	0.0015	0.0019	0.000	0.0001	0.0178

The analysis attempted to display if personalism has an impact on whether a state failure would occur. The regression shows us that this is the case, as the $Chi^2(1)=15.04$ (p<0.001) tells us that the model is a good fit and that there is a significant overall effect of the independent variable. The number of observations is consistent with the t-test, as both total 280 observations. Most importantly, the odds ratio for *personalism* is significant (p=0.001). The odds ratio of 1.9765 tells us that if *personalism* increases with 1, the odds that a failed state occurs increase with 1.9765. This indicates that *personalism* affects whether a state failure occurs. The hypothesis that higher personalism will result in higher odds of state failure thus seems to hold.

Consequently, we now include the failed states that were not listed in the GWF dataset (i.e. Syria, Libya, Yemen, Zimbabwe and Venezuela) for models B. We will follow the same steps as we did for models A. The first analysis that we run is whether the mean *personalism* in failed states is significantly different from the mean *personalism* in non-failed states.

Model B1: T-test *personalism*, by *failedstate*

Group	Observations	Mean personalism	Std. deviation
Failed states	17	6.059	1.43
Non-failed states	263	3.772	1.96

Again, the t-test examines if the regimes preceding the failed states experienced a higher score of personalism than the non-failed states. The test shows us that the score of *personalism* is indeed higher for regimes preceding the failed states, having risen with the five states now included as failed states. We see that the mean *personalism* for both groups has changed (with non-failed states changing from 3.817 to 3.772 and that of regimes preceding the failed states changing from 6.000 to 6.059). This is also reflected in the change in standard deviation, as both groups now have smaller deviations. Additionally, the t-test shows us that the mean *personalism* in regimes preceding the failed states is significantly different from the mean *personalism* in non-failed states ($p<0.001$).

For the next step, we will again analyse if we can consider *personalism* to increase the odds of a failed state occurring. The prediction is that, as both the mean of *personalism* and the number of failed states have increased, the effect will be stronger in model B. To test this, we run a binomial logistic regression.

Model B2: binomial logistic regression, effect of *personalism* on *failedstate*

failedstate	Odds ratio	Std. Error	P> |z|	95% Conf.	Interval
personalism	2.0922	0.3924	0.000	1.4486	3.0217
_cons	0.0016	0.0018	0.000	0.0002	0.0145

The regression tested if higher *personalism* would lead to a higher odds of state failure. Because of the inclusion of the five new cases, the answer is again: yes. The $Chi^2(1)=23.27$ ($p<0.001$) tells us that the model is a good fit and that there is a significant overall effect of the independent variable. Additionally, the increase in Chi^2 from Model A2 (increase from 15.04 to 23.27) tells us that the independent variable is better able to predict the dependent variable, resulting in an overall better fit for the model. Most importantly, the odds ratio for *personalism* is again significant ($p<0.001$), with a value of 2.0922. The increase of the odds ratio from 1.9765 to 2.0922 tells us that in this model, *personalism* has a larger effect on whether or not a regime is to be considered a failed state. The odds ratio of 2.0922 tells us that if *personalism* increases with 1, the odds that a failed state occurs increase with 2.0922. Again, this indicates that *personalism* affects whether a state failure occurs.

Concluding, Models A2 and B2 have displayed that, whether or not one includes the five cases of state failure outside of GWF, the odds of state failure rise when *personalism* increases. The next step is to analyse the second part of the theory that questions whether, when a regime change is imposed, personalism influences whether a state will fail. We will consequently run a t-test which divides our total observations by this variable *impsd_regime*, so that we can tell whether the cases where a regime is not imposed (i.e. *impsd_regime = 0*) and a regime is imposed (i.e. *impsd_regime = 1*) are significantly different from each other.

