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A new wave of politicized LGBTI phobia in Hungary and Poland

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A new wave of politicized **LGBTI phobia in Hungary and Poland**

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Abstract

Scholars have thoroughly researched the political backlash against the LGBTI community in Poland and Hungary after EU accession. As time has passed, a new wave has arisen. With very little research conducted concerning this new wave or its relation to the earlier wave, it is time to update the body of literature surrounding politicized LGBTI phobia. Therefore, this thesis researches how politicized LGBTI phobia has developed in Poland and Hungary since their accession into the EU in 2004. This question has been answered through an examination of academic articles and NGO reports from the earlier wave, and a thematic analysis of interviews with local and transnational actors combined with information of NGO reports about the current wave. Thematic analysis has been used to analyze these interviews and this thesis utilizes antagonism theory as the wider framework. This thesis observes both parallels and differences among the waves within Poland and Hungary individually and the totality of waves between the two countries. There are continuations of factors, but also new factors to be found in the new waves. This thesis concludes that politicized LGBTI phobia has come in waves, with a shift towards anti-migration narratives in between the two waves. Furthermore, the developments consist of unique domestic factors, regional parallels that can be understood as echos, and also global developments such as the overall anti-gender and anti-LGBTI movements. New factors include new intensified forms of previous characteristics which are for example LGBT free zones, rule by decree, NGO restructuring and family mainstreaming. However, it is apparent that the latest wave has not yet ended and is showing no evidence of dissipating

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List of abbreviations

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
COVID	Coronavirus Disease
EU	European Union
EP	European Parliament
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ILGA	International Lesbian and Gay Association
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersexual
LGBTIQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersexual, Queer
LPR	Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families, political party in Poland)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice, political party in Poland)
PO	Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform, political party in Poland)

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Figure 1: A timeline of important events during Poland's waves

Figure 2: A timeline of important events during Hungary's waves

Figure 3: An oversight of all important factors in the waves of Poland and Hungary

Chapter 1 Introduction

Front pages of newspapers in the past years have been filled with “LGBTI free zones in Poland” (Douglas 2021). Similar developments are taking place in Hungary, where even at the time of this research, significant hostile developments towards the LGBTI community take place. Ákos Modolo, a representative of Szimpozion Association, a LGBT youth organization, shared his concerns around their school-program “[w]e are afraid of the fact that maybe in the future they might ban the school program” (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). On the 15th of June 2021, this fear became reality when news broke that Hungary had passed a new law banning the teaching of LGBTI content in schools (Rankin 2021). Both in Poland and Hungary, circumstances are thus worsening for the LGBTI community. Whether it is about Poland denouncing sex educators as pedophiles and gay activists (Savage 2020) or Hungary banning adoption for same-sex couples (U.S. News & World Report 2020), LGBTI phobia is politicized in both countries. Politicized LGBTI phobia is the making political of negative attitudes towards Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, or Intersex people. This term is derived from politicized homophobia. However, given the anti-gender movements this affects transgender and intersex people as well, and should therefore be included in the terminology according to this thesis. Since this thesis specifically looks into phobia towards sexuality and gender, LGBTI phobia is used. Numerous studies have been conducted on the topic of politicized LGBTI phobia in Hungary and Poland around and after their accession to the EU. After the first wave of politicized LGBTI phobia, right after the accession period of the two countries, their attention seemed to shift to an anti-immigration discourse. In Hungary, anti-immigration and xenophobia were part of the Fidesz election Campaign (Verseck 2019). In Poland, the Law and Justice Party focused on the same narrative. They recently both switched back to an anti-LGBTI narrative (CHR. Michelsen Institute 2019, 2). The new switch towards politicized LGBTI phobia is called the “new wave of politicized LGBTI phobia” in this thesis. The new developments in the topic of this research have taken place very recently and there is thus little research about it. This thesis would like to explain the relevance in fourfold. Firstly, there are moral costs to politicized LGBTI phobia, since excluding certain groups in society is a harmful practice. Secondly, there are significant economic costs of homophobia as explained by the Peter Tatchell Foundation (Thurlow 2018, 5). Thirdly, researching specifically the new wave of politicized LGBTI phobia helps to understand how factors have developed, which is important information for other countries and possible future developments. This could help

important organizations such as the Human Rights Watch (HRW) or institutions like the European Union to have a better understanding of what is currently going on and how it is related to the past. This possibly gives insights to ways of moving forward in the future. Fourthly, LGBTI topics are still a developing body of research and often contested. Therefore, it is especially important to contribute research to this field. This thesis therefore aims to answer the question ‘*How has politicized LGBTI phobia developed in Poland and Hungary since their EU accession?*’. The upsurges of politicized LGBTI phobia are compared to waves, which in itself is rather a preliminary conclusion than an observation. The analogy that best encapsulates the upsurges of politicized LGBT+ phobia is a tsunami. Tsunamis typically consist of multiple waves, a fast-rising tide and go much further inland than normal water. This is to say, that the broader setting of this research is a tsunami of politicized LGBTI phobia, consisting of multiple upsurges, waves, that quickly rise and are not exactly loose anti-LGBTI sentiments. Additionally, the tsunami as a whole shows the continuation, whereas the waves represent the upsurges. Furthermore, given the strategic usage of politicized LGBTI phobia, the current wave is presumably not the last one either. The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 offers a literature review, which discusses the local, regional and global dimension on which the issue at hand should be understood. It also outlines antagonist theory and the wider body of research that is embedded in this thesis. Thereafter, Chapter 3 explains the research design, on which the research, explained in Chapters 4 and 5, is built upon. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the historical context, the first wave and the current wave of politicized LGBTI phobia in respectively Poland and Hungary. The parallels and differences between the waves and the countries are drawn in Chapter 6, the discussion. Lastly, this thesis ends in Chapter 7 with a conclusion.

Chapter 2 Literature review: The past, a continuation of oppression at long last?

In order to fully grasp the factors in politicized LGBTI phobia, it is important to investigate the different levels in which these phenomena are occurring. Moreover, one needs to define the lense that's used to look at these events and how it is embedded in the wider body of literature. These points will be briefly discussed in this literature review and will discuss the decision taken on which views are appropriate for this thesis.

2.1 Local or global, understanding the wider setting of politicized LGBTI phobia

Anti-gender, anti-LGBTI and pro-movements all have transnational and global networks in which the wider discussion of rights is embedded. The origins of both the term 'gender ideology' and the anti-gender discourse can be traced back to the Vatican. The Holy See started to include 'gender feminists' and 'gender agenda' in its documents after the 1995 UN Women Conference in Beijing (Kováts 2017, 178). Furthermore, scholars like Jasbir Puar also introduced the concept of homonationalism, which structures global politics through making gay-friendliness a key factor in assessing whether a country is modern or not (Slootmaeckers et al. 2016, 2). This is resisted by opponents, for example by framing it as an imposition of the West linking modernity to traditional values (Slootmaeckers et al. 2016, 3). Rather than national occurrences, this is all part of a wider phenomenon that can be observed globally. There is politicization of LGBTI rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific and Europe, which is logical given the worldwide exportation of sodomy laws by the United Kingdom during their colonial rule. More recently, politicized LGBTI phobia is also a global phenomenon, given the significance of same-sex relationships in the current and last century which presents discourses of modernity, human rights, traditions, and nationalism, successfully brought up by social and political actors (Adam 2019, 9). At the regional level, for example, we observe the EU requiring certain standards of human rights, such as the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession of that country. Furthermore, looking at a regional level is helpful as often the development of anti-LGBTI narratives occur in proximity. For example, Russia banned the distribution of non-traditional sexual relations among minors (Heinrich Böll Foundation 2015, 7). And as discussed in the introduction, Hungary has now done so too. Both Poland and Hungary are located between a progressive Europe with inclusive values, and Russia with an alternative model of traditional values. However, the observation of some societies being more supportive of LGBTI equality than others, depicts that explanations should be searched for at

the national level (Mole 2016, 104). In the end, rhetoric of politicized LGBTI phobia needs to resonate domestically, and therefore be adapted to the ‘audience’. One can imagine that in some countries, politicized LGBTI phobia is embedded in a post-colonial discourse where they fight neo-colonialism, whereas this is not the case in Europe for example. Focusing on the local level, divisions between rural and urban spaces are apparent. Rural areas are, for example, less affected by social change and more traditionalist (Marcinkiewicz 2017, 7). Scholars also see urbanization as a predictor of tolerance (Weiss & Bosia 2013, 12). In the following chapters we see the division between rural and urban areas also playing a role in politicized LGBTI phobia in Poland and Hungary. In short, a national approach can help in understanding domestic factors and local contexts. However, given the simultaneity of movements between different national contexts, a national approach cannot fully explain all developments (Kováts 2017, 189). A solution proposed is then a regional approach. Such as one of Agnieszka Graff, who looks at the East-West divide in Europe (Kováts 2017, 181). Nevertheless, this divide does not hold, given the emergence of anti-gender movements in West European countries (Kováts 2017, 181). Therefore, in this thesis we might want to look a bit closer in comparing Poland and Hungary, as two Central European countries with much more similarities. However, we observe that both international and domestic events can trigger anti-gender campaigning in countries. For example, the Istanbul Convention, or pedophilia scandals in the Polish Church (Grzebalska 2015, 83). This thesis therefore recognizes the importance of combining a local, national, regional, and global perspective. However, as mentioned, the research design focuses on similarities and differences between Poland and Hungary. Two countries in the same region, hence the main view taken is a regional one.