Model A3: T-test *personalism*, by *impsd_regime*

Group	Observations	Mean personalism	Std. deviation
Imposed regime change	142	4.176	1.869
Non-imposed regime change	138	3.638	2.124

The t-test scrutinises whether personalism is higher in regimes with imposed regime change. The results indicate that this is the case, as the mean *personalism* of the groups is significantly different from each other (p=0.025) and the mean *personalism* of regimes with imposed regime change is higher. The t-test shows us that there are 138 observations of an autocratic regime changing due to a non-imposed regime change and 142 observations where a regime change is imposed.

Consequently, we will once more test whether we can consider *personalism* to increase the odds of state failure. This time, we will analyse this effect by studying the group of regimes that had regime change imposed. For this, we run a binomial logistic regression.

Model A4: binomial logistic regression, effect of *personalism* on *failedstate*, by *impsd_regime*

failedstate	Odds ratio	Std. Error.	P> |z|	95% Conf.	Interval
	if impsd_regime = 1				
personalism	1.5506	0.3923	0.083	0.9444	2.546
_cons	0.0063	0.0089	0.000	0.0004	0.1005
	if impsd_regime = 0				
personalism	2.6240	0.7365	0.001	1.5137	4.5487
_cons	0.0005	0.0009	0.000	0.0000	0.0172

This model tests whether we can consider *personalism* to increase the odds of state failure occurring when regime change is imposed. As Model A4 shows us, we cannot conclude anything about this relation, as the result is not significant for the regimes who had regime change imposed. The number of observations is consistent with the t-test, as both indicate 142

observations for imposed regime changes. The $Chi^2(1)=3.60$ ($p=0.058$) tells us that the model is not a good fit and that the independent variable does not have a significant effect. The odds ratio for *personalism*, additionally, is not significant ($p=0.083$), which means that we cannot say something about the odds ratio.

When no regime change is imposed, *personalism* does significantly increase the odds of state failure. The model is a good overall fit and that there is an overall effect of the independent variable as the $Chi^2(1)=22.17$ ($p<0.000$) displays. The odds ratio of 2.6240 indicates that in regimes where no regime change is imposed, the odds that state failure occurs increase with 2.6240 when *personalism* increases.

In the following models B3 and B4, the imposed regime changes in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Zimbabwe will be incorporated. We will again run a t-test to indicate whether the mean *personalism* is significantly different between regimes where a regime change is not imposed and regimes where a regime change is imposed.

Model B3: T-test *personalism* by *impsd_regime*

Group	Observations	Mean personalism	Std. deviation
Imposed regime change	146	4.240	1.884
Non-imposed regime change	134	3.552	2.094

The test displays that *personalism* is higher in regimes which experienced imposed regime change. The t-test shows us that there are now 134 observations of a non-imposed autocratic regime change and 146 observations where a regime change was imposed. With the addition of Syria, Libya, Yemen and Zimbabwe, the mean *personalism* has changed from 3.638 to 3.552 for the regimes where regime change was not imposed and changing from 4.176 to 4.240 when regime change was imposed, with the standard deviation in both groups dropping accordingly. The mean *personalism* of the groups is, still, significantly different ($p=0.004$), indicating that the mean *personalism* in regimes where regime change is imposed is significantly higher than in regimes where regime change is not imposed.

With the addition of Syria, Libya, Yemen and Zimbabwe, we will once more test whether we can consider *personalism* to increase the odds of a failed state occurring. Again, this effect will be analysed while dividing the observations between regimes with and without imposed regime change. We will run a binomial logistic regression to test this. The prediction will be that, because of the addition of the aforementioned cases and the consequent rise of failed states present in the analysis, the effect of *personalism* increases.