2.2 From context to theory

The relationship between the LGBTI-community and the state has been characterized by oppression and othering. Othering in this sense means one is treated or viewed as different by someone else. Along with globalization and EU accession, the relationship has taken on a form of antagonism. The phenomenon that this thesis will attempt to understand is thus the phenomenon of antagonism in the form of politicized LGBTI phobia. Therefore, this thesis will utilize the point of view of the theory of antagonism and agonism of Chantal Mouffe. Carl Schmitt already investigated antagonism, liberalism and the political in which liberalism must negate antagonism, yet it cannot annihilate the political (Mouffe 2005, 12). However, within the political system, antagonism is inherently there. This is also Schmitt’s critique of the

inconsistency of liberalism and the impossibility of pluralism inside a democratic political community (Mouffe 2005, 14). However, Mouffe's view differs and departs from that of Schmitt in this. In Mouffe's view, the political must be reunited with democratic pluralism, which is why she introduces 'agonism' (Kováts 2017, 177). Antagonism is a "us vs them" relation without any common ground, whereas agonism is an "us vs them" relation with no rational solution to the conflict at hand. However, legitimacy of the opponent is recognized (Mouffe 2005, 20). Kovats has already applied this theory to a similar field, which is also partly used in this thesis, namely in the case of anti-gender discourse. In this case, gender ideology is used as an antagonistic tool for the "us vs them" division and delegitimization of gender lobbyists (Kováts 2017, 178). The political is acknowledged. However, pluralism is not (Kováts 2017, 178). Gender ideology and anti-gender movements are an important part of this thesis as well, since it affects the LGBTI community in Poland and Hungary. Politicized LGBTI phobia is, however, the main topic to which this theory can be similarly applied. In the case of the thesis, besides looking into anti-gender movements like Kováts, it also looks at politicized LGBTI phobia from the view of antagonism. Politicized LGBTI phobia is proven to be a tool for "us vs them" division through antagonism and delegitimization of LGBTI lobbyist where the political is acknowledged, yet pluralism is not. The Hungarian and Polish governments have made gender ideology and LGBTI ideology as their useful enemy figures of traditional culture and the nation, which is the main theoretical perspective taken in this thesis.

2.3 The research gap to build further on

Scholars such as Ayoub, O'Dwyer and Chetaille are all known for their research about LGBTI topics in the Central and East European region. O'Dwyer has very well documented the rise of LGBTI activism and the backlash around the EU accession in his book *coming out of communism*. Ayoub and Chetaille have written important work about the LGBTI movements and countermovements and offered a great timeline about their development as well. Thus, there already exists a body of literature on the topic of LGBTI developments in Poland and Hungary. However, these works are bound to a certain timeframe and have not yet been expanded to incorporate more recent developments. Therefore, this thesis will add to the existing body of literature by distilling factors out of academic works concerning earlier upsurges and investigating the new upsurge through collecting primary data which will be compared to understand current developments. Secondly, the Europeanization school can be useful to explain the backlash during the accession period. However, it also has some

limitations and could not explain all the events happening. For example, the Europeanization school did not anticipate the transformation of LGBTI movements through EU accession, nor did it offer ground for rights gains after accession (O'Dwyer & Vermeersch 126). Other theories have also been proposed such as social movement theory or an explanation through the conditionalities (O'Dwyer & Vermeersch 2016, 126)(O'Dwyer 2012, 336). However, as we move further in time, and understand the complexity of politicized LGBTI phobia, this thesis would argue that a broader framework would fit better if it incorporates those different aspects of politicized LGBTI phobia. This thesis will still incorporate the views such as that of the Europeanization school. However, it sees the link between the EU and politicized LGBTI phobia as one factor of the broader framework it uses, namely in the framework of antagonism explained in the next chapter. Therefore, this thesis adds to the academic literature in twofold. It builds further on existing research and adds a new period of time, and it also looks from a different angle, moving on to a wider frame from which politicized LGBTI phobia should be understood.

Chapter 3 Research design

3.1 Methodology

3.1.1 Data collection

The aim of this thesis is to compare the earlier upsurge right after the EU accession to the current upsurge of politicized LGBTI phobia in Poland and Hungary. The earlier upsurges of politicized LGBTI phobia in these countries have been well researched by scholars such as Ayoub, Renkin, Chetaille, O'Dwyer and many more. Nevertheless, the latest upsurge has not been widely researched yet. Therefore, this thesis uses both primary and secondary data consisting of academic articles, interviews, and reports. Reports will be used for all upsurges. However, for the first upsurge, academic articles are mainly used. Whereas for the recent upsurge, data had to be collected through interviews. These interviews were conducted in a semi-structured interviews way, and with people with active in local organizations and movements in Poland and Hungary. The data collected therefore offered in-depth and regional sensitive information. These interviews were online and took place through Zoom and were all recorded with the permission of the interviewees. Depending on the speed of answers, this took between 40 to 100 minutes. In total, eight interviews were conducted. All interviewees were selected through networking and were interviewed because of their local, regional, or academic expertise and experiences, mainly targeting local organizations and movements. This thesis did not conduct interviews with any anti-LGBTI organizations, because in order to understand the actual factors and impact of the politicized LGBTI phobia, one needs to talk with the oppressed, since the oppressor will not see this as phobia for example. Three interviews have been with locally active people in Hungary who represented the following organizations and movements: Szimpozion Association, Labrisz Lesbian Association, Hungarian LGBTI Alliance and Hatter Society. Labrisz Lesbian Association and the Hungarian LGBTI Alliance were represented by the same person in this case. Two interviews have been with locally active people in Poland, representing Amnesty International Poland and Lambda Warsaw Association. Furthermore, a member of the LGBTI branch of the HRW has been interviewed, of which the representative mainly had authority on the situation in Poland. Additionally, one interview has been with a member of the LGBTI intergroup of the European Parliament. Lastly, this thesis also includes the interview of the well-known academic scholar

Phillip Ayoub to collect academically informed information on the ongoing situation in Poland and Hungary. Semi-structured interviews have been used in similar research fields by Ayoub and Chetaille to understand responses of lesbian and gay movements in Poland (Ayoub & Chetaille 2020, 26). The questions asked were open questions concerning the factors interviewees have seen in the upsurges, the timeline of those upsurges and the responses of the organizations they represented. Lastly, when transcribing the interviews, the transcriptions were edited in such a way as to also involve significant non-verbal communication. Similarly, certain utterings which were not important for the analysis of this thesis, such as repeating “uhm” consecutively, are left out of the transcription.

3.1.2 Analysis

Since this thesis is more interested in comparing characteristics of upsurges in politicized LGBTI phobia, it will utilize thematic analysis to discover themes where characteristics and factors can be derived and compared more easily. To make sure both differences and similarities between the upsurges and the countries can be discovered, the data analysis will be data-driven. After all, if this thesis would choose its themes based on earlier research, this could prove to be difficult in discovering new factors. For the part looking into responses of the organizations and movements, this is analyzed on a more individual level, without looking into themes to a large extent. Since this thesis’ aim is to document how organizations and movements have dealt with the upsurges individually and has no primary interest into seeing links between organizations and their responses. Thematic analysis has been widely used in qualitative research and is appropriate for a range of epistemologies and research questions (Nowell et al. 2017, 2). It is especially appropriate for identifying, analyzing and reporting themes found in a data set (Nowell et al. 2017, 2). Since this thesis looks into characteristics of anti-LGBTI upsurges and compares them, this can help identify those. A strong point of thematic analysis is its usefulness for examining perspectives of different research interviewees, highlighting similarities and differences (Nowell et al. 2017, 2). Furthermore, it can still generate unanticipated insights and it can both summarize key features of the data well and offer an in-depth description of it (Braun & Clarke 2006, 97). Lastly, an important factor to mention is its flexibility in analysis. However, this can also be seen as a weakness. The characteristics searched for in this analysis are defined as features belonging typically to the

upsurge of the politicized LGBTI phobia. Reports and academic articles will just be used when consisting of relevant content and not be necessarily analyzed in a certain manner.

3.2 Obstacles & Limitations

It is already well known that thematic analysis has certain shortcomings. One of the main critiques is the inability to keep a sense of continuity and contradiction throughout individual accounts (Braun & Clarke 2006, 97). Furthermore, it is often too simply carried out, has limited interpretative power and results in broad potential outcomes (Braun & Clarke 2006, 97). More importantly, besides the already known general shortcomings, this study has some others specifically to it as well. One of the ways this thesis counters this, as proposed by Lincoln and Guba, is through testing the findings and interpretations with the participants (Nowell et al. 2017, 3). This thesis will check quotes with the interviewees and make sure those are in the right context and well interpreted. Contradiction within individual accounts will be countered through checking with the original interviews. Furthermore, through its flexibility there is also the 'anything goes' critique and the lack of clear and good quality analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006, 78). However, Braun and Clarke propose a 15-point checklist to solve this issue, which this thesis will follow (Braun & Clarke 2006, 96). Furthermore, with in-depth interviews, this thesis relies on the accuracy of the interviewees. It is hard to tackle this weakness, yet this thesis can confirm that all interviewees were part of the organizations for some time. Almost all interviewees admitted not knowing much about earlier waves, and only the current wave. Therefore, this thesis relies on different types of sources for different chapters, which are being compared. In order to still be able to draw valid comparisons, both chapters include reports as well to check and confirm the information that has been found. Furthermore, the academic works used are often based on interviews and reports as well, which makes the comparison more appropriate. When it comes to interviews, these were held over Zoom, which resulted sometimes in unstable internet and the inability to read non-verbal communication. Additionally, the interviews were held in English. Since this was no one's native language, it led to miscommunications at times. The use of jargon such as the word 'securitization' had to be explained, which might have influenced answers as well. Meaning gets lost in translation as well. To avoid false interpretations as much as possible, quotes were checked with the interviewees. The number of interviews could be seen as a limitation. It was hard to get further interviewees due to the organization's continuous work. In the case of Poland, this led to only two regionally active NGOs. In order to increase the reliability, the outcomes of those

interviews were also compared to HRW, which mainly talked about Poland during the interview. Furthermore, reports and academic articles are used as well, to enhance reliability of the interviewees. In some interviews there were time constraints, which meant that the factors of the upsurge were discussed in depth rather than the response of the organization towards this, which were questions that were asked in the interview later on. The last limitation is the recency of the last wave. It still seems to be ongoing and therefore, a comparison of the full last wave to earlier waves cannot be made yet.

Chapter 4 The trajectory of Poland

The road towards politicized LGBTI phobia has had (un)expected twists in Poland. This chapter will discuss the key factors and developments. In order to explain current political and cultural developments, it is important to not ignore the past. This thesis aims to include historical context and build further on existing research to understand the current wave of anti LGBTI politics. Therefore, this chapter will largely be chronological, first discussing the historical context, then discussing the EU accession period, followed by the first wave of anti LGBTI phobia and lastly discussing the current wave.

4.1 Oppression before joining the European Union

In Poland, same-sex acts were decriminalized in 1932 (Lukasz 2018, 97). However, secret services were still using homosexuality as a tool for achieving political goals (Lukasz 2018, 98). Until the 1980s, homosexuality was framed as a battle between the West and the healthy Eastern bloc (Lukasz 2018, 99). The mid-80s account for discrimination in Poland, focusing on the practice of 'Pink Archive', which was created by the secret service to detain, interrogate, and register gay people, which is known as Operation Hyacinth (Lukasz 2018, 106). The operation fueled new initiatives of activism through magazines that published underground issues until the fall of the Iron Curtain. Even though censorship was abolished, homosexuality remained a strong taboo in Poland. The stigma prevented open discussion, especially in the political domain (O'Dwyer 2012, 340). Deeply rooted conservative values were the result of the communist ideology being imposed for years. Persecutions continued after 1985, even though previously homosexuality was decriminalized (O'Dwyer & Schwartz 2010, 223). This ideology in Poland included a high appraisal of family values and the perception of homosexuals as a threat to society (Lepka 2009, 620). Some scholars take the collapse of the Iron Curtain as a starting point for the LGBTI movement in Poland (Lukasz 2018, 92). The year 1989 marks the beginning of political transformation in Poland as sexual customs began to change (Lepka 2009, 621). The Roman Catholic Church was pointed out as the most important ally of the political opposition during the time of Polish People's Republic, as the church provided a safe haven for solidarity at that time (Lukasz 2018, 101). The church is conservative, but the solidarity and lack of distinctive conservative stance provided a frame and ground for the organization of many activists such as LGBTs (Lukasz 2018, 101). More importantly, the arrival of HIV to Poland brought more visibility to the LGBTI-community.

Yet, an unfavorable climate continued, which made the LGBTI movements decline till the late 90s (O'Dwyer 2012, 341). By 1998, this started to change as Poland aspired to become part of the European Union, which had non-negotiable terms regarding LGBTI rights as accession criteria (O'Dwyer 2012, 342). Conditionalities were a key instrument and the EU helped with reshaping the framing of LGBTI rights in the Polish constitution and labor code (O'Dwyer 2012, 342). The Church was constrained on some LGBTI issues, since it supported EU entry, whereas in the political landscape polarization resulted in populist backlash (O'Dwyer 2012, 343-344).

4.2 The accession period for EU membership, opportunities, and failures

On the 1st of May 2004, Poland became a member of the EU, which had many consequences. The accession conveyed the loss of power given that conditionalities were no option anymore and monitoring being significantly weaker. What mainly remained, was the capacity of public criticism on LGBTI policies of the EU (O'Dwyer 2012, 344). In short, the legal conditions for entry still apply and the EU is able to withdraw or disavow monetary support. However, the options to check and enforce become less effective without significant ability to interfere with internal policy (O'Dwyer 2018, 138-140). Before accession, the Polish parliament added sexual orientation as an anti-discrimination provision to the labor code, even though they strongly resisted at first (O'Dwyer 2012, 342). The EU's conditionalities, however, ultimately triggered a shift in framing LGBTI rights in Polish politics (O'Dwyer 2012, 342). Political polarization led to split with, on one side more secular, cosmopolitan Poles, and another side of Poles with a national identity closely related to Catholicism as demonstrated by the *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (PiS) or Law and Justice party (O'Dwyer 2012, 342). The 2001 parliamentary elections reflected the polarization through great losses of liberal parties and major wins for right-wing parties. Combined with the loss of the EU's grip on Poland, this led to a slow but certain manifestation of the first wave of politicized LGBTI phobia.

4.3 Poland, Pathways of political Homophobia

Around the years of accession, the public discourse on the LGBTI community had changed significantly in just a few years' time (Hanley 2017, 151). This change was at least partly a result of the EU's conditionalities for the constitution and labor code (O'Dwyer 2012, 342). The division between Poles is also characterizing the start of the backlash. Polarization in the

political spectrum generally happened on the basis of urban rural divisions, education, age and religion (O'Dwyer 2012, 342). The 2005 election and the PiS victory marked the institutionalization of homophobia, which continued as a political resource for the government and its legitimacy, positioning itself as opposition to previous governments and Western secularized immoral countries (Chetaille 2011, 15-16). However, the LGBTI community received more empathy due to the severe assaults by the right-wing politicians (Graff 2010, 588). The election campaign of PiS in 2005 was built on gays in the public debate, using homophobic language, and framing themselves as protectors of traditional values (Kulpa & Mizielieńska 2011, 86). Politicized LGBTI phobia and anti-EU sentiments even intensified through resolutions adopted in 2006 (Graff 2010, 588). After all, the politicization of LGBTI rights seemed effective as they held the most seats in parliament. This resulted in harsh backlash between 2005 and 2007 against homosexuality and an even harsher disjuncture within Poland (O'Dwyer 2018, 141-2). Once elected, the government initialized a regime against LGBTI rights consisting of banning pride parades, equality and tolerance education, sex education and 'immoral' behavior (Kulpa & Mizielieńska 2011, 87). The government attempted to reinforce traditional family values and prevent aggressive promotion of homosexuality in contrast to the EU's loose attitudes (Graff 2006, 438). The government's focus on youth and education formed the base of their homophobic attacks in which condemnation of European policies was included (Chetaille 2011, 16). In 2006, the European Parliament initiated a resolution discussing the worrying events, such as banning gay pride, equality marches, hate speech, violent demonstrations etc. urging member states to counteract those developments (European Parliament P6_TA(2006)0018). In this resolution, no specific country is mentioned. However, according to O'Dwyer, Poland was clearly the intended target (O'Dwyer 2012, 345). The subsequent EU resolution named Poland in reference to homophobic intolerance occurring in the country (European Parliament P6_TA(2006)0273). Poland responded that the resolutions were ineffective on domestic legislation (Hanley 2017, 154) and refuted them (O'Dwyer 2012, 345). Furthermore, the resolutions can be perceived as counterproductive, since it led PiS leaders to frame this as the EU trying to harm Poland by promoting this ideology of homosexual communities (Hanley 2017, 155). However, in 2017 the governing coalition dissolved, resulting in elections in which the PO won the most votes. The PO remained rather silent on LGBTI issues, which continued during it being part of the government (Chetaille 2011, 19), whereas in the 2011 elections, it became a campaign focal point for the PiS again (O'Dwyer 2018, 142). Ultimately in 2015, the PiS obtained enough votes for a majority, not needing any

coalition parties to govern (Hanley 2017, 155). There has thus been an hectic period of politicized LGBTI phobia.