Model B4: binomial logistic regression, effect of *personalism* on *failedstate*, by *impsd_regime*

failedstate	**Odds ratio**	**Std. Error.**	**P> |z|**	**95% Conf. Interval**	
	if impsd_regime = 1				
personalism	1.8763	0.4484	0.008	1.1746	2.9973
_cons	0.0034	0.0047	0.000	0.0002	0.0527
	if impsd_regime = 0				
personalism	2.4788	0.8025	0.005	1.1343	4.6752
_cons	0.0004	0.0009	0.000	0.0000	0.0261

The regression shows that when *personalism* increases, state failure becomes more likely. The number of observations is consistent with the t-test, as both indicate 146 cases of imposed regime change. More importantly, the $Chi^2(1)=9.63$ ($p=0.002$) tells us that the model is a good fit and that there is a significant overall effect of the independent variable. This is thus different from the previous model, indicating that we can conclude something about the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. In this case, the odds ratio for *personalism* when it concerns an imposed regime is 1.8764 and is a significant effect ($p=0.008$). This tells us that when *personalism* increases with 1 within the group of regimes that have had an imposed regime change, the odds of state failure increase with 1.8764. Again, this indicates that *personalism* affects whether a state failure occurs.

When no regime change is imposed, *personalism* also increases the odds of state failure. The model is a good overall fit and that there is an overall effect of the independent variable as the $Chi^2(1)=13.46$ ($p<0.001$) displays. The odds ratio of 2.4788 indicates that in regimes where no regime change is imposed, the odds that state failure occurs increase with 2.4788 when *personalism* increases.

Model B4 has thus shown that state failure becomes more likely when *personalism* increases, even when solely taking those regimes where regime change is imposed. The fact that Model A4 was not significant shows us that this effect is only present when taking into account the five cases of state failure that occurred outside of GWF's parameters. The last two models that we will run will be models that we have run before, only with the addition of control variables. These models will be binomial logistic regression analyses, one for all observations and one for specifically the regimes which have had an imposed regime change. The control

variables will be, as explained in the section *research design*: *monoethnic*, *leadermil*, *leaderrebel*, *seizure_coup* and *seizure_rebel*.[9]

Model A5: binomial logistic regression, effect of *personalism* on *failedstate* with control variables

failedstate	**Odds ratio**	**Std. Error.**	**P> |z|**	**95% Conf.**	**Interval**
personalism	1.6439	0.3602	0.023	1.0700	2.5259
monoethnic	6.2151	4.6559	0.015	1.4315	26.9839
leadermil	5.6560	5.8570	0.094	0.7431	43.0483
leaderrebel	1.2400	3.7300	0.996	0	.
seizure_coup	0.4906	0.4422	0.429	0.8389	2.8698
seizure_rebel	4.1000	0.0012	0.996	0	.
_cons	.0007	0.0010	0.000	0.0000	0.0118

The regression shows that, even when controlling for several variables, when *personalism* increases, state failure becomes more likely. The number of observations is consistent with previous models at 280. The $Chi^2(6)=28.62$ ($p<0.001$) tells us that the model is a good fit and that there is a significant overall effect of the independent variable. The odds ratio in the new model, with control variables, has decreased to 1.6439 – from 1.9765 without control variables. However, more importantly for our research, the odds ratio is still significant ($p=0.023$), indicating that if personalism increases with 1, the odds that a failed state occurs increase with 1.6439, even when controlling for the aforementioned control variables. Of these control variables, only *monoethnic* displays a significant odds ratio of 6.2151 ($p=0.015$). *Monoethnic* is a binary variable, however, which means that its overall effect will be not per se be bigger than that of *personalism*, which is scaled from 0 to 8.

Model A6: binomial logistic regression, effect of *personalism* on *failedstate* with control variables, by *impsd_regime*

failedstate	**Odds ratio**	**Std. Error.**	**P> |z|**	**95% Conf.**	**Interval**
	if impsd_regime = 1				
personalism	1.2724	0.3406	0.368	.7529	2.1502
monoethnic	6.5506	6.4429	0.056	.9530	45.028
leadermil	7.4752	10.4133	0.149	0.4876	114.5907
leaderrebel	25413	8.5100	0.996	0	.