The characteristics and factors found in this wave are diverse, ranging from nationalism to securitization. Some of them have already been discussed in the previous paragraph such as pride bans, traditional values, EU conditionalities, traditional family, homophobic speech and campaigning, etcetera. The broader context of the issue at hand is that of competing ideologies. Poland finds itself at an intersection between the EU, promoting Western liberalism, anti-discrimination, and equality (Hanley 2017, 153), and Russia, attempting to creating an alternative to the EU through the protection of traditional values, and countering homosexual propaganda which is undermining heterosexual families (Hanley 2017, 152-3). Following Polish EU accession, homophobia is now seen as patriotism, since the EU is imposing their values on Polish traditional culture (Hanley 2017, 157). Thus, homophobia is a rejection of the EU and its values while also antagonizing the EU. However, Russia is not an alternative to the EU for the Poles. There is a distrust of Russia and Poland has no significant links to them (Hanley 2017, 159). Rather, it is the policies in Russia that are echoed in countries such as Poland. Together with the LPR party, the PiS created a discourse that demonized and Europeanized homosexuality from 2001 till 2007 (O'Dwyer 2018, 78). Political antagonism has furthermore been realized through the demonization of equality politics and the utilization of 'gender ideology' as an enemy-figure (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 165). Particularly 'gender ideology' is found towards the end of the wave around 2013 (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 166). The alternative model made by the right-wing parties comprises the nation, family, and religion (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 165). In addition, securitization of human rights issues has occurred through posing them as existential threats to the nation (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 166). Events like these are oftenly strategically used to distract people's attention from a pedophilia scandal in the church, or debates around the Istanbul Convention (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 166). An interesting point in this is that the government rejects gender 'ideology' and not directly the people. By talking about an ideology instead of people, it is dehumanized. A reference to culture as a nationalistic symbol is also made. Poland claims that the EU is violating the integrity of Poland's traditional culture, leading to a schism between the EU and Poland (Graff 2010, 597). Other interesting factors in the upsurge of politicized LGBTI phobia in Poland are that of religion and culture in the form of othering. The Catholic Church plays a role in politicized LGBTI phobia for example. Members of the clergy and right-wing politicians both

called equality marches a threat to public morality and framed it as the promotion of homosexuality (Graff 2010, 584). In speeches of Lech Kaczyński, former president of Poland and politician, Poland is the moral saviour of Europe in which Polish morality, formed by Catholicism, is contrasted with EU immorality (Kulpa & Mizielińska 2011, 87-8). In Poland, the Catholic Church has close ties with the nation and plays an active role in civil society (Ayoub 2014, 340). The church might not influence the government strongly, yet the church backs up the government since it partly relies on it. As seen, there are thus many factors playing a role in the politicized LGBTI phobia in Poland.

4.4 A new wave of political homophobia?

According to research from Poushter and Kent in 2020, we see that 47% of the Polish respondents in 2019 say that homosexuality should be accepted, whereas this was 40% in 2002 (Poushter & Kent 2020, 25). Nevertheless, anti-LGBTI people still seem to be the weapon of choice for the PiS. Therefore, this political tool should be seen as a tool that energizes a small base, rather than trying to appeal to the entire country. However, there are divisions between the rural and the urban areas in Poland, in which rural areas are way more traditional and conservative and are more targeted as a base by the PiS for example (Sławomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). All interviewees from Poland had a common stance on the start of the new wave, namely the anti-migrant narrative of the government. More specifically, the election cycle around 2018 was identified, however, to a certain extent politicized LGBTI phobia has been ongoing all this time (Mikołaj Czerwiński, interview by author, May 19, 2021). Political scientist Phillip Ayoub described the following timeline “[i]n 2015, it got a little tricky again, when the Law & Justice Party came into power again and vetoed an important piece of legislation. But in that election campaign too, it was a little quieter because the main issue was migration then in Poland. In a similar way to how LGBTI people are scapegoated, politicians prescribed threat onto migrants, especially Muslim migrants and so LGBTI people were attacked as usual, but not to the same degree where I think in this last 2020 wave, where LGBTI people came back as the main kind of target” (Phillip Ayoub, interview by author, May 14, 2021). The LGBTI community was the dominant issue during the presidential elections of 2020 as well, which were the elections president Duda won. (ILGA 2021, 90). Thus, we see both a continuation, but also a new upsurge where many characteristics and developments appear, which are presented in the following section.

One of the characteristics of the new wave turned out to be a switch from gender ideology to LGBTI ideology, in terms of how the government referred and attacked to their framed enemy (Czwerwinski 2021). Yet at the same time, gender ideology also seems to be an important characteristic of this wave, confirmed by multiple interviewees. Anti-gender campaigning began towards the end of the last wave around 2013 (Grzebalska 2015, 83). It is even more so present in the new wave. Furthermore, a representative of Amnesty International Poland stated “more high ranking politicians and Church officials started using homophobic language, demonizing language like ‘LGBTI people are not people’ or calling LGBTI people a rainbow’s plague” (Czerwinski 2021). This is also confirmed by other interviewees stating it is simply put as an ideology. Thus, the discussion is not solely focused on creating an opposition to a human anymore, but ‘just’ an ideology, effectively dehumanizing it. As opposed to gender-mainstreaming, the Polish government came up in 2016 with family-mainstreaming, a form of biopolitics in which it supports the ‘traditional family’ on which the nation is built (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 167-8). Family mainstreaming is seen in Poland’s policies to reinforce ‘traditional’ values again, such as that women can retire five years earlier reinstating their ‘caring potential’ (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 167). Further connections can be traced back, with Poland wanting to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention and make a change to it in the shape of a ‘Family Rights Convention’ (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). In the government narrative at least, human rights are thus being replaced with family rights to a certain extent. They furthermore, use the human rights language in a way, as for example protecting children from gays that are trying to adopt them (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). Slawomir Kirdzik, a representative of Lambda Warsaw Association stated “[t]here were organizations and right oriented parties telling that we have to secure the children, because the gays are trying to do anything to adopt our children” (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). Family rights are also part of a wider phenomenon in Poland of hijacking the human rights language and infrastructure (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 168). The family rights are thus presented as human rights, as a policy tool. Yet at the same time, it goes against the human rights of LGBTI people by excluding them. President Duda also vowed to amend the constitution to stop same-sex couples from adopting children (ILGA 2021, 91). The HRW confirmed seeing this narrative of hijacking the human rights language as well (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). Moreover, the government presents itself as being for fundamental human rights, like freedom of expression, or speech, which is under threat by politically correct ideological framing (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June

4, 2021). In 2019, Local municipalities signed a 'Local Government Charter of the Right of the Family' after the mayor of Warsaw introduced the Warsaw LGBTI+ Charter earlier that year (ILGA-Europe 2020). As previously mentioned, another major influence is still the Roman Catholic Church. It joined in on the anti-LGBTI campaigning and it still has a strong influence in Poland, since most Poles see themselves as Catholics (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). The Church has significant influence on reproductive and LGBTI rights through bolstering the language around traditional family values (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). The Church has a large influence on the citizens in the countryside and creates a connection between the government, the Roman Catholic Church and the inhabitants of the countryside (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). This influence exists to some extent on the citizens, but definitely on the politicians (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). Thus, the Church played a crucial role in the creation of the politicized LGBTI phobia going on in Poland. Connecting to the Church, some parts of it also spread that COVID is the revenge of god on sodomy in Poland, however, this was only in the beginning of the pandemic (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). This has been confirmed by the representative of Amnesty International Poland (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). Furthermore, Mikolaj Czerwinski, a representative of Amnesty International Poland has said "Poland was the only country where the LGBTI people were on the top of the list, being held accountable for the pandemic" (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). The pandemic has also made organizations move a lot of their work to the online realm (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). Actually the pandemic has also shown Lambda Warszawa, for example, the importance of online visibility (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021).

The biggest aspect of securitization rhetoric is that of protecting the families from LGBTI ideology and the protection of family values, in which gender ideology is deemed as a 'Western' ideology (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). Threat of traditional values of the Polish nation lies deep in their historical context and it traces back to Bolshevism, which was their biggest enemy (Kirdzik, 2021). One can see that the connotation of a 'threat to traditional culture' is deeply rooted in Poland's history. One out of the three interviewees did not recognize the narrative of LGBTI as something foreign. However, securitization rhetoric is clearly seen in President Duda's 2020 Family Charter, which aimed to defend the institution of marriage and the protection of children and family from 'LGBTI


ideology' by singleing out same-sex couple adoption and defining LGBTI as a foreign ideology worse than communism (ILGA-Europe 2020). Graeme Reid, the director of LGBTI rights from the HRW employed a great metaphor describing the securitization of LGBTI rights "It is like a Trojan horse, because the way in which it is presented is as if it is a foreign influence which becomes a dangerous force within the country" (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). This securitization can also be seen through the LGBTI free zones. LGBTI-free zones in Poland are also connected to the 'family' again. After the declaration of LGBTI-free zones, the EU together with Norwegian and Icelandic organizations restricted their funding to those zones (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). This resulted again in a utilization of 'family' but this time in the form of family rights narrative (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). Those family rights are highly exclusive and do not include divorced families, families that adopt, single mothers, and thus only support one type of family seen as traditional (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). We observe the hijacking of human rights language here in the form of family rights. The LGBTI free zones in Poland have also been met by a clear answer from the European Parliament stating they declare the EU, as a whole, anLGBTIQ freedom zone. Miguel Chambel, coordinator of the European Parliament's LGBTI Intergroup stated; "We drafted the resolution together, the resolution is a direct response to what has been happening in Poland" (Miguel Chambel, interview by author, May 25, 2021). Miguel Chambel also stated, "[w]hat needs to be done now, is to try to ensure that in future funding opportunities the oversight on what the funds are spent is clear, with more supervision and that there is insurance when expenditures do not comply with the principle of nondiscrimination that they can be taken back" (Miguel Chambel, interview by author, May 25, 2021). The European Commission also stated that it would refuse to include six Polish cities in its twin cities program and stop the funding (ILGA 2021, 90). In Poland, nationalism 'others' through the word 'ideology' to show it is something foreign to Polish family values and traditional family values (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). This is seen through the creation of the divide between traditional values and LGBTI ideology. Other interviewees talked about nationalism being mainly used to target very specific groups, which is not generally effective in the cities (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). The division between the rural and urban is also noticed by others, demonstrating that there are competing visions of Poland, where the current nationalistic rhetoric of the current government concerning LGBTI rights is perceived as threatening and a push back towards Polish values, and the pro-EU side which supports LGBTI rights (Graeme

Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). There are furthermore similarities in the rhetoric of dehumanizations and reference to people as a plague (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). Neither is there spoken about Russia influencing the politicization of LGBTI phobia. In terms of the EU as a characteristic in politicized LGBTI phobia, the government is showing that the EU is a threat to their values, but they maintain the relationship with the EU, since it is economically beneficial (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). The people in Poland are pro-EU and the government would know that anti-European narrative is not working well, which is why the narrative of the EU as an enemy can no longer be used (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021).

The media is also utilized to disseminate the ideas of the government (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). However, private tv channels mainly support the LGBTI community. The HRW also identified the decrease of independent media and the independence of judiciary in Poland (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). Additionally, since 2016, a restructuring of the NGO sector has also been observed with ideological motives, to build one free from foreign influence (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 169). There are movements restricting funding to NGOs through laws, or administrative needs, such as foreign agent bills (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). This is also confirmed by NGO reports (ILGA B 2020, 181). Human rights NGOs, like Amnesty International, are also harassed (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). An example of activist harassment is the raiding of an activist house, who posted pictures of Virgin Mary and baby Jesus with rainbow halos (ILGA 2020, 87). However, Amnesty International does not receive public funding from the Polish government. Interviewees mention that given the stances of the government, obtaining funds is impossible (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). The NGOs that were interviewed mention that advocacy used to be less complicated. There were consultancy periods in which the government would engage with NGOs, whereas now bills are passed without any consultation (Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). The future for sexual education programs looks relatively ambiguous given the currently frozen bill that would criminalize sexual education and campaigning on sexuality.(Mikolaj Czerwinski, interview by author, May 19, 2021). The education program of Lambda Warszawa is not currently active due to the fear among schools of being inspected by institutions (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). On a more positive note, Lambda Warszawa states that in this new wave of anti-LGBTI sentiment, it became clear to

them that they have many allies and not a lot of enemies (Slawomir Kirdzik, interview by author, June 2, 2021). Moreover, all interviewees state that the amount of activities online has increased, especially due to the continuing impact of the pandemic. For the summary of this timeline see figure 1.

Figure 1: A timeline of important events during Poland's waves



Chapter 5 Hungary, a trail of mimicry?

5.1 Oppression before joining the European Union

In Hungary, from 1878 till 1961, homosexuality was criminalized between men, not only referring to the sexual act but also whole sexual orientation (Kurimay & Takacs 2017, 588). It was generally looked upon as a crime against morality and socialism and thus, considered as a taboo (Kurimay & Takacs 2017, 588). The criminalization ended in 1961, yet homosexuals were still treated far from equal compared to heterosexuals (Kurimay & Takacs 2017, 589). During the communist era, there was still significant state surveillance with lists of homosexuals used to blackmail gay men and forcing them to collaborate with the police (Torra 1998, 74). The public opinion was in line with the state's view and consequently, homosexuals were considered to be sick individuals (Kurimay & Takacs 2017, 589). In the 1970s, homosexuals gained increasing visibility in reaction to stigmatization by society that tried to render them invisible (Kurimay & Takacs 2017, 591). Increasing visibility led to a regular discussion in public forums with continued stigmatization (Kurimay & Takacs 2017, 593). Radical change came through the HIV/AIDS pandemic which legitimized the permission for the establishment of a homosexual organization for the ministry of health (Kurimay & Takacs 594). The legal recognition of "Homeros-Lambda" was previously, and especially under socialist rule, not imaginable. However, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the authorities continued to harass gay and lesbian organizations (Torra 1998, 83). When democracy was established in Hungary, the realization of marginalization became widespread through the introduction of Western liberal ideas and rights (Kurimay & Takacs 2017, 597). After the collapse of Communism, religion was reinstated and replaced the communist ideology and its influence in some way. However, religion continued to play a less prominent role in societies and had little influence on LGBTI policies (Torra 1998, 84). Even before the accession to the EU, Hungary made legal progression through court decisions on common-law marriages, recognition of sexual orientating discrimination as part of the constitutional ban on discrimination, and through the recognition of same-sex partnerships (O'Dwyer 2018, 170). Furthermore, It is remarkable that even Fidesz was "somehow supportive" of LGBTI-rights activism, yet this changed through politicization of the LGBTI community (O'Dwyer 2018, 169).

5.2 The accession period, no backlash yet?

The accession period of Hungary was also characterized by polarization. The breakthrough of the political right and anti-gay backlash was yet to come (O'Dwyer 2018, 172). In the case of Hungary, the Fidesz party redefined itself from liberal to Christian-nationalist-populist in opposition to a Europeanizing liberal and social-democratic left (O'Dwyer 2018, 172). There was a major reorganization of the right but no breakthrough (O'Dwyer 2018, 172). Yet, it is important to note, that during the accession negotiations Hungary adopted an anti-discrimination framework which went beyond the EU's requirements. Furthermore, Hungary equalized the age of consent for homosexuals (O'Dwyer 2018, 175). Just like in other countries during the EU enlargement, this happened through conditionalities but in Hungary also due to lobbying. As discussed for Poland, the EU had lost a lot of its capacity to influence Hungary. In fields such as social policy, freedom, security, justice and common safety concerns in public health matters, the EU has shared authority. However, in education and the protection and improvement of human health it can only support, coordinate and do supplementary actions (Takács 2015, 15). Responses by the EU in the period after accession have often been in the form of resolutions. The far-right seemed demobilized earlier and unfortunately this transformed into a harsh mobilization after the actual accession (O'Dwyer 2018, 172). In 2002 and 2006, Fidesz already came close to the socialist(s) with 41 and 42 percent in the elections (O'Dwyer 2018, 178). The backlash however started in the streets and ultimately translated into a supermajority for the Fidesz party (O'Dwyer 2018, 179).