[9] See page 13

seizure_coup	0.8747	0.9766	0.886	0.0886	8.1091
seizure_rebel	2.2600	0.0076	0.997	0	.
_cons	0.0019	0.0032	0.000	0.0001	0.0514
	if impsd_regime = 0				
personalism	2.6569	1.3406	0.053	0.9883	7.1428
monoethnic	7.7783	10.1848	0.117	0.5975	101.2605
leadermil	3.6397	6.5468	0.473	0.1071	123.6352
leaderrebel	84132	2.78e10	0.996	0	.
seizure_coup	0.1556	0.2800	0.301	0.0046	5.2913
seizure_rebel	0.0000	0.0015	0.996	0	.
_cons	0.0001	0.0002	0.004	0	0.0412

For this model, it is tested whether state failure becomes more likely when *personalism* increases, when solely analysing those cases that experienced imposed regime change and controlling for several variables. Because the result is not significant, we cannot draw any conclusions. The number of observations is consistent with previous models at 142 observations for imposed regime changes. The $Chi^2(6)=12.04$ ($p=0.061$) tells us that the model is not per se a good fit and that there is not a significant overall effect of the independent variable. This means that we cannot conclude anything about the odds ratios in this model. Additionally, none of the independent variables is significant at the $p<0.05$ level. When no regime change is imposed, the model is significant ($p<0.005$), but none of the independent variables is. We thus cannot draw any conclusions from this model either.

Model B5: binomial logistic regression, effect of *personalism* on *failedstate* with control variables

failedstate	**Odds ratio**	**Std. Error.**	**P> |z|**	**95% Conf.**	**Interval**
personalism	1.8873	0.3632	0.001	1.2942	2.7520
monoethnic	3.8807	2.2622	0.020	1.2380	12.1652
leadermil	2.2979	1.8175	0.293	0.4876	10.8290
leaderrebel	1.1890	1.5963	0.897	0.0856	16.5191
seizure_coup	0.7241	0.5705	0.682	0.1546	3.3916
seizure_rebel	2.0621	2.4411	0.541	0.2026	20.9870
_cons	.0010	0.0012	0.000	0.0001	0.0109

This model once more tests whether state failure becomes more likely if *personalism* increases, with the aforementioned control variables included. As Model B5 shows, this effect is present. The $Chi^2(6)=31.50$ ($p<0.0001$) tells us that the model is a good fit and that there is a significant overall effect of the independent variable. The odds ratio in the model without control variables was 2.0922. The odds ratio in the new model, with control variables, has ever so slightly decreased to 1.8873. This thus indicates that, predictably, some of the explanatory prowess of the independent variable, *personalism*, is taken away by the inclusion of the control variables. More importantly for our hypothesis, the odds ratio is still significant (p=0.001), indicating that if personalism increases with 1, the odds that a failed state occurs increase with 1.8873, even when controlling for the aforementioned control variables. Of these control variables, only *monoethnic* displays a significant odds ratio of 3.8801 (p=0.020). *Monoethnic* is a binary variable, however, which means that its overall effect will be lesser than that of *personalism*, which is scaled from 0 to 8.

Model B6: binomial logistic regression, effect of *personalism* on *failedstate* with control variables, by *impsd_regime*

failedstate	**Odds ratio**	**Std. Error.**	**P> |z|**	**95% interval**	
	if impsd_regime = 1				
personalism	1.6481	0.4004	0.040	1.0237	2.6532
monoethnic	4.1983	3.1375	0.055	0.9704	18.1638
leadermil	3.1599	3.2751	0.267	0.4144	24.0937
leaderrebel	0.4707	0.8074	0.660	0.0163	13.5831
seizure_coup	1.2225	1.1999	0.838	0.1786	8.3701
seizure_rebel	6.1370	8.3231	0.182	0.4285	87.7232
_cons	.0014	0.0021	0.000	0.0001	0.0278
	if impsd_regime = 0				
personalism	2.2811	0.8603	0.029	1.0892	4.7772
monoethnic	3.9980	4.2507	0.192	0.4976	32.1250
leadermil	2.2224	3.3483	0.596	0.1160	42.5874
leaderrebel	35286	1.12e10	0.996	0	.
seizure_coup	0.1435	0.2379	0.242	0.0056	3.6972
seizure_rebel	0	0.016	0.996	0	.
_cons	0.0005	0.0011	0.001	0	0.0483