5.3 Political homophobia but starting from the streets

The backlash in Hungary occurred with a slight delay relative to the case of Poland. Its timing and magnitude followed the Polish case narrowly, yet its character seems to be a bit different (O'Dwyer 2018, 167). As discussed, the church did not have much influence in Hungary, neither was homosexuality much discussed among Hungarian parties (O'Dwyer 2018, 169). Pre-accession, Hungary was even a rather progressive country in terms of sexuality. This was followed by Fidesz and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) as part of the government coalition without radical right parties and then by a Liberal Socialist government till 2006, which marks the starting point of the backlash towards LGBTI people (O'Dwyer 2018, 172). In the meantime, like the character of the PiS in Poland, Fidesz redefined itself from a liberal party to a Christian nationalist populist party in opposition to Europeanizing liberal social-

democratic left (O'Dwyer 2018, 172). However, both in 2002 and 2006, Fidesz still lost to the socialists in elections by around 2% of the votes (O'Dwyer 2018, 178). Unlike Poland, the backlash came from the streets. The European Parliament initiated two resolutions in 2006 about worrying events such as hate speech and violent demonstrations urging member states to counteract this without specifically mentioning countries in the first resolution (European Parliament P6_TA(2006)0018). Given the events in Hungary, this can also be seen to apply to the country. The liberal left in Hungary slowly collapsed due to the former Prime Minister Gyurcsány lying about the state of the economy, resulting in riots (Wilkin 2018, 21). Fidesz could then play the moral compass of the country and establish itself more widely in Hungarian politics (Wilkin 2018, 22). Around the same time, the far-right party called Jobbik came up, which went after sexual minorities in an even more extreme way than Fidesz. All those developments show a shift to the right in Hungarian politics. One of the ways in which the backlash manifested itself was through violent attacks on the Budapest Pride in 2007, which also gave the LGBTI movement more visibility (O'Dwyer 2018, 178-181). Furthermore, it is interesting that in 2007, the legalization for same-sex civil partnerships passed (Hanley 2017, 156). However, this was possibly due to the fact that the composition of the parliament was not yet propitious for Fidesz. Ultimately, in 2010, Fidesz won an absolute majority. This was enough to amend the constitution to define marriage solely between a man and a woman in 2012 (O'Dwyer 2018, 180). Since Jobbik and Fidesz are both right wing parties, they also share some potential electorate. This results in competition. In a way, Jobbik (and its popularity) forced Fidesz to continuously shift its ideology to the right to obtain votes and thus, parrot Jobbik's views and policies to a certain extent (Hanley 2017, 156). Both parties have deployed anti-EU rhetoric as a powerful discourse since 2010. However, they never mention leaving the EU (Wilkin 2018, 23). The European Parliament also responded to developments in Hungary condemning discrimination, also in light of far-right Jobbik party bills that targeted LGBTI people (European Parliament P7_TA(2012)0222).

Factors such as the anti-EU rhetoric and the character of the backlash towards the LGBTI community are not the only ones to this wave of politicized LGBTI phobia. Again, the issue at hand here is also competing ideologies in which Russia is an alternative model to the EU. Russia is the one promoting traditional culture, and the EU represents Western liberalism, which is once more echoed in Hungary (Hanley 2017, 153). In Hungary, homophobia is like in Poland, politicized as the EU trying to influence the national identity and culture (Hanley

2017, 157). However, in this case it manifested itself differently. Hungarian nationalism shifted from one with anti-Moscow sentiments to one with anti-EU sentiments due to perception of the EU as a threat to Hungarian sovereignty (Nuñez-Mietz 2019, 556). Putin and Viktor Orban, the leader of Fidesz, do seem to have a connection, confirmed by Orban stating that 'Europe's prevailing ideological winds are blowing from the East' (Hanley 2017, 158). Previously, Hungary chose to become part of the EU, but now we see Hungary echoing Russia's model of 'traditional values'. This new form of heteronormative nationalism, used by right-wing parties has a homophobic tone and frames events such as the Budapest Pride as Western import (Nuñez-Mietz 2019, 556). In this case LGBTI people are otherized and are seen to align themselves with the transnational enemy due to being 'gay' and denying the Nation its needs as not being reproductive (Renkin 2009, 23). This perception adds to our understanding of the role of nationalism. Another way in which the LGBTI community have become scapegoats is the EU's imposition of cultural rules and ideas, without the social and economic benefits that were expected by joining the EU (Renkin 2009, 24). The worsening of Hungary's economy is also associated with joining the EU, since before accession, the economy was doing rather good and better than post-accession (Renkin 2009, 24). The economy is thus worse off, yet the EU imposes certain liberal ideas such as human rights for LGBTI people, which are then used to distract people from the economic problems of the country. Right-wing LGBTI phobia is thus a rejection of 'moral colonialism' by Western Europe, in a wider attempt to shape East European cultural politics (Renkin 2009, 24).

Hungary is no stranger to political antagonism through the demonization of equality politics. This included the utilization of gender ideology as an enemy figure (Grzebalska and Petö 2018, 165). This can be partly explained through the inequalities that the globalized neoliberal model brought with it in Eastern Europe, such as the lack of structural reforms which were needed to reach actual equality (Grzebalska and Petö 2018, 165). This resulted in opposition to the liberal project through anti-gender movements similarly to Poland (Grzebalska and Petö 2018, 165). Additionally, the core threat for Hungary is the West destroying traditional national society through normalization of homosexuality (Nuñez-Mietz 2019, 557). Homophobia has become a form of patriotism (Hanley 2017, 157). Family mainstreaming, on the other hand, has been a reaction to deal with it. As earlier mentioned, this taps into the biopolitics of the 'traditional' family. Fidesz has a pro-family stance with accompanying social benefits and an aim to protect marriage as a union for a man and a woman

(Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 167). These policies are clearly not including LGBTI people, especially since they cannot get married. Family mainstreaming should also be seen as an alternative to gender mainstreaming already used since 2010 in Hungary (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 168). One can thus also observe hijacking of the human rights language and infrastructure in Hungary (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 168). Human rights language can also be seen in cases of politicians saying that they need to protect the children from the LGBTI people. They argue that counter-demonstrations to Pride events are needed to protect their children, and the interest of the healthy development of their community (Renkin 2009, 21).

5.4 A new wave for Hungary as well?

In 2019, the Hungarian statistics state that 49% of the respondents says that society should accept homosexuality (Poushter & Kent 2020, 25). Given that this is only half of the population, the politicization of LGBTI phobia is rather used for a specific base than the entire population. In terms of polarization as a general factor connected to politicization the widening gap between the rich and the poor has also been raised (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). The representatives of NGOs all had similar views on when a new wave in Hungary started. Around 2015, there first was an anti-migrant narrative, during which the Roma people were scapegoated (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). Furthermore, George Soros, a famous American Hungarian philanthropist, appeared as an enemy around 2017, and only since the last couple of years there has been an increase in politicized LGBTI phobia (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). More specifically, since 2019 there is a shift observed towards politicized LGBTI phobia (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). Radical activists even started to attack Pride events, in this case 'Mi Hazánk' supporters, which is a split off from the already aforementioned radical right Jobbik party (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). A rather ambiguous (turning) point is 2017, marked by the ban of the European Central University of George Soros (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). Interviewees disagree whether this is connected to politicized LGBTI phobia. One argues it is rather an attack towards Soros, whereas others point at the banning of the Master's degree Gender Studies, also confirmed by ILGA and thus connect it to LGBTI phobia (ILGA B 2020, 161). The attacks of 2017 did result in the opposition and celebrities drawing a line and becoming more LGBTI friendly, which would have not happened before (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). Therefore, it seems that closing the European Central University is a significant event. All interviewees, however, recognize a turning point in or

around 2019. Given all the different enemies it seems like Orban needs an enemy to rule, to unite people against through fear (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). The LGBTI community has proven to be a useful political tool. Having Fidesz in power is especially challenging since the government does not really listen or tries to do consults with LGBTI groups (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021).

One of the characteristics of the new wave has been gender. However, this is not unique to only this wave. In 2020, Hungary banned legal gender recognition (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). Furthermore, the Hungarian parliament adopted on the 5th of May 2021 a resolution refusing to ratify the Istanbul Convention (Ilga 2021, 58). KM, a representative of Labrisz and the Hungarian LGBTI Alliance stated “[t]he main issue was that there was the word ‘gender’ which is a devilish word now, nobody knows what it means here, but the word ‘gender’ is wrong” (KM, 2021). In terms of hijacking the human rights language, this is particularly done by the anti-gender movement representing itself as under threat and standing up for fundamental human rights (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). However, another participant thinks that they use their own language, not human rights language, but rather Christian ideology (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). Yet, we do actually see this through, for example, the language of defending children's rights (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). Another way is that the government claims that unlike the cancel culture of Western Europe and America, there is freedom of speech in Hungary (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). The usage of ‘freedom of speech’ is also used by radical activists to join LGBTI events (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). Furthermore, they claim that white Christian heterosexual males are actually the ones being discriminated against given that everyone in the EU supports LGBTI and migrants and other minorities (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). The church as a characteristic in the politicization of LGBTI phobia is not specifically seen, except for a very small Christian Democrat party which is considered a bit more radically right than Fidesz (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). The state, however, returned multiple schools under the church's administration (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). This shows that the Catholic church still plays a certain, but a limited role, in public life in Hungary. The government also seems to use the Christian ideology, which is seen in the constitution stating that the father is a man and the mother is a woman and that children have the right to grow up with a Christian ideology and identify with their birth gender (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021; Savage

2020). This has come up together with banning the right for same-sex couple to adopt. The Catholic church has lost a lot of influence in politics (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). All interviewees agree on this. However, some points were raised including that the Church benefits financially from the government and thus, goes along with its agenda (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). The situation around the pandemic is definitely a unique characteristic of the new wave. “They (Fidesz) use this COVID situation to rule by decree” (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). An example of this is the anti-trans law, rendering legal gender recognition for trans persons impossible (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). The HRW has also recognized the pushing through of certain laws such as the legal gender recognition ban under emergency provision of the COVID pandemic (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). This is not to say that it would not have happened otherwise, it rather means that those restrictive laws have been realized in an accelerated fashion. This furthermore seems to be used to divert attention from the health and sanitary crisis in Hungary (Miguel Chambel, interview by author, May 25, 2021). It has also been met by statements of the European Parliament (ILGA 2021). Besides, the pandemic resulted in no opportunities to protest against the anti-LGBTI laws either (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021).