This model tests whether state failure becomes more likely when *personalism* increases, with control variables and solely taking those cases which have had regime change imposed. State failure is more likely when *personalism* increases, even when taking only those cases with imposed regime change and controlling for several variables. The number of observations is consistent with previous models where a regime change was imposed with 146 observations. The $Chi^2(6)=16.43$ ($p=0.012$) tells us that the model is a good fit and that there is a significant overall effect of the independent variable. However, the fact that the Chi^2 has decreased from 31.50 in Model B5 to 16.43 in Model B6 displays that, when including the aforementioned control variables, the overall effect of *personalism* in regimes where regime change is imposed on whether or not a state fails is less weaker than when all observations are taken into account (i.e. when *impsd_regime* is not taken into account). This decrease in Chi^2 can also be seen in the odds ratio, as it has decreased from 1.8763 in Model B4, or 1.8873 in Model B5, to 1.6481 ($p=0.040$) in the current Model. The effect remains, however, significant. This indicates that, when a regime change is imposed, the odds of that state failure occurs increase with 1.6481 when *personalism* increases with 1. None of the control variables in this model is significant.

When no regime change is imposed, *personalism* increases the odds of state failure. The model is a good overall fit and that there is an overall effect of the independent variable as the $Chi^2(6)=18.88$ ($p<0.005$) displays. The odds ratio of 2.2811 ($p<0.05$) indicates that in regimes where no regime change is imposed, the odds that state failure occurs increase with 2.2811 when *personalism* increases. None of the control variables is significant. What this model has thus displayed is that even when including all of the aforementioned control variables and solely analysing those regimes that experienced imposed regime change, *personalism* significantly increases the odds of state failure. This effect is even larger when analysing regimes that had a non-imposed regime change.

Overview of all Regression Models

failedstate	**A2****	**B2****	**c:A4**	**A4****	**c:B4****	**B4****
personalism	1.9765**	2.0922**	1.5506	2.6240**	1.8763**	2.4788**
monoethnic						
leadermil						
leaderrebel						
seizure_coup						
seizure_rebel						
_cons	.0015**	0.0018**	0.0089**	0.0005**	0.0034**	0.0004**

failedstate	***A5****	***c:A6***	***A6****	***B5****	***c:B6****	***B6****
personalism	1.6439*	1.2724	2.6569	1.8873**	1.6481*	2.281*
monoethnic	6.2151*	6.5506	7.7783	3.8807*	4.1983	3.9980
leadermil	5.6560	7.4752	3.6397	2.2979	3.1599	2.2224
leaderrebel	1.2400	25413	84132	1.1890	0.4707	35286
seizure_coup	0.4906	0.8747	0.1556	0.7241	1.2225	0.1435
seizure_rebel	4.1000	2.2600	0.0000	2.0621	6.1370	0
_cons	.0007**	.0019**	0.0001**	.0010**	.0014**	0.0005**

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; c: denotes model for *impsd_regime* = 1

Discussion

Models A2 and B2 show us that the odds of state failure are significantly higher when *personalism* increases with 1, increasing with about 2 in both models. The size of this effect is particularly noteworthy when one takes into account that *personalism* is graded on an 8-point scale. Hence, the regimes that report very high values of *personalism* are much more likely to become failed states eventually. Additionally, the fact that the odds ratios of both models are significant at the p<0.01 level displays that there is an undisputable effect between personalism and state failure. This result is thus consistent with the theory that we have built in previous sections of this paper, where it was posed that regimes that know high degrees of personalism will become dependent on the regime's leadership and the leader's clique, as the institutions will have served to uphold and maintain that specific balance of power.

Models A3 and B3, measuring whether the means of *personalism* were significantly different if the observations were divided by whether they had a regime change imposed, were both significant, indicating that regimes with an imposed regime change had higher *personalism* scores, on average, than the regimes that had un-imposed regime change. What this seems to imply, although more research would be needed for the analysis of a possible causal relation, is that a regime change imposition is more likely to occur when a regime is more personal.

Moreover, what many of the failed states have in common (whether they were in model A or B) was that there was a genuine, consistent challenge to the central government's authority. This challenge to the central government's authority is consistent with Rotberg's (2002, p. 86) theory that ethnic, cultural or linguistic differences within the state lead the central government's control to be limited to one or more ethnically specific zones. This lack of control then plays into the regime's 'insecurity', resulting in the situation where the state apparatus 'preys on its own citizens'. This ethnic, cultural or linguistic specificity is something that we

encountered in many of the failed states that we discussed (e.g. Afghanistan, Angola). However, what also seemed to be a recurring factor is the distancing of the regime from the general population (e.g. Libya, Iraq). This development of elite-distancing thus seems to play the same role as the ethnic, cultural or linguistic specificity as argued for by Rotberg.

Furthermore, these aspects of specificities are also addressed in the questions regarding the personalism in a regime by GWF (2017). For example, question 6 from GWF asks: does the regime leader promote officers loyal to himself or from his ethnic, tribal, regional, or partisan group …? This question hence addresses the aforementioned theory that ethnic, cultural or linguistic differences matter to consequently put this difference into the perspective of how it translates itself into personalism in autocratic regimes. Thus, following Rotberg's argument, if a regime elite hence consists out of a specific subgroup of the population, thereby hence becoming more personalist in the progress (as one of the questions is regarding whether the party elite distances itself from the general population), it is more likely to become a failed state – as ethnic, cultural or linguistic 'elitism' is specific to failed states (Rotberg, 2002, p. 86).

To measure whether this ethnic 'elitism' was not too important of a factor in explaining whether a regime becomes a failed state, models A5 and B5 measure the exact same thing as models A2 and B2, but then with control variables. The only significant variable was *monoethnic*, which asks whether the party leadership is dominated by people from particular ethnicities, regions or cultures (GWF, 2017). This variable was significant in both models at the $p<0.05$ level, with respective odds ratios of 6.21 and 3.88. These values are thus relatively large, which means that if the party leadership is in fact dominated by people from particular ethnicities, regions or cultures, the odds that a failed state occurs go up with 6.21 and 3.88 respectively. However, although this finding is in and of itself worthy of further investigation, it should be taken into consideration that the variable *monoethnic* is binary. This means that the odds can only go up with 6.21 maximally, whereas *personalism* is rated on an 8-point scale. In the end, the effect of *personalism* on whether a state fails is still more impactful. Additionally, despite the inclusion of the aforementioned control variables, the variable *personalism* is still significant in both model A5 and B5 at the $p<0.05$ and $p<0.01$, with odds ratios of 1.64 and 1.89 respectively. This indicates that even when including the aforementioned control variables, the odds that state failure occurs rise significantly when *personalism* increases.

We have unfortunately not had the opportunity to test whether it was indeed the case that the personalism directly affects the efficacy of the states' institutions, consequently causing a failed state, so this analysis will have to be performed in future work.

Additionally, the paper has hypothesised that personalism will have a larger effect on whether state failure occurs in regimes where regime change has been imposed. This is put to test in models A4 and B4. Model A4 was not significant, meaning we cannot validly conclude anything about the 1.5506 odds ratio. Model B4's 1.8763 odds ratio was significant, however, meaning that the odds that a failed state occur increase with almost 2 when *personalism* increases with 1. This effect is still significant in Model B6, which measured the same effect with control variables, although it has decreased to 1.6481. Although the B-models are thus significant, the overall size of the effect has decreased when only taking into account those regimes which have had a regime change imposed, going from an odds ratio of 2.0922 for all observations without control variables and 1.8873 with control variables to the aforementioned odds ratios of 1.8763 and 1.6481 respectively. More importantly, the odds ratios are higher for all models when regime change is not imposed. This means that we have thus not found evidence that the effect of *personalism* is bigger when a regime change has been imposed and instead must conclude than the effect of *personalism* is larger when regime is not imposed.