Securitization applies as well through different ways that all tap into framing LGBTI people as an antagonist or an enemy for which protection is needed. LGBTI for example is framed as an ideology and Western propaganda to harm children (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). Luca Dudits, a representative of Hatter Society added “Orban and the government are just very carefully constructing this image of us being like a martyr or something that is being attacked constantly. I am not sure if you are aware of this, but we have been in a state of emergency since the refugee crisis in 2014” (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). However, it seems that a lot is put as a foreign, or an international threat by the government (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). The government uses words like ‘foreign imported ideology’ or ‘propaganda’ (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). The main line of the government however stays that in private you can do what you want, but not publicly (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). However, they do pose LGBTI people as spreading an agenda, indoctrinating children at school, and trying to destroy the traditional Hungarian values (Modolo 2021). Orban is even going as far as warning neighbouring governments of Western efforts to experiment with a Godless cosmos and rainbow families (Ilga 2021, 57). Nationalism and patriotism definitely play a role, which has


even grown in the last years in Hungarian politics. Consequently, forming a narrative against liberalism and the EU, in which money is welcome but no interference with domestic issues is allowed (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). All interviewees agree on this. Furthermore, nationalism is used to position Hungary as the last country standing between the Western liberalized countries with new evil ideologies (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). The traditional family is seen as the building block of society, which is under threat by outside transnationally connected ideologies in which Hungary takes the role to defend its national character and culture (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). This further connects to people feeling under threat by globalization and its uncertainties, which makes them latch onto things that can be easily identified and managed (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). Moreover, there is still high government support for traditional family values in the form of tax benefits for example (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). Russian influence is not directly seen, those should rather be seen as parallel developments (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021) or echoed tactics (Graeme Reid, interview by author, June 4, 2021). The people in Hungary are pro-EU and therefore Fidesz will not use a strong anti-EU narrative (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). The angle they take is that the EU is forcing LGBTI propaganda upon Hungary and their autonomy is in danger (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). This is agreed upon by another interviewee stating that Brussels is a symbol for globalism and multiculturalism in which the anti migrant narrative fitted and also the anti LGBTI agenda (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). Furthermore, Hungary mainly wants funds from the EU. However, they don't want funds that could be restricted by the EU for not adhering to certain rules (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). Therefore, it is questionable whether monetary threats by the EU would work in the case of Hungary.

Almost all the newspapers are in the hands of the government, TV channels as well, especially on the countryside people mainly get information from government sources (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). There are only four channels that are free, and it is mainly in the big cities where educated people can use the internet and hear more liberal voices on radio channels for example (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). This is also seen by the Hungarian LGBTI organization Szimpozion Association (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). Even if the channels are private, they are still spreading the same narrative (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). One instance of a channel talking about the

rainbow family's campaign of Hatter has even a procedure against them for endangerment of children (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). There is also the case of Coca Cola posters featuring same-sex couples leading Coca Cola being fined by the Hungarian consumer protection authority since the posters endangered the mental and physical well-being of children and adolescents (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021; ILGA 2020, 57). Again, tapping into the rhetoric of securitization. Whereas it is hard for opposition parties to get into public media since it is state owned, radical right parties such as the Mi Hazánk party gets access through support by Fidesz (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). It can be difficult to spread a message differing from the government narrative. Labrisz Lesbian Association, however, has tried to do so, and published a fairytale book called *Wonderland is for everyone*. The book contained 17 fairytales rewritten in a non-conventional way with, for example, lesbian princesses and trans people (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). The government has deemed this as a LGBTI propaganda (KM, interview by author, May 20, 2021). In a response to the children's fairytale book, Orban has said that Hungary is very accepting and tolerant to homosexuals, but there is a red line that they should not cross. Basically, they have to leave the children alone (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). Nevertheless, KM states “[e]specially with this fairytale book, many people are standing with us” (KM, 2021). Another factor in the politicized LGBTI phobia is the harassment of foreign funded NGOs which are framed as ‘EU agents’ (Nuñez-Mietz 2019, 555). Additionally, Fidesz attempted to gain power over grand distribution through a government-funded think tank and introduced new standards for charities resulting in many Hungarian NGOs to lose their charity status (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 166). Fidesz thus successfully set up a deceptive NGO sector that is in line with the government's agenda (Grzebalska & Petö 2018, 169). When an NGO receives more than 24,000 Euros from oversea donors, it is considered a foreign agent (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021; ILGA b 2020, 181). The European Court of Justice found that this law is against the EU law (ILGA 2021, 58). State funds are not given to NGOs with LGBTI agendas, which makes NGOs rely on the Open Society Foundation by George Soros for example (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). To the other extreme, the government is also funding organizations like fundamental rights institutions that push a very strong anti LGBTI agenda, framing Hatter Society and Labrisz Lesbian Association as going too far and corrupting kids (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). This also taps into the hijacking of human rights language in the way that they need to defend the children's rights (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). Another very important

point to raise is the education program for schools, showing LGBTI people are the same as everyone else. Szimpozion Association has also had a school program. However, since the 15th of June 2021, it is now banned by law. Szimpozion Association did prepare for this and found limited ways to continue their work. Ákos Modolo, a representative of Szimpozion Association stated “[i]f we cannot reach students or if we cannot go to schools, this year we try to reach teachers, because they can volunteer and teach” (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). The European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, also responded to the ban, stating it is a shame and by sending a formal letter to the Hungarian government. Yet, no resolution has been adopted (Euronews 2021). The aforementioned resolution of declaring the European Union as an LGBTIQ freedom zone also targeted Hungary and its deteriorating situation of LGBTI rights (European Parliament 2021). Szimpozion Association had to address attacks on their school program, which again gave little time to no time to invest in other activities (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). This is shared with the Hatter Society which increasingly has to address political issues (Luca Dudits, interview by author, May 20, 2021). All interviewees agreed that everything is more digital now, especially with COVID. On a positive note, the current upsurge has also brought together multiple different actors within the NGOs (Ákos Modolo, interview by author, May 25, 2021). For the summary of this timeline see figure 2.

Figure 2: A timeline of important events during Hungary’s waves



Chapter 6 Discussion throughout time and among countries

In the chapters above, we have observed the timelines of both Poland and Hungary. There are numerous differences and parallels to be found between the waves, however, this applies to the unique yet similar characteristics in both countries. This chapter will first discuss and compare the two waves in Poland. It will do the same for Hungary, and lastly the totality of waves of both Poland and Hungary will be discussed and compared.

6.1 The politicized LGBTI phobia waves in Poland, parallels and differences

In the first wave of politicized LGBTI phobia, this thesis has observed a strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church interfering with LGBTI issues. There has been utilization of nationalism and patriotism within the LGBTI phobic speech, in which traditional family values are at the core of the rhetoric. LGBTI is framed as a foreign import and by refusing it, a rejection of the EU's ideology. This also relates to securitization in which LGBTI people are framed as a threat. Lastly, we also observe towards the end the introduction of the characteristics of gender ideology. All these elements are seen in the second wave. However, some characteristics have taken on different forms through newly introduced factors. This thesis observed hijacking of the human rights language and infrastructure in the second wave. Therefore, securitization is not only taking place in the international dimension as deeming LGBTI as an existential threat, but also as the need to protect children from the threat of LGBTI. Additionally, this taps into traditional family values that are seen in the second wave. However, this is now even promoted through family mainstreaming which is not seen in the first wave. Other differences can be found in the upsurge of LGBT free zones, in which towns declare themselves free of the LGBTI ideology. This could be seen as a symbolic institutionalized form of the elements of securitization, anti-gender and anti-LGBTI movements. Furthermore, this thesis observed an erosion of independent media, toughening the grip the government has on spreading their narrative. Interestingly, the global pandemic has been used to scapegoat the LGBTI community, and as we have seen this narrative is used by the church as well. Moreover, the EU slowly but most certainly, also seems to start using other responses than only resolutions in the new wave. For example, it has been withholding funds from Hungary. The aforementioned elements seamlessly fit in the wider frame of antagonism used in both waves. It is used to frame traditional values as part of the nation, whereas LGBTI are foreign. This is mainly seen in the domestic context, yet international

factors such as covid or anti-gender movements have also occurred. There might not be a significant connection between Russia and Poland but parallel developments can be observed.

6.2 The politicized LGBTI phobia waves in Hungary, parallels and differences

During the first wave in Hungary, the utilization of nationalism and patriotism within the LGBTI phobic speech in addition to traditional family values was at the core of the anti LGBTI rhetoric. By rejecting the EU's ideology about the LGBTI community, Hungary has framed the community as a foreign threat to the nation. Furthermore, family mainstreaming, gender ideology, anti-gender movements and the hijacking of human rights language and infrastructure are all found in the first wave and used against the LGBTI community. The aforementioned elements are all seen in the second wave. Additionally, throughout the waves in Hungary, the EU continued to respond with mostly resolutions as Hungary does not accept money coming with conditions. However, there are also new elements in the latest wave. Mainly, a restructuring of the NGO sector. In the new wave, foreign funded NGOs are labeled as EU agents. There is an erosion of independent media, making it harder for government opposing narratives to spread. Moreover, through the circumstances of the global pandemic, Orban rules by decree, resulting in more LGBTI phobic laws to pass quicker. All the named elements fit in the wider frame of antagonism in a sense that the governments strategically utilize all these elements and carefully construct a narrative to construct an antagonist. The waves in Hungary are mainly compared at the domestic level in this section. However, this thesis does observe international factors of the anti-gender movement and the pandemic. This is especially the case with Russia. For the summary of factors see figure 3.

Figure 3: An oversight of all important factors in the waves of Poland and Hungary

	Poland	Hungary
1st wave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Start 2004 - Pride bans - LGBTI phobic speech - Roman Catholic Church - Nationalism & Patriotism - Securitization - Traditional family values - Towards the end gender ideology - LGBTI phobia as EU rejection - LGBTI as foreign import - EU response mainly resolutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Start 2006-2010 - From the streets into politics - Hijacking human rights language - Nationalism & Patriotism - Securitization & existential threat - LGBTI phobia as EU rejection - Traditional family - Family mainstreaming - LGBTI as foreign import - Anti-gender & Gender ideology - EU response mainly resolutions
Between	Anti-migrant narrative	Anti-migrant narrative + others
2nd wave	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Start around 2018 - Hijacking Human rights language & infrastructure - Pride bans - Family mainstreaming - Anti-gender & gender ideology - LGBTI phobic speech - Gender ideology - Restructuring NGO sector - Roman Catholic Church - Nationalism & Patriotism - Traditional family values - LGBTI as foreign import - Securitization - COVID for scapegoating - LGBT free zones - Erosion independent media - EU response through resolutions and funds - EU threat to values 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Start 2019 - Restructuring NGO sector - Hijacking Human rights language & infrastructure - Family mainstreaming - LGBTI phobic speech - Gender ideology - Nationalism & Patriotism - Traditional family values - Securitization - Erosion independent media - COVID rule by decree - LGBTI as foreign import - Anti-gender & Gender ideology - EU endangers autonomy Hungary - EU response mainly resolutions

6.3 Comparing politicized LGBTI phobia Poland and Hungary, copycats?

As this thesis in this section compares the waves of Poland with the waves of Hungary, we come to understand the importance of the levels of understanding beyond the domestic level. There are some parallels, such as the use of traditional values and the family in both countries. As discussed, this can also be seen at the wider regional level with Russia for example. Furthermore, throughout both waves and in both countries, we observe the notion of gender ideology, LGBTI phobic speech, securitization and the framing of an existential threat and EU rejection. Both, Poland and Hungary, have also switched to a certain extent to an anti-migrant narrative in between the waves. There are thus, transnationally seen shared factors. The comparison highlights the unique domestic factors of each country. The Roman Catholic Church plays an important role in Poland but not in Hungary. Furthermore, the backlash in Hungary came from the streets and was later reflected in the Parliament, unlike in Poland. We do see parallels, however, this thesis also sees elements of hijacking human rights language and infrastructure, and family mainstreaming in Hungary's first wave that only appear in Poland during its second wave. Therefore, there might be mutual echoing of certain factors. Yet, in the latest wave, both countries have unique characteristics. Poland's Pride bans and LGBT free zones are not seen in Hungary and Hungary's rule by decree and the emergency provisions are not seen in Poland. Furthermore, the EU seems to use resolutions and monetary threats in the new wave towards Poland. With Hungary this is not the case given the governmental preference of uncontrolled money. Parallels are present and one of the most significant is the law banning school programs teaching about the LGBTI community. The law passed in Hungary in June 2021 and in Poland this is still 'frozen'. Both countries underwent a restructuring of the NGO sector and the erosion of independent media. This thesis also observes anti-gender and anti-LGBTI movements in both countries, also seen in the wider global level. The politicization of LGBTI issues is a global phenomenon as discussed. However, the way in which it is politicized can be best understood regionally and domestically, given the cultural and local specificity of some of the factors.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis has answered the question of how politicized LGBTI phobia has developed in Poland and Hungary since their accession to the European Union. It has done so through discussing the local, regional, and global dimension in which the issue at hand should be understood. Subsequently, there have been the main chapters examining the historical context and the waves of politicized LGBTI phobia in Poland and Hungary. This has been done through using the antagonist theory and through the usage of academic articles, NGO reports and a thematic analysis of self-conducted interviews with local and transnational actors. In the last part, the discussion, this thesis has argued that there are developments in the politicization of LGBTI phobia in multiple ways. One of the first conclusions is that politicized LGBTI phobia has come in waves in which the first wave occurred around the period after EU accession. Given the refugee crisis, the governments of Poland and Hungary shifted towards an anti-migration narrative. However, this crisis has passed and has been followed by a new wave of politicized LGBTI phobia around 2018. We have observed unique factors at the domestic level such as the Roman Catholic Church in Poland or the way the backlash started from the streets and later in politics in Hungary. At the regional Central European level, we have seen the echoing of traditional family values, and other parallel developments. Additionally, there has been the framing of gender ideology, LGBTI ideology and anti-movements, which have parallels all around the world. Looking at those different levels helps to understand the unique factors in a given country, but also the wider global development this is a part of through international parallels. Another important point is that all these elements fit into a wider frame of antagonism, in which LGBTI people are framed as undesirable and a threat. This has been conducted by creating anti LGBTI laws and (traditional) family mainstreaming. In Poland, this thesis discovered that many factors of the first wave can be found in the second wave as well. However, new characteristics have been discovered which include LGBTI free zones, blaming COVID on LGBTI, family mainstreaming and hijacking of human rights language and infrastructure. Interestingly some factors of Poland's second wave can already be seen in Hungary's first wave. However, in Hungary, we also see new elements in its second wave such as rule by decree in which emergency provisions have acted as a catalyst for new LGBTI phobic laws. The developments in Poland and Hungary are thus, unique to a certain degree. Furthermore, it is important to understand that politicized LGBTI phobia is a continuous phenomenon. However, there are upsurges or waves within it. To a certain extent, the latest wave can be seen as intensified politicization of LGBTI phobia, given

all the extra factors playing a role. As discussed, the wave of politicized LGBTI phobia is still ongoing and has even during the last stages of this research been updated through new legislation. The current and ongoing events prove the importance and relevance of this work. This research can be seen as another piece of the puzzle to understand the politicization of LGBTI phobia. It has made sure to give firstly, a relevant update on the existing literature through adding a new period of time full of interesting developments. Secondly, it has taken a different angle than most existing research that is inclusive of earlier developments and understandings. However, given the limited number of interviews, the ongoing character of the current wave, and the broad framework used, it is worthwhile for other researchers to tap into those niches and strengthen the body of literature. To better understand the implications of the named factors or the current developments, future studies could address the ongoing developments through different angles or even different comparisons and regions. As this thesis has discussed, the politicization of LGBTI phobia is a global phenomenon, just as anti-gender and anti-LGBTI movements are. The strategic utilization of LGBTI phobia for gaining political capital causes severe damage to marginalized communities. These developments are currently happening and are likely to continue giving the successful political turnout to the opposition to equal rights. Right now is the time to enhance our comprehension of these developments and provide local and global actors with this information to counter these harmful developments.

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