This research has thus created new questions. Why is personalism a better predictor for state failure in regimes without imposed regime change? How does personalism corrode the regimes institutions? Is personalism reserved to autocracies, or can other regime-types also experience personalism in the form of personifying a political movement? What institutions are most prone to corrosion under personalist rule? Questions such as these are good for future research, that should perhaps take a more qualitative method in dissecting these issues.

Conclusion

Analysing the 'pathways from authoritarianism', this paper concluded that the current academic debate is overlooking the possibility that an authoritarian regime transitions into a failed state. This gap is what this paper researched, questioning what causes state failure in authoritarian regimes. Building on a conceptualisation of a failed state as a state without internal and external sovereignty as well as an inability of the state apparatus to provide its citizens with essential basic services, this paper theorised that personalism in autocratic regimes induces state failure. It is argued that personalism, which must be understood as the shaping of institutions to the leaders' demands, corrodes the country's institutions, as the personalisation of the institutions results in a situation where the institutions are consequently dependent upon that leader for effective functioning. The theory, consequently, follows that if the leader would be forcibly removed through an imposed regime change, the institutions are rendered effectively useless, causing the state to fail.

This theory of state failure in authoritarian regimes challenged rival explanations that focused on 1) resource-based explanations that pose that resource-rich states either a) behave as aggressive insurgencies in an attempt to attain financial compensation for their resources, thereby failing to provide its citizenry with security; or b) develop no set of reciprocal obligations such as accountability with its citizens, as the state apparatus does not need its citizenry to collect revenue. This lack of reciprocity consequently causes the state institutions to be weak, rendering it illegitimate and making the state vulnerable to insurgencies. Other explanations of state failure 2) identify civil war as the cause of state failure, because it is accompanied by a lack of security-provision by the state apparatus and an increase in influence for warlords or other figures who can provide this security, the state apparatus loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.

To scrutinise the theory of personalism as an indicator for state failure, an 8-point scale for personalism was created to consequently analyse a dataset on authoritarian regime transitions by Geddes Wright and Frantz (2017). In the process, the paper identified what cases should be considered failed states under the condition that they have experienced regime change. Consequently, with the scale of personalism as the independent variable and state failure as the dependent variable, a binomial regression analysis was run. There were two models of state failure (some of the cases fell outside of the parameters of the dataset as it only contained observations up until 2010). Additionally, whether the regimes had regime change imposed would be a dividing factor in the analyses, to test whether personalism would have a greater effect in regimes with imposed regime change. Lastly, all analyses should be run once with control variables and once without. These three binary divisions essentially formed a 2 X 2 X 2 analysis.

Of the total eight regression models, the analyses showed significant effects for six, indicating that there is an overall effect of *personalism* on the odds of state failure. These significant results led us to be able to conclude that, on average for all observations (i.e. models A2, B2, A5 and B5 – which all were significant), if personalism increases with 1, the odds that a failed state occur increase with about 1.9. When the observations were divided by whether regime change was imposed, this effect was only significant for the B-models when regime change was imposed, with an average reported odds ratio of 1.75. The odds ratios were higher for the regimes that experienced un-imposed regime change, indicating that *personalism* is more impactful in regimes without imposed regime change.

These significant results hence lead us to be able to conclude on several questions raised above. Although we cannot conclude whether our theory that the personalism affects the states'

institutions, causing the state to fail, holds true, we can say that high autocratic regimes with high degrees of personalism are more likely to eventually experience state failure. As the size of the effect decreases when only analysing those cases where regime change is imposed, it appears that the second part of the theory does not hold true. Personalism is hence not a more impactful factor to predict state failure in a regime where regime change is imposed.

